| Dokumendiregister | Riigikogu |
| Viit | 1-2/26-769/1 |
| Registreeritud | 06.11.2026 |
| Sünkroonitud | 08.11.2026 |
| Liik | EL dokument |
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| Toimik | Komisjoni teatis - COM(2026) 690, SWD 2026 690, SWD 2026 691, SWD 2026 692, SWD 2026 693, SWD 2026 694, SWD 2026 695, SWD 2026 696, SWD 2026 697, SWD 2026 698, SWD 2026 699, SWD 2026 700 |
| Juurdepääsupiirang | Avalik |
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| Originaal | Ava uues aknas |
| Taotle dokumendi eemaldamist või parandamist |
EN EN
EUROPEAN COMMISSION
Brussels, 4.11.2026 SWD(2026) 698 final
COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT
Republic of Moldova 2026 Report
Accompanying the document
COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN
PARLIAMENT, THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL
COMMITTEE AND THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS
2026 Communication on EU enlargement policy
{COM(2026) 690 final} - {SWD(2026) 690 final} - {SWD(2026) 691 final} -
{SWD(2026) 692 final} - {SWD(2026) 693 final} - {SWD(2026) 694 final} - {SWD(2026) 695 final} - {SWD(2026) 696 final} - {SWD(2026) 697 final} -
{SWD(2026) 699 final} - {SWD(2026) 700 final}
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Table of Contents
1. INTRODUCTION ..................................................................................................................... 3
1.1 Context .............................................................................................................................. 3
1.2 Main findings of the report ................................................................................................. 4
1.3. State of play of the accession process ........................................................................... 23
2. CLUSTER 1: THE FUNDAMENTALS OF THE ACCESSION PROCESS ................................ 24
2.1. Functioning of democratic institutions and public administration reform ....................... 24
2.1.1 Democracy......................................................................................................... 24
2.1.2. Public administration reform ............................................................................. 26
2.2 Rule of law and fundamental rights ................................................................................. 29
2.2.1 Chapter 23: Judiciary and fundamental rights ................................................... 29
2.2.2 Chapter 24: Justice, freedom and security ........................................................ 48
2.3. Economic criteria ........................................................................................................... 60
2.3.1. The existence of a functioning market economy .............................................. 60
2.3.2. The capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union ........................................................................................................... 67
2.4. Public procurement, statistics and financial control ....................................................... 69
Chapter 5 - Public procurement .................................................................................. 69
Chapter 18 – Statistics ............................................................................................... 70
Chapter 32 - Financial control .................................................................................... 72
3. GOOD NEIGHBOURLY RELATIONS AND REGIONAL COOPERATION ............................... 73
4. RESILIENCE, SECURITY AND DEFENCE ............................................................................... 74
5. ABILITY TO ASSUME THE OBLIGATIONS OF MEMBERSHIP .............................................. 76
Chapter 1 - Free movement of goods......................................................................... 76
Chapter 2 - Freedom of movement for workers ......................................................... 77
Chapter 4 - Free movement of capital ........................................................................ 79
Chapter 6 - Company law ........................................................................................... 79
Chapter 7 - Intellectual property law ........................................................................... 80
Chapter 8 - Competition policy ................................................................................... 81
Chapter 9 - Financial services .................................................................................... 83
Chapter 28 - Consumer and health protection ........................................................... 83
Cluster 3: Competitiveness and inclusive growth .................................................................. 85
Chapter 10 - Digital transformation and media ........................................................... 85
Chapter 16 - Taxation ................................................................................................. 87
Chapter 17 - Economic and monetary policy ............................................................. 88
Chapter 19 - Social policy and employment ............................................................... 89
Chapter 20 - Enterprise and industrial policy ............................................................. 91
Chapter 25 - Science and research ............................................................................ 92
Chapter 26 - Education and culture ............................................................................ 93
Chapter 29 - Customs union ....................................................................................... 95
Cluster 4: The Green agenda and sustainable connectivity ................................................. 97
Chapter 14 - Transport policy ..................................................................................... 97
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Chapter 15 - Energy ................................................................................................... 99
Chapter 21 - Trans-European networks ................................................................... 100
Chapter 27 - Environment and climate change ........................................................ 101
Cluster 5: Resources, agriculture and cohesion ................................................................. 103
Chapter 11 - Agriculture and rural development ...................................................... 103
Chapter 12 - Food safety, veterinary and phytosanitary policy ................................ 104
Chapter 13 - Fisheries and aquaculture ................................................................... 106
Chapter 22 - Regional policy and coordination of structural instruments ................. 108
Chapter 33 - Financial and budgetary provisions ..................................................... 109
Cluster 6: External relations ................................................................................................ 110
Chapter 30 – External relations ................................................................................ 110
Chapter 31 - Foreign, security and defence policy ................................................... 111
ANNEX I – RELATIONS BETWEEN THE EU AND MOLDOVA ................................................. 113
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1. INTRODUCTION1
1.1 CONTEXT
The Republic of Moldova (‘Moldova’) has continued to progress on the path to EU accession since its application in 2022 and the formal opening of accession negotiations in June 2024. After concluding bilateral screening of the EU acquis in September 2025, the Commission has assessed all negotiating clusters as ready to be opened. Since then, cluster 1 (fundamentals) was formally opened at the Intergovernmental Conference on 15 June, followed by cluster 6 (external relations) on 14 July 2026 as well as cluster 2 (internal market) and cluster 3 (competitiveness and inclusive growth) on 13 October 2026.
EU accession is a strategic objective for Moldova, as anchored in its Constitution. The September 2025 parliamentary election reaffirmed the growing pro-EU sentiment. Nevertheless, a notable degree of political polarisation remains.
Moldova continues to face sustained and multi-faceted pressure by Russia and its proxies to destabilise the country, as well as significant challenges posed by Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine. By autumn 2026, the number of airspace violations by Russia had more than doubled compared with 2025, underscoring the growing spillover of Russia’s war and increasing risks to Moldova’s security. Despite these challenges, Moldova has continued to prioritise EU- related reforms and alignment with EU standards, economic development and building up its democratic resilience. Moldova has set itself the goal of concluding accession negotiations by 2028 and joining the EU in 2030. The second EU-Moldova Summit was held in Brussels on 22 June 2026, showing the ever-closer ties between Moldova and the EU. Moldova has been very responsive in the context of the joint task force set up by the European Commission supporting Moldova to meet the interim benchmarks.
The Growth Plan for Moldova, worth EUR 1.9 billion, continues being implemented to support economic transformation and EU integration, and is underpinned by the Reform and Growth Facility. Moldova continues to implement the EU-Moldova Association Agreement (AA), including the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA).
The EU remains fully committed to supporting Moldova’s sovereignty and territorial integrity as well as the peaceful resolution of the Transnistrian conflict, based on the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Moldova within its internationally recognised borders. The government has stepped up its efforts to advance the reintegration of the Transnistrian region. The DCFTA applies to the entire territory of Moldova.
1 This report covers the period from 1 September 2025 to 1 September 2026. It is based on input from a variety of
sources, including contributions from the government of the Republic of Moldova, EU Member States, European Parliament reports and information from various international and non-governmental organisations. It also includes the results of comparative assessments and indices produced by other stakeholders, in particular in the area of rule of law.
The report uses the following assessment scale to describe the state of play: early stage, some level of preparation, moderately prepared, good level of preparation and well advanced. To describe progress made during the reporting period, it uses the following scale: backsliding, no progress, limited progress, some progress, good progress and very good progress. Where appropriate, interim steps have also been used.
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1.2 MAIN FINDINGS OF THE REPORT
CLUSTER 1: THE FUNDAMENTALS OF THE ACCESSION PROCESS
2.1 FUNCTIONING OF DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS AND PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION REFORM
2.1.1 Democracy
The existing framework provides an adequate foundation for holding democratic elections, in line with international standards. In August 2026, the Central Electoral Commission adopted a new set of amendments to the Electoral Code, mainly aiming to transpose into law the Constitutional Court decision of 9 July 2026 pertaining to the Gagauzian regional electoral commission. Other amendments included provisions aimed at facilitating alternative electoral methods, including postal voting, and at strengthening campaign-finance oversight and the fight against new forms of illicit financing and misuse of public resources. Moldova should address all outstanding recommendations on these amendments, including by the Venice Commission.
Moldova continued to face unprecedented levels of foreign interference and has pursued efforts to address this issue, including by strengthening its legal framework and the capacities of the Centre for Strategic Communication and Countering Disinformation. As recommended by the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) / Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), Moldova could further strengthen transparency in its fight against disinformation and manipulative content. This may include measures like public reporting of the ‘take down requests’ sent to platforms or providing access to timely information to assist voters in independently assessing disinformation.
Parliament is able to exercise its powers in a generally effective way. The newly established standing committee on European integration and the adoption of the annual legislative plan aim to enhance legislative output. The adoption of the Code on the Organisation and Functioning of Parliament in April 2026 has raisedconcerns among the opposition and civil society with regards to the prohibitionon individual MPs switching parliamentary groups and the lack of safeguards against the excessive use of emergency procedures. Moldova has requested an opinion from the Venice Commission to assess the Code’s compliance with European standards. While progress was made in enhancing the transparency of parliamentary activities, further efforts are needed to increase parliamentary accountability and integrity. This includes improving the use of oversight tools, less resource to accelerated procedures, and adopting a code of conduct and ethics for members of parliament, as recommended by GRECO.
The institutions in charge of EU integration process are mostly in place. The 2025-2029 National Programme for the Accession of Moldova to the EU was updated in December 2025 with the addition of new reforms that need to be implemented on the accession path, distribution of institutional responsibilities and new mechanisms for monitoring progress.
The government has given the Bureau for European integration (BEI) the resources to coordinate EU accession policy. Additionally, steps were taken to improve coordination mechanisms for policy planning, including with the launch of the e-monitoring tool. Legislative provisions on the transparency of decision making should be implemented more efficiently. The capacity of ministries to systematically oversee policy implementation and address recommendations of independent institutions should be further strengthened. The dialogue between the central authorities and the Autonomous Territorial Unit of Gagauzia should continue.
Civil society, including human rights defenders,operate in an overall enabling environment. There is a regulatory framework governing the establishment and functioning of civil society organisations (CSOs) standards. While there has been an increase in the number of CSOs
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gaining access to funds through the percentage designation mechanism, the lack of financial sustainability remains the sector’s most important vulnerability. Further efforts by the government are needed to improve existing funding mechanisms and tax incentives to ensure long-term organisational development across the sector. While some gaps persisted in the consistent enabling of CSO’s participation in the legislative process, Moldova adopted in September 2026 a law on public participation in decision-making, that aims to facilitate the involvement of citizens and civil society in public consultations and guarantee their right to make recommendations.
Public administration reform
Moldova is moderately prepared in the area of public administration reform. Good progress has been made with the adoption in July 2026 of a new law on public institutions, the subsequent methodology for the evaluation of certain categories of public institutions in October 2026 (and of the concept for the salary reform. The local administration reform was relaunched with the aim of completing the process of amalgamating municipalities, significantly reducing their number, before the local elections in 2027. The effective implementation of this reform remains to be demonstrated. Other steps taken include adopting the new law on public participation in the decision-making process and improving fiscal sustainability by amending the law on public finance and fiscal responsibility. The first meeting of the newly established EU- Moldova PAR Subcommittee took place in June 2026.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were largely implemented and remain mostly valid. In the coming year, Moldova should, in particular:
→ finalise the transparent reorganization of the central public institutions, with the aim of ensuring equal payment and status for all staff carrying out civil service tasks;
→ continue the reform of local self-governance by enhancing local administrative capacity, including by ensuring an appropriate level of fiscal autonomy, with the aim of delivering better public services and opportunities to foster local economic and social development;
→ ensure adherence to fiscal rules and improve budget transparency and accountability by substantially reducing the general actions budget line and revising the administrative budget classification.
Chapter 23: Judiciary and fundamental rights
Moldova is between having some level of and a moderate level of preparation and has made good progress in the area of the judiciary, the fight against corruption and fundamental rights.
Functioning of the judiciary
Moldova is moderately prepared in the area of the judiciary. The country made good progress in reforming the justice sector. The vetting of all sitting judges with leadership positions has been completed, and the vetting of candidates and prosecutors continued. Under the Superior Council of Magistrates and the Supreme Council of Prosecutors respectively, the selection and evaluation boards for judges and prosecutors are in full composition with vetted members, while appointments to the disciplinary boards for judges and prosecutors are nearing completion. Sufficient resources for these self-governing bodies must be guaranteed to enable them to operate effectively. With vetting of appeal judges moving forward, Moldova drafted a new legislative proposal to extend vetting to judges working on administrative and insolvency cases. Despite new appointments, the Supreme Court of Justice is still not operating at full capacity, which has been delaying the implementation of its new regulatory framework. The
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National Institute of Justice adopted a new Strategic Development Plan, which integrates the recommendations of the 2022 TAIEX review. In order to increase the practical effectiveness of the justice system, more efforts are needed to reduce the significant number of vacancies in the judiciary and further improve clearance rates, which will also ensure that the excessive length of proceedings is tackled across all areas.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were partially implemented and some of them remain valid. In the coming year, Moldova should in particular:
→ finalise the vetting and appointment of judges and candidates, especially for the Supreme Court of Justice and anticorruption panels, and make substantial progress with vetting prosecutors from prosecutorial institutions, in particular specialised prosecutors’ offices;
→ implement a significant part of the Strategic Development Plan of the National Institute of Justice, develop and implement human resource strategies for the judiciary and prosecution services, further implement the judicial and prosecutorial maps and significantly improve clearance rates and disposition time in courts;
→ strengthen the autonomy and integrity of the prosecution service, including by finalising the implementation of a manual random case allocation system for prosecution and transition towards an electronic system of randomised allocation of cases for prosecutors based on strict and objective criteria, by removing the ex officio membership of the Minister of Justice in the Superior Council of Prosecutors at the end of 2027 .
Fight against corruption
Moldova is between having some and a moderate level of preparation in the fight against corruption and has made good progress. The track record has improved, including an increase in the overall number of prosecutions. More efforts are needed to proactively investigate corruption, and translate investigations into convictions, including at high level. A unified statistical system is needed to improve the accuracy of reported data. In December 2025, an amendment introduced the mandatory vetting of all judges of the specialised anticorruption panels, in line with last year’s recommendation. Moldova adopted amendments to the Criminal Procedural Code in June 2026, transferring some of APO’s competences to the National Anticorruption Centre (NAC), while retaining APO’s prosecutorial oversight. Merit-based, objective and transparent selection of the NAC leadership must be ensured in practice for future appointments. The powers of the Prosecutor General have been revised with the aim to safeguard the independence of APO. On the prevention of corruption, while the implementation of the National Programme on Integrity and Anticorruption (NIAP) 2024-2028 registered general progress, several indicators, in particular on governance and justice aspects, show a slight deterioration compared to 2024. Targeted risk assessments in vulnerable sectors are being developed, but Moldova should address corruption risks and improve integrity especially in SOEs and public institutions. Moldova aligned the legislation on whistleblower protection with the EU acquis, in line with 2025 recommendations.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were partially implemented and some remain valid. In the coming year, Moldova should in particular:
→ deliver increasingly proactive and efficient anticorruption investigations to ensure an improved track record on investigations, prosecutions and final convictions at all levels with dissuasive sanctions and assets confiscation; and further strengthen the independence, integrity and operational capacity of prosecution services;
→ achieve substantial progress towards developing an integrated electronic case management system for law enforcement agencies and prosecution bodies, with a view to improving
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procedural cooperation and enhancing transparency, effectiveness and speed in criminal proceedings;
→ and provide sufficient resources for NAC and coordination between APO and NAC; adopt legislative amendments to ensure specialised anticorruption panels can adjudicate all high- level corruption cases;
Fundamental rights
The legislative and institutional framework is largely in place. Implementation of the national human rights action programme and programmes on gender equality and gender-based violence was enhanced following last year’s recommendations. Moldova has established an interinstitutional dialogue to increase the implementation rate of the People’s Advocate Office and the Equality Council recommendations. Detention and pre-trial police custody conditions remain a concern, as does the treatment of persons with disabilities in specialised institutions.
The number of judgments issued by the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) concerning Moldova remains high, including the cases under enhanced supervision, and their execution rate should be improved. Moldova has developed a National Programme for the social inclusion of persons with disabilities. Efforts to strengthen procedural rights, the rights of victims of crime, the rights of persons belonging to national minorities, including Roma2, and combat gender- based violence need to continue.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were partially implemented and therefore some remain valid. In the coming year, Moldova should in particular:
→ ensure that adequate resources are available to strengthen the independence and effectiveness of the Equality Council and the People’s Advocate Office;
→ step up safe deinstitutionalisation of persons with disabilities through community-based solutions;
→ increase the implementation rate of judgments issued by the ECHR, notably by improving detention and prison conditions by addressing the outstanding European Committee for the Prevention of Torture recommendations of 2023 and 2025; including by transferring the responsibilities of the penitentiary medical system from the Ministry of Justice and the medical services in pre-trial police custody from the Ministry of Internal Affairs, both to the Ministry of Health.
Freedom of expression and media freedom
Moldova is moderately prepared on freedom of expression and has made good progress, notably by extending ownership transparency to print and online media and by preparing amendments to the Audiovisual Media Services Code, to ensure further alignment with the European Media Freedom Act and with the Audiovisual Media Services Directive, in line with the 2025 recommendation. Media ownership concentration and political influence persist. While some progress has been achieved to enhance legal safeguards for protecting journalists, notably through the adoption of a law against Strategic Lawsuits against Public Participation (SLAPP) and an action plan on journalists’ security, further efforts are required to ensure systematic law enforcement investigations and consistent judicial follow-up. Journalists faced
2 In line with the terminology of European institutions, the umbrella term ‘Roma’ is used here to refer to a number of
different groups, without denying the specificities of these groups.
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mostly verbal abuse and online harassment and the number of cases of intimidation against them decreased.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were largely implemented. In the coming year, Moldova should in particular:
→ Ensure the proper implementation of the new law on mass media, including the provisions regulating ownership transparency for print and online media;
→ Ensure adequate protection of journalists against intimidation and threats, through thorough law enforcement investigations and judicial follow-up of cases;
→ Adopt the amendments to the Audiovisual Media Services Code and ensure its full compliance with the relevant EU acquis, also to enable participation in the Creative Europe Media strand.
Chapter 24: Justice, freedom and security
Moldova is moderately prepared in the area of justice, freedom and security. Good progress was made during the reporting period by further aligning with the EU acquis, notably on preventing and combating trafficking in human beings, protecting victims, and in the field of migration and asylum. In parallel, the legal framework for investigation and prosecution of money laundering and other financial crimes was further enhanced and a roadmap of complementary measures to strengthen the entire financial crimes investigation system was adopted. Additionally, Moldova continued to implement its general home affairs strategy and updated all six sectoral development strategies for 2026-2030 covering organised crime, public order, safety, civil protection, migration and education/ethics/digitalisation. The legal framework for fighting cybercrime was strengthened by adopting several legal acts.
Moldova also enhanced operational capacities, especially on asset recovery. Consequently, Moldova has presented an improving track record across the different categories of crime, specifically on organised crime, money laundering, cybercrime, illicit drugs, and firearms trafficking. Capacity constraints across the board remain however a challenge for operational delivery. The continuation of strengthening of operational capacities remains essential to translate reforms into further tangible results. Moldova improved its interinstitutional cooperation and coordination and further intensified cooperation with EU agencies in the field.
In the field of migration, beyond progress on legal alignment, Moldova adopted an Integrated State Border Management Programme for 2025-2030 as well as a National Programme on Migration and Asylum for 2026-2030 in line with last year’s recommendations. Moldova should intensify efforts to address the continued occurrence of unfounded asylum applications by Moldovan nationals in EU Member States.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were largely implemented. In the coming year, Moldova should in particular:
→ continue strengthening operational capacity, finalise the set-up of the single point of contact in line with data protection acquis, and continue improving the cooperation with EU Member States and EU institutions and agencies (including data exchange via SIENA and related collection, analysis and sharing across services, supported through the proactive use of information exchange tools);
→ further strengthen border controls and continue its preparations to adopt a Schengen Action Plan to set up a robust national Schengen governance system and appoint a Schengen coordinator;
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→ continue aligning its visa policy with the EU’s list of visa-required countries and strengthen the screening of visa-exempt third-country nationals, particularly those coming from countries presenting higher migration or security risks.
Fight against serious and organised crime
Moldova is moderately prepared in the fight against serious and organised crime. Good progress was made in this area, including through continued efforts to tackle firearms and drugs trafficking, demonstrating an improved track record in these areas. Moldova also increased its operational capacity to fight serious international crime, including through continuous participation in EMPACT and more qualitative data exchange with EU Member States. Additionally, it further aligned its drug-related legal framework with the EU acquis, covering the National Drug Observatory, the national early warning system, and new psychoactive substance classifications. Further work is needed to strengthen these structures and ensure adequate capacity to fully implement and enforce the improved legal framework.
Moldova also made good progress in the areas of financial crimes investigation, asset recovery and confiscation by strengthening the legal and institutional framework. This included adopting a revised law on preventing and combating money laundering and the financing of terrorism in June 2026, which addresses recommendations of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) and the standards of the Egmont Group. Mechanisms for the fight against corruption, financial crime and organized crime were also strengthened, NAC was given the competence for serious financial crime, including stand-alone money laundering. Additionally, a national mechanism for parallel financial investigations was set up and Moldova operationalised a national register for seized assets and strengthened the mandate of the Criminal Assets Recovery Agency (CARA), which also saw a considerable increase in parallel financial investigations and seized assets.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were partially implemented and therefore remain partly valid. In the coming year, Moldova should in particular:
→ further improve the track record of investigations, prosecutions and final judgments in all fields of serious and organised crime, including by strengthening the intelligence-led policing framework the interagency cooperation across all organised and serious crime categories;
→ further align with the EU acquis on money-laundering investigation and criminalisation and on asset recovery and confiscation, in particular Directive (EU) 2024/1260; Operationalise the national parallel-financial-investigation mechanism, strengthen FIU–NAC–Prosecution– CARA cooperation, and demonstrate measurable results in stand-alone money-laundering investigations, confiscation, enforcement and actual recovery of criminal assets;
→ Adopt the comprehensive national drug strategy (2026-2032); improve the capacity to detect monitor and exchange qualitative information by further capacitating the national early warning system and national drug observatory.
The existence of a functioning market economy
Moldova has some level of preparation and has made good progress in creating a functioning market economy. Authorities remain committed to macroeconomic stability and show good progress on economic governance, including through advancing the Reform Agenda implementation with a strong track record and submitting the third Economic Reform Programme in January 2026. Discussions are ongoing for a three-year IMF non-financing Policy Coordination Instrument (PCI). A close engagement with the IMF serves as an important anchor for macroeconomic and fiscal policies and provides a signal of reform commitment to international partners and investors. The economic rebound in 2025 slowed down during the first half of 2026, driven largely by the impact of the Middle East conflict and renewed upward
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pressure on energy prices and inflation, the current account deficit continues to remain wide, reflecting structural vulnerabilities and the cessation of electricity supply from the Transnistrian region. Moldova’s fiscal position weakened with a persistently high deficit and upward debt trajectory, while public investment execution remains weak. Fiscal structural reforms are progressing, particularly on public investment management and spending efficiency, though results have yet to materialise. The banking sector remains stable and well capitalised. Credit growth has been robust but financial intermediation remains low despite ample market liquidity. Efforts to improve the business environment are ongoing, notably through cutting red tape and streamlining business support programmes. The state-owned enterprise (SOE) reform is advancing gradually, however weak SOE governance remains a persistent challenge. The spillovers from Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine, a large informal economy, low labour force participation, and weak competition enforcement continue to weigh on domestic and foreign investment.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were partially implemented and remain valid. In the coming year, Moldova should, in particular:
→ pursue fiscal policy aimed at achieving prudent medium-term fiscal positions and ensuring debt sustainability, notably by further broadening the tax base, including by systematically streamlining tax expenditures and improving spending efficiency through the new spending reviews while implementing the medium-term debt management strategy by deepening the domestic government securities market and broadening the institutional investor base;
→ reduce the economy’s vulnerability to external shocks, including through diversifying its export base and reducing energy import dependence while accelerating progress on the implementation of the SOE reform, notably the triage implementation, accelerating steps to strengthen SOE governance, notably through the selection of independent SOE board members and reforming the Public Property Agency, and completing the full digitalisation of the public property register;
→ continue efforts to address low labour market participation and informal employment, including through increased active labour market measures and a reform of income taxation.
The capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the EU
Moldova has some level of preparation and has made good progress to cope with competitive pressures and market forces within the EU. The government has made further improvements in the quality of education and coverage of dual vocational training; however, ongoing labour shortages, persistently low FDI, and weak innovation continue to undermine competitiveness. Notable progress was achieved in energy security through higher domestic renewable energy production and deeper integration into the EU electricity grid. However investment gaps, particularly in quality infrastructure and transport, remain substantial. The economy continues its shift toward services from agriculture and industry despite industrial development efforts. Integration with the EU continues to deepen, but export performance remains constrained by a narrow, low-value-added base.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were partially implemented and remain valid. In the coming year, Moldova should, in particular:
→ address the skills mismatch, notably by increasing the coverage of dual vocational and educational training, adult and work-based learning and ensure greater employer involvement at all skill levels as well as regular public-private dialogue including with foreign investors;
→ increase public investment, including through the Growth Plan, especially in infrastructure
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supporting transport and cross border trade, energy security, and climate resilience;
→ step up measures to promote foreign direct investment, especially in the tradable sectors, and increase efforts to promote innovation, including through technology transfers and stronger linkages with foreign investors.
Chapter 5 - Public procurement
Moldova is between having some and a moderate level of preparation in the area of public procurement. Good progress has been made with the adoption of the new Law on public procurement and the Law on remedies and review procedures, as well as important amendments to the laws on utilities and the law on defence and security procurement, ensuring further alignment with the EU acquis. The implementation of the National Programme for the Development of the Public Procurement System for 2023-2027 has continued.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were partially implemented. In the coming year, Moldova should, in particular:
→ finalise the implementing legislation necessary for the Law on public procurement;
→ implement the National Programme for the Development of the Public Procurement System, with a focus on professionalisation and centralisation;
→ finalise the development of a new electronic procurement system and make it operational.
Chapter 18 - Statistics
Moldova has some level of preparation in the area of statistics. The countrymade some progress in strengthening the legal and institutional framework for official statistics, and in modernising statistical production across several domains, while alignment in the macroeconomic statistics domain continued to lag. Staffing remained a constraint. Data transmission to Eurostat showed an upward trend.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were partially implemented and therefore remain valid. In the coming year, Moldova should, in particular:
→ align the statistics produced with the EU acquis, particularly in the macroeconomic statistics domain;
→ expand the use of administrative and privately held data in the production of official statistics by concluding agreements with holders of administrative data to increase efficiency of statistical production and reduce response burden;
→ set up a functional statistical geodatabase on the basis of the 2024 population and housing census.
Chapter 32 - Financial control
Moldova is between having some and a moderate level of preparation in the area of financial control. Good progress was achieved, notably with the adoption of legal amendments strengthening the financial independence of the Court of Accounts as well as strengthening the anti-fraud coordination service (AFCOS) and the AFCOS network.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were partially implemented and therefore remain valid. In the coming year, Moldova should, in particular:
→ further strengthen managerial accountability in public administration by increasing the delegation of authority in financial management and internal control, notably by adopting and implementing the Guide for the application of delegation standards within the public
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sector;
→ build capacity for auditing the use of EU funds, notably through filling vacant posts and implementing the training and certification programmes for internal auditors;
→ improve the implementation rate of the Court of Accounts’ recommendations across central administrative authorities and other relevant organisational structures.
CLUSTER 2: INTERNAL MARKET
Chapter 1 - Free movement of goods
Moldova is moderately prepared in the area of the free movement of goods. Good progress was made during the reporting period on both the horizontal framework and alignment with EU product acquis, however further efforts are required to ensure full and consistent implementation of the acquis in this chapter.
One of the Commission’s recommendations from last year is close to being fully implemented while the others were partially implemented and remain valid. In the coming year, Moldova should, in particular:
→ adopt and start implementing the Action Plan to ensure the consistent application of Articles 34-36 TFEU and Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) case law;
→ align with the EU acquis on Registration, Evaluation, Authorisation, and Restriction of Chemicals (REACH) and Classification, Labelling, and Packaging of chemicals (CLP);
→ strengthen the capacity of the quality infrastructure, especially in standardisation, conformity assessment, accreditation and market surveillance, by implementing the follow-up actions outlined in the action plans adopted in the context of the ACAA process.
Chapter 2 - Freedom of movement for workers
Moldova is between having some and a moderate level of preparation in the area of freedom of movement for workers. Good progress was made during the reporting period by signing further social security coordination agreements with EU Member States (Slovakia) and continuing work to prepare for joining the European Network of Employment Services (EURES) upon accession, notably by establishing the national legal framework for EURES activities and designating the National Employment Agency (NEA) as the National Coordination Office (NCO). Moldova conducted a feasibility study for the introduction the European Health Insurance Card (EHIC).
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were partially implemented and therefore remain valid. In the coming year, Moldova should, in particular:
→ continue alignment of national legislation with the EU acquis on free movement of workers, including access for EU citizens to the labour market and equal treatment of EU workers;
→ conclude additional agreements on social security coordination, in particular with EU Member States and provide gap analyses for the Regulations on social security coordination;
→ work to ensure technical and organisational measures, administrative and financial capacity and resources as well as development of IT infrastructure, systems and relevant databases for full participation in the EURES and the Electronic Exchange of Social Security Information (EESSI) system and the EHIC scheme.
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Chapter 3 - Right of establishment and freedom to provide services
Moldova is moderately prepared in the area of the right of establishment and freedom to provide services. Good progress was made, notably by further aligning with the Proportionality Test Directive, the EU Services Directive and the Directive on the recognition of professional qualifications.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were partially implemented and therefore remain valid. In the coming year, Moldova should, in particular:
→ continue aligning its legal framework with the EU acquis on the mutual recognition of professional qualifications, especially with the minimum training requirements for professions benefiting from automatic recognition;
→ fully align national legislation with the Proportionality Test Directive;
→ fully align national sectoral legislation with the EU Services Directive.
Chapter 4 - Free movement of capital
Moldova is between a moderate and a good level of preparation in the area of free movement of capital. Limited progress was made during the reporting period, notably through measures to strengthen anti-money laundering and countering the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT) and the capacities of the Financial Intelligence Unit.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were partially implemented and therefore remain valid. In the coming year, Moldova should, in particular:
→ continue the gradual liberalisation of capital movements, including for foreign exchange operations;
→ continue strengthening the institutional capacity of the Office for the Prevention and Combating of Money Laundering within the Financial Intelligence Unit, including through additional staff, and enforce sanctions for non-compliance with the beneficial ownership obligations;
→ advance alignment with the latest EU acquis on AML/CFT, including legislative and institutional reforms to facilitate AML/CFT regulation and supervision of virtual asset service providers, and address the remaining technical deficiencies identified by FATF.
Chapter 6 - Company law
Moldova is between having some and a moderate level of preparation in company law. Some progress was made during the reporting period, including the launch of the new State Register of Legal Entities, a strengthened Public Audit Oversight Council, and adoption of amendments to the Corporate Governance Code.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were partially implemented and therefore remain valid. In the coming year, Moldova should, in particular:
→ further align legislation on insolvency and bankruptcy procedures with the EU acquis;
→ further align with the EU acquis on takeover bids, cross-border conversions, mergers and divisions, as well as shareholder rights;
→ align with the EU acquis on accounting, transparency and statutory audit and continue improving the capacity, independence and effectiveness of the audit oversight system.
Chapter 7 - Intellectual property law
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Moldova has between a moderate and good level of preparation in the area of intellectual property rights (IPR). Some progress was made during the reporting period, notably through legislative alignment, stronger institutional capacity, and better supervision of collective rights management. The State Agency on Intellectual Property (AGEPI) continued its cooperation with the European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO).
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were partially implemented and therefore remain valid. In the coming year, Moldova should, in particular:
→ continue to improve the alignment with the EU acquis on IPR, including on designs and trademarks with a particular attention to establishing an EU exhaustion of rights upon accession;
→ continue to adopt legislation to improve the enforcement of IPR, particularly by implementing the National Action Plan for ensuring the enforcement of IPR;
→ continue to improve collective rights management to safeguard appropriate royalty payments.
Chapter 8 – Competition policy
Moldova is between having some and a moderate level of preparation in the area of competition policy. Good progress was made during the reporting period, notably through a strengthened legislative framework, especially through the adoption of the State aid law in August, and a more consistent enforcement record.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were partially implemented and therefore remain valid. In the coming year, Moldova should, in particular:
→ further align the legislative framework with the EU acquis on antitrust and mergers and on the level of fines which can be imposed;
→ further align the legislative framework and the existing State aid schemes with the EU acquis on State aid, including by ensuring that the State aid registry is updated and fully operational and by requiring all State aid, including de minimis aid, to be reported digitally;
→ continue to strengthen the administrative and institutional capacity of the Competition Council by ensuring sufficient resources, training and autonomy to effectively enforce competition laws.
Chapter 9 – Financial services
Moldova is between having some and a moderate level of preparation in the area of financial services. It made good progress in the reporting period by adopting central bank regulations, aiming to align with parts of the EU Capital Requirements Directive and Capital Requirements Regulation (CRD/CRR), as well as the laws on the crypto-asset market, investments firms and investment activities.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were partially implemented and therefore remain valid. In the coming year, Moldova should, in particular:
→ advance efforts to align legislation with the EU acquis related to the regulation and supervision of the banking sector, including bank recovery and resolution and bank deposit guarantee schemes;
→ further advance efforts for alignment with the EU acquis on insurance and occupational pensions, including Solvency II and the Motor Insurance Directive;
→ intensify efforts to align legislation with the EU acquis on securities markets, investment
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funds and investment services, financial market infrastructure and digital finance.
Chapter 28 - Consumer and health protection
Moldova is between having some and a moderate level of preparation in consumer and health protection. Good progress was achieved on alignment with the EU General Product Safety acquis and with the EU public health acquis.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were partially implemented and therefore remain valid. In the coming year, Moldova should, in particular:
→ continue to align the legal framework with the EU acquis on consumer protection and product safety, and improve the cooperation between the public institutions dealing with consumer protection;
→ advance alignment with the EU acquis on tobacco control and strengthen its effective implementation and enforcement;
→ continue to improve access to healthcare for the groups in most vulnerable situations (persons with disabilities, older people, Roma, women, as well as people with multiple layers of vulnerability) by continuing to invest in rural healthcare.
CLUSTER 3: COMPETITIVENESS AND INCLUSIVE GROWTH
Chapter 10 - Digital transformation and media
Moldova is moderately prepared in the area of digital transformation and media. Good progress was made, as the government continued to implement the Digital Transformation Strategy 2023-2030 and advanced on its key performance indicators. On 1 January 2026, Moldova joined the EU’s ‘Roam Like at Home’ area, after fully aligning with the EU roaming acquis. During the reporting period, Moldova also advanced legislative alignment with the EU requirements on electronic identification and digital services. Furthermore, 78% of government- to-business services were digitalised.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were partially implemented and therefore remain largely valid. In the coming year, Moldova should, in particular:
→ ensure institutional capacity to continue implementing the priority areas under the Digital Transformation Strategy 2023-2030, in particular by further aligning legislation with EU data protection and cybersecurity standards, including the EU 5G Cybersecurity Toolbox;
→ ensure further alignment with the EU acquis on semiconductors;
→ improve the accessibility of public sector websites, mobile applications and audiovisual services for persons with physical, sensory and intellectual disabilities.
Chapter 16 - Taxation
Moldova has some level of preparation in taxation. Good progress was made in further aligning national legislation with the EU acquis in the areas of indirect and direct taxation, excise duties, and the digitalisation of tax administration services. On indirect taxation, Moldova implemented a phased increase of the VAT registration threshold and a VAT reverse charge mechanism for electricity and natural gas and clarified legal provisions to explicitly state that price discounts and rebates reduce the taxable VAT base, among other measures. In the area of excise duties, a comprehensive law aligning with six EU directives on excise duty structures and rates was adopted. On direct taxation, efforts were made on the interest and royalties, and the parent subsidiary directive. Moldova further improved its capacity in administrative
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cooperation and mutual assistance, notably by developing the framework for the recovery of tax claims.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were partly implemented and therefore remain valid. In the coming year, Moldova should, in particular:
→ further align excise and VAT legislation with EU acquis to minimise competitive distortions and legal uncertainties and to prevent issues such as non-taxation, double taxation, tax evasion, and fraud;
→ strengthen procedures to limit tax avoidance and increase tax revenue, in particular by adopting provisions in line with the Anti-Tax Avoidance Directive (ATAD 1 and 2) and by implementing the roadmap on the BEPS minimum standards;
→ continue modernising the tax administration, notably by implementing the national Multiannual Development Programme and Action Plan (2025-2027) for the digital transformation of the State Tax Service and developing an automated compliance risk management system supporting voluntary and enforced compliance.
Chapter 17 - Economic and monetary policy
Moldova is between having some and a moderate level of preparation in economic and monetary policy and made good progress in the reporting period. Central bank governance has been strengthened in terms of personal independence and improving transparency and accountability. On fiscal governance, progress has been made by institutionalising spending reviews. Preparations for setting up an independent fiscal institution are advancing gradually, with a first assessment of its possible scope and mandate published. In January 2026, the country submitted its third Economic Reform Programme, which for the first time included a labour market and current account forecast, while capturing the macroeconomic and fiscal impact of the EU Growth Plan.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were partially implemented and therefore remain valid. In the coming year, Moldova should, in particular:
→ strengthen the capacity to underpin the medium-term budgetary framework with a description of medium-term policy plans and their impact on public finances and further improve the capacity to produce macroeconomic and fiscal forecasts, including for long-term projections of expenditures required to conduct a debt sustainability analysis;
→ prepare and adopt the legislation for establishing an independent fiscal institution and start setting it up;
→ ensure that the public accounting system covers all sectors of general government and start generating accrual data in line with ESA 2010;
Chapter 19 - Social policy and employment
The country is moderately prepared in social policy and employment and made good progress during the reporting period. Alignment with the EU acquis continued and measures were taken to strengthen overall capacities and increase employment. The State Labour Inspectorate was significantly strengthened, by aligning its powers and mandate with the requirements of the relevant International Labour Organisation (ILO) conventions, including making unannounced inspection visits possible. In addition, social assistance reform continued.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were largely implemented. In the coming year, Moldova should in particular:
→ fulfil the Reform Agenda steps on undeclared work and active labour market measures and
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continue the implementation of the reform of the State labour inspection;
→ ensure the unified Automated Information System for social services (eSocial) is operational and used by the Ministry of Labour and Social Protection and social workers;
→ continue alignment with the EU acquis on labour law, occupational safety and health, social protection and social inclusion, non-discrimination in employment and social policy and equality between women and men in employment and social policy, in cooperation with social partners.
Chapter 20 - Enterprise and industrial policy
Moldova is moderately prepared in enterprise and industrial policy. Good progress was made during the reporting period. Moldova continued implementing the National Programme for the Promotion of Entrepreneurship and Increasing Competitiveness for 2023-2027, the National Industrialisation Programme for 2024-2028 and the National Smart Specialisation Programme 2024-2027. Moldova made more limited progress in the implementation of the Programme on Administration of State Public Property for 2024-2027.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were partially implemented and therefore remain valid. In the coming year, Moldova should in particular:
→ adopt an annual action plan or work programme with financial allocations for the implementation of the Industrial Strategy;
→ streamline support to SMEs by digitalising the national Entrepreneurship Development Organisation (ODA) processes and by strengthening its capacities in internal controls and risk management through the evaluation of all ODA programmes and implementing the resulting recommendations;
→ continue taking further steps towards aligning with the EU Late Payment Directive.
Chapter 25 - Science and research
Moldova is between a moderate and a good level of preparation in the area of science and research. Good progress was made during the reporting period. The government advanced the implementation of the National Programme for Research and Innovation 2024-2027 and started implementing the National Programme for Smart Specialisation 2024-2027 ’Smart Moldova’, with several project calls launched and strengthened Moldova’s integration into the European Research Area.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were partly implemented and therefore remain valid. In the coming year, Moldova should in particular:
→ put in place structures to strengthen the research and innovation ecosystem and to improve reporting on research and innovation statistics, especially for the European Innovation Scoreboard;
→ increase the level of public investment in R&I towards the national target, and address the pending recommendations from the 2016 and 2021 Horizon policy support facility reviews, including on research career frameworks, open science and cooperation between the private and public sector;
→ increase the institutional and administrative capacity of the National Agency for Research and Development and integrate research performance indicators into institutional funding mechanisms.
Chapter 26 - Education and culture
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Moldova is between a moderate and a good level of preparation in the area of education and culture. Good progress was made during the reporting period. The amendments to the Education Code introduce financial autonomy for schools, strengthen academic integrity and provide a legislative framework for school network consolidation. Vocational education and training (VET) enrolment grew significantly, and dual VET expanded. The National Qualifications Framework was formally referenced to the European Qualifications Framework. Moldova adopted the National Strategy for Culture and Heritage 2025-2035 and joined the Creative Europe programme on 1 January 2026.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were partially implemented and therefore remain valid. In the coming year, Moldova should, in particular:
→ continue the reform of education governance and advance school network consolidation, including by establishing Territorial Education Agencies and ensuring adequate transport and support measures for pupils and staff affected by school reorganisation;
→ continue enhancing the quality and relevance of vocational education and training and lifelong learning, including adult learning, contributing to reducing the mismatch between skills and labour market demands;
→ implement the 2026-2030 programme of the National Strategy for Culture and Heritage, including by putting in place effective mechanisms for the conservation, restoration and management of cultural heritage.
Chapter 29 - Customs union
Moldova has a good level of preparation in the area of the customs union. The country has made good progress, notably through the implementation of the New Computerised Transit System (NCTS) and formal accession to the Common Transit Convention (CTC) and the Convention on the Simplification of Formalities in Trade in Goods. A national Customs Decisions System (CDS) has been developed and put into operation.
One of the Commission’s recommendations from last year was implemented, and two were partially implemented and therefore remain valid. In the coming year, Moldova should, in particular:
→ adopt the amendments to the Customs Code and related bylaws, providing the basis for the implementation of the national customs IT systems to ensure interoperability with the EU digital customs environment, and continue the alignment to take account of the progressive application of the new Union Customs Code;
→ advance the implementation of the multiannual strategic national IT programme for the Customs Service to ensure a fully digital, EU-interoperable customs environment, prioritising core interconnectivity systems and a Single Window Environment for Customs;
→ finalise the reorganisation of the Customs Service and implement the Anti-Corruption Policy and Action Plan for 2026-2029, with an emphasis on automation and digitalisation of customs operations, customs officer capacity building, the periodic rotation of staff holding sensitive posts, and the robust monitoring and evaluation of anti-corruption measures.
CLUSTER 4: THE GREEN AGENDA AND SUSTAINABLE CONNECTIVITY
Chapter 14 - Transport policy
Moldova is between having some and a moderate level of preparation in transport policy.
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Some progress was made in the reporting period, notably with the removal from the blacklist of the Paris Memorandum of Understanding on Port State Control, the entry into force of the new provisions of the Railway Code, and on the legislation concerning vehicle equipment and air passenger rights.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were partially implemented and remain valid. In the coming year, Moldova should, in particular:
→ finalise the reorganisation of the railway company, in line with the step of the Reform Agenda;
→ continue aligning the social and market rules for road transport with the EU road transport acquis, and ensure the implementation of the Reform Agenda step on road market access;
→ revise the regulatory framework for the development of sustainable urban mobility plans (SUMP) according to EU methodology in anticipation of the urban nodes agenda of the trans-European transport network (TEN-T) for enhanced connectivity, in line with the step of the Reform Agenda.
Chapter 15 – Energy
Moldova has a good level of preparation in this area and has made good progress during the reporting period, including through full transposition of the EU Electricity Integration Package, transposition of the EU Oil Stocks Directive, continuous implementation of the National Energy and Climate Plan (NECP), launching the electricity day-ahead and intra-day markets and the electricity balancing market. In the gas sector, regulated tariffs for large gas consumers were removed. The government also finalised a tender for large investments in renewable energy.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were partially implemented and remain valid. In the coming year, Moldova should continue to:
→ implement energy efficiency measures and deployment of renewable energy in line with the objectives of the National Energy and Climate Plan (NECP).
→ fully implement the Electricity Integration Package in line with any recommendations issued by the European Commission, to advance with market coupling with the EU;
→ accelerate the development of security architecture for stockage of oil required by the transposed Oil Stocks Directive.
Chapter 21 - Trans-European networks
Moldova is between having some and a moderate level of preparation in trans-European networks (TENs) and made some progress by approving the TEN-T Regulation at national level. It started and completed key feasibility studies to further align with the TEN-T network, while some progress was achieved in the deployment of the European standard gauge. It amended its energy legislation in July 2026 to further align with the TEN-E Regulation.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were partially implemented and therefore remain valid. In the coming year, Moldova should in particular:
→ continue accelerating the implementation of key infrastructure projects on TEN-T Corridors, in particular the deployment of EU standard gauge on the Ungheni-Chisinau line, the rehabilitation of the North-South railway corridor as well as projects approved under the Connecting Europe Facility (CEF) aiming at increasing TEN-T border crossing capacity;
→ accelerate progress in the preparation of priority TEN-T road and rail corridors, including the feasibility study for the Chișinău ring road, the M3 motorway and the Chisinau terminal;
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→ continue accelerating the implementation of key infrastructure projects, in particular electricity interconnectors: the Vulcănești – Chișinău Overhead Power Line, the Bălți – Suceava cross-border interconnection, the Strășeni – Gutinaș transmission line, and the Bălți – Dnestrovsk regional interconnection project.
Chapter 27 - Environment and climate change
Moldova has some level of preparation in this area. Good progress was made during the reporting period on legislative alignment in certain areas. Moldova needs to continue and further strengthen its efforts in the areas of waste, water and biodiversity. In the field of climate policy, further work will be needed towards the establishment of a monitoring, reporting, verification and accreditation (MRVA) system of greenhouse gases (GHG).
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were largely implemented and therefore remain valid. In the coming year, Moldova should, in particular:
→ further improve institutional and administrative capacity, notably for the management of protected areas, and facilitate effective interinstitutional coordination and environmental monitoring for effective implementation and enforcement;
→ operationalise the monitoring, reporting, verification and accreditation (MRVA) for the purpose of introducing carbon pricing and aligning with the EU emissions trading system (ETS) in its full scope, and align legislation on fluorinated gases and ozone-depleting substances with the EU acquis;
→ advance alignment, operationalise strategic frameworks and, develop costed plans, providing for adequate financing of environmental investments, particularly on waste, water, air quality and biodiversity.
CLUSTER 5: RESOURCES, AGRICULTURE AND COHESION
Chapter 11 - Agriculture and rural development
Moldova has some level of preparation in agriculture and rural development. Good progress was made during the reporting period, with legislation aligning the regulatory system of financial support on agriculture and rural development and on the paying agency, adopting legislation on some elements of the common market organisation, producer organisations, plans for the development of the integrated administration and control system (IACS) and establishment of an agricultural knowledge and innovation system platform (AKIS).
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were partially implemented and therefore remain valid. In the coming year, Moldova should, in particular:
→ continue to strengthen the administrative capacity of the Ministry of Agriculture and Food Industry and of the Agency for Interventions and Payments in Agriculture, with a focus on implementing the aligned legal framework;
→ continue to work on setting up the IACS, in particular the land parcel identification system
(LPIS), the farm register, and in establishing the farm sustainability data network (FSDN);
→ continue alignment for the EU common market organisation (CMO) and organics.
Chapter 12 - Food safety, veterinary and phytosanitary policy
Moldova is moderately prepared on food safety, veterinary and phytosanitary policy and has made good progress, notably through legislative alignment, institutional capacity building and enhanced border controls. While significant advancements have been made in sanitary inspections, remaining gaps, notably in enforcement consistency and laboratory infrastructure,
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require further attention to ensure full compliance with the EU acquis.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were partially implemented and therefore remain valid. In the coming year, Moldova should, in particular:
→ continue strengthening the administrative capacity of the National Food Safety Agency for effective implementation of efficient and risk-based official controls, including through the implementation of the human resources development strategy and specialised training for inspectors from local subdivisions and border posts;
→ advance alignment with the EU acquis on animal health and animal welfare, including by stepping up implementation of animal welfare standards during transport, at farm and slaughter stages, and by preparing a national plan to upgrade establishments producing food, feed and animal by-products to meet EU structural standards;
→ establish a national network of laboratories and adopt a multiannual control plan aligned with EU acquis requirements, while reinforcing integrity safeguards in official controls, certification, laboratory testing and enforcement.
Chapter 13 - Fisheries and aquaculture
Moldova has between a moderate and a good level of preparation in the area of fisheries and aquaculture and made good progress in the reporting period. It has improved the traceability of fishery and aquaculture products and has taken legislative measures to protect aquatic biological resources and strengthen the enforceability of scientific data use in the aquaculture sector, in alignment with the EU acquis. To align with international agreements, Moldova approved a law on the country’s accession to the Agreement on Port State Measures to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were partially implemented and therefore remain valid. In the coming year, Moldova should, in particular:
→ implement the multiannual national strategic plan dedicated to aquaculture;
→ continue implementing the new legislation on the organisation of the market for fishery and aquaculture products.
Chapter 22 - Regional policy and coordination of structural instruments
Moldova is moderately prepared on regional policy and coordination of structural instruments. Good progress was madein the reporting period, notably by strengthening institutional structures, advancing legislative alignment, and enhancing operational capacity for Interreg programmes.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were largely implemented. In the coming year, Moldova should, in particular:
→ continue aligning with the EU cohesion policy acquis by adopting a clear legal and strategic framework for regional policy programming, monitoring and evaluation, in line with EU cohesion policy principles and institutional requirements;
→ strengthen administrative capacity for managing structural instruments by clarifying mandates across institutions, reinforcing coordination between central and regional levels, and investing in stable staffing, training and project preparation;
→ establish a more robust system for risk management, irregularity detection, reporting and follow-up, in line with EU requirements for sound financial management and protection of EU funds.
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Chapter 33 - Financial and budgetary provisions
Moldova is between an early stage and having some level of preparation in the area of financial and budgetary provisions. Some progress was made over the reporting period, including the preparation of a roadmap for reforming the national accounts.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were partially implemented and therefore remain valid. In the coming year, Moldova should, in particular:
→ finish operationalising the coordination body for own resources;
→ continue upgrading the IT infrastructure for traditional own resources;
→ advance alignment with the EU acquis, particularly concerning VAT rules and GNI compilation.
CLUSTER 6: EXTERNAL RELATIONS
Chapter 30 - External relations
Moldova has between a moderate and a good level of preparation in external relations and made good progress. Moldova further enhanced cooperation and coordination with the EU within the WTO framework and continued to improve its framework for humanitarian assistance and international cooperation.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were largely implemented. In the coming year, Moldova should, in particular:
→ continue aligning the work of the Council for the promotion of investment projects of national importance with international and EU standards.
Chapter 31 - Foreign, security and defence policy
Moldova has a good level of preparation in the area of foreign, security and defence policy. Very good progress was made through continued intense political dialogue with the EU at all levels, substantially increasing Moldova’s capacity to counter hybrid threats, notably cyber and FIMI, and increasing its alignment rate with the EU’s common foreign and security policy (CFSP). Moldova has continued its active participation in EU crisis management missions and operations under the common security and defence policy (CSDP).
The recommendations from last year were largely implemented but remain valid. In the coming year, Moldova should, in particular:
→ continue increasing alignment with the CFSP, ensure that the restrictive measures are implemented and continue to cooperate to prevent any attempts to circumvent sanctions against Russia and Belarus;
→ advance the operationalisation of the national crisis management framework by strengthening the capacity of the National Crisis Management Centre and adopting the National Crisis Management Plan, in line with the approved National Risk Assessment methodology.
1.3. STATE OF PLAY OF THE ACCESSION PROCESS
During the reporting period, Moldova completed the bilateral screening process on 22 September 2025. As a result, the Commission assessed all six negotiation clusters as ready to be opened. In December 2025 and March 2026 Member States provided Moldova with guidance on reform priorities for each cluster. In 2026, this was followed by the formal opening
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of accession negotiations on cluster 1 (fundamentals) in June, cluster 6 (external relations) in July as well as cluster 2 (internal market) and cluster 3 (competitiveness and inclusive growth) in October.
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2. CLUSTER 1: THE FUNDAMENTALS OF THE ACCESSION PROCESS
2.1. FUNCTIONING OF DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS AND PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION REFORM
2.1.1 Democracy
The functioning of democratic institutions is generally stable. Moldova continued to implement EU-related reforms, despite persistent foreign interference attempts and hybrid attacks, and a notable degree of political polarisation. The authorities sought to balance measures to counter foreign interference with respect for the rule of law and fundamental rights.
Elections
Moldova held parliamentary elections on 28 September 2025. According to the final report by the OSCE/ODIHR election observation mission, the elections were competitive and offered voters a clear choice between political alternatives, although the process was marred by serious cases of foreign interference, vote-buying schemes, illicit financing and cyberattacks.
Following the elections of 2025, the Central Electoral Commission organised consultations with national and international observers to gather lessons from the elections. It also shared its experience with other countries in the region. The recently revised legal electoral framework is generally adequate and provides a sound basis for conducting democratic elections. The authorities work actively and in a coordinated manner to detect and counter foreign interference, including illicit financing and vote-buying schemes. The Law on combating electoral corruption should be brought fully in line with European standards.
In August 2026, Moldova adopted a new set of amendments to the Electoral Code. These new provisions aimed to facilitate postal voting, reinforce campaign- finance oversight and strengthen the fight against new forms of illicit financing, such as crypto-currency schemes, and misuse of public administrative resources. Moldova should ensure that these new amendments are in line with the Venice Commission recommendations. Based on the OSCE/ODIHR recommendations, the authorities should, among other things, ensure contestants’ right to an effective remedy when
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sanctioned on the exercise of their political rights, enhance coordination between competent authorities for tackling electoral corruption and improve rules to prevent misuse of public resources. Moldova should ensure alignment with all relevant EU acquis in this area, including the Regulation on the transparency and targeting of political advertising, and taking into account European and international democratic standards.
Although challenges persist, Moldova has taken steps to ensure adequate inclusion of persons with disabilities, particularly in terms of accessibility for persons with psychosocial disabilities and access to polling stations.
Parliament
The Code on the Organisation and Functioning of Parliament was adopted in second reading in August 2026. It has sparked mixed reactions from the opposition to new provisions such as the reduction of time allocated for debate or the prohibition on MPs switching political parties during their mandate, as well as over the lack of safeguards to prevent the abusive use of emergency procedures. Moldova has requested an ex-post opinion from the Venice Commission to assess the compliance of its rules of procedures with European standards. In parallel, Moldova should adopt a code of conduct and ethics of members of Parliament and ensure practical guidance on its provisions. Rules on conflicts of interest and interactions with third parties should also be regulated in this legislation.
In 2025, only interpellations and parliamentary hearings were used as oversight tools. An effective parliamentary oversight mechanism was adopted on 27 July 2026 to monitor the activities of the National Commission for Management of Crisis Situations. The Parliament established a Standing Committee for European Integration in October 2025, composed of 11 members, which contributed to better coordination across institutions working on EU accession. It also launched a digital platform to strengthen cooperation with civil society. Dialogue between the majority and the opposition is insufficient, and no plenary session was dedicated to opposition draft laws.
A legislative plan for 2026 was adopted in February, contributing to greater transparency. The number of draft laws submitted under urgent procedure or priority procedure decreased but still remains considerable. Out of 339 legal acts adopted in 2025, 28 legal acts were adopted under the fast-track procedure and two in urgent procedure.
Moldova has made progress on women’s political participation: women accounted for 44% of candidates in the 2025 parliamentary elections, supported by the mandatory 40% gender quota.
EU integration
The institutional framework for EU integration remains in place. The administrative capacity of the Bureau for European Integration continued to improve, supported by increased staffing and a gradual strengthening of its operational functions.
The 2026-2028 National Development Plan continued to guide the integration of EU accession priorities. The 2025-2029 National Programme for the Accession of Moldova to the EU was updated in December 2025 to further reflect new reforms undertaken in the accession process.
Moldova has continued implementing its roadmap on the functioning of democratic institutions. Progress was achieved on the transparency of parliamentary activities with the launch of a modernised online portal. All plenary sessions are broadcast live.
Governance
The government changes in July 2026 did not affect the strategic approach to maintain the accelerated pace of reforms in the context of the EU accession process.
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The State Chancellery adopted a guide on strategic planning in autumn 2025, providing a unified reference framework for correlating public policy with planning documents. In 2026, the e-Monitoring information system was launched to support reporting on the progress on the legislative process.
The first instance verdict of seven years imprisonment issued against the former Governor (Bashkan) of Gagauzia was upheld by the Court of Appeal on 28 May 2026. The elections of the Gagauz People’s Assembly and Bashkan are planned for 15 November 2026. These were initially delayed due to legal and institutional uncertainties concerning the applicable electoral framework, including the alignment of regional electoral legislation with the national Electoral Code. Following the Constitutional Court ruling of 9 July 2026, the Electoral Code was amended in August, clarifying the rules and responsibilities for the organisation of regional elections in Gagauzia.
The state of emergency introduced temporarily March and in September 2026 in the context of persistent energy security risks as well as the hydrological situation did not significantly affect the functionality of central government. The parliamentary oversight over the state’s management of crisis situations has been strengthened through amendments adopted in July 2026, that aim to ensure accountability, transparency and the protection of citizens’ rights.
Civil society
Civil society organisations (CSOs) in Moldova operate in an overall enabling environment, supported by a legal framework that safeguards fundamental freedoms and aligns with European and international standards on freedom of assembly and association. During the reporting period, there were gradual improvements in participatory governance, such as the adoption of the Law on public participation in decision-making and the Law on volunteering, introducing clearer procedures, expanding opportunities and aligning national policy with European standards.
Some gaps persisted in practice in ensuring consistent and meaningful participation of civil society organisations in the legislative process. Although eleven out of twelve parliamentary committees have formally established expert councils, their activity has not yet fully started, which limits opportunities for structured dialogue and for CSOs to contribute to policymaking.
To reinforce the inclusion of citizens and civil society in the legislative consultative process, Moldova adopted a Law on Public Participation in August 2026. This aims to establish dialogue platforms between civil society and the authorities and to also introduce enforceable obligations for both central and local authorities throughout the entire decision-making cycle. It promotes the use of digital tools (particip.gov.md and e-Democracy) and introduces a regulated civic initiative mechanism allowing citizens to submit policy proposals through the e-Democracy platform.
Verbal attacks against CSOs and media organisations intensified in 2025, particularly in the context of the parliamentary elections and the suspension of USAID funds.
Financial sustainability remains the sector’s most significant vulnerability, driven by heavy reliance on external funding. Nonetheless, in 2025, 1 050 non-commercial organisations and religious organisations benefited from financial support directed via the 2% designation mechanism, representing a 15% increase compared to 2024.
2.1.2. Public administration reform
Strategic framework on public administration reform
The strategic framework for public administration reform (PAR) is formally in place, though implementation gaps persist. The Government advanced the PAR Strategy 2023-2030 and its
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2023-2026 implementation programme, in line with the PAR Roadmap. The self-reported implementation rate of the actions foreseen by the Programme for 2025 is 65%. The mid-term evaluation of the 2023–2026 implementation programme for the PAR strategy was completed, approved and published during the reporting period, in consultation with OECD-SIGMA experts.
During the reporting period, a key focus was the local administration reform, particularly the voluntary amalgamation of local municipalities. Following initial consultations, amendments to the voluntary amalgamation law were adopted aimed at simplifying procedures and granting greater local autonomy, while secondary legislation is being updated to reflect these changes, with funds allocated to incentivise amalgamation. By 31 August 2026, 63% of the local municipalities had agreed to voluntarily amalgamate while the normative process is set to consolidate the reform by end-November 2026.
The institutional framework remains largely unchanged. The political leadership for PAR remains concentrated at the level of the Secretary-General of the Government and the State Chancellery. Broader political endorsement and visibility is needed, especially for communicating the benefits of reform such as central, regional and local administration restructuring.
On financial sustainability of PAR, under the draft Government Decision on the approval of the Medium-Term Budgetary Framework (MTBF) for 2026-2028, an amount of MDL 246.27 million (approximately EUR 12.31 million) is planned for the implementation of PAR in 2026. This amount is also an increase from the planned annual allocation of MDL 100 million (EUR 5 million) in 2025.
The first meeting of the EU–Moldova Subcommittee on Public Administration Reform was held on 25 June 2026 in Chisinau, establishing a structured format for political and technical dialogue with the European Commission on public administration reform.
Policy development and coordination
Moldova has established a solid policy development framework, with strengthened coordination structures and the adoption of key strategic documents, including the 2025-2029 National Programme for Accession to the EU (NPA) and the 2026-2028 National Development Plan. To support the planning, monitoring and reporting of policy implementation, including EU commitments, the digital tool e-Monitorizare was developed and is currently in pilot stage More institutional capacity is needed to address uneven administrative capabilities, policy silos and weak linkages between strategic planning and budgeting. The link between policy and finance remains one of the weakest parts of the system and has deteriorated in 2026. Continued focus on improving policy costing, monitoring and cross-ministerial collaboration will be essential to consolidate and ensure sustainable reform.
On evidence-based policymaking, the legal framework is in place despite implementation being weak. In 2025, regulatory impact assessment methodologies and performance-based monitoring mechanisms were improved, but gaps in implementation remain. Public consultation platforms have expanded, notably through the modernisation of the public participation portal.
Public financial management
Reforms on public financial management have continued to advance, while further improvement is still necessary. Progress continued in implementing the Strategy for the development of public finance management for 2023-2030 and its action plan for 2025-2027 as evidenced by its mid-term evaluation. In December 2025, the Law on public finance and fiscal responsibility was amended with effect from 2027, introducing the legal requirement to have regular spending reviews to assess efficiency, effectiveness and relevance of public
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expenditure, as well as to reallocate resources to relevant policies. The amendment also requires financial reporting for extra-budgetary entities and institutionalises budget expenditure review every seven years.
Adherence to fiscal rules continued to show systemic weaknesses. The budget calendar is not systematically followed as required by law, reducing the time for parliamentary scrutiny. The Law itself was amended in December 2025, with changes creating some opportunities for improvement in the PFM area, such as spending reviews, costing of new policy proposal proposals and public investment management. The 2026-2028 and 2027-2029 medium-term budgetary framework (MTBF) were developed but not adopted during the reporting period, indicating that the MTBF is not yet embedded in the implementation of the annual budget calendar. The link between strategic planning and the MTBF remains weak and needs improvement. The share of expenditure kept under the ‘General actions’ budget line decreased in the 2026 budget from 60% to 29%, providing limited improvement in budget transparency. Gender-responsive budgeting has only been partially institutionalised into budget planning and reporting. Moldova made some improvements in the area of public investment management by reforming the relevant institutional framework for the preparation and selection of projects, including the appraisal through the single project pipeline of all new investment projects included in the annual budget, and the establishment of dedicated focal points and subdivisions in line ministries. Additional effort is needed to improve all stages from planning to implementation of investment projects.
Public service and human resources management
The public service and human resources management system needs to be improved. A new law adopted in August 2026 foresees that an evaluation of the over 50 public bodies, including key regulatory agencies, functioning outside civil service rules with weaknesses in governance, accountability and transparency, will be carried out in 2027, accordingly to a new transparent methodology. Merit-based recruitment and selection frameworks are not applied consistently, and are weakened by limited competition, exemptions from recruitment practices and decentralisation. New legal amendments were adopted, aiming at strengthening and clarifying responsibilities of the role of Secretaries General in ministries by allowing greater flexibility in internal structures and reinforcing their coordination of key administrative functions, including public policy, external assistance, legal affairs, HR, finance, ICT, and document management. Efforts are ongoing to implement a competency framework for senior management and introduce a centralised recruitment system for central public administration.
The current salary system is fragmented and complex and fails to ensure competitiveness and transparency of remuneration. A civil service remuneration reform has been developed in the framework of a broad process of public consultations; a new law is planned to come into force in January 2027. The reform should include job evaluation, pay analysis, the design of a revised salary scale and a budget impact assessment framework.
A new human resource management information system (HRMIS) is still in the development phase. Currently the system remains mostly decentralised, with limited monitoring and reporting.
The civil service continues to face a high vacancy rate of 20.06%, especially in executive roles (23.16%) and senior management posts (20.66%), while other management positions have the lowest vacancy rate at 8.12%. Across the wider public sector, 57,954 of 67,832 permanent posts were occupied on 1 January 2026, giving an employment rate of 85.4%, slightly lower than 85.7% in 2024. Recruitment through competitions has improved, rising from 1.6 candidates per post in 2020 to 2.6 in 2025, the highest level so far. However, participation is still relatively low, and only around 52% of advertised posts were filled this way. The system has limited ability
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to distinguish between different levels of performance. Staff turnover has improved but remains notable. Voluntary turnover fell to 7.0% in 2025 from 8.4% in 2024, while total turnover declined to 9.4% from 11.6%.
Gender balance is generally achieved in senior management positions (over 50%), while there is a majority of women in the public service overall (over 70%). Gender equality policies should be strengthened.
Accountability of administration
The accountability of the public administration still needs to be improved. The legislative framework provides for a governance and accountability scheme for ministries, administrative authorities under ministries, and central administrative authorities reporting to the Government. A restructuring of central public administration is ongoing, based on the new law on certain categories of public institutions, adopted in July 2026; however, it does not address all the system’s bottlenecks. Despite independent oversight bodies being in place and operational, implementation of their recommendations by public authorities remains inconsistent.
The right to access public information is generally well regulated, but improvements in implementation are needed and public authorities still struggle to publish aggregated data or ensure effective monitoring functions. Transparency procedures have improved through proactive information disclosure on the e-Democracy platform.
On the right to administrative justice, while the legal framework is in place, its practical implementation across public institutions remains uneven, undermined by lengthy administrative procedures and limited operational capacity.
Service delivery to individuals and business
Moldova has made significant progress in developing a framework for digitalisation and modernisation of public services, including through e-government platforms and service portals. Digital access to public services continued to expand during the reporting period. The EVO integrated governmental portal now brings together 636 public services, of which 70.3 % (447 services) are available online. User uptake of e-services increased significantly, including in rural areas where 118 Unified Centres for Public Service Delivery (CUPS) were set-up to respond to the persistent low demand. As of February 2026, the e-Governance Agency is undergoing a CAF assessment, contributing to the institutional self-evaluation and benchmarking in line with EU best practices. However, significant gaps persist. The absence of a government-wide performance metrics system and a comprehensive quality management policy undermine consistency. A new law on accessibility requirements for certain products and services was adopted in August 2026, in line with EU acquis. It ensures standardised accessibility requirements for key products and services, including digital, banking, e-commerce and transport services for persons with disabilities.
2.2 RULE OF LAW AND FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS
2.2.1 Chapter 23: Judiciary and fundamental rights
The EU’s founding values include the rule of law and respect for human rights. An effective (independent, high-quality and efficient) judicial system and an effective fight against corruption are of paramount importance, as is the respect for fundamental rights in law and in practice.
Functioning of the judiciary
Strategic documents
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The implementation of the 2022-2025 Justice Sector Reform Strategy and its action plan has been partially satisfactory, although some actions were no longer relevant by the end of the implementation period. A new strategy is under preparation and is expected to address the outstanding sectoral issues together with new priorities. The first Superior Council of Magistracy Strategic Plan (2025-2029), the Strategic Development Programme of the Superior Council of Prosecutors (2025-2029), the Human Resources Strategy of the Judicial System and the Strategic Development Programme of the Superior Council of Prosecutors (2025-2029) were all adopted in 2025 and are in the early stages of implementation. The Strategic Development Plan of the National Institute of Justice for 2026-2031 was adopted in July 2026. Consultation among key actors is ongoing to adopt a comprehensive salary reform, aiming at improving the attractiveness of judicial positions.
Management bodies
The Superior Council of Magistracy (SCM) and the Superior Council of Prosecutors (SCP) are fully functional in full composition with vetted members and continue to exercise their responsibilities for managing the justice and prosecution services, including appointments, promotions and career of judges and prosecutors. By September 2026, the Superior Council of Prosecutors had exercised its legal prerogative to overturn six negative reports from the Vetting Commission, which appealed both decisions to the Supreme Court of Justice. The SCM and SCP’s capacities should be further strengthened by increasing their staffing, especially in the secretariats, where only around 60% of positions are filled, and by improving their internal procedures.
The SCM and SCP specialised bodies are almost in full composition with vetted members. In March 2026, the SCM’s Selection and Evaluation Board reached its full composition with nine vetted members. The SCM’s Disciplinary Board is still missing two (vetted) members to reach its full composition of seven members. Remaining vacancies should be filled without delay. All members of the SCP’s Selection and Evaluation Board were appointed. The last remaining member of the SCP’s Disciplinary Board, representing civil society, is still to be appointed.
The re-evaluation of pending appeals as part of the process of extraordinary evaluation of candidates for vacant positions in the SCM and the SCP (also known as ‘pre-vetting’) ended in November 2025, with the last appeal having been ruled on by the Supreme Court of Justice.
Legislative amendments adopted in December 2025 extended the ex officio membership of the Minister of Justice in the SCP until January 2028, backtracking on an earlier commitment to remove this membership to ensure the independent functioning of the SCP and to meet GRECO recommendations. The Minister’s membership must be removed without delay, and until that time, the Minister has taken a commitment to not take part in any decisions related to the selection, evaluation or careers of prosecutors. An amendment in that sense has been adopted in first reading in October 2026.
Independence and impartiality
The independence and impartiality of judges and prosecutors continued to improve, in particular through the extraordinary evaluation (‘vetting’) of judges and prosecutors in top positions.
During the reporting period, the vetting process continued. It progressed for candidates for the Supreme Court of Justice, with five new judges vetted and appointed, which allows the Supreme Court of Justice to reach quorum as currently 12 of the 20 positions are filled. The vetting process for the judges of the Courts of Appeal was completed in early 2026, while the vetting for candidate appeal judges is at an early stage. The vetting for the presidents and vice- presidents of first instance courts launched in May 2025 has been completed for sitting judges. Vetting was extended in December 2025 to anticorruption judges. The process has been
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initiated but none have been vetted yet. The vetting process for specialised anti-corruption prosecutors is ongoing and registered good progress in 2026, the vetting of specialised prosecutors on organised crime and chief prosecutors from the General Prosecutors’ Office, launched in May 2025 progressed but remains at a very early stage, as does the vetting of managerial prosecutors in territorial offices.
The vetting process has led to a significant number of resignations in the judiciary and prosecution service, and most vacancies were not filled during the reporting period. Vacancies in the Supreme Court and Courts of Appeal in particular continue to negatively impact judicial capacity, limiting the system’s ability to address existing backlogs.
The two vetting commissions for judges and prosecutors are in full composition with nine members each. The process for the appointment of new international members following resignations raised concerns and strong criticism from civil society and opposition. The new rules for selection were adopted in a rushed manner without consultation. The Venice Commission opinion noted that in the specific circumstances, the anti-deadlock mechanism chosen by the Moldovan authorities does not in itself run counter to international standards, but recommended ensuring a meaningful interval between the first (qualified majority) vote and the
second (absolute majority) vote, so that the majority and opposition have a genuine opportunity to negotiate the nomination of international members. Moldova should implement these recommendations. A Constitutional Court ruling is pending on these amendments.
In May 2026, Moldova submitted to the Venice Commission for review legislative amendments to extend the extraordinary evaluations of integrity to all judges, including those in first instance. The reasons invoked were a lack of confidence of the population in the justice system, and the perception that corruption is the main structural problem of the judicial system. The amendments proposed would have modified the responsibility for assessing financial integrity and changed the evaluation criteria. The Venice Commission recommended that the
amendments proposed be reviewed, and that the extended integrity assessment should be addressed through the vetting framework, instead of being part of the evaluation process, with full procedural safeguards, explicit statutory justification, and clear legal basis for consequences that such a framework requires.
In September 2026, new draft amendments to the law on the status of judge proposed an extension of vetting only to judges working on insolvency and administrative cases. The law on the Constitutional Court has been amended to address outstanding Venice Commission
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recommendations, notably on the transparency of the nomination procedure.
Amendments to the law on performance evaluation of judges and prosecutors entered into force in August 2025, aiming to strengthen the integrity verification mechanism for judges and prosecutors not subject to the vetting process. Minimal progress was registered in their implementation in the evaluation of judges by the SCM with 27 judges evaluated out of 128.
In September 2025, the SCM increased the number of judge positions to 510 judges. In 2025, the Selection and Evaluation College of the SCM selected 109 candidates for the position of judge. From these, 51 were proposed for appointment for the President and 36 of them have been appointed as of August 2026. Out of the 15 remaining candidates, 13 have either withdrawn their candidacies or have been refused repeated proposals by SCM, following the initial refusal by the President to appoint them based on professional competence concerns, despite the SCM’s positive assessment. Two candidates remain pending appointment by the President. The SCM organised 37 competitions to fill judge positions in the system and decided the transfer of 17 judges to different instances. As regards prosecutors, the Selection and Evaluation College of the SCP evaluated 21 candidates in 2025 and proposed seven candidates for appointment. As of August 2026, the Selection and Evaluation College of the SCP carried out selection procedures in respect of 32 candidates, two of whom subsequently withdrew before the interview stage. Out of the 30 remaining candidates, 10 were proposed for appointment. All of them were NIJ graduates. The system for random allocation of cases among judges is in place and is fully used. The system still needs to be complemented with a common online calendar for judges, lawyers and prosecutors. An automated system for randomised allocation of cases to prosecutors based on strict and objective criteria should be introduced. Moldova amended its law strengthening the guarantees of the prosecutors’ procedural independence in order to further strengthen the autonomy of the specialised prosecutors. It was adopted in first reading in October 2026.
Accountability
The framework for the regulation of accountability is largely satisfactory.
In terms of its implementation, in 2025, 35 disciplinary proceedings were initiated. 25 were processed by the SCM Disciplinary Board (including 14 carried over from 2024). Four warnings, three reprimands, and two dismissals were issued but due to appeals, there were no final decisions by the end of 2025. The SCM should accelerate decision making on disciplinary proceedings.
The Disciplinary and Ethics Board of the SCP carried out 44 disciplinary procedures concerning 39 prosecutors, with 17 sanctions including warnings, reprimands, dismissals and one position downgrade.
All judges, prosecutors and candidates for these posts have to submit annual declarations on assets and interests to the National Integrity Authority (NIA). In 2025, there were no cases initiated against judges or prosecutors concerning violations related to their declarations of assets. NIA’s capacity should be strengthened to improve the verification of assets.
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The codes of ethics for judges, prosecutors and lawyers are in place. Additional amendments were added to the Code of Ethics for Judges in March 2026 to update the rules of professional conduct, in particular online.
Both Councils have in place an inspection board for investigations and a disciplinary board for the enforcement of decisions, which reinforces the independence of the bodies. These ethics and disciplinary mechanisms should be used more effectively. The Committee on Ethics and Professional Conduct of Judges under the SCM did not hold any meetings in the last years. The Inspectorate for Public Prosecutions is operational with six inspectors appointed out of nine.
In August 2026, the SCP adopted the Methodological Guide on uniform application of Norms regarding Legal Qualification of Disciplinary Violations Committed by Prosecutors, aimed at further strengthening accountability and integrity in the prosecution system by enhancing the disciplinary mechanism. In the judiciary, the disciplinary framework became more operational in 2025 after the temporary institutional blockage seen in 2024, when the SCM Disciplinary College lacked quorum and imposed no sanctions.
Quality of justice
The quality of justice is improving. The National Institute of Justice (NIJ) has improved the quality of its training programmes. New bylaws were adopted and curricula revised. The EU Law module was fully institutionalised, and legal drafting modules were expanded, while training programmes were introduced on managerial competencies, ethics and integrity. However,
further measures are needed. The NIJ’s capacity constraints negatively affect its programmes. In July 2026, the NIJ adopted an ambitious Institutional Strategy, which should be given sufficient financial allocations and political support for implementation.
Although most recommendations of the 2022 TAIEX mission have been achieved, the recommendations on amending the current model of recruiting candidates and appointing
judges and prosecutors, and the admission and graduation process for the NIJ still need to be addressed without delay. The duration of the practical side of the training should be extended.
Moldova should continue efforts to ensure sufficient human and financial resources to enable the judiciary to function efficiently. The SCM’s strategic plan for 2025-2029 included a human resources strategy for the judicial system is in place. However, Moldova still needs to finalise and adopt the salary reform and improve human resources management to increase the attractiveness of judicial positions. In 2025, EUR 35 million was allocated to courts of law
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(0.73% of the state budget) and EUR 25.8 million to prosecutors’ offices (0.54% of the state budget), constituting a budget increase of 5.5% for the courts and 9.8% for the prosecution service compared to 2024.
Alternative dispute resolution mechanisms in the form of non-judicial mediation, conciliation and arbitration continue to be barely used. Most Moldovan mediators are inactive, with 48 registered mediators per 100 000 inhabitants and 173 practising in 2025. The new legal framework on mediation, adopted in February 2026 and applicable from September 2026, as well as the new law on arbitration adopted in August 2026 are expected to expand the use of these out-of-court dispute resolution mechanisms. Training for mediators is being organised to ensure that the mediation system is fully operational once the law becomes applicable.
While access to justice was expanded through a law adopted in May 2025, it is still limited due to other legislative shortcomings, territorial gaps and lack of information. Regarding accessibility, courtrooms have been reorganised and adapted to facilitate access for persons with disabilities to the judicial process, including by locating the courtrooms on the ground floor or by equipping most of the courts with ramp access.
On the judicial map reorganisation and new structure of the prosecutors’ offices, the number of territorial prosecutors’ offices is being reduced from 36 to 14. However, the finalisation of the whole reorganisation process was postponed to 31 December 2035 due to the need to build/adapt premises to allow courts to function with higher staff numbers, sufficient courtrooms and adequate IT equipment. As a result, tangible progress has been limited. Moldova put in place a normative act in September 2026 to establish a clear monitoring framework to monitor the implementation of the judicial and prosecutorial maps. In addition, SCM, SCP, the General Prosecutor's office and the police should coordinate better to use resources efficiently and limit the number of instances in which a case is not assigned in an optimal manner.
To further improve the quality of court decisions, the Guideline on quality standards for judicial decisions was adopted by the Superior Council of Magistracy in December 2025.
As regards the reform of the Supreme Court of Justice, a Strategic Development Plan, an Action Plan and a revised Regulation were prepared with the aim of strengthening the Court’s institutional role in ensuring uniformity of case law and providing methodological guidance,
optimising working processes and enhancing public trust.
Efficiency
The efficiency of justice improved partially
Moldova spent EUR 65 million on its judicial system in 2025, which is an increase compared to 2024 in the court
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budget (8.7%), legal aid budget (0.3%) and for prosecution services (12.2%).
The disposition time in first instance for civil and commercial cases improved while it worsened in second instance. Clearance rate and disposition time for administrative law cases in first instance improved considerably in 2025 (148% in 2025 compared to 101% in 2024, and 209 days in 2025 compared to 476 days in 2024).
Disposition times remain high in administrative cases in second instance and in criminal cases in all types of courts. Disposition time reached 1018 days for criminal cases at the Supreme Court of Justice in 2025 (compared to 865 in 2024). The clearance rate should be further improved for the second instance, particularly in criminal courts, but reaches a good level for criminal cases assigned to the Supreme Court of Justice (99% clearance rate). During the first half of 2026, clearance rates improved in second instance cases overall compared to 2025.
Further efforts remain necessary to ensure consistent improvements across all court levels to avoid accumulation of pending cases and backlogs and prolonged duration of trials. The Courts of Appeal show an improved trend in their clearance rate for civil and commercial cases, but they remain below 100% overall. It should be noted that in 2025, the Supreme Court of Justice examined 95% of the cases received, with just 10 out of 20 judges in post.
The Agency for Digitalisation in Justice and Judicial Administration (ADJAJ), officially set up in January 2025 has an extremely limited capacity due to persistent staffing concerns. The level of use of IT tools across the justice system remains uneven and partial. In August 2026, normative amendments promoted the digitalisation of certain judicial procedures. Further legal framework improvements are needed, together with a decisive reinforcement of ADJAJ mandate and institutional capacity.
Fight against corruption
Track record
The track record on the fight against corruption has further improved during the reporting period, although significant weaknesses remain, in particular as regards the timely adjudication of complex corruption cases, the translation of increased investigations into final court rulings, and effective confiscation of assets. More proactivity is needed in certain vulnerable sectors such as
public procurement.
On high-level corruption cases in 2025, the Anticorruption Prosecutor’s Office (APO) sent 38 criminal cases to court involving 44 persons, compared to 71 cases involving 113 persons in 2024. Courts of first instance, with the participation of APO prosecutors,
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delivered 202 judgements, of which 128 were convictions involving 181 persons, 50 were terminations involving 104 persons, and 24 were acquittals involving 64 persons. The total value of fines and confiscations ordered in cases sent to court reached MDL 365 120 532 (EUR 18 080 769), which is almost five times higher than the total value ordered in 2024, albeit from a low base. 65 convicted persons received prison sentences. Compared to 2024, when the APO brought 71 cases involving 113 individuals/entities, the number of new high-level corruption cases sent to court was lower, but the total number of final court decisions increased from 183 in 2024 to 202 in 2025. The lower number of high-level corruption cases sent to court together with a significant increase of confiscated assets demonstrate an orientation towards more complex cases that require longer investigations but have higher impact.
At the same time, the deterrent effect of sanctions continued to be affected by lengthy court proceedings and the lapse of statutes of limitation, which APO identifies as a major obstacle in complex corruption and financial crime cases. For example, in 2025, 38 first instance court proceedings on high level corruption cases, involving a total of 85 persons, were terminated due to the lapse of the statute of limitation.
In the first six months of 2026, 59 high- level corruption cases were initiated, 25 were sent to court and 50 conviction judgements were delivered. Seizures amounted to approximately MDL 39.8 million (almost EUR 2 million), while courts ordered confiscations of approximately MDL 3.8 million (EUR 187 739). These interim figures should be read together with the continuing need to secure timely adjudication and effective enforcement of confiscation orders.
The National Anticorruption Centre (NAC) reported strong operational activity in 2025. NAC investigative officers detected 847 crimes (749 in 2024), of which 792 were corruption and corruption-related offences (701 in 2024). The most common offences included active bribery, passive bribery and trading in influence. NAC also reported 20 cases of electoral corruption and 6 cases of illegal financing of political parties. During criminal investigations, 129 persons were detained and 77 persons were taken into custody. During the first half of 2026, NAC detected 447 crimes, of which 411 were corruption and corruption-related offences. It initiated 428 criminal cases, referred 201 cases to court and recognised 500 persons as suspects. During the same period, the Asset Recovery Agency (CARA) seized 382 assets, worth more than MDL 236.4 million (EUR 11.7 million).
The effectiveness of asset recovery remains limited. A 2026 Court of Account audit found that, at the end of 2025, 6 227 frozen assets were recorded with a total value of around MDL 9.6 billion, while only around 0.6% of the value of assets frozen by CARA in 2018-2025 was effectively recovered and transferred to the state budget. The audit also identified weaknesses in assets records, interoperability and realisation of confiscated property. The authorities need to translate asset tracing and freezing into executed confiscation and actual recovery.
Legal framework
The legal framework on the fight against corruption is broadly adequate regarding preventive measures and was further strengthened in 2025, while major gaps remain regarding repressive measures, resources and training for specialised bodies, lobbying regulation and comparable
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statistical reporting.
GRECO’s Fifth Evaluation Round Compliance Report published in April 2026 concluded that seven out of 25 recommendations had been implemented satisfactorily, while 12 were partly implemented, and six not implemented. The Law on Professional Ethics in public administration was adopted in July 2026, while a draft Code of Ethics and Conduct for Government members was publicly consulted in August 2026. Moldova is addressing remaining several important GRECO recommendations; for instance limiting the participation of the Minister of Justice in the SCP’s decision-making in 2026 and removing the ex officio membership of the Minister of Justice in the SCP as of 1 January 2028, addressing rules on contacts with lobbyists, conflict of interest, asset declaration and post-employment restrictions.
On electoral corruption, key recommendations of the Venice Commission and of OSCE/ODIHR remain unaddressed, notably on clarifying the grounds for suspending and dissolving political parties or the criteria for banning successor parties declared unconstitutional. Moldova should ensure the Law on combating electoral corruption is brought into line with European standards.
In July 2026, Moldova amended its national legislation with a view to aligning whistleblower protection with the EU acquis as regards the conditions for protection for reports and public disclosures, and the measures of support and protection against retaliation.
Strategic documents
The strategic documents are in place and adequate in terms of prioritising actions to respond to current gaps. The National Integrity and Anticorruption Programme (NIAP) 2024-2028 and its action plan are supported by an effective and comprehensive monitoring methodology with semi-annual and annual reporting, a monitoring group, a secretariat within NAC, and parliamentary oversight. The reports are made publicly available via the NAC’s website. The implementation framework serves as a vehicle for following up on recommendations related to GRECO, the OECD’s Anticorruption Network for Eastern Europe and Central Asia and the United Nations Convention against Corruption. At the same time, implementation remains mixed and further efforts are needed, including more targeted anticorruption responses in high-risk sectors. The programme should be updated to include the newest round of recommendations from these organisations.
In June 2026, the Parliament adopted the National Programme and Action Plan for modernising the investigation and prosecution system in the fight against corruption, organised crime, financial fraud, money laundering and other illicit activities for 2026-2027. In 2025 overall, six strategic analyses were carried out. In the first quarter of 2026, five strategic analyses were under review. These covered areas such as customs, illicit trafficking of narcotic substances, the recovery of criminal assets, and judicial practice in corruption cases.
Institutional framework
The institutional framework on the fight against corruption is in place and is adequate regarding preventive measures and satisfactory regarding law enforcement.
Through amendments to the Criminal Procedural Code in June 2026, Moldova re-distributed the anticorruption investigation and prosecution functions of APO and NAC. The new institutional framework is expected to strengthen the financial crime investigation system and places APO in the lead of investigations. For the other high-level corruption cases, NAC is led by APO in the investigative process. The 2026-2027 modernisation programme complements this model through NAC capacity-building, specialised functions for criminal-asset recovery and virtual assets, and an increase of 150 posts.
Moldova has an overall well-established and operational specialised institutional setup for
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corruption prevention and anticorruption policy coordination, centred on the NAC for the prevention, coordination and investigation of corruption and corruption-related offences within its competence, and on the NIA for asset and interest declarations, conflicts of interest, incompatibility of office and related integrity restrictions. Capacity constraints remain, in particular on the NIA’s effective verification capacity and the full practical functioning of automated and interoperable verification tools. In August 2026, NIA launched public consultations on a new concept for the e-Integritate system, to replace the current one, and started implementing its internal guidelines, expanded the powers of its president for more coherent control practice and tightened the declaration and verification of assets system.
Attention should be paid to ensuring a more effective framework for the proactive detection of latent high-level corruption cases. In this regard, cooperation, operational coordination and the overall institutional setup for high-level corruption detection should be further strengthened.
Asset recovery and management reforms advanced with the introduction in February 2026 of a Law on Social and public-interest use of confiscated assets. Moldova should ensure that financial investigations lead to timely freezing, final confiscation and measurable recovery.
Following the adoption in 2025 of the law to set up specialised anticorruption panels, Moldova faced a low participation rate in the competitions for these panels. Moreover, legislative amendments are needed to ensure that these panels retain jurisdiction over all high-level corruption cases.
At the end of 2025, Moldova amended the vetting law to include all first instance judges that are part of the anticorruption panels, in line with Venice Commission recommendations, and judges who have dealt with corruption cases at any point after 2017.
Fundamental rights
General framework
The general framework on fundamental rights is broadly satisfactory. The implementation of these rights should be improved, notably by allocating adequate resources to relevant bodies.
International human rights instruments
The cooperation with international human rights monitoring bodies and follow-up to their recommendations needs to be improved. During the reporting period, Moldova ratified the second Protocol of Convention 108 of the Council of Europe on the protection of personal data.
Moldova has not yet ratified the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages or the Protocol No 12 of the European Convention on Human Rights (on anti-discrimination).
European Court of Human Rights
The cooperation with the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) and the implementation of its judgments need to be improved. Moldova appointed a Government Agent to the ECtHR in July 2026 and should support her with the secondment of staff at the Department of Execution of the ECtHR judgments.
Over the reporting period, the ECtHR delivered 48 judgments
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against Moldova and found breaches of the European Convention on Human Rights relating mainly to adequate investigation of ill-treatment or domestic violence, the lack of an effective legal remedy and discriminatory attitude of the authorities based on gender and disability. The non-execution of court decisions, disproportionate interference in the right to property and inhuman detention conditions are among the most common violations.
Currently, there are 24 leading cases under enhanced supervision by the Committee of Ministers related notably to the right to a fair trial and inadequate investigation of ill-treatment.
At the end of the reporting period, the Government Agent presented an Action Plan on the execution of the ECtHR judgments, focusing on groups of cases under enhanced supervision, with the aim of obtaining their closure or their downgrade to the standard supervision.
Promotion, protection and enforcement of human rights
The legal and institutional framework for the promotion, protection and enforcement of human rights is in place, but implementation needs to be improved. Gaps in legislation continue to persist, notably on torture and ill-treatment, procedural rights and non-discrimination.
While the implementation rate of the recommendations issued by the Equality Council rose to 36% (from 29% in 2024), the implementation rate of the recommendations directed at public authorities decreased to 21% in 2025. The implementation rate for recommendations by the People’s Advocate office increased to 80% in 2025 (from 64% in 2024). In order to increase the implementation rate of the recommendations issued by the Ombuds institutions, Moldova has convened 19 meetings with relevant public institutions and developed an electronic register to
monitor their enforcement.
Both institutions remain understaffed, especially the Equality Council with twelve vacant positions. Moldova’s legal framework does not provide the Equality Council with the financial resources necessary to perform all its duties effectively. Its sanctioning mechanism and competence to assist victims of
discrimination should be strengthened.
The National Human Rights Council has not been convened during the reporting period.
Prevention of torture and other forms of ill-treatment
Moldova provides legal guarantees on the prevention of torture and ill- treatment, nevertheless further legislative safeguards could be adopted and the follow-up to cases remains insufficient.
Moldova still needs to address the
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2023 recommendations of the Committee on the Prevention of Torture (CPT). Progress in combating and investigating ill-treatment and torture remains limited. The National Preventive Mechanism (NPM) operates independently and monitors detention facilities.
The ECtHR in its Petrov v. Moldova judgment of March 2026 condemned Moldova for the informal prisoner subculture. Several cases of alleged ill-treatment in detention are pending before the Court. Some steps have been taken to address this issue that remains entrenched and impacts rehabilitation efforts.
Recent progress includes the launch of an electronic registry to document cases of ill-treatment, with 2 170 incidents recorded in 2025, and installation of 74 CCTV cameras across eight institutions. A systematic inspection programme covering all 17 penitentiary institutions started in January 2026.
An increasing number of prisoners have access to paid work and vocational training, particularly juveniles. Medical services in prisons remain insufficient, despite improvements in the quantity of medical equipment and certified medical services. Moldova needs to advance on the implementation of its Roadmap against Criminal Subculture 2024-2027.
The UN Human Rights Committee and the NPM raised concerns over underreporting ill- treatment in police custody, due in part to fear of retaliation, and the reclassification of these acts as lesser criminal offences. The lack of independence of the medical services within these temporary detention facilities, which are placed under the Ministry of the Interior, further contributes to ill-treatment cases being insufficiently documented.
Detention facilities are overcrowded and largely not adapted for persons with disabilities with special needs, including individuals with mental health disorders, disabilities and those at risk of extreme violence or self-harm. Deficiencies in infrastructure and human resources persist. There were approximately 2500 penitentiary staff on 1 September 2026, while the system foresees 2900 staff units.
Execution of criminal sanctions
The system for the execution of criminal sanctions (including probation) is still inadequate.
Moldova remains one of the countries in Europe with the highest incarceration rates (255 inmates per 100 000 inhabitants in 2025), with the number of inmates reaching 6 334 in January 2026. The number of persons in pre-detention custody remains high. Alternative probation measures, which are also relevant to
reducing prison overcrowding, are needed.
The lack of institutional independence of healthcare services in places of detention remains a concern, as medical personnel in police custody and penitentiary institutions are
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subordinated to the Ministry of the Interior and the Ministry of Justice respectively.
Moldova has adopted a roadmap for the transfer of responsibilities for the penitentiary medical system from the Ministry of Justice to the Ministry of Health, as recommended by the CPT. In September 2026, an interinstitutional working group has been established to pilot the reform.
Protection of personal data
The law on personal data protection, adopted in 2024, entered into force in 2026, harmonising Moldova’s regulatory framework with the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR). While the introduction of this law has significantly expanded the mandate of the National Centre for Personal Data Protection, its human resources, technical and financial capacities have not increased in parallel and therefore remain limited. Since Moldova made further progress in August 2026, with the adoption of the law on the protection of personal data processed for crime prevention, aligning with the EU Law Enforcement Directive. Moreover, Moldova has ratified in May 2026 the second Protocol of the Council of Europe Convention 108 for the protection of individuals with regards to the automatic processing of personal data.
Moldova should still implement EU standards on contractual clauses between operators and
processors.
Freedom of thought, conscience and religion
Moldova provides adequate legal guarantees on freedom of religion or belief. No breaches of freedom of thought, conscience and religion were reported.
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Freedom of expression and media freedom
Overall, Moldova provides adequate legal guarantees on freedom of expression and the enabling environment for the free, independent and professional media operation have been further strengthened.
Intimidation of journalists
Instances of intimidation by private actors, including verbal attacks by political figures, as well as aggressive behaviour of protesters towards journalists have decreased over the reporting period, with 37 reported cases in 2025 vs 66 cases in 2024. Three criminal cases were initiated in relation to threats against journalists. Further efforts are required to ensure consistent investigation and judicial follow-up. In July 2026, Moldova adopted a set of amendments to provide legal safeguards against Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation.
Journalists still face frequent obstructions in Gagauzia. Journalists from the right bank remain restricted from entering the Transnistrian region by the de facto administration and face risk of detention.
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Amendments to the Criminal and Contravention Codes aiming to strengthen the protection of journalists against intimidation, threats and violence, particularly online, entered into force in February 2026. An inter-ministerial action plan on journalists’ security was adopted in April 2026 to enhance coordination between law enforcement, prosecution services and media as well as to put in place clearer procedures for prevention and response to threats or harassments.
Legislative environment
Freedom of expression is generally ensured and the legislative environment has been further aligned the EU acquis and European standards.
A new law on mass media was adopted in October2026, with the aim to ensure further alignment with the European Media Freedom Act and extending ownership transparency requirements to print and online media. Moldova should fully align the Audiovisual Media Service Code (AVMSC) to EU acquis and all Venice Commission recommendations.
Moreover, Moldova should continue implementing steps to support national authorities to fulfil their regulatory function upon accession and enable civil society to support implementation of the European Media Freedom Act and the Digital Services Act. Operational readiness will require institution-building, awareness-raising and stakeholder engagement.
The Council of Europe assessed overall positively the provisions of the law on Strategic Investments and issued a recommendation, subsequently adopted by Moldova as amendment, to narrow the grounds under which broadcasting content can be assessed as dangerous for national security.
Moldova has adopted a legislation with the aim of aligning with the EU Anti-SLAPP legal framework.
Implementation of legislation/institutions
The capacity of the Audiovisual Council (AC) has been strengthened, with a new department for monitoring nonlinear audiovisual media and video-sharing platforms. The AC applies the provisions of the AVMSC. Although the number of fines is low, their application rate rose significantly. Overall, 323 sanctions were applied to media providers and distributors: 103 public warnings, 215 fines and 5 advertising suspensions. Legal remedies to contest them are effective.
The Criminal Code lays down criminal liability for the intentional obstruction of media activity. However, law enforcement agencies have rarely invoked this provision.
The Centre for Strategic Communication and Countering Disinformation plays a central role in monitoring FIMI and coordinating interinstitutional response measures.
Public service broadcaster
With the amendments to the Audiovisual Media Service Code in 2025, the independence and financial sustainability of the public service broadcaster have improved. The AC is responsible for appointing members of the supervisory body Teleradio-Moldova, which was restructured and whose membership increased from seven to nine members.
The director of the Public Service Broadcaster resigned during the reporting period and a competition has been launched to replace him.
The regional public broadcaster of Gagauzia (GRT) remains subject to strong political influence from the local executive committee and the People’s Assembly. Financial links to the fugitive oligarch Ilan Șor were also reported. The AC sanctioned GRT with a fine of 30 000 lei in September 2025 for the dissemination of false information, slander and incitement to
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discrimination in a broadcasted speech of Ilan Șor.
Economic factors
A small advertisement market, lack of subsidies and difficulty in addressing unfair advertising practices represent serious issues for independent media. In the reporting period, most TV media providers faced financial strain. As a result of the competition for granting subsidies launched in 2025 by the Media Subsidy Fund, approximately 11.3 million lei were disbursed to 23 media outlets. In 2026, Moldova plans to fund 22 media projects, focusing mainly on promoting democracy and European integration and aiming to address media literacy and combat disinformation, including in the languages of national minorities. These funds aim to partially mitigate financial uncertainty in the sector.
The AVMSC contains specific provisions aimed at ensuring transparency of ownership, particularly within the audiovisual media sector.
Internet
The legal framework regulating online space in Moldova is limited and focuses on technical aspects. Amendments to the Criminal Code and the Contravention Code that entered into force in February 2026. These changes criminalise the obstruction of media activity through information systems (e.g. cyberattacks, unauthorised access, digital sabotage), with penalties such as fines or prisons’ sentences. Since 2022, the Security and Intelligence Service has blocked nearly 60 websites linked to Russian propaganda or the fugitive oligarch Ilan Șor.
Professional organisations and working conditions
The working conditions of journalists in Moldova have not improved significantly in recent years and remain challenging. Financial sustainability remains an issue and leads many journalists to leave the profession. Only two media NGOs, the Independent Journalism Centre (IJC) and the Independent Press Association (IPA), carry out visible activities to protect the rights of journalists.
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Freedom of assembly and association
Moldova provides adequate legal guarantees to freedom of assembly and association and regulation of assemblies is adequate.
The Constitution safeguards the right to freedom of assembly, which is further regulated by the Law on assemblies and non-commercial organisations. There is no pending case to address with regards to the ECtHR’s judgments on freedom of assembly and association.
In December 2025, Moldova adopted a law on Public Events. Civil society organisations have raised concerns over the vague definitions and potentially burdensome notification procedures it has introduced for event organisers.
Legal provisions, introduced in 2023, criminalising ‘separatism’ could negatively affect freedom of assembly and association. Moldova should address relevant OSCE/ODIHR recommendations.
Property rights
The legal and institutional framework for enforcing property rights is broadly in place. Property rights have continued to be affected by systemic challenges, particularly regarding legal certainty and administrative efficiency. The share of applications submitted to the ECtHR pertaining to the non-enforcement of court judgments on property matters remains high. Out of
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27 Moldovan applications communicated to the ECtHR in 2025, seven concerned alleged violations of the right to protection of property in civil, administrative or criminal proceedings.
Non-discrimination
The legal and institutional framework on non-discrimination is comprehensive but remains to be fully aligned with the EU acquis. Moldova has prepared two legislations aiming to transpose the Directives on standards for equality bodies and the Racial Equality Directive. Moldova did not ratify the Protocol 12 to the ECHR providing for a general prohibition of discrimination. Most instances of discrimination registered by the Equality Council relate to discrimination in the workplace and access to goods and services.
Anti-racism and hate offences
The legal and institutional framework on hate crime and hate speech remains to be fully aligned with European standards, in particular on combating racism and xenophobia by means of criminal law. In 2025, the police recorded nine cases of hate speech motivated by prejudice. A unified methodology for data collection on hate crime incidents, including disaggregation by bias and type of offence, needs to be put in place.
The National Programme on Ensuring Human Rights 2024-2027 is the national strategic framework in the fight against discrimination, hate speech and hate crimes, while there is no specific strategy on anti-racism. The Digital Transformation Strategy of Moldova 2023-2030 aims to ensure the promotion and protection of online rights and freedoms. However, the capacity to detect hate speech and/or cases of incitement in online information systems, including on social networks, remains limited.
Compared to the 2021 elections period, the number of cases of hate speech was 1.7 times higher during the 2025 parliamentary election.
Gender equality
The legal and institutional framework on gender equality and combating gender- based violence is partially aligned with the EU acquis, while implementation needs to be improved.
Moldova continues to implement its national programme on gender equality. One of the main achievements of the Programme for Promoting and Ensuring Equality between Women and Men 2023- 2027 was the integration of the gender perspective into further sectoral policies. The mid-term evaluation review of the National Programme for the Prevention and Combating of violence against Women and Domestic Violence confirmed its high relevance in Moldova, with important progress achieved in normative and institutional frameworks. Some challenges remain with regards to the capacity of specialist support services for
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victims, resources, unequal territorial access and data collection.
The National Agency and the National Coordinating Council for Preventing and Combating Violence against Women and Domestic Violence continue to function but still lack capacity.
During the reporting period, Moldova approved a regulation on the prevention and combating of violence and harassment at work in public authorities. The gender equality mechanism with gender focal points and coordination groups designated at national and local level is in place. At national level, however, these remain insufficiently regulated and weakly institutionalised across ministries.
On 14 February 2026, new criminal offences, including femicide and forced marriage, entered into force. These amendments also reinforced victim protection mechanisms, including by extending the duration of protection orders, introducing electronic monitoring of perpetrators, and guaranteeing victims’ access to legal assistance.
The development of the first national integrated gender-based violence information system, Vio Data, progressed with the approval of national indicators in line with the methodology of the European Institute for Gender Equality and the procurement of system development.
Shelter capacity for survivors of gender-based violence increased, extending the total number of available places to 214, against the 260 under the Istanbul Convention standards. However, geographical coverage remains limited and barriers to accessing shelters persist, particularly for women with disabilities and Roma women.
Some progress was made in strengthening specialised support services for victims of sexual
violence. Their availability and geographical coverage remain insufficient, and further efforts are
needed to ensure their sustainable integration into the national system and adequate state
funding.
Rights of the child
The legal and institutional framework on the rights of the child is largely in place and in line with
the EU acquis and international frameworks. Implementation and enforcement need to be
improved towards an integrated child protection system and to ensure the effective realisation of
children’s rights. Over the reporting period, Moldova strengthened the child protection system
against violence, neglect and exploitation, introducing stricter safeguards for professionals
working with children and reinforcing prevention and intervention mechanisms. In addition,
legislative amendments were adopted to strengthen child protection and improve the
enforcement of court decisions concerning the exercise of parental rights.
Quality standards for social services, including those targeting children, were updated, alongside the recruitment of 200 child protection specialists.
Moldova has prepared legislation aiming to align with the EU directive on procedural safeguards for children who are suspects or accused persons in criminal proceedings.
As concerns child-friendly justice, some progress was made in expanding integrated, child- friendly support services for child victims of crime. However, their availability and geographical coverage remain limited, while specialised services for children who are suspects or accused persons in criminal proceedings are still lacking.
Further progress has been achieved in the deinstitutionalisation of children. 225 new admissions to residential care institutions were recorded and 339 children were deinstitutionalized. 344 children remain in institutional care at year-end, including 98 with disabilities. Moldova should make further progress by extending the number of foster carers,
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preventing family separation and new placements, accelerating transitioning to family-based and community-based care, and closing the remaining large residential institutions. Children with disabilities remain disproportionately affected by poverty, violence, family separation and institutionalisation, and continue to face limited access to specialised support services, and barriers to inclusive education. The placement of children with intellectual disabilities in psychiatric institutions continues to be a systemic concern.
Persons with disabilities
The legal and institutional framework for the rights of persons with disabilities remains to be fully aligned with the EU acquis and the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (UNCRPD), while implementation and enforcement need to be improved. In June 2026, Moldova adopted the National Social Inclusion Programme of People with Disabilities, that will cover the period 2026-2030. The programme aims to ensure equal access to services, support for independent living and integrates specific deinstitutionalisation objectives. The National Council for the Rights of Persons with Disabilities should resume activities to follow up on the implementation of the UNCRPD.
A Law on Accessibility Requirements for Certain Products and Services was adopted, introducing mandatory accessibility standards and compliance obligations.
Deinstitutionalisation of persons with disabilities continued at a slow pace. Large residential institutions for adults with disabilities remain operational and continue to consume a significant share of public budget, while community-based services supported independent living expanded only modestly. Further efforts are needed to develop and implement a costed national deinstitutionalisation roadmap and progressively redirect resources from institutional care towards accessible, person-centred community-based support services.
Accessibility remains insufficiently enforced and funded, with significant barriers persisting in the build environment, transport, websites and digital services.
Supported decision-making mechanisms remain underdeveloped, limiting the ability of persons with disabilities to exercise their legal capacity on an equal basis with others, including in relation to access to justice, consent to services, and independent living.
LGBTIQ+ persons
The legal protection of the rights of LGBTIQ+ persons is largely adequate, but LGBTIQ+ persons continued to face discrimination, including hostile rhetoric, and social acceptance in the country remains fragile and easily reversible. Moldova does not provide for legal recognition and protection of same-sex couples, as required by relevant ECtHR case-law.
A LGBTIQ+ equality action plan or strategy remains to be adopted.
In 2026, the Pride March in Chișinău took place without any security incidents, although counter-protests and cases of verbal abuse were reported. During the 2025 parliamentary election period, recorded cases of homophobic speech increased almost threefold compared with the 2021 parliamentary elections, from 39 to 106 cases. Some political actors and the Moldovan Orthodox Church continued to contribute to hostile public discourse against the LGBTIQ+ community.
Procedural rights of suspects and accused persons and rights of victims of crime
Moldova has prepared legislation with the view to align with the EU directives related to the rights of victims of crimes and procedural rights. Moldova has also adopted the law strengthening the criminal liability of legal persons on 24 July 2026.
Some systemic issues in practice continue to affect the right to a fair trial. While the ECtHR
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found 32 violations in 2025, several cases remain under enhanced supervision due to procedural rights concerns. Common issues include inadequate reasoning in convictions, reopening of final judgments after late appeals by prosecutors. Challenges remain in ensuring access to justice for persons belonging to minorities and people with disabilities. Legal aid is widely available, with increased training to improve its quality.
Protection of minorities
The legal and institutional framework for the rights of persons belonging to minorities is incomplete, although these persons are broadly integrated. New policy frameworks to support minorities should be developed and the dialogue between the authorities and ethnic and linguistic minorities enhanced. The Agency for Interethnic Relations has been placed under the authority of the Ministry of Education. Its staff and financial capacity require strengthening.
Moldova has adopted the Action Plan for the Implementation of Multilingual Education in schools with instruction in minority languages for 2025-2030. Institutional efforts to revive the use of the Gagauz language were reinforced, including with a dedicated National Action Plan for 2026-2027, covering all education levels in the region and expanding educational resources. In February 2026 a similar action plan was adopted for learning and promoting the Ukrainian language.
Roma
The Roma in Moldova continue to suffer from racism and discrimination.
Over the reporting period, Moldova has strengthened its legal and institutional framework on Roma. Progress has been achieved with the appointment of a new National Roma contact point. A new programme dedicated to supporting the Roma population in Moldova for 2027- 2030 has been developed. The law on Roma community-based mediators has been amended, creating more favourable recruitment, training, work and financial conditions for the mediators. Their role has also been strengthened to improve access to education and services for Roma communities. Roma pupils and students also benefit from merit-based scholarships, with the number of beneficiaries steadily increasing in recent years.
The exceedingly low level of school attendance of Roma refugee children remains a major concern. Roma displaced persons from Ukraine continue to face challenges in relation to housing, employment, documentation, education and discrimination in reception centres.
Citizenship rights
The law on citizenship entered into force in December 2025. This has led to some controversy, as it introduced new criteria for obtaining Moldovan citizenship by recognition. The new provisions would have adverse effects predominantly on stateless and marginalised persons, as well as ethnic or linguistic minorities. In February 2026, new amendments were proposed to introduce exemptions and clarifications to these unintended shortcomings.
2.2.2 Chapter 24: Justice, freedom and security
The EU has common rules for border and migration management, visa policy and asylum. Schengen cooperation entails the lifting of border controls inside the EU. There is also cooperation in the fight against serious and organised crime and terrorism, and judicial, police and customs cooperation, all with the support of the EU Justice and Home Affairs agencies.
Fight against serious and organised crime
The legal framework on serious and organised crime is partially aligned with the EU acquis. The capacity to fight against serious and organised crime needs to be improved.
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General framework
Legal alignment, strategic and institutional frameworks
Moldova is partially aligned with the EU acquis in the field of police cooperation and the fight against organised crime. The country continued to implement its general home affairs strategy for 2022-2030 and its six sectoral development strategies for 2026-2030 covering organised crime, public order, safety, civil protection, migration and education/ethics/digitalisation, which were all updated in December 2025. In August 2026, Moldova upgraded its national serious and organised crime threat assessment (SOCTA) and made some progress aligning its engagement in EMPACT with its national and regional threat landscape.
The high turnover rate and significant number of vacancies in law enforcement agencies remains an issue, especially in light of increasing threats. Appropriate budget, equipment and specialists are needed. Moldova strengthened the criminal asset recovery and confiscation framework, partly aligning it with the EU acquis on asset recovery and confiscation and on the mutual recognition of freezing and confiscation orders. It broadened confiscation rules, improved seizure, enforcement and repatriation mechanisms, and expanded the role of the Criminal Asset Recovery Agency (CARA), which is now authorised to conduct financial investigations at trial stage. CARA continues to conduct parallel financial investigations, while stand-alone money-laundering investigations fall under NAC’s competence. Alignment with the acquis on asset recovery and confiscation needs to continue.
The national register for seized and confiscated assets is now fully populated and all relevant institutions can access the data, contributing to greater transparency and more effective tracking of assets throughout legal proceedings. In August 2026, Moldova conducted further reforms to enable social and public-interest use of confiscated assets.
Internal integrity measures in law enforcement bodies also continued to advance, including integrity training, corruption reporting mechanisms and internal investigations within the Ministry of Internal Affairs. Nonetheless, corruption among law enforcement authorities remains a concern, with the police perceived as the most corrupt institution in the country and several specialised officers, including investigators, under investigation and/or removed from office due to alleged involvement in corruption cases. Integrity measures should be risk-based and focused on functions exposed to organised and financial crime, with transparent reporting on internal investigations, disciplinary measures and criminal referrals.
Implementation and enforcement capacity
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Moldova made further efforts to combat serious and organised crime. On organised crime, the track record of investigations, indictments and convictions improved between 2023 and 2025: investigations more than tripled (57 to 206) and final convictions reached a three-year high (108), while indictments grew only modestly (50 to 85). Regarding serious crime, the track record of investigations, indictments and convictions
improved between 2023 and 2025: investigations more than doubled (874 to 1 825) and final convictions rose by 44% (380 to 548), while indictments also grew substantially (547 to 637). Moldova must strengthen its response to complex cases by improving continuous law enforcement training and identifying skill gaps. The country should maintain progress in detecting, preventing and prosecuting serious crimes, such as trafficking in human beings, child sexual abuse, drug trafficking, cybercrime, money laundering and firearms trafficking, to secure more final convictions.
Intelligence-led policing needs to be further developed, and investigations should be launched more proactively on the basis of intelligence. More equipment and personnel are needed to reduce response time in organised crime investigations, including cross-border ones. Interagency cooperation also needs strengthening.
In 2025, the Criminal Assets Recovery Agency (CARA) significantly stepped up its asset recovery efforts. It seized 1 066 assets worth MDL 706.2 million (EUR 34.73 million). EUR 760
000 in confiscated funds were transferred to the state budget. Meanwhile, the courts issued 562 confiscation decisions. CARA carried out 312 parallel financial investigations (PFIs) (190 in 2024, and 119 in 2023). In the first half of 2026, CARA seized 382 assets worth EUR 11.61 million.
In 2025, the General Police Inspectorate (GPI) placed 11 adults and three minors in witness protection programmes.
Moldovan law enforcement authorities have made some progress in dealing with gender- based violence cases, including adopting a victim-centred approach in a more systematic manner.
Law enforcement cooperation
Law enforcement cooperation was further strengthened, building on good cooperation with Europol and the European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Training (CEPOL). Moldova is encouraged to make full use of CEPOL’s support in the reform of its training curriculum by integrating the knowledge and skills acquired into its national law enforcement training system.
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Europol continues to deploy guest officers to Moldova, and, since January 2026, a Moldovan liaison officer has been posted to Europol’s headquarters. Cooperation has been positive in several crime areas such as drug trafficking (especially synthetic drugs), organised property crime, migrant smuggling and fraud. Moldova continued its active involvement in the European Multidisciplinary Platform Against Criminal Threats (EMPACT) and its new cycle priorities. It took part in 154 operational actions in the period 2024-2025, a 50% increase compared with 2023. Moldova has taken the initiative to propose operational measures to its EU partners during the renewal of the EMPACT cycle. For the 2026-2027 operational action plans (OAPs), Moldova will engage in 104 actions across 11 out of 13 OAPs, with particular emphasis on synthetic drugs and new psychoactive substances (YD/NPS), firearms, the most threatening criminal networks and individuals (MTCN-I), cybercrime, and trafficking in human beings (THB). Additionally, Moldova is a co-leader for three operational actions under SYD/NPS, THB and Cyber operational action plans and an action leader in one operational action under SYD/NPS operational action plan. This reduced but more targeted participation seems aligned with its threat landscape, and Moldova should continue focusing its EMPACT participation where it can effectively contribute.
Moldova has rolled out SIENA (Secure Information Exchange Network Application) to several law enforcement authorities and information exchanges facilitated through the system have increased.
Moldova has made progress in implementing the law on the use of passenger name record (PNR) data, which entered into force in January 2025 and aims to align with the relevant EU acquis. In 2025, the Passenger Information Unit systematically monitored advance passenger information (API) and PNR data from 30 air carriers, covering over 5.7 million passengers and more than 39 000 flights. Full implementation requires ongoing progress in monitoring and capacity building, including equipment procurement.
Judicial cooperation in criminal matters
Judicial cooperation in criminal matters has improved but further efforts are needed, including to align the legal framework with the EU acquis.
Mutual legal assistance in criminal matters intensified between 2023 and 2025: total requests rose by 71% (800 to 1 366), driven mainly by incoming requests, which nearly doubled (432 to 844), while outgoing requests dipped in 2024 before recovering to 522.
Moldova maintained good cooperation with partners concerning mutual legal assistance (MLA) in criminal matters for the purpose of asset recovery in particular. CARA sent 181 requests to foreign jurisdictions while incoming requests increased by 80%.
In November 2025, the status of the Liaison Prosecutor at Eurojust was strengthened and since July 2026 a new Liaison Prosecutor has taken office.
In 2025, the Liaison Prosecutor managed 100 cases of international legal cooperation in various forms, compared with 79 cases in 2024 (+26%). Between September 2025 and March 2026, Moldova was involved in 26 new cases at Eurojust, including five as requesting country. Most cases were related to organised crime, money laundering and fraud. Moldova participated in 15
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joint investigative teams, including four new ones.
Moldova continued to cooperate with the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO) based on the relevant working agreements, but in 2025 there were no incoming EPPO mutual legal assistance requests. However, the EPPO had one active case with links to Moldova at the end of 2025.
Crime areas
Investigation and criminalisation of money laundering
Moldova stepped up its efforts to strengthen the financial crimes investigation system. Ahead of the September 2025 presidential elections, Moldova showed effectiveness and proactivity in investigating interference related actions, including illegal political financing, vote buying and financing of unrest. On that occasion, Moldova also adopted an effective national coordination approach. In June 2026, Moldova modified the legal framework for investigating and prosecuting money laundering and other financial crimes. The law modified NAC’s mandate to include the possibility of pursuing the detection of stand-alone money laundering, facilitating the prosecution of latent financial crimes. Additionally, a Roadmap of complementary measures to strengthen the entire financial crimes investigation system was adopted. NAC was allocated additional staff and budget in June 2026 to support it in implementing these reforms. In August 2026, Moldova adopted a unified national mechanism for parallel financial investigations, harmonising rules for assessing, launching, planning, conducting and coordinating such investigations.
Cybercrime
Moldova developed a sectoral strategy on cybersecurity in December 2025, which includes cybercrime. Moldova made progress in aligning with the EU acquis in this sector by ratifying the Second Additional Protocol to the Cybercrime Convention on enhanced cooperation and disclosure of electronic data in August 2026. Moldova now needs to align the national legal framework with the protocol’s provision. The Ministry of the Interior’s cybercrime unit and central forensic laboratory operational capacities should be further strengthened.
More efforts are needed to strengthen the detection and traceability of cybercrime data and the prosecution of cybercriminals. Since September 2025, an online platform for individuals to report on cybercrime was operationalised.
Child sexual abuse
In February 2026, Moldova adopted a law to strengthen the legal framework on preventing and combating sexual exploitation and abuse of minors, including through the internet, in line with the EU acquis in this area. Moldova is encouraged to improve its operational capacity to detect, investigate and prosecute child sexual abuse while ensuring support for victims and raising public awareness.
The institutional framework, monitoring mechanisms and interinstitutional coordination also need to be further strengthened in line with the recommendations of the Lanzarote Committee.
Trafficking in human beings
The legal framework for trafficking in human beings (THB) is partially aligned with the EU acquis. The country adopted a roadmap to implement the recommendations from the 2025 Council of Europe’s Group of Experts on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings (GRETA) 4th round evaluation report. Moldova also made further progress in EU acquis alignment, namely by adopting the law on preventing and combating trafficking of human beings and victim protection in July 2026.
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Moldova has stepped up its fight against trafficking through stronger interagency coordination, monitoring, and EU cooperation under EMPACT. To further advance these efforts, it must strengthen law enforcement’s investigative capacity, particularly to combat trafficking of children both online and offline in a proactive manner, as well as close gaps in early victim identification and support.
Regarding the track record, the number of identified trafficking victims fell by over a third between 2023 and 2025 (169 to 108), driven by fewer adult victims (144 to 83), while the number of child victims remained stable (25, 30, 25).
Migrant smuggling
Moldova remains primarily a transit country. Cooperation with EU agencies, Member States and neighbouring countries has improved, including through stronger interagency coordination. Moldova needs to boost its operational capacity to detect incidents along green borders and the administrative line. This requires further investment in detection equipment, risk analysis and intelligence-led policing.
Moldova takes part in the Global Alliance to Counter Migrant Smuggling and participated at the Global Alliance’s second conference in December 2025 and the Senior Officials’ Meeting of the Global Alliance in July 2026. Moldova has endorsed the Global Alliance Joint Declaration.
Trafficking in firearms
Moldova adopted a national programme on Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW). It established an inter-agency commission in line with international standards and operationalised the National Firearms Focal Point (NFFP). Moldova also adopted national legislation aimed at aligning its legal framework with the Firearms Directive and demonstrated its commitment to the different operational actions in which it participates under the EMPACT Firearms and Explosives framework. Moldova is encouraged to further develop the NFFP’s capacity in line with EU standards, finalise the set up of the SALW national registry, and fully align with the remaining EU acquis, including the relevant implementing acts.
Cooperation in the field of drugs
The legal framework for cooperation in the field of drugs needs to be further improved.
Moldova’s institutional model of cooperation in the field of drugs is broadly in line with EU standards. The legal and institutional framework on the prevention and combating of the illegal circulation of drugs has been improved, including with the NPS and precursor legislation. Further alignment with the EU acquis is still needed and the national early warning system (NEWS), and National Drugs Observatory (NDO) need to be further capacitated. Moldova must strengthen its capacity to detect, monitor and share high-quality information on new psychoactive substances and precursors, as well as reinforce storage and destruction capabilities.
While cooperation with the EU Drugs Agency (EUDA) remains strong, the quality of data provided requires improvement. EUDA and Moldova signed a working arrangement, which needs to be translated into operational action. Moldova also collaborates with Europol in this
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area.
Moldova remains a transit country for drugs. In 2025, drug-related offences increased compared with 2024, as did final convictions and court decisions. To counter this, Moldova must intensify drug trafficking investigations and implement measures to prevent, detect and address corruption within law enforcement. Moreover, Moldova must put in place effective preventive
measures to counter the domestic drug use.
During the reporting period, Moldova maintained strong cooperation on drug-related issues with neighbouring countries and beyond, sharing information via SIENA. It also participated in the EMPACT Operational Action Plan on synthetic drugs and new psychoactive substances (NPS), in which Moldova will be an action leader for 2026-2027. To further strengthen its response, Moldova should deepen operationalcooperation using an interagency approach and continue its engagement with EMPACT and Europol.
Moldova should also expand forensic capacity, particularly in laboratory services for NPS detection. At the same time, it must enhance addiction awareness, prevention, treatment, harm reduction, rehabilitation and social reintegration, ensuring full compliance with data protection and fundamental rights.
There are eight treatment centres for drug addiction, and access to
treatments is available in 13 prisons. During 2025, 137 new patients registered with the national opiate pharmacotherapy programme.
Counterfeiting of the euro
Moldova’s legislation on the suppression of counterfeit currency is partially aligned with the EU acquis.
Moldova aligned further with the EU acquis by updating its Criminal Code and becoming a party to the 1929 Geneva Convention for the suppression of counterfeiting currency. It should continue its efforts to set up a national central office (within the INI General Police Inspectorate).
Counter-terrorism, prevention and resilience
The legal frameworks for the fight against terrorism and for countering violent extremism are
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partially aligned with the EU acquis.
Fight against terrorism and prevention of radicalisation
The fight against terrorism is mainly addressed from the angle of combating terrorist financing (see also Chapter 4, Free movement of capital). In practice, the Anti-Terrorism Centre within the Security and Intelligence Service is in charge at the national level, ensuring institutional cooperation in this field. As terrorism threats are not identified as a major national concern, no specific legal or institutional reforms are currently envisaged.
Legal alignment, strategic and institutional frameworks
Moldova’s anti-terrorism legislation is partially aligned with the EU acquis. Compliance with the EU acquis on explosives precursors should still be ensured.
There is no dedicated national strategy in place on the fight against terrorism, as Moldova’s national security strategy addresses terrorism and terrorist financing. There are no plans to set up a dedicated strategy, due to the limited extent of the issue. Nonetheless, Moldova adopted a new National Programme for the Prevention and Combating of Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing (2026-2030) and adopted legislation to prevent terrorist financing in July 2026. Its current national programme for anti-terrorist protection measures does not align with the EU acquis on critical entity resilience. Moldova should address this gap when renewing the programme post-2026. Moldova should also implement the Regulation on Terrorist Content Online. In May 2026, Moldova signed the Protocol amending the Council of Europe Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism.
The institutional framework for the fight against terrorism needs to be improved, including by establishing competences, tasks and responsibilities for institutions working on preventing and countering radicalisation and violent extremism.
Implementation and enforcement capacity
The fight against terrorism and the countering of violent extremism are broadly satisfactory. Moldova has a national terrorist alert system with four levels, currently set at a moderate threat level. Moldova is encouraged to apply the methodology developed with the support of the Counter Terrorism Support Network (CTSN) to prepare a domestic terrorism trend and situation report.
Critical infrastructure protection
Legal alignment, strategic and institutional frameworks
The legal framework for critical infrastructure protection and the resilience of critical entities is partially aligned with the EU acquis. In February 2026, a new law on critical infrastructure protection entered into force, aligning partially with the EU acquis on the resilience of critical entities. However, the law is not yet fully aligned with the EU acquis. In July–August 2026, Moldova adopted a set of government decisions establishing an interinstitutional working group and key methodological, security and threshold frameworks to identify, assess and protect national critical infrastructure and strengthen responses to national security threats.
Implementation and enforcement capacity
The protection of critical infrastructure needs to be improved. Moldova has started identifying critical entities and a subdivision of the Ministry of Internal Affairs was designated as the central coordinating authority for critical infrastructure protection.
Migration and asylum
Legal and irregular migration and returns
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The legal framework for management of legal and irregular migration is partially aligned with the EU acquis. The management of legal and irregular migration needs to be improved.
Legal alignment, strategic and institutional frameworks
Moldova adopted and started implementing the new sectoral development programme for managing migration flows, asylum and integration of foreigners for 2026- 2030. Moldova should continue operationalizing the National Programme for the Phased Integration of Foreigners through the implementation of the roadmaps developed through the Education, Health, and Inclusion & Solutions Working Groups of the Refugee Coordination Forum. During the reporting period, Moldova also updated both its legal and irregular migration frameworks. The law on foreigners was amended to partially align with EU directives on third-country nationals’ stay, while also strengthening return procedures.
In 2026, Moldova extended temporary protection for displaced persons from Ukraine until March 2027.
Implementation and enforcement capacity
Irregular movements have been lower in 2025 than 2024 and the trend has been declining since its peak in 2022 (see Graph 18). As concerns readmission with the EU, the implementation of the EU-Moldova readmission agreement is continuing. In 2025, 5005 Moldovan citizens were returned from the EU. Moldova reported 425 voluntary and 70 forced returns.
Asylum
While the legal framework on asylum in Moldova is partially aligned with the EU acquis as it was in force until 12 June 2026, Moldova should focus on developing its national legal framework and operational capacities on migration and asylum to align with the Pact. The management of asylum is broadly satisfactory.
Legal alignment, strategic and institutional frameworks
Moldovan legislation on asylum is partially aligned with the EU acquis, and the country is party to the international conventions.
Moldova strengthened its asylum system through amendments to the Asylum Law that entered into force in January 2026. These established procedures for granting material reception conditions to applicants for international protection and mechanisms for applying the safe country of origin and safe third country concepts. To make it fully operational, Moldova should continue improving its national referral system for applicants with special needs.
The temporary protection granted to displaced persons from Ukraine aligns with EU standards, providing access to residence rights, identity documentation, education, the labour market and basic healthcare. As of 31 August 2026, 57 731 displaced persons from Ukraine were registered under Moldova’s temporary protection regime, many of them older persons or persons with
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disabilities. Resource constraints remain the primary challenge for national authorities processing international protection requests, compounded by the phased withdrawal of humanitarian aid. In 2026, Moldova updated its contingency planning.
Implementation and enforcement capacity
Following Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, Moldova has become both a transit and destination country for those fleeing the conflict.
In 2025, Moldova received 2 587 asylum applications, down from 4 101 in 2024. Despite this decrease, the number remains high relative to Moldova’s limited resources. To address this, authorities should continue strengthening the General Inspectorate for Migration (GIM) with additional specialised staff and equipment to ensure adequate assistance and basic services for migrants and applicants for international protection. Significant resources are needed to upgrade the GIM to EU standards. The GIM’s digital systems also require upgrades to ensure interoperability with other national and EU IT systems.
Moldova maintains a hosting capacity of 900 places in 9 Refugee Accommodation Centres (RACs), which were hosting 528 refugees as of August 2026. More RACs could be opened in the event of a crisis. Access to information on asylum procedures and legal counselling needs improvement, particularly at border crossing points and Chișinău International Airport to prevent potential cases of refoulement and unnecessary detention. Asylum case management should be further harmonised and the appeals system strengthened to align with EU standards. Moldova cooperates effectively with the European Union Agency for Asylum (EUAA), and will benefit from enhanced support following the first Roadmap signed between Moldova and the EUAA in September 2026.
Visa policy
The visa policy is not fully aligned with that of the EU, in particular with the list of countries
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whose nationals require a visa to enter the EU. Moldova’s list of visa-free countries diverges from that of the EU for 11 countries: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Qatar, Russia, Tajikistan, Türkiye, Uzbekistan, and Vanuatu.
In the reporting period, Moldova made progress in aligning its visa policy. In December 2025, Moldova adopted the law on denunciation of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) Agreement on visa-free travel. It represents a preparatory step towards further harmonisation of Moldova’s visa list with that of the EU.
Further progress on visa policy alignment is required, and pending full alignment, a more rigorous screening of visa-free arrivals of third-country nationals should be conducted, particularly those potentially presenting a security risk. The European Commission’s eighth report under the visa suspension mechanism from December 2025 concluded that Moldova continues to meet the visa liberalisation benchmarks.
Schengen governance and external borders
The legislative and strategic framework for the management of external borders is partially aligned with the EU acquis. The management of borders needs to be improved in line with European integrated border management principles and in preparation for the Schengen Agreement.
Legal alignment, strategic and institutional frameworks
Given the need to reinforce and establish solid foundations for the Schengen system, it is necessary to continue strengthening the national Schengen governance framework by appointing a national Schengen coordinator. A Schengen action plan covering all aspects related to Schengen preparations should also be adopted.
Moldova implements a national concept for European integrated border management (EIBM), including a four-tier access control model aligned with the European Border and Coast Guard Regulation. In December 2025, it adopted a new Integrated Border Management Programme for 2026-2030, accompanied by an action plan aligned with the EU’s multiannual strategic policy cycle. However, the Programme only partially aligns with the National Schengen Strategy.
The Law on the state border of Moldova must be fully implemented. This includes strengthening the capacity to conduct second-line checks at all border crossing points in line with EU standards, with adequate digital equipment, infrastructure, and specialised personnel. Substantial financial resources are needed to meet basic EU/Schengen criteria.
The General Inspectorate of Border Police has increased staffing for new border crossing points and second-line checks, achieving an overall occupancy rate of 93%. It should continue enhancing its capacity to detect criminal activities, especially drug and arms trafficking.
Moldova remains an active member of the Eastern Partnership Risk Analysis Network, a regional platform for information exchange and intelligence sharing. National procedures related to INTERPOL alerts are harmonised with European procedures.
However, the border police information system still faces security and data protection vulnerabilities. These issues must be addressed alongside the need to ensure interoperability with other law enforcement and national IT systems, in anticipation of a future connection to the EU large-scale IT systems.
Implementation and enforcement capacity
Moldova maintained strong cooperation with Frontex, with information exchange occurring both centrally and through joint points of contact. Cooperation with neighbouring border services in Romania and Ukraine continued through joint patrols and border control measures, including
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customs operations. As of September 2026, there were 86 Frontex-deployed officers at Moldova’s borders with Romania and Ukraine as well as at Chișinău airport on the basis of the status agreement between the EU and Moldova. The renewal of the working arrangement with Frontex is ongoing.
Moldova continued its efforts to train law enforcement institutions on anticorruption measures. In 2025, the border police implemented preventive activities to strengthen institutional ethics, reduce corruption vulnerabilities, and promote professional conduct standards through training and information sessions. During 2025, 49 cases of active corruption were reported, resulting in 22 criminal investigations and six cases sent to court.
Judicial cooperation in civil and commercial matters
Judicial cooperation in civil and commercial matters needs to be improved. This includes acceding to key international instruments: the 2007 Hague Child Support Convention and the 2007 Maintenance Obligations Protocol. In August 2026, Moldova adopted a law to accede to the 2019 Hague Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Civil or Commercial Matters.
Mutual legal assistance in civil and commercial matters also grew between 2023 and 2025: total requests rose by 41% (253 to 356), driven by incoming requests (207 to 293), while outgoing requests stayed low and volatile (46, 87, 63). During the reporting period, the National Institute of Justice provided training on international judicial cooperation in civil matters as part of its continuous training programme. However, institutional capacities to handle requests in civil and commercial matters require further improvement, as the average processing time currently remains between four and six months.
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2.3. ECONOMIC CRITERIA3
2.3.1. The existence of a functioning market economy
Economic governance
The government remains committed to macroeconomic stability and demonstrates strong willingness to improve economic governance, while some decisive reforms are still pending. Following Moldova’s request in January for a new IMF programme, discussions for a three-year non-disbursing IMF Policy Coordination Instrument (PCI) are ongoing but have stalled since a staff-level agreement was found in May 2026. Amendments to the central bank law were adopted in April 2026 to strengthen the central bank’s independence and institutional setup. The implementation of Moldova’s Reform Agenda under the EU Growth Plan is advancing well.
In March and October 2026, Moldova received the second and third regular instalments of EUR 189 million and EUR 157 million respectively under the Reform and Growth Facility, after successfully completing 44 additional reform steps. In terms of policy areas, Moldova has demonstrated good progress in economic governance, business environment and the energy sector. Key achievements include the adoption of deregulation package, enhanced budgetary transparency requirements, and further development of the electricity market.
Moldova participated in the economic and financial dialogue with the EU in May 2026, following the submission of its third economic reform programme. Implementation of the 2025 policy guidance was partial, with progress on macroeconomic forecasting, fiscal structural reforms, particularly related to spending reviews, and monetary policy. However, progress on increasing
3 Unless otherwise indicated, the data in this section are taken from the relevant national sources (the statistical
office, Ministry of Finance and the central bank).
Table: 2023 2024 2025
Moldova - Key economic figures
GDP per capita (% of EU27 in PPS) 27.8 30.0 29.8 30.1
GDP growth 2.1 1.2 0.3 2.4
Activity rate of the population aged 20-64 (%), total n/ a 58.4 59.1 57.2
male n/a 61.9 60.9 61.3
female n/a 55.3 57.5 53.6
Unemployment rate of the population aged 20-64 (%), total n/ a 4.6 3.9 3.9
male n/a 5.0 3.8 4.3
female n/a 4.2 4.1 3.4
Employment of the population aged 20-64 (annual growth %) n/ a 6.9 2.0 -3.2
male n/a 5.4 -0.3 0.0
female n/a 8.8 4.0 -6.2
Nominal wages (annual growth %) 13.1 16.9 14.6 11.5
Consumer price index (annual growth %) 8.7 13.4 4.7 7.8
Exchange rate against EUR 20.2 19.6 19.3 19.6
Current account balance (% GDP) -10.5 -11.1 -16.6 -19.7
Net foreign direct investment, FDI (% of GDP) 2.6 2.1 2.0 1.8
General government balance, % GDP -2.2 -5.1 -3.9 -3.9
General government debt, % GDP 30.8 34.9 38.1 39.2
Sources: WiiW, National Bureau of Statistics
2017-22
average
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public investment, streamlining tax expenditures, and reforming state-owned enterprises (SOE) was limited.
Macroeconomic stability
The economic recovery, that started in the second half of 2025, faces headwinds from external shocks. Annual real GDP growth in 2025 reached 2.4%, initially driven by a strong harvest and construction, before broadening towards the end of the year as manufacturing and IT recovered. Notably, industry recorded growth for the first time since 2021, driven largely by the extractive industry and food processing, although the signs of strengthening have not yet been sustained long enough to confirm a structural change. Growth was driven by strong private investment, backed by
favourable financing conditions and state support, alongside energy subsidies that shielded households from higher prices. Net exports remained a drag on growth, as agricultural exports only recovered in the second half of 2025 due to improved weather conditions. Real GDP growth slowed to 0.6% y-o-y in Q1-2026, as robust private consumption and a positive contribution from net exports were largely offset by weaker investment, amid the impact of the conflict in the Middle East and renewed upward pressure on energy prices. On the supply side, gains in manufacturing and retail trade were offset by sharp contractions in real estate, IT, and construction. After a growth of only 0.6% y-o-y in the second quarter, real GDP growth is expected to slow down in 2026 particularly due to the spillovers from increased escalation of Russia’s war against Ukraine and the impact of the conflict in the Middle East, higher imported energy prices, and potential second-round effects. Economic growth should pick up again in 2027, provided the impact of the conflict in the Middle East fades. Reforms and investments under the Reform and Growth Facility are expected to materialise from late 2026 onwards, increasing the potential GDP and the country’s resilience to external shocks. Moldova’s economic convergence with the EU has been slow, mainly due to the impact of external crises while absolute poverty rates stabilised around 30%.
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Moldova's external position deteriorated further in 2025, as the current account deficit reached a 16-year high reflecting persistent structural vulnerabilities to external shocks. In 2025, the current account deficit increased to 19.7% of GDP, up from 16.6% in 2024. This mainly reflected a surge in imports due to robust demand as well as a sharp increase in electricity imports after Russian gas supplies to the Transnistrian region, which had been the right bank's main source of electricity before 2025, were cut off. The larger goods deficit was partly offset by a services surplus, from strong IT services exports. During the first quarter of 2026, the current account deficit narrowed compared to Q1 2025 reaching 20.9% of GDP, driven by a reduction in the trade deficit. Remittances declined as share of GDP by 1 pp. to 9.2% in 2025. The widening current account deficit has been primarily financed by net inflows of currency and deposits, trade credits and advances as well as concessional long-term loans from multilateral and bilateral donors. Foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows slightly decreased as a share of GDP from 2.0% of GDP in 2024 to 1.8% in 2025 and remained dominated by reinvested earnings. Official reserves reached EUR 5.4 billion at the end of August 2026, equivalent to almost six months of projected imports, similar to levels end of 2024, and remaining well above the recommended range of 100-150% of the IMF’s reserve adequacy metric. Moldova’s net international investment position has become slightly more negative since the end of 2024 reaching -36.5% of GDP end of Q1 2026.
Inflation moderated in late 2025 before resurging in March 2026 after the escalation of the conflict in the Middle East, prompting the central bank to start tightening monetary policy. Inflation remained well above the central bank's target range of 5% ±1.5 pps. in 2025, reflecting an energy price shock at the beginning of that year. While inflation returned to the target range in January 2026, it re-accelerated thereafter reaching 7% in August 2026. This was driven by a sharp increase in global energy prices following the conflict in Iran and the Middle East, compounded by a depreciation of the domestic currency. As inflationary dynamics stabilised in 2025, the NBM shifted to an accommodative stance from August, gradually reducing the policy rate to 5% by December. Furthermore, the NBM continued to gradually reduce the required reserves ratio, to 18% for domestic currency, and to 26% for foreign
currency in February 2026. However, rising inflationary pressure prompted a gradual increase of the policy rate to 7.5% in August and 9% in September.
Moldova’s fiscal position is characterised by persistently high fiscal deficits and an upward debt trajectory. The 2025 fiscal deficit stood at 3.9% of GDP, below the 5% target, reflecting persistent under-investment. Revenues slightly exceeded expectations on the back of stronger than expected economic recovery. Despite three budget revisions
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and a fiscal stimulus of 2% of GDP through EU energy grants and Growth Plan disbursements, capital expenditure effectively edged up only by 0.1 pps. of GDP to 3.3% of GDP compared to 2024, with capital investment, in the narrow definition used by Moldova,4 rising modestly from 1% to 1.2% of GDP. In 2025, the public debt-to-GDP ratio increased by 1 pp, reaching 39.2% by the end of the year primarily driven by the high fiscal deficit, partly offset by favourable stock flow adjustments, mainly due to exchange rate developments.
The 2026 budget targets a fiscal deficit of 5.7% of GDP, presenting an overall shift towards investment and growth enhancing spending supported by the Growth Plan. However, similar to recent years, execution rates by end of July 2026 point to another under-execution of public investment in 2026. In addition, the supplementary budget for 2026 tabled at the end of August provides for a higher fiscal deficit of 6% of GDP, supported by higher current spending, such as public salaries and energy support payments during December. The estimated Growth Plan related spending in 2026 accounts for 1.5% of GDP, with 0.6% of GDP allocated to capital spending and the rest dedicated to the implementation of the Reform Agenda. Revenue is projected to remain broadly unchanged as a share of GDP. Given the projected fiscal deficits and limited nominal GDP growth, public debt is expected to further increase. Public debt management remains heavily reliant on concessional external financing and short-term domestic issuance, that increased by 3 pps y-o-y to almost 96% of total domestic issuances by end of June 2026, adding to debt-servicing costs amid rising interest rates.
There has been progress with structural fiscal reforms. On the revenue side, although some tax expenditures were phased out in 2025, new ones offset most revenue gains. In 2026, additional exemptions were introduced, the zero-income tax on reinvested SME profits was extended through 2026 at an estimated cost of 0.45% of GDP, and a new freelance tax regime with a 15% flat rate entered into force. The adoption of a broader tax reform aimed at simplification, revenue mobilisation, and improving predictability for investment and compliance is set to take place in the autumn. Main measures include an increase and introduction of new excises on harmful products, the increase of VAT for imported food, agriculture, HoReCa services and gas and electricity consumption above a certain threshold. The reform also proposes to increase the tax-free allowance for personal income taxation to incentivise formal employment, higher taxation on gambling and, temporarily, on the financial sector, as well as further expansion of the zero-income tax on reinvested corporate profits. Overall, while some welcome steps have been taken to eliminate selected tax expenditures, the proposed reform falls short of a systematic reduction of tax expenditures to broaden the tax base. In addition, the estimated revenue gains are likely to be insufficient to cover the costs of the forthcoming public sector salary reform and to create fiscal space for higher public investment, thereby adding further pressure on the fiscal position. To improve tax compliance, work is ongoing to establish an automated tax non-compliance risk management system, with its implementation still pending. The public investment management reform has advanced well, with all new public investment projects above EUR 10 million now being assessed through the Single Project Pipeline and steps taken to increase public investment management capacities in the ministries. Lastly, the government has institutionalised regular spending reviews and adopted a robust implementation methodology. Building on this, the government has approved the scope and themes for upcoming spending reviews in education, general economic services and agriculture.
4 Capital investments fall under Code 391 in the National Public Budget. This is defined as expenditure aimed at
reconstruction, expansion, restoration of existing fixed assets and creation of new fixed assets. Compared to the broader concept of capital spending it does not include maintenance, repairs or increase in the value.
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Moldova's macroeconomic policy mix was broadly appropriate in 2025, sustaining stability and supporting growth, though key structural vulnerabilities persist. On the fiscal side, phasing out the electricity bill support by the end of 2025 helped mitigate the impact of higher energy prices on consumption. However, the 2025 fiscal stimulus heavily relied on current spending, limiting its growth enhancing effect, while capital expenditure remained under- executed. Monetary policy was broadly appropriate. The NBM shifted from an accommodative stance to tightening as inflation, having declined gradually in the second half of 2025, re- accelerated in response to global energy price pressures following the military escalation in the Middle East. On the external side, the widening current account deficit partly reflects a structural shift in energy supply, while highlighting the persistent vulnerability to external shocks, including climate change and lower demand from external partners.
Functioning of product markets
Business environment
Efforts to improve the business environment and attract investments have been increased, but structural challenges and the impact of Russia’s war against Ukraine continue to weigh on firms. The share of companies planning new investments in 2026 declined from 40% to around 32%, with larger firms reporting increased investment intentions and micro and small enterprises a decrease, suggesting that the latter are more affected by uncertainty. The 2025 OECD/World Bank Product Market Regulations Indicators recorded a meaningful progress over the past six years in reducing regulatory and administrative burdens, notably through simplified business registration requirements, cutting the costs of starting a business and steps to improve the communication and simplification of regulation. However, regulatory uncertainty remains a concern, as the regulatory reform agenda is not publicly disclosed, limiting firms' advance visibility of upcoming reforms, which is particularly relevant given the fast pace of EU acquis alignment. Further deregulation efforts are ongoing, including elimination of permits and procedural administrative simplification. In addition, the government continued to provide financial support to businesses to invest in the modernisation of production capacities, energy efficiency and innovation.
Investment promotion efforts continue through the expansion of the One-Stop Shop mechanism for investors and the creation of the Investment Map. However, FDI levels remain low, in part due to the impact of Russia’s war against neighbouring Ukraine. The adoption of a new Law on Investments, aimed at strengthening the investment framework, particularly for strategic investments, and further aligning it with the EU acquis, is pending, having been adopted in first reading by the Parliament in September. The first EU-Moldova Investment Conference was held in 2026 and led to a number of MoUs being signed with private investors.
The Corruption Perceptions Index’ score deteriorated slightly in 2025 for the first time since 2019, though the decline was less pronounced than the broader trend across Eastern Europe and Central Asia.
Informality remains high, although recent data suggest a slight improvement compared to 2024. According to World Economics (2025), the informal economy represents about 33.6% of GDP, a decrease by 3.5 pps. compared to 20245. Efforts to tackle informality intensified, notably a higher number of inspections, including unannounced inspections, as well as compliance campaigns and activation requirements under the Social Aid Programme to incentivise formal employment. Steps were taken to enhance the State Labour Inspectorate’s capacity. As a
5 Any estimations need to be taken with caution given the variety of methodological approaches.
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result, 76.7% of 8 000 identified informal workers were formalised in 2025, contributing to a 37% increase in salary-related tax revenues that year. In the first eight months of 2026, the number of identified and formalised cases already exceeded the previous year’s total. In June 2026, the paper-based registry for day labourers was replaced by an electronic system, strengthening the oversight of day labour arrangements further simplifying administrative procedures to incentivise formalisation.
State influence on product markets
The state continues to play a substantial role in the economy, while state ownership and competition frameworks remain to be strengthened. According to the 2025 World Bank Business Ready report and the OECD/WB Product Market Regulations Indicators, Moldova lags significantly behind newer EU Member States on competition enforcement, SOE governance, and public ownership transparency, as reflected by the persistent dominance of SOEs across competitive sectors. Despite efforts to delineate functions between the Ministry of Economic Development and Digitalisation and the Public Property Agency (PPA), the PPA continues to exert influence over policy and regulatory priorities in sectors where SOEs operate, conflating ownership and policymaking. Similar concerns exist in line ministries. Some SOEs that provide both commercial and public services lack legal separation of these activities or adequate compensation mechanisms, undermining a level playing field. Preparations for digitalising the public property register to improve transparency are ongoing, with full operationalisation still pending. The OECD Review of the Corporate Governance of SOEs is ongoing. In 2025, Moldova launched its first state aid scheme in line with EU requirements covering planned investments of about 0.6% of GDP.
Privatisation and restructuring
The SOE reform is advancing gradually, while recent developments raise concerns over SOE governance. Following the completion of the triage exercise in 2023, privatisation of five enterprises identified for immediate privatisation has been launched in June 2026. The deadline for the submission of offers for four investment profiles was extended until October due to a lack of sufficient interest. SOEs that are undergoing restructuring include the national electricity transmission system operator, SE Moldelectrica and the State Railway company. In addition, the government has prepared a draft decision on the liquidation of nine SOEs that are no longer operational. Insolvency procedures are underway to reduce contingent fiscal liabilities. However, several legal challenges risk stalling the process. SOE corporate governance reform is progressing, with four additional state-owned enterprises adopting the corporate governance code (bringing the total to 48), though the selection of independent board members continues to advance only slowly. A new law on SOE governance is being prepared with the support of international organisations, among others, strengthening the framework for the selection of independent board members.
The recently revealed irregularities in senior appointments, remuneration, and recruitment practices at the air navigation services state-owned enterprise MoldATSA have raised broader concerns regarding SOE governance. In response, the President of Moldova announced that a sector-wide audit would be conducted. In addition, the government has announced a reform of the Public Property Agency, with a stronger oversight from the Ministry of Economic Development and Digitalisation. As of September, there are plans to speed up the privatisation process of SOEs and to assess the feasibility of listing certain packages on stock exchanges.
Functioning of the financial market
Moldova's banking sector remained stable and resilient, supported by strong capital and liquidity buffers, though rising real estate lending amid growing prices warrants
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continued monitoring. The sector is dominated by mainly foreign-owned banks with assets accounting for 55% of GDP in 2025. Profitability increased as a result of higher interest income. Capital buffers remain high despite a slight decrease due to increased lending activity and liquidity levels stay well above regulatory requirements. The sector remains concentrated, with the five largest banks holding almost 90% of assets. Non-performing loans edged up again during the first six months of 2026 but remaining relatively low at 5.2%. There are potential risks related to loans under the Prima Casă PLUS programme and, warrant closer monitoring. The programme should be integrated into the general National Bank of Moldova (NBM) macroprudential framework. The IMF’s Financial Sector Assessment Programme published in February 2026 confirms that the banking system remains broadly resilient under a severe adverse scenario, supported by strong liquidity buffers across all banks and high initial capital in some institutions.
Lending to households and businesses increased strongly in 2025, supported by favourable financing conditions and broad investment promotion policies. Credit to the private sector reached 28.2% of GDP compared to 25.5% of GDP in 2024, driven mainly by consumer loans and real estate financing. The loan-to-deposit ratio rose by nearly 10 pps to 72.2% in 2025, the highest since 2020. Non-bank lending continued its upward trajectory, with non-bank assets rising to 5.9% of GDP by the end of 2025, an increase of 0.5 pps from the previous year. The concept for the National Financial Inclusion Strategy 2030 has been validated, and work is ongoing to finalise the strategy and its implementation programme. Moldova has a nascent capital market. As part of its Capital Market Development Strategy 2025–2030, Moldova established the Moldova International Stock Exchange, which was authorised to operate in August 2026.
Functioning of the labour market
Moldova's labour market continues to face structural challenges amid gradual signs of recovery. In line with the economic recovery, the labour market showed early signs of improvement in 2025, with employment growth concentrated in micro and small enterprises. Labour market participation, however, remains relatively low, standing at 60.5%6 in Q1 2026 (compared to the EU average of about 75.7% in 2025), with high inactivity reflecting informal employment and a growing share of NEETs in 2025 compared to the previous year. Unemployment in Q1 2026 stood at 10.4%, a significant increase compared to 2025, mainly reflecting, for the first time seasonally unemployed population7. Increased offer of active labour market measures helped increase placements by the National Employment Agency by 24%. To further support
6 The Labour force survey (LFS) in 2025 underwent several modifications/adjustments, also reflecting the results of
the 2024 census. The LFS was further revised in 2026 to ensure the alignment to EU standards. Hence, figures from 2026 and 2025 are not comparable to previous year figures.
7 From 2026, the revised definition of unemployment includes persons due to start a job within three months of the
reference week and seasonal workers awaiting return to seasonal employment — both previously classified as inactive until 2025.
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female employment, more childcare places were created, and a new allowance was introduced targeting youth employment. The freelancer regime, in force since January 2026, aims to address informality, although its impact still remains to be seen. In addition, there is a risk that freelance work could replace regular employment or incentivise the underreporting of income. Net migration, while slightly lower than in 2024, remains negative, particularly strong among working age population and still above pre-COVID levels.
2.3.2. The capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union
Education and innovation
While spending on education remains above EU average and efforts to improve education outcomes have intensified, measurable results remain limited. Amendments to the Education Code entered into force in March 2026, introducing performance-based school funding and measures to optimise local school networks. Curriculum revision is ongoing, with new qualification standards introduced in ICT, agriculture and engineering, and a new pilot scheme across 35 schools to encourage careers in science and technology. Moldova has stepped up its anti-fraud and anti-plagiarism efforts in universities. During the 2025/2026 school year, the number of dual VET learners expanded by 41% compared to the previous school year with employability rate well above that of traditional VET. A new vocational training centre was opened in the Bălți Free Economic Zone. Lastly, different formats of public-private dialogue have been strengthened to better align training with labour market needs. Despite these efforts labour shortages persist, especially among larger firms indicating more difficulties to hire particularly highly skilled workers. Recent PISA results point to a continued decline in basic skills, consistent with the broader OECD trend, whereas performance in science shows a positive trajectory.
Innovation outcomes remain limited despite ongoing efforts to increase investments into research and technology. Moldova records only 23 patents per million inhabitants compared, for example, to 55 in Romania. While patent applications have recovered from a low in 2023, they remain well below pre-pandemic levels. In terms of investment in emerging technologies, the country ranks 116th out of 127 countries measured. On the policy side, funding competitions have been launched under the National Programme on Research and Innovation and the Smart Specialisation Strategy, covering collaborative research, innovation vouchers, research infrastructure, and technology transfer. The winners of 12 public calls were announced in June 2026. Under the 2025-2030 Programme for Digital Innovation and Tech Start-ups, nine investment projects have already been approved, expected to mobilise about 1.4% of GDP.
Physical capital and quality of infrastructure
Moldova is advancing transport and digital infrastructure, although investments remain significantly below infrastructure needs. Overall capital spending increased by less than 0.1% of GDP compared to 2024, reaching 3.3% of GDP in 2025. Investments in the road infrastructure are ongoing with about 0.5% of GDP allocated to road maintenance and modernisation in 2025 from Growth Plan funds. However, the execution of road projects continues to be affected by high costs and inefficiency. Preparations remain at an early stage for a Chișinău ring road, a Ungheni-Chișinău-Odesa cross-border corridor with Ukraine, and the country's first motorway. Railway infrastructure remains underdeveloped and outdated, though electrification projects are slowly advancing. To strengthen project execution, a dedicated capital investment management unit has been established in the Ministry of Infrastructure and Regional Development, though it is not yet fully operational.
Investments into energy infrastructure remain a priority as Moldova's energy security continues to be directly affected by Russia's war against Ukraine. A Russian strike on 23
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March 2026 disrupted the main electricity import line. A separate strike on a Ukrainian hydropower station caused significant pollution of the Nistru river. At the same time, efforts to improve interconnectedness with the EU and independence are progressing. Work on two electricity interconnection lines with the EU grid continues, although the operationalisation of the Vulcănești-Chișinău line is delayed beyond its initial end of 2025 target. Renewable energy capacity grew strongly, increasing by 69% y-o-y in 2025 and accounting for 24.5% of annual electricity consumption, up from 13.9% in 2024. Investment in battery energy storage systems is also ongoing. A mechanism to support households and businesses in acquiring battery storage systems was launched in the second part of 2025.
Digitalisation is continuing to advance. Nearly 95% of households have internet access, online public services for businesses reached close to 80% of all business-related public services, and Moldova joined the EU Roam Like at Home scheme in January 2026. However, according to the European 5G Observatory, 5G coverage remains well below the EU average (25-40% versus over 90%).
Sectoral and enterprise structure
The shift from agriculture and industry toward services continued in 2025. ICT recorded the strongest increase in GDP share, reaching 7.5% of GDP and broadly matching agriculture, whose contribution has declined by more than 3 pps in the last five years. Trade and other services further expanded their contribution to growth. By contrast, manufacturing continued to lose share, despite some positive developments at the end of 2025 mainly supported by the food industry. While on a declining trajectory, agriculture remains characterised by subsistence farming, which accounted for more than two fifths of agricultural output in 2025.
SMEs contribute more than half of GDP and remain concentrated in trade, construction, and agriculture. At the same time, the sector is gradually diversifying, supported by targeted programmes implemented by ODA, including initiatives promoting the green transition and a new scheme supporting SME integration into global value chains. Around 75% of SMEs operate in the services sector, but activity remains concentrated in wholesale and retail activities, with only about one third active in higher value-added activities such as ICT, business and financial services.
Economic integration with the EU and price competitiveness
Despite deeper EU integration and a shift towards services, Moldova's trade performance remains constrained by a narrow export base. Trade with the EU intensified confirming the EU as Moldova largest trading partner, absorbing 67.8% of goods exports (up 6 pps over five years) and supplying over half of goods imports (up 10 pps) in 2025. At the same time, flows remain heavily concentrated, with Romania alone accounting for more than 40% of all goods exports to the EU.Overallservices exports amounted to almost half of total exports in 2025, rising by more than 10 pps over five years, driven mainly by ICT. Goods exports remain concentrated in low value-added activities, with agricultural products and processed food accounting for nearly 50% of the total. The share of machinery and equipment continues to fall, and textiles stabilise. The import licensing requirements on grain and seeds introduced in 2023 expired at the end of 2025, removing restrictions that had previously constrained the production and export of processed agricultural goods, particularly sunflower oil, by limiting access to lower-cost inputs sourced mainly from Ukraine. At the end of August 2026, a temporary licensing mechanism for imports of certain cereals and oilseeds was adopted. It will apply until the end of October.
External price competitiveness continued to erode. Wages and unit labour costs increased further in 2025, amid persistently low average productivity, though wages rose at a slower pace
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than in 2024. The real effective exchange rate stabilised in 2025 before slightly depreciating
during the first months of 2026 supported by a gradual currency depreciation and easing inflation during the first months of 2026. These overall developments call for greater export diversification and policies to increase productivity.
2.4. PUBLIC PROCUREMENT, STATISTICS AND FINANCIAL CONTROL
Chapter 5 - Public procurement
EU rules ensure that the public procurement of goods, services and works in any Member State is transparent and open to all EU companies on the basis of non-discrimination and equal treatment.
Institutional setup and legal alignment
The legal framework on public procurement is largely aligned with the EU acquis. The government continued the implementation of the National Programme for Development of the Public Procurement System for 2023-2027.
A new Law on public procurement was adopted in December 2025 and is planned to enter into force on January 2027, ensuring a high level of alignment with the EU acquis. The new law consolidates the fragmented regulations into a comprehensive framework, with clearer rules on procedures, mixed contracts and social procurement, expanded and structured exceptions, differentiated thresholds at both local and central level, and expanded publication and reporting obligations to enhance transparency. In June 2026, amendments to the law on procurement in the water, energy, transport and postal services sectors achieved a high level of alignment with the EU Directive on utilities procurement. In addition, in June 2026, another legislative amendment on coordination of defence and security procurement achieved partial alignment with the EU Directive.
The legislative framework on concessions and public-private partnerships still needs to be fully aligned with the EU acquis.
During the reporting period, institutional priorities focused on improving procurement planning, professionalisation and monitoring mechanisms, with limited progress on digitalising procurement processes.
From a gender equality perspective, efforts should continue to mainstream gender equality and social inclusion into public procurement, including through the adoption of a national methodological guide, capacity building for contracting authorities, gender-responsive monitoring and evaluation, and increased participation of women-led businesses and other
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underrepresented groups.
Implementation and enforcement capacity
The public procurement market accounted for 4.9% of GDP, increasing from 4.1% in 2024, with 10 013 total procedures in 2025. The most used procedure for public procurement in 2025 was the open tender procedure, with 4 553 open tenders conducted, leading to 26 818 contracts. This accounted for 74.1% of the total number of contracts awarded and 81% of their total value in 2025.
The institutional framework is in place, but the capacity to manage public procurement processes needs to be improved at both central and local levels. The implementation capacity continued to face systematic weaknesses due to weak monitoring on contract execution and limited data interoperability, which restricts transparency and risk-based oversight. Training on the new qualification system and the certification of procurement professionals began in March 2026. The monitoring capacity of the Public Procurement Agency remained limited due to the outdated electronic procurement system, MTender, as delivery, invoices, payments amendments and performance are not captured digitally or published. Moldova still needs to establish monitoring mechanisms regarding low-value procurement.
Regarding prevention of corruption in public procurement, Moldova continued reforms through measures linked to the National Integrity and Anti-corruption Programme, efforts to professionalise procurement functions and the modernisation of e-procurement systems. Transparency and monitoring tools are in place through MTender and the Public Procurement Agency, but concerns persist, notably regarding low-value procurement. In June 2026, the regulation on low-value public procurement introduced mandatory publication of participation notices in SIA RSAP for low-value procurement above MDL 400,000 for goods and services and MDL 600,000 for works, social services and other specific services
Efficient remedy system
In terms of the right to legal remedy, Moldova further aligned its legislative framework by adopting the new Law on remedies and review procedures in February 2026, establishing a specialised and distinct system for handling complaints across all types of procurement. The independent National Agency for Solving Complaints received 1 206 appeals on 864 procurement procedures (1 245 appeals in 2024), of which 89.5% were related to public procurement procedures, 7.5% were related to sectoral procurement procedures and 2.9% fell outside the agency's remit.
Chapter 18 – Statistics
European statistics are developed, produced and disseminated by EU Member States, guided by the principles and quality criteria elaborated in the Regulation on European statistics, such as professional independence, impartiality, reliability, accessibility and statistical confidentiality. Common rules are provided for the methodology, production and dissemination of statistical information, which are further specified in sectoral legislation that constitute the EU acquis on statistics.
Regarding statistical infrastructure, the implementation of the national statistical system (NSS) development strategy and programme requires adequate resources and stronger internal capacity. The staffing of the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) stood at 79% in August 2026 and remains a constraint. Moldova expanded the use of administrative data in official statistics. In December 2025, the NBS adopted Guidelines on confidentiality and data protection, strengthening the framework for secure data use. Implementation of the Single Integrated Metadata Structure began in January 2026, and quality work continued under the ESS Quality
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Assurance Framework, although all posts in the quality division remain vacant.
On classifications and registers, full alignment with the EU acquis on coverage, methodology, timeliness, and disaggregation remains pending. The NACE Rev. 2 and CPA Ver. 2.1, need to be updated. Moldova implemented the national version of the Nomenclature of Industrial Products and Services (PRODMOLD), harmonized with the European standard PRODCOM- 2022, and the Classification of Individual Consumption According to Purpose (COICOP). The NBS, developed the national Classification of Education and Training Programmes (MoldCED 2), in line with ISCED 2011 and ISCED-F 2013.
On macroeconomic statistics, fiscal notifications for the excessive deficit procedure are not produced. In December 2025, the NBS, NBM, the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Economic Development and Digitalization signed a Memorandum of Understanding for the national accounts for the general government sector, government finance statistics, and excessive deficit procedure requirements. A Coordination Committee and working group on the classification of institutional units in line with ESA 2010 was created in January 2026. The timeliness of annual GDP data improved from 75 to 70 days after the reference period. The compilation of national accounts and the gross national income (GNI) based on ESA 2010 definitions and accounting rules still needs to be ensured. An updated roadmap for improving national accounts in 2026-2030 in line with ESA 2010 has been prepared, providing a more robust institutional basis for future alignment in the macroeconomic domain. The NBS does not calculate the harmonised index of consumer prices (HICP) or the house price index (HPI).
On business statistics, Moldova increased its data transmission to Eurostat. Surveys were conducted on innovation, information and communication technology, and tourism. Experimental calculations on women's entrepreneurship were disseminated. Starting from July 2026, the timeliness of the transmission of data on international trade in goods statistics to Eurostat improved to correspond to EU acquis requirements. Data on the ICT usage by enterprises was disseminated on the NBS website.
On social statistics, dissemination of the 2024 population and housing census results continued. The European health interview survey was conducted in 2025; preparations for the EU survey on income and living conditions advanced with pilot data collection in May 2026. A gender-based violence survey was completed in December 2025. The NBS updated the Labour Force Survey methodology and redesigned the questionnaires to align it with the EU acquis. Data and metadata on healthcare facilities, human resources and utilisation were prepared in SIMS format and transmitted to Eurostat. The methodology for producing Health Accounts in accordance with the SHA-2011 requirements was approved in December 2025. Demographic and international migration statistics including metadata were produced and transmitted to Eurostat. However, data availability still needs improvement. Moldova needs to strengthen the collection of sex and disability-disaggregated data and develop statistics on asylum and managed migration. The NBS publishes annual overviews of the situation of persons with disabilities.
On agricultural statistics, the last agricultural census was conducted in 2011. The roadmap for the integrated agricultural survey was approved in December 2025. The year of conducting the General Agricultural Census has not yet been determined.
On the statistical geodatabase for disseminating the results of the population and housing census, significant progress was achieved. The structure of the NBS Geoportal has been finalised, and 180 thematic maps have been prepared based on the 2024 Census data and other regional level data. The beta version of the Geoportal is currently undergoing internal testing and is expected to become operational by the end of 2026.
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Energy statistics data are produced in accordance with the relevant international classifications.
Chapter 32 - Financial control
The EU promotes the reform of national governance systems to improve managerial accountability, sound financial management of income and expenditure, and external audit of public funds. The financial control rules further protect the EU’s financial interests against fraud in the management of EU funds and the euro against counterfeiting.
Public internal financial control (PIFC)
The PIFC Development Programme 2024-2027 is making gradual progress despite some delays and drove the strengthening of the national certification scheme for internal audit. There were no relevant updates to the PIFC legal framework in place.
The compliance of first-budget users with the organisational standards set by the internal control system has increased, although full compliance should be targeted, and related monitoring and reporting procedures were strengthened. Risk management remains at an early stage, but groundwork is ongoing for its development, notably regarding risk registers and methodologies.
After the reorganisation of internal audit functions, the number of internal audit posts within ministries surged and all ministries now comply with the relevant legal requirements. However, almost half of the positions are still vacant. A pilot was launched on organising internal audit by associating the local public administration level, where capacity constraints remain substantial due to size. The mechanism for monitoring cases investigated following internal audits should also be reinforced.
Efficient implementation of managerial accountability continues to be a challenge for budget users at both central and local levels. Public bodies report to the central harmonisation unit, which consolidates annual reports and submits them to the government for approval. The role of public internal financial control in combating corruption needs strengthening, as does cooperation with the Court of Accounts.
External audit
Regarding the legal framework, the Court of Accounts (CoA) has its role enshrined in the Constitution, but not its independence. Legal amendments to the Court of Accounts Law to strengthen its financial independence were adopted in June 2026. Work continued to improve the consistency and quality of audits, and an external assessment of the CoA’s Quality Management System was finalised in October 2025. Challenges remain related to staffing and institutional capacity.
Parliamentary scrutiny occurs through the relevant committees, which organised hearings on more than half of submitted CoA audit reports. Implementation of the recommendations in CoA reports is encouraged by online publication of the data they contain. The CoA’s external engagement has improved and should be further reinforced to strengthen public trust and transparency and better follow up on CoA recommendations.
Protection of the EU’s financial interests
The legal framework remains partially aligned with the EU acquis, notably the PIF Directive. An Anti-fraud strategy has not yet been adopted. The State Financial Control Inspectorate, as the designed anti-fraud coordination service (AFCOS), was empowered to detect and report offences related to EU funds through amendments to the criminal procedure code in December 2025. It also signed bilateral agreements with 14 relevant institutions forming the National Anti-
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Fraud Network as the national AFCOS network in December 2025. Strengthening the capacity to proactively detect and investigate financial crimes and related illegal acts affecting EU’s financial interests remains essential.
Cooperation with the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) takes place on a case-by-case basis and has to be backed by a solid track record. In 2025, national authorities have initiated the process allowing them to report irregularities via the Irregularity Management System (IMS) and Moldovan authorities are encouraged to finalise their preparations and start using the system in cooperation with the Commission and OLAF.
Protection of the euro against counterfeiting
Strengthening of non-criminal measures will still be needed, including on technical examination and withdrawal of counterfeits. No progress was made regarding the implementation of the 1929 Geneva Convention.
Moldova made significant progress in strengthening the protection of public, EU-related and external funds through two complementary reforms: the establishment of the National Anti- Fraud System with the State Financial Control Inspectorate as Anti-Fraud Unit/AFCOS and the adopted financial crime investigation reform. Public internal financial control and external audit should support the anti-fraud system, such as by identifying weaknesses in internal controls and procurement. Audit and control findings need to be followed by effective recovery, disciplinary action, administrative sanctions or criminal referrals as appropriate.
3. GOOD NEIGHBOURLY RELATIONS AND REGIONAL COOPERATION
Moldova actively participates in and contributes to various regional cooperation platforms. During the reporting period, Moldova maintained its strong engagement in several regional cooperation initiatives, including the Central European Initiative (CEI) and the Three Seas Initiative (TSI). Additionally, Moldova remained active in the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Organisation (BSEC) and the South-East European Cooperation Process (SEECP). Moldova also contributed to regional security dialogue by hosting the third edition of the Black Sea Security Conference in March 2026 under the auspices of the International Crimea Platform.
Moldova maintains good relations with neighbouring EU Member States and other candidate countries, alongside cooperation under the Eastern Partnership policy framework.
Moldova enjoys excellent cooperation and bilateral contacts with Romania at all levels, with continued high-level exchanges. The first foreign visit of Prime Minister Tofan was to Romania in July 2026, soon after taking office, underlining the continued strategic nature of the bilateral relations. Bilateral dialogue remains intensive, with a strong focus on EU integration, resilience- building, and cooperation in energy security and connectivity. This includes several strategic investment projects being implemented in these areas. Romania also remains Moldova’s leading trading partner, helping it to strengthen connectivity with the EU Single Market.
Cooperation with Ukraine remains a cornerstone of Moldova’s foreign policy, marked by regular high-level engagement, including in the context of their respective EU accession processes. Both are in regular contact on regional and security challenges stemming from Russia’s ongoing war of aggression against Ukraine. Moldova remained actively engaged in international efforts to ensure accountability for crimes committed by Russia in Ukraine, including by signing the Convention on the establishment of an International Organisation for Claims and participating in the Register of Damage, while also supporting the establishment of a Special Tribunal for the Crime of Aggression against Ukraine. Moldova joined the Coalition of the Willing in support of Ukraine. To facilitate the export of Ukraine’s agricultural goods, Moldova has provided a 50%
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discount on rail transit for Ukrainian cargo until the end of 2026. Moldova continues to host the highest number of Ukrainian refugees per capita among countries in the region.
Trilateral cooperation with Ukraine and Romania further intensified on infrastructure, energy and security. In February 2026, the three countries signed a memorandum establishing the Cyber Alliance for Regional Resilience.
The strategic partnership between Moldova and Türkiye continued to evolve in key areas of engagement such as education and economic cooperation, as well as Türkiye’s continued support for projects in the autonomous region of Gagauzia.
Moldova also continued deepening relations with Western Balkanspartners and especially appreciates learning from their pre-accession experiences. Although Moldova does not recognise Kosovo*, the country participates in the NATO-led and UN-mandated Kosovo Force (KFOR) peacekeeping force.
4. RESILIENCE, SECURITY AND DEFENCE
Moldova’s contribution to regional stability, connectivity and resilience has gained strategic relevance for the EU in the context of the evolving regional security environment. Moldova is exposed to sustained attempts by Russia and its proxies to influence democratic processes, undermine sovereignty, territorial integrity, security, public trust, societal cohesion, and exploit strategic vulnerabilities. Since taking office in July 2026, the new Government has placed continued emphasis on resilience-building, making it a cross-cutting objective, underpinning economic and energy security, crisis preparedness and resilience to hybrid threats.
Democratic resilience
Strengthening democratic resilience and countering hybrid threats have become areas in which Moldova has developed significant operational know-how and institutional capacity, including cooperation with the EU. Faced with sustained interference and pressure by Russia, Moldova has generated valuable lessons on countering hybrid threats, including foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI), countering illicit financing, that are relevant for EU Member States and partner countries.
Recent electoral cycles in Moldova provided practical experience in protecting democratic processes against increasingly sophisticated interference tactics, including the misuse of artificial intelligence, coordinated online influence operations and the use of cryptocurrencies for covert political financing.
Support to building Moldova’s resilience has also helped refine the EU’s toolbox for countering hybrid threats through the EU’s deployment of complementary instruments and response mechanisms. This is reflected, inter alia, in the establishment in 2023 of the EU Partnership Mission in Moldova (EUPM), the first civilian CSDP mission with a dedicated mandate on hybrid threats.
Economic security and resilience
Moldova has significant potential to deepen its integration into European value chains, particularly through the relocation and nearshoring of production activities to Eastern Europe. The development of Moldova’s industrial parks and the activity of free economic zones, the
* This designation is without prejudice to positions on status and is in line with UNSCR 1244(1999) and the ICJ Opinion on the Kosovo declaration of independence.
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continued expansion of the IT sector, the modernisation of the agri-food industry, and investments supporting the green transition are concrete avenues for advancing this transformation. In this regard, Moldova currently has 13 industrial parks, 5 free economic zones, as well as the Giurgiulești International Free Port, which provide operational platforms for business expansion, investment attraction and enhanced economic cooperation. Moldova is also developing into a dynamic digital ecosystem, increasingly connected to digital value chains. Moldova’s economic security has been strengthened through cutting its dependence on Russian gas imports, the diversification of energy supplies and the reorientation of trade towards more stable European markets. Moldova is also well placed to serve as a regional hub supporting Ukraine’s reconstruction and recovery.
Defence capacity building and defence industrial dimension
Moldova is the second-largest beneficiary of bilateral support under the European Peace Facility (EPF), an off-budget instrument, with EUR 317 million committed to date, contributing to the modernisation of its defence capabilities and addresses key priorities, notably in air surveillance and air defence. EPF support covers a broad range of areas, from military medical equipment, cyber defence and tactical communications to mobility, electronic warfare and unmanned aerial reconnaissance. Since 2023, it has also increasingly supported Moldova’s air surveillance and defence capabilities, a new strategic dimension of the EU-Moldova partnership.
In the light of a deteriorating security situation in the region, Moldova is undertaking a comprehensive reform of its defence sector, including efforts to modernise its still limited defence industry, while fully respecting its constitutional neutrality. The country is interested in gradually integrating into European defence and dual-use industrial ecosystems. Although limited in scale, Moldova’s defence industry possesses certain dual-use capabilities, notably in nanotechnologies, electronics and components. Moldova is eligible to participate in common procurement projects with EU Member States under the Security Action for Europe (SAFE) instrument. Under the frameworks of the European Defence Fund (EDF) and the European Defence Industry Programme (EDIP), opportunities also exist for entities established in the EU or in associated countries, but subject to conditions and guarantees. To date, these opportunities have not yet materialised.
Civil protection and disaster resilience
Moldova continues improving its resilience in the field of civil protection and disaster preparedness. The country is an active Participating State in the Union Civil Protection Mechanism (UCPM).
5. ABILITY TO ASSUME THE OBLIGATIONS OF MEMBERSHIP
CLUSTER 2: INTERNAL MARKET
This cluster covers: free movement of goods (Chapter 1); freedom of movement for workers (Chapter 2); right of establishment and freedom to provide services (Chapter 3); free movement of capital (Chapter 4); company law (Chapter 6); intellectual property law (Chapter 7); competition policy (Chapter 8); financial services (Chapter 9); and consumer and health protection (Chapter 28). This cluster is key for Moldova’s preparations for the requirements of the EU’s internal market.
Chapter 1 - Free movement of goods
The free movement of goods ensures that many products can be traded freely across the EU based on common rules and procedures. Where products are governed by national rules, the principle of the free movement of goods prevents these rules from creating unjustified barriers to
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trade.
General principles
Moldova advanced the implementation of the Action Plan to adress the recommendations from the operational assessments of the standardisation, accreditation and conformity assessment and metrology systems.
Non-harmonised area
Moldova still needs to finalise and adopt the dedicated Action Plan on compliance with Articles 34–36 TFEU. It also needs to operationalise the newly established mutual recognition and obstacles to trade monitoring while strengthening administrative capacity, coordination and reporting in the non-harmonised area. Moldova has established an information and monitoring mechanism for major obstacles to trade, aligned with EU requirements. It also established a SOLVIT Centre within the Ministry of Economic Development and Digitalisation. In addition, the system for notification of technical regulations is fully operational and coordinated centrally.
Harmonised area: quality infrastructure
The Institute for Standardisation (ISM) reached 100% adoption of European Committee for Standardisation (CEN), European Committee for Electrotechnical Standardisation (CENELEC), and European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI) standards. During 2025, Moldova adopted 1 025 CEN, 420 CENELEC and 1 579 ETSI standards. ISM withdrew all ex-Soviet standards in January 2026 and in September 2025 was accepted for full CEN and CENELEC membership, which will start in 2027. ISM will also have to become a full fee-paying member of ETSI.
Moldova amended its law on accreditation and on conformity assessment in February 2026 to recognise radio, electrical and electronic equipment that has undergone EU conformity assessment, complies with EU directives, bears the CE mark, and has an EU Declaration of Conformity.
In 2025, Moldova conducted 3 263 market surveillance inspections, compared with 1 739 in 2024. Of the cases inspected, 10% were found non-compliant, down from 16% in 2024. The authorities temporarily blocked 102 products from being placed on the market, fully withdrew 3 products, and applied sanctions in 205 cases. Nevertheless, market surveillance authorities are not yet designated for all product sectors, and capacity building in this area remains necessary.
Harmonised area: sectoral legislation
In the area of the ‘new and global approach’, while Moldova has already aligned with a lot of the relevant EU acquis under the Association Agreement, there was progress on legislative alignment on EU acquis on civil explosives, fertilising products, and simple pressure vessels.
On EU ‘old approach’ product acquis, Moldova took steps to increase alignment with the EU acquis on motor vehicles and motorcycles, and on agricultural and forestry tractors. Alignment with the EU acquis on non-road mobile machinery safety has not progressed. In regard to Registration, Evaluation, Authorisation and Restriction of Chemicals (REACH) a phased alignment process is underway. In parallel, in August 2026 a comprehensive draft regulation on classification, labelling and packaging (CLP), developed with EU Twinning support, has been adopted by the Government.
On procedural measures, Moldova took steps to align with the EU acquis on the return of cultural goods unlawfully removed from the territory of an EU Member State.
As regards anti-corruption measures, the State Inspectorate for the Supervision of Non-Food Products and Consumer Protection continued inspections, product checks and laboratory
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testing of non-compliant products. However, there is still limited public information on complaints against inspectors, conflicts of interest, disciplinary measures or cases of suspected corruption related to inspections and product controls. Additionally, the level of deferral of criminal cases to courts remains low. Measures related to Customs corruption risks are reported under Chapter 29.
Chapter 2 - Freedom of movement for workers
National of one Member State have the right to work in another Member State and must be given the same working and social conditions as other workers.
Regarding access to the labour market, in March 2026, the law on the free movement and residence of citizens of the EU entered into force aiming to align with the EU acquis on the right of Union citizens to move and reside freely, on education of children of migrant workers and on the rights conferred on workers in the context of the freedom of movement of workers. The new legislation has also opened certain technical, specialised and auxiliary public administration positions to EU citizens, while civil servant posts remain restricted to Moldovan nationals. In 2025, 783 of 10 290 total residence permits were granted to EU citizens (v 303 in 2024). The largest number of foreigners who received residence permits came from Nepal, Türkiye, Bangladesh, and Uzbekistan.
Following the approval of a standard operating procedure by the General Inspectorate for Migration in March 2026, 28 applications for residence documents had been submitted, while in 2025, a total of 422 EU citizens were still to be documented under the old temporary stay-for- work regime.
On the European Network of Employment Services (EURES), Moldova has taken a series of measures to prepare for joining the network. In September 2025, it designated the National Employment Agency (NEA) as the National Coordination Office. In November 2025, the National Employment Agency (NEA) approved an order establishing the tasks and responsibilities of the National Coordination Office and the procedure for admission of organisations as EURES members and partners. Additionally, 10 EURES members were designated at territorial level and their responsibilities were clarified, thereby extending preparation into the territorial employment service network. Additional implementing acts have been adopted in the reporting period covering data collection, monitoring and evaluation of EURES activities.
Technical standards, procedures and formats were developed for matching job vacancies, applications and CVs with the EURES portal and for information exchange regarding the national EURES work programme.
On coordination of social security systems, the social security agreement with Italy entered into force in September 2025 and until September 2026 anagreement on social security was signed with Slovakia (March 2026).Negotiations of agreements with other Member States have been initiated and should continue.
In February 2026, Moldova designated the e-Governance Agency as the National Access Point for the Electronic Exchange of Social Security Information (EESSI), while the National Office of Social Insurance and the National Health Insurance Company were designated as liaison bodies within their areas of competence. A law amending several normative acts to establish the legal basis for the implementation of EU social security coordination rules and EESSI interconnection was adopted in the reporting period. An EESSI Action Plan was approved.
On the on the European Health Insurance Card (EHIC) a feasibility study on the financial impact of EHIC implementation was finalised in August 2026. In the same month, an EHIC
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Action Plan was approved detailing a roadmap for operational implementation
Chapter 3 - Right of establishment and freedom to provide services
EU natural and legal persons have the right to establish themselves in any Member State and to provide cross-border services. For certain regulated professions, there are rules on the mutual recognition of qualifications. EU rules on postal services focus on improving the quality of universal service, gradual market opening to competition, and the establishment of an independent regulator.
Regarding the right of establishment and freedom to provide services, Moldova has made progress towards alignment with the EU Services Directive, notably through carrying out a comprehensive screening of sectoral legislation to identify areas requiring further alignment and by developing a roadmap to strengthen institutional capacities. In August 2026, the national roadmap for 2026-2027 to implement the law on the freedom of establishment of service providers and the freedom to provide services was adopted to ensure the effective implementation of the EU Service Directive. Further progress is needed regarding the alignment of sectoral legislation, including through the amendment of identified normative acts and addressing remaining regulatory inconsistencies.
On postal services, Moldova is making progress to achieving the remaining alignment with the EU postal acquis, including provisions on the financing of the universal postal service and regulatory oversight of parcel delivery services. In March 2026, a Programme for the development of modern and competitive postal services for 2026-2029 was approved supported by a roadmap. Moldova should strengthen the administrative capacity of the national regulatory for postal services to enable efficient monitoring of the postal market and ensure compliance with the postal market rules.
Moldova has continued to work to align its legislation with the EU Directives on the recognition of professional qualifications and on the proportionality test. In August 2026, the law on the recognition of professional qualifications was adopted. A law amending certain normative acts and regulating the exercise of medical and pharmaceutical professions was adopted in July 2026.
Moldova advanced on the minimum training requirements for professions benefiting from automatic recognition. A Government Decision was adopted in May 2026 with regard to the profession of veterinary surgeon.
Chapter 4 - Free movement of capital
In the EU, capital and investments must be able to move without restrictions, with common rules for cross-border payments. Banks and other economic operators apply certain rules to support the fight against money laundering and terrorist financing.
On capital movements, Moldova continued work to further liberalise capital outflows. Moldova should adopt and start implementing the amended framework, establishing a calendar for liberalisation of capital movement until date of EU accession. Restrictions on the acquisition of agricultural land remain in place.
On payments, Moldova’s national legislation is largely aligned with the EU Payment Services Directive 2 (PSD2). Moldova should continue to step up its alignment efforts on the latest acquis, including the EU Payment Services Directive. Following Moldova’s inclusion in the geographical scope of the Single Euro Payments Area (SEPA), almost all Moldovan banks have been operational in the relevant schemes since October 2025, with the central bank reporting substantial savings on transaction costs.
Moldova has taken steps to continue strengthening on its anti-money laundering and
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countering the financing of terrorist (AML/CFT). The Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU) further strengthen its institutional and supervisory capacity during the reporting period. In July 2026, Moldova adopted the AML/CFT National Programme for 2026-2030 building on the findings of the 2025 National Risk Assessment. Moldova also worked on operationalising the goAML software and established an AML Training and Education Centre for certification of reporting officer. Further efforts are needed to ensure effective supervision of reporting entities and systematic use of FIU financial intelligence in corruption and financial crime investigations. Moldova should continue work on further legislative alignment with the latest EU acquis, ensure robust enforcement of the framework, including provisions on beneficial ownership, and account for AML/CT risk stemming from virtual assets, which is a high-risk area.
Chapter 6 - Company law
The EU has common rules on the formation, registration and disclosure requirements of a company, with complementary rules for accounting and financial reporting, and statutory audit.
In the area of company law and corporate governance, Moldova’s legislation is partially aligned with the EU acquis. A new information system ‘State Register of Legal Entities’ was launched by the State Services Agency in December 2025. The system enables registration of all legal forms of entities, thus strengthening the digital infrastructure for market entry and establishment procedures.
The National Commission for Financial Markets (NCFM) approved amendments to the Corporate Governance Code, which entered into force in January 2026, transposing key provisions of the EU acquis on shareholders’ rights and relevant Commission recommendations on directors’ remuneration and the role of non-executive and supervisory directors.
Further alignment with the EU acquis is still needed on cross-border operations (mergers, divisions, conversions) as well as on takeover bids, shareholder rights (SRD I), including the encouragement of long-term shareholder engagement (SRD II). Moldova should also complete alignment with the Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive (CSDDD), as amended by the Omnibus I Directive. The amendments simplified some of the obligations and postponed the transposition deadline to July 2028 and the application deadline to July 2029.
On company reporting and statutory audit, Moldova’s legislation is partially aligned with the EU acquis. Moldova should step up efforts to align with the EU acquis on accounting, transparency and statutory audit. In the reporting period, Moldova adopted a Decision aimed at strengthening recruitment procedures at the Public Audit Oversight Council and in May 2026 adopted Law on Accounting and Financial Reporting with the aim of aligning with the updated size criteria for micro, small, medium-sized and large enterprises.
Moldova should continue ensuring an independent system of oversight, investigations and penalties, with the appropriate level of administrative and financial resources.
Chapter 7 - Intellectual property law
The EU has, to a large extent, harmonised rules for the legal protection and enforcement of copyright and related rights, as well as of industrial property rights, including trade marks, designs, patents and related supplementary protection certificates (SPCs), and geographical indications (GIs), including craft and industrial GIs.
The Code of Offences was amended to introduce penalisation of the use of copyright infringing devices in March 2026. The new provision aims to prevent and combat unlawful acts in the field of electronic communication networks and services. These, together, with sanctions for using commercial communication to promote illegal devices, will enter into force in March 2027.
On collective rights management, the State Agency on Intellectual Property (AGEPI)
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strengthened supervision of collective management organisations (CMO). It issued control acts in December 2025 following verifications of the collection, distribution and payment of remuneration for 2021–2022, carried out a control of five CMOs for the 2024 activity year, approved two CMOs in March 2026, and issued corrective measures to improve transparency and administrative practices.
Institutional capacity was strengthened through structural reforms and intensified international cooperation. In January 2026, AGEPI was transferred to the Ministry of Justice under a new organisational framework. The reform also created an Intellectual Property Policy Division and assigned coordination to a State Secretary. In December 2025, two new AGEPI units were established: the Legal Cooperation Division, and the Planning and Public Procurement Division.
On industrial property rights, in April 2026, the Law on topographies of semiconductor products was adopted, aligning with the EU acquis and incorporating provisions on the enforcement of intellectual property rights, marking a key step in modernising the intellectual property framework. The Law on geographical indications, traditional specialties guaranteed and optional quality terms, adopted in April 2026, integrates enforcement provisions and aligns with recent EU regulations on geographical indications.
Moldova still has to advance on reforms in industrial designs, ensuring that enforcement provisions are systematically embedded across all major intellectual property domains, on trademarks, and procedure for patent applications.
Further strengthening of cooperation and coordination between the different bodies and institutions is needed. Moldova became the 40th member state of the European Patent Organisation in June 2026. In 2025, 5 068 trademark applications were filled, 3 975 were granted protection, and 4 719 were renewed. This represents a decrease from 2024 but was not due to any shortcomings under this chapter.
Regarding enforcement, Moldova needs to further improve its track record regarding the number of court cases and the number of inspections and sanctions on industrial property rights. While several training programmes have been delivered, improving capacities of the IPR institutions’ staff, judges, and prosecutors, and reinforcing human resources is needed for IPR enforcement.
Interinstitutional coordination was strengthened in May 2026 by expanding the IPR Enforcement Observatory, by integrating additional agencies such as the National Food Safety Agency and the National Anti-Corruption Centre, and by enabling the involvement of right holders in its activities. This reflects a shift towards integrated enforcement aligned with EU best practice.
The number of counterfeit products seized by the Customs Service decreased further from 33 656 in 2024 to 29 500 in 2025, as more big importers are complying with the law. Operational enforcement has also improved. In 2025, authorities recorded 133 detention cases, involving 1 084 cargo lots, including 285 lots (29 500 units), compared to 2024, when 141 seizures, equating 1 009 units, took place. A total of 3 363 counterfeit goods were destroyed, compared to 4 918 in 2024.
Chapter 8 - Competition policy
EU rules protect free competition. They include antitrust rules against restrictive agreements between companies and abuse of a dominant position, and also include rules on concentrations between companies which would significantly impede effective competition. EU rules also set out a system of State aid control. Governments are only allowed to grant State aid if restrictive conditions are met, with a view to preventing distortion of competition.
Antitrust and mergers
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On the legislative framework, Moldova’s legislation is broadly aligned with the EU acquis on antitrust and merger control.
Secondary legislation was strengthened on antitrust and merger proceedings. The Instruction on the Rules of Access to the File entered into force in November 2025, strengthening the rights of defence and procedural transparency in antitrust and merger proceedings. The Instruction on the Definition of the Relevant Market entered into force in January 2026, aligning analytical methodologies with EU practice. The Competition Council developed new instruments for access to confidential information, informal guidance in cases of genuine legal uncertainty, and commitments in antitrust and merger proceedings, including structural and behavioural remedies.
On the institutional framework, full alignment is still needed with the EU Directive 2019/1 to ensure more effective enforcement by providing the competition authority with the necessary independence, resources, and powers to conduct investigations, make decisions, and impose fines.
The resignation of the President of the Competition Council in February 2026 raised concerns about the operational independence of the institution. The dismissal procedures for the Competition Council Board members in Moldova are not yet aligned with EU acquis.
On enforcement capacity, leniency applications and dawn raids increased significantly indicating a more active enforcement approach. At the same time, the Competition Council’s remains understaffed and its institutional capacity needs to be further strengthened to ensure it can conduct investigations and enforce the law.
On implementation, the Competition Council has organised in the reporting period, through targeted measures including specialised trainings, seminars and awareness campaigns to the relevant stakeholders. Further specialised trainings are however needed.
The procurement procedure for the electronic case management system was contracted in March 2026. The system is expected to streamline internal workflows and strengthen analytical and case-handling capacity.
The Competition Council has advanced the integration of forensic IT tools for inspections by procuring specialised software and laboratory equipment.
State aid
Regarding the legislative framework, the Law on State aid is broadly aligned with Articles 107 and 108 TFEU. The legislation on State aid is partially aligned with the EU State aid guidelines, regulations and communications.
A new Law on State Aid was adopted, establishing a fully modernised framework aligned with the EU acquis. The new framework introduces clearer procedures, fixed timelines for notification and assessment, and stronger transparency and monitoring mechanisms, including the creation and operationalisation of a central register of de minimis aid.
Secondary legislation on state aid has been strengthened through several Regulations (on postal services, non-financial undertakings) and Instructions.
Some existing state aid schemes need to be fully aligned with the EU acquis. The use of state aid to repair damage caused by natural disasters or exceptional occurrences without prior notification is not in line with EU acquis.
Regarding the institutional framework, the Competition Council ensures consistent implementation of State aid law. The Competition Council remains understaffed (out of 120 posts, 52 posts were vacant by end of 2025) and its institutional capacity needs to be further
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strengthened.
On enforcement capacity, the Competition Council adopted 15 decisions were adopted on State aid in 2025. Since the increase of the minimum threshold in January 2024, the number of notifiable measures has decreased, and scrutiny has become more qualitative. Moldova received two State aid complaints in 2025, one of which led to the opening of an investigation.
On implementation, the Competition Council has raised awareness among aid grantors by informing them of the need to notify State aid measures to the Competition Council and to comply with the standstill obligation.
Liberalisation
The existing implementing legislation on various types of State aid, including horizontal aid, sectoral aid, and specific aid instruments, needs to be further strengthened in line with EU acquis.
Chapter 9 - Financial services
EU rules aim at ensuring fair competition among financial institutions, and the stability and integrity of financial markets, namely in the field of banking, insurance, supplementary pensions, investment services and securities. They include rules on the authorisation, operation and supervision of these institutions.
On banks and financial conglomerates, amendments to the central bank regulations were adopted during the reporting period aiming to align the national legislation with parts of the EU Capital Requirements Directive and Capital Requirement Regulation. These changes concern in particular, the treatment of counterparty credit risk, the leverage ratio reporting requirements, for the calculation of own funds requirements for operational risk, the prudential treatment of credit risk, counter-cyclical capital buffers, and the assessment of members of the management bodies of banks and persons holding key positions. In addition, a Law on Prudential Supervision of Investment Firms was adopted in July 2026. Moldova should continue efforts to align with the EU acquis, including also in the areas of bank recovery and resolution and deposit insurance. The current legal framework provides for the applicability of the MREL requirement starting from 2030.
On insurance and occupational pensions, there were no major legislative developments in the reporting period. The National Commission for Financial Markets (NCFM) granted the first license to administer private pension funds, however, no occupational pension funds are yet operational. The insurance and voluntary pension markets still remain in early stages of development. During the reporting period, insurers started disclosing their Solvency and Financial Condition Reports (for 2024) and most of them carried out their first Own Risk and Solvency Assessments (ORSA).
As regards financial market infrastructure, Moldova remains partially aligned with EU acquis. In November 2025, the NBM adopted a Regulation to define the legal framework necessary for establishing connections between central securities depositories from different jurisdictions. In July 2026, a Law amending the provisions on financial collateral arrangements was adopted. Moldova should continue alignment efforts to the EU acquis on financial markets infrastructure, including the European Market Infrastructure Regulation (EMIR), taking into account recent amendments.
On securities markets and investment services, markets remain at early stages of development. Moldova undertook preparatory work on future legislation aiming to align with the
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EU acquis and adopted a Law on Markets in Financial Instruments and Investment Activities, as well as a law on payment accounts. In December 2025, the International Stock Exchange of Moldova was registered as a joint stock company, and it was licensed by the NCFM in August 2026. Moldova should continue efforts to align with the EU acquis. In this area and across the Chapter, efforts are still needed to ensure that the NBM and the NCFM have sufficient capacity to carry out their responsibilities related to investor protection, market integrity and financial stability.
On sustainable and digital finance, a national Sustainable Finance Taxonomy was adopted by the government decision in April 2026 and a Law on the crypto-asset market was adopted in August 2026. Efforts need to continue to effectively implement the framework and to further strengthen operational resilience in the financial sector.
Chapter 28 - Consumer and health protection
EU rules protect consumers’ economic interests and also ensure product safety, prevent dangerous imitations and establish liability for defective products. The EU also guarantees a high level of protection of public health and in particular also ensures high common standards for tobacco control, blood tissues, cells and organs, and human and veterinary medicinal products. The EU also has rules for upholding patients’ rights in cross-border healthcare and in preparing for and responding to serious cross-border health threats, including communicable diseases.
Consumer protection
On general principles and non-safety related issues, Moldova adopted amendments to its Law on consumer protection aimed at aligning with the EU acquis on unfair commercial practices, alternative dispute resolution (ADR), sales of goods and consumer protection cooperation. On In October 2025, new legislative provisions entered into force with the aim of strengthening the protection of consumers of financial services and increasing the accountability of service providers, expanding the legal framework for consumer protection.
In 2025, consumer protection authorities handled a total of 11 356 calls through the single Consumer call centre. Calls were related to products and services placed on the market, as well as breaches of trade regulations. The e-Democracy platform, where individual can submit petitions and monitor their status, was expanded with the integration of the e-Petitions module for the management of digital consumer complaints.
Several structural problems remain in the consumer protection area, including the limited coordination powers of the national coordination council on consumer protection and market surveillance authorities and the slow operationalisation of ADR mechanisms.
On product safety, Moldova’s remains to be fully aligned with the EU acquis. Some progress was achieved, notably with the approval in March 2026 of Moldovan standards adopting harmonised European standards for general product safety. In February 2026 Moldova introduced a unified methodology for assessing the risk level of non-food products, aligning with EU practice and strengthening market surveillance.
Public health
In the reporting period, Moldova made some progress in strengthening its health system. The implementation of the 2030 national health strategy progressed with the focus on digital transformation and improvement of the quality of healthcare services. Investments in district- level and rural healthcare infrastructure and equipment, as well as state support programme for pharmacies in rural areas continued. The decentralisation of chemotherapy to district-level hospitals progressed. A 2026-2030 national patient safety plan has been adopted. Disparities
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remain prominent and require continued sustained measures to ensure equitable access to healthcare for rural population, persons with disabilities, Roma, and elderly.
On e-Health, in the reporting period, Moldova adopted the National Programme for Digitalisation and Innovation in Health for 2025-2030. The ePrescription system for compensated medicines and medical devices was modernised, while a fully digital system for certificates was introduced.
Moldova is partially aligned with EU acquis on tobacco control. Moldova prepared a comprehensive legislative package to adopt with the EU Directive on tobacco control and amendments to the hygiene regulations on tobacco and related products, devices and accessories, and health warnings and labelling in January 2026. An electronic reporting tool was developed in June 2026 to enable economic operators to submit information on tobacco products
Moldova is partially aligned with EU acquis on patients’ rights in cross-border healthcare.
Moldova is partially aligned with EU acquis on communicable diseases and cross-border threats. Moldova adopted medical crisis response measures and procedures in the event of public health emergencies in December 2025. A 2026-2030 national tuberculosis response programme for and 2026-2030 national action plan on patient safety were also adopted.
Moldova is partially aligned with EU acquis on blood, tissues, cells and organs. In December 2025, inspection mechanism for transplantation and control measures on compliance for quality and safety standards for substances of human origin were introduced.
Moldova is partially aligned with EU acquis on medicinal products for human use and veterinary medicine products. Moldova has an advanced alignment with the EU acquis on the pharmacovigilance of medicinal products for human use. A law on good manufacturing practice rules has been adopted.
In the field of falsified medicines, Moldova should adopt the rulebook and establish in a timely manner a verification system compatible with the technical requirements of the repositories system run by the European Medicines Verification Organisation (EMVO).
Moldova increased its alignment with EU acquis on cosmetics and on medical devices. On mental health, Moldova reorganisedspecialised units for treatment through coercive medical measures and adopted the minimum quality standards for providing mental health care by public and private services. Moldova also recorded progress on cancer screenings, with the adoption of the national cancer control programme for 2026-2030, around four main pillars: prevention, early detection, diagnosis and treatment
A sector-specific Anti-Corruption Action Plan for the health sector and mandatory health insurance for 2025-2028 was adopted ensuring a comprehensive framework to enhance transparency, accountability and integrity across the system.
CLUSTER 3: COMPETITIVENESS AND INCLUSIVE GROWTH
This cluster covers: digital transformation and media (Chapter 10); taxation (Chapter 16); economic and monetary policy (Chapter 17); social policy and employment (Chapter 19); industrial policy (Chapter 20), science and research (Chapter 25); education and culture (Chapter 26); and the customs union (Chapter 29).
Chapter 10 - Digital transformation and media
The EU supports the smooth functioning of the internal market for electronic communications,
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electronic commerce and audiovisual services. The rules protect consumers and support the universal availability of modern services.
Moldova has achieved tangible progress on the key performance indicators of its National Digital Transformation Strategy 2025-2027 and continued its implementation. The first European Digital Innovation Hub was launched in April 2026. In December 2025, Moldova adopted the National Cybersecurity Programme 2026-2030.
Regarding electronic communications, Moldova joined the EU’s ‘Roam Like at Home’ area on 1 January 2026, following alignment with the EU roaming acquis. Secondary legislation was also approximated, including measures related to the European Electronic Communication Code. Moldova harmonised its normative framework with the Gigabit Infrastructure Act, through the law on access to property for public services providers, adopted in June 2026, aimed at facilitating the deployment of very high-capacity electronic communications networks and reducing the broadband rollout costs. As of March 2026, the regulatory authority, renamed ARCOM, had 105 employees out of 114 available positions. The new legal framework reinforced ARCOM’s administrative and financial independence.
On digital services, Moldova has taken initial steps to establish the institutional framework for implementing the Digital Services Act (DSA) and the Digital Markets Act (DMA). Moldova needs to take further steps to build the societal and institutional capacity and to establish the legal basis to effectively support the enforcement of the DSA and the DMA as of EU accession, in line with the considerations and requirements outlined at the 2026 TAIEX workshops.
Alignment with the EU acquis on geo-blocking and platform-to-business relations remains partial: additional legislation entered into force in 2026 It is also broadly aligned with the E- Commerce Directive. Furthermore, Moldova has continued to expand digital public services. As of June 2026, 82% of government-to-businesses services and 61% government-to-citizens services have been digitalised. In July 2026, Moldova has adopted a law partially harmonising with the EU Directive on open data and the reuse of public sector information, in line with the European Interoperability Framework.
On digital trust and cybersecurity, Moldova has an advanced level of alignment in the field of electronic identification and trust services. Through amendments to the Law on electronic identification and trust services in December 2025, Moldova has fully aligned with EU requirements for qualified trust service providers as outlined in the European Digital identity regulation and joined the EU third country trusted list for advanced electronic signatures and seals. It has also developed a national strategy to align with eIDAS 2.0., including the amendments regarding the EUDI Wallet, and joined the EU Digital Identity Cooperation Group. Another key achievement was the launch of EVO 2.0 in June 2026. Cross-border interoperability of the national digital identity wallet was tested with European partners.
The Cyber Security Agency became operational as the national Single Point of Contact and national CERT, following staff recruitment, the deployment of core hardware and software and the establishment of the Cyber Incident and Crisis Response Directorate. Moldova continued to align with the NIS 2 Directive, including through the adoption of secondary legislation on cyber incidents and on security of public 5G networks. In December 2025, the National Cybersecurity Programme 2026-2030 was approved, setting objectives for national cyber resilience, institutional strengthening, skills development and public-private cooperation. The Council renewed Moldova access to the EU Cybersecurity Reserve for an additional year in July 2026.
There was some progress on 5G deployment with population coverage estimated at 25-35% Moldova should start implementing the EU 5G Cybersecurity Toolbox measures, including by putting in place appropriate restrictions and/or exclusions for high-risk suppliers.
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On artificial intelligence (AI), Moldova should develop the necessary governance, regulatory and enforcement structures in line with the EU AI Act. Moldova signed the Council of Europe Framework Convention on AI and Human Rights, Democracy and the Rule of Law.
On semiconductors, Moldova has made some progress by adopting the Law on the protection of topographies of semiconductor products in April 2026 but is yet to align with the Chips Act.
On media, Moldova adopted a new Law on Mass Media in August 2026 aiming to harmonise its legal framework with the European Media Freedom Act and with the Venice Commission recommendations on the extension of ownership transparency to print and online media. The institutional capacity of the Audiovisual Council was strengthened through the establishment of a new department for monitoring nonlinear audiovisual media services and video-sharing platforms. Yet, the authority remains understaffed. Public sector websites and mobile applications remain insufficiently accessible for persons with physical, sensory and intellectual disabilities, and accessibility of audiovisual services is limited.
In relation to the protection of minors online, a Safer Internet Centre was established in Moldova.
Chapter 16 - Taxation
EU rules on taxation cover value added tax, excise duties and aspects of corporate taxation. They also cover cooperation between tax administrations, including the exchange of information to prevent tax evasion.
As regards indirect taxation,Moldova has made some progress in further aligning national
legislation with the EU acquis. However, structural misalignments regarding VAT refunds and
exemptions remain. Moldova applies a standard VAT rate of 20% and a reduced rate of 8%. In
January 2026, the reduced VAT rate was extended to registered medical devices, a reverse-
charge mechanism was introduced for supplies of electricity and natural gas between registered
traders, and imports of natural gas, electricity, thermal energy and cooling energy delivered
through networks became exempt with the right of deduction. Further alignment is needed,
notably on the structure and scope of exemptions, deductions, reduced rates and special
schemes, and on VAT refund procedures. Moldova also needs to advance the technical
interoperability of its systems with the VAT Information Exchange System (VIES) and with the
solutions under the VAT in the Digital Age (ViDA) package.
In the area of excise duties, the legal framework for tobacco traceability was supplemented in January 2026 by rules on data-storage contracts; work on technical standards for security features continued. Digital solutions for the Excise Movement and Control System (EMCS) and the System for the Exchange of Excise Data (SEED) remain to be developed. Further capacity- building is needed in this area. Excise duty rates on energy and tobacco products have not yet been aligned with the EU acquis.
Regarding direct taxation, Moldova still needs to align with the EU directives on taxation applicable to mergers, cross-border reorganisations and parent-subsidiary companies. Progress was made on the Anti-Tax Avoidance Directive. While a Roadmap for Base Erosion and Profit Shifting minimum standards is in place, Moldova has not yet introduced the Pillar Two global minimum tax (15%). Alignment with EU administrative cooperation rules remains partial. While the Common Reporting Standard is operational, further work is required to ensure full compatibility with the Directive on Administrative Cooperation.
Regarding administrative cooperation and mutual assistance, there have been no developments on double taxation avoidance agreements during the reporting period. Moldova has concluded four treaties on cooperation in tax enforcement and is a party to the OECD
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Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters.
In terms of operational capacity and digitalisation, the tax administration launched sector- specific compliance initiatives and monitoring campaigns, incorporating both advisory visits and targeted inspections within high-risk sectors. In October 2025, the State Tax Service approved its IT Development Programme for 2025-2027, supported by a substantial multiannual budget allocation for its implementation. As part of the IT Development Programme and the National Programme for Accession, a Roadmap and timeline for interoperability with EU information systems, covering the period 2026-2029 was approved in November 2025. A Risk-based approach is being strengthened based on the recently approved Audit Modernisation Plan and capacity building measures including trainings. It is essential to further increase the digitalisation of tax services, strengthen the risk-based approach through operationalisation of an automated compliance risk management system and increase the share of risk-based tax audits. Further capacity building is also essential, including to establish a Central Excise and TAX Liaison Office. Moldova is the most active candidate country in the Fiscalis 2021-2027 programme.
Chapter 17 - Economic and monetary policy
EU rules require the independence of central banks and prohibit them from directly financing the public sector. Member States coordinate their economic policies and are subject to fiscal, economic and financial surveillance.
On monetary policy, Moldova made substantial progress on the alignment with the EU acquis. Amendments to the National Bank of Moldova Law to strengthen the appointment and dismissal procedures of members of the decision-making bodies and improving governance, transparency and accountability and alignment with the prohibition of privileged access were adopted in April 2026. The adoption of further amendments to the central bank law ensuring alignment with the EU acquis related to central bank independence and prohibition of monetary financing is pending.
On economic policy, Moldova made progress in strengthening fiscal governance by institutionalising spending reviews and linking the implementation of their results with the budget process and by establishing a new implementation methodology. The country is partially aligned with the EU acquis on fiscal surveillance. A three-year medium-term budgetary framework (MTBF) exists. However, the 2026-2028 MTBF was not approved and the approval of the 2027- 2029 MTBF is still pending. The framework lacks an assessment of medium-term budgetary impacts of fiscal policy measures and a long-term debt sustainability assessment. The macroeconomic forecast used for budgetary planning has been improved, notably by incorporating the labour market and external sector forecasts. However, there are methodological challenges related to the consistency between the macroeconomic and fiscal forecasts. Similar to previous years, the annual budgetary calendar was not respected in 2025. The escape clause for Moldova’s own fiscal rule continues to be in place for longer than foreseen, thereby weakening its credibility and effectiveness as a fiscal anchor. Legal amendments were introduced to improve fiscal transparency in line with the IMF Fiscal Transparency Code, requiring the inclusion of extra-budgetary units such as universities, public health institutions and the state road administration in the national public budget from 2027. Preparations for setting up an independent fiscal institution are advancing, with a first assessment of its possible scope and mandate published.
Moldova is partially aligned with the requirements of the coordination and surveillance of economic policies. Its participation in pre-accession economic surveillance has contributed to developing relevant administrative capacity. The Economic Reform Programme 2026-2028 included alternative macroeconomic scenarios reflecting different pace and scope of the EU Growth Plan implementation and its impact on the macroeconomic and fiscal outlook. It also
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covered for the first time the cyclically adjusted balance, current account and labour market projections. The programme would benefit from a comprehensive assessment of the budgetary impact of reforms and fiscal measures and long-term fiscal projections, particularly costs related to demographic developments.
Moldova’s statistical framework is not yet aligned with ESA 2010 requirements. An interinstitutional working group was established to classify institutional units in line with ESA 2010. Some new ESA 2010 datasets were produced and transmitted to Eurostat.
Chapter 19 - Social policy and employment
EU rules in the social field include minimum requirements for labour law, equality and non- discrimination, health and safety at work. They also promote social inclusion, social protection, and social dialogue at EU level.
In the area of labour law, Moldova continued preparing for alignment with the relevant acquis for example on safety and health at work for temporary workers, adequate minimum wages or temporary agency work. From 1 January 2026, the minimum wage was increased by 15%.
In 2025, informal employment decreased to an estimated 12.7% from 14.8% in 2024, despite a higher output of the agricultural sector, where informality is usually the highest (2025: 61.0% vs 64.4% 2024), compared to 10.2% in non-agricultural sectors. Construction also continues to have a high level of informality 49.0% (vs 63.3% in 2024). Moldova continued to implement the National Programme for the Reduction of Undeclared Work for 2024-2027.
In the area of health and safety, alignment with the relevant acquis continued. In April 2026, the government assigned the State Labour Inspectorate responsibility for collecting and coding data on all work accidents, including those involving civilian personnel in public authorities and special-status institutions.
In 2025, the State Labour Inspectorate (SLI) intensified efforts to detect and formalise undeclared work, identifying 8 086 informal workers, more than double the 3 088 cases detected in 2024. Around 76.6% of those identified were formalised. Preliminary data for 2026 is already showing further expansion: until end of the reporting period, the SLI identified 10 430 persons performing undeclared work, securing formalisation of 67.2 percent. This progress is linked to the SLI reform of December 2025. The SLI gained the power to conduct unannounced inspection visits, with its powers and mandate aligned with relevant ILO Conventions. A monitoring mechanism for inspection visits’ recommendations was also introduced.
On social dialogue, At the end of the reporting period, Moldova adopted an Action Plan for promoting collective bargaining and increasing collective bargaining coverage for 2026-2030. There is a need to strengthen capacity of social partners at all levels.
On employment policy, the National Employment Agency (NEA) focused on training of staff, and expanded digitalisation via the development of a new integrated information system in December 2025, aiming at ensuring fully digitalised services by 2027. In 2025, 20 733 jobseekers were employed, representing a 24.2% increase compared to 2024. Also 1 217 unemployed persons benefited from active measures. The latter is currently being expanded, with special focus to groups in vulnerable situations, reaching 3739 persons by end of August 2026. Up until August 2026, through the territorial employment subdivisions of the NEA
supported the employment of 15 083 jobseekers. NEA has limited but increasing human resources and financial capacity. Regarding labour force participation and unemployment rate see the statistical annex and the section on the functioning of the labour market under 2.3 Economic criteria. Moldova’s definitions for both are not aligned with the EU’s.
On social protection and inclusion, Moldova continued its progress during the reporting
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period amid a continuing challenging economic situation.
In 2025, the poverty rate was 31.1% (urban areas 21.1%, rural areas 40%), disproportionately affecting older people, children, persons with disabilities, Roma, and those working in agriculture. To address these challenges, the government continued indexing pensions and social benefits by 6.84% in 2026 and continued income support through social aid payments and energy poverty compensations. Moldova should further strengthen its social protection system by enhancing adequacy, coverage and targeting of social benefits, focusing on children, low-income households and persons with disabilities.
Under the ‘RESTART’ reform, progress was made through capacity building, the hiring of additional child protection specialists, updates to quality standards for 34 social services, and digitalisation efforts, including the launch of second iteration of eSocial. However, challenges persist, such as suboptimal targeting, staff shortages, and unclear division of responsibilities between social assistance agencies and local authorities. Moldova committed to implementing the European Child Guarantee by setting up an interministerial working group in September 2025 and preparing its National Plan 2027 -2030.
Investments in existing social service facilities continued, with a modest expansion of social services, including community-based ones, in some regions, mainly supported by donors. Despite these efforts, coverage remains insufficient, particularly for vulnerable groups.
Moldova needs to prioritise investments in high-quality, equitable, and affordable social services, including family- and community-based services and accessible housing. It should also transfer donor-established services into the state budget and facilitate social service contracting from civil society organisations to diversify the market and improve quality and outreach. Strengthening the capacity of the State Social Inspectorate for monitoring and inspection is also necessary.
On non-discrimination and equal treatment in employment and social policy, Moldova needs to complete alignment of its legal framework with the relevant EU acquis, including the Employment Equality Directive. According to the Equality Council, discrimination in employment in 2025 was most frequently based on sex/gender (45%), followed by age (21%). As regards access to goods and services, discrimination was primarily based on disability (33%), followed by language and ethnic origin (17% each).
Participation of persons with disabilities in the labour market decreased to 14.6%, with 13.9% for men and 15.4% for women (2024: 16% for men, 18.2% for women). Persons with disabilities continue to face persistent employment barriers linked to poverty, lack of reasonable accommodation, limited access to inclusive education, infrastructure and transportation. Although subsidies for employing persons with disabilities and reasonable accommodation for workplaces exist, their uptake appears limited, reflecting broader challenges in employer engagement and labour market inclusion. Supported
employment initiatives are implemented, often in cooperation with civil society and international
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partners, and should continue to ensure more sustained and systematic impact. Public and private job portals are largely inaccessible. The newly adopted National Programme for Social Inclusion of Persons with Disabilities 2026-2030 aims to strengthen social services and support for independent living.
The National Roma Programme 2022-2025 includes a dedicated employment objective; however, its implementation remains limited.
On equality between women and men in employment and social policy, Moldova made progress by adopting legislation on gender balance on company boards The implementation of the National Programme for Promoting and Ensuring Equality between Women and Men for 2023-2027 progressed, with overall 65.9% of planned activities completed. Public and private kindergartens were expanded, also with support of development partners. However, women’s labour market participation decreased from 41.4% (2024) to 37.8%, while the gender pay gap increased from 15.6% (2024) to 16.6%. Women and girls in STEM remain significantly underrepresented. Moldova should strengthen efforts to increase women’s labour market participation.
Moldova is partially aligned with the EU acquis on the European Social Fund (ESF) andcontinues to establish the necessary institutional, administrative and financial frameworks to implement the ESF upon accession.
Chapter 20 - Enterprise and industrial policy
EU industrial policy strengthens competitiveness, facilitates structural change, and encourages a business-friendly environment that stimulates small and medium-sized enterprises.
On enterprise and industrial policy principles, the Government continued implementing the 2023–2027 entrepreneurship and competitiveness programme and the 2024–2028 industrial development programme (NIPD). Limited administrative capacity and limited funding from the national budget continue to restrain the implementation of these programmes. The NIPD would benefit from a time-bound action plan and adequate budget allocations. The regular publication of implementation reports would also strengthen the monitoring of these programmes.
Moldova took further steps to strengthen skills and competitiveness in industrial policy. In December 2025, it opened the “TechZone” Industrial Continuing Education Centre in the Bălți Free Economic Zone to provide training tailored to industry needs. To strengthen the Entrepreneurship Development Organisation (ODA) internal governance, compliance and risk management, two new units were established in January 2026. In April 2026, ODA approved a methodology for monitoring and evaluating grant programmes in line with OECD-DAC criteria. Procurement for the implementation of the ODA Integrated Information System was completed in June 2026.
In September 2025, a government decision established a unified framework for SME support to reduce fragmentation, simplify access, avoid overlaps, and strengthen monitoring and accountability. In April 2026, ODA completed the consolidation of six grant-support mechanisms into the “GROWING SMEs” instrument. In December 2025, Moldova adopted legislative packages to simplify permit procedures and improve the business environment, including a range of deregulation measures aimed at streamlining and modernising administrative processes.
On enterprise and industrial policy instruments, ODA relaunched grant calls supporting women entrepreneurs, small producers, digital innovation and tech start-ups, tourism SMEs, and local producer competitiveness, with a focus on digital and green transition, modernisation, and energy efficiency.
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In October 2025, the government amended its state aid scheme for investment in the six priority manufacturing sectors of electronics, chemical and pharmaceutical, machinery and automotive components, textile and clothing, construction materials, and food industries to align it with EU requirements and doubled its budget to MDL 4 billion (EUR 198 million). In 2025, 20 companies benefited from the scheme. By August 2026, 28 State aid agreements had been concluded for manufacturing projects, supporting approximately MDL 2.76 billion (EUR 138 million) in planned investment and the creation of 1572 jobs. A government decision amending the regional State aid scheme was adopted in August 2026 strengthening the alignment of the investment support framework with EU State aid requirements.
Moldova is associated with the Single Market Programme, is a Member of the Enterprise Europe Network, and is involved in the EU cluster initiatives like the European Cluster Collaboration Platform.
Moldova does not yet follow the EU Recommendation on the SME definition. Application improved in January 2026, when 396 enterprises were requalified from large to small and medium enterprises.
Under the Late Payment Directive, monitoring systems to assess payment performance, especially by public authorities, remain needed.
Progress under the programme on administration of state public property for 2024-2027 included raising the share of publicly owned land recorded in the Real Estate Register from 14% to 27%, appointing independent members to seven SOE boards, and launching the Public Property and State Property Administration Register. In June 2026, 11 SOEs were merged to improve governance and operational efficiency in line with EU and OECD principles.
In sectoral policies, no progress was achieved.
Chapter 25 - Science and research
The EU provides significant support for research and innovation. All EU Member States, associated countries and third countries participate in the EU’s research and innovation programmes, and can benefit from them, especially where there is a scientific excellence and solid investment in research and innovation.
Moldova continued the implementation of the National Programme on Research and Innovation 2024-2027. In December 2025, the National Agency for Research and Development institutional capacity was reinforced by establishing three new subdivisions covering project expertise and evaluation, innovation and technology transfer support, and scientific data management. These new subdivisions improve the management of research funding, support innovation, streamline administrative processes, improve the management of scientific data, and increase transparency and trust in public research institutions.
The National Programme for Smart Specialisation ‘Smart Moldova’ 2024-2027 continues its implementation. The National Fund for Innovation and Technology Transfer, launched the first initiatives to strengthen collaboration between the scientific and business sectors. Three calls followed during the reporting period, namely a call for smart specialisation related projects, an Innovation Voucher competition, and a Technology Transfer competition. In addition, a call for research infrastructure sub-projects was launched in January 2026.
The transparency ofcompetitive procedures has been improved through the establishment of a digital platform for the management of research project applications and for independent expert evaluation. Outreach and capacity building for Horizon Europe participation have been strengthened through a dedicated project as of September 2025. The Moldovan Horizon Europe Office, established in 2023 and supported since September 2025 by Horizon Europe aims to
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strengthen institutional capacity, improve proposal skills and develop international strategic research partnerships. In the reporting period the total EU net contribution for Moldova amounted to EUR 3.98 million.
Since September 2025, monthly allowances for Habilitated Doctors and for PhD holders have increased substantially. In August 2026, the Government adopted measures to support the recruitment of young specialists to vacant teaching and scientific positions in public vocational and higher education institutions. The National Action Plan for the implementation of the European Research Area Policy Agenda 2025-2027 was adopted in December 2025. This Action Plan is structured around 11 structural policies and 8 ERA actions, demonstrating a more systematic approach to ERA integration. The National Regulation on Open Science, and the Roadmap on Promoting Gender Equality in Research and Innovation for 2026-2027 was adopted in March 2026.
Public R&I investment has slightly increased to MDL 802.1 million (approx. EUR 40 million) in 2026 but remains low. Budget allocations to Public Research Performing Organisations reached MDL 558 million (approx. EUR 28 million) in 2026, up from MDL 511 million (approx. EUR 26 million) in 2025. Despite this improvement the gross domestic expenditure in R&D remains low, at 0.23% of GDP in 2025, which is below the EU-27 average and the EU target of 3% of GDP.
Moldova continues to be classified among the Emerging Innovators in the 2026 European Innovation Scoreboard, with an innovation performance of 18.6% of the EU average. The innovation gap with the EU is increasing. Relative weaknesses are venture capital expenditures, cloud computing and SMEs introducing product innovations.
Researchers from Moldova participated in 59.3% of actions of the European Cooperation in Science and Technology (COST). Moldova is associated to the Research and Innovation Framework Programme Horizon Europe. In the reporting period, 17 grants with Moldovan participation were signed with a total EU net contribution for Moldova of EUR 3.98 million.
Chapter 26 - Education and culture
The EU supports cooperation in education and culture by funding programmes and the coordination of Member State policy through the open method of coordination. The EU and its Member States must also prevent discrimination and ensure quality education for children of migrant workers, including those from disadvantaged backgrounds.
Moldova’s education and training system continued the reform process focusing on quality, efficiency and inclusion. In August 2026, the government adopted the 2026-2030 implementation programme of the Education 2030 Strategy, setting out measures across all levels of education. The amendments to the Education Code adopted in February 2026 mark the most significant legislative development in the education sector in several years with the introduction of financial autonomy for schools with more than 400 students as of January 2027, the establishment of academic integrity in higher education, and the provision of the legal basis for school network consolidation. A comprehensive reform of education governance was launched in July 2026, followed by the adoption on 3 September 2026 of a law amending the Education Code as part of the ‘Restart in education’ reform, which aims to replace the existing district and municipal education authorities with Territorial Education Agencies subordinated to the Ministry of Education and Research. Public expenditure on education as percentage of GDP was 6.04% in 2025, above the EU average of 4.7% of GDP (2023).
In general education,the Model Schools initiative moved from pilot to a structural programme targeting 90 schools by 2030 from the initial 35 envisaged. During the reporting period, 200 kindergartens and 200 general education institutions received equipment upgrades. STEAM (Science, Technology, Engineering, Arts and Maths) labs, libraries, sport facilities, sanitary
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blocks and new teaching and learning resources were launched in several Model Schools. New school buses and GPS tracking systems improve rural connectivity and network consolidation. The introduction of a new normative cost-per-child methodology standardises and makes transparent the funding of all kindergartens and schools from 2026 onward. A record 426 young teachers were recruited into schools and kindergartens in 2025-2026, the highest level in recent years (up from 404 in 2024 and 365 in 2023), reducing the number of vacant teaching positions in the system. The attractiveness of the teaching profession was supported by a one-off allowance of MDL 200 000 (EUR 10 000), reduced workload for five years, housing support and mentoring. Digital transformation continued with 60% of schools using electronic gradebooks, over 4 100 teachers trained in digital competences using the DigCompEdu framework and national digital competence testing conducted for 3 021 students.
The curriculum reform, ongoing since 2024, reached an advanced stage: 31 working groups finalised concepts for all school subjects in February 2026. According to the results of the Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA) 2025, 54% of students attained at least basic proficiency (Level 2 or higher) in science, 44% in mathematics and 48% in reading. While results remain below the OECD average, they have improved when compared to PISA 2022. On multilingual education, 39 pilot schools were designated to implement multilingual education models (Romanian alongside Gagauz, Bulgarian, or Ukrainian). Moldova approved the second National Programme for Learning Romanian, applying a competency-based Common European Framework of Reference for Languages (CEFR)-aligned approach. For the first time, a Romanian language certification exam was held in February–May 2026. School textbook procurement procedures were revised to strengthen quality.
As part of the National Programme for the Development of Inclusive Education 2024-2027, the participation of learners with special educational needs in mainstream education increased by 18% in 2025 compared to 2024. 931 Resource Centres for Inclusive Education are now operational, staffed by 1 492 support teachers, and an integrated management information system on students with special educational needs was established in March 2026. However, reasonable accommodation for learners with special educational needs in schools and universities are provided to a limited extent. Support services are expanding but remain insufficient and require further strengthening. Despite progress, school buildings, facilities and digital platforms remain largely inaccessible. Roma children enrolment and rural-urban disparities remain challenging. Informal fees collection from students’ families to fill financial gaps for basic needs at school level remains a widespread practice. Gender-sensitive approaches are increasingly mainstreamed in the policies of the education system, including in the Implementation Programme of the Education Strategy 2030. Although violence, harassment and bullying remain issues of concern, institutional mechanisms to prevent and combat sexual harassment in higher education institutions are being piloted.
In vocational education and training (VET) enrolment increased by 5.1% over 2024-2025 along with the expansion of dual VET, mostly in manufacturing, technical engineering, ICT, HoReCa and other service sectors. A new State aid scheme has been established to incentivise companies participating in dual VET, compensating 50% of the eligible training costs. New qualification standards were approved at NQF (National Qualification Framework) Levels 3 and 4 in automotive, agriculture, logistics, ICT, and legal sectors, and green occupation standards were developed in the renewable energy sector. Moldova has increased its engagement in the European Alliance for Apprenticeships (EafA).
Higher education enrolment increased by 6.8% over 2024-2025, driven in part by the ‘Study in Moldova’ campaign. Bachelor admissions rose 11% and master’s admissions by 13%. The independence and operational capacity of the National Agency for Quality Assurance in Education and Research was strengthened.
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In March 2026, Moldova formally presented its NQF referencing report to the European Qualifications Framework (EQF) Advisory Group, establishing the comparability of Moldovan qualifications at European level and enhancing graduate mobility. Further efforts remain necessary to fully implement key Bologna Process commitments, notably on automatic recognition and external quality assurance.
Legislative steps to enhance academic integrity have been undertaken, with a law requiring all higher education institutions to adopt codes of ethics, implement plagiarism detection, establish independent ethics committees and report annually to the Ministry of Education and Research. During the reporting period, approximately 27 000 undergraduate students attended the mandatory ‘Academic Ethics and Integrity’ training course. Moldova benefits from the international dimension of the 2021-2027 Erasmus+ Programme. Preparations started for establishing a dedicated Erasmus+ national agency, with a view to participation in the next programme period.
In the youth sector, the implementation of the National Youth Strategy 2030 continued, including through the Youth Centre Development Programme 2030 and government grant programmes for youth organisations and local youth initiatives. A revised regulatory framework for the Youth Capital programme was adopted in April 2026. The law on volunteering, adopted in December 2025, provides a structural framework for formalising and recognising volunteer activity, benefiting youth civic participation. A new regulation on student self-governance repositions student representatives as active co-creators of university policy.
The sport regulatory framework was substantially reformed following the adoption of a law on Physical Education and Sport and multiple implementing regulations covering sports schools, monthly scholarships for high-performance athletes, financial norms for sports activities, sports federations, and sports clubs. The government also adopted the 2026-2028 implementation programme of the Sport 2030 Strategy, providing a framework for implementation of the national sport policy. Moldova continued taking part in the European Week of Sport.
On culture, Moldova adopted the National Strategy for Culture and Heritage 2025-2035 and its 2026-2030 implementation programme, positioning culture as a central pillar of national development. Moldova joined the Creative Europe programme on 1 January 2026 and designated the National Office for Cultural Development as Creative Europe Desk.
Chapter 29 - Customs union
All Member States are part of the EU customs union and follow the same customs rules and procedures. This requires legislative alignment as well as adequate implementing and enforcement capacity and access to and interoperability with the EU electronic customs environment.
The operational rollout of the New Computerised Transit System (NCTS) Phase 6 was completed in September 2025. This facilitated the country’s full accession to the Common Transit Convention (CTC) and the Convention on the Simplification of Formalities in Trade in Goods in November 2025, significantly enhancing the interoperability of Moldova’s customs operations.
Moldova continues to implement its modernised customs legislation broadly aligned with the EU acquis, including regular updates of its tariff nomenclature and an Authorised Economic Operator programme with 155 authorisations, of which 55, covering security and safety aspects, enjoy mutual recognition with EU Member States. Substantial progress has been made in aligning with the Union Customs Code. Implementation remains incomplete due to transitional provisions provided by the current Moldovan Customs Code and a lack of IT tools. These should be addressed in the draft Law amending the Moldovan Customs Code which will provide
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the legal basis for the full automation of all customs procedures.
A Strategic Risk Management Programme for 2026–2030 was approved. Risk management was applied systematically, with the share of individual consignments subjected by the Customs Service to physical or documentary control standing at 20.2% for imports, and 3.3% for exports in August 2026.
Regarding administrative and operational capacity, there is a need to strengthen the institutional framework of the Customs Service, elevate integrity standards and minimise corruption risks. This requires greater automation, optimisation of internal customs clearance processes, and broader access for traders to simplified digital procedures. To this end, the Customs Service initiated an institutional reorganisation process, aimed at centralising selected functions, including risk analysis, post-clearance control and audit, to improve efficiency and advance acquis implementation. The proposed new structure was submitted to the Ministry of Finance in June 2026.
In October 2025, the Government approved the National Programme and Action Plan for the Harmonisation of Customs Information Systems for 2025-2030, which prioritises interconnectivity and interoperability with EU customs systems. Of the 25 information systems envisaged under the National Programme, three are currently operational: NCTS Phase 6 which was connected to the common transit network in November 2025, the national Customs Decisions System (CDS), aligned with the EU Customs Data Model and EU specifications and data requirements, and the Binding Tariff Information system, launched in September 2026.
In March 2026, a new Customs Service Anti-Corruption Policy and Action Plan for 2026-2029 was adopted, providing a practical framework to prevent and combat corruption. It sets out time- bound, result-oriented measures with clear responsibilities and monitoring mechanisms to strengthen institutional integrity. The plan promotes zero tolerance through increased digitalisation, reduced human intervention, improved reporting, and enhanced whistleblower protection, in line with European standards. Moldova has taken important anti-corruption steps, but implementation across the most corruption-prone customs functions remains a challenge.
Moldova continued to cooperate with the EU Member States under the EU-Moldova Association Agreement Protocol III on mutual administrative assistance in customs matters, and with the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) to investigate suspected cross-border customs offences and other illegal activities. Methodological rules on the use of the Anti-Fraud Information System were approved in September 2026.
CLUSTER 4: THE GREEN AGENDA AND SUSTAINABLE CONNECTIVITY
The cluster on Green Agenda and sustainable connectivity covers: transport policy (Chapter 14); energy (Chapter 15); trans-European networks (Chapter 21); and environment and climate change (Chapter 27).
Chapter 14 - Transport policy
The EU has common rules on technical and safety standards, security, social standards, State aid and market liberalisation in road transport, railways, inland waterways, multimodal transport, aviation and maritime transport.
On general transport, the country continued to align with the EU acquis. In the maritime sector, Moldovan flag vessels are no longer on the blacklist of the Paris Memorandum of Understanding on Port State Control. However, it exhibited insufficient capacity to effectively
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implement the approved reforms. The intelligent transport systems (ITS) strategy for all modes of transport was developed and needs to be adopted and implemented. As an observer, Moldova continued to actively participate in the work of the Transport Community Treaty. The Sustainable Urban Mobility Plan for Chișinău was approved by the Municipal Council.
On road transport, some progress was achieved. Legislation on market access, profession of road transport operators, digital tachographs and access to the haulage market remain partially aligned with the EU acquis. Following the adoption of the Road Safety Programme, the reorganisation of the Transport Accident and Incident Investigation Bureau was approved, granting it new competences to develop normative acts and monitor
compliance with national and international obligations regarding transport accident and incident investigations. Further actions are needed to align with provisions related to guidelines for road safety audits and inspections of infrastructure and vehicles, and to enhance the road safety crash data system. The State Register of Traffic Accidents has been modernised and complemented by a mobile application for real-time reporting by police officers. The development of the accident data management is being implemented in line with the Common Accident Data Set (CADaS) methodology.
On vehicle equipment, tyre tread depth for certain categories of vehicles is now specified in the Road traffic regulations. The Directive on speed limitation devices remains partially transposed and implemented. Additionally, as of June 2026, all relevant vehicles are required to have speed limitation devices.
On the transport of dangerous goods, some progress was achieved. Moldova has aligned with the Directive on the transport of dangerous goods by road. The new framework simplifies the authorisation of transport of dangerous goods, defines institutional responsibilities for monitoring compliance and strengthens cooperation between national and EU authorities through information exchange and harmonised inspection procedures.
A review of the national road transport framework was carried out with support from the Transport Community Secretariat. The measures under the new law aim at ensuring full compliance with EU social and market rules for road transport.
On rail transport, steps were taken to unbundle the railway state enterprise by adopting the general conditions of the multiannual contract for the management of railway infrastructure. On unbundling, Moldova has initiated its separation in two distinct joint-stock companies responsible for infrastructure and passenger and cargo. Work is ongoing to further align the Railway code with the EU acquis. Notably, the changes are expected to facilitate passenger rail operators’ access to the services market.
Steps were taken towards establishing regulations governing interoperability. Moldova should further pursue alignment with the fourth railway package, including adoption of the technical specifications for interoperability and the common safety methods. The national railway safety method has been formalised, ensuring full compliance with the EU railway safety decision, and a new legal basis for a national vehicle register has been introduced to support interoperability.
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On maritime transport, Moldovan flag vessels are no longer on the backlist of the Paris Memorandum of Understanding on Port State Control. Moldova still needs to fully align with the Port Services Regulation. Regarding trade facilitation, Moldova has partially aligned its legal framework with the Regulation on a European Maritime Single Window environment.
On inland waterways, Moldova still needs to further align with the relevant acquis.
On aviation, the country is mostly aligned with the EU acquis, having implemented more than half of the legal acts listed under the EU-Moldova Common Aviation Area Agreement in its legislation. Moldova has a good level of alignment with the EU aviation rules in several key areas, including market access, safety, security, environment, social aspects, and consumer protection. However, the alignment with air navigation services rules as well as airport legislation such as airport charges and ground handling is only partial. Regarding the protection of air passenger rights, the aviation regulatory framework is partially aligned with relevant EU regulations.
On intermodal transport, there are not yet any legal and technical provisions in Moldova.
As regards passenger rights, Moldova needs to align with the EU passenger rights acquis for all modes of transport and make further progress to align with outstanding provisions, especially concerning bus, coach and waterborne passenger rights.
From the perspective of the rights of persons with disabilities, passengers with disabilities in Moldova are legally protected and entitled to assistance for railway, air and road transportation. However, while air transport at Chisinau airport is largely adapted for passengers and visitors with disabilities, full and consistent implementation across all transport sectors remains a challenge, and accessibility in practice remains largely limited.
Transport remains vulnerable to corruption risks linked to procurement, infrastructure contracts, licensing, permits and inspections. Moldova strengthened integrity controls through NAC- monitored integrity plans for the National Road Transport Agency (ANTA), road sector enterprises and the Civil Aviation Authority, with implementation rates reaching 79-94% in several entities. The measures targeted risks in procurement, contract supervision, infrastructure maintenance, certification and asset management. The main challenge remains demonstrating concrete enforcement results, including sanctions, and effective follow-up to procurement irregularities and suspected corruption cases.
Chapter 15 - Energy
EU energy policy covers energy supply, infrastructure, the internal energy market, consumers, renewable energy, energy efficiency, nuclear energy, nuclear safety, radiation protection and nuclear safeguards.
On security of supply, the Law on the security of supply of petroleum products was adopted in
June 2026, aligning with the EU acquis. A Central Stockholding Entity was established setting
out the stock calculation methodology and reporting requirements and monitoring the gradual
build-up of oil stocks. The main challenge remains the implementation of the security system in
line with the EU framework. In the gas sector, Moldova set a target for security stocks for 2026
equal to 56.3 mcm. The National Agency for Energy Regulation (ANRE) set the obligation for
2026 for all active suppliers at 15% of the annual gas consumption, to be met by 1 November
2026. Amendments to the gas law were adopted to increase the mandatory gas stocks for the
Transnistrian region, equal to 15% of annual consumption.
Regarding internal energy markets, the legislative package aligning with the Electricity
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Integration Package (EIP) was adopted and is being assessed by the European Commission, with full compliance required for market coupling with the EU. ANRE also continued updating the energy regulatory framework. Key measures include the electricity tariff setting with new time-of-use pricing and the integration of flexible connections and capacity auctions into the grid connection regime. The balancing regulatory framework was updated to introduce new rules on imbalance pricing, balancing service providers, and balance responsible parties, aimed at alignment with the applicable EU terms, conditions and methodologies (TCMs).
The transmission system operator Moldelectrica launched the electricity balancing market in September 2025, with the first transaction registered in December 2025. Its operational scope expanded in June 2026, when balancing services from storage installations were activated for the first time. A tender for new balancing capacities was finalised in May 2026. The tender documentation imposed a binding obligation on the successful tenderers to commission the new balancing capacities and place them into commercial operation by the end of June 2028. In parallel, the short-term organised electricity markets became operational under OPEM, with day-ahead market and intra-day markets launched in December 2025, introducing competitive and transparent platforms for electricity trading, laying a solid foundation for deeper regional market integration. In the gas sector, Moldova opened its market for large non-household consumers in April 2026, preparing for future integration with the EU internal energy market.
On renewable energy, Moldova adopted rules for verifying biofuels, bioliquids, and biomass fuels, as well as the recognition of voluntary schemes and the amendment of certain regulatory acts, representing the final step towards the transposition of Renewable Energy Directive (RED II). In addition, Moldova is already making progress towards harmonisation with the provisions of the Renewable Energy Directive (REDIII). A second tender for large investments in renewables for wind farms with associated battery energy storage systems was launched in December 2025, with the preliminary list of winning bids validated in July and average price of 62.04 EUR/MWh. Overall, by the end of June 2026, the total installed capacity of renewables had reached 1 074 MW (combining solar, wind, biogas and hydro), marking a major acceleration in renewable deployment, contributing to the goals of security of supply and decarbonisation. To support expansion of storage capacities, the government introduced mechanisms to boost investments. System flexibility also gradually improved.
On energy efficiency, Moldova has further strengthened the regulatory framework. Substantial progress was made in operationalising the National Centre for Sustainable Energy (NCSE), with a focus on the management of energy efficiency projects in residential buildings in an open and transparent manner under donor oversight. The regulation on financial guarantees and provisioning financial compensation by the NCSE was adopted in July 2026, supporting the financing of energy efficiency and renewable energy projects by homeowners’ associations in condominiums. The implementation of three financing initiatives targeting residential energy efficiency, rural household upgrades, and the Green House initiative continued. Another important support mechanisms managed by NCSE, the Home Appliances Vouchers Programme, supports vulnerable households in replacing old and used appliances with new and energy efficient equipment.
On governance, the National Energy and Climate Plan (NECP) is currently under implementation. Its monitoring is ensured by the Ministry of Energy and the Ministry of Environment through a dedicated working group set up in March 2026.
On nuclear energy, nuclear safety and radiation protection, Moldova is only partially aligned and still needs to align with and implement the Euratom Directives on nuclear safety, management of radioactive waste, basic safety standards (radiation protection) and drinking water. Moldova is not yet a member of European Community Urgent Radiological Information
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Exchange (ECURIE) and the European Radiological Data Exchange Platform (EURDEP) systems and should take steps to join them. On nuclear safeguards, upon EU accession, the existing systems of accountancy and control of nuclear materials in Moldova would need to be adapted to accommodate for the safeguards provisions of the Euratom Treaty.
Moldova has introduced transparency-relevant measures in the energy sector, including renewable energy auctions, energy efficiency financing mechanisms, digital management of energy efficiency projects and donor-supported investment programmes. The effectiveness of these reforms depends on transparent award criteria, beneficial ownership checks, conflict-of- interest safeguards and traceability of procurement procedures, grants and payments. The main remaining challenges concern SOE governance, strategic infrastructure contracts, tariff-setting decisions, renewable energy support schemes and effective follow-up to procurement irregularities, audit findings and suspected corruption cases.
Chapter 21 - Trans-European networks
The EU promotes trans-European networks (TENs) in the areas of transport, telecommunications and energy to strengthen the internal market and contribute to growth and employment.
On transport networks, the current strategic framework for transport infrastructure is outlined in the 2030 National Strategy for Development. Moldova has approved the TEN-T regulation at national level. A feasibility study is ongoing to further assess the identified road axis of the Chișinău ring road. The three road TEN-T border infrastructure projects with Romania remain delayed, mainly due to administrative procedures and adjustment of project scope with introduction of coordinated bidirectional controls on the Romanian territory. Key road projects, such as M3 from Giurgiulesti port to Chisinau, have identified funding and await final decision before being launched. The Road Fund remains the primary source of national budget funding for public road maintenance albeit funds remain insufficient.
Regarding rail, rehabilitation works for the north-south railway corridor continue to be delayed. In terms of European standard gauge deployment in Moldova, the feasibility and design study for the deployment of the European standard gauge connecting Chișinău and Ungheni has been awarded through the Facility for Eastern Partnership Investment in Connectivity (EPIC). Moreover, Moldova received support from the Connecting Europe Facility (CEF) for upgrading the rail connection and electrification between Ungheni (Moldova) and Ungheni (Romania), combined with the electrification planned in Romania until Iași. Rehabilitation works on the Basarabeasca-Giurgiulești railway segment are ongoing but delayed with respect to the initial planning.
In April 2026, the ownership of Giurgiulesti International freeport was transferred from EBRD to Romania’s Port of Constanta.
On energy networks, Moldova is partially aligned with the TEN-E Regulation. It adopted
legislation in July 2026 partially transposing version of the TEN-E Regulation as adapted and
adopted by the Energy Community.
Moldova needs to develop its regional electricity connections in line with the Central and South-
Eastern Europe Energy Connectivity (CESEC) action plan. Infrastructure projects should be
accelerated to reduce Moldova’s structural vulnerability and improve its connectivity with
neighbouring countries. The operationalisation of the Vulcanesti–Chisinau 400 kV Energy
Independence Line has been constantly delayed, with final testing ongoing. For the Balti–
Suceava 400 kV Power Line, the construction contract was signed in June 2026, with work
progressing on the Balti substation and the modernisation of 120 other substations. Preparatory
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work on the Straseni–Gutinas 400 kV Power Line is also advancing, with the feasibility study
completed in June 2026. The Secondary Circuit of the 330 kV Balti–Dnestrovsk HPP
Interconnection Line with Ukraine has been pre-qualified for the second PECI list, with
reconfirmation expected in December 2026, while discussions on financing are ongoing.
Chapter 27 - Environment and climate change
The EU promotes strong climate action, sustainable development and protection of the environment. EU rules contain provisions addressing climate change, water and air quality, waste management, nature protection, industrial pollution, chemicals, noise and civil protection.
Environment
Moldova strengthened administrative capacity by hiring additional staff for the Environmental Inspectorate and the Environmental Agency. Moldova officially joined the European Environment Agency (EEA) and the Eionet network as a cooperating country in March 2026.
On horizontal legislation, Moldova continues its alignment with related EU acquis. In April 2026, the Law on environmental liability as well as amendments to the Law on environmental impact assessment and the Law on strategic environment assessment were adopted.
Alignment of air quality standards to the EU acquis is progressing. During the reporting period, a concept for modernising the air quality monitoring system and network was developed and an air quality plan has been initiated for Chișinău. Moldova has updated the strategy for air quality monitoring and management. Moldova should further increase administrative capacity, legislation alignment and financial planning in the air quality plans.
On waste management, some progress was made with adoption of technical regulation on soil protection measures in agricultural practices and efforts to align legislation with the Nitrates Directive. Implementation of the regional solid waste management system is ongoing in parts of Moldova and planned across the country. The alignment of product-specific waste streams legislation continued. Further efforts are needed to ensure the full alignment, including strengthening implementation capacities, advancing producer responsibility schemes, enhancing reporting and further developing waste treatment and recycling infrastructure.
On circular economy, policies still need improvement.
On water quality, Moldova has undertaken preparatory work related to the further alignment with the EU water acquis. Amendments adopted in April 2026 completed alignment with the Water Framework Directive as regards to reporting obligations and strengthened alignment with the Environmental Quality Standards Directive, the Groundwater Directive and the Water Reuse Regulation. Further efforts are needed to ensure effective implementation, and engagement with agricultural stakeholders. In terms of implementing the Water Framework Directive, Moldova has improved the consistency of inter-sectoral policies, annual monitoring programmes and strengthened interinstitutional coordination through platforms. Measures for reducing urban and industrial pollution are top priorities under the River Basin Management Plans that have been adopted within the implementation of the Water Framework Directive.
On nature protection, Moldova needs to make further progress. The Law on Zoos has been adopted. Moldova is aligned with the Leghold Traps acquis. On biodiversity, continued efforts are required to advance legislative alignment with the Regulation on Nature Restoration and the Birds and Habitats Directives, including the identification and designation of protected areas, and to strengthen administrative structures for nature conservation. A roadmap for the transition of Emerald sites to the NATURA2000 network was launched in April 2026. The reform of Moldsilva (the public agency for forestry and hunting) and the establishment of an independent agency for protected areas is ongoing and remains a priority.
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On industrial pollution control and risk management, the update of the existing pollutant release and transfer register platform remains to be completed. This includes ensuring full compliance with EU standards of pollutions and greenhouse gas emissions (GHG) data collection, monitoring and reporting requirements. In December 2025, the government adopted the regulation on the organisation and provision of public services for issuing integrated environmental authorisation and environmental authorisation. A series of ministerial orders approved Best Available Techniques conclusions in several sectors. Moldova still lacks a sufficient enforcement mechanism and implementation capacity on reporting obligations by economic actors and strengthen the private sector’s capacity to comply with reporting requirements.
On environmental noise, Moldova has progressed and the Government approved the Regulation on the assessment and management of environmental noise, fully transposing the directive relating to the assessment and management of environmental noise.
On chemicals, the restriction of hazardous substances in electrical and electronic equipment was adopted in October 2025. The government adopted a regulatory measure in August 2026, aligning with REACH, including the list of restricted and prohibited chemical substances and mixtures. In addition, the government approved in August 2026 the Regulation on classification, labelling and packaging of substances and mixtures aligning with the CLP regulation. Furthermore, the reorganisation of the Environmental Agency has established a dedicated Chemicals Directorate. Moldova further deepened its cooperation with European Chemicals Agency (ECHA).
On civil protection, Moldova is an active Participating State in the Union Civil Protection Mechanism (UCPM). In September 2025, Moldova established the National Crisis Management Centre (NCMC) as a central authority coordinating nationwide crisis response from prevention to recovery. A new Law on crisis management also created an integrated framework for prevention, preparedness, response and recovery. Moldova is required to clarify the roles of ministries, emergency services and other bodies vis-à-vis the coordination with the UCPM. Further work is needed to strengthen the legislative and operational framework for prevention, preparedness, Host Nation Support, coordination and cross-border cooperation under the UCPM.
Climate change
Moldova made good progress on climate change. It advanced preparatory work on a long-term low-emission development strategy. In December 2025, Moldova validated the concept underlying the Long-term Strategy for Greenhouse Gas Emission Reduction – “Climate Neutral Moldova 2050”, which aims to achieve climate-neutrality by 2050. Moldova issued a new Nationally Determined Contribution under the Paris Agreement, which commits to an unconditional 71% reduction in greenhouse gas emissions by 2030 and 75% by 2035 (compared to 1990 levels)
On carbon pricing, Moldova has significantly advanced alignment with the EU system for the monitoring, reporting, verification and accreditation (MRVA) of greenhouse gas emissions (GHG) at installation level. The regulatory framework establishing the MRVA is in place. Moldova still needs to achieve full alignment with the EU MRVA system, notably in terms of sectoral scope. A carbon pricing mechanism is not in place yet and should remain a priority to prepare for entering the EU ETS.
In March 2026, the Ministry of Energy and the Ministry of the Environment established a dedicated working group, tasked with monitoring progress in implementing the National Energy and Climate Plan, which created the basis for a structured monitoring of delivery.
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Moldova further needs to align with EU standards on light and heavy-duty vehicles emission and the Carbon Capture and Storage Directive.
Mainstreaming of climate across all policies is still limited. The Climate Law established a National Commission on Climate Change (NCCC). The work on its full operationalisation is ongoing and includes: the development of detailed regulations that define the structure, mandate, and functions of the NCCC, setting up a permanent Secretariat within the Ministry of the Environment for the NCCC, provision of training for the secretariat and NCCC members and, developing and disseminating an operational manual and guidebook on the NCCC.
Moldova needs to significantly reinforce administrative capacity to make progress in aligning with the EU climate acquis and to effectively address climate mitigation and adaptation. The institutional reforms, including the establishment of a Climate Change Directorate within the Environmental Agency, are critical steps in this regard.
CLUSTER 5: RESOURCES, AGRICULTURE AND COHESION
This cluster covers: agriculture and rural development (Chapter 11); food safety, veterinary and phytosanitary policy (Chapter 12); fisheries and aquaculture (Chapter 13); regional policy and coordination of structural instruments (Chapter 22); and financial and budgetary provisions (Chapter 33).
Chapter 11 - Agriculture and rural development
The EU’s common agricultural policy supports farmers and contributes to ensuring Europe’s food security. It helps tackle climate change and the sustainable management of natural resources; preserves rural areas and landscapes; and supports the rural economy by promoting jobs in farming, agri-food industries and related sectors. This requires robust management and control systems. There are also common EU rules for marketing standards, quality policy and organic farming.
On horizontal issues, the law on financing, management and monitoring of agricultural policy entered into force, regulating the system of financial support to agriculture and rural development, including the role of the agriculture paying agency. The Strategic Programme of Agricultural Policy 2026-2030 (SPAP), guiding its implementation and establishing the interventions was approved. It includes financing of measures related to knowledge transfer, innovation, advice, and Agricultural Knowledge and Innovation System (AKIS). A digital hub has been established within the ministry to support the development of the information systems required for the implementation of the Integrated Administration and Control System (IACS) and its components, as well as to provide the corresponding technical support to the Capacities of the Agency for Interventions and Payments in Agriculture (AIPA).
Preparation for the Farm Sustainability Data Network (FSDN) have advanced through legislative updates, refining methods and IT rules, and stakeholder consultations. A new pilot will test the revised tools before a wider rollout. Further efforts are required to establish the IACS. A concept aligned with the relevant EU acquis was established and is being developed in line with Commission recommendations, while the national farm registry was developed and piloted with a view to nationwide rollout. The development of the Land Parcel Identification System (LPIS) has advanced with the orthophoto acquisition and parcel delimitation is ongoing. AIPA must be further strengthened with an effective staff retention policy.
Steps towards the operationalisation of the Agricultural Knowledge and Innovation System (AKIS) have been taken including the establishment of the national digital platform.Further efforts are needed to improve links and knowledge transfer between research, advisory services
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and farmers, in particular for small farms.
Regarding agricultural markets - common market organisation, the reporting period saw progress in aligning with EU marketing standards for eggs and in the fruits and vegetables sector). Efforts should continue to further develop the regulatory framework in line with the EU acquis.
The rural development framework policy document is the National Strategy for Agriculture and Rural Development 2023-2030, and the National Fund for the Development of Agriculture and Rural Areas provides the corresponding financial support. According to the National Programme for Agriculture and Rural Development 2025-2030, Moldova will continue to implement rural development measures focused on investment and related support measures.
On quality policy, Moldova is progressing in aligning with the latest EU acquis in the area. Some progress has been achieved in the regulation for establishment and recognition of producer organisations and interbranch organisations in the agri-food sector.
In the area of organic farming, alignment with the EU acquis continued. Further work is required, in particular on the supervision of certification bodies and traceability of products. The system of control and enforcement should be strengthened.
On the fight against corruption, the Moldovan authorities are obliged to prevent, detect and report irregularities.
Chapter 12 - Food safety, veterinary and phytosanitary policy
The EU food acquis including hygiene rules for foodstuff production ensures a high level of food and feed safety, and a high level of protection of consumers’ interests. Animal health and welfare, and the safety of food of animal origin, are safeguarded together with plant health, the quality of seeds, plant reproductive material, animal nutrition and the use of plant protection products.
In the area of general food safety, institutional and human resource capacitywas further developed.The Human Resources Development Strategy 2024-2027 was implemented through a training programme for central level staff and staff from territorial subdivisions (inspectors) and border inspection posts of the National Food Safety Agency.
Moldova further strengthened its official controls oversight at various stages of the agri-food chain in line with EU standards. Institutional capacities for risk assessment were strengthened through the establishment of a Risk Assessment Directorate. Further implementing provisions for risk-based official controls of plants, plant products and wood packaging materials and treatment services were adopted, aiming for a broader alignment with the EU acquis.
New testing methods were accredited at the national reference laboratory. However, Moldova still needs to put in place a national network of laboratories, and a multiannual control plan aligned with EU acquis requirements.
Moldova further advanced the digitalisation of permissive act issuance and Moldova’s integration into the e-Phyto system, in preparation of full TRACES-NT integration, enhancing the reliability and traceability of consignments while improving compliance with standards.
On veterinary policy, additional implementing measures on the prevention, control and eradication of transmissible diseases in animals were established, aligning with the EU acquis on transmissible animal diseases. Moldova also enhanced Avian influenza and African swine fever detection and response, learning from the 2024/2025 outbreaks. Eradication measures were implemented, including stamping-out, movement restrictions, zoning, investigations and biosecurity measures. Consistent updating of farm animal registration, including non-
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commercial holdings, and their movements require further efforts. Increased monitoring of the wild boar population for containing the African swine fever is recommended.
On animal health and welfare, Moldova continued transposing key EU regulations on animal traceability, health certification, and import requirements for animals and animal products. Moldova strengthened its administrative and control framework by introducing new procedures for veterinary certification and updating sector-specific inspection checklists for aquaculture, germinal material, and pig holdings. Animal health requirements and certification of aquatic animals and products derived from them were further regulated.
The Parliament ratified the European Convention for the protection of animals kept for farming purposes and the European Convention for the protection of animals during international transport in August 2026. Nevertheless, the consistent implementation of animal welfare standards during transport, at farm and slaughter stages, remains a significant area for improvement in many establishments, especially small operators. More efforts are needed on enforcement, including ensuring adequate administrative capacity to put in place the certificates and approval systems required by the EU acquis. A workplan to address the remaining implementation challenges has to be established.
On the placing of food, feed and animal by-products on the market, Moldova implemented its national residue monitoring plan for residues of pharmacologically active substances, pesticides and contaminants in animal and animal products. The scope of the National Monitoring and Surveillance Programme for food safety, plant health, feed and veterinary medicinal products was further extended in 2026, including for sheep and goat meat.
Moldova increased its capacity to sample, analyse, and report antimicrobial resistance in food- producing animals and fresh meat as a result of improvements to the institutional framework, laboratory infrastructure and staff training.
Moldova strengthened the traceability mechanisms of animal drugs and medicines from import of substances to farm level application, including through digitalisation, ensuring interoperability with the animal register and laboratory testing.
On food safety rules, hygiene requirements for food of animal origin, bakery products and pasta were further aligned. The implementation, monitoring and documentation of Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Points (HACCP) by food business operators at all stages of production, processing and distribution remains a concern and should be addressed. While increasing the number of risk-based official controls obtained at the farm, production and distribution level, more awareness raising, training and investments for and by business operators are required to accelerate positive change. Further alignment with relevant EU rules on food contact materials, food additives and pesticide residues was achieved.
On specific rules for feed no significant developments were reported.
On phytosanitary policy, the legislative framework for plant health and placing of fertiliser and plant protection products on the market was further aligned with the EU acquis. Market surveillance remains to be improved from marketing and circulation of plant protection products and fertilisers to farm level application, especially the sustainable use of pesticides, and the recovery and destruction of obsolete products. Several specific procedures were updated in order to strengthen the seed certification system.
On the marketing of seed and other plant reproductive material, the country should finalise alignment with the EU acquis on the rules plant (PRM) and forest reproductive material (FRM). Moldova should first focus on establishing the necessary institutional frameworks, and technical capacities to implement and enforce the acquis effectively aiming at setting up functioning PRM
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and FRM certification systems.
On genetically modified organisms, Moldova adopted implementing legislation on their genetically modified organisms law. Food safety controls – especially in veterinary and phytosanitary inspections, laboratory testing, certification, and import enforcement – remain exposed to corruption risks. Moldova has strengthened its official control framework through NFSA, improving inspection and laboratory capacities to support risk-based checks, sample traceability, and standardised procedures. However, critical gaps persist in integrity safeguards, including inadequate conflict-of-interest controls for inspectors, weak oversight of sampling and testing processes, and limited accountability for misconduct.
Moldova should prioritise risk-based supervision, clear separation of inspection and testing functions, transparent certification, and robust sanctions for inspection-related misconduct, while reinforcing laboratory integrity and conflict-of-interest protections.
Chapter 13 - Fisheries and aquaculture
The common fisheries policy lays down rules on fisheries management, protects living resources of the sea and limits the environmental impact of fisheries. This includes setting catch quotas, managing fleet capacity, rules on control and inspection, rules on markets and aquaculture and support for fisheries and coastal communities. Further, it promotes a sustainable aquaculture.
Moldova needs to continue further aligning with the EU Common Fisheries Policy (CFP), particularly in areas relevant to a landlocked country, focusing on the development of its aquaculture and fish processing sectors.
The legislative framework is partially aligned with key EU CFP regulations and supports sustainable development, improved market standards and the fight against illegal fishing.
The strategic programme for the aquaculture sector for 2026-2030 was approved by the government in August 2026, setting out the directions for the development and modernisation of the aquaculture sector. The programme will be implemented in two stages based on dedicated action plans: one for the period 2026–2028 and the second for the 2029–2030, respectively.
In the area of inspection and control, new legislation has been prepared to improve the traceability of fishery and aquaculture products through the further strengthening of the official control system. Operational capacities have been strengthened through training of food safety inspectors at territorial subdivisions and border inspection posts, as well as by increasing quality awareness and standards compliance at frame level and among food business operators in the aquaculture sector.
Legislative measures have been taken, aimed at protecting aquatic biological resources and minimising the impact of fishing activities on sensitive habitats, namely the regulation of fishing in sensitive habitats and introduction of closed seasons, as well as reduction of by-catch.
Enforceability has been strengthened through the adoption of a regulation on the collection, reception, processing, management and use of scientific data in the aquaculture sector, that entered into force in July 2026, but additional efforts are required in the control and enforcement of these measures.
This provides the necessary normative framework for the alignment with the EU standards and acquis in the field. This mechanism will complement existing controls carried out by national authorities, including the National Food Safety Agency (ANSA) and the Customs Service, which currently oversee the quality, safety, and traceability of imported fish and fishery products. The agency will also be responsible for monitoring the implementation of the new provisions for the prevention, deterrence, and elimination of illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing, which will
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enter into force in 2027.
In the area of structural actions, further efforts are needed to enhance administrative capacity and preparedness for administering future support schemes under the newly created National Fund for Support of Maritime Affairs, Fisheries, and Aquaculture and subsequently the European Maritime, Fisheries and Aquaculture Fund once Moldova becomes an EU Member State. The implementation mechanism of the Fund was approved by the government and entered into force in July 2026. The development and planned adoption of orders are conditional on the substantiation of the indicators set out in the Strategic Programme for the Aquaculture Sector 2026-2030 (SPAS). In addition, new regulations were adopted to set up a specialised aquaculture service at AIPA and strengthen the overall management, control, audit, reporting of sectoral financial support and future administration of financial instruments.
On international agreements, the law on the accession of Moldova to the Agreement on Port State Measures to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing was approved by the government. Moldova should further strengthen international cooperation activities. Progress should be made in integrating international fisheries agreements into the national framework, in finalising legislation covering the definition of fishing vessels in line with international fisheries instruments, and in adopting new rules with regards to the registration and deregistration of vessels engaging in illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing.
As regards to the wider blue economy, Moldova continues to participate in the Common Maritime Agenda. It maintains a strong commitment at both the grassroots and ministerial level, with the Ministry of Environment coordinating cooperation among participating countries under the initiative during the reporting period. This positive regional cooperation should continue.
Moldova is not yet aligned with the acquis on state aid in the area of fisheries and aquaculture. A system for a state aid control in these sectors needs to be set up.
Chapter 22 - Regional policy and coordination of structural instruments
Regional policy is the EU’s main tool for reducing regional disparities and investing in sustainable and inclusive socio-economic growth. It is operating through shared management between the Commission and EU Member States. The implementation of cohesion policy programmes requires appropriate administrative capacity on programme and project level, the establishment of systems of sound financial management and control and also the fulfilment of other EU acquis elements such as environmental or public procurement legislation.
On the legislative framework, Moldova has created a network of growth pole cities to generate employment and to stimulating the development of adjacent zones by 2027, in line with the National Programme for the Development of Growth Pole Cities. Efforts continued to update the regulatory framework governing local action groups, with the goal of bringing it in line with European standards on community-led local development. A dedicated legal framework for cohesion policy, is in preparation, pending the establishment of the future cohesion policy regulatory framework. Moldova is also engaged in a dialogue with Eurostat regarding its NUTS set up.
The current institutional framework supports management of EU funds, with the State Chancellery acting as the national coordinating authority and overseeing the five Interreg cooperation programmes in which Moldova participates and the Growth Plan. An branch office for the EU Interreg NEXT Romania–Moldova Programme was established within the Central Regional Development Agency, with dedicated staff supporting beneficiaries. A national working group, comprising representatives of key ministries and government agencies, coordinates the management of EU funds, including cross-border, transnational, and interregional cooperation programmes with strengthened audit and control structures.
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On administrative capacity, Moldova has continuously strengthened the capacity of local public authorities in project implementation, monitoring, and evaluation through trainings and study visits. It has also continued strengthening its capacity to manage EU funds, supporting effective implementation of cross-border and transnational cooperation programmes under Interreg. While high staff turnover remains a challenge, measures such as salary increases, improved working conditions, and enhanced training programmes have helped mitigate its impact. Overall administrative capacity remains adequate, and monitoring and evaluation systems have been further strengthened through the integration of key governmental digital platforms into a single National Development Plan platform.
Multiannual programming takes place via the medium-term budget framework approved by the government. The current National Programme for Local Development aligns with the National Strategy for Regional Development 2022-2028 and strengthens national involvement in regional and local development initiatives. Moldova should continue aligning its regional policy programming with the upcoming legislative framework for EU cohesion policy in the 2028-2034 period. On financial management, control and audit, Moldova has improved the implementation of activities and effectiveness of its management and control systems, thus demonstrating its capacity for sound financial management. In addition, a nationwide management information system is being rolled out.
On the fight against corruption Moldova has established new risk registers and disciplinary committees, strict rules on gifts and conflicts of interest, and integrity and merit-based hiring. The National Anti-Corruption Centre also has flagged procurement irregularities to OLAF. Moldova needs yet to fully digitalise project management systems to reduce risks of favouritism and undue influence. In 2025, Moldova has taken an important anti-fraud step for future EU funds management by establishing the National Anti-Fraud System and designating the State Financial Control Inspectorate (SFCI) as the Anti-Fraud Coordination Service (AFCOS) and national contact point for OLAF. Additionally, the newly established National Anti-Fraud Network is a relevant coordination to connect managing bodies, control institutions, audit authorities and law-enforcement bodies when irregularities are detected in externally funded programmes. Its practical value will depend on clear reporting channels, standardised irregularity indicators, timely referral of suspected fraud, feedback between institutions and publication of aggregated results.
A new law on strengthening mechanisms to combat corruption, organised and financial crime, adopted in June 2026, creates a stronger basis for protecting EU and external funds, but the main priority is operationalisation of MCAF. The effectiveness of the system will need to be demonstrated through a track record of irregularity reporting, transmission of suspected fraud cases to the SFCI/AFCOS, cooperation with OLAF, recoveries, sanctions and final outcomes in fraud, corruption and money laundering cases affecting EU-related and other externally funded programmes.
Chapter 33 - Financial and budgetary provisions
This chapter covers the rules governing the funding of the EU budget (‘own resources’). These resources mainly consist of: (i) contributions based on the gross national income of each Member State; (ii) customs duties; (iii) the non-recycled plastic resource; and (iv) a resource based on value added tax. Member States must have the appropriate administrative capacity to adequately coordinate and ensure the correct calculation, collection, payment and control of own resources.
There was some to good progress in the underlying policy areas that indirectly affect the own resources system (for progress in these areas, see Chapters 16 – Taxation, 17- Economic and monetary policy; 18 – Statistics, 29 – Customs union, and 32 – Financial control). A
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Coordination Body for Own Resources is in place, and progress was made towards operationalising the necessary administrative structures.
On traditional own resources, no progress was achieved beyond that already reported under Chapter 29 - Customs union. Moldova remains partially aligned with the provisions of the EU Regulationon customs duty exemptions through its Customs Code.
Limited progress was achieved on VAT, with introduction of the reverse charge mechanism for VAT on electricity and natural gas in January 2026. Moldova must continue aligning its legislation with the EU acquis, especially on VAT structure, exemptions, deductions, special schemes, and the scope of reduced rates.
On the gross national income (GNI) resource, Moldova prepared an updated 2026–2030 roadmap for national accounts reform. Moldova needs to ensure the compilation of national accounts and GNI based on ESA 2010 definitions and accounting rules.
Further efforts are needed to fully align legislation, strengthen anti-fraud measures, upgrade IT systems, and operationalise the own resources coordination body.
Moldova strengthened the protection of national, public and external financial interests through the National Anti-Fraud System adopted, established in 2025, and the financial crime investigation system reform. The later gives the National Anti-corruption Centre a central role in detecting and investigating serious fraud, large-scale tax evasion, misuse of internal or external funds, money laundering and corruption-related offences affecting Moldova’s budget, public assets and external assistance. The main priority is to translate this framework into operational results: detection, referral to the criminal justice system, recovery, and transparent reporting.
CLUSTER 6: EXTERNAL RELATIONS
There are two chapters in this cluster: External relations (Chapter 30); Foreign, security and defence policy (Chapter 31).
Chapter 30 – External relations
The EU has a common commercial policy towards third countries, based on multilateral and bilateral agreements and autonomous measures. There are also EU rules in the field of humanitarian aid and development policy.
Moldova is working to align with the EU’s common commercial policy and continued to coordinate closely with the EU in the World Trade Organisation (WTO), including on investment facilitation, digital trade initiatives and dispute settlement by notifying, on 13 March, its intention to join the Multi-Party Interim Appeal Arbitration Arrangement (MPIA).
Moldova re-introduced an import control licensing mechanism for certain cereals and oilseeds, expiring on 31 October 2026. If the measure will be prolonged, it will require an additional assessment of its compatibility with the WTO and DCFTA’s provisions.
Moldova’s national legal framework is designed to align with the EU acquis on export control for dual-use goods and, is invited to continue enforcing the updates on the list of dual-use items.
Moldova is neither a participant nor an adherent to the Australia Group and is encouraged to become an adherent and eventually a member.
Moldova has to align with the new EU regulation on the screening of foreign investments (FDI). The authorities advanced the implementation of the law on the screening of investments in strategic sectors by developing and adopting the Investment Screening the Commission’s internal rules of procedure. Further efforts to strengthen the Commission’s functioning and
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ensure decisions are taken in a consistent and transparent manner are needed.
On bilateral trade agreements, Moldova has taken preparatory steps to ensure that its external economic agreements are compatible with EU obligations, including by introducing EU accession-linked expiration clauses in the provisions of bilateral free trade and investment agreements. It is also conducting a comprehensive inventory of its FTAs and bilateral investment treaties (BITs) as well as an analysis of the implications of its withdrawal from them. Moldova signed an economic cooperation agreement with the Republic of Korea in February 2026 and updated its FTA with Türkiye to incorporate the new Pan-Euro-Mediterranean rules of origin. It also launched negotiations on investment protection agreements with Italy and the Republic of Korea. Moldova has 41 bilateral investment treaties, of which 20 are with EU Member States covering 21 EU countries. In 2025, Moldova also granted preferential treatment to certain US products.
On development policy and humanitarian aid, Moldova remains a recipient of aid rather than a donor. With the Law on International Development Cooperation and Humanitarian Assistance having entered into force in January 2026, followed by the entry into force of the relevant secondary legislation in July 2026, Moldova continued to develop its legal and policy framework. In this regard, Moldova should continue to strengthen the implementation of the regulatory framework, including with regard to strategic planning, reporting and data collection in line with EU policies and principles. The Division for International Development Cooperation and Humanitarian Assistance within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has been staffed. Moldova has provided humanitarian aid to Ukraine in the form of both goods and supplies.
Chapter 31 - Foreign, security and defence policy
Member States must be able to conduct political dialogues in the framework of foreign, security and defence policy, align with EU statements, take part in EU action, and apply agreed restrictive measures.
Moldova continued to actively engage in political dialogue with the EU on foreign and security policy, reflected in a large number of high-level political visits. In November 2025, the 4th High- Level Political and Security Dialogue took place in Brussels.
Moldova maintained an institutional framework enabling its participation in common foreign and security policy (CFSP) and common security and defence policy (CSDP). Moldova’s alignment rate with the EU common foreign and security policy (statements by the High Representative on behalf of the EU and decisions of the Council of the EU on restrictive measures) remained high and continued increasing from 87% in 2025 to 91% as of September 2026. It aligned with one further EU regime on restrictive measures in the reporting period, reaching 38 out of 41.
Good cooperation with the EU on preventing circumvention of restrictive measures related to Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine has continued. Moldova continued applying the new centralised mechanism for the implementation of restrictive measures, with implementing decisions issued by the Interinstitutional Supervisory Council. Moldova should continue strengthening its enforcement capacities.
As a member of multiple international organisations, Moldova has continued to align with, support and co-sponsor international and EU positions, initiatives and resolutions, including in support of Ukraine and in favour of upholding sovereignty, territorial integrity and the UN Charter. Between November 2025 and May 2026, Moldova held the Presidency of the Council of Europe’s Committee of Ministers. Its mandate, focused on accountability for Ukraine, including the adoption of a resolution establishing an Enlarged Partial Agreement for a Special Tribunal for the Crime of Aggression against Ukraine, democratic resilience, responses to disinformation and migration with the adoption of the Chișinău Declaration on the topic of
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migration and the European Convention on Human Rights. In December 2025, Moldova also signed the Convention establishing the International Claims Commission for Ukraine regarding claims for damages, loss, or injury caused by Russia's invasion, ratifying it in July 2026. In May 2026, it also joined 35 states and the EU in establishing the Council of Europe’s Special Tribunal for the Crime of Aggression against Ukraine. Moldova further solidified its foreign policy direction through its withdrawal from the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) by denouncing the founding agreements of the organisation with relevant legislation adopted in April 2026. Moldova was elected in November 2025 to the UNESCO Executive Board for 2025- 2029. The United Nations Economic Commission for Europe continues to be headed by a Moldovan national.
Moldova is party to the Rome Statue of the International Criminal Court.
Moldova continued to support EU measures and documents on conflict prevention. Moldova is implementing its National Action Plan (NAP) for the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace, and Security and should further develop the third NAP beyond 2027. Moldova should continue targeted measures to promote gender parity in high- level diplomatic assignments and decision-making roles within the foreign service.
On disarmament and non-proliferation, Moldova systematically aligned with EU statements in the framework of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), as well as other NPD fora. It participates in the Proliferation Security Initiative and The Hague Code of Conduct and is a party to the Chemical Weapons Conventions (CWC), the Biological Weapons Conventions (BWC), the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) and the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT). Moldova demonstrated progress in implementing the National 2026-2030 Programme on Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW). On arms export control, Moldova remains aligned with the Council Common Position 2008/944 , and generally implements its reporting obligations under the ATT.
On security measures, Moldova has continued to implement the agreement with the EU on security procedures for exchanging and protecting classified information.
Cooperation in the field of common security and defence policy (CSDP) remained strong under the strategic framework of the EU-Moldova Security and Defence Partnership. Moldova has been contributing to Operation EUFOR ALTHEA in Bosnia and Herzegovina and continues to contribute to EUTM Somalia. At the same time, Moldova continued efforts to modernise its armed forces, using the substantial support through the European Peace Facility.
Regarding hybrid threats, Moldova has built up remarkable resilience and an ability to counter hybrid threats and foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI), despite evolving patterns of Russian hybrid activities and the continued spilled-over effects of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine. In this context, it is the rural and less developed regions in the country that are mostly vulnerable to FIMI. Cooperation increased between Moldova and the EU in addressing hybrid threats, with the country also sharing valuable lessons learned and thereby contributing to Europe’s shared security. The National Agency for Cyber Security has been further strengthened, and the Centre for Strategic Communications and the Countering Disinformation continued to play a crucial role. The National Crisis Management Centre (NCMC) was established in September 2025, and despite still being in the early stages of institutional development, it has already demonstrated its ability to respond quickly and in principle fulfil its coordination function in a series of national level emergencies in 2026. To be fully operational, NCMC needs to expedite recruitment processes and further alignment to EU standards. In December 2025, the National Security Council adopted the Plan for Strengthening Democratic Resilience against Electoral Interference, establishing a cross-sectoral approach to national resilience and hybrid threats, structured around information security, cybersecurity, fighting illicit
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financing, and public order.
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ANNEX I – RELATIONS BETWEEN THE EU AND MOLDOVA
Moldova applied for EU membership in March 2022 and was granted European perspective and candidate country status in June 2022. In December 2023, the European Council decided to open accession negotiations with the country. In 2026, three intergovernmental conferences have taken place, opening Cluster 1 (fundamentals) in June, Cluster 6 (external relations) in July as well as Cluster 2 (internal market) and Cluster 3 (competitiveness & inclusive growth) in October.
Moldova continues to broadly implement its obligations under the Association Agreement (AA), including those related to its Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA). The AA/DCFTA remains the bilateral legal instrument serving as the basis for political association and economic integration between the EU and Moldova. Regular political, economic and other sectoral dialogue between the EU and Moldova has continued through the AA/DCFTA structures. The EU-Moldova Public Administration Reform Subcommittee took place for the first time on 25 June 2026.
The bilateral relations between the EU and Moldova remained strong and continued to deepen across policy areas. The second EU-Moldova Summit took place on 22 June 2026. The latest EU-Moldova Association Council meeting was held on 5 October 2026. The 12th meeting of the EU-Moldova Association Committee in Trade Configuration took place in November 2025, and the EU-Moldova Parliamentary Association Committee met in May 2026. The High-Level Energy Dialogue continued holding biannual meetings during the reporting period with the latest meeting held in May 2026, and the latest High-Level Political and Security Dialogue was held in November 2025. The first EU-Moldova Investment Conference took place in June 2026.
Trade relations with the EU have further intensified since the start of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine. In 2025, the EU remained Moldova’s biggest trade partner, accounting for 56% of its total trade in goods, and its main export destination, with over two thirds of goods exports going to the EU.
The EU remains fully committed to supporting a comprehensive, peaceful, and sustainable settlement of the Transnistrian conflict, based on the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Moldova within its internationally recognised borders. The DCFTA applies to the entire territory of Moldova.
Citizens of Moldova have enjoyed visa-free travel to the Schengen area since April 2014. As part of the visa liberalisation monitoring mechanism, the Commission has regularly assessed the progress made by the country in implementing reforms under the visa roadmap. The Commission’s eight report under the Visa Suspension Mechanism, published in December 2025, concluded that Moldova continues to take action to address the recommendations made in the previous year’s report. A readmission agreement between the European Union and Moldova entered into force in January 2018.
The EU remained deeply committed under the common foreign and security policy to further strengthen cooperation with Moldova in the framework of the Security and Defence Partnership, which Moldova was the first country to sign with the EU in 2024. The EU Partnership Mission in Moldova (EUPM) continued supporting Moldovan institutions in building resilience. Facility (EPF) reached EUR 317 million. In addition, the EU has rolled-over in place a dedicated sanctions regime targeting those responsible for actions aimed at destabilising, undermining or threatening the sovereignty and independence of Moldova.
The EU is the largest provider of financial assistance to Moldova. In 2021-2025, the EU allocated over EUR 1.2 billion in grants to Moldova and mobilised EUR 1.7 billion for projects in Moldova, together with international financial institutions. The EU continues to implement the
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Growth Plan for Moldova, worth EUR 1.9 billion and underpinned by a Reform and Growth Facility for the period of 2025-2027. To date, the country has unlocked EUR 661 million.
Bilateral programmes are complemented by a package of multi-country and regional programmes supporting, among others, civil society, reforms in the fundamentals and the energy sector. The country also receives support from TAIEX and competitiveness programmes together with international financial institutions and international organisations.
Since 2014, Moldova has progressively extended its participation in EU programmes. It has joined the EU Customs programme, Fiscalis, LIFE, EU4Health, Horizon Europe, the Connecting Europe facility (CEF), the single market programme, the Union Civil Protection Mechanism (UCPM), Digital Europe, Employment and Social Innovation (EaSI), the Citizen, Equality, Rights and Values Programme (CERV), and the Justice Programme. As of 1 January 2026, Moldova joined the Creative Europe programme. Organisations and individuals from Moldova are also eligible for certain schemes under the Erasmus+ and European Solidarity Corps programmes. Moldova participates in several Interreg programmes and is a member of the EU macro-regional strategy for the Danube region. Moldova’s participation fee for EU programmes has been waived as a result of the impact on Moldova of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine. To strengthen the digital sector, to enhance access to EU initiatives and funds and to support the development of social and solidarity economy, Moldova is participating as an observer in a pilot project under the Technical Support Instrument.
Since its launch in 2009, Moldova has participated in the Eastern Partnership (EaP). The country also takes part in the Connectivity Agenda Platform launched in June 2026.
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ANNEX II – STATISTICAL ANNEX
STATISTICAL DATA (as of 14/09/2026)
Moldova**
Basic data Note 2013 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
Population (thousand) 3 559 i 2 644 i 2 565 i 2 513 pi 2 423 pi 2 416 i
Total area of the country (km²) 1) 2) 33 846 w 33 849 w 33 849 w 33 849 w 33 849 w 33 848 w
National accounts Note 2013 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
Gross domestic product (GDP) (million national currency) 3) : 242 079 274 488 303 554 323 933 353 521 p
Gross domestic product (GDP) (million euro) 3) : 11 571 13 794 15 454 16 825 18 045 p
GDP per capita (euro) 3) : 4 460 5 450 6 360 7 000 7 590 p
GDP per capita (in purchasing power standards (PPS) 3) 5 927 w 16 377 w 17 461 w 20 910 w 23 195 w 25 803 pw
GDP per capita (in PPS), relative to the EU average (EU-27 = 100) 3) : 31.5 ew 30.9 ew 34.9 ew 36.5 ew 37.0 ew
Real GDP growth rate: change on previous year of GDP volume (%) 3) 9.0 w 13.9 w - 4.6 w 1.2 w 0.3 w 2.4 pw
Employment growth (national accounts data), relative to the previous year (%) 3) : 1 2 3 - 4 :
Labour productivity growth: growth in GDP (in volume) per person employed, relative to the
previous year (%)
3) : 13 - 7 - 2 4 :
Unit labour cost growth, relative to the previous year (%) 3) - 5 w - 5 w 1 w 7 w 5 w 0 pw
Nominal unit labour cost index based on persons (3 year % change) 3) 29.0 iw 22.4 iw 23.2 iw 28.2 iw 15.8 iw :
Labour productivity per person employed: GDP (in PPS) per person employed relative to EU
average (EU-27 = 100)
3) : 46 ew 44 ew 47 ew 47 ew 45 ew
Gross value added by main sectors
Agriculture, forestry and fisheries (%) 3) : 12.3 9.4 8.2 8.5 8.6 p
Industry (%) 3) : 14.7 13.3 12.2 11.3 11.4 p
Construction (%) 3) : 9.3 8.8 8.3 8.3 8.4 p
Services (%) 3) : 63.6 i 68.4 i 71.3 i 72.0 i 71.6 pi
Final consumption expenditure, as a share of GDP (%) 3) : 100.3 102.4 103.7 103.4 105.0 p
Gross fixed capital formation, as a share of GDP (%) 3) : 24.1 22.1 19.4 20.5 22.0 p
Exports of goods and services, relative to GDP (%) 3) : 30.6 41.2 35.1 31.6 31.8 p
Imports of goods and services, relative to GDP (%) 3) : 57.8 70.9 58.9 57.3 60.9 p
Gross fixed capital formation by the general government sector, as a percentage of GDP (%) : : : : : :
Business Note 2013 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
Industrial production volume index (2015 = 100) : 100.0 w 96.8 w 92.8 w 92.5 w 98.1 w
Number of active enterprises (number) 51 269 w 38 783 w 42 056 w 46 653 w 48 190 w :
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Birth rate: number of enterprise births in the reference period (t) divided by the number of
enterprises active in t (%)
11.9 w 11.3 w 11.0 w : 5.5 w :
Death rate: number of enterprise deaths in the reference period (t) divided by the number of
enterprises active in t (%)
5.4 w 8.6 w 5.3 w : 9.8 w :
People employed in SMEs as a share of all persons employed (within the non-financial
business economy) (%)
56.7 iw 71.1 iw : : : :
Value added by SMEs (in the non-financial business economy) (EUR million) : : : : : :
Total value added (in the non-financial business economy) (EUR million) : : : : : :
Inflation rate and house prices Note 2013 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
Consumer price index (CPI), change relative to the previous year (%) 4.6 w 5.1 w 28.7 w 13.4 w 4.7 w 7.8 w
Balance of payments Note 2013 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
Balance of payments: current account total (million euro) - 369.1 w - 1 435.7 w - 2 358.2 w - 1 709.0 w - 2 786.1 w :
Balance of payments current account: trade balance (million euro) - 2 362.7 w - 3 540.6 w - 4 933.1 w - 4 489.0 w - 5 193.1 w :
Balance of payments current account: net services (million euro) 114.5 w 399.3 w 863.0 w 854.0 w 864.1 w :
Balance of payments current account: net balance for primary income (million euro) 673.1 w 225.2 w 56.7 w 246.3 w 85.9 w :
Balance of payments current account: net balance for secondary income (million euro) 1 206.0 w 1 480.5 w 1 655.2 w 1 679.6 w 1 457.0 w :
Net balance for primary and secondary income: of which government transfers (million euro) 113.6 w 156.4 w 279.0 w 312.8 w 139.0 w :
*3 year backward moving average of the current account balance relative to GDP (%) - 7.6 iw - 9.8 iw - 12.4 iw - 13.5 iw - 14.9 iw :
*Five year change in share of world exports of goods and services (%) : : : : : :
Net balance (inward - outward) of foreign direct investment (FDI) (million euro) 158.9 w 314.2 w 514.0 w 323.3 w 332.6 w 321.2 w
Foreign direct investment (FDI) abroad (million euro) 23.2 dw 12.1 dw 42.7 dw 10.3 dw 91.0 dw 87.7 dw
of which FDI of the reporting economy in the EU-27 countries (million euro) : : : : : :
Foreign direct investment (FDI) in the reporting economy (million euro) 182.1 dw 326.3 dw 556.7 dw 333.7 dw 423.6 dw 408.9 dw
of which FDI of the EU-27 countries in the reporting economy (million euro) : : : : : :
*Net international investment position, relative to GDP (%) 4) - 21.6 w - 39.8 w - 42.3 w - 34.9 w - 34.6 w - 38.1 w
Year on year rate of change in gross inflow of remittances (in national currency) from migrant
workers (%)
3) 5) 11.3 diw 9.0 diw 8.3 diw 6.7 diw 5.7 dpiw :
Public finance Note 2013 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
General government deficit / surplus, relative to GDP (%) - 1.5 ew - 1.9 ew - 3.2 ew - 5.1 ew - 3.9 ew - 4.0 ew
General government gross debt relative to GDP (%) 18.5 ew 33.9 ew 34.2 ew 35.4 ew 38.0 ew 38.1 ew
Total government revenues, as a percentage of GDP (%) 30.9 ew 32.0 ew 33.3 ew 33.4 ew 34.1 ew 35.5 ew
Total government expenditure, as a percentage of GDP (%) 32.3 ew 33.9 ew 36.5 ew 38.5 ew 37.9 ew 39.6 ew
Financial indicators Note 2013 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
Gross external debt of the whole economy, relative to GDP (%) 3) 68.1 iw 66.6 iw 65.3 iw 59.0 iw 58.7 piw :
Gross external debt of the whole economy, relative to total exports (%) 212.7 w 217.7 w 158.4 w 167.1 w 186.0 w 177.9 w
114
Money supply: M1 (banknotes, coins, overnight deposits, million euro) 1 509.2 w 3 027.9 w 3 115.9 w 4 137.3 w 4 874.9 w 5 374.0 w
Total credit by monetary financial institutions to residents (consolidated) (million euro) 6) : 2 991.9 w 3 207.4 w 3 495.0 w 4 373.5 pw 5 182.3 pw
*Annual change in financial sector liabilities (%) : 8.7 ew 13.1 ew 10.6 ew 7.9 pw :
*Private debt, consolidated, relative to GDP (%) 6) : 52.9 ew 51.4 ew 45.1 ew 48.8 pw 50.0 pw
Interest rates: day-to-day money rate, per annum (%) : : : : : :
Euro exchange rates: average of period (1 euro = … national currency) 16.724 20.922 19.900 19.643 19.253 19.591
Trade-weighted effective exchange rate index, 42 countries (2015 = 100) 105.2 w 123.0 w 132.4 w 146.2 w 157.1 w 158.5 w
*3 year change (T/T-3) in the trade-weighted effective exchange rate index, 42 countries
(2015 = 100)
0.1 iw 0.0 iw 0.1 iw 0.2 iw 0.3 iw 0.2 iw
Value of reserve assets (including gold) (million euro) 2 049.5 w 3 445.8 w 4 206.0 w 4 903.5 w 5 247.5 w :
External trade in goods Note 2013 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
Value of imports: all goods, all partners (million euro) 4 135 w 6 085 w 8 788 w 8 021 w 8 385 w 9 662 pw
Value of exports: all goods, all partners (million euro) 1 827 w 2 670 w 4 114 w 3 746 w 3 286 w 3 339 pw
Trade balance: all goods, all partners (million euro) - 2 308 iw - 3 415 iw - 4 673 iw - 4 275 iw - 5 099 iw - 3 695 iw
Terms of trade (export price index / import price index * 100) (number) 97.2 iw 110.4 iw 105.4 iw 96.0 iw : :
Share of exports to EU-27 countries in value of total exports (%) 42.4 iw 61.0 iw 58.4 iw 65.4 iw 67.3 iw 66.1 iw
Share of imports from EU-27 countries in value of total imports (%) 43.9 iw 43.8 iw 47.4 iw 48.3 iw 50.2 iw 54.4 iw
Demography Note 2013 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
Crude rate of natural change of population (natural growth rate): number of births minus
deaths (per thousand inhabitants)
- 0.1 - 6.2 ep - 3.6 ep - 3.9 ep - 4.1 ep - 4.2 e
Infant mortality rate deaths of children under one year of age (per thousand live births) 9.5 : 9.0 p 10.0 : :
Life expectancy at birth: male (years) : : : 67.5 ep : :
Life expectancy at birth: female (years) : : : 76.4 ep : :
Labour market Note 2013 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
Economic activity rate for persons aged 20–64: proportion of the population aged 20–64 that
is economically active (%)
7) 49.9 w 52.8 w 53.7 w 58.4 w 59.1 w 57.2 bw
Employment rate for persons aged 20–64: proportion of the population aged 20–64 that are
in employment (%)
7) 47.4 w 51.1 w 52.1 w 55.7 w 56.8 w 55.0 bw
Male employment rate for persons aged 20–64 (%) 7) 49.0 w 55.6 w 55.8 w 58.8 w 58.6 w 58.6 bw
Female employment rate for persons aged 20–64 (%) 7) 45.8 w 46.9 w 48.7 w 53.0 w 55.1 w 51.7 bw
Employment rate for persons aged 55–64: proportion of the population aged 55–64 that are
in employment (%)
7) 39.5 w 42.6 w 44.1 w 47.1 w 47.9 w 44.0 bw
Employment by main sectors
Agriculture, forestry and fisheries (%) 7) 28.8 w 21.5 w 20.8 w 20.9 w 18.1 w 14.0 bw
Industry (%) 12.1 w 14.4 w 14.8 w 14.4 w 13.4 w 12.3 bw
Construction (%) 5.5 w 7.7 w 7.7 w 7.1 w 7.5 w 10.0 bw
Services (%) 53.5 w 56.4 w 56.7 w 57.6 w 61.0 w 63.7 bw
115
People employed in the public sector as a share of total employment, persons aged 20–64
(%)
27.2 w 28.6 w 28.8 w 28.5 w 30.7 w 31.4 bw
People employed in the private sector as a share of total employment, persons aged 20–64
(%)
7) 72.9 w 71.4 w 71.2 w 71.5 w 69.3 w 68.6 bw
Unemployment rate: proportion of the labour force that is unemployed (%) 5.1 w 3.2 w 3.1 w 4.6 w 4.0 w 3.9 bw
Male unemployment rate (%) 6.0 w 3.9 w 3.6 w 5.0 w 3.8 w 4.3 bw
Female unemployment rate (%) 4.1 w 2.5 w 2.6 w 4.2 w 4.1 w 3.4 bw
Youth unemployment rate: proportion of the labour force aged 15–24 that is unemployed (%) 12.2 w 9.2 w 10.7 w 11.5 w 9.8 w 7.4 bw
Long-term unemployment rate: proportion of the labour force that has been unemployed for
12 months or more (%)
1.3 w 0.8 w 0.7 w 0.8 w 0.6 w 0.8 bw
Unemployment rate for persons (aged 25–64) having completed at most lower secondary
education (ISCED levels 0-2) (%)
4.5 w 4.2 w 3.8 w 5.8 w 5.0 w 4.5 bw
Unemployment rate for persons (aged 25–64) having completed tertiary education (ISCED
levels 5-8) (%)
4.1 w 1.7 w 1.7 w 2.3 w 3.0 w 3.6 bw
Social cohesion Note 2013 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
Average nominal monthly wages and salaries (national currency) 8) 3 674 w 8 980 w 10 447 w 12 209 w 13 990 w :
Index of real wages and salaries (index of nominal wages and salaries divided by the
inflation index) (2016 = 100)
47 w 112 w 129 w 150 w 173 w :
Gini coefficient 33 w 36 w 35 w 36 w 36 w :
Poverty gap 21.5 w 26.1 w 21.4 w 20.7 w 22.9 w :
Standard of living Note 2013 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
Number of passenger cars relative to population size (number per thousand population) 137.0 279.0 e 297.0 ep 325.0 ep 349.0 e 378.0
Infrastructure Note 2013 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
Density of railway network (lines in operation per thousand km²) 1) 2) 34.2 iw 34.0 iw 34.0 iw 34.0 iw 34.0 iw :
Length of motorways (kilometres) 0 0 0 0 0 :
Education, Innovation and Research Note 2013 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
Percentage of persons aged 30-34 with a tertiary education level (ISCED 2011 levels 5 to 8) 33.8 w 31.8 w 31.8 w 31.3 w 35.3 w 35.1 bw
Percentage of persons aged 30-34 with a tertiary education level (ISCED 2011 levels 5 to 8),
males
29.6 w 28.6 w 27.8 w 23.5 w 27.2 w 30.6 bw
Percentage of persons aged 30-34 with a tertiary education level (ISCED 2011 levels 5 to 8),
females
37.8 w 34.7 w 35.2 w 38.1 w 42.5 w 39.1 bw
Participation in early childhood education (children aged 3 and over) : 89.2 w 94.4 w 98.9 w 104.9 pw 109.0 pw
Participation in early childhood education (children aged 3 and over), males : 89.6 w 94.4 w 99.2 w 105.1 pw 109.6 pw
Participation in early childhood education (children aged 3 and over), females : 88.9 w 94.5 w 98.6 w 104.7 pw 108.4 pw
Low achieving 15-year-olds in reading (%) : : : : : :
Low achieving 15-year-olds in mathematics (%) : : : : : :
116
Low achieving 15-year-olds in science (%) : : : : : :
Early leavers from education and training: proportion of persons aged 18-24 with at most
lower secondary education (at most ISCED 2011 level 2) who are not in further education or
training
21.0 w 19.6 w 21.5 w 17.5 w 16.4 w 18.0 w
Early leavers from education and training: proportion of men aged 18-24 with at most lower
secondary education (at most ISCED 2011 level 2) who are not in further education or
training
25.9 w 23.1 w 24.5 w 18.6 w 16.6 w 21.0 w
Early leavers from education and training: proportion of women aged 18-24 with at most
lower secondary education (at most ISCED 2011 level 2) who are not in further education or
training
15.5 w 16.1 w 18.7 w 16.4 w 16.1 w 14.8 w
Proportion of persons aged 25-64 having participated in education and training (last 4
weeks)
1.9 w 1.1 w 1.3 w 2.2 w 2.9 w :
Proportion of persons aged 25-64 having participated in education and training (last 4
weeks), men
: 0.9 w 1.1 w 1.6 w 2.1 w :
Proportion of persons aged 25-64 having participated in education and training (last 4
weeks), women
: 1.2 w 1.4 w 2.7 w 3.6 w :
Exposure of vocational education and training (VET) graduates to work-based learning (% of
population aged 20-34)
: : : : : :
Share of individuals having at least basic digital skills (% of population aged 16-74) : : : : : :
Share of individuals having at least basic digital skills (% of population aged 16-74), males : : : : : :
Share of individuals having at least basic digital skills (% of population aged 16-74), females : : : : : :
Public expenditure on education relative to GDP (%) 3) 5.6 iw : : : : :
Gross domestic expenditure on R&D relative to GDP (%) 3) 0.30 iw 0.23 iw 0.23 iw 0.22 iw 0.22 piw :
Government budget appropriations or outlays on R&D (GBAORD), as a percentage of GDP
(%)
: : : : : 0.19 p
Percentage of households who have internet access at home (%) 35.0 w 66.8 w 67.5 w 70.6 w 74.1 w 79.7 w
Environment Note 2013 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
Index of greenhouse gas emissions, CO2 equivalent (1990 = 100) 28.8 ew 32.3 ew 30.5 ew : : :
Energy intensity of the economy (kg of oil equivalent per 1 000 euro GDP at 2015 constant
prices)
158.0 w 73.3 w 62.7 w 51.2 w 49.1 w :
Electricity generated from renewable sources relative to gross electricity consumption (%) 1.7 3.6 5.5 9.2 13.7 22.3 p
Road share of inland freight transport (based on tonne-km) (%) : : : : : :
Energy Note 2013 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
Primary production of all energy products (thousand TOE) 599 762 525 586 558 :
Primary production of crude oil (thousand TOE) 10 5 5 4 2 :
Primary production of solid fuels (thousand TOE) 0 0 0 0 0 :
Primary production of gas (thousand TOE) 0 0 0 0 0 :
Net imports of all energy products (thousand TOE) 1 966 i 2 306 i 2 181 i 1 944 i 2 130 i :
Gross inland energy consumption (thousand TOE) 2 560 3 009 2 692 2 573 2 686 :
117
Gross electricity generation (GWh) 905 1 131 995 1 169 1 498 :
Agriculture Note 2013 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
Agricultural output volume index (at producer prices) (2015 = 100) 87.5 w 178.1 w 150.9 w 153.7 w : :
Utilised agricultural area (thousand hectares) : : : : : :
Livestock numbers: live bovine animals (thousand heads, end of period) 189.0 w 104.1 w 102.4 w 101.0 w 98.8 w 95.8 w
Livestock numbers: live swine (thousand heads, end of period) 420.0 w 347.9 w 340.1 w 350.7 w 379.6 w 289.6 w
Livestock numbers: live sheep and live goats (thousand heads, end of period) 849.2 iw 573.7 iw 558.7 iw 549.9 iw 561.7 iw :
Raw milk available on farms (thousand tonnes) 9) 526.9 w 295.3 w 270.5 w 261.3 w 267.2 w 282.5 w
Harvested crop production: cereals (including rice) (thousand tonnes) 2 680.8 iw 4 690.0 iw 1 784.4 iw 3 214.8 iw 2 168.3 iw :
Harvested crop production: sugar beet (thousand tonnes) 1 009.0 w 757.8 w 478.2 w 428.3 w 292.7 w 335.1 w
Harvested crop production: vegetables (thousand tonnes) 292.0 w 232.0 w 286.1 w 322.6 w 283.8 w 310.7 w
Source: Eurostat and/or the statistical authorities in Moldova**
: = not available b = break in time series d = definition differs e = estimated p = provisional i = Eurostat estimate w= data supplied by and under the responsibility of the national statistical authority and published on an "as is" basis and
without any assurance as regards their quality and adherence to EU statistical methodology
* = Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure (MIP) indicator
** = The data managed by the National Bureau of Statistics of the Republic of Moldova does not include data from the
Transnistrian region over which the government of the Republic of Moldova does not exercise control.
Footnotes:
1) Including data from the Transnistrian region.
2) Including wetlands.
3) Based on 2008 SNA.
4) GDP according to SNA 2008.
5) Personal transfers.
6) Data are for Q1 2025.
7) Including persons producing goods for own consumption.
8) Includes units with one and more employees.
9) Raw milk available at farms includes cow, sheep and goat milk.
118
EN EN
EUROPEAN COMMISSION
Brussels, 4.11.2026 SWD(2026) 700 final
COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT
Gradual integration strands across the accession chapters
Accompanying the document
COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN
PARLIAMENT, THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL
COMMITTEE AND THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS
2026 Communication on EU enlargement policy
{COM(2026) 690 final} - {SWD(2026) 690 final} - {SWD(2026) 691 final} - {SWD(2026) 692 final} - {SWD(2026) 693 final} - {SWD(2026) 694 final} - {SWD(2026) 695 final} - {SWD(2026) 696 final} - {SWD(2026) 697 final} -
{SWD(2026) 698 final} - {SWD(2026) 699 final}
Gradual integration strands across the accession chapters
EU PROGRAMMES
CEF Digital Connecting Europe Facility - Digital
CEF Energy Connecting Europe Facility - Energy CEF Transport Connecting Europe Facility - Transport CERV Citizens, Equality, Rights and Values Programme Creative Europe Creative Europe Customs P Customs Programme DIGITAL P Digital Europe Programme EDF European Defence Fund EDIP European Defence Industry Programme Erasmus+ Erasmus+ ESC European Solidarity Corps ESF+ (EaSI) European Social Fund Plus (Employment and Social Innovation strand) EU4Health P EU4Health Programme EURATOM Euratom Research and Training Programme EU Space P EU Space Programme Fiscalis P Fiscalis Programme Horizon Europe Horizon Europe Interreg Interreg Justice P Justice Programme LIFE Programme for the Environment and Climate Action SMP Single Market Programme UAFP Union Anti-Fraud Programme UASL Ukraine Support Loan UCPM Union Civil Protection Mechanism USCP Union Secure Connectivity Programme
EU AGENCIES
BEREC Office Agency for Support for the Body of European Regulators for Electronic Communications CEDEFOP European Centre for the Development of Vocational Training CEPOL European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Training EASA European Union Aviation Safety Agency ECDC European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control ECHA European Chemicals Agency EEA European Environment Agency EFCA European Fisheries Control Agency EFSA European Food Safety Authority EIGE European Institute for Gender Equality ELA European Labour Authority EMA European Medicines Agency EMSA European Maritime Safety Agency ENISA European Union Agency for Cybersecurity ERA European Union Agency for Railways ETF European Training Foundation EUAA European Union Agency for Asylum EUDA European Union Drugs Agency EUIPO European Union Intellectual Property Office EU-OSHA European Agency for Safety and Health at Work Euratom Supply Agency Euratom Supply Agency Europol European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation Eurofound European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions Eurojust European Union Agency for Criminal Justice Cooperation EUSPA EU Agency for the Space Programme
Frontex European Border and Coast Guard Agency
EN EN
EUROPEAN COMMISSION
Brussels, 4.11.2026 COM(2026) 690 final
COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN
PARLIAMENT, THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL
COMMITTEE AND THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS
2026 Communication on EU enlargement policy
{SWD(2026) 690 final} - {SWD(2026) 691 final} - {SWD(2026) 692 final} - {SWD(2026) 693 final} - {SWD(2026) 694 final} - {SWD(2026) 695 final} - {SWD(2026) 696 final} - {SWD(2026) 697 final} - {SWD(2026) 698 final} -
{SWD(2026) 699 final} - {SWD(2026) 700 final}
1
A STRONGER EUROPE THROUGH ENLARGEMENT
INTRODUCTION
In a geopolitical environment marked by uncertainty, strategic competition, economic fragmentation and war, the European Union remains an anchor of peace, security, prosperity and democratic stability.
Enlargement has been one of the European Union’s most consequential policies for promoting stability, democratic transformation and economic integration across the continent. Today, its strategic importance has grown further. A credible enlargement policy is an investment in Europe’s collective security, competitiveness and resilience, strengthening the Union’s capacity to protect its interests, reduce vulnerabilities and create opportunities for citizens and businesses.
Enlargement is already contributing to these objectives. Through reforms, investment and gradual integration, enlargement countries are strengthening their democratic institutions, becoming more closely integrated into the European economy and contributing increasingly to Europe’s security and resilience. At the same time, closer integration with the Union brings tangible benefits before accession, including through greater economic opportunities, improved connectivity, opportunities for work, study and research and increased participation in selected areas of the single market.
Enlargement countries need to prepare for the rights and obligations of membership, while the EU needs to prepare for a larger Union capable of acting effectively and delivering on its priorities. To prepare for enlargement, the European Commission adopted a Communication1 on how the Union can anticipate enlargement in its policies, institutions, governance and financial framework, adapting where necessary as the accession process advances. This includes ensuring that future accessions are accompanied by effective and proportionate safeguards to protect the functioning of the Union and ensure that commitments made in the accession process continue to be respected after accession.
The reporting period showed that sustained reform efforts lead to concrete progress to EU membership as evidenced in particular by the four frontrunners. Montenegro’s remarkable progress in EU accession negotiations demonstrates that enlargement remains a reality within reach. With all 33 negotiating chapters opened and 21 provisionally closed, Montenegro has made significant strides in advancing its membership preparations and, in the Commission’s opinion, has met the closing benchmarks in all chapters. The country has made decisive progress on the fundamentals by achieving good results in areas such as the rule of law, economic governance, statistics and public administration reform. The work on Montenegro’s accession treaty and the adoption of Council Conclusions2 on the financial package for the accession negotiations with Montenegro confirm the country as the frontrunner in the EU’s enlargement process.
Albania also made significant progress in its accession negotiations. It opened all accession negotiation clusters in just over a year, met the interim benchmarks on cluster 1 and provisionally closed the first four chapters. Albania needs to maintain the pace of reforms, ensuring speed and quality, to fulfil closing benchmarks in all chapters of negotiations.
The Republic of Moldova’s (‘Moldova’) consistent implementation of reforms and its strong commitment to align with the EU acquis despite unprecedented external pressures demonstrate its readiness to advance on its EU path. All clusters have been assessed by the Commission as ready to be opened since December 2025. Clusters 1, 2, 3 and 6 were formally
1 COM(2026) 705 final 2 14265/26
2
opened. Moldova has continued to pursue sustained reforms to prepare for the next steps in the process, particularly fulfilling the interim benchmarks for cluster 1. Maintaining the strong momentum of EU-related reforms with greater focus on implementation and enforcement will be essential.
Ukraine has shown steadfast commitment to European integration through continued reform implementation, even in the face of most difficult circumstances brought by Russia’s war of aggression, which has been ongoing for more than four years. This is a testament to the Ukrainian people's resilience. Reforms have gradually continued during the reporting period, with reform momentum recently accelerating. All clusters have been assessed by the Commission to be ready to be opened since December 2025. Clusters 1, 2, 3 and 6 were formally opened.
Overall, progress across enlargement countries has remained uneven. North Macedonia has yet to fulfil the commitment it made to amend its constitution 3. At the same time, the country has recently accelerated reforms under the Growth Plan. The Kosovo* government has been in a caretaker mode for most of the reporting period but started to deliver on the Growth Plan. Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Serbia have not progressed on the fundamentals. Türkiye remains a candidate country, and a key partner for the EU; the underlying conditions for a standstill in accession negotiations remain in place. In Georgia there has been further backsliding on the fundamentals, and the accession process remains de facto halted.
The credibility of the enlargement process depends on reforms being put into practice and maintained over time. Progress towards membership therefore continues to be determined by objective criteria and each country’s own merits, with the fundamentals setting the overall pace of accession negotiations.
Gradual integration brings the Union and enlargement countries closer together before accession. Access to particular policies or parts of the single market depends on alignment with the EU rules, the capacity to implement and enforce them, and respect for the principles of the accession process. Gradual integration complements and reinforces, but does not replace, the accession process. The EU single market is the world’s second largest economy. The opportunity to expand it through gradual integration (followed by accession) means expanding a highly successful economic model. At a time of increasing global competition, enlargement strengthens Europe’s economic foundations and supports sustainable prosperity for all Europeans. Alignment with the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and stepped-up cooperation on CFSP and the common security and defence policy (CSDP) is part of gradual integration logic and highlights the enlargement countries’ contribution to Europe’s security.
I. PROTECTING EUROPE – DEMOCRACY, SECURITY AND RESILIENCE
A stronger Europe starts with a safer and more resilient Europe. Enlargement strengthens the foundations of European security by extending the area in which democracy, the rule of law, fundamental rights and accountable institutions are firmly anchored. Strong democratic institutions and effective rule of law systems are not only core requirements for EU membership, they are also essential for the capacity of states and societies to withstand internal and external pressures.
At the same time, Europe’s security environment has fundamentally changed. Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine and recent military escalation in the Black Sea, hybrid and cyberattacks, foreign information manipulation and interference, organised crime, and vulnerabilities affecting critical infrastructure, as well as climate related growing risk of natural hazards, demonstrate the increasingly interconnected nature of security. Developments in
3 Council Conclusions of July 2022 (11440/22) * This designation is without prejudice to positions on status, and is in line with UNSCR 1244/1999 and the ICJ Opinion on the Kosovo declaration of independence.
3
enlargement countries can have direct consequences for the EU’s security, just as closer cooperation with resilient, capable and committed partners strengthens Europe as a whole.
Enlargement countries are increasingly contributing to addressing these common challenges. Cooperation with the EU has intensified in areas such as foreign and security policy, defence, border management, the fight against organised crime, cybersecurity, hybrid threats, energy security, critical infrastructure, crisis preparedness and management, and civil protection. Ukraine and Moldova, in particular, have developed significant experience in responding to sustained hybrid and security threats, providing lessons relevant to the Union’s own resilience and that of other enlargement countries. Ukraine is already contributing to European defence readiness through cooperation and knowledge sharing.
This security dimension complements the fundamentals of the accession process. Both dimensions reinforce and depend on each other. Democracy, the rule of law, fundamental rights, functioning democratic institutions, public administration reform and the economic criteria remain at the core of the accession process4 and determine the overall pace of negotiations. Strengthening these foundations is indispensable for building democratic and societal resilience.
1. Democracy, rule of law and fundamental rights
Progress on the fundamentals remains essential for every enlargement country. Credible reforms require not only legislative alignment but also effective implementation, independent institutions, a strong public administration and a sustained track record of results.
During the reporting period, substantial progress was recorded in several enlargement countries, particularly where accession-related reforms benefited from sustained political commitment and broad institutional cooperation. Montenegro and Albania continued to advance reforms linked to the fundamentals, with Montenegro notably meeting the closing benchmarks for the rule of law chapters (as assessed by the Commission) and Albania meeting the interim benchmarks under cluster 1. Moldova and Ukraine pursued major reforms despite significant external pressures and, in Ukraine’s case, wartime conditions. At the same time, progress remained uneven across the enlargement countries. Serious concerns persist in several countries. Democratic standards, fundamental rights and freedoms and the rule of law deteriorated further in Georgia and Türkiye.
The annual rule of law report involves Albania, Montenegro, North Macedonia and Serbia in the same preventive cycle as Member States based on objective and merit-based criteria. The exercise is complementary to the enlargement reports. It is also an element of gradual integration, and it supports reform efforts aiming to firmly and irreversibly anchor democracy and the rule of law in enlargement countries. Building on the participation of four enlargement countries, the Commission will progressively include further candidates as and when they become ready.
Democratic institutions and civil society
Stable and effective democratic institutions are central to the accession process. Democratic systems require effective checks and balances, strong parliamentary oversight, transparent and inclusive political dialogue and electoral processes in which citizens can exercise their choices freely.
Overall, electoral processes were peaceful, competitive and professionally conducted. It is important for all enlargement countries to ensure alignment with relevant EU acquis in this area, taking into account European and international democratic standards. To address longstanding electoral integrity concerns, Bosnia and Herzegovina’s October 2026 general elections introduced countrywide use of new election information and communication technologies. At the 25 October elections, which took place in an atmosphere of profound
4 Public procurement, statistics and financial control are also part of the fundamentals of the accession process.
4
polarisation, the Serbian voters have given the next government a strong mandate for reforms. The October 2025 municipal elections in Georgia were held under deeply compromised political and electoral conditions including intimidation andpressure on independent media and civil society.
Cross-institutional cooperation facilitated the adoption and implementation of EU-related reforms in Montenegro, Ukraine and Moldova. In Albania, the Constitutional Court’s active role in upholding institutional safeguards contributed to conducive conditions for reform. However, political polarisation, weaknesses in parliamentary oversight and excessive use of accelerated legislative procedures continue to affect the quality of democratic governance in some of the enlargement countries. Respect for both constitutional arrangements and implementation of decisions of constitutional courts remains essential. In Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo, the functioning of the executive and legislature was hindered by political fragmentation. The dismantling of institutional safeguards continued in Georgia and Türkiye. Despite some progress in some countries, women remain under-represented in political leadership positions and continue to face gender-specific barriers to equal participation in political and public life
EU accession is most transformative where it is supported by broad political and societal ownership. Governments have primary responsibility for implementing reforms, but opposition parties, parliaments, local authorities, civil society, social partners, independent media and citizens all have an important role to play. Enlargement therefore requires a whole- of-society approach and sustained public engagement on the opportunities and responsibilities associated with EU membership. Young people have a vital role to play in shaping their countries’ European paths. This is also being supported by enhanced communication both in the enlargement countries and in the EU Member States.
An open, enabling and inclusive environment for civil society is an integral part of a functioning democracy. While the required legal and policy frameworks are broadly in place in most enlargement countries, their implementation remains uneven. Progress on some matters in Montenegro, Moldova, and Ukraine is not matched in other enlargement countries. Public consultations take place in most countries, but the mechanisms behind them have limited effectiveness. Civil society organisations and independent actors continue to face smear campaigns, strategic lawsuits and administrative obstacles in some countries.
In three enlargement countries, mounting challenges have been affecting civic space, effectively limiting civil society’s ability to operate freely and safely. In Serbia, civil society organisations have been subject to increasing pressure, attacks and intimidation. In Georgia, civil society operates in a repressive environment and is subject to restrictive legislation, deepening the chilling effect. In Türkiye, ongoing legal and administrative pressure from authorities and the disproportionately harsh implementation of national security laws stifles and shrinks civic space.
Public administration reform
Overall progress in implementing public administration reforms (PAR) remains uneven. Moldova, Montenegro and Ukraine have made good progress. Moldova relaunched the local administration reform. Montenegro adopted the Law on free access to information, the Law on local self-government, the Law on local civil servants, the Law on budget and fiscal responsibility and related secondary legislation on the Law on civil servants and state employees for the central civil service. Ukraine has further reinforced its strategic framework with the adoption of the PAR and the public financial management system strategies for 2026- 2030.
Although the strategic frameworks are broadly in place across all enlargement countries, major shortcomings persist. Political leadership and ownership of the reform agenda remain insufficient. Persistent weaknesses in linking strategic planning with medium-term budgetary frameworks continue to affect policy prioritisation and public expenditure planning. The continued politicisation of the civil service remains a critical challenge. Public consultation
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processes are still insufficiently institutionalised, with limited systematic follow-up and inadequate integration of stakeholder feedback into policymaking. The lack of systematic regulatory impact assessments in most countries continues to constrain evidence-based policymaking and the quality of legislative development.
All countries have put in place a broadly credible and relevant strategic framework for public financial management. However, progress in implementation remains insufficient, and structural weaknesses persist. This is particularly evident for budget transparency, the setting up and operationalising of independent fiscal oversight bodies and systems to ensure fiscal discipline and tax revenue performance. Structural weaknesses continued in public investment management, preparation of medium-term budgetary frameworks and a comprehensive fiscal risks monitoring. Public internal financial control systems require more effective internal audit functions and improved risk management.
Judiciary and the fight against corruption
Independent, impartial and effective judicial systems are indispensable for the rule of law, the protection of fundamental rights and a functioning market economy. They are essential for societal trust as well as for foreign investor confidence.
Several enlargement countries continued reforms aiming to strengthen judicial independence and accountability, including through vetting, legislative reforms and more transparent and merit-based appointment procedures. Montenegro, Moldova, and Albania continued reforms aiming to strengthen the functioning and accountability of their judicial systems. Montenegro adopted constitutional amendments, strengthening the independence of the Judicial and Prosecutorial Councils, fully in line with EU and Venice Commission recommendations. Albania completed the comprehensive vetting of judges and prosecutors. Ukraine advanced on the vetting and appointment of vetted candidates at high judiciary bodies and Constitutional Court levels. Judicial independence remains seriously weakened, especially in Türkiye and Georgia. In Serbia, the initial backsliding caused by legal amendments that removed some of the existing safeguards to protect prosecutorial autonomy and judicial independence was subsequently partly addressed.
However, political and other undue influence over judicial institutions is a concern in several countries. North Macedonia and Kosovo struggle with political or vested-interest interference with and influence over courts and prosecution services. Serbia is similarly affected, where undue pressure has significantly increased. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, the judiciary’s independence and impartiality need to be improved, and legislative reforms and integrity checks are key to rebuilding public trust in the justice system. The most severe situations are in Georgia and Türkiye.
Structural weaknesses, including unfilled vacancies, backlogs, lengthy proceedings and insufficient administrative capacity, continue to undermine the effectiveness of justice systems. Access to legal aid also remains limited. Legislative reforms therefore need to be accompanied by adequate resources, merit-based selection procedures, training, institutional capacity and a sustained track record of independent decision-making. This requires high political attention and leadership.
Corruption remains a serious challenge across the enlargement region and must be addressed as a matter of priority. A credible fight against corruption requires transparency, effective public procurement systems, independent media and an enabling environment for investigative journalism and civil society. The mainstreaming of anti-corruption policies and measures across the most vulnerable sectors remains an important priority. Several countries strengthened their legal and institutional frameworks and continued to develop track records on investigations and prosecutions. Montenegro, Ukraine, Moldova and Albania registered progress. In Montenegro, prosecutorial and law enforcement institutions’ effectiveness and coordination in the area of corruption continued to improve and the process to adopt two sets of amendments to the Constitution is ongoing. In Ukraine, anticorruption institutions continued
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to build up the track record on investigations, prosecutions and convictions in high-level anti- corruption cases, while certain priority legislative reforms to strengthen the fight against corruption remain outstanding. The risk of state capture risks remains salient, especially in Georgia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia and Türkiye.
Fundamental rights and freedom of expression
Legal frameworks for the protection of fundamental rights are generally in place across the enlargement countries, but implementation and enforcement remain uneven. The situation continued to deteriorate in Türkiye and Georgia. Across the region, the enforcement of human rights, including of European Court of Human Rights judgments and recommendations of international and European monitoring bodies needs to be improved, particularly in Türkiye and Georgia. National human rights institutions need more resources and greater independence. Improvements in child protection, gender equality and the rights of persons with disabilities were noted in Albania, Montenegro, Moldova and Ukraine. The rights of persons belonging to minorities continued to be generally upheld everywhere and were strengthened in Ukraine.
Montenegro and Moldova took steps to tackle ill-treatment of prisoners and made efforts to improve detention and prison conditions, but continued efforts are needed. In North Macedonia, and Türkiye, reform efforts have yet to lead to tangible results. Most countries need to respond more decisively to cases of discrimination and hate offences, in particular those targeting Roma, LGBTIQ+ persons, persons with disabilities, and minorities. This requires effective prevention, investigation, prosecution and access to remedies, alongside measures addressing the structural conditions that enable discrimination. Implementation of measures to improve gender equality is uneven. The continued incidence of gender-based violence requires increased resources for the prevention and for accessible, specialised support services for victims. The increase in anti-rights and anti-gender narratives is a challenge in several countries. In Türkiye, the recent wave of arrests and legal proceedings targeting LGBTIQ+ persons, activists, human rights associations and businesses has led to further stigmatisation and curtailed the exercise of their rights.
Efforts are still ongoing to align legislation and practice with the EU acquis and European standards on victims’ rights and procedural safeguards for suspects and accused persons. Montenegro is a good example of considerable progress in alignment in this area.
Freedom of expression, media freedom and media pluralism remain essential indicators of democratic resilience. Some positive developments were recorded in certain enlargement countries, but intimidation, threats and attacks against journalists, including strategic lawsuits against public participation, political influence over media, concentration of media ownership and weaknesses in the independence of regulatory authorities remain of concern in others. Montenegro has continued to progress in this area, further aligning with EU standards and implementing a zero-tolerance policy to intimidation and violence against journalists. Moldova adopted a new media law on transparency, including in relation to media ownership, consistent with the European Media Freedom Act5. Positive developments were also recorded in other countries, particularly Ukraine. Further efforts are needed to align legislation and practice with the EU acquis and European standards. The safety of journalists remains a concern in several countries and has further deteriorated in Serbia, Georgia and Türkiye. A credible track record of effective and systematic follow-up by law enforcement and judicial authorities is essential. Independent and pluralistic media are also increasingly important for strengthening societies’ resilience against foreign information manipulation and interference. In Serbia, a further erosion of academic freedom and the freedom of scientific research was noted, with authorities increasing pressure and interference on university students, and research institutes.
5 European Media Freedom Act
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2. Internal security, borders and migration
Effective cooperation on internal security protects citizens in both the Union and enlargement countries. Organised crime, trafficking in human beings, drug trafficking, migrant smuggling, money laundering, violent extremism, radicalisation, terrorism and cybercrime are inherently cross-border challenges and require coordinated responses and effective cooperation. In today’s security environment, the ability and commitment of enlargement countries to address internal security threats ranging from hybrid attacks to organised crime and terrorism, is essential.
Efforts to strengthen the fight against serious and organised crime delivered results. Montenegro and Albania’s specialised prosecution offices achieved results in investigating and prosecuting high-risk criminal networks. Ukraine, Moldova and Bosnia and Herzegovina each issued a new national Serious and Organised Crime Threat Assessment. Albania adopted new strategic frameworks to fight organised crime. Shortages in human resources and equipment remain an issue across enlargement countries, and integrity measures across all law enforcement agencies need to be strengthened.
Cooperation among enlargement countries, EU Member States and EU agencies continued to deepen. Several partners strengthened their specialised law enforcement and prosecution capacities and intensified their operational cooperation, including through EMPACT (the European Multidisciplinary Platform Against Criminal Threats). These efforts have contributed to the investigation and prosecution of organised criminal networks.
Further progress is nevertheless needed to consolidate track records of investigations, prosecutions, convictions and confiscation of criminal assets. Some enlargement countries have regularly used financial investigations and asset recovery, but a systematic follow-the- money approach should become standard practice. Capacity to investigate cybercrime, cryptocurrency-related crime and complex financial crime also needs to be strengthened further. Montenegro, Albania, Türkiye and Moldova have taken steps to strengthen their anti- money laundering and countering the financing of terrorism framework. Although money laundering is increasingly recognised as a stand-alone offence, prosecutions and convictions in such cases remain scarce. Serbia, Türkiye and Bosnia and Herzegovina have been recently assessed by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) and Moneyval. These countries should prioritise implementing the Key Recommended Actions – or, in Bosnia and Herzegovina’s case, fully commit to its FATF action plan to address the identified strategic deficiencies that have led to its inclusion in the FATF list of jurisdictions under increased monitoring.
Drug trafficking remains the most common activity of organised criminal groups operating across enlargement countries. Drugs seizures have tended to increase, and it is essential that all enlargement countries ensure a timely destruction of any confiscated drugs. Albania, Montenegro and Moldova made further progress in aligning their legislation with the EU acquis on drugs, while additional efforts are needed in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo and North Macedonia. Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, North Macedonia and Serbia should also adopt a comprehensive national drugs strategy and action plan against drug trafficking. Ukraine should further align its legislative and institutional framework with the EU acquis on drugs.
Some good results were achieved in dismantling networks involved in trafficking in human beings. In Montenegro, the track record of prosecutions and convictions in this area continued to improve. Progress has been made in combating all forms of trafficking in human beings, particularly forced labour and forced begging. However, stronger mechanisms are needed for identifying, protecting, helping, compensating and reintegrating victims. Investigations into child sexual abuse and identification and support to victims also need to be strengthened.
Enlargement countries are implementing their national strategies, roadmaps, and action planson small arms and light weapons. Terrorism, violent extremism and radicalisation are particular security challenges. Enlargement countries continued to strengthen their counterterrorism and prevention frameworks. Cooperation with EU agencies and international
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partners also remained robust, and law enforcement capacities were generally effective. However, new challenges are emerging, including online radicalisation, terrorist content online, disinformation and the misuse of new technologies, including AI, and the growing influence of ethno-nationalism and political extremism.
Migration and border management remain areas of close cooperation, and continued to deliver results. Irregular border crossings from the Western Balkans to the EU have not increased, reflecting strengthened cooperation and border-management capacities. Cooperation with Frontex and implementation of the EU Action Plan for the Western Balkans contributed to these results. In 2025, the substantial decrease in the number of irregular arrivals to the EU from Türkiye that had been recorded in 2024 continued. The EU continued to support Türkiye in its significant efforts to host 2.3 million refugees, mainly from Syria.
Further alignment with the EU’s visa policy remains necessary, alongside strengthened asylum and return systems and preparations to implement European integrated border management and, ultimately, the Schengen acquis. Montenegro amended its visa policy to fully align with the EU list of visa-required third countries as of 31 October 2026 and North Macedonia achieved almost full alignment, but other partners, especially Bosnia and Herzegovina, Georgia, Kosovo, and Serbia, must accelerate their efforts. Pending their full alignment with the EU’s visa policy, other enlargement countries should ensure a rigorous screening of visa-exempt third-country nationals to prevent any security or illegal migration risk towards the EU. The investor citizenship scheme functioning in North Macedonia should be discontinued without delay. Serbia should put an end to the practice of granting citizenship under accelerated or simplified procedures to nationals of countries that pose illegal migration or security risks to the EU.
Asylum procedures should be further aligned with the EU acquis. This should include adequate procedures and protection for unaccompanied minors and vulnerable people.
Enlargement countries should also start aligning with the legislative instruments that are part of the Pact on Migration and Asylum6. It is crucial that all enlargement countries continue to strengthen their capacities to follow the principlesdefined in the European integrated border management, as well as those connected with a stronger Schengen governance. This includes strengthening capacities to implement the customs legislation in view of the progressive application of the amended Union Customs Code7.
The fight against migrant smuggling improved. All Western Balkan partners, Moldova and Ukraine continue to actively take part in the Global Alliance to Counter Migrant Smuggling. The countries should develop a comprehensive approach to labour migration that prevents irregular secondary movements to the EU.
Enlargement countries should take measures without delay to reduce the number of unfounded asylum applications from nationals of these countries in the EU. Countries should continue to implement the readmission agreements with the EU and build capacity for returns, in line with fundamental rights.
Security and resilience
Foreign information manipulation and interference, cyberattacks and other hybrid threats are increasingly targeting democratic institutions, elections, public trust and the accession process itself. Strengthening resilience against these threats is therefore both an accession priority and a shared European security interest.
Preparedness remains uneven across the enlargement region. Moldova and Ukraine have developed increasingly comprehensive approaches to fighting foreign interference, strategic communication, cybersecurity and electoral resilience in response to sustained hostile activity.
6 Pact on Migration and Asylum7 Regulation (EU) 2026/2108
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EU CSDP missions in Ukraine and in Moldova are supporting capacity building and providing advisory support to sustain those efforts. Other enlargement countries, such as Montenegro, have also strengthened institutional arrangements and cooperation with the EU.
Election integrity requires permanent preparedness rather than temporary measures limited to electoral periods. Independent institutions, pluralistic media, an informed public and an active civil society are central to this effort. Enlargement countries should therefore continue strengthening their capacity to detect, analyse and respond to foreign interference and disinformation while safeguarding freedom of expression and other fundamental rights.
The European Democracy Shield and the European Centre for Democratic Resilience provide additional opportunities to strengthen cooperation among Member States and enlargement countries. On 13 October 2026, Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Moldova, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Serbia and Ukraine were associated with the European Centre for Democratic Resilience. Participation should support exchanges of expertise, operational cooperation and capacity-building, while being tied to clear commitments to democratic principles and resilience.
Cybersecurity, the protection of critical infrastructure, civil protection and preparedness are equally important. European energy, transport, digital and communications networks are increasingly interconnected, meaning vulnerabilities outside the Union can have direct cross-border consequences. Gradual alignment with EU standards, preparedness capacities and stronger crisis management across both natural and human-induced risks as well as closer operational cooperation can reduce these vulnerabilities and strengthen the resilience of shared networks and reinforce societal resilience.
3. Foreign, security and defence policy
Alignment with the EU’s common foreign and security policy (CFSP) is a strong signal of a candidate country’s strategic orientation. Full CFSP alignment, including implementation of EU sanctions is a key requirement for membership. This includes taking measures to prevent circumvention of EU sanctions. A number of enlargement countries benefit from capacity- building under the European Peace Facility.
Most enlargement countries maintained a full or high alignment rate with the CFSP during the reporting period. Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro and North Macedonia continued to be fully aligned. Kosovo’s full alignment with the CFSP is reflected in the dedicated Chapter 31 of the annual report for the first time. Ukraine and Moldova maintained very high levels of alignment. By contrast, Serbia’s alignment remained low, while Georgia’s alignment declined further. While Türkiye increased the number of consultations and its cooperation with the EU on a number of regional and international security issues, it continued to maintain a very low alignment rate.
Beyond CFSP alignment, enlargement countries are increasingly contributing to the EU’s common security and defence policy (CSDP). They participate in EU crisis-management missions and operations, contribute to European security and benefit from closer cooperation through a range of instruments. Security and Defence Partnerships with several enlargement countries provide structural frameworks for enhancing security and defence cooperation across a wide range of areas.
Ukraine’s contribution is of particular significance. Cooperation between the EU and Ukraine on security and defence has deepened substantially8 since Russia’s full-scale invasion. The gradual and future full integration of Ukraine’s defence industrial capacity into the EU defence technological base can contribute to strengthening both Ukraine’s defence and Europe’s long- term defence readiness and preparedness, industrial capacity and technological innovation. Ukraine is increasingly associated to EU instruments and programmes enabling practical cooperation and joint projects, such as Security Action for Europe, the European Defence
8 The EU-Ukraine defence industrial partnership, and Drone Deal, adopted in July 2026.
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Fund, BraveTech EU and European Defence Industry Programme, and participates in European Defence Projects of Common Interest. The EU will continue to support Ukraine military needs through the defence window of the Ukraine Support Loan.
These developments show that enlargement countries are already contributing to European security. At the same time, deeper security and defence cooperation must remain anchored in and be aligned with the Union’s values, foreign policy objectives and accession requirements.
Upholding international law, including the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, is central to the Union’s values.
II. GROWING EUROPE – COMPETITIVENESS, INVESTMENT AND OPPORTUNITY
Europe’s prosperity depends on its ability to compete, innovate and create opportunities in a rapidly changing global economy. Enlargement contributes to Europe’s economic strength by gradually creating a larger, more integrated and more dynamic economic space, increasing EU’s weight on a global stage. Economic reforms, investment and gradual integration are bringing enlargement countries closer to the EU single market, European value chains and investment flows.
Evidence from previous rounds of enlargement underlines the scale of the opportunity: an International Monetary Fund (IMF)9 analysis revealed that GDP per capita in the countries that joined the EU in the 2000s was 34% higher after 10 years, and 47% higher after 15 years than on a modelled path without accession. The analysis also points to gains for existing Member States, while noting that its model covers them less comprehensively. These estimates illustrate the combined effects of reform, improved governance, market integration and investment, but they are not a forecast of the outcome for every enlargement country.
The economic potential is significant, but convergence remains incomplete. The IMF10 estimates the Western Balkans and Moldova could achieve GDP-per-capita gains of around 30-35% over 10 years through reforms, deeper market integration and EU investment. The overall macroeconomic picture is mixed. In 2025, economic growth in many enlargement countries was weaker than expected. In the Western Balkans, annual growth slowed to 2.6%, down from 3.6% in 2024, mainly because of a sharp slowdown in Serbia, the region’s largest economy. North Macedonia was the only Western Balkan economy where growth accelerated. Growth ranged from 2% in Serbia to 3.7% in Albania. In 2025, Moldova’s economy grew by 2.4%, supported by a recovery in agriculture and higher IT exports. However, this growth did not carry into 2026 as the country’s vulnerability to external energy shocks, repeated energy and environmental emergencies, and a weak export base, continued to weigh on economic growth. In Türkiye, growth reached 3.6%, driven mainly by strong domestic demand, and was higher than in 2024. Growth remained strong in Georgia at 7.5%. In Ukraine, growth slowed to 1.8%, largely because of continued Russian attacks on energy infrastructure. The Black Sea blockade has further disrupted trade routes, leading to loss of domestic revenue. Inflation remained persistent in most economies.
Current account balances deteriorated in most countries in 2025. Exports were weak amid global headwinds while strong domestic demand kept import levels high. Attracting foreign direct investment into tradable sectors remains difficult as investment often goes to non- tradable sectors such as real estate. In addition, Russia’s war against Ukraine heavily weighs on the business environment not only in Ukraine but also in neighbouring Moldova, where heightened geopolitical uncertainty and elevated risk perceptions are adversely affecting investor sentiment and FDI inflows.
Banking sectors remained stable in 2025, and credit growth generally accelerated, supported in several countries by stronger household borrowing for housing and consumer spending.
9 IMF report - Bridging Borders: Making the Most of EU Accession 10 See footnote 9
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Across the enlargement countries, banks continued to show solid capital adequacy ratios, ample liquidity and low non-performing loan ratios.
Overall, general government balances deteriorated in 2025 compared with the previous year, although most countries performed better than their budget targets. Revenue collection has increased. At the same time, expenditure was often lower than planned, mainly because capital spending was under-executed. As a result, fiscal deficits were smaller than expected in several countries. Common fiscal challenges across the countries include narrow revenue bases, weaknesses in public investment management, gaps in fiscal governance and, in some cases, moderate to high public debt.
All economies face similar structural barriers to higher productivity and sustainable long-term growth. In most of them, corruption, legal uncertainty and slow court procedures continue to undermine the business environment. Weak regulatory and institutional frameworks hold back private-sector development, and insufficient investment in research and innovation further constrains competitiveness and productivity growth. Large and inefficient state-owned enterprises distort competition and weigh on growth. A large informal sector further weakens competition and reduces tax revenue, limiting the resources available for investment in education, culture, healthcare and infrastructure. Meanwhile, the green transition has become more urgent as it is both a challenge and an opportunity for sustainable growth. Labour market outcomes have improved in many economies, with employment rising, but participation remains low overall, especially among women, and unemployment is still relatively high, and capacity on social dialogue remains weak. Discrimination and inequalities pose structural obstacles to labour market participation and prevent the economies from making full use of available human capital.
The EU supports economic transformation through reforms, investment and gradual integration. The Growth Plans for the Western Balkans and Moldova and the Ukraine Facility link substantial financial support to reforms that prepare countries for EU membership. In parallel, gradual integration can open selected areas of EU policies and the single market before accession subject to certain conditions, strengthening convergence and the Union’s own preparedness for a larger membership.
1. Accelerating economic and social convergence through reforms and investment
Economic convergence is essential for enlargement to be a success. Stronger economies and functioning market institutions enable enlargement countries to compete effectively within the single market and contribute to the Union’s prosperity after accession. The IMF analysis of previous rounds of enlargement attributes roughly two thirds of estimated income gains to higher productivity. It identifies mutually reinforcing sources of growth, namely better governance, rule of law and regulation, single market integration and EU funding and investment.
Economic convergence needs to go hand in hand with social convergence, based on the principles of the EU Pillar of Social Rights and the EU social acquis. To achieve this, it is crucial that all enlargement countries progress on developing well-functioning labour market structures and institutions, effective social protection systems and strong social dialogue.
The Growth Plans and their respective facilities - the Reform and Growth Facility for the Western Balkans11, the Reform and Growth Facility for the Republic of Moldova12 and the Ukraine Facility13 strengthen the link between reforms, investment and economic integration. They support structural reforms in areas including the business environment, public administration, energy, digitalisation, human capital and the green transition, while mobilising public and private investment. Improved governance and the rule of law reduce uncertainty for investors; stronger links to the single market support scale and participation in
11 Regulation (EU) 2024/1449 12 Regulation (EU) 2025/535 13 Regulation (EU) 2024/792
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European value chains; and EU-backed investment can help close infrastructure gaps and draw in private capital.
In the Western Balkans, all partners adopted Reform Agendas, and financial support under the Reform and Growth Facility for the Western Balkans was linked to the delivery of agreed reform steps. By September 2026, 673.6 million have been released out of the 6 billion available under the Facility following the completion of 90 out of 731 reform steps. Implementation needs to accelerate, with particular attention to reforms that improve economic governance, strengthen the rule of law and the business environment, and support convergence with the single market14.
The EU rolled out WiFi4WB, preparing the installation of free Wi-Fi hotspots in around 500 municipalities across the region to foster digital connectivity and inclusion. The first regional EU-Western Balkans Investment Forum mobilised investors around reform and investment priorities. These measures complemented ongoing pre-accession assistance under the Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance (IPA III) and participation in EU programmes such as Horizon Europe, Erasmus+ and Creative Europe.
The Western Balkans region has the ambition to create a Common Regional Market (CRM) that aims to ensure freedom of movement for people, services, goods and capital. The CRM facilitates movement, recognising professional and academic qualifications, digitalising procedures and strengthening customs cooperation. Full implementation of existing commitments remains crucial. A well-functioning regional market based on EU rules can generate economic benefits for the region while helping businesses prepare for competition in the single market.
The Reform and Growth Facility for Moldova, amounting to EUR 1.9 billion, is supporting an ambitious reform and investment agenda and closer economic integration with the Union. The amount is composed of EUR 1.63 billion that are conditional to the implementation of the Reform Agenda and unconditional complementary support worth EUR 250 million for 2025- 2027. Moldova continued implementing its Reform Agenda and benefited from a gradual participation in areas of the single market and EU programmes. By October 2026, EUR 660.8 million out of EUR 1.63 billion in grants and loans available under the Facility had been released following the completion of 46 out of 48 reform steps scheduled until June 2026 and overall 153 steps for 2025-2027. Sustained implementation while stepping up the implementation of public investments will be essential to turn financial support into long-lasting economic convergence and increased resilience15.
The Ukraine Facility provides over EUR 50 billion of stable financing (across the three Pillars), in grants and loans, to support Ukraine's recovery, reconstruction, and modernisation for the period from 2024 to 2027. The amount of Pillar 1 of the Ukraine Facility received an increase of EUR 8.4 billion in financing for 2026 following the adoption of the Ukraine Support Loan16. A total of EUR 32.5 billion has been disbursed so far under Pillar 1. The Ukraine Plan continued to support reforms necessary for accession, reconstruction and private-sector development in the country. Despite the exceptional circumstances created by Russia’s war of aggression, Ukraine continued to adopt reforms that aim to strengthen economic governance and support its gradual integration into the EU economy. Reconstruction and accession preparations should continue to reinforce each other, ensuring that investment contributes to a competitive, sustainable economy that is increasingly integrated into European markets17.
14 More information - Reform and Growth Facility for the Western Balkans - Enlargement and Eastern Neighbourhood 15 More information - Reform and Growth Facility for Moldova - Enlargement and Eastern Neighbourhood 16 The budget support under the Ukraine Support Loan is also channelled through macro-financial assistance. 17 More information - Ukraine Facility - Enlargement and Eastern Neighbourhood
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EU-backed investment platforms, including the Ukraine Recovery Conference, the EU- Moldova Investment Conference and the EU-Western Balkans Investment Forum, have helped connect reform and investment priorities with businesses, international financial institutions and investors. Mobilising significantly more private capital will be needed to close the investment and productivity gaps with the EU.
Improving the investment climate remains critical. Legal uncertainty, corruption, weaknesses in public administration and judicial systems, inefficient state-owned enterprises and large informal sectors continue to discourage productive investment in several enlargement economies. Tackling these structural constraints is essential both for economic convergence and for successful participation in the single market.
2. Integrating into the single market before accession
Gradual integration is already delivering tangible benefits for citizens and businesses while supporting preparations for membership. It is part of a wider approach to enlargement preparedness: as candidates gradually align with EU rules and implement them, the Union can anticipate the implications of a larger membership across its policies and instruments.
Progress during the reporting period was particularly visible in telecommunications, payments, customs, taxation, digital services, energy and industrial products. These initiatives combine concrete benefits with regulatory convergence. Participation is conditional on alignment with relevant EU rules, effective implementation and enforcement, and the capacity to safeguard the functioning of the single market.
The extension of the EU’s Roam Like at Home area to Ukraine and Moldova since January 2026 has removed roaming charges and brought immediate benefits to citizens and businesses. Work is advancing on extending the scheme to the Western Balkans.
Integration into the Single Euro Payments Area (SEPA) is another major example of this gradual approach. Albania, Moldova, Montenegro, North Macedonia and Serbia have entered the geographical scope of SEPA schemes following a decision of the European Payments Council, with payment service providers gradually joining its schemes. This facilitates faster and less costly euro payments and requires alignment with major EU financial-sector legislation, including anti-money laundering and counterterrorist financing requirements. Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo and Ukraine should continue, complete and implement the reforms required to meet the conditions for integration into SEPA.
Customs cooperation is similarly crucial for facilitating trade and protecting the Union’s financial and security interests. Enlargement countries continued to align customs systems, strengthen risk management and gradually participate in European customs arrangements, including the Common Transit Convention (CTC). While current CTC members successfully upgraded to the latest version of the New Computerised Transit System (NCTS), Albania and Bosnia and Herzegovina made further progress towards joining CTC in the next years. The integration of enlargement countries in CTC brings significant benefits, such as reduced customs controls and faster clearance times, and strengthens the countries’ capacity to prevent and detect non-compliant trade flows. The Commission calls on Serbia to lift its veto to Kosovo’s application to become an observer to the CTC. Coordination and adjustment of tax systems is necessary for the good functioning of the single market and to avoid distortion of competition. Further digitalisation and interoperability of customs systems will be essential for accession preparedness. Energy-market integration is progressing in parallel, building on the Energy Community Treaty as the main framework for the integration of enlargement countries’ energy markets with the EU. Closer integration of enlargement countries into European electricity and energy markets strengthens energy security, facilitates investment in renewable energy and infrastructure and reduces strategic dependencies. Ukraine and Moldova have made particularly significant progress in integrating their energy systems into the EU and in reducing dependence on Russian energy.
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3. Connecting Europe
A larger Union will require stronger physical, energy and digital connections. Connectivity is therefore both an economic opportunity and a requirement for enlargement. Regional connectivity remained high on the agenda through cooperation in the areas of transport, energy and digital technologies in the Western Balkans, Türkiye and the Black Sea region.
The EU continued investing in transport links that connect enlargement countries with the single market and with each other. In the Western Balkans, Moldova and Ukraine, the Transport Community supported regulatory alignment and measures to facilitate transport across the region and with neighbouring Member States. Green Lanes and work on the busiest border crossing points aim to reduce waiting times, facilitate trade and boost the resilience of transport corridors.
The EU-Ukraine Solidarity Lanes continued to provide essential routes for Ukraine’s exports and imports and strengthened transport connections between Ukraine, Moldova and the Union. Their importance has increased following massive attacks by Russia on Ukraine’s ports and land infrastructure since this summer, which have had a negative impact on freedom of navigation, with global consequences. Enhancing the cooperation on the Danube and Black Sea corridors is critical not only for Ukraine, but also for European trade, and economic resilience, as well as global food security.
Connectivity has an increasingly significant geopolitical dimension. The European Transport Corridors provide the long-term strategic transport framework for strengthening connectivity, resilience and links to neighbouring countries, including the Baltic Sea - Black Sea - Aegean Sea Corridor. Under the connectivity agenda launched as part of the EU Black Sea strategy, the EU and regional partners are strengthening transport, energy, digital and trade links between Europe, the Black Sea region, the South Caucasus and Central Asia. The Trans- Caspian Transport Corridor creates opportunities to diversify trade routes and strengthen Europe’s connections with Central Asia and can reduce vulnerabilities from concentrated or insecure transport routes. In her 2026 State of the Union address, President von der Leyen announced an ambition to mobilise up to EUR 12 billion in public and private investment through the Global Gateway for the Middle Corridor and a Regional Connectivity Summit.
Transport infrastructure should increasingly be developed with both civilian and security requirements in mind. Improving cross-border infrastructure, interoperability and transport capacity can support trade and mobility and contribute, where relevant, to military mobility and wider European preparedness. The development of transport infrastructure should go hand in hand with the facilitation of customs procedures and digitalised transit.
Digital connectivity is equally important. Enlargement countries continue to develop digital public services and digital identity frameworks aligned with EU standards. European Digital Innovation Hubs and cooperation on high-performance computing and AI are helping businesses and public administrations develop the capabilities needed for the digital transition. The European Innovation and Technology Institute is present in the Western Balkans and Ukraine through Community Hubs. More hubs will open in Moldova and Kosovo by end-2026.
Further investment will be required to close infrastructure gaps, improve cross-border connections and ensure that transport, energy and digital networks are resilient, secure and interoperable with those of the Union.
4. Strengthening European value chains and economic security
Enlargement can contribute to the Union’s competitiveness and economic security by diversifying supply and value chains, building common resilience through mutual dependencies among partners, expanding industrial capacity and integrating complementary resources and capabilities into critical European value chains.
Work is continuing to integrate enlargement countries more closely into EU industrial supply chains. Regulatory alignment, agreements on conformity assessment and closer industrial
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cooperation can lower barriers for businesses and ensure that products meet EU standards. The process leading to start negotiations of an agreement on conformity assessment and acceptance of industrial products with Ukraine is well on track. Moldova is implementing an action plan to this effect, and preparatory work started with Serbia. The Commission has proposed a framework for the gradual integration of the Western Balkans, Ukraine and Moldova into strategic industrial sectors. This will facilitate the complete integration of their industries into European value chains ahead of full EU accession. Bilateral work on this has started with Kosovo, Montenegro, North Macedonia and Serbia. Efforts to improve the functioning of the EU-Turkey Customs Union should also continue.
The economic potential extends beyond market size. Enlargement countries possess industrial capacity, skilled workforces, energy resources, critical raw materials and increasingly dynamic technology sectors that can complement the Union’s economic base. Better integration can help diversify supply chains and reduce excessive dependencies in strategically important sectors, as well as contribute to food security.
Ukraine has particular potential to contribute to European industrial resilience through its capabilities in areas such as critical raw materials, energy, agriculture, digital technologies and defence production. As Ukraine rebuilds, its reconstruction process can help modernise infrastructure and industrial capacity that is more closely integrated into European value chains and aligned with European standards.
The Western Balkans are already closely integrated into EU manufacturing and supply chains. Further reforms, infrastructure investment and regulatory convergence can expand the region’s role in European production networks and attract more investment into higher- value-added sectors.
Türkiye’s diversified industrial base and deep integration into European value chains through the EU-Turkey Customs Union are important for European supply-chain resilience. Addressing existing trade irritants and improving implementation of the Customs Union would help this relationship function more effectively. In July 2026, the EU-Turkey Customs Cooperation Committee adopted an agreement to mutually recognise the respective authorised economic operator programmes.
The defence industrial dimension is also becoming increasingly relevant. Pursuant to the conditions set out in the different programmes and initiatives, starting with the security and defence interests of the Union and its Member States, closer cooperation with enlargement countries, particularly with Ukraine, can contribute to strengthening European defence production, technological innovation and supply-chain resilience.
5. Investing in the green and digital transitions
Successful enlargement requires economies that can integrate in a climate-neutral and increasingly digital European economy.
The green transition is both a significant investment challenge and a major opportunity. Many enlargement economies are more carbon-intensive than the EU and require substantial investments to align with the EU’s climate, energy and environmental objectives and standards, including in renewable energy, grids, energy efficiency, environmental protection infrastructure, clean transportation, clean industrial technologies, waste and water management, circularity, and climate resilient infrastructure. Accelerating decarbonisation and tackling pollution while ensuring energy security and clean and affordable energy will be essential for their long-term competitiveness and successful integration into the single market. Enlargement countries should also harness the benefits of introducing carbon pricing measures based on EU requirements, that can help generate revenues to finance the transition. Closer energy integration with the EU can support this transformation. Investment in electricity interconnections, circular economy, renewable energy and energy efficiency can reduce vulnerabilities, strengthen regional energy security and create new opportunities for European businesses and investors.
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Protecting and restoring the natural capital of the enlargement countries and promoting nature- based solutions will help the countries accelerate their decarbonisation efforts and gain competitive advantages stemming from the green transition.
The digital transition offers similar opportunities. Enlargement countries are gradually aligning with the EU digital acquis and developing digital infrastructure, public services and innovation ecosystems. Cooperation on AI, high-performance computing, digital identity and cybersecurity can accelerate productivity growth and contribute to Europe’s technological capacity. This is the case with the greater AI capacity available following the set-up of three AI factory antennas in Moldova, North Macedonia and Serbia.
These opportunities need to be accompanied by investment in skills. Labour shortages, low labour market participation and mismatches between education systems and employers’ needs remain constraints in several enlargement economies. Education, vocational training and skills policies should therefore form an integral part of economic convergence.
By combining reforms, investment and gradual integration, enlargement can help create a larger and more competitive European economic space. Unlocking this potential requires sustained reforms in the enlargement countries, effective implementation of EU-supported investment and continued progress on regulatory alignment. As integration deepens, the benefits should be felt more on both sides: through greater opportunities and convergence in enlargement countries and through stronger markets, value chains, connectivity and resilience for the Union as a whole.
A common framework for gradual integration
The ‘Preparing for a wider Union’ Communication18 expands and deepens the concept of gradual integration as an integral part of efforts to boost growth, competitiveness and security, and an essential part of the accession process.
In recent years, the EU’s gradual integration offer has been developed through a bottom-up approach. This was based on greater access to: (i) EU programmes; (ii) greater support from and access to EU agencies; (iii) implementation of single market integration and ad hoc measures; (iv) development of connectivity into EU transport, energy and digital networks; and (v) access to expert groups and committees. Significant progress has been made in recent years in all these strands. However, implementation of some measures remains uneven and fragmented across enlargement partners and among the different components of gradual integration. Furthermore, the work has not systematically focused on or being clearly linked to progress in accession preparations.
Therefore, the Commission is now putting forward a more coherent and structured approach to gradual integration with follow-up on the five strands of work, building on the work done so far. The offer will be made to every partner in comparably advanced accession situation. The mapping in the annex to this Communication shows how each part of this work will be directly anchored in – and related to – the dedicated enlargement chapter.
Gradual integration should expand in a structured manner where it brings clear benefits for enlargement partners and the EU, supports accession preparations and serves shared strategic priorities. Further opportunities exist in the areas of digital identity, transport, public procurement, industrial goods, energy, and emerging technologies, where appropriate. The scope and timing of participation and the associated support from the EU budget should reflect each country’s progress and capacity. Access must remain conditional and reversible based on the country’s alignment with the relevant acquis, effective implementation, enforcement, and respect for the principles underpinning the accession process. Enlargement countries will only be able to benefit from gradual integration in individual sectors if they meet the relevant
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cross-cutting conditions. Gradual integration does not confer the rights of EU membership or change the merit-based accession process.
At the same time, closer economic integration in a growing number of sectors and policies requires more stringent conditions. Enlargement countries need to strengthen foreign investment screening, export controls, cybersecurity, the protection of critical infrastructure and measures against sanctions circumvention and economic coercion, gradually aligning with the Union’s economic security framework. Therefore, access to gradual integration should be subject to strategic alignment which is part of the EU acquis in chapter 31 “Common Foreign and Security Policy”, and economic security requirements above, which are part of the EU acquis in chapter 30 “‘External relations”’, chapter 10 “Digital transformation and media” and chapter 15 “Energy”. Current conditions for participating in programmes and activities, as set out in the acts establishing them, will have to be met as well.
Launching dialogues on gradual integration with the enlargement partners in the next six months will give the opportunity to take stock of all the existing gradual integration measures and their financing. It will also help to bridge gaps, and, where possible, to provide a more tailor-made offer suited to the specific situation of each enlargement country.
These dialogues will also create the opportunity for the Commission to assess the conditionality linked to the gradual integration offer – CFSP alignment, rule of law, progress on the enlargement process and economic security – as assessed in the annual Enlargement package. This could form both a condition to access gradual integration and the criteria for reversibility if the conditionality ceases to be respected. This is in line with the conditionality already present in currently applicable legal bases, such as the relevant association agreement and the agreement related to financial assistance. Dedicated support under the proposed Global Europe instrument should finance the gradual integration needs identified through the dialogues. It would support the investments, administrative capacity, regulatory implementation and information systems required for effective participation in Union policies and programmes. National plans should identify these needs and sequence financing with the reforms and operational preparations on which participation depends.
As gradual integration expands, the Union should also ensure that new policy initiatives do not unintentionally create barriers that undermine accession-driven convergence. To mitigate this, the Commission will systematically assess the enlargement dimension in other policy initiatives. And, where appropriate, the Commission will support the participation of enlargement countries that are actively converging with the relevant EU acquis and meet the applicable cross-cutting political conditionalities or provide for adapted treatment. Any such arrangements will remain sector-specific, conditional and reversible and will not confer the rights of membership. As announced in the ‘Preparing for a wider Union’ Communication, consideration should be given to how candidate countries’ involvement could deepen further following the signature of accession treaties, so they could already participate in relevant parts of the single market. The Commission will examine structured political participation in relevant Commission activities, in full respect of the Treaties, the Commission’s institutional autonomy and the principle of collegiality.
III. BUILDING TRUST – GOOD NEIGHBOURLY RELATIONS AND REGIONAL COOPERATION
Lasting stability depends on trust, cooperation and reconciliation. The enlargement process has long been a catalyst for regional cooperation and remains one of the EU’s most effective instruments for promoting stability across the continent. By encouraging dialogue, supporting reconciliation and fostering practical cooperation, enlargement can help overcome historical divisions and build the foundations for a shared European future.
Good neighbourly relations and regional cooperation are an essential part of the Stabilisation and Association process and the accession process. Unresolved bilateral disputes, tensions between neighbours, and questions stemming from past conflicts can
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undermine regional stability and impede progress on membership. Enlargement countries are therefore expected to address outstanding issues constructively and in good faith, in line with international law and established agreements.
At the same time, bilateral issues should be addressed in a manner that supports the accession process. Sustained political dialogue, implementation of existing agreements and a commitment to good neighbourly relations are essential for building the trust required for a larger and more united Union.
Western Balkans: reconciliation and good neighbourly relations
In the Western Balkans, overcoming the legacy of the conflicts of the 1990s remains a major part of European integration. Stronger efforts are needed to address outstanding bilateral issues, including border questions, missing persons, accountability for war crimes and succession issues arising from the dissolution of the former Yugoslavia. Reconciliation must be based on facts and respect for victims, recognition of their rights and needs, and their meaningful participation in transitional justice processes.
Political leaders have a particular responsibility to contribute to reconciliation and avoid rhetoric or action that deepen divisions. Historical revisionism, denial or glorification of war crimes and inflammatory rhetoric are incompatible with the values underpinning the accession process and undermine trust between societies.
Existing bilateral agreements need to be implemented in good faith. This includes the Prespa Agreement between Greece and North Macedonia and the Treaty of Friendship, Good Neighbourliness and Cooperation between Bulgaria and North Macedonia. Their implementation remains crucial for regional stability, mutual trust and progress on the European path.
Regional cooperation should continue to complement these efforts. Practical cooperation on trade, connectivity, transport, energy, environment, security, research and innovation and cross-border challenges creates mutual benefits and strengthens relations between societies. Regional initiatives should remain inclusive, contribute to EU integration and be based on EU rules and standards.
Normalisation of relations between Kosovo and Serbia
For both Kosovo and Serbia, progress on their respective European paths remains contingent on progress in the normalisation of their relations.
Implementation of the Agreement on the Path to Normalisation and its Implementation Annex remains insufficient. Both parties need to engage constructively in the EU-facilitated dialogue and implement their respective obligations without further delay.
Normalisation is not only a requirement of the European path. It is essential for the security, stability and economic development of both societies and of the wider region. The lack of progress carries political and economic costs and risks leaving both sides behind at a time when the enlargement process has regained momentum.
The EU will continue to facilitate the dialogue towards comprehensive normalisation of relations between Kosovo and Serbia and support implementation of the agreements reached. Despite the readiness expressed by the HR/VP to convene a High-Level Dialogue meeting, political constraints have so far prevented such a meeting. Both parties bear responsibility for creating the political conditions required to achieve tangible and sustainable progress and to avoid any unilateral and uncoordinated actions, inflammatory rhetoric and measures that undermine trust.
Türkiye
Re-engagement between Türkiye and Greece continued and Türkiye did not engage in any unauthorised drilling activity in the Eastern Mediterranean during the reporting period. Yet the unresolved issue over the continental shelf and the exclusive economic zones continued to
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strain bilateral relations, marked most recently by the Libyan House of Representatives ratifying on 20 October the so called Libyan-Turkish Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on the delimitation of maritime jurisdictions in the Mediterranean, which triggered a strong EU reaction at the highest level declaring the MoU as null and void. Moreover, a higher number of violations of Greek airspace, including flights over Greek islands and of Greek territorial waters were reported. Türkiye is expected to make an unequivocal commitment to good neighbourly relations, international agreements and the peaceful settlement of disputes in accordance with the UN Charter. Türkiye must avoid threats and actions that damage good neighbourly relations; normalise its relations with the Republic of Cyprus; and respect the sovereignty of all EU Member States over their territorial sea and airspace as well as all their sovereign rights. Türkiye continued to refuse to recognise and cooperate with the Republic of Cyprus, including on security related issues. Türkiye did not fulfil its obligation to ensure the full and non-discriminatory implementation of the Additional Protocol to the Association Agreement.
The EU attaches particular importance to resuming and progressing on the Cyprus settlement talks to further improve EU-Türkiye cooperation19. The EU remains fully committed to a comprehensive settlement within the UN framework, on the basis of a bi- communal, bi-zonal federation with political equality, in accordance with the relevant UN Security Council resolutions and in line with the EU acquis and the principles on which the Union is founded. The EU has confirmed its readiness to play an active role in supporting all stages of the UN-led process, with all the appropriate means at its disposal. In July 2026, the Commission appointed Executive Vice-President Raffaele Fitto as the Commission’s Special Representative for Cyprus. Türkiye is expected to actively support efforts on a comprehensive settlement and to fulfil its obligations towards all Member States, including the Republic of Cyprus.
Across the enlargement region, the underlying principle is the same: European integration requires cooperation, trust and a commitment to resolving disputes peacefully. Good neighbourly relations are not an additional requirement alongside accession reforms; they are part of a country’s ability to assume the responsibilities of EU membership.
IV. DELIVERING ENLARGEMENT – PROGRESS, REFORM AND RESULTS
The enlargement process is delivering. Since October 2025, 16 intergovernmental conferences took place. Montenegro closed 14 chapters reaching a total of 21 overall. Albania saw all its chapters opened and the first four closed after meeting the interim benchmarks for rule of law requirements in June. Ukraine and Moldova opened four clusters each, building up on thorough preparatory work ahead of the formal launch of negotiations in June.
The reporting period demonstrated that countries that sustain reforms and meet the required conditions can advance towards membership, but progress remained uneven in others. Several enlargement countries reached significant milestones, while others progressed more slowly or stalled. In some cases, countries moved further away from the requirements of EU membership.
These differences reflect the merit-based nature of the accession process. Each country advances according to its own progress in meeting the set criteria. The fundamentals remain central and determine the overall pace of accession negotiations. There are no shortcuts to membership, but sustained reforms produce tangible results.
The renewed momentum behind enlargement creates an opportunity for countries that are ready to advance. Seizing this opportunity depends primarily on their capacity and political determination to implement reforms, meet outstanding requirements and build the broad societal support required for EU membership.
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Preparing the Union for enlargement
Successful enlargement requires preparedness on both sides. Readiness must be built throughout the process. Candidate countries must be able to apply the EU acquis, participate effectively in the Union’s institutions and assume the rights and obligations of membership from the moment of accession. At the same time, the Union must remain capable of taking decisions, financing its policies and delivering on its priorities with a larger membership. Progress on one side should inform practical preparations on the other.
Work on pre-enlargement policy reviews continued during the reporting period. The reviews show that most Union policies can accommodate a larger membership, with targeted adaptations where needed. Enlargement preparedness should become an integral part of Union policymaking throughout the accession process. This means: (i) anticipating enlargement across policies, legislation and financial instruments; (ii) making more systematic use of gradual integration to support reform and convergence; and (iii) ensuring that the Union’s governance and financial framework evolve as negotiations advance. This approach will support a merit-based accession process.
The Union’s capacity to act is equally important. Work with Member States and the other institutions on decision-making and institutional arrangements needs to advance while negotiations are under way. As outlined in the Communication ‘Preparing for a Wider Union20’, future accession treaties should also contain effective and proportionate safeguards to ensure that key commitments made during negotiations continue to be respected after membership. These preparations give practical assurance that enlargement will strengthen the Union’s ability to act and protect its interests.
The countries most advanced in the process have declared target dates for closing accession negotiations. This demonstrates their ambition, and the Commission is committed to supporting them in meeting EU membership requirements, as part of an accession process based on the own-merits principle. Roadmaps for the most advanced negotiating countries – Montenegro, Albania, Moldova and Ukraine – are presented in annex to this Communication. The roadmaps will give both the candidate countries and the Council a clearer framework for the next steps, thus helping to organise the next stages of preparation in a more structured and transparent manner. This reflects the ambition of the revised Enlargement methodology to make the process more predictable and manageable by setting out clearer priorities, sequencing reforms and negotiating steps in a more orderly way, while also improving monitoring of progress. The Commission will update the roadmaps as progress and challenges evolve, and depending on the candidates’ progress, the Commission can in time draw them up for additional negotiating countries.
Until the closure of negotiations with Montenegro, which could be achieved in December 2026, the priority will be toagree on the financial package, on the institutional arrangements, including the necessary safeguards, and on closing all remaining chapters, for which the closing benchmarks have been met. Following the closure of negotiations, and until EU membership, the Commission will put in place a monitoring mechanism to ensure that all outstanding reforms are completed by the time of accession and that the commitments made during negotiations are maintained and consolidated further, as relevant. The 2026 enlargement report on Montenegro could be the last enlargement report prepared for the country and be succeeded from next year by monitoring reports. An information and consultation procedure will be set up to ensure Montenegro is informed about changes to the acquis between signature and accession. The Commission proposes that appropriate information arrangements be put in place in the Council and in the Commission already after the final intergovernmental conference, ahead of signature of the accession treaty. Such arrangements would aim to ensure that Montenegro is kept adequately informed of proposals, communications, recommendations or initiatives.
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The rigorous accession process aims to ensure that countries joining the EU meet all their membership obligations on accession. The strengthened approach to safeguards will be applied for the first time in Montenegro’s Accession Treaty. Safeguard clauses are temporary provisions designed to tackle, without delay, any shortcomings that may arise from the accession of the new Member State and to ensure that negotiation commitments are upheld after accession. Including robust, effective and proportionate safeguard clauses into the accession framework mitigates potential risks and sets a precedent for future candidates, balancing incentives with accountability. The core cross-cutting parts of the Montenegro Accession Treaty will serve as a model for institutional aspects and safeguards in future accession treaties.
Preparing the Union also means strengthening public understanding and support for enlargement. Member States, EU institutions and enlargement countries share the responsibility for communicating transparently about the implications, opportunities and challenges of future accessions. A credible enlargement policy requires public confidence that new members will be ready to assume their obligations and that the Union itself will be ready to welcome them.
Maintaining a credible and merit-based process
The renewed momentum behind enlargement must be matched by delivery. The EU will continue to support enlargement countries through political engagement, technical assistance, investment and gradual integration. In return, progress on membership requires sustained implementation of reforms and respect for the values, principles and obligations on which the Union is founded.
Indicative reform ambitions or target dates can help organise work and maintain political momentum, but they cannot replace fulfilling accession conditions. The pace of each country’s progress will continue to depend on its own merits and its capacity to meet all memberships requirements.
The enlargement process is both demanding and achievable. The progress made by the most advanced candidates shows that reforms lead to transformative results. The responsibility now lies with each enlargement country to make full use of the opportunities available, while the Union advances its own preparations for a larger and stronger Europe.
V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
I.
For the first time since 2011, when the EU closed accession negotiations with Croatia, the EU is in a position to soon close accession negotiations with another candidate country, Montenegro. This is testament to Montenegro’s sustained efforts to advance on the European path and implement the reforms needed to turn EU membership into reality. It also shows that the enlargement process delivers results when the necessary reforms are undertaken.
EU enlargement is delivering. It is advancing more than at any point in time in the past fifteen years. This is reflected in the record high number of intergovernmental conferences held in the accession negotiations with Montenegro, Albania, Moldova and Ukraine. However, progress in the other enlargement partners has often been slow or non-existent.
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The fundamentals of the accession process remain decisive. Democracy, the rule of law, fundamental rights, functioning democratic institutions, effective public administrations and the economic criteria are indispensable for membership. They continue to determine the overall pace of accession negotiations. Once adopted, reforms need to produce sustainable results and credible track records.
Security and resilience has become an increasingly important dimension of accession process. Alignment with the EU’s common foreign and security policy, including with EU restrictive measures is a key requirement and a signal of strategic orientation in the current geopolitical context. In addition, enlargement countries should progressively strengthen their alignment and cooperation with the Union on hybrid threats, economic security, cybersecurity, critical infrastructure, border management and preparedness. This will help the enlargement countries consolidate their role as essential partners in countering cross-border threats and in improving the stability and security of the European continent.
Economic convergence needs to accelerate. Growth Plans, the Ukraine Facility, investment and gradual integration offer important opportunities for boosting the economies of enlargement countries before accession. The potential gains depend on reforms, regulatory alignment and enforcement, and a sound business and investment environment.
Significant progress has been achieved in recent years on gradual integration. The Commission is now putting forward a more structured approach, to bring clear benefits for the candidates and the EU alike, support accession preparations and serve shared strategic priorities. Participation would remain merit-based, conditional and reversible, and depend on policy readiness and strategic alignment. In the first quarter of next year, the Commission will launch gradual integration dialogues with the enlargement countries to take stock of existing measures and, where possible, to provide a more tailor-made offer.
The Commission looks forward to discussing further with the Council the conditions that should be attached to gradual integration. This could include for instance requirements related to CFSP alignment, defence industry integration, rule of law, cooperation on economic security or progress in the enlargement process itself.
Good neighbourly relations and regional cooperation remain essential. Bilateral issues unrelated to accession criteria should not be included in the enlargement negotiations as such. Outstanding bilateral issues should be addressed constructively and in good faith, through
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appropriate bilateral or international mechanisms, and existing agreements should be implemented. Reconciliation should be advanced: the European path should provide an incentive to overcome divisions.
Strategic communication and outreach on enlargement across both the Union and the enlargement countries will continue to play a key role in making the next EU enlargement a success. In parallel, strengthening resilience to foreign information manipulation and interference, including disinformation aimed at the enlargement process, remains essential to safeguarding the integrity of the process and ensuring informed public debate. The Commission has stepped up communication on what accession means for EU citizens and businesses, and what benefits and challenges there are for existing Member States. There are significant socio-economic, political and security advantages of a bigger and stronger Union. An enlarged EU is a better guarantor of political stability, security and peace on the continent. The Commission has also raised awareness of the candidate countries most advanced in the accession process. Member States and enlargement partners need to lead the national debate about enlargement, especially where public support and awareness are comparatively weaker. The Commission stands ready to support them in this effort. Two new elements complement the 2026 Enlargement package.
First, building on experience from the 2004 and 2013 enlargements, the Commission is proposing a set of indicative roadmaps covering milestones and an outlook for the year ahead for Montenegro, Albania, Moldova and Ukraine. These roadmaps will serve both as a pathway and an anchor for the accession negotiations for these negotiating countries and for the Member States. They will allow for better prioritisation, sequencing and monitoring of the process, providing greater predictability – a core principle of the 2020 revised methodology.
The roadmaps prejudge neither the outcome nor the pace of negotiations or any decision taken by the Council, the Commission or the European Parliament. They are living documents that may be adapted depending on progress made and may be updated by the Commission once a year in the framework of the enlargement package. The Commission is ready to put forward similar roadmaps for other candidate countries once they have reached a similar level of advancement, pace and engagement in the accession negotiations.
Second, as some candidates advance towards membership, the EU must be ready to welcome them. A larger Union must be stronger, more resilient and remain effective. In its Communication ‘Preparing for a wider Union’21, the Commission has set out the internal preparations needed to achieve this ambition - strengthening the Union’s governance, safeguarding its values and the rule of law, adapting its policies, and preparing its budget for enlargement.
II.
Montenegro’s progress is tangible evidence of the transformative power of the enlargement process when the acquis alignment is accompanied by firm focus on implementation. Montenegro has largely completed the reforms that are needed to close the negotiations, and the Commission has sent the relevant documentation to the Council. The establishment and ongoing work of the Ad Hoc Working Party on Montenegro’s accession treaty, together with the Council Conclusions on the financial package based on the Commission’s proposal, demonstrates that the EU delivers when a country progresses decisively on its EU path.
Since the last report, six inter-governmental conferences have been held with Montenegro, resulting in the provisional closure of 14 additional chapters, meaning a total of 21 closed chapters. Despite recurrent tensions between the ruling majority and the opposition, culminating with the failed motion to dismiss the Speaker of Parliament, Montenegro has managed to maintain cross-party agreement and broad support for EU-related reforms. Through political dialogue and as part of broader efforts to advance the EU accession process,
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this has enabled the Parliament to launch the process for constitutional amendments and adopt several of them, along with electoral reforms. It has also enabled the finalisation of most outstanding high-level appointments, including two vacant judges of the Constitutional Court. Montenegro has also made great strides in implementing its Reform Agenda, thereby supporting the reforms required for accession. The country remained fully aligned with the EU's common foreign and security policy.
The Commission assessment is that in line with the negotiating framework, an overall balance has been ensured between progress under the rule of law chapters and progress in the accession negotiations across chapters, and that Montenegro has met all outstanding closing benchmarks. As such, it considers that accession negotiations could realistically be closed by the end of 2026. The Commission is therefore proposing a roadmap for Montenegro for the next phases of the accession process leading up to the signature of the accession treaty. In the weeks and months ahead, it will be essential that Montenegro maintains a steady focus on completing the preparations for EU membership, sustaining the adopted reforms and ensuring continuous cross-party support to its EU path.
Albania continued its steady progress in accession negotiations. The country opened all accession negotiations clusters in just over a year. The adoption of the interim EU Common Position on Cluster 1 in May 2026 allowed the country to start closing chapters. By October 2026, negotiations on 4 chapters were closed: 25 – science and research, 26 – education and culture, 30 – external relations, and 20 – enterprise and industrial policy. Closing benchmarks on the rule of law were also adopted, confirming the good progress made by Albania in this area. The meaningful involvement of civil society to ensure a robust legislative process remains important. Albania also continued to make good progress on the implementation of its Reform Agenda. The country remained fully aligned with the EU's common foreign and security policy.
The progress under the Rule of Law chapters determine progress in the accession negotiations across all chapters. The Commission assessment is that, in line with the negotiating framework, an overall balance is currently ensured between progress under the rule of law chapters and progress in the accession negotiations across chapters. Cross-party cooperation and inclusive and constructive dialogue in the Parliament and with civil society are needed to move ahead on EU key reforms, in particular in the context of the ongoing largest protests since the country’s democratic transition. Albania needs to continue adopting key reforms to fulfil closing benchmarks across all chapters of negotiations. This is important for Albania to meet its ambitious but achievable target of closing negotiations by the end of 2027. The Commission puts forward a roadmap for next year to guide work towards this objective.
Moldova’saccession negotiations gained momentum in 2026, with the opening of clusters 1– fundamentals, 6 – external relations, as well as 2 – internal market and 3 – competitiveness and inclusive growth in June, July and October respectively. The Commission’s assessment remains that Moldova has met the conditions to open all remaining negotiation clusters. The September 2025 parliamentary elections re-confirmed Moldova’s strategic choice of future EU membership. 2026 also saw the further deepening of political and economic relations with the 2nd EU—Moldova Summit (22 June) and the EU—Moldova Investment Conference (4 June). Moldova’s high alignment with the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy continued to increase. Moldova also joined key gradual integration initiatives such as the Single European Payments Area, Roam Like Home, and the Common Transit Convention. Moldova continues to make very good progress implementing its Reform Agenda commitments under the EU Growth Plan but needs to accelerate work to build an investment pipeline.
Moldova intensified legislative alignment across most chapters of the EU acquis and further advanced on key rule of law reforms, most notably on judiciary, anti-corruption and the fight against organised and serious crime and on public administration reforms. To further advance essential rule of law and anti-corruption reforms, the European Commission and Moldova
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launched a joint task force in July 2026. Moldova has made very substantial progress towards meeting the interim benchmarks. These reforms, work on closing benchmarks, and further alignment with the acquis need to continue at pace, with strengthened implementation and enforcement capacity to ensure effective and sustained delivery on commitments. This includes working towards establishing a solid track record of investigations, prosecutions and final court rulings in corruption cases, including at high level.
The Commission assessment is that, in line with the negotiating framework, an overall balance is currently ensured between progress under the rule of law chapters and progress in the accession negotiations across chapters. The government of Moldova has signalled its objective to provisionally close accession negotiations by early 2028. The Commission is committed to supporting this objective, which is ambitious but achievable, provided Moldova maintains the current pace of reforms. The Commission puts forward a roadmap to guide work for next year.
Ukraine’s accession negotiations gained momentum in 2026 with the opening of cluster 1– fundamentals, 6 – external relations, as well as 2 – internal market and 3 – competitiveness and inclusive growth in June, July and October, respectively. The Commission’s assessment remains that Ukraine has met the conditions to open all remaining negotiation clusters. Amid the difficult circumstances brought by Russia’s ongoing war of aggression, Ukraine remained committed to the EU integration reform agenda, notably by continuing to demonstrate that its institutional framework for the fight against corruption is effective and that the specialised anti- corruption institutions continue to operate overall independently and effectively. 2026 also saw further deepening of the EU-Ukraine political and defence relations, including defence industry cooperation, with the launch of the EU-Ukraine Defence Industrial Partnership and the Drone Deal in July 2026. Integrating Ukraine into the European Defence Technological and Industrial Base should continue to enable co-production and joint ventures between European and Ukrainian defence industries. Recently there has been a renewed focus in Ukraine on the reforms and actual implementation of policy conditionality under Ukraine Facility and Ukraine Support Loan, with Ukraine having expressed the ambition to significantly advance in the implementation of rule of law chapters. This is a welcome development that must continue at pace. In October 2026, a joint task force was launched between the European Commission and Ukraine to further advance essential rule of law and anti-corruption reforms. Ukraine made progress on key sectoral reforms, such as customs, taxation and public procurement, as well as on alignment in the area of free movement of goods. On 1 January 2026, it joined the Roam Like at Home area, building on other gradual integration steps achieved in previous years. Ukraine has continued to advance on the implementation of the Ukraine Plan, maintaining a high level of completion of the steps agreed. It will be essential to further ensure sustained implementation in order to unlock available budget support. Ukraine’s alignment with the EU's common foreign and security policy remained very high.
The Commission’s assessment is that, subject to continued efforts on the rule of law, and in line with the negotiating framework, an overall balance is currently ensured between progress under the rule of law chapters and progress in the accession negotiations across chapters. Ukraine should now focus on meeting the interim benchmarks on rule of law and delivering on the roadmaps concerning the rule of law, the functioning of democratic institutions, public administration reform, and the action plan on national minorities. Ukraine should implement a comprehensive justice reform in line with EU acquis and European standards. It should demonstrate significant progress in tackling and preventing corruption and protecting fundamental rights in practice. Ukraine should also make tangible progress in the fight against serious and organised crime, co-operation in the field of drugs, migration and asylum. Further progress on rule of law will be essential to sustaining reform momentum and consolidating the progress achieved to date. Further progress is also needed on sectoral reforms to achieve full alignment with the EU acquis, in particular on aligning anti-money laundering and countering the financing of terrorism legislation to advance the prospect of joining SEPA. The Ukrainian government has signalled its objective to close accession negotiations by the end of 2028.
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The Commission is committed to support this ambitious objective but considers that to meet it an acceleration of the pace of reforms is required. The Commission puts forward a roadmap to guide work for next year.
During this reporting period, there has been no progress in the accession negotiations with Serbia.The period was marked by increasingsocietal polarisation in the country and erosion of trust between the Serbian authorities and civil society.
The outgoing government has reaffirmed that EU accession remains Serbia‘s strategic goal and work has advanced on the alignment with EU acquis and technical standards. At the same time, persistent anti-EU rhetoric and the glorification of convicted war criminal Ratko Mladic run counter to this declared strategic objective and to the fundamentals of the accession process, undermining Serbia’s EU path. Alignment with the EU’s CFSP remained low for a candidate country aspiring to join the EU.
The EU-facilitated Dialogue on the normalisation of relations between Serbia and Kosovo was heavily impacted by domestic political developments. Implementation of outstanding Dialogue commitments remained limited. Both Parties are expected to implement all their respective obligations stemming from the Agreement on the path to normalisation and its implementation annex22, as well as past Dialogue agreements.
The Commission maintains its assessment that Cluster 3 is technically ready for opening. Continued attention is needed to preserve the overall balance between progress under the rule of law chapters and normalisation of relations with Kosovo, on the one hand, and the overall pace of accession negotiations across chapters, on the other hand.
Serbia’s progress on its path towards the EU will depend on the efforts of the incoming Serbian government to refocus on the fundamentals of the accession process, including democratic criteria, the judiciary and fundamental rights. It will need to restore respectful democratic dialogue, demonstrate a clear and unambiguous commitment to EU values, including aligning with the EU’s geopolitical orientation, and make genuine efforts towards reconciliation, good- neighbourly relations and normalisation.
North Macedonia has yet to fulfil the commitments it made to amend its constitution to include citizens who live within the borders of the state and who are part of other people, such as Bulgarians23. At the same time, during this period the authorities continued to work on the roadmaps on public administration reform and the rule of law, with the accompanying action plan on minorities, required under the opening benchmarks for cluster 1, and the roadmap on functioning of democratic institutions. In 2026, North Macedonia has engaged more actively with the Growth Plan for the Western Balkans and with the implementation of key reforms under its Reform Agenda, making it one of the top performers under the Reform and Growth Facility.
North Macedonia should intensity efforts to uphold the rule of law, in particular by safeguarding judicial independence and strengthening the fight against corruption. Energy reforms are also key. The country remains fully aligned with the EU’s common foreign and security policy and continues to maintain generally good cooperation and bilateral relations with the EU and its neighbours.
The reporting period was marked by an increasing disengagement from the EU path on the part of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The work of the executive and legislature continued to be hindered by the lack of a functioning ruling coalition, and key EU-related reforms still need to be adopted. There was continued fallout from the criminal conviction and removal from office of Milorad Dodik, including institutional changes and early Presidential elections in the Republika Srpska entity. A new High Representative for Bosnia and Herzegovina remains to be appointed while an acting High Representative has been in office since June 2026 on an
22 2023 Ohrid Agreement 23 As referred to in the Council Conclusions of July 2022.
27
interim basis. While the severe political tensions reported last year initially subsided, political posturing, divisive rhetoric, and anti-EU narratives increased ahead of the general elections held on 4 October 2026. Bosnia and Herzegovina maintained its full alignment with the EU common foreign and security policy.
Following the elections, Bosnia and Herzegovina should proceed with setting up all executive and legislative bodies and show a renewed commitment to deliver swiftly on EU reforms. Bosnia and Herzegovina should urgently take the necessary steps to fully benefit from the Reform Agenda adopted under the Reform and Growth Facility in autumn 2025. It should finalise the adoption of the law on the High Judicial and Prosecutorial Council as well as the amendments to the Law on the Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina, in line with European standards, and appoint an operational Chief Negotiator. As soon as the country acts on these reforms, the Commission will be ready to table the negotiating framework with a view to its adoption by the Council, hold the first intergovernmental conference, and start the analytical screening process.
In Kosovo, persistent political fragmentation contributed to prolonged institutional crisis, leading to early parliamentary elections in December 2025 and again in June 2026. While public support for Kosovo’s European future remained strong, the institutional gridlock hindered the implementation of key EU-related reforms. Some progress has been made on serious and organised crime, but there was no progress on the functioning of the judiciary, with other concerning developments on rule of law. Following the transfer of local governance in northern Kosovo after the 2025 local elections, the Commission lifted its measures vis-à-vis Kosovo, re-engaging through the Stabilisation and Association Process Dialogue and resuming the delivery of financial assistance. Kosovo has reached full alignment with the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy. The Commission stands ready to prepare an Opinion on Kosovo's EU membership application if so requested.
Kosovo needs to benefit of the renewed institutional stability in order to unlock progress on its path towards the EU. Substantive efforts are needed to strengthen the independence of the judiciary and to uphold Kosovo’s multi-ethnic character as enshrined in the Constitution. Kosovo needs to abide by its international commitments to ensure the Kosovo Specialist Chambers’ judicial independence, and the commitment to ensure accountability and to give justice to the victims and their families from all communities in Kosovo.
The EU-facilitated Dialogue on the normalisation of relations between Kosovo and Serbia was heavily impacted by domestic political developments. Implementation of outstanding Dialogue commitments remained limited. Both Parties are expected to implement all their respective obligations stemming from the Agreement on the path to normalisation and its implementation annex24, as well as past Dialogue agreements.
Türkiye is a candidate country and a key partner of the European Union. Accession negotiations with Türkiye have remained at a standstill since 2018, in line with the Council’s conclusions. The underlying factors that led to this assessment remain unchanged. The past year saw further deterioration in the areas of democracy, fundamental rights and the rule of law, raising serious concerns. There is a widening gap between Türkiye’s stated objective of joining the EU and this backsliding on the fundamental political criteria for EU accession.
The EU has a strategic interest in a stable and secure environment in the Eastern Mediterranean and in developing a cooperative and mutually beneficial relationship with Türkiye. Cooperation is essential in areas of mutual interest, such as trade and economic relations, migration management, the green transition, the connectivity agenda aimed at bringing the EU closer to the South Caucasus and Central Asia, enhancing security in the Black Sea region. Türkiye is a significant regional actor in foreign and security policy, which constitutes an important dimension of the EU-Türkiye relationship, even though differences persist on certain foreign policy issues. Although interests and objectives have often been
24 2023 Ohrid Agreement
28
aligned on key regional developments, including peace and connectivity in the South Caucasus, stability in Syria, a ceasefire in Gaza and the objective of a two-state solution, as well as support for Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, Türkiye has continued to maintain a very low rate of formal alignment with the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy. Türkiye implemented specific measures to stop the circumvention of EU sanctions against Russia through its territory and should continue to cooperate with the EU and step up its efforts in this area.
A phased, proportionate and reversible approach to reinvigorating key areas of cooperation with Türkiye should continue to apply, in line with the 2023 Joint Communication and the 2024 European Council conclusions. Türkiye’s own constructive efforts should be sustained, and EU concerns should be addressed. Türkiye is expected to respect international law, good neighbourly relations and the sovereignty of EU Member States. Türkiye is expected to actively support negotiations on a fair, comprehensive and viable settlement of the Cyprus issue within the UN framework, in accordance with the relevant UN Security Council resolutions, including their external aspects, and in line with the principles on which the EU is founded and with the acquis. Türkiye must also fulfil its obligation to ensure the full and non- discriminatory implementation of the Additional Protocol to the EU–Türkiye Association Agreement. The resumption of the settlement talks on Cyprus would open new opportunities for cooperation and for advancing the EU-Türkiye relationship.
The continued backsliding on the fundamentals observed during the reporting period confirms that Georgia remains an EU candidate in name only and continues to forego the benefits that candidate status and the pre-accession process bring. The ruling party in Georgia has continued to undermine the country’s EU path by pursuing its attack on democratic principles, the rule of law and fundamental rights, as well as by enabling further state capture. As a result of increasingly repressive legislation, civic space has been further and severely curtailed. Georgia continues to fall short of the nine steps set out in the Commission’s recommendation for candidate status. Georgian authorities have not addressed the concerns about the state of democracy and fundamental rights in the country that led the EU to suspend visa-free travel for Georgian diplomatic, service and official passport holders, putting at risk the visa-free regime more generally.
The EU’s longstanding support for Georgia’s independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity stands firm, as does its unwavering support for the European aspirations of the Georgian people.
Should the Georgian authorities decide to change course and recommit to the fundamental principles underpinning EU accession – democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights – the country’s EU path could resume. The Commission would welcome such a resumption in light of the strong people-to-people ties that exist and the broad and longstanding public support in Georgia for the country’s democratic European future.
VI. ANNEXES
1. A roadmap for the accession negotiations with Montenegro
2. A roadmap for the accession negotiations with Albania
3. A roadmap for the accession negotiations with Moldova
4. A roadmap for the accession negotiations with Ukraine
5. Third party indicators related to the status of democracy, good governance and the
rule of law in candidate countries and potential candidates
6. Statistical data
29
EN EN
EUROPEAN COMMISSION
Brussels, 4.11.2026 COM(2026) 690 final
ANNEXES 1 to 6
ANNEXES
to the
COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN
PARLIAMENT, THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL
COMMITTEE AND THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS
2026 Communication on EU enlargement policy
{SWD(2026) 690 final} - {SWD(2026) 691 final} - {SWD(2026) 692 final} - {SWD(2026) 693 final} - {SWD(2026) 694 final} - {SWD(2026) 695 final} -
{SWD(2026) 696 final} - {SWD(2026) 697 final} - {SWD(2026) 698 final} - {SWD(2026) 699 final} - {SWD(2026) 700 final}
1
ANNEX I
A roadmap for the accession negotiations with Montenegro
An outlook for 2027
In the light of the overall progress to date in the accession negotiations, the Commission
presents the below roadmap for finalising the accession negotiations with Montenegro. The
roadmap presented below offers clear sequencing for the provisional closure of the remaining
individual negotiating chapters as well as the main steps following the conclusion of accession
negotiations. By the nature of the accession negotiations, the pace of which depends on
Montenegro’s progress in meeting the requirements for membership, this indicative timetable
prejudges neither the outcome, nor the pace of negotiations or any decision taken by the
Council, the Commission or the European Parliament.
The Commission will continue to support Montenegro in its preparations for accession, and
will continue to help it with expertise, including by making full use of instruments such as
TAIEX and twinning, and through well targeted financial assistance, including assistance
available under the Reform and Growth Facility, based on the Reform Agenda.
***
PHASE I: FROM NOW UNTIL THE CONCLUSION OF NEGOTIATIONS
Milestone: final intergovernmental conference - indicative date: December 2026
Following the IGC on 12 October 2026, 14 chapters remain to be closed in the accession
negotiations, which requires Council agreement that Montenegro has met the closing
benchmarks as well as agreement on transitional arrangements in certain chapters, on the
financial package for Montenegro and the respective institutional and other arrangements
related to the country’s accession.
The Commission considers that Montenegro has met all the closing benchmarks in the
accession negotiations and by mid-November the Commission intends to provide all remaining
draft EU common positions to the Council. The Commission therefore considers that accession
negotiations could be completed as soon as December 2026 according to the below priority
schedule for the closure of the chapters:
IGC in November
- Energy
- Transport
- Food safety, veterinary and phytosanitary policy
- Taxation
- Free movement of goods
IGC in December
- Financial services
- Regional policy and coordination of structural instruments
- Environment and climate change
2
- Foreign and security policy
- Financial and budgetary provisions
- Institutions
- Other issues
- Judiciary and fundamental rights
- Justice, freedom and security.
PHASE II. BETWEEN THE CONCLUSION OF NEGOTIATIONS AND SIGNATURE OF THE
ACCESSION TREATY
Without prejudice to the outcome of any decision of the Council, the European Commission
and the European Parliament in the process leading to Montenegro’s accession to the European
Union, the Commission would foresee the following steps following the conclusion of the
accession negotiations at the last intergovernmental conference in December 2026:
1. Progressive association with the Union’s institutions and working structures – phase 1
Milestone: final intergovernmental conference – indicative date December 2026
The Commission proposes that appropriate information arrangements be put in place in the
Council and in the Commission already after the final intergovernmental conference, ahead of
signature of the accession treaty. Such arrangements would aim to ensure that Montenegro is
kept adequately informed of proposals, communications, recommendations or initiatives.
2. Completing the work on the draft accession treaty
Indicative date: spring of 2027
Requirements
- the Commission to continue to submit to the Council the remaining draft texts at the
beginning of 2027;
- the draft accession treaty is agreed by the Member States and Montenegro;
- the draft accession treaty is translated into the current EU treaty languages and
Montenegrin.
3. Signature of the accession treaty with Montenegro
Indicative date: June 2027
Requirements
- EU primary law is translated into Montenegrin and revised by the Council;
- the Commission issues a positive opinion on Montenegro’s accession to the EU;
- the European Parliament gives its consent to Montenegro’s accession;
- the Council adopts a Council decision on the admission of Montenegro to the European
Union.
3
PHASE III: INTERIM PERIOD BETWEEN SIGNATURE AND MONTENEGRO’S ACCESSION TO THE
EUROPEAN UNION
Progressive association with the Union’s institutions and working structures – phase 2
Milestone: signature of the accession treaty - indicative date: June 2027
The European Parliament may invite the parliament of the acceding country to appoint
observers. The Commission will examine structured political participation in relevant
Commission activities, in full respect of the Treaties, the Commission’s institutional autonomy
and the principle of collegiality.
Following signature of the accession treaty, all Member States and Montenegro will need to
ratify the accession treaty according to their constitutional procedures.
***
Pre-accession monitoring
The Commission will continue to asses all the way to accession whether commitments,
including those related to the fundamentals, are being implemented by Montenegro and
maintained and will report regularly to the European Parliament and the Council. The
Commission will continue to make use of regular peer assessment missions, the bi-annual
monitoring tables as well as of all other available tools and measures. As in the past, the
Commission stands ready to report to the Council and the European Parliament regularly on
Montenegro’s progress in meeting its commitments from the accession negotiations. The
monitoring should identify shortcomings early and specify the corrective action required.
Where serious issues of concern arise, the Accession Treaty should enable the Council, acting
on a Commission proposal, to adopt appropriate measures focused on those commitments.
Where monitoring identifies backsliding before the first day of membership and targeted
measures would be insufficient, a postponement clause in the Accession Treaty could provide
a last resort instrument.
4
ANNEX II
A roadmap for the accession negotiations with Albania
An outlook for 2027
I. Introduction
In line with the negotiating framework for the accession negotiations, which foresees that the
intergovernmental conferences take stock of the overall accession process and set out an
indication for the year ahead of which clusters / chapters could potentially be opened or closed,
as well as in light of the overall progress achieved to date in the negotiations, the Commission
presents the below roadmap for accession negotiations with Albania for 2027.
The roadmap offers a sequencing for the provisional closure of negotiating chapters and cluster
1, as a whole. It therefore provides both a pathway and an anchor for the accession negotiations
for both Albania and the Member States.
Given the nature of accession negotiations, the pace of which depends on Albania’s progress
in meeting the requirements for membership, this indicative timeline neither prejudges the
outcome, nor the pace of negotiations. This roadmap is a living document, which the
Commission will update regularly, based on the progress made by Albania.
In line with the negotiating framework, progress in the negotiations remains measured in
particular against the requirements of the Copenhagen criteria, including the meeting of the
closing benchmarks set for the individual chapters and for cluster 1, the fulfilment of Albania’s
obligations under the Stabilisation and Association Agreement, as well as Albania's progress in
addressing the key areas identified in the Commission's reports and relevant Council
conclusions. Progress under the fundamentals’ cluster determines the overall pace of
negotiations, Albania needs to devote substantial further efforts to complete the work on the
closing benchmarks set out in the negotiating clusters to be able to provisionally close the
chapters. Progressing along the timelines set out in this roadmap will therefore depend upon
the pace of reforms in Albania.
II. Outlook for the year ahead
1. Priority schedule for provisional closure of chapters
Following the IGC on 13 October 2026, 31 chapters of the accession negotiations remain to be
closed. In order to reach the ambition of the Albanian authorities to close accession negotiations
by the end of 2027, it would be necessary for Albania to complete its work on the closing
benchmarks sufficiently in time as to allow for the closure of the remaining chapters, after
verification of the fulfilment of the closing benchmarks by the EU, and for the EU and Albania
to reach agreement on the transitional arrangements. Taking into consideration the relative
complexity and level of preparation in each chapter, as well as the relevant reform plans of the
authorities, the following initial priority schedule could be envisaged for the remainder of 2026
and 2027 for provisional closure of chapters:
Priority schedule for the remainder of 2026: intellectual property law; economic and monetary
policy; company law; fisheries and aquaculture; Trans-European networks; foreign and
security policy
Priority schedule for the first semester of 2027: public procurement; right of establishment and
freedom to provide services; free movement of capital; digital transformation and media;
5
Customs Union; financial control; transport policy; social policy and employment; financial
services; consumer and health protection.
Priority schedule for the second semester of 2027: freedom of movement of workers;
competition policy; agriculture and rural development; taxation; free movement of goods; food
safety, veterinary and phytosanitary policy; statistics; regional policy and coordination of
structural instruments; energy; environment and climate change; judiciary and fundamental
rights; justice, freedom and security; financial and budgetary provisions; institutions; other
issues; cluster 1 (the fundamentals), closed last.
Where the pace of reforms allows, the Commission will revise the priority schedule to reflect
the possibility of earlier provisional closure of chapters, subject to the relevant conditions being
met.
2. Other milestones of the accession negotiations
Subject to Albania making the necessary progress in its preparations, the Commission will
present a Communication in due course on a financial package for the accession of Albania.
The Commission further recommends that the Council starts the arrangements for drafting the
Accession Treaty with Albania in the course of 2027. In the meantime, Albania needs to ensure
the timely availability of the translation of the acquis in Albanian.
III. Gradual integration
Accession preparation must go hand in hand with progressively deeper integration of Albania
into Union policies, programmes, systems, agencies and working structures before
membership. This includes advancing participation in strategic sectors, expanding access to
parts of the Single Market where conditions are met, strengthening energy, transport and digital
connectivity, deepening security and defence cooperation, and delivering concrete benefits for
citizens and businesses. This will bring Albania closer to the EU and the Single Market already
ahead of membership. Bearing in mind Albania’s advanced stage of negotiations, which brings
membership closer, further areas of cooperation for gradual integration prior to accession will
be identified through the gradual integration dialogue to be launched in the first quarter of
2027. Deeper integration requires sustained alignment with the Union’s values, acquis and
strategic interests.
The Commission will continue to support Albania in its preparations for accession and will
continue to help it with expertise, including by making full use of instruments such as TAIEX
and twinning, and through well targeted financial assistance, including assistance available
under the Reform and Growth Facility, based on the Reform Agenda.
The Commission will closely monitor that the commitments undertaken by Albania in the
negotiations in particular in the area of the fundamentals, are fulfilled and will report on its
findings regularly to the Council. It will make use of monitoring tables, regular peer assessment
missions, including as regards the rule of law, as well as of all other available tools.
6
ANNEX III
A roadmap for the accession negotiations with Moldova
An outlook for 2027
I. Introduction
In line with the negotiating framework for the accession negotiations, which foresees that the
intergovernmental conferences take stock of the overall accession process and set out an
indication for the year ahead of which clusters / chapters could potentially be opened or closed,
as well as in light of the overall progress achieved to date in the negotiations, the Commission
presents the below roadmap for the accession negotiations with Moldova for 2027.
The roadmap outlines the main deliverables of the accession negotiations by the end of 2027,
starting with opening the remaining two negotiating clusters, the meeting the interim
benchmarks on the rule of law chapters, followed by the provisional closure of a number of
individual negotiating chapters. It therefore provides both a pathway and an anchor for the
accession negotiations for both Moldova and the Member States.
Given the nature of accession negotiations, the pace of which depends on Moldova’s progress
in meeting the requirements for membership, this indicative timeline neither prejudges the
outcome, nor the pace of negotiations. This roadmap is a living document, which the
Commission will update regularly, based on the progress made by Moldova.
In line with the negotiating framework, progress in the negotiations remains measured in
particular against the requirements of the Copenhagen criteria, including the meeting of the
benchmarks set for the individual chapters and for cluster 1, the fulfilment of Moldova’s
obligations under the Association Agreement, including a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade
Area, as well as Moldova's progress in addressing the key areas identified in the Commission's
reports and relevant Council conclusions. Progress under the fundamentals’ cluster determines
the overall pace of negotiations. Moldova needs to devote substantial further efforts to
complete the work on the closing benchmarks set out in the negotiating clusters. Progressing
along the timelines set out in this roadmap will therefore depend upon the pace of reforms in
Moldova.
II. Outlook for the year ahead
1. Opening of the remaining clusters
The Commission considers that Moldova has met the necessary conditions and urges the
accession conference to make every effort to open the outstanding clusters - cluster 4 (The
green agenda and sustainable connectivity) and cluster 5 (Resources, agriculture, and cohesion)
by the end of 2026.
2. Meeting the interim benchmarks on the rule of law
In order to reach the next phase of accession negotiations where negotiating chapters can be
provisionally closed, it would be necessary for Moldova to complete its work on the interim
benchmarks on the rule of law chapters. The Commission considers that Moldova is well
advanced in its preparations to meet the interim benchmarks and will present the interim
benchmark assessment report together with the draft interim common position to the Council,
allowing Member States to process this assessment.
7
3. Initial priority schedule for provisional closure of chapters
All 35 chapters and cluster 1 of the accession negotiations remain to be closed. Work on the
closing benchmarks for all chapters should continue without delay. A chapter can be
provisionally closed after the EU has verified that the closing benchmarks have been fulfilled
and once the EU and Moldova have reached an agreement on the transitional arrangements, if
any. Taking into consideration the relative complexity of and Moldova’s level of preparation
in each chapter, as well as the relevant reform plans of the authorities, the following initial
priority schedule could be envisaged for 2027 for provisional closure of chapters:
- Priority schedule for the first semester of 2027: science and research; education and
culture; free movement of capital; intellectual property law; digital transformation and
media; Customs Union; fisheries and acquaculture; external relations; foreign, security
and defence policy
- Priority schedule for the second semester of 2027: right of establishment and freedom to
provide services; economic and monetary policy; social policy and employment; free
movement of goods; freedom of movement of workers; company law; competition
policy; financial services; consumer and health protection; taxation; enterprise and
industrial policy; transport; Trans-European networks; energy; environment and climate
change; food safety, veterinary and phytosanitary policy
Where the pace of reforms allows, the Commission will revise the priority schedule to reflect
the possibility of earlier or additional provisional closure of chapters, subject to the relevant
conditions being met.
III. Gradual integration
Accession preparation must go hand in hand with progressively deeper integration of Moldova
into Union policies, programmes, systems, agencies and working structures before
membership. This includes advancing participation in strategic sectors, expanding access to
parts of the Single Market where conditions are met, strengthening energy, transport and digital
connectivity, deepening security and defence cooperation, and delivering concrete benefits for
citizens and businesses. This will bring Moldova closer to the EU and the Single Market
already ahead of membership. Moldova is encouraged to take full advantage of the
opportunities for internal market treatment offered under the Deep and Comprehensive Free
Trade Area (DCFTA). Further areas of cooperation, possibly including wider market access,
will be identified through the gradual integration dialogue to be launched in the first quarter of
2027. Deeper integration requires sustained alignment with the Union’s values, acquis and
strategic interests.
The Commission will continue to support Moldova in its preparations for accession and will
continue to help it with expertise, including by making full use of instruments such as TAIEX
and twinning, and through well targeted financial assistance, including assistance available
under the Reform and Growth Facility, based on the Reform Agenda.
The Commission will closely monitor that the commitments undertaken by Moldova in the
negotiations in particular in the area of the fundamentals, are fulfilled and will report on its
findings regularly to the Council. It will make use of monitoring tables, regular peer assessment
missions, including as regards the rule of law, as well as of all other available tools.
8
ANNEX IV
A roadmap for the accession negotiations with Ukraine
An outlook for 2027
I. Introduction
In line with the negotiating framework for the accession negotiations, which foresees that the
intergovernmental conferences take stock of the overall accession process and set out an
indication for the year ahead of which clusters / chapters could potentially be opened or closed,
as well as in light of the overall progress achieved to date in the negotiations, the Commission
presents the below roadmap for the accession negotiations with Ukraine for 2027.
The roadmap outlines the main deliverables of the accession negotiations by the end of 2027,
starting with opening the remaining two negotiating clusters, the meeting of the interim
benchmarks on the rule of law chapters, followed by the provisional closure of a number of
individual negotiating chapters. It therefore provides both a pathway and an anchor for the
accession negotiations for both Ukraine and the Member States.
Given the nature of accession negotiations, the pace of which depends on Ukraine’s progress
in meeting the requirements for membership, this indicative timeline neither prejudges the
outcome, nor the pace of negotiations. This roadmap is a living document, which the
Commission will update regularly, based on the progress made by Ukraine.
In line with the negotiating framework, progress in the negotiations remains measured in
particular against the requirements of the Copenhagen criteria, including the meeting of the
benchmarks set for the individual chapters and for cluster 1, the fulfilment of Ukraine’s
obligations under the Association Agreement, including a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade
Area, as well as Ukraine's progress in addressing the key areas identified in the Commission's
reports and relevant Council conclusions. Progress under the fundamentals’ cluster determines
the overall pace of negotiations. Ukraine needs to devote substantial further efforts to complete
the work on the interim and the closing benchmarks set out in the negotiating clusters.
Progressing along the timelines set out in this roadmap will therefore depend upon the pace of
reforms in Ukraine.
II. Outlook for the year ahead
1. Opening of the remaining clusters
The Commission considers that Ukraine has met the necessary conditions and urges the
accession conference to make every effort to open the outstanding clusters - cluster 4 (The
green agenda and sustainable connectivity) and cluster 5 (Resources, agriculture, and cohesion)
by the end of 2026.
2. Meeting the interim benchmarks on the rule of law
In order to reach the next phase of accession negotiations where negotiating chapters can be
provisionally closed, it would be necessary for Ukraine to complete its work on the interim
benchmarks on the rule of law chapters. The Commission welcomes the intention of Ukraine
to urgently and significantly step up the pace of the rule of law reforms, which are often
complex and require broad consultations with various stakeholders, allocating sufficient time
and resources to this effort to meet the established targets in the first semester of 2027. In order
to guide Ukraine towards this objective, the Commission has set up a dedicated task-force for
an enhanced coordinated support.
9
3. Initial priority schedule for provisional closure of chapters
All 35 chapters and cluster 1 of the accession negotiations remain to be closed. Work on the
closing benchmarks for all chapters should continue without delay in parallel with the
fulfilment of the interim benchmarks. A chapter can be provisionally closed after the EU has
verified that the closing benchmarks have been fulfilled and once the EU and Ukraine have
reached an agreement on the transitional arrangements, if any. Taking into consideration the
relative complexity of and Ukraine’s level of preparation in each chapter, as well as the relevant
reform plans of the authorities, the following initial priority schedule could be established for
2027 for provisional closure of chapters:
- Priority schedule for the first semester of 2027: education and culture
- Priority schedule for the second semester of 2027: intellectual property law; social policy
and employment; enterprise and industrial policy; science and research; external relations;
foreign, security and defence policy
Where the pace of reforms allows, the Commission will revise the priority schedule to reflect
the possibility of earlier or additional provisional closure of chapters, subject to the relevant
conditions being met.
III. Gradual integration
Accession preparation must go hand in hand with progressively deeper integration of Ukraine
into Union policies, programmes, systems, agencies and working structures before
membership. This includes advancing participation in strategic sectors, expanding access to
parts of the Single Market where conditions are met, strengthening energy, transport and digital
connectivity, deepening security and defence cooperation, and delivering concrete benefits for
citizens and businesses. This will bring Ukraine closer to the EU and the Single Market already
ahead of membership. Ukraine is encouraged to take full advantage of the opportunities for
internal market treatment offered under the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area
(DCFTA). Building on the progress already achieved under the Priority Action Plan for the
implementation of the DCFTA, gradual integration in 2027 should focus in particular on
concluding the Agreement on Conformity Assessment and Acceptance of Industrial Products
(ACAA), on Ukraine’s integration in the Single Euro Payment Area (SEPA) and on achieving
electricity market coupling with the EU, within the legal framework of the Energy Community
Treaty and in line with the Electricity Integration Package. This will reduce compliance costs
and further integrate Ukrainian industry into EU value chains and financial system. Further
areas of cooperation will be identified through the gradual integration dialogue to be launched
in the first quarter of 2027. Deeper integration requires sustained alignment with the Union’s
values, acquis and strategic interests.
The Commission will continue to support Ukraine in its preparations for accession and will
continue to help it with expertise, including by making full use of instruments such as TAIEX
and twinning, and through well targeted financial assistance, including assistance available
under the Ukraine Facility.
The Commission will closely monitor that the commitments undertaken by Ukraine in the
negotiations, in particular in the areas of the fundamentals, are fulfilled and will report on its
findings regularly to the Council. It will make use of monitoring tables, regular peer assessment
missions, including as regards the rule of law, as well as of all other available tools.
10
ANNEX V
Indexes
THIRD PARTY INDICATORS RELATED TO THE STATUS OF DEMOCRACY, GOOD GOVERNANCE AND THE RULE OF LAW IN CANDIDATE
COUNTRIES AND POTENTIAL CANDIDATES1
Albania
Bosnia and
Herzegovina
Kosovo
North
Macedonia
Montenegro
Serbia
Türkiye
Georgia Moldova Ukraine
Freedom in the World 2026 -
Global Freedom Score,
Freedom House
Countries and Territories |
Freedom House
Total score: 69/100
(2025: 68/100)
Status: Partly free
(2025: Partly
free)
Total score: 54/100
(2025: 52/100)
Status: Partly free
(2025: Partly
free)
Total score: 61/100
(2025: 60/100)
Status: Partly free
(2025: Partly
free)
Total score: 67/100
(2025: 67/100)
Status: Partly free
(2025: Partly
free)
Total score: 68/100
(2025: 69/100)
Status: Partly free
(2025: Partly
free)
Total score: 53/100
(2025: 56/100)
Status: Partly free
(2025: Partly
free)
Total score:
32/100
(2025: 33/100) Status: Not free
(2025: Not free)
Total score: 51/100
(2025: 55/100)
Status: Partly free
(2025: Partly
free)
Total score: 60/100
(2025: 60/100)
Status: Partly free
(2025: Partly
free)
Total score: 51/100
(2025: 51/100)
Status: Partly free
(2025: Partly
free)
Democracy Index 2025 - The
Economist Intelligence Unit
Democracy Index 2025 -
Economist Intelligence Unit
Overall Score:
6.20/10
(2024: 6.20/10) Rank: 67/167
(2024: 66/167)
Regime type:
Flawed democracy
(2024: Flawed
democracy)
Overall Score:
5.23/10
(2024: 5.06/10)
Rank: 85/167
(2024: 88/167)
Regime type: Hybrid regime
(2024: Hybrid
regime)
n/a
Overall Score:
6.28/10
(2024: 6.28/10) Rank: 64/167
(2024: 62/167)
Regime type:
Flawed democracy
(2024: Flawed
democracy)
Overall Score:
6.73/10
(2024: 6.73/10) Rank: 53/167
(2024: 50/167)
Regime type:
Flawed democracy
(2024: Flawed
democracy)
Overall Score:
6.30/10
(2024: 6.26/10) Rank: 63/167
(2024: 64/167)
Regime type:
Flawed democracy
(2024: Flawed
democracy)
Overall Score:
4.26/10
(2024: 4.26/10)
Rank: 102/167
(2024: 104/167)
Regime type: Hybrid regime
(2024: Hybrid
regime)
Overall Score:
4.36/10
(2024: 4.70/10) Rank: 99/167
(2024: 94/167)
Regime type: Hybrid regime
(2024: Hybrid
regime)
Overall Score:
5.86/10
(2024: 6.04/10) Rank: 77/167
(2024: 71/167)
Regime type:
Flawed democracy
(2024: Flawed
democracy)
Overall Score:
4.79/10
(2024: 4.90/10)
Rank: 93/167
(2024: 92/167)
Regime type: Hybrid regime
(2024: Hybrid
regime)
World Press Freedom Index 2026
- Reporters without borders
https://rsf.org/en/index
Global Score:
56.52/100 (2025:
58.18/100) Rank: 83/180
(2025: 80/180)
Global Score:
54.29/100
(2025:
56.33/100)
Rank: 90/180 (2025: 86/180)
Global Score:
55.89/100
(2025:
52.73/100)
Rank: 84/180 (2025: 99/180)
Global Score:
69.49/100
(2025:
70.44/100)
Rank: 45/180 (2025: 42/180)
Global Score:
71.80/100
(2025:
72.83/100)
Rank: 41/180 (2025: 37/180)
Global Score:
50.79/100
(2025:
53.55/100)
Rank: 104/180 (2025: 96/180)
Global Score:
27.94/100
(2025:
29.40/100)
Rank: 163/180 (2025: 159/180)
Global Score:
40.77/100
(2025:
50.53/100)
Rank: 135/180 (2025: 114/180)
Global Score:
74.77/100
(2025:
73.36/100)
Rank: 31/180 (2025: 35/180)
Global Score:
66.10/100
(2025:
63.93/100)
Rank: 55/180 (2025: 62/180)
1 The table presents the latest available ranking and/or scores by third parties. Additional reference to data from previous assessment is shown in between parenthesis, when available.
11
Rule of Law Index 2025 - World
Justice Project
https://worldjusticeproject.org/
rule-of-law-index/global/
Overall Score:
0.49/1 (2024: 0.48/1)
Global Rank:
87/142 (2024: 89/140)
Overall Score:
0.52/1 (2024: 0.52/1)
Global Rank:
70/142 (2024: 71/140)
Overall Score:
0.56/1 (2024: 0.56/1)
Global Rank:
59/142 (2024: 58/140)
Overall Score:
0.54/1 (2024: 0.53/1)
Global Rank:
64/142 (2024: 67/140)
Overall Score:
0.57/1 (2024: 0.57/1)
Global Rank:
55/142 (2024: 56/142)
Overall Score:
0.47/1 (2024: 0.47/1)
Global Rank:
96/142 (2024: 94/140)
Overall Score:
0.41/1 (2024: 0.42/1)
Global Rank:
118/142 (2024: 117/140)
Overall Score:
0.58/1 (2024: 0.60/1)
Global Rank:
52/142 (2024: 49/140)
Overall Score:
0.53/1 (2024: 0.54/1)
Global Rank:
68/142 (2024: 64/140)
Overall Score:
0.48/1 (2024: 0.49/1)
Global Rank:
90/142 (2024: 88/140)
Worldwide Governance
Indicators 2025 - Rule of Law,
The World Bank Group
https://www.worldbank.org/en/pu
blication/worldwide-governance-
indicators
Score: 2025: 57.99/100
2024: 56.86/100
Score: 2025: 53.03/100
2024: 52.41/100
Score: 2025: 0.44/100
2024: 0.05/100
Score: 2025: 56.30/100
2024: 54.94/100
Score: 2025: 62.06/100
2024: 61.67/100
Score: 2025: 53.34/100
2024: 55.17/100
Score: 2025: 45.25/100
2024: 44.94/100
Score: 2025: 60.20/100
2024: 60.83/100
Score: 2025: 56.12/100
2024: 56.01/100
Score: 2025: 45.64/100
2024: 46.13/100
Worldwide Governance
Indicators 2025 - Government
Effectiveness, The World Bank
Group
https://www.worldbank.org/en/pu
blication/worldwide-governance-
indicators
Score:
2025: 61.98/100 2024: 53.97/100
Score:
2025: 42.60/100 2024: 42.01/100
Score:
2025: 49.86/100 2024: 50.49/100
Score:
2025: 56.37/100 2024: 54.88/100
Score:
2025: 61.98/100 2024: 62.57/100
Score:
2025: 53.02/100 2024: 54.04/100
Score:
2025: 52.94/100 2024: 51.27/100
Score:
2025: 59.53/100 2024: 58.74/100
Score:
2025: 56.73/100 2024: 56.30/100
Score:
2025: 40.15/100 2024: 40.65/100
Worldwide Governance
Indicators 2025 - Control of
Corruption, The World Bank
Group
https://www.worldbank.org/en/pu
blication/worldwide-governance-
indicators
Score:
2025: 41.97/100 2024: 41.00/100
Score:
2025: 38.35/100 2024: 38.10/100
Score:
2025: 42.80/100 2024: 44.40/100
Score:
2025: 42.04/100 2024: 41.38/100
Score:
2025: 49.57/100 2024: 46.87/100
Score:
2025: 35.90/100 2024: 36.94/100
Score:
2025: 37.39/100 2024: 36.83/100
Score:
2025: 45.22/100 2024: 56.21/100
Score:
2025: 42.92/100 2024: 42.15/100
Score:
2025: 34.11/100 2024: 34.25/100
Corruption Perceptions Index
2025 - Transparency International
https://www.transparency.org/en/
cpi/2025
Score: 39/100 (2024: 42/100)
Rank: 91/182 (2024: 80/180)
Score: 34/100 (2024: 33/100)
Rank: 109/182 (2024:114/180)
Score: 43/100 (2024: 44/100)
Rank: 76/182 (2024: 73/180)
Score: 40/100 (2024: 40/100)
Rank: 84/182 (2024: 88/180)
Score: 46/100 (2024: 46/100)
Rank: 65/182 (2024: 65/180)
Score: 33/100 (2024: 35/100)
Rank: 116/182 (2024: 105/180)
Score: 31/100 (2024: 34/100)
Rank: 124/182 (2024: 107/180)
Score: 50/100 (2024: 53/100)
Rank: 56/182 (2024: 53/180)
Score: 42/100 (2024: 43/100)
Rank: 80/182 (2024: 76/180)
Score: 36/100 (2024: 35/100)
Rank: 104/182 (2024: 105/180)
Civicus Monitor 2025 - Global
Civil Society Alliance
https://monitor.civicus.org/globalf
indings_2025/
Score: 68/100 (2024: 64/100)
Rating:
Narrowed (2024:
Narrowed)
Score: 57/100 (2024: 56/100)
Rating:
Obstructed (2024:
Obstructed)
Score: 67/100 (2024: 62/100)
Rating:
Narrowed (2024:
Narrowed)
Score: 69/100 (2024: 74/100)
Rating:
Narrowed (2024:
Narrowed)
Score: 77/100 (2024: 76/100)
Rating:
Narrowed (2024:
Narrowed)
Score: 38/100 (2024: 49/100)
Rating:
Repressed (2024:
Obstructed)
Score: 23/100 (2024: 24/100)
Rating:
Repressed (2024:
Repressed)
Score: 34/100 (2024: 54/100)
Rating:
Repressed (2024:
Obstructed)
Score: 72/100 (2024: 71/100)
Rating:
Narrowed (2024:
Narrowed)
Score: 52/100 (2024: 50/100)
Rating:
Obstructed (2024:
Obstructed)
12
ANNEX VI
Statistical Annex
STATISTICAL DATA (as of 14/09/2026), part 1 (Albania – Montenegro)
Demography Note Albania
Bosnia and Herzegovina
Kosovo North Macedonia Montenegro EU-27
2023 2024 2023 2024 2023 2024 2023 2024 2023 2024 2023 2024
Total population (thousands)
2 762 i 2 391 i 3 441 pi 3 417 pi : : 1 830 i 1 826 i 617 i 624 i 447 806 bi
449 490 pi
Share of 15-64 in total population (%)
67.5 i : : : : : 65.5 i 65.2 i 65.7 i 65.1 i 63.8 bpi 63.8 pi
Crude rate of natural population change (per 1 000 inhabitants)
0.9 0.5 - 2.8 p - 3.2 p : : -1.9 -2.3 1.1 1.0 - 2.6 bep - 2.8 ep
Life expectancy at birth, males (years)
: 78.4 b : : : : : : 75.1 75.2 b 78.6 bep 78.9 ep
Life expectancy at birth, females (years)
: 82.4 b : : : : : : 80.2 80.1 b 83.9 bep 84.1 ep
Labour market Note 2023 2024 2023 2024 2023 2024 2023 2024 2023 2024 2023 2024
Economic activity rate for persons aged 20-64: proportion of the population aged 20-64 that is economically active (%)
Total 81.4 w 81.6 w 64.3 66.6 45.1 w 47.9 w 71 71.3 76.3 w 78.2 w 80.0 80.3
Males 88.1 w 88.9 w 77.7 79.8 64.1 w 67.5 w 82.5 82.5 82.0 w 84.4 w 85.2 85.5
Females 75.1 w 74.7 w 50.6 53.1 26.8 w 28.4 w 59.4 60.2 70.6 w 71.8 w 74.8 75.2
Employment rates, aged 20- 64 (% of the population)
Total 73.4 w 74.1 w 55.9 58.2 40.3 w 42.9 w 61.7 62.7 66.5 w 69.7 w 75.3 75.7
Males 79.6 w 81.2 w 69.5 71.9 59.4 w 62.5 w 70.7 71.7 72.0 w 76.1 w 80.4 80.7
Females 67.5 w 67.4 w 42.1 44.3 22.0 w 23.5 w 52.7 53.7 61.0 w 63.3 w 70.2 70.7
Persons aged 15-24 not in employment, education or training, % of the population in the age group
22.8 w 20.9 w 16.5 14.7 33.4 w 31.4 w 18.8 18.2 17.3 w 14.2 w 9.2 9.2
13
Labour market (cont.) Note Albania
Bosnia and Herzegovina
Kosovo North Macedonia Montenegro EU-27
2023 2024 2023 2024 2023 2024 2023 2024 2023 2024 2023 2024
Persons aged 15-29 not in employment, education or training, % of the population in the age group
25.0 w 22.2 w 22.2 20.1 37.6 w 35.4 w 24.2 22.6 20.3 w 16.5 w 11.3 11.2
Employment by main sectors
Agriculture, forestry and fisheries (%)
37.2 w 36.7 w 7.6 i 7.7 i 2.4 w 2.8 w 7.8 i 9.0 i 4.5 w 4.3 w 3.6 i 3.3 i
Industry (%)
12.2 w 12.5 w 25.1 i 24.2 i 12.9 w 14.4 w 23.7 i 23.9 i 9.8 w 10.4 w 17.4 i 17.2 i
Construction (%)
7.4 w 7.9 w 9.2 i 9.5 i 11.8 w 12.6 w 7.3 i 6.7 i 8.6 w 8.7 w 6.8 i 6.9 i
Services (%)
43.2 w 42.8 w 58.0 i 58.6 i 72.9 w 70.2 w 61.2 i 60.4 i 77.1 w 76.6 w 72.0 i 72.1 i
People employed in the public sector as a share of total employment, persons aged 20-64 (%)
1) 18.2 w 19.0 w 19.0 w 19.0 w 27.4 w 26.1 w : : 28.3 w 29.8 w : :
People employed in the private sector as a share of total employment, persons aged 20-64 (%)
81.8 w 81.0 w 81.0 w 81.0 w 72.6 w 73.9 w : : 68.4 w 66.7 w : :
Unemployment rates (% of the labour force)
Total
9.6 w 8.5 w 13.2 12.6 10.8 w 10.9 w 13.1 12.3 13.1 w 11.4 w 6.1 6.0
Males
9.3 w 8.0 w 10.9 10.1 7.6 w 7.7 w 14.3 13.3 12.2 w 10.8 w 5.8 5.8
Females
9.9 w 9.2 w 16.7 16.6 18.2 w 18.5 w 11.4 11.0 14.0 w 12.2 w 6.4 6.2
Youth, aged 15-24
24.5 w 22.8 w 30.1 30.2 17.3 w 19.5 w 29.4 28.9 23.3 w 26.0 w 14.6 15.0
Long-term (>12 months)
6.8 w 6.5 w 9.6 9.0 7.7 w 8.5 w 9.4 8.0 9.4 w 8.5 w 2.1 1.9
Average nominal monthly wages and salaries (EUR)
2) 648 iw 769 iw 646 iw 706 iw 570 iw 639 iw 595 iw 670 iw 792 iw 876 iw : :
14
Education Note Albania
Bosnia and Herzegovina
Kosovo North Macedonia Montenegro EU-27
2023 2024 2023 2024 2023 2024 2023 2024 2023 2024 2023 2024
Public expenditure on education relative to GDP (%)
2.9 iw 3.0 piw : : 4.1 iw 4.3 iw : : : : 4.7 d :
Participation in early childhood education (children aged 3 and over)
3) 82.9 w 94.2 w 43.6 w 45.0 w : : 46.1 48.3 78.3 78.6 94.6 d 94.9 d
Participation in early childhood education (children aged 3 and over), males
3) 84.3 w 93.8 w 44.1 w 45.3 w : : 46.2 47.3 78.4 78.6 94.5 d 94.8 d
Participation in early childhood education (children aged 3 and over), females
3) 81.5 w 94.6 w 43.2 w 44.7 w : : 46.1 49.4 78.2 78.5 94.7 d 95.0 d
Low achieving 15-year-olds in reading
4) 73.7 : : : : : 73.6 : 52.9 : 26.2 :
Low achieving 15-year-olds in mathematics
4) 73.9 : : : : : 66.2 : 59.5 : 29.5 :
Low achieving 15-year-olds in science
4) 67.4 : : : : : 65.3 : 54.9 : 24.2 :
Early leavers from education and training: percentage of the population aged 18-24 with at most a lower secondary education and not in further education or training (%)
15.7 w 15.4 w 4.2 3.8 7.7 w 6.2 w 8.4 8.0 6.8 w 4.9 w 9.6 9.6
Male early leavers from education and training: proportion of men aged 18-24 with at most lower secondary education (at most ISCED 2011 level 2) who are not in further education or training
: : 5.2 5.0 : : 8.6 8.9 : : 11.3 11.2
Female early leavers from education and training: proportion of women aged 18- 24 with at most lower secondary education (at most ISCED 2011 level 2) who are not in further education or training
: : 3.1 2.5 : : 8.2 7.0 : : 7.7 7.9
15
Education Note Albania
Bosnia and Herzegovina
Kosovo North Macedonia Montenegro EU-27
2023 2024 2023 2024 2023 2024 2023 2024 2023 2024 2023 2024
Proportion of persons aged 25-64 having participated in education and training (last 4 weeks)
0.7 w 1.6 w 1.8 1.6 4.5 w 2.3 w 2.5 2.8 2.8 w 3.6 w 12.8 13.5
Proportion of persons aged 25-64 having participated in education and training (last 4 weeks), men
0.6 w 1.3 w 1.5 1.2 4.3 w 2.0 w 2.7 2.4 2.2 w 2.6 w 11.6 12.2
Proportion of persons aged 25-64 having participated in education and training (last 4 weeks), women
0.8 w 1.9 w 2.0 2.0 4.8 w 2.5 w 2.4 3.1 3.5 w 4.6 w 14.0 14.7
Exposure of vocational education and training (VET) graduates to work-based learning (% of population aged 20-34)
1.6 w 1.9 w : : : : 4.4 : : : 64.4 65.2
Percentage of the population aged 20-24 with at most lower secondary education, total
17.4 w 16.5 w 8.1 8.2 8.8 w 7.6 w 12.9 7.5 3.8 w 4.7 w 15.0 15
Percentage of the population aged 20-24 with at most lower secondary education, males
19.0 w 19.9 w 8.8 10.2 8.1 w 7.1 w 11.8 7.3 4.6 w 6.0 w 17.5 17.4
Percentage of the population aged 20-24 with at most lower secondary education, females
16.0 w 12.9 w 7.5 6.2 9.6 w 8.2 w 14 7.7 3.0 w 3.2 w 12.3 12.5
Percentage of the population aged 20-24 with upper secondary or post secondary non-tertiary education, total
57.8 w 55.9 w 86.1 85.4 77.5 w 79.1 w 78.1 85.0 86.2 w 83.9 w 65.9 65.6
Percentage of the population aged 20-24 with upper secondary or post secondary non-tertiary education, males
65.0 w 63.0 w 87.2 84.8 83.0 w 83.6 w 81.0 88.1 84.5 w 84.1 w 66.3 66.1
Percentage of the population aged 20-24 with upper secondary or post secondary non-tertiary education, females
51.0 w 48.5 w 85.1 86 71.7 w 74.3 w 75.1 81.7 88.0 w 83.6 w 65.4 65.1
Percentage of the population aged 30-34 with tertiary education, total
36.5 w 37.8 w 28.2 26.7 30.6 w 29.1 w 35.5 39.3 40.9 w 41.3 w 43.8 44.5
16
Education Note Albania
Bosnia and Herzegovina
Kosovo North Macedonia Montenegro EU-27
2023 2024 2023 2024 2023 2024 2023 2024 2023 2024 2023 2024
Percentage of the population aged 30-34 with tertiary education, males
31.2 w 34.0 w 23.5 21.3 23.9 w 23.6 w 31.4 32.5 37.7 w 41.4 w 38.4 39.2
Percentage of the population aged 30-34 with tertiary education, females
42.0 w 42.5 w 33.1 32.6 37.4 w 34.8 w 39.8 46.3 44.1 w 41.3 w 49.4 50
Share of individuals having at least basic digital skills (% of population aged 16-74)
23.3 : 30.1 36.3 w 52.5 pw : : : 52.0 : 55.6 :
Share of individuals having at least basic digital skills (% of population aged 16-74), males
25.1 : 30.8 41.1 w 52.8 pw : : : 53.5 : 56.7 :
Share of individuals having at least basic digital skills (% of population aged 16-74), females
21.6 : 29.3 34.1 w 52.3 pw : : : 50.0 : 54.5 :
17
National accounts Note Albania
Bosnia and Herzegovina
Kosovo North Macedonia Montenegro EU-27
2023 2024 2023 2024 2023 2024 2023 2024 2023 2024 2023 2024
Gross domestic product
In current prices (EUR million)
21 739 24 995 25 524 27 483 9 680 10 350 14 667 15 672 p 7 069 7 645 17 259
390 18 043
410
Per capita (EUR)
7 868 iw : 7 460 8 050 : : 8 020 e 8 590 e 11 340 12 260 38 450 40 110
In purchasing power standards (PPS) per capita
: : 13 600 13 800 : : 15 837 e 16 932 e 19 903 21 365 38 366 39 985
In purchasing power standards (PPS) per capita, relative to the EU average (EU-27 = 100)
: : : : : : 41.3 e 42.3 e 51.9 53.4 100 100
Real (volume) annual rate of change, compared with the previous year (%)
4.0 4.0 p 2.0 3.2 4.1 4.6 2.6 3.0 p 6.5 3.2 0.4 1.2
Gross value added by main sectors
Agriculture, forestry and fisheries (%)
18.4 17.7 5.5 5.4 9.0 9.3 7.1 7.0 p 4.7 4.4 1.8 1.8
Industry (%)
13.6 12.8 22.7 21.2 22.8 22.8 20.6 20.6 p 11.1 10.5 20.2 19.4
Construction (%)
13.8 14.1 5.4 5.6 10.1 10.0 7.0 7.2 p 4.8 4.9 5.5 5.5
Services (%)
54.1 i 55.4 i 66.3 i 67.8 i 58.2 i 57.9 i 65.4 i 65.1 pi 79.4 i 80.3 i 72.5 i 73.4 i
Balance of payments Note 2023 2024 2023 2024 2023 2024 2023 2024 2023 2024 2023 2024
Net (inward - outward) foreign direct investment (FDI) (million euro)
1 253.6 i 1 337.3 i 949.8 i 816.1 i 650.1 w 569.2 w 488.1 w 1 036.8
w 434.0 i 491.0 i - 60
215.5 i - 150
086.3 i
Net (inward - outward) foreign direct investment (FDI) (% of GDP)
5.77 i 5.35 i 3.72 i 2.97 i 6.72 i 5.50 i 3.33 i 6.62 pi 6.14 i 6.42 i - 0.35 i - 0.83 i
Net (inward - outward) foreign direct investment (FDI) in relation to EU-27 (million euro)
813.4 i 762.5 i 451.5 i 676.5 i 352.0 i 304.1 i 402.2 i 642.0 i 95.0 i 79.0 i - 25
748.0 i 113 753.6
i
Net (inward - outward) foreign direct investment (FDI) in relation to EU-27 (% of GDP)
3.74 i 3.05 i 1.77 i 2.46 i 3.64 i 2.94 i 2.74 i 4.10 pi 1.34 i 1.03 i - 0.15 i 0.63 i
Remittances as % of GDP
4.26 i 4.18 i 7.59 i 7.75 i 13.80 i 0.00 i 2.32 i 2.11 pi 5.52 i 5.38 i 0.14 i 0.14 i
18
External trade in goods Note Albania
Bosnia and Herzegovina
Kosovo North Macedonia Montenegro EU-27
2023 2024 2023 2024 2023 2024 2023 2024 2023 2024 2023 2024
Share of exports to EU-27 countries in value of total exports (%)
70.8 iw 71.6 iw 73.0 iw 73.1 iw 32.3 iw 33.1 iw 78.7 iw 76.9 iw 36.1 iw 29.1 iw : :
Share of imports from EU-27 countries in value of total imports (%)
50.9 iw 51.4 iw 59.0 iw 59.2 iw 43.0 iw 44.7 iw 49.2 iw 50.5 iw 45.8 iw 45.7 iw : :
Trade balance (EUR million)
- 3 994 - 5 191 - 5 659 - 6 432 - 5 044 - 5 437 - 2 826 - 3 282 - 3 136 - 3 453 35 331 133 115
International trade in goods and services relative to GDP
Imports (% of GDP)
43.9 43.2 55.7 54.1 70.3 72 80.4 74.6 p 67.6 66.2 48.1 46.3
Exports (% of GDP)
38 36.3 43.9 40.7 39.6 41.7 p 67.4 61.7 p 49.2 43.7 51.7 50.4
Public finance Note 2023 2024 2023 2024 2023 2024 2023 2024 2023 2024 2023 2024
General government surplus (+) / deficit (-) (%)
-0.8 wd -0.3 wd : : : : : : : : -3.4 -3.1
General government debt (%)
54.6 wd 51.5 wd : : : : : : : : 80.5 80.7
19
Financial indicators Note Albania
Bosnia and Herzegovina
Kosovo North Macedonia Montenegro EU-27
2023 2024 2023 2024 2023 2024 2023 2024 2023 2024 2023 2024
Annual change in consumer prices (%)
5) 6.6 d 5.3 d 14.0 w 6.1 w 11.6 d 4.9 d 14.0 d 9.0 d 11.9 d 8.7 d 9.2 6.4
Total external debt, relative to GDP (%)
6) 54.1 iw 46.3 piw 51.6 iw 47.4 iw 38.6 iw 39.6 iw 81.5 iw 77.9 piw 158.7 iw 130.1 iw : :
Value of reserve assets (including gold) (million euro)
-71.8 911.5 72.8 26.5 67.6 -44 271.6 603.1 164 -482 : :
International reserves - equivalence in months of imports
6) 6.9 iw 7.3 iw 6.8 iw 7.0 iw 2.2 iw 2.0 iw 3.7 iw 4.6 iw 5.2 iw 3.6 iw : :
20
Business Note Albania
Bosnia and Herzegovina
Kosovo North Macedonia Montenegro EU-27
2023 2024 2023 2024 2023 2024 2023 2024 2023 2024 2023 2024
Industrial production index (2021 = 100)
94 87 97 93.1 : : 100.4 96.8 103 102.9 101.1 98.7
Infrastructure Note 2023 2024 2023 2024 2023 2024 2023 2024 2023 2024 2023 2024
Density of railway network (lines in operation per thousand km²)
8.8 i 8.8 i 19.9 iw 19.9 iw 30.5 iw 30.5 iw 26.9 i 26.9 i 18.0 i 18.0 i 47.7 i 47.7 i
Length of motorways (kilometres)
25 49 231 242 : : 335 335 0 0 76 515 :
Energy Note 2023 2024 2023 2024 2023 2024 2023 2024 2023 2024 2023 2024
Net energy imports in relation to GDP
1.1 i 1.6 i 4.2 i 4.6 i 7.5 i 6.9 i 7.5 i 6.6 pi 2.1 i 3.5 i 3.2 i 2.6 i
21
STATISTICAL DATA (as of 14/09/2026), part 2 (Serbia – Ukraine)
Demography Note Serbia Türkiye Georgia** Moldova*** Ukraine EU-27
2023 2024 2023 2024 2023 2024 2023 2024 2023 2024 2023 2024
Total population (thousands)
6 641 i 6 605 i 85 280 i 85 372 i 3 736 i 3 695 i 2 513 pi 2 423 pi : : 447 806 bi
449 490 pi
Share of 15-64 in total population (%)
63.4 bi 63.1 i 68.1 i 68.3 i 63.8 i 64.3 i 65.9 pi 65.1 pi : : 63.8 bpi 63.8 pi
Crude rate of natural population change (per 1 000 inhabitants)
-5.4 -5.7 5.1 5.2 -0.7 -1.2 - 3.9 ep - 4.1 ep : : -2.6 bep - 2.8 ep
Life expectancy at birth, males (years)
73.8 b 73.9 b 74.8 76.4 b 69.9 70.5 b 67.5 ep : : : 78.6 bep 78.9 ep
Life expectancy at birth, females (years)
78.6 b 78.5 b 79.8 81.7 b 77.5 79.3 b 76.4 ep : : : 83.9 bep 84.1 ep
Labour market Note 2023 2024 2023 2024 2023 2024 2023 2024 2023 2024 2023 2024
Economic activity rate for persons aged 20-64: proportion of the population aged 20-64 that is economically active (%)
Total 7) 76.8 78 63.1 64.0 68.7 w 70.8 w 58.4 w 59.1 w : : 80.0 80.3
Males 7) 83.3 84.2 82.7 83.3 80.3 w 81.5 w 61.9 w 60.9 w : : 85.2 85.5
Females 7) 70.5 71.8 43.5 44.6 57.9 w 60.5 w 55.3 w 57.5 w : : 74.8 75.2
Employment rates, aged 20- 64 (% of the population)
Total 7) 69.6 71.3 57.3 58.5 56.9 w 60.4 w 55.7 w 56.8 w : : 75.3 75.7
Males 7) 75.9 77.2 76.5 77.5 64.9 w 67.8 w 58.8 w 58.6 w : : 80.4 80.7
Females 7) 63.4 65.5 38.0 39.4 49.4 w 53.3 w 53.0 w 55.1 w : : 70.2 70.7
Persons aged 15-24 not in employment, education or training, % of the population in the age group
7) 12.4 12.9 22.4 22.9 21.0 w 17.5 w 13.8 w 13.5 w : : 9.2 9.2
22
Labour market (cont.) Note Serbia Türkiye Georgia** Moldova*** Ukraine EU-27
2023 2024 2023 2024 2023 2024 2023 2024 2023 2024 2023 2024
Persons aged 15-29 not in employment, education or training, % of the population in the age group
7) 15.2 14.9 25.8 25.9 26.9 w 24.1 w 23.1 w 21.9 w : : 11.3 11.2
Employment by main sectors
Agriculture, forestry and fisheries (%)
7) 8) 13.1 i 12.8 i 14.6 i 14.6 i 16.5 w 16.0 w 20.9 w 18.1 w : : 3.6 i 3.3 i
Industry (%) 7) 8) 23.5 i 23.0 i 21.3 i 20.7 i 12.2 w 12.9 w 14.4 w 13.4 w : : 17.4 i 17.2 i
Construction (%) 7) 8) 5.9 i 6.0 i 6.3 i 6.6 i 8.8 w 8.9 w 7.1 w 7.5 w : : 6.8 i 6.9 i
Services (%) 7) 8) 57.4 i 58.2 i 57.8 i 58.1 i 62.4 w 62.2 w 57.6 w 61.0 w : : 72.0 i 72.1 i
People employed in the public sector as a share of total employment, persons aged 20-64 (%)
: : : : 23.3 w 22.0 w 28.5 w 30.7 w : : : :
People employed in the private sector as a share of total employment, persons aged 20-64 (%)
: : : : 76.7 w 78.0 w 71.5 w 69.3 w : : : :
Unemployment rates (% of the labour force)
Total 7) 9) 9.5 8.6 9.4 8.8 16.4 w 13.9 w 4.6 w 4.0 w : : 6.1 6
Males 7) 9) 9.1 8.4 7.7 7.1 18.3 w 16.1 w 5.0 w 3.8 w : : 5.8 5.8
Females 7) 9) 9.9 8.9 12.7 11.8 14.0 w 11.1 w 4.2 w 4.1 w : : 6.4 6.2
Youth, aged 15-24 7) 25 23 17.5 16.4 34.5 w 28.9 w 11.5 w 9.8 w : : 14.6 15
Long-term (>12 months) 7) 9) 3.8 3.4 2.0 1.7 6.5 w 5.0 w 0.8 w 0.6 w : : 2.1 1.9
Average nominal monthly wages and salaries (EUR)
7) 10) 11) 12) 1 011 iw 1 156 iw 333 iw 491 iw 622 iw 669 iw 622 iw 727 iw 441 iw 494 iw : :
23
Education Note Serbia Türkiye Georgia** Moldova*** Ukraine EU-27
2023 2024 2023 2024 2023 2024 2023 2024 2023 2024 2023 2024
Public expenditure on education relative to GDP (%)
13) 3.4 piw 3.5 piw : 4.0 iw 3.7 iw 3.9 iw : : : : 4.7 d :
Participation in early childhood education (children aged 3 and over)
11) 71.6 b 79.5 bd 54.9 55 : : 98.9 w : 87.1 w 87.1 w 94.6 d 94.9 d
Participation in early childhood education (children aged 3 and over), males
11) 71.4 b 79.2 bd 55.3 55.3 : : 99.2 w : 87.3 w 87.3 w 94.5 d 94.8 d
Participation in early childhood education (children aged 3 and over), females
11) 71.8 b 79.8 bd 54.5 54.7 : : 98.6 w : 86.9 w 86.0 w 94.7 d 95.0 d
Low achieving 15-year-olds in reading
4) 11) 36.4 : 29.3 : : : : : 41.0 w : 26.2 :
Low achieving 15-year-olds in mathematics
4) 11) 43.1 : 38.7 : : : : : 42.4 w : 29.5 :
Low achieving 15-year-olds in science
4) 11) 35.1 : 24.7 : : : : : 34.0 w : 24.2 :
Early leavers from education and training: percentage of the population aged 18-24 with at most a lower secondary education and not in further education or training (%)
5.8 6.2 19.5 18.7 5.3 w 6.4 w 17.5 w 16.4 w : : 9.6 9.6
Male early leavers from education and training: proportion of men aged 18-24 with at most lower secondary education (at most ISCED 2011 level 2) who are not in further education or training
5.8 6.8 20.1 19.6 5.1 w 6.4 w 18.6 w 16.6 w : : 11.3 11.2
Female early leavers from education and training: proportion of women aged 18- 24 with at most lower secondary education (at most ISCED 2011 level 2) who are not in further education or training
5.9 5.7 19.0 17.8 5.4 w 6.5 w 16.4 w 16.1 w : : 7.7 7.9
24
Education Note Serbia Türkiye Georgia** Moldova*** Ukraine EU-27
2023 2024 2023 2024 2023 2024 2023 2024 2023 2024 2023 2024
Proportion of persons aged 25-64 having participated in education and training (last 4 weeks)
7) 6.1 5.5 7.4 8.0 1.7 w 1.6 w 2.2 w 2.9 w : : 12.8 13.5
Proportion of persons aged 25-64 having participated in education and training (last 4 weeks), men
7) 5.5 4.9 7.0 7.3 1.6 w 1.4 w 1.6 w 2.1 w : : 11.6 12.2
Proportion of persons aged 25-64 having participated in education and training (last 4 weeks), women
7) 6.7 6.1 7.8 8.6 1.8 w 1.7 w 2.7 w 3.6 w : : 14.0 14.7
Exposure of vocational education and training (VET) graduates to work-based learning (% of population aged 20-34)
21.4 21.0 : : : : : : : : 64.4 65.2
Percentage of the population aged 20-24 with at most lower secondary education, total
7) 14) 6.3 6.7 23.5 21.5 5.3 w 4.5 w 22.4 w 21.9 w : : 15.0 15
Percentage of the population aged 20-24 with at most lower secondary education, males
7) 5.9 7.1 24.6 22.4 4.3 w 4.1 w 22.5 w 22.2 w : : 17.5 17.4
Percentage of the population aged 20-24 with at most lower secondary education, females
7) 6.7 6.2 22.4 20.5 6.4 w 5.0 w 22.2 w 21.7 w : : 12.3 12.5
Percentage of the population aged 20-24 with upper secondary or post secondary non-tertiary education, total
7) 85.9 84.6 53.8 54.4 76.4 w 78.5 w 65.2 w 67.5 w : : 65.9 65.6
Percentage of the population aged 20-24 with upper secondary or post secondary non-tertiary education, males
7) 87.5 87.7 58.0 59.8 79.4 w 81.4 w 67.4 w 68.6 w : : 66.3 66.1
Percentage of the population aged 20-24 with upper secondary or post secondary non-tertiary education, females
7) 84.2 81.3 49.4 48.7 72.9 w 75.1 w 63.0 w 66.4 w : : 65.4 65.1
Percentage of the population aged 30-34 with tertiary education, total
7) 38.2 40.0 39.9 41.7 35.6 w 38.8 w 31.3 w 35.3 w : : 43.8 44.5
25
Education Note Serbia Türkiye Georgia** Moldova*** Ukraine EU-27
2023 2024 2023 2024 2023 2024 2023 2024 2023 2024 2023 2024
Percentage of the population aged 30-34 with tertiary education, males
7) 29.8 32.3 39.2 40.3 31.2 w 33.3 w 23.5 w 27.2 w : : 38.4 39.2
Percentage of the population aged 30-34 with tertiary education, females
7) 46.9 48.0 40.5 43.1 40.3 w 44.5 w 38.1 w 42.5 w : : 49.4 50
Share of individuals having at least basic digital skills (% of population aged 16-74)
33.6 : 33.1 : 34.5 w 36.3 w : : : : 55.6 :
Share of individuals having at least basic digital skills (% of population aged 16-74), males
35.5 : 36.8 : 33.5 w 35.9 w : : : : 56.7 :
Share of individuals having at least basic digital skills (% of population aged 16-74), females
31.8 : 29.4 : 35.4 w 36.6 w : : : : 54.5 :
26
National accounts Note Serbia Türkiye Georgia** Moldova*** Ukraine EU-27
2023 2024 2023 2024 2023 2024 2023 2024 2023 2024 2023 2024
Gross domestic product
In current prices (EUR million)
11) 13) 75 205 p 83 258 p 1 051 700
1 253 387
28 464 w
31 597 w
15 454 16 825 167 632 176 270 17 259 390
18 043 410
Per capita (EUR) 7) 11) 13) 11 350 p 12 640 p 11 860 14 140 7 661 w 8 541 w 6 360 7 000 : : 38 450 40 110
In purchasing power standards (PPS) per capita
11) 15) 18 600 p 20 593 p 25 721 27 621 : : 20 910 w
23 195 w
: : 38 366 39 985
In purchasing power standards (PPS) per capita, relative to the EU average (EU-27 = 100)
11) 15) 48.5 p 51.5 p 67.0 69.1 : : 34.9 ew 36.5 ew : : 100 100
Real (volume) annual rate of change, compared with the previous year (%)
11) 13) 15) 3.7 p 3.9 p 5.0 3.3 7.8 w 9.7 w 1.2 w 0.3 w 5.5 3.2 0.4 1.2
Gross value added by main sectors
Agriculture, forestry and fisheries (%)
13) 4.4 p 3.7 p 7.2 6.6 6.9 w 6.3 w 8.2 8.5 8.6 8.4 1.8 1.8
Industry (%) 13) 22.0 p 21.2 p 25.6 22.2 14.1 w 14.0 w 12.2 11.3 19.9 20 20.2 19.4
Construction (%) 13) 5.9 p 5.9 p 6.1 6.6 7.6 w 8.5 w 8.3 8.3 1.8 2 5.5 5.5
Services (%) 12) 67.8 pi 69.1 pi 60.9 i 64.7 i 71.4 w 71.2 w 71.3 i 72.0 i 69.7 i 69.6 i 72.5 i 73.4 i
Balance of payments Note 2023 2024 2023 2024 2023 2024 2023 2024 2023 2024 2023 2024
Net (inward - outward) foreign direct investment (FDI) (million euro)
7) 11) 4 261.6 w
4 602.5 w
4 228.3 i 4 737.0 i 1 515.7 w
1 058.7 w
323.3 w 332.6 w 4 037.3 w
3 393.4 w
- 60 215.5 i
- 150 086.3 i
Net (inward - outward) foreign direct investment (FDI) (% of GDP)
11) 13) 15) 5.67 pi 5.55 pi 0.40 i 0.38 i 5.32 iw 3.35 iw 2.09 iw 1.98 piw 2.45 iw : - 0.35 i - 0.83 i
Net (inward - outward) foreign direct investment (FDI) in relation to EU-27 (million euro)
7) 11) 2 123.0 i 1 721.0 i 1 373.4 i 2 020.2 i 480.9 w 262.6 w : : 3 228.5 w
2 540.8 w
- 25 748.0 i
113 753.6 i
Net (inward - outward) foreign direct investment (FDI) in relation to EU-27 (% of GDP)
11) 13) 2.82 pi 2.07 pi 0.13 i 0.16 i 1.69 iw 0.83 iw : : 1.98 iw : - 0.15 i 0.63 i
Remittances as % of GDP 11) 13) 5.25 pi 4.58 pi 0.02 iw 0.01 iw 7.92 iw 6.40 iw 6.71 diw 5.66 dpiw
0.99 iw : 0.14 i 0.14 i
27
External trade in goods Note Serbia Türkiye Georgia** Moldova*** Ukraine EU-27
2023 2024 2023 2024 2023 2024 2023 2024 2023 2024 2023 2024
Share of exports to EU-27 countries in value of total exports (%)
11) 65.7 iw 64.4 iw 40.8 iw 41.9 iw 11.6 iw 8.7 iw 65.4 iw 67.3 iw 71.1 iw 64.4 iw : :
Share of imports from EU-27 countries in value of total imports (%)
11) 53.6 iw 53.1 iw 29.0 iw 32.0 iw 24.5 iw 27.1 iw 48.3 iw 50.2 iw 51.2 iw 50.5 iw : :
Trade balance (EUR million) 11) - 8 178 - 9 159 - 97 406 - 77 291 - 8 809 iw
- 9 544 iw
- 4 275 iw
- 5 099 iw
- 29 005 iw
- 32 214 iw
35 331 133 115
International trade in goods and services relative to GDP
Imports (% of GDP) 11) 13) 59.4 p 58.1 p 33.8 27.0 57.9 w 55.6 w 58.9 57.3 49.2 50 48.1 46.3
Exports (% of GDP) 11) 13) 55.1 p 53.6 p 31.9 27.6 49.3 w 47.8 w 35.1 31.6 28.3 29.7 51.7 50.4
Public finance Note 2023 2024 2023 2024 2023 2024 2023 2024 2023 2024 2023 2024
General government surplus (+) / deficit (-) (%)
11) 13) 16) : : : : - 2.3 w - 2.2 w - 5.1 ew - 3.9 ew - 19.5 w - 17.7 w -3.4 -3.1
General government debt (%) 11) 13) : : : : 38.8 w 35.6 w 35.4 ew 38.0 ew 83.3 w 91.1 w 80.5 80.7
28
Financial indicators Note Serbia Türkiye Georgia** Moldova*** Ukraine EU-27
2023 2024 2023 2024 2023 2024 2023 2024 2023 2024 2023 2024
Annual change in consumer prices (%)
11) 12.1 d 4.8 d 54.0 d 58.5 d 2.1 w 1.7 w 13.4 w 4.7 w 12.9 w 6.5 w 6.4 2.6
Total external debt, relative to GDP (%)
11) 13) 15) 17) 58.7 piw 58.6 piw 43.3 iw 38.1 iw 77.7 iw 76.3 iw 59.0 iw 58.7 piw 86.8 iw : : :
Value of reserve assets (including gold) (million euro)
11) 5 104.0 2 834.0 - 1 949.6 691.1 4 528.2 w
4 260.6 w
4 903.5 w
5 247.5 w
36 459.0 w
41 913.1 w
: :
International reserves - equivalence in months of imports
11) 6.7 iw 7.3 iw 4.4 iw 5.0 iw 3.3 iw 2.9 iw 6.5 iw 6.5 iw 5.3 iw 5.7 iw : :
29
Business Note Serbia Türkiye Georgia** Moldova*** Ukraine EU-27
2023 2024 2023 2024 2023 2024 2023 2024 2023 2024 2023 2024
Industrial production index (2021 = 100)
11) 104.8 107.7 106.1 106.5 : : 92.8 w 92.5 w 67.6 70.7 101.1 98.7
Infrastructure Note 2023 2024 2023 2024 2023 2024 2023 2024 2023 2024 2023 2024
Density of railway network (lines in operation per thousand km²)
18) 38.2 iw 38.2 iw 14.6 i 14.6 i 16.0 iw 16.0 iw 34.0 iw 34.0 iw 32.7 iw : 47.7 i 47.7 i
Length of motorways (kilometres)
11) 963 999 3 726 3 796 271 358 0 0 15 : 76 515 :
Energy Note 2023 2024 2023 2024 2023 2024 2023 2024 2023 2024 2023 2024
Net energy imports in relation to GDP
13) 15) 4.6 pi 4.1 pi 4.7 i 3.6 i 1.1 iw 1.2 iw 6.0 iw 6.3 piw : : 3.2 i 2.6 i
Source: Eurostat and/or the statistical authorities of the enlargement countries
: = not available
b = break in time series
d = definition differs
e = estimated
p = provisional
i = Eurostat estimate
w= data supplied by and under the responsibility of the national statistical authority and published on an "as is" basis and without any assurance as regards their quality and adherence to EU statistical methodology ** = Data shown for Georgia exclude the occupied breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia over which the government of Georgia does not exercise control.
*** = The data managed by the National Bureau of Statistics of the Republic of Moldova does not include data from the Transnistrian region over which the government of the Republic of Moldova does not exercise control, unless otherwise indicated.
Footnotes:
1) Bosnia and Herzegovina: The public sector includes NACE Rev. 2 Sections O, P and Q while the private sector includes other NACE Sections.
2) Albania: Public sector only.
3) Bosnia and Herzegovina: Since 2023, children who attended a preschool programme prior to enrolling in school and who did not regularly attend preschool are also included.
4) 2022 data instead of 2023.
5) Bosnia and Herzegovina: Consumer price inflation
30
6) Bosnia and Herzegovina: Based on IMF balance of payments manual, sixth edition.
7) Ukraine: Official statistics for 2022–2025 were not fully produced due to the martial law. It will gradually be produced and disseminated as defined by the State Statistics Service of Ukraine, taking into account the specific conditions of producing statistics during Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine.
8) Georgia**: Since 2020 - NACE Rev.2, before 2020 - NACE Rev.1.1.
9) Georgia**: Persons aged 15 years and older.
10) Moldova***: Includes units with one and more employees.
11) Ukraine: Since 2014, data for Ukraine generally exclude the illegally annexed Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the City of Sevastopol and the territories which are not under control of the Ukrainian government.
12) Serbia: Wages and salaries paid to employees of legal entities and of unincorporated enterprises. Wages and salaries are obtained from administrative sources (tax administration records). Average earnings are calculated on the basis of the total amount of accrued earnings for the reporting month and the number of full-time equivalent (FTE) employees.
13) Georgia**: Based on 2008 SNA.
14) Georgia**: Persons without education are excluded.
15) Moldova***: Based on 2008 SNA.
16) Ukraine: Cash data (Government finance statistics manual 2014, IMF).
17) Serbia: Official external debt of the Republic of Serbia.
18) Moldova***: Including data from the Transnistrian region.
EN EN
EUROPEAN COMMISSION
Brussels, 4.11.2026 SWD(2026) 699 final
COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT
Ukraine 2026 Report
Accompanying the document
COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN
PARLIAMENT, THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL
COMMITTEE AND THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS
2026 Communication on EU enlargement policy
{COM(2026) 690 final} - {SWD(2026) 690 final} - {SWD(2026) 691 final} -
{SWD(2026) 692 final} - {SWD(2026) 693 final} - {SWD(2026) 694 final} - {SWD(2026) 695 final} - {SWD(2026) 696 final} - {SWD(2026) 697 final} -
{SWD(2026) 698 final} - {SWD(2026) 700 final}
1
Table of Contents 1. INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................................ 3
1.1. Context .................................................................................................................................... 3
1.2. Main findings of the report ....................................................................................................... 4
1.3. State of play of the accession negotiations ............................................................................... 23
2. Cluster 1: The fundamentals of the accession process .................................................................... 23
2.1. Functioning of democratic institutions and public administration reform ................................... 23
2.1.1. Democracy ......................................................................................................................... 23
2.1.2. Public administration reform ............................................................................................... 26
2.2 Rule of law and fundamental rights ............................................................................................ 30
2.2.1 Chapter 23 - Judiciary and fundamental rights ............................................................... 30
2.2.2 Chapter 24 - Justice, freedom and security .................................................................... 49
2.3. Economic criteria ....................................................................................................................... 62
2.3.1. The existence of a functioning market economy ................................................................ 62
2.3.2. The capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the EU ............ 67
2.4. Public procurement, statistics and financial control ................................................................... 68
Chapter 5 - Public procurement ................................................................................................... 68
Chapter 18 - Statistics .................................................................................................................. 70
Chapter 32 - Financial control ...................................................................................................... 70
3. Good neighbourly relations and regional cooperation ...................................................................... 72
4. Security, defence and resilience ....................................................................................................... 73
5. Ability to assume the obligations of membership .............................................................................. 76
Cluster 2: Internal market ................................................................................................................. 76
Chapter 1 - Free movement of goods .......................................................................................... 76
Chapter 2 - Freedom of movement for workers ........................................................................... 77
Chapter 3 - Right of establishment and freedom to provide services .......................................... 77
Chapter 4 - Free movement of capital .......................................................................................... 78
Chapter 6 - Company law ............................................................................................................. 79
Chapter 7 - Intellectual property law ............................................................................................. 79
Chapter 8 - Competition policy ..................................................................................................... 80
Chapter 9 - Financial services ...................................................................................................... 81
Chapter 28 - Consumer and health protection ............................................................................. 82
Cluster 3: Competitiveness and inclusive growth ............................................................................. 84
Chapter 10 - Digital transformation and media ............................................................................ 84
Chapter 16 - Taxation ................................................................................................................... 86
Chapter 17 - Economic and monetary policy ............................................................................... 86
Chapter 19 - Social policy and employment ................................................................................. 87
Chapter 20 - Enterprise and industrial policy ............................................................................... 89
2
Chapter 25 - Science and research .............................................................................................. 90
Chapter 26 - Education and culture .............................................................................................. 91
Chapter 29 - Customs union ........................................................................................................ 92
Cluster 4: The green agenda and sustainable connectivity .............................................................. 93
Chapter 14 - Transport policy ....................................................................................................... 93
Chapter 15 - Energy ..................................................................................................................... 94
Chapter 21 - Trans-European networks ....................................................................................... 96
Chapter 27 - Environment and climate change ............................................................................ 97
Cluster 5: Resources, agriculture and cohesion ............................................................................. 100
Chapter 11 - Agriculture and rural development ......................................................................... 100
Chapter 12 - Food safety, veterinary and phytosanitary policy .................................................. 101
Chapter 13 - Fisheries and aquaculture ..................................................................................... 102
Chapter 22 - Regional policy and coordination of structural instruments................................... 103
Chapter 33 - Financial and budgetary provisions ....................................................................... 105
Cluster 6: External Relations .......................................................................................................... 105
Chapter 30 - External relations ................................................................................................... 105
Chapter 31 - Foreign, security and defence policy ..................................................................... 106
Annex I - Relations between the EU and Ukraine .......................................................................... 109
Annex II – Statistical annex ............................................................................................................ 111
3
1. INTRODUCTION1
1.1. CONTEXT
Ukraine has continued to face the consequences of Russia’s war of aggression, including a severe energy crisis during the first months of 2026 and daily attacks on civilian targets.
Ukraine has continued to progress on the path to EU accession since its application in 2022 and the formal opening of accession negotiations in June 2024. After concluding a bilateral screening of the EU acquis in September 2025, cluster 1 (fundamentals) was formally opened at the intergovernmental conference on 15 June, followed by cluster 6 (external relations) on 14 July 2026 as well as cluster 2 (internal market) and cluster 3 (competitiveness and inclusive growth) on 13 October 2026. The Commission has assessed all remaining clusters as ready to be opened. In April 2026, Ukraine adopted its National Programme for the adoption of the acquis (NPAA). Ukraine has remained committed to the EU integration reform agenda, in particular by continuing to demonstrate that its institutional framework for the fight against corruption is effective and that the specialised anti-corruption institutions continue to generally operate independently and effectively. The slowing down of legislative decision-making during the reporting period is a point of concern. However, since the end of the summer there has been increased focus on the reforms and actual implementation of policy conditionality under Ukraine Facility and Ukraine Support Loan. In October 2026 Ukraine and the Commission set up a joint Task Force to support Ukraine in accelerating progress on the interim benchmarks, which will advance essential rule of law and anti-corruption reforms.
Regular political and economic dialogue between the EU and Ukraine continued through the Association Agreement and the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area, and the joint bodies under the agreement. This dialogue was further strengthened by the implementation of the Ukraine Facility, including its financial assistance and the Ukraine Plan indicators, which are linked to a set of targeted reforms across key sectors that promote growth, attract priority investments, and advance European integration.
Since the beginning of Russia’s war of aggression, the EU and its Member States have enabled the mobilisation of EUR 231.6 billion in support of Ukraine and its people. The recommendations in this report are aligned with the main priorities of the Ukraine Plan for the next 12 months and with the benchmarks set in the accession negotiations. Overall, the interaction between the commitments under the enlargement process and the Ukraine Plan works well, but further efforts are needed.
The EU-Ukraine joint security commitments signed in 2024 continue to guide the EU’s and Member States’ support for Ukraine’s security, resilience and defence. This support complements bilateral commitments between Ukraine and individual Member States.
The EU continues to fully support the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine within its internationally recognised borders. Ukraine maintains a high level of alignment with the EU’s common foreign and security policy.
1.2. MAIN FINDINGS OF THE REPORT
1 This report covers the period from 1 September 2025 to 1 September 2026. It is based on input from a variety of
sources, including contributions from the government of Ukraine, EU Member States, European Parliament reports and information from various international and non-governmental organisations. It also includes the results of comparative assessments and indices produced by other stakeholders, in particular on the rule of law.
The report uses the following assessment scale to describe the state of play: early stage, some level of preparation, moderately prepared, good level of preparation and well advanced. To describe progress made during the reporting period, it uses the following scale: backsliding, no progress, limited progress, some progress, good progress and very good progress. Where appropriate, interim steps have also been used.
4
CLUSTER 1: THE FUNDAMENTALS OF THE ACCESSION PROCESS
Democracy
The functioning of democratic institutions in Ukraine is generally stable despite Russia’s ongoing war of aggression and the restrictions imposed under martial law.
The general framework remains overall conducive to the organisation of democratic elections upon the lifting of martial law once circumstances allow, but it will require certain adjustments given the war-related challenges. The authorities strengthened the work on electoral reforms and set up a special parliamentary working group to prepare legislative proposals for post-war elections.
Parliament can exercise its powers, including overseeing the executive and participating in the legislative process, in an overall effective way despite the constraints of martial law. Further progress was achieved on parliamentary transparency and public engagement. However, the legislation on political parties still needs a comprehensive update, and no legislative initiatives have yet been developed on the rights of the parliamentary opposition.
The institutions in charge of EU integration are in place and actively involved in coordinating the accession process. The NPAA is the main document for planning and monitoring the fulfilment of Ukraine's obligations arising from the accession negotiations, together with the roadmaps on rule of law, public administration reform, functioning of democratic institutions, and the action plan on national minorities.
Ukraine’s government has continued to perform its functions effectively, prioritising security and defence, EU integration, digital transformation, economic recovery and reconstruction. The decentralisation reform should continue, maximising the potential of local government authorities and making tangible advances, in line with Ukraine’s efforts to fulfil the requirements for EU accession.
Ukraine has a vibrant and robust civil society, from service providers to policy actors to government watchdogs and human rights defenders. Civil society operates in an overall enabling environment. However, there were reported incidents of pressure on activists that should be investigated. The authorities took some positive steps in support of the volunteering sector, such as the adoption of the State Targeted Social Programme for the Development of Volunteering until 2030 and legislation simplifying long-term stay rules for foreign volunteers and humanitarian workers.
Public administration reform
Ukraine is moderately prepared in the area of public administration reform (PAR) and has made good progress, in particular by: (i) adopting the PAR and the public financial management system (PFM) strategies for 2026-2030, as well as the NPAA; (ii) completing the necessary steps to establish the EU-UA PAR sub-committe, (iii) adopting the law to improve and restart competitive recruitment and selection procedures, including strengthening integrity checks for management positions and other posts considered to be at high risk of corruption; (iv) developing the new civil service vacancy portal; (v) advancing implementation of the unified human resource management information system across all public administration bodies; (vi) making further progress on the digitalisation of public services; and (vii) further aligning secondary legislation with the Law on administrative procedure (LAP). Ukraine has demonstrated a good capacity in implementing PFM reforms, particularly in public investment management. This is reflected in: (i) the adoption of the medium-term plan for priority public investment for 2027-2029; (ii) stronger sectoral planning; (iii) a wider use of IT systems; and (iv) closer integration of investment planning into the annual budget cycle.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were partially implemented and remain mostly valid. In the coming year, Ukraine should, in particular:
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→ in line with the Ukraine Plan, resume merit-based recruitment for all civil service posts through the unified state web portal of electronic services; finalise the countrywide roll- out and implementation of the human resources management information system;
→ clarify political responsibility for civil service policy development and implementation within the Cabinet of the Ministers; address recommendations of the Accounting Chamber’s audit report on the implementation of the salary reform;
→ complete legislative alignment and harmonisation with the LAP, particularly in the areas of taxation, customs, land relations, electronic public services and secondary legislation, and align all existing digital administrative procedures with the LAP.
Chapter 23: Judiciary and fundamental rights
Ukraine is between having some and a moderate level of preparation in the areas of the judiciary, the fight against corruption and respect for fundamental rights and made some progress. The ten priority reforms as agreed with the Ukrainian authorities on 10 December 2025 remain mostly outstanding.
Functioning of the judiciary
Ukraine is between having some and a moderate level of preparation in the functioning of the judiciary. Limited progress was made during the reporting period and certain delays occurred in advancing the reforms set out in the Rule of Law Roadmap. The selection of judges for the Constitutional Court of Ukraine (CCU) continued, and five internationally vetted members were appointed to the High Council of Justice (HCJ), securing its quorum. The Congress of Judges also appointed 30 new members to the Council of Judges (CoJ). For the new specialised administrative courts, an internationalised judge selection mechanism was put in place, and competitions are progressing. The High Qualification Commission of Judges (HQCJ) and its auxiliary body, the Public Integrity Council (PIC), advanced in selecting candidates for vacant judicial positions and the vetting of sitting judges; however, continued involvement of internationally nominated experts in the HQCJ is not yet legislated. Despite difficult circumstances, Ukrainian courts increased the number of cases considered in 2025. A number of legislative reforms for the judiciary are outstanding, including to ensure merit-based recruitment to managerial positions in the prosecution service, to revise the procedure for the selection and dismissal of the Prosecutor General, and to in strengthen nomination and integrity procedures at the Supreme Court with the temporary involvement of internationally nominated experts. A law to improve the enforcement of court decisions was approved. While a new justice strategy has not yet been adopted, significant efforts took place to coordinate the implementation of the Rule of Law Roadmap in a consultative manner.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were partially met and remain valid. In the coming year, Ukraine should in particular:
→ accelerate the filling of judicial vacancies and the evaluation of the qualification (vetting) of sitting judges, with the involvement of the Public Integrity Council; improve the selection and integrity verification of Supreme Court judges and other high court judges by temporarily and meaningfully involving independent experts nominated by international partners; fill the remaining and upcoming vacancies in the Constitutional Court and High Council of Justice and improve the constitutional procedure; and improve the transparency and quality of the selection processes for judicial and prosecutorial self- governance bodies;
→ improve the selection and dismissal procedures for the Prosecutor General and repeal the provisions allowing for the transfer and appointment of prosecutors without competition, as well as those granting the Prosecutor General access to pre-trial investigations materials;
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→ urgently extend the temporary involvement of internationally nominated independent experts in the selection of members of the High Qualification Commission of Judges in line with the Ukraine Plan and of members of the High Council of Justice; operationalise the new specialised administrative courts; adopt legislation to improve the selection of management-level prosecutors; adopt legislation improving the disciplinary system for prosecutors and the capacity of the prosecutorial governance bodies; launch the criminal e-case management system modules and implement the roadmap for the e-judiciary system;
→ reform the legal profession by modernising governance, improving access to the profession, raising qualification and admission standards, and strengthening disciplinary and financial accountability. Advance the reforms of legal education and the National School of Judges.
Fight against corruption
Ukraine is between having some and a moderate level of preparation in the area of anti- corruption. Some progress was made, mostly because the specialised anti-corruption institutions – the National Anti-Corruption Bureau (NABU), the Special Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office (SAPO), the High Anti-Corruption Court (HACC) – continued to deliver on their mandate and build a track record by stepping up investigations, prosecutions and final convictions in high-level corruption cases, including at the highest levels of government and the judiciary. These achievements, together with cumulative improvements in institutional capacity and the implementation of preventive measures over recent years, justify an improvement in the overall level of preparation. This continued operational effectiveness of the specialised anti-corruption institutions represents an important achievement that demonstrates the growing resilience of Ukraine’s anti-corruption framework. This resilience has also been supported by an exceptionally active civil society, whose sustained scrutiny and engagement have contributed to exposing corruption risks, promoting accountability and safeguarding the independence of anti-corruption institutions. The number of judges and administrative staff at the HACC was increased considerably and new permanent premises were allocated to the court. Ukraine made progress towards the ratification of the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention but has yet to adopt final legislation. A new anti-corruption strategy for 2026-2030 was developed by the NACP, but its adoption by Parliament is pending. Despite these improvements, the limited advancement in adopting structural legislative and institutional reforms recommended by the Commission remains a major concern, requiring urgent action by the authorities to ensure the sustainability and effectiveness of the anti-corruption framework. Anti-corruption institutions continued to report pressure from state institutions, law enforcement and security agencies, and their situation remains fragile overall. Despite some improvements in regulatory and corporate governance, corruption remains an issue in certain economic sectors, particularly energy, defence and construction.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were partially implemented and remain valid. In the coming year, Ukraine should in particular:
→ further consolidate the track record on corruption cases, including the seizure and confiscation of criminal assets; strengthen NABU’s and SAPO’s autonomy in investigating Members of Parliament without prior approval by the Prosecutor General; expand NABU’s jurisdiction to cover high-risk positions and adopt a law ensuring anti- corruption bodies’ access to high-quality forensics, in line with the Ukraine Plan; introduce robust safeguards against interference with the work of NABU and SAPO and circumvention of their exclusive jurisdiction; expand the scope of declarants and improve the procedures for the verification of asset declarations with a focus to detect and confiscate unexplained wealth effectively; ensure timely selection and appointment of a new head and deputy head of SAPO.
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→ in line with the Ukraine Plan, adopt amendments to the Criminal Procedure Code to address procedural impediments in criminal proceedings; eliminate automatic case closures and revise statutes of limitations in line with European standards; adopt legislative amendments to enable single-judge adjudication of civil and administrative cases in the HACC;
→ in line with the Ukraine Plan, adopt an ambitious anti-corruption strategy and state anti- corruption programme; ensure that identified corruption risks in vulnerable sectors (such as energy, defence, procurement, construction and land management, justice and law enforcement) are reduced effectively in national anti-corruption and relevant sectoral strategic frameworks.
Fundamental rights
The overall framework for fundamental rights and its enforcement is largely in place. The government has maintained its overall respect for fundamental rights and shown its commitment to protecting them.
Ukraine has taken some steps to implement key reforms, such as legislation to protect persons belonging to national minorities, and made progress on the deinstitutionalisation of care for children towards family and community-based care. The institution of the Military Ombudsman was established to protect the rights of military personnel. However, several recommended reforms are still delayed, such as developing support systems for persons with disabilities, launching data protection reform, adopting legislative amendments criminalizing hate crimes, and adopting legislation on civil partnerships. Overall, Ukraine should continue ensuring that restrictions imposed temporarily under martial law comply with the principles of necessity and proportionality, while continuing progress in aligning with the EU acquis.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were only partially met and remain valid. In the coming year, Ukraine should in particular:
→ ensure consistent implementation of the revised Action Plan for the protection of the rights of people belonging to national minorities;
→ advance penitentiary reform by adopting legislation to address in particular torture and ill- treatment; adopt legislation on the Ombudsperson's role in full alignment with the Venice and Paris Principles; and adopt legislation on data protection, procedural rights of suspects and accused persons and victims’ rights in full compliance with the EU acquis;
→ continue the deinstitutionalisation reform for care of persons with disabilities and older people;
Freedom of expression and media freedom
Ukraine is between having some and a moderate level of preparation in the area of freedom of expression. Despite the constraints resulting from the Russian war of aggression, Ukraine has made some progress in this area, particularly on the financial independence of Suspilne, the public broadcaster as well as journalists’ access to information in parliament, which was expanded with the live streaming of plenary and committee sessions. Overall, Ukraine should continue its efforts to maintain and gradually strengthen a transparent, pluralistic and independent media landscape, ensuring that restrictions imposed temporarily under martial law comply with key public rights and interests, such as access to information and media freedom.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were partially met and remain valid. In the coming year, Ukraine should in particular:
→ continue ensuring the safety and independence of journalists and respect their public information role; investigate promptly, independently and effectively cases of direct
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intimidation and harassment as well as indirect forms of pressure against journalists and media outlets;
→ ensure adequate funding for the media regulator and its functional independence;
→ maintain adequate funding for the public service broadcaster, while ensuring that content produced by publicly funded media is representative of Ukraine’s political and societal pluralism.
Chapter 24: Justice, freedom and security
Ukraine is between having some and a moderate level of preparation in the field of justice, freedom and security and made some progress during the reporting period. In particular, Ukraine conducted a serious and organised crime threat assessment (SOCTA) covering 2021-2024 and continued implementing the overarching strategic plan on law enforcement reform (OAS AP). However, the pace of reforms has been slow, and many reforms have been delayed. Ukraine still needs to demonstrate a strong, consistent approach to preventing and combating corruption in law enforcement agencies.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were partially implemented and therefore remain valid. In the coming year, Ukraine should:
→ in line with the Ukraine Plan, make tangible progress on the comprehensive reform of the State Bureau of Investigation (SBI) by entry into force of the lawn to reform the SBI;
→ make tangible progress in implementing the overarching strategic plan on law enforcement reform (OAS AP), including adopt the law on the delineation of powers, functions and responsibilities of law enforcement agencies; create an effective system for cooperation and coordination between law enforcement agencies; make tangible progress in reforming the National Police of Ukraine (NPU), including by adopting legislation to introduce competitive, transparent and merit-based selection procedures for NPU senior management, putting in place a robust integrity framework, strengthening disciplinary mechanisms and internal control systems, and improving public oversight; adopt the new integrated border management (IBM) strategy with an action plan incorporating measurable implementation indicators.
Fight against serious and organised crime
Ukraine is between having some and a moderate level of preparation in the fight against serious and organised crime and made some progress, in particular in the re-attestation and certification of Economic Security Bureau (ESBU) staff. In addition, the leadership selection of the head of the Asset Recovery and Management Agency (ARMA) and the independent external assessment of the agency are ongoing. Ukraine continued active international cooperation in the field of law enforcement, and there were several successful joint operations between Ukraine and EU Member States. Ukraine did not make progress in aligning its legislation with the EU acquis on the fight against serious and organised crime. Ukraine has not fully implemented the comprehensive action plan to combat organised crime based on the results of 2019-2022 SOCTA. The use of financial investigations, asset freezing and confiscations increased but remains limited overall. The creation of registers of bank accounts of individuals and of beneficial owners of trusts remains pending. Interagency cooperation remains problematic, and there is widespread interinstitutional conflict between law enforcement agencies and other agencies involved in the fight against organised crime.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were only partially implemented and therefore remain largely valid. In the coming year, Ukraine should in particular:
→ in line with the Ukraine Plan, finalise the re-attestation of ESBU staff and make tangible progress in further strengthening the ESBU; finalise the selection process of the head of ARMA and begin implementing the recommendations from the agency’s independent external assessment; and set up a register of accounts and individual bank safes of
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natural persons and ensure the relevant authorities have access to it, in line with the EU acquis;
→ adopt and start implementing the new 2026-2030 strategy to combat organised crime on the basis of the 2021-2024 SOCTA; adopt and start implementing the Financial Investigation Strategy and the 2026-2030 Asset Recovery Strategy; formally put in place the permanent national coordinator to fight organised crime and strengthen the institutional and operational capacities of law enforcement agencies and other relevant bodies, including by institutionalising the SOCTA methodology across relevant agencies.
→ make tangible progress in preventing and fighting small arms and light weapons trafficking, particularly by adopting the law on the acquisition and possession of firearms for civilians in line with EU acquis, adopting the roadmap to fight against trafficking of firearms and other small arms and light weapons; and integrating all relevant agencies which have competences on firearms within the National Firearms Focal Point.
ECONOMIC CRITERIA
The existence of a functioning market economy
Ukraine has some level of preparation and has made some progress in establishing a functioning market economy. Macroeconomic stability remained severely affected by the war, resulting in slower economic growth despite sound policymaking, strong international financial assistance, and private sector. Some steps were taken to strengthen domestic revenue mobilisation and public financial management. The National Bank of Ukraine continued to preserve monetary and foreign exchange market stability, while gradually easing foreign-exchange restrictions. Despite progress, revenue mobilisation is still constrained by undeclared work, tax avoidance, and delays in key tax policy reforms. The business environment still suffers from severe labour shortages, infrastructure damage, high energy costs, and high administrative burdens on firms, particularly SMEs. The state’s footprint in the economy remains significant, including through state-owned banks.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were partly implemented. In the coming year Ukraine should, in particular:
→ ensure continued implementation of the Ukraine Support Loan conditionality, including macro-financial assistance, to strengthen revenue mobilisation, improve the sustainability and effectiveness of public expenditure, and enhance public financial management; improve fiscal transparency through the timely publication of general government data, including comprehensive defence sector data; continue to pursue policies supporting macroeconomic and financial stability, including by implementing the Financial Sector Development Strategy roadmap;
→ improve the regulatory environment and reduce administrative burdens by implementing the Action Plan on Deregulation; improve the business environment and market competition by combating corruption and informality, promoting antitrust enforcement, and reducing the state footprint in the economy by progressing on the implementation of the State Ownership Policy in line with OECD standards, notably on corporatisation and professionalisation, while safeguarding the independence of decision-making by all state-owned enterprise (SOE) supervisory boards;
→ continue facilitating the labour market integration of displaced persons and war veterans, while intensifying efforts to reduce informality and promote formal employment, including by reforming the simplified tax system, modernising the Labour Code and strengthening labour inspections.
The capacity to cope with competitive pressures and market forces within the EU
Ukraine is at some level of preparation and has made good progress in developing its capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the EU. Education
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reforms continued, including in higher education, preschool education, and vocational education and training. Innovation capacity remained constrained by low R&D spending but benefited from technological developments linked to the expansion of domestic defence production. Repair and reconstruction of the energy network continued, with increasing focus on decentralised electricity generation. Public investment management improved significantly, with stronger sectoral planning, a wider use of IT systems, and closer integration of investment planning into the budget cycle. Agriculture and industry remained affected by the destruction of assets, labour shortages, and supply-chain disruptions, while services, ICT, and defence-related manufacturing increased their relative importance. Ukraine remained relatively open to trade, although the trade-to-GDP ratio declined, partly reflecting weak agricultural production.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were addressed. In the coming year Ukraine should, in particular:
→ continue supporting the repair, rehabilitation, and building of infrastructure, in particular energy generation capacity, including from decentralised renewable sources;
→ continue implementing the public investment management reform, in particular by adopting sectoral strategies that include the main investment goals and priorities by sector;
→ continue improving the quality, accessibility, and labour-market relevance of education, including vocational education and training; expand upskilling and reskilling opportunities for adults and advance the implementation of the Innovation Strategy to address skills shortages, support reconstruction, and strengthen productivity growth.
Chapter 5 - Public procurement
Ukraine is between having some and a moderate level of preparation in the area of public procurement. Some progress was made by implementing the Strategy for Reforming the Public Procurement System for 2024-2026. The new Law on public procurement was adopted on 27 May 2026, which further aligned the legislative framework with the EU acquis.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were only partially met. In the coming year, Ukraine should in particular:
→ in line with Ukraine Plan, align all legislation on public procurement, including utilities, concessions, public-private partnerships, and defence and security procurement, with the EU acquis, ensuring EU economic operators are able to remain established in the EU in the context of the public-private partnerships, in line with the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA) and the EU acquis on public procurement;
→ enhance e-procurement functionality, including developing procurement procedures and tools that comply with EU standards, improve e-contracting in the Prozorro system and reduce the number of procurements outside of Prozorro;
→ work on the implementation and, if needed, the adjustment of the new public procurement strategy for 2027-2030, focusing on closing remaining legislative gaps and issues related to administrative, operational and institutional capabilities at all levels, including on financial control, corruption prevention and review mechanisms, as well as focusing on effective implementation and enforcement.
Chapter 18 - Statistics
Ukraine has some level of preparation in the area of statistics and has made some progress on statistical reporting and surveys.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were partially implemented and remain largely valid. In the coming year, Ukraine should:
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→ gradually increase the production, dissemination and transmission of high-quality statistics to Eurostat, in particular macroeconomic statistics;
→ conclude a memorandum of understanding between the State Statistical Service of Ukraine, the National Bank and the Ministry of Finance and set up a working group on macroeconomic statistics;
→ adopt legislation to ensure the State Statistical Service of Ukraine’s full professional independence, its central role in shaping state policy on statistics and its full access to administrative and privately held data.
Chapter 32 - Financial control
Ukraine has some level of preparation in the area of financial control. The country made some progress in strengthening public internal financial control, in particular by revising the definition of internal audit in line with the Global Internal Audit Standards and setting up audit committees in key budget spending units.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were partially implemented and remain valid. In the coming year, Ukraine should, in particular:
→ improve the effectiveness of public internal financial control by implementing the Global Internal Audit Standards, strengthening the institutional role and operational capacity of the Central Harmonisation Unit in the Ministry of Finance, and supporting the set-up and operation of audit committees in key budget spending units. Continue implementing managerial accountability and risk management practices across all line ministries and agencies, including at regional level;
→ further strengthen the cooperation on anti-fraud, in particular with OLAF and EPPO;
→ strengthen the Accounting Chamber of Ukraine’s (ACU) institutional and financial independence and administrative capacity, including by operationalising the ACU Board, expanding financial audit coverage based on strategically significant public expenditure, and improving performance audit practices, as recommended in the Ukraine Facility Audit Board report.
CLUSTER 2: INTERNAL MARKET
Chapter 1 - Free movement of goods
Ukraine is between a moderate and a good level of preparation in the area of free movement of goods,and good progress was made in aligning with the EU acquis with the adoption of the Laws on accreditation of conformity assessment bodies and on market surveillance as well as on a technical regulation on machinery, which paves the way for the possibility to start negotiating an Agreement on Conformity Assessment and Acceptance of Industrial Products (ACAA).
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were partially implemented and remain largely valid. In the coming year, Ukraine should:
→ make progress in aligning with the EU acquis on harmonised products, especially non- road mobile machinery approval and emissions, motor vehicles, good laboratory practices, drug precursors, chemical labelling and packaging, detergents and fertilising products;
→ start screening to identify gaps and make progress in ensuring compliance with Articles 34-36 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and relevant case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) in order to eliminate quantitative restrictions on the free movement of goods in the non-harmonised area;
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→ continue its efforts to join the EU standardisation and metrology bodies, such as the European the Committee for Standardization (CEN), the European Committee for Electrotechnical Standardization (CENELEC), the European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI) and the European Association of National Metrology Institutes (EURAMET).
Chapter 2 - Freedom of movement for workers
Ukraine isat an early stage of preparation on the freedom of movement for workers. Limited progress was made, primarily through the adoption of the Employment Strategy 2030, which includes, among others, some measures for Ukraine’s participation in the European Employment Services (EURES), upon accession.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were only partially implemented and therefore remain valid. In the coming year, Ukraine should in particular:
→ align national legislation with the EU acquis on free movement of workers, including access for EU citizens to the labour market and equal treatment of EU workers;
→ conclude agreements on social security coordination and healthcare insurance with EU Member States;
→ implement the newly adopted Employment Strategy 2030 with a focus on free movement of workers and advance preparations for joining EURES upon accession.
Chapter 3 - Right of establishment and freedom to provide services
Ukraine has some level of preparation on the right of establishment and freedom to provide services. Limited progress was made, notably by developing a unified register of qualifications and establishing quality standards for universal service provision.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were only partially implemented, and therefore, remain mostly valid. In the coming year, Ukraine should in particular:
→ take measures towards eliminating existing restrictions for the provision of services, using the possibilities provided for by the Association Agreement and initiate alignment with the EU Services Directive;
→ adopt the Law on amendments in the field of postal communications, which aims to further align with the EU postal acquis, including Regulation (EU) 2018/644 on cross- border parcel delivery services;
→ continue progress in aligning with the EU acquis on the mutual recognition of professional qualifications.
Chapter 4 - Free movement of capital
Ukraine is between having some and a moderate level of preparation in the area of the free movement of capital. Limited progress was made through the gradual relaxation of some foreign exchange restrictions and continued preparation for alignment with the EU acquis on payment services. Delays are observed in the adoption of legislation relevant to Ukraine’s accession to the geographical scope of the SEPA schemes, including on anti- money laundering and countering the financing of terrorism.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were not fully implemented and remain valid. In the coming year, Ukraine should in particular:
→ continue progress towards the liberalisation of capital movements, and as far as the circumstances allow, gradually remove the additional restrictions introduced under martial law;
→ advance alignment with the Payment Services Directive 2, the SEPA Regulation, the Cross-Border Payments Regulation 2 and the E-Money Directive 2;
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→ make progress in the fight against money laundering and terrorist financing by adopting legislation to ensure the operational independence, autonomy, and adequate capacity of the Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU), including through a transparent, competitive and merit-based selection procedure for its Head; as well as by establishing and operationalising the registersof bank accounts of individuals and beneficial owners of trusts, with access by competent authorities in line with the EU acquis, and by further aligning provisions on politically exposed persons with the EU acquis.
Chapter 6 - Company law
Ukraine has some level of preparation in the field of company lawand made limited progress by modernising the Unified State Register, moving closer to compatibility with business registers interconnection system (BRIS).
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were only partially implemented and remain valid. In the coming year, Ukraine should in particular:
→ continue aligning with the EU acquis, including by putting in place a legal framework for the nullity of limited liability companies, joint-stock companies, cross-border mergers, divisions and conversions, takeover bids, and shareholders’ rights, in particular through the adoption of the laws on harmonisation of company legislation; in the area of corporate governance, improve the governance of state-owned enterprises in line with the Ukraine Plan and ensure any update of the national Corporate Governance Code is anchored in the EU acquis;
→ continue aligning with the EU acquis concerning transparency requirements, corporate governance, accounting and statutory audits, including by adopting and implementing the pending legislation in these areas;
→ continue aligning with the EU acquis on digital tools and processes in company law, including interoperability with BRIS, and further develop the Unified State Register, which is the technological solution to enable the full online registration of companies and branches, the full online filing and disclosure of company information, and public access to companies’ financial statements through the business register.
Chapter 7 - Intellectual property law
Ukraine has some level of preparation in the area of intellectual property law. Limited progress was made.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were partially implemented and remain valid. In the coming year, Ukraine should in particular:
→ address the functioning of collective management organisations, including through their accreditation;
→ further improve the industrial property rights enforcement, in particular through adoption and implementation of new legislative alignment of customs procedures with the EU acquis (ensure well-functioning customs registers of intellectual property rights, border enforcement mechanisms, and enhanced inter-institutional cooperation and cooperation between customs authorities and rights holders);
→ adopt the laws on industrial property rights, including on trade secrets, trademarks, and patents; adopt the intellectual property strategy, and continue alignment with the EU acquis in all relevant areas.
Chapter 8 - Competition policy
Ukraine has some level of preparation in the area of competition policy. Limited progress was made in the reporting period, in particular the adoption of some secondary legislation on State aid and by updating the inventory of state aid measures.
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The Commission’s recommendations from last year were only partially implemented and therefore remain valid. In the coming year, Ukraine should in particular:
→ in line with the Ukraine Plan, amend the Law on State aid to further align it with the EU acquis and lift the suspension of the application of State aid control;
→ make further progress in finalising a reliable and comprehensive inventory of existing State aid measures;
→ in line with the Ukraine Plan, take further steps to align services of general economic interest / public service obligations (PSO) with the EU acquis, including the structural separation of accounts between PSO and non-PSO activities in key state-owned enterprises.
Chapter 9 - Financial services
Ukraine is between having some and a moderate level of preparation in the field of financial services. Good Progress was made in the reporting period, in particular through continued alignment of banking regulation with the EU acquis, publication of the 2025 banking resilience assessment, adoption of legislation aiming to align with the EU acquis on securitisation and covered bonds, as well as further strengthening of supervisory frameworks for non-bank financial institutions and capital markets.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were partially implemented and remain valid. In the coming year, Ukraine should in particular:
→ continue alignment with the EU acquis on banking regulation and supervision (including the Capital Requirements Regulation and Directive), bank recovery and resolution and on deposit guarantee schemes, and adopt legislation regarding requirements on confidentiality and professional secrecy in line with the EU acquis;
→ continue aligning legislation and supervisory practices with the EU acquis on insurance and occupational pensions, investment firms, investment funds, and financial market infrastructures. In particular, adopt legislative amendments to align with the Solvency II Directive;
→ continue aligning legislation with the EU acquis on securities and capital markets, financial market infrastructure and digital finance, including on digital operational resilience, while further strengthening the independence, governance, and institutional capacity of the National Securities and Stock Markets Commission (NSSMC).
Chapter 28 - Consumer and health protection
Ukraine is between having some and a moderate level of preparation in the area of consumer and health protection. Over the reporting period, some progress was made by Ukraine in adopting legislation aimed at aligning with the EU acquis on market surveillance and on veterinary medicinal products.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were partially implemented and therefore remain valid. In the coming year, Ukraine should in particular:
→ adopt the Law on general safety of non-food products in order to align with the EU acquis on general product safety;
→ adopt the secondary legislation necessary to complete the alignment with the EU acquis on medicinal products for human and veterinary use;
→ adopt the Law on patients’ rights in cross-border healthcare.
CLUSTER 3: COMPETITIVENESS AND INCLUSIVE GROWTH
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Chapter 10 - Digital transformation and media
Ukraine has a good level of preparation in the field of digital transformation and media. In the reporting period, it made good progress, in particular by joining the EU’s ‘Roam Like at Home’ area, advancing digital identity and trust services and strengthening cyber resilience.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were partially implemented and remain largely valid. In the coming year, Ukraine should in particular:
→ ensure that independent telecommunications and media regulators, as well as central executive bodies in the field of electronic communications, have adequate funding and human resources to fulfil their mandates;
→ align national legislation with the EU 5G Cybersecurity Toolbox and fully implement the Protocol of Intent on 5G Security, including by enacting provisions to exclude high-risk suppliers from 5G auctions;
→ continue further aligning national legislation with the European Digital Identity Framework.
Chapter 16 - Taxation
Ukraine is between having some and a moderate level of preparation in the field of taxation. Good progress was made, in particular by amending the Tax Code on value added tax (VAT) and excise duties.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were partially implemented and remain valid. In the coming year, Ukraine should in particular:
→ further align national legislation with the EU acquis on the common system of VAT and on excise duties, especially on procedures, rates and exemptions, and continue implementing the National Revenue Strategy, in particular by reforming the simplified tax system;
→ further align with the Anti-Tax Avoidance Directive and the Directive on Administrative Cooperation in the field of taxation;
→ continue strengthening the administrative and operational capacity of the tax administration, in particular by developing IT systems and ensuring their interoperability with the IT systems at EU level.
Chapter 17 - Economic and monetary policy
Ukraine is moderately prepared in the field of economic and monetary policy and made some progress in returning to an inflation-targeting regime, gradually easing foreign exchange restrictions, and improving the medium-term budgetary framework.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were partially implemented. In the coming year, Ukraine should in particular:
→ advance the National Bank of Ukraine’s (NBU) Strategy for easing foreign exchange restrictions, transitioning to greater exchange rate flexibility and returning to inflation targeting;
→ strengthen the legal framework to ensure the independence of the NBU in line with the EU acquis, and to fully comply with the monetary financing prohibition when martial law is lifted;
→ continue strengthening fiscal sustainability analysis by increasing the capacity to prepare long-term fiscal projections for the pension system, while advancing towards the set-up of an independent fiscal institution to monitor and assess government forecasts.
Chapter 19 - Social policy and employment
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Ukraine remains at an early stage of preparation in the field of social policy and employment. Some progress was achieved over the reporting period with the adoption of the Employment Strategy 2030, the entry into force of the basic principles of housing policy legislation in line with the Ukraine Plan, the adoption of the law on basic social assistance and the appointment of a new president to the National Tripartite Social and Economic Council (NTSEC).
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were partially implemented and remain largely valid. In the coming year, Ukraine should in particular:
→ adopt new framework legislation for labour relations in line with the EU acquis and, building on the restarted NTSEC, further develop an enabling environment for bipartite and tripartite social dialogue and strengthen the capacity of social partners;
→ adopt legislation on occupational safety and health in line with the Ukraine Plan and ensure labour inspection systems are strengthened;
→ continue reforming the social benefits system and further align national legislation with the EU acquis on non-discrimination and equality between women and men in employment and social policy.
Chapter 20 - Enterprise and industrial policy
Ukraine is between having some and a moderate level of preparation in the area of enterprise and industrial policy and has made some progress by continuing implementation of the Strategy for the Recovery, Sustainable Development, and Digital Transformation of Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises until 2027 and by endorsing the 2026-2027 Roadmap under the Critical Raw Materials Act.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were partially implemented and remain valid. In the coming year, Ukraine should:
→ start working on a national industrial policy, in line with the EU’s main principles in the field, and increase coordination across all the underlying policy areas;
→ in line with the Ukraine Plan commitments, align national legislation with the principles of the Late Payment Directive;
→ building on the 2026-2027 Critical Raw Materials Roadmap in line with the EU acquis, continue progress on decarbonisation and digitalisation and further improve the National Geological Portal to combine all geological registers, catalogues and GIS (geographic information system) interactive maps in a single online solution, and make progress in developing the project pipeline.
Chapter 25 – Science and research
Ukraine is moderately prepared in the field of science and research and has made good progress. This was done through its active participation in Horizon Europe, adoption of new legislation to improve support for researchers and development of innovation activities. Additionally, the European Research Area (ERA) roadmap for 2025-2027 was adopted, and regional teams and preparations for entrepreneurial discovery processes to develop Smart Specialisation Strategies were created.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were largely implemented. In the coming year, Ukraine should:
→ strengthen competitive funding for research in line with Horizon Europe best practices, including by consolidating the role and independent funding of the National Research Foundation;
→ take steps to implement the European Research Area roadmap for 2025-2027;
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→ take stock of the Entrepreneurial Discovery Process (EDP) conducted in selected regions and advance towards the design and approval of Smart Specialisation Strategies at regional level.
Chapter 26 – Education and culture
Ukraine is moderately prepared in education and culture. Good progress was made through approval of: (i) the new state standard for preschool education; (ii) the updated procedure for inclusive education in schools; (iii) the updated standards and curricula in primary education; (iv) the standard for supervisory boards in vocational education and training (VET) institutions; (v) the recommendations for the network of vocational and specialised pre-higher education institutions; (vi) the State Target Social Programme ‘Youth of Ukraine’: Generation of Resilience 2030; (vii) adoption of the Law on academic integrity; and continued implementation of the Strategy for the Development of Ukrainian Culture 2025-2030.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were largely implemented. In the coming year, Ukraine should, in particular:
→ adopt the Law on adult education;
→ complete preparations for the nationwide introduction of specialised upper secondary education;
→ adopt secondary legislation required by the Law on vocational education.
Chapter 29 – Customs union
Ukraine has a good level of preparation with regard to the Customs Union and made good progress over the last year. In particular, the new Head of the State Customs Service was appointed following an independent selection process, substantial progress was made in the adoption of the new Ukrainian Customs Code, in line with the Union Customs Code and an updated version of the national IT Strategy for Customs Digitalisation has been approved.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were partially implemented and remain valid. In the coming year, Ukraine should in particular:
→ adopt the new Ukrainian Customs Code in line with the Union Customs Code, advance developing of related secondary legislation and continue preparations for its implementation, as well as continue the alignment to take account of the progressive application of the new Union Customs Code;
→ continue implementing the updated Strategic Plan for the Digital Development of the State Customs Service until 2030. The implementation should be granted with adequate budget line and pool of experts. Priority focus should be given to the national import system and IT systems required for full interoperability with the EU customs digital environment;
→ in order to improve administrative capacity, complete the reform of the State Customs Service, in accordance with the new Ukrainian Customs Code when enacted.
CLUSTER 4: THE GREEN AGENDA AND SUSTAINABLE CONNECTIVITY
Chapter 14 - Transport policy
Ukraine has some level of preparation in the field of transport policy and made some progress, in particular through the adoption of the Law on safety and interoperability of railway transport, the progress with secondary legislation on road transport as well as its removal from the blacklist of the Paris Memorandum of Understanding on Port State Control.
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The Commission’s recommendations from last year were partially implemented and remain valid. In the coming year, Ukraine should in particular:
→ in line with the Ukraine Plan, adopt the primary legislation setting out a public service obligation (PSO) framework for the organisation of socially important passenger rail transport and its institutional oversight, approve the action plan for the phased introduction of competition in the rail freight and passenger sectors and make progress on the regulatory alignment with the EU rail market acquis;
→ in line with the Ukraine Plan, adopt the Law on merchant shipping and shipping on inland waterways and adopt new rules on the provision of port services and common rules on the financial transparency of ports;
→ further align the social rules and market rules for road transport with the EU transport acquis, strengthen the enforcement of haulage market rules and traffic safety measures, and set up independent inspection and investigation bodies for rail, road and waterborne transport and make progress with the introduction of periodical roadworthiness testing for all M and N category vehicles.
Chapter 15 - Energy
Ukraine has a good level of preparation in the field of energy. Good progress was made during the reporting period in partially aligning with the Electricity Integration Package, designating the Nominated Electricity Market Operator (NEMO), adopting permitting procedures for RES investments, and taking significant steps to improve corporate governance in energy state-owned enterprises.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were partially implemented and remain valid. In the coming period, Ukraine should in particular:
→ accelerate energy market reforms: continue the gradual removal of the wholesale electricity price caps; start working on setting up a mechanism to support vulnerable energy consumers and adopt a roadmap to gradually liberalise gas and electricity prices in line with the Ukraine Plan; continue adopting secondary legislation, submit for verification and implement the Electricity Integration Package; adopt legislation to change the indirect taxation regime for electricity market participants to support market coupling;
→ prioritise the energy transition by focusing on renewable energy (RES) and energy efficiency: resolve the issue of debt settlement for RES producers; lift the moratorium on raising heat and hot water tariffs; and set minimum energy efficiency performance levels for buildings;
→ further improve governance in the energy sector: building on the completion of supervisory boards and the revision of charters of major state-owned energy companies, further align with OECD standards on corporate governance; in line with the Ukraine Plan, adopt legislation to further strengthen the energy regulator’s independence and build a track record on fair and transparent decision-making relating to implementation of the Regulation on Wholesale Energy Market Integrity and Transparency (REMIT).
Chapter 21 - Trans-European networks
Ukraine has some level of preparation in the field of trans-European networks (TENs). Some progress was achieved during the reporting period, primarily through the implementation of several road and rail projects supported by Connecting Europe Facility (CEF).
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were partially implemented and remain valid. In the coming year, the country should in particular:
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→ continue prioritising planning and implementing critical energy and transport infrastructure projects, including synchronisation with neighbouring countries; ensure better connections with the EU through deployment of efficient trans-European transport network (TEN-T), with particular focus on integrating railway systems into the EU standard gauge network and upgrading border crossing points;
→ ensure timely implementation of projects funded by the CEF that support the long-term integration of Ukraine’s transport systems with those of the EU, do utmost to ensure that all conditions enable this timely implementation, in particular by closing the financing gap to avoid any delays in the execution of works.
→ further align with and implement the TEN-T - through the deployment of EU standard gauge on the main priority axis in priority on the Poland-Lviv corridor which is essential for resilience, economy and security - and the trans-European networks for energy (TEN- E): accelerate alignment with the new TEN-T and TEN-E Regulations, improve the permitting process for TEN-E projects.
Chapter 27 - Environment and climate change
Ukraine has some level of preparation in the field of environment and climate change and made some progress in the reporting period. In the area of the environment, Ukraine made progress in waste management and nature protection through the adoption of the Circular Economy Strategy and the Biodiversity Strategy along with their respective action plans, as well as in water quality and industrial pollution through the adoption of secondary legislation. Ukraine made advancements in the area of climate change, where the Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC) under the Paris Agreement for 2035 and a new Long-Term Low Emissions Development Strategy were adopted.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were only partially implemented and therefore remain mostly valid. In the coming year, Ukraine should in particular:
→ continue strengthening the responsible authorities with clearly defined competencies, adequate staffing and sufficient technical expertise; ensure effective implementation and mainstreaming of environmental and climate policies; focus on the alignment and implementation of horizontal environmental legislation in line with the EU acquis, in particular on the application of environmental impact assessments (EIAs) and strategic environmental assessments (SEAs) for all relevant projects, plans and programmes; ensure public participation and access to justice;
→ increase the level and coverage of carbon pricing as a stepping stone to entering the EU Emission Trading System (ETS); revise the carbon tax; extend the monitoring, reporting, verification and accreditation framework (MRVA) to additional sectors, including road transport and buildings; ratify the Kigali Amendment to the Montreal Protocol; and adapt national legislation to align with EU standards on fluorinated gases and ozone-depleting substances;
→ in line with the Ukraine Plan, adopt a law on reducing deforestation and forest degradation; advance alignment with the EU acquis on nature protection, adopt a law on the protection of waters against pollution caused by nitrates from agricultural sources; and prepare a strategy on the cost recovery of water services and resources.
CLUSTER 5: RESOURCES, AGRICULTURE AND COHESION
Chapter 11 - Agriculture and rural development
Ukraine has some level of preparation in the field of agriculture and rural development and has made good progress, in particularby adopting the Law on support in the agricultural
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sector. This law provides the legal basis for the paying agency, the integrated administration and control system (IACS) and the farm sustainability data network (FSDN). Implementation of the strategy for agriculture and rural development until 2030 continued. Land Parcel Identification System (LPIS) pilot projects allow for testing future countrywide solutions.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were partially implemented and remain largely valid. In the coming year, Ukraine should in particular:
→ continue implementing the strategy for agriculture and rural development until 2030 and strengthen the administrative capacity for its implementation;
→ accelerate the set-up of the FSDN in line with the Ukraine Plan and the IACS and improve the targeting and delivery of agricultural support, based on reliable data and strengthened controls and transparency, including through the State Agrarian Registry (SAR);
→ adopt implementing legislation under the Law on support to the agricultural sector and provide sufficient resources for the designated paying agency’s operations.
Chapter 12 - Food safety, veterinary and phytosanitary policy
Ukraine is moderately prepared in the field of food safety, veterinary and phytosanitary policy. Some progress was made in the reporting period, in particular through the adoption of the amended Law on veterinary medicine and animal welfare and the expansion of the use of the EU’s trade control and expert system (TRACES).
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were partially implemented and remain valid. In the coming year, Ukraine should in particular:
→ advance alignment with the EU acquis on food safety, veterinary and phytosanitary policy, in line with the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA) obligations in the fields of animal welfare, animal feed, plant protection products, genetically modified organisms and official controls;
→ strengthen administrative capacity for carrying out official control activities in the fields of laboratories and infrastructure and databases;
→ continue the reform of the food safety bodies in line with EU requirements, in particular by strengthening the capacity of the State Service of Ukraine on Food Safety and Consumer Protection (SSUFSCP) for risk assessment, risk communication and risk- based planning.
Chapter 13 - Fisheries and aquaculture
Ukraine has some level of preparation in the field of fisheries and aquaculture. Some progress was made during the reporting period, in particular through the adoption of the framework act for the functioning of the e-Fish system in September 2025 and of the 2026- 2029 operational plan. Ukraine became full member of the General Fisheries Commission for the Mediterranean in November 2025.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were partially implemented and remain valid. In the coming year, Ukraine should in particular:
→ continue to align national legislation with the EU acquis, including on the collection, management and use of data, on the functioning of the fisheries and aquaculture market, on state control and on technical measures;
→ take preparatory institutional steps to put in place an effective fisheries monitoring, control and inspection system to combat illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing;
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→ further develop the features and interoperability of Ukraine’s e-Fish system, including the core modules needed for traceability, data collection and state control, and further harmonise it with the equivalent EU registers.
Chapter 22 – Regional policy and coordination of structural instruments
Ukraine has some level of preparation in the area of regional policy and coordination of structural instruments. Limited progress was made in the reporting period, in particular by reactivating the Interagency Coordination Commission on regional development.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were only partially implemented and remain valid. In the coming year, Ukraine should, in particular:
→ prepare and adopt a government action plan for the fulfilment of Chapter 22 benchmarks and implement the Law on the principles of state regional policy; ensuring establishment of clear regional policy and coordination of future EU structural instruments institutional architecture, with defined Ministries’ mandates and a stable lead coordination function;
→ improve reporting on the implementation of the State Regional Development Strategy and prepare the new strategy for 2028-2034; finalise the regional and local development strategies to prioritise investments for all regional and local stakeholders; ensure the State Fund of Regional Development becomes operational and digitalised;
→ strengthen the capacity of national, regional and local administrations in project development and public procurement, and the capacity of the Ministry for Communities, Territories and Internally Displaced Persons in cohesion policy programming and implementation, cross-sectoral and interinstitutional coordination; ensure the Interagency Coordination Commission becomes fully operational and ensure the systematic and inclusive engagement of regional and local stakeholders at all stages of the programming cycle.
Chapter 33 - Financial and budgetary provisions
Ukraine is at an early stage of preparation in the area of financial and budgetary provisions. There was limited progress made in the areas covered by the chapter, namely by the continued work on the preparation of a roadmap for implementation of an own resources system.
The Commission’s recommendation from last year was not implemented and therefore remains valid. In the coming year, Ukraine should:
→ adopt the roadmap to implement an own resources system, and strengthen awareness among key stakeholders;
→ set out internal procedures for the management and maintenance of A and B accounts in line with the own resources legislation and ensure that the IT infrastructure supports these procedures;
→ develop and implement the necessary administrative, technical and legislative framework to ensure readiness to calculate and make available the own resources from non- recycled plastic packaging waste.
CLUSTER 6: EXTERNAL RELATIONS
Chapter 30 - External relations
Ukraine has a good level of preparation in the field of external relations but made limited progress in the reporting period. Ukraine’s trade policy largely complies with World Trade Organization (WTO) commitments and the rules of the Association Agreement/Deep and
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Comprehensive Free Trade Area (AA/DCFTA). However, an increasing trend in applying trade barriers has been observed.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were partially implemented, including on drafting relevant legislation, and remain valid. In the coming year, Ukraine should in particular:
→ continue to ensure that its trade policy remains compliant with WTO and AA/DCFTA commitments, in particular by refraining from introducing discriminatory measures, including measures that unjustly favour domestic products or producers and act as barriers in EU-Ukraine trade relations;
→ before entering any new bilateral trade agreement, assess its impact, in light of Ukraine’s candidate status and forthcoming accession, ensuring that any agreement contains a clause allowing for its early termination in the event of EU accession;
→ make progress in aligning its national legislation with the EU acquis on the screening of foreign direct investments (FDI), including the recently adopted Regulation no. 2026/1386.
Chapter 31 - Foreign, security and defence policy
Ukraine has a good level of preparation anddemonstrated very good progress with continued intense political dialogue with the EU at all levels, the significantly improved security and military cooperation with the EU and its Member States, and the maintenance of a very high rate of alignment with the EU’s common foreign and security policy (CFSP).
The recommendations from last year were partially implemented and remain valid. In the coming year, Ukraine should in particular:
→ further align Ukraine’s legislative framework with the provisions of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC) and its related instruments;
→ further align with the CFSP, including the Statements by the High Representative on behalf of the EU and Council decisions on restrictive measures, and ensure that restrictive measures are implemented.
1.3. STATE OF PLAY OF THE ACCESSION NEGOTIATIONS
Following the first intergovernmental conference that opened accession negotiations with Ukraine, the bilateral screening meetings were concluded on 30 September 2025. Accession negotiations on cluster 1 (fundamentals) were opened on 15 June 2026, followed shortly by the opening of accession negotiations on cluster 6 (external relations) on 14 July 2026 as well as cluster 2 (internal market) and cluster 3 (competitiveness and inclusive growth) in October.
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2. CLUSTER 1: THE FUNDAMENTALS OF THE ACCESSION PROCESS
2.1. FUNCTIONING OF DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS AND PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION REFORM
2.1.1. Democracy
The functioning of democratic institutions in Ukraine is generally stable. Martial law has been in place since February 2022, with its 20th extension valid until 31 October 2026. Martial law permits certain restrictions on individual rights and freedoms and on legal entities’ rights and interests. While its application has been proportionate overall, it remains essential that these
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powers are not exercised in ways that could jeopardise the reform agenda, which has had positive results so far.
Elections
No elections took place during the reporting period as they remain prohibited under martial law. The authorities made some progress in preparing for the first post-war elections. The Roadmap on the Functioning of Democratic Institutions remains a key policy document advancing electoral reform in Ukraine.
In October 2025, the Central Election Commission (CEC) conducted a comprehensive assessment of recommendations made by the Office for Security and Cooperation in Europe / Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (OSCE/ODIHR). Following this assessment, the CEC adopted Resolution No 48 to put forward legislative proposals and a regular monitoring mechanism to implement them. In December 2025, the CEC organised an inclusive expert dialogue on outstanding OSCE/ODIHR recommendations, including those on ensuring voting rights of persons with disabilities, and approved its communication strategy. In addition, the CEC resumed public-facing services of the State Voter Register, allowing citizens to submit applications and update their details. In July 2026, the CEC adopted a concept on countering FIMI in elections in Ukraine, which will require consistent implementation.
A special parliamentary working group established in December with the inclusive participation of different political forces and civil society organisations aims to develop comprehensive legislative proposals for elections for the post- war era. This working group covers a broad range of administrative, security and voting rights issues, as well as implementation of the OSCE/ODIHR recommendations and the Roadmap on the Functioning of Democratic Institutions. CEC Resolution No 1 of January 2026 provides the substantive basis for this work.
Building on these efforts, this preparatory work is expected to result in Parliament adopting legislation. As part of this process, Ukraine needs to ensure alignment with all relevant EU acquis in this area, including Regulation (EU) 2024/900 on the transparency and targeting of political advertising, and taking into account European and international democratic standards. The seven-year term of office of CEC members is scheduled to expire in October 2026. Its timely renewal must be ensured to prevent legal, political and reputational risks to preparations for the first post-war elections.
Parliament
Parliament continues to exercise its powers amidst the ongoing war and martial law, albeit at a slower pace than in the previous reporting period. Between 1 September 2025 and 1 September 2026, 133 laws were adopted, out of which 130 have fully entered into force. The legal fragmentation of the procedure for the adoption of laws relating to EU integration still needs to be addressed.
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Compared with the previous reporting period, more progress was achieved in the area of parliamentary transparency and public engagement. Parliament’s open plenary sessions continued to be broadcast live, and the amendments to the Law on parliamentary committees, which entered into force in January 2026, better regulate access for journalists and civil society. Civil society organisations (CSOs) continued to be involved in legislative processes. Since the entry into force of the Law on lobbying, 205 bodies have been registered in the Transparency Register. The practice of ‘Hour of Questions to the Government’ continued on a regular basis.
The legislation on political parties requires a comprehensive update, including on procedures to hold political parties accountable for breaches of financing rules. It is crucial to always ensure that the rights of the opposition are respected. No legislative initiatives regulating the rights of parliamentary opposition have been developed or registered.
Women remain underrepresented in politics and decision making.
EU integration
The institutions in charge of the EU integrationprocess are in place. There remains broad public consensus on EU integration as a top priority for Ukraine. CSOs and professional organisations are part of Ukraine’s EU integration efforts.
The National Programme for the Adoption of the Acquis (NPAA)was adopted in April 2026. Negotiation working groups are active and include representatives of the relevant line ministries, Parliament and CSOs. During the reporting period, the government launched regional dialogues with business communities to strengthen consultations with stakeholders at sub-state level. Ukraine continues its quarterly reporting to the European Commission on implementation of the roadmaps on the rule of law, public administration reform and the functioning of democratic institutions, as well as on the action plan on national minorities.
Governance
During the reporting period, several ministerial changes took place. Following a considerable anti-corruption investigation into the state nuclear energy operator, the Energy and Justice Ministers resigned. In January 2026, the Defence Minister became First Deputy Prime Minister and Energy Minister, while the Digital Transformation Minister was appointed Defence Minister. In July 2026, a major government reshuffle took place, including the appointment of a new Prime Minister and the replacement of almost two thirds of the Ministers. Following the dismissal of Defence Minister as part of the government reshuffle, public protests took place in several cities. In August, the composition of the new government was completed with the appointment of the new Defence Minister and re- appointment of the Minister of Foreign Affairs.
Ukraine’s multilevel governance system continues to function effectively amidst Russia’s full-scale war of aggression. The decentralisation reform remains focused on improving local self-governance capabilities and should continue advancing in line with EU accession requirements and the European Charter of Local Self Governments.
Some progress has been made in strengthening the effectiveness and transparency of the multilevel governance system. The adoption of the Law to ensure legality and transparency in local self-government activities is a significant achievement, but further efforts are needed to align local state administrations with a prefect-type oversight model. The adoption of the 2025 Revised Concept of local self-government reform is a positive step. A comprehensive action plan for the reform of local self-government should be adopted to operationalise the Revised Concept and should set out clear legislative steps, timelines, and responsibilities across all decentralisation reform areas and identify which tasks from the 2024-2027 action plan still need to be completed.
Preparatory work has advanced in drawing up the principles and criteria for delineating: (i) powers between state and sub-national levels; and (ii) sectoral powers between sub-national
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levels of governance. The draft law has yet to be adopted. This law should set a multi-level governance system where powers are delineated between governance levels, rather than among governance bodies, and preserve local autonomy. To fully eliminate conflicts of power, sectoral competences should be delineated between executive and sub-national governance levels and sector specific legislation should be amended.
The level of personal income tax allocated to municipalities was maintained at 64%. Ukraine should amend the legislative framework creating a robust mechanism to guarantee local financial autonomy. The number of local military administrations has increased. The legislative framework for resuming local governance after martial law has yet to be adopted, including safeguards of local autonomy and phasing out military administrations in de- occupied territories.
Civil society
Civil society, including human rights defenders, in Ukraine operates in an overall enabling environment.
Mechanisms for dialogue and cooperation between authorities and civil society continued to function, with CSOs frequently involved in government and parliamentary working groups and expert councils, including in monitoring key EU accession policy documents. However, the effectiveness of these mechanisms remained uneven across institutions and policy areas. The Ministry of Justice and the Secretariat of the Cabinet of Ministers maintained strong engagement with leading expert organisations in strategic processes relating to civil society sectoral reforms.
The National Strategy for the Promotion of Civil Society Development, ending in 2026, continued to be implemented through an overall transparent process. The government already started consultations with civil society on the new National Strategy for the Development of Civil Society for 2027-2032. At the same time, key reforms to improve the enabling environment for CSOs faced delays, including amendments aiming to strengthen public participation, in particular at local level and legislation simplifying the set-up and operation of CSOs, including through online registration. Public funding for CSOs remained limited and fragmented, mainly channelled through targeted calls aligned with specific ministries’ priorities.
Incidents have been reported of pressure on activists. During the reporting period, the working group at the Office of the Prosecutor General, an effective tool which had brought together authorities and civil society to monitor such cases, ceased to function. In December 2025, the Ministry of Internal Affairs set up a new working group with civil society participation, focusing on cybercrimes targeting activists. Although this is a positive initiative, it does not fully replace the previous mechanism. The State Targeted Social Programme for the Development of Volunteering until 2030 was drafted through a transparent and inclusive process led by the Ministry of Social Policy and adopted in April 2026. However, delays in its adoption meant that budgetary funding for its effective implementation was not secured. In March 2026, Parliament adopted legislation simplifying long-term stay rules for foreign volunteers and humanitarian workers. Some progress was also achieved in improving the tax environment for CSOs with the implementation of a new law.
Instances of CSOs being denied financial services have been reported. In the context of the fourth national risk assessment of money laundering and financing of terrorism, the risks inherent to the non-profit sector should be properly substantiated, in line with Financial Action Task Force (FATF) operational definitions and by relying on a wide set of sources.
2.1.2. Public administration reform
Strategic framework for public administration reform
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The strategic framework for public administration was updated through the adoption of the public administration reform (PAR) strategy in June 2026 and the public financial management (PFM) strategy in February 2026, both for 2026-2030, and their accompanying action plans. These documents were developed through an inclusive consultation process involving stakeholders, experts and civil society, and are aligned with the Ukraine Plan and the PAR roadmap commitments. The government continued to implement the PAR roadmap, which serves as a key guiding document for the PAR reform process in the EU accession process.
The institutional framework for PAR remained largely unchanged. In July, due to the Government reshuffle, the overall political responsibility for coordinating public administration reform has been assigned to the Prime Minister. Political responsibility for civil service policy development and implementation is still not clearly assigned within the Cabinet of the Ministers. Cooperation and synergy among the institutions concerned need to be significantly improved.
Management and coordination mechanisms toimplement the PAR are well established, but actual implementation is weak. In particular, the PAR Coordination Council, responsible for overseeing reform implementation, did not ensure effective and strategic reform steering and coordination in the reporting period. Ensuring the financial sustainability of PAR is an ongoing challenge.
Policy development and coordination
The National Programme for the Adoption of the EU acquis (NPAA) was adopted in April 2026. It serves as the key overarching framework for aligning national legislation with the EU acquis. Its effective implementation, regular updating and monitoring should be ensured. The Law on the national strategic planning system, which should strengthen the link between policy planning and budgeting, should also be adopted.
Monitoring ofthe implementation of policies and legislation was strengthened. The ‘reform matrix’, introduced in 2024, is regularly updated. To monitor and report on the implementation of the European integration commitments and the NPAA, the ‘Accession Pulse’ information system was set up, but it is not yet publicly available. The Translation Office has been set up to ensure the standardisation of terminology and the high-quality translation of EU legal acts.
The capacity for evidence-based policymaking need to bestrengthened further. No tangible progress was made in revising the regulatory framework to improve policymaking and legislative drafting standards. The government’s role as an initiator of draft legislation remains limited, with most adopted legislation originating from Members of Parliament. In 2025, 25% of adopted laws were initiated by the Cabinet of Ministers, down from 32% in the previous year. The quality of explanatory notes and impact assessments accompanying legislative proposals should be improved in line with European standards. Public consultations should also apply to legislative initiatives of Members of Parliament.
Public financial management
The public financial management (PFM) system is broadly in place. Ukraine has demonstrated good capacity in implementing PFM reforms, particularly by focusing on: (i) fiscal discipline; (ii) medium-term budgeting; (iii) cash and debt management; (iv) public investment management; and (v) accountability. On the strategic framework, a new comprehensive PFM strategy 2026-2030and a related action plan for its implementation were adopted in February 2026.
Key developments on budget management include the continued implementation of medium-term budget planning following the 2027-2029 Budget Declaration’s adoption in June 2026 and annual spending reviews of the state budget. The methodology for spending reviews was improved in line with OECD standards in March 2026. In December 2025, the
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medium-term debt management strategy for 2026-2028 was adopted, setting debt sustainability targets and measures to deepen the domestic bond market. The link between strategic planning and budgeting needs to be further strengthened.
Effective oversight of the budget process is needed. Legislative and operational steps should be taken to set up an independent fiscal institutionto evaluate government forecasts, scrutinise government budgetary assumptions and assess the performance of previous forecasts.
The adoption of the medium-term plan for priority public investment (MTP) for 2027-2029 in May 2026 and the 2027 state-level single project pipeline (SPP) in September 2026 marked significant developments in implementing public investment management (PIM) reform. There was also progress with the adoption of sub-national MTPs and SPPs by local and regional authorities. It is essential that Ukraine continues to implement the reform based on the PIM roadmap and action plan, which requires a whole-of-government approach. Significant steps are still needed to fully operationalise the new PIM system, including the preparation of the following: (i) updated sectoral strategies to guide investment priorities; (ii) strengthened appraisal procedures (iii) a methodology for the economic analysis of public investment projects; (iv) prioritisation methodologies for SPP projects; and (v) an overall national strategic planning framework. As regards the IT architecture, the Unified Digital Management Ecosystem for PIM should be consolidated by completing the integration of the Digital Restoration Ecosystem for Accountable Management (DREAM) with other relevant IT systems.
Budget transparency remains affected by martial law and security considerations. Nevertheless, the publication of key budget information and fiscal reporting has been maintained.
The government is advancing the digitalisation of PFM systems through the Ministry of Finance’s Digital Transformation Programme (2025-2030), which focuses on IT system modernisation, data integration, and alignment with EU digital systems.
Public service and human resources management
Martial law continues to significantly affect the civil service regulatory framework and HR practices. Competitive, merit-based recruitment and selection to the civil service remainedsuspended. However, in October 2026, a law aiming to improve and restore merit- based recruitment was adopted in Parliament.Beyond restoring competitive recruitment, the law improves the current selection and recruitment procedures in line with European best practices and strengthens integrity checks for management positions and other posts considered to be at high risk of corruption. The adoption of this law should be followed by fully restoring merit-based recruitment in the civil service, in line with the Ukraine Plan indicators. Development of the new civil service vacancy portal, integrated into the Diia platform, is finalised. The portal’s full operational capacity is essential to helping resume open competitions, ensuring transparent publication of all civil service vacancies through a single centralised platform.
The next steps in the civil service remuneration reform, initiated in 2024, should be based on the findings and recommendations set out in the audit report of the Accounting Chamber of Ukraine, issued in October 2025. This should help ensure an evidence-based approach to advancing the reform.
The roll-out of the unified human resource management information system (HRMIS) across the public administration has advanced with most of the government bodies now connected to the system. Its implementation and actual use should be accelerated to ensure comprehensive institutional coverage and achieve the reform’s objectives. The National Agency on Civil Service, responsible for HRMIS administration, continues to face insufficient administrative capacity. In parallel, the Ministry of Digital Transformation is advancing the implementation of the Diia.Office service for civil servants. Its alignment with the HRMIS
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should be ensured.
Gender balance across the civil service remains uneven. As of June 2026, women only accounted for 26% of top management positions, but made up the most of middle management roles (68%) and non-managerial/executive roles (80%).
Accountability of the administration
Ukraine’s public accountability system is largely in place and operational. During the reporting period, the Accounting Chamber of Ukraine (ACU) continued implementing its approved ISSAI-based methodologies for financial, compliance and performance audits, supported by practical methodological assistance, structured review of audit planning and reporting documents. Day-to-day operation remains fragmented and further steps are needed to strengthen the ACU’s professional and financial independence. In 2025, most, but not all public bodies, had adopted anti-corruption programmes.
Internal governance within ministries continues to lack a clear separation of responsibilities at senior management level between deputy ministers and state secretaries. Policy areas continue to be managed and coordinated by political appointees (deputy ministers), rather than professionally selected senior civil servants. Progress was made in optimising work processes in central executive bodies, in particular by developing catalogues for typical work processes and setting up working groups. In addition, AI-based support tools were developed.
Over 200 laws and nearly 300 secondary legislative acts have been aligned with the Law on administrative procedure (LAP) since it entered into force in December 2023. Further legislative alignment and harmonisation with the law is needed in the areas of taxation, customs, land relations, digital administrative procedures and secondary legislation. Training for officials at all levels has continued but should be expanded, particularly at local government level.
The law on citizens’ appeals should be adopted and aligned with both the LAP and EU standards, ensuring a clear distinction between administrative procedure cases and other types of public petitions. The new code on administrative violations should be adopted to systematise penalties for administrative offences in full alignment with the LAP. The right to access public information is well regulated and consistently applied, but access to certain public information remains restricted under the ongoing martial law.
On the right to administrative justice, the Kyiv Specialised District Administrative Court and the Kyiv Specialised Administrative Court of Appeal, established in 2025, are still not operational. The new courts should become operational without delay to ensure access to administrative justice involving central government bodies.
Service delivery to citizens and businesses
The delivery of public services to both the public and businesses continues to improve, with a growing number of online services and physical access points across Ukraine. Ukraine has emerged as a global frontrunner in digitalisation, as reflected in its progress in the United Nations e-Government Development Index (EGDI). Ukraine achieved first place in the E- Participation Index and fifth place in the Online Service Index, both of which are EGDI sub- components. Diia remains the most widely used e-platform, playing a crucial role in ensuring the continuity of public service delivery amid ongoing challenges caused by the war. Its e- DEM platform, the first national e-democracy tool, covers topics on local petitions, participatory budget, public consultations and is used by 500 municipalities (35% of all municipalities) and 2.2 million people. The legislative harmonisation of digital services with the LAP is still pending, as is the adoption of legislation on digital accessibility.
The offline provision of public services continued through the nationwide network of administrative service centres (ASCs). At the beginning of 2026, the ASC network included 5 763 operational service access points (up from 4 886 in 2025). In 2026, 87% of ASCs were
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accessible to persons with disabilities and reduced mobility. To further improve inclusivity, methodological recommendations for assessing the accessibility of ASC buildings have been developed, supporting a more systematic approach to barrier-free service provision.
To further strengthen the capacity of administrative service delivery and improve the regulatory framework for funding them, Ukraine should adopt the Law on administrative fees.
2.2 RULE OF LAW AND FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS
2.2.1 Chapter 23 - Judiciary and fundamental rights
The EU’s founding values include the rule of law and respect for human rights. An effective (independent, high quality and efficient) judicial system and an effective fight against corruption are of paramount importance, as is respect of fundamental rights in law and in practice.
Functioning of the judiciary
Strategic documents
Strategic documents are partly in place, but their level of implementation still needs to be improved. Following the expiry of the last strategy in 2023, a new strategy for the development of the justice system and constitutional judiciary is not yet drafted. It should be developed through broad consultations and include a budgeted action plan. The Office of the Prosecutor General (OPG) should also adopt its new strategy and develop monitoring tools for its implementation.
Management bodies
Management bodies within the judiciary are in place and function adequately. There are issues with selecting and appointing their members and with their institutional capacity, including IT, analytics and access to databases, which need to be resolved.
In October 2025, the President appointed two internationally vetted members to the High Council of Justice (HCJ), the Council of Judges (CoJ) appointed another two in March 2026 and the Congress of Representatives of Law Schools and Scientific Institutions one member in August 2026. The terms of two HCJ members expired in August 2026, and Parliament should appoint selected candidates without delay and before the continuation mechanism expires. The HCJ now has 19 of 21 members in place, with two positions from the Congress of Attorneys’ quota still vacant. The Ukrainian National Bar Association (UNBA) should launch the competition to fill these vacancies. Competitions have already been launched for the 10 additional members whose terms will expire in early 2027.
In March 2026, the Congress of Judges elected 30 members to the CoJ, reaching the quorum required for full operational authority. However, transparent and credible integrity and professionalism checks of candidates were not yet introduced, and the list of candidates was not published before the Congress meeting. Concerns have been raised over the new composition’s commitment to advance accountability in the judiciary.
Continued resistance to the temporary involvement of internationally nominated independent experts in various selection and vetting processes is of concern. The premature termination of the role of independent experts before national appointing bodies are fully reformed risks undermining judicial reform. In particular, the meaningful involvement of internationally nominated independent experts in the selection commission for the High Qualification Commission of Judges (HQCJ) and the HCJ needs to be urgently extended.
The Public Integrity Council (PIC) has continued to assist the HQCJ in judge selection competitions but needs to be further strengthened by improving access to judicial dossiers, strengthening analytical capacity, and ensuring an adequately staffed secretariat.
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In December 2025, the appointment of the new head of the State Judicial Authority (SJA) did not comply with the competitive, merit and integrity-based selection procedure, contrary to Ukraine’s specific commitments in its Rule of Law Roadmap. Ukraine should improve the selection procedure for SJA management positions.
On 27 August the All-Ukrainian Conference of Prosecutors elected 11 new members of the Council of Prosecutors (CoP), albeit under the existing framework, which is in need of improvements on transparency and quality. An independent functional audit of the CoP and the Qualification and Disciplinary Commission of Prosecutors (QDCP) was conducted in December 2025. Ukraine should implement the expert recommendations to improve the selection procedures for members of prosecutorial self-government bodies and strengthen their institutional independence, efficiency and overall effectiveness, and follow the advice of the Venice Commission.
Independence and impartiality
The independence and impartiality of the judiciary is guaranteed by the constitution and judicial legislation, but certain shortcomings in the statutory legislation and in its practice persist. Public trust in the judiciary remains low, including among judges themselves. It would be beneficial if the HCJ and the CoP were more proactive in using the measures at their disposal to protect judges and prosecutors from undue interference
The automatic allocation of cases among judges is laid down in law but is open to manipulation due to limited controls in place within each court. An improved module for case allocation should be added to the Unified Judicial Information and Telecommunication System (UJITS), which is currently being upgraded. Legislation should also be amended to ensure that judges cannot be
involved in decisions on their own recusal and that such decisions are subject to appeal.
Adopted in late 2024, the unified indicators for evaluating the integrity and professional ethics of judges are now uniformly applied by the HCJ, HQCJ and PIC to assess sitting judges and certain judicial candidates. The HQCJ continued recruiting judges, but the staffing situation aggravated compared to last year, with 2 505 judicial vacancies unfilled due to the slow pace of selections and appointments, as well as retirements and resignations. There are safeguards in place to protect judges and prosecutors from appointments, promotions and transfers without their consent.
In June and September 2025, the President appointed two new judges to the Constitutional Court of Ukraine (CCU), restoring its quorum. Five vacancies remain to be filled, one under the President’s quota, two under the CoJ’s and two under Parliament’s after Parliament
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failed to appoint two judges in October 2025, delaying the renewal of the CCU. Transparent selection processes involving the Advisory Groups of Experts need to continue, and the appointing authorities must proceed with the selection and appointment of the vetted candidates to avoid further delays. The Law on the constitutional procedure has yet to be improved, in line with the 2021 Venice Commission recommendations.
The Cabinet of Ministers took preparatory steps to reform the legal profession, including through the set-up of a multi-stakeholder working group in January 2026, led by the Ministry of Justice. Work on the substance needs to resume to ensure meaningful change and to develop legislative amendments that emerge from broad, constructive consultations and address key areas. These areas include: (i) the transparent, credible election of the Ukrainian National Bar Association (UNBA) governance bodies; (ii) improved access to the legal profession; (iii) better qualification and admission standards; (iii) more disciplinary accountability; (iv) robust financial oversight; and (v) continuous training.
Questions remain on the fairness and consistency of disciplinary proceedings initiated by the UNBA and regional bar associations. This affects lawyers, including HCJ and HQCJ members and could undermine the independence of the legal profession and judicial governance bodies.
During a NABU investigation into alleged corruption schemes protected by senior prosecutors, the Prosecutor General resigned in September and was later dismissed by the Parliament. Prior to his dismissal, he left Ukraine, made criminal accusations and signed notices of suspicion against the director of NABU and an associate to the head of SAPO that were shortly afterwards revoked by the PGO. Ukraine should urgently reform the selection and dismissal procedures for the Prosecutor General and high-level prosecutors by making them more transparent and merit-based. While the QDCP made progress in selections for prosecutors and launched competitions for district prosecutors, concerns persist over non- competitive appointments and transfers to the OPG and regional offices. Reinstating competitive selections is critical to restoring meritocracy and preventing undue interference.
Accountability
The accountability of the judiciary is broadly satisfactory but needs to be improved. The HQCJ continued the evaluation of sitting judges’ qualifications (vetting) with the involvement of the PIC, although at a slow pace due to capacity constraints. 4 476 judges have so far completed the vetting procedure, while 1 244 still needed to prove their suitability undergo evaluation as of June 2026. Submissions for dismissal were made in respect of 29 judges due to their refusal to undergo the vetting procedure. 156 judges have ceased exercising office due to their five-year term ending, including 32 who the HQCJ deemed were suitable to hold position.
The PIC’s capacity should be further developed, including by granting its secretariat access to certain databases. The HQCJ should build autonomous analytical resources and improve the reasoning of its decisions when they override a negative opinion of the PIC. The HCJ needs to accelerate the
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HQCJ’s review of submissions on the dismissal of judges who failed the evaluation of qualifications and improve the reasoning of its decisions. The Supreme Court, in its decision of January 2026, departed from its June 2024 position on the qualification assessment of judges and restored a stronger role for the PIC: where PIC issues a negative opinion, the matter must be decided by the plenary HQCJ and with the votes of at least 11 HQCJ members.
The Service of Disciplinary Inspectors (SDI), which has been operational for over a year and where two vacancies remain, was assigned around 22 000 disciplinary complaints against judges, including the backlog of around 11 000 pending cases when it was set up. In 2025, the HCJ processed over 10 000 complaints with the help of the SDI, resulting in 383 disciplinary cases being opened, sanctions on 92 judges, and 33 dismissal motions. However, many cases have been left unresolved, and only about one third of the 174 prioritised complaints have been completed due to delays at various stages of the disciplinary proceedings.
HCJ and SDI rules on prioritisation should be systematically applied and without delay, while improving reasoning and uniformity of practice. To prevent conflicts of interest, judicial members of the HCJ should be recused from reviewing complaints against judges from their own courts. Given the 36% rise in registered complaints in 2025, greater financial and institutional support should be provided to sustain the SDI’s operations. The current legislation still allows judges subject to disciplinary proceedings to resign before the HCJ’s decision on a dismissal has been made. Legislation that defines disciplinary offences more precisely still needs to be adopted, in line with the recommendations of the Council of Europe’s Group of States against Corruption (GRECO).
To address corruption risks and raise the level of professionalism and integrity at the Supreme Court, the selection process for judges as well as integrity checks should be strengthened, including through the temporary and meaningful involvement of independent experts nominated by international partners. New legislation on the system of judges’ integrity declarations entered into force in June.
The CoJ approved a commentary on the Code of Judicial Ethics of 2024 to improve the quality and uniformity of its application. The National School of Judges included training on judicial ethics and integrity in its initial and continuous training curricula. The detailed procedures to verify declarations of assets and conduct lifestyle monitoring of ordinary and CCU judges still need to be agreed on between the National Agency on Corruption Prevention (NACP), the HCJ and the CCU.
The OPG continued the attestation of prosecutors based on transparency and professional criteria. Those who fail the process should be dismissed, and pending court cases should be resolved. In 2025 and until August 2026, the QDCP received 2 108 disciplinary complaints alleging disciplinary misconduct by prosecutors and initiated 442 proceedings, rejecting the rest. This led to disciplinary sanctions being imposed on 119 prosecutors. Following the 2024 scandal on prosecutors benefiting from allegedly unlawful disability pensions, administrative and criminal investigations have led to 42 dismissals from office in the prosecution service and four indictments in criminal proceedings without outcome to date.
Ukraine should adopt legislation to improve the disciplinary system for prosecutors and strengthen the QCDP’s institutional capacity, in line with the outstanding GRECO Round IV Evaluation recommendations. Ukraine should also transfer the power to review complaints against QDCP disciplinary decisions from the HCJ to the CoP or a court. The General Inspectorate should also increase its capacity and its independence from the OPG.
Quality of justice
The quality of justice should be further improved. As of August 2026, there were 4 198 judges, 9 862 prosecutors and 47 800 actively practising lawyers, out of approximately 74 000 registered UNBA members. The number of judges continued to decline from the
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previous year and remains a significant concern, unlike the number of prosecutors and lawyers. More efforts are needed to ensure the uniformity of court practice within the appeal and cassation review instances. Ukraine still needs to bring regular performance evaluations of judges and prosecutors in line with GRECO recommendations and European standards.
Improvements in legal education include the adoption of the Law on academic integrity in December 2025, which applies to all higher education programmes, including law programmes, and introduces a comprehensive accountability framework. However, new legislation is still needed to tackle: (i) the uneven quality of legal education; (ii) fragmented regulation; (iii) insufficient alignment between legal training and professional requirements; (iv) weaknesses in quality assurance systems; and (v) the lack of a coherent framework governing access to legal professions as well as the institutional separation of legal education and law enforcement training. To ensure consistency and quality standards, the requirements for the Unified State Qualification Exam should be extended to all law graduates. Further steps are needed to develop and spread knowledge of EU law and of specialised skills, including in the area of ethics.
The adoption of the judicial education strategy for 2026-2030 is a positive signal. Judicial training is improving, while it still requires comprehensive reforms, in line with the TAIEX peer review recommendations. This includes fundamental reforms to judges’ training, while preserving the progress achieved in prosecutors’ training and preventing any rollback. The model of initial training should be evaluated
against European standards and practices, including pre-appointment training, its duration, its role in the selection process and its competency-based approach. The EU Law Training Laboratory of the National School of Judges (NSJU) has improved the integration of EU law into the training curricula. Further modernising the curricula, teaching methodologies and the design of training remain essential to align them with European standards, particularly by ensuring a systematic linkage between training, skills gaps, learning outcomes and judicial practice. Funding and processes for the recruitment and secondment of qualified trainers should be improved. The adoption of a new procedure for the selection of the vice rector of the NSJU is a positive step but further amendments need to ensure the strengthening of integrity, merit, transparency and independence safeguards and establish such procedure for selecting other NSJU management and staff, alongside new accountability and anti- corruption procedures. The Prosecutorial Training Centre is well funded and is delivering effective training, including on managerial skills.
Ukraine expanded free legal aid to cover close relatives and family members of persons missing under special circumstances. There were key advances in child-friendly justice, including: (i) updated quality standards for cases involving minors; (ii) a new coordination mechanism between penal and probation authorities; and (iii) clearer procedures for engaging lawyers for child victims or witnesses. Interagency cooperation was strengthened thanks to a new mechanism that redirects calls from the police hotline to the legal aid system.
Ukraine has partly expanded alternative dispute resolution (ADR) mechanisms. In cross-border family disputes, courts
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are now required to inform parties about mediation options. While arbitration and conciliation mechanisms with the participation of a judge are available, implementation of the mediation law remains limited, including in family disputes. A system to collect data on various forms of ADR is still not operational. The Register of Mediators has expanded with newly trained mediators, including specialists in juvenile restorative justice. The restorative justice programme continued, with mediation conducted in 70% of cases. The planned mandatory mediation for specific categories of disputes still needs to be finalised by the Coordination Council set up in August 2025. Public awareness of mediation should be raised further, and arbitration should be developed and used more frequently.
Efficiency
The efficiency of Ukraine’s justice system continues to suffer from a persistent lack of resources, despite nominal increases in budgetary allocations. In 2025, only 65.9% of the judiciary’s declared financial needs were met, and this fell to 59.4% in 2026. This persistent shortfall has negatively affected court staff retention and courts’ operations. Concerns have been raised about legislative initiatives seeking to link judicial remuneration to special fixed amounts rather than to the minimum wage, which could create possible political leverage over the judiciary.
Despite these challenges, courts have kept a solid clearance rate, exceeding 90% across most instances and specialisations; however, the backlog of cases continued to accumulate. The SJA has not addressed systemic issues affecting judicial operations, including a shortage of judges and court staff and logistical support. This has become particularly critical following missile attacks in December 2025 and January 2026 that disrupted heating and electricity supplies in court buildings. Despite available funding, the SJA has not ensured timely procurement of basic resilience equipment, leaving 40% of the 583 courts vulnerable to outages. These energy disruptions have contributed to delays in proceedings and the postponement of hearings, which are expected to negatively affect court performance indicators in 2026.
Following the creation of the Kyiv Specialised District Administrative Court and the Kyiv Specialised Administrative Court of Appeal to hear cases involving national state agencies, the HQCJ formed the Expert Council, comprising independent experts nominated by international partners, to help select ten judges for the first instance court and 17 for the appeal court. Their selection must be completed without delay as both courts are expected to start operations by the end of 2026.
The current provision allowing certain high-level officials (including Members of Parliament) to choose to have their criminal cases heard in any court by a panel of three judges, regardless of the severity of the possible penalty, should be reviewed for its proportionality and impact on judicial efficiency.
Several measures aiming to digitalise the
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judiciary are under planning and development, such as the UJITS and its core module – the automated court document management system, including a judges’ dossier system and an e-case management system for courts. Strengthened coordination, planning, technical capacities and state funding are needed to avoid delays in the operationalisation of UJITS.
Ukraine continued the development of an e-case management system in the criminal justice chain. The basic modules have been developed to enable integrated case management, information analysis, and interagency cooperation. They are deployed for trial operation with test users from the OPG, NPU and SSU. In addition, work continued on two specialised modules on war crimes statistics and the Russian Federation’s military-political structure.
In March 2026, legislation on improving the enforcement of court decisions was adopted, but data collection has only slightly improved. In 2025, only about 33% of court decisions were enforced. The main reasons were: (i) the ongoing moratoria on enforcement of court decisions; (ii) unresolved public debts accumulated by public companies and institutions; (iii) insufficient budget allocations for settling payments related to social cases (pensions and taxes); and (iv) the absence of adequate instruments, such as the automatic seizure of bank accounts, property attachments or procedures involving residents of the Russian Federation. Further efforts are needed to execute judgments of the European Court of Human Rights. Also, following a comprehensive assessment by independent experts of the entire enforcement system, Ukraine should strengthen the legal status of private bailiffs, reform the state enforcement system and take other measures to improve the enforcement system’s effectiveness.
International crimes
As of August 2026, 286 318 criminal proceedings related to international crimes were registered, out of which 254 530 were for war crimes. 1 279 individuals received a notice of suspicion for war crimes, 933 were accused and 311 convicted. 551 were accused of the crime of aggression and 362 were convicted. 85 were accused of the crime of propaganda and 59 were convicted.
Following the entry into force of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court in January 2025, the OPG set up a dedicated working group, bringing together national and international experts. The working group aims to ensure the comprehensive alignment of the Criminal Code of Ukraine with the Rome Statute and broader international criminal law standards. The group has completed its work on the provisions relating to the catalogue of war crimes and the crime of aggression, but the draft law has yet to be brought before Parliament.
The Victims and Witness Coordination Centre continued to strengthen its regional presence, ensuring that victims and witnesses have an assistance mechanism in the regions. Alongside the work of prosecutors, a network of victim and witness support units was set up. In 2026, three new units will become operational in the Lviv, Odesa and Chernivtsi regions, in addition to the nine regional units that have been in operation since 2024.
Fight against corruption
Track record
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Ukraine continued to make good progress in building a track record on the fight against high- level corruption. The National Anti-Corruption Bureau (NABU) and the Special Anti- Corruption Prosecutor’s Office (SAPO) exposed major cases of corruption at the highest levels allegedly involving serving ministers, senior members of the President’s Office, senior
judges and prosecutors as well as Members of Parliament. Most notably, NABU and SAPO led Operation ‘Midas’, which uncovered an alleged high-level corruption and money laundering scheme exploiting public procurement in the energy and defence sectors. The investigation led to the resignation of the ministers of energy and of justice, the head of the office of the President of Ukraine, as well as of other senior officials, most of whom were served a notice of suspicion. In August 2026 further notices of suspicion were served, among others, to a deputy head of the
office of the President of Ukraine, an MP and high-level executives of a state-owned bank, in an alleged graft and money laundering case linked with the Midas investigation. In September 2026, NABU also exposed an alleged organised crime group that established a systematic bribery mechanism in exchange for non-interference with the illegal activities of fraudulent call centres, which led to the resignation of the Prosecutor General, his first deputy, and the arrest of senior prosecutors. Overall, the number of indictments in NABU cases increased, while the total number of suspects declined slightly. At the same time, the number of indictments in corruption cases investigated by the National Police of Ukraine (NPU) and the Economic Security Bureau (ESBU) decreased, while it slightly increased for the State Bureau of Investigation (SBI).
The number of verdicts issued by the HACC, including final convictions, considerably increased, including the conviction of a former Chair of the Supreme Court. The average disposition time at the court (the time it takes to resolve a case) fell by one third but remains too high overall, and the case backlog needs to be reduced. In 2025, a total of ten defendants in high-level corruption cases were released from criminal liability due to the expiration of the statute of limitation. As for ordinary courts, despite a moderate increase in the rate of convictions for corruption offences, many cases remained without a court decision, and the number of closed proceedings further increased.
Legal framework
The legal framework for the fight against corruption is broadly in place but needs to be strengthened.
No laws were adopted to significantly advance the anti-corruption legal framework. Ukraine is encouraged to step up its efforts in this area as a matter of priority. Ukraine’s ratification of the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention remains pending, as the related amendments to criminal law have yet to be adopted. The country should refrain from advancing legislative initiatives
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bearing corruption risks, such as those concerning politically exposed persons (PEPs), criminal procedures for economic crimes and free-of-charge land privatisation.
Current criminal law and criminal procedures should be reviewed to strengthen the delivery of justice in high-level corruption cases. Ukraine should remove from the relevant legislation the provision on the automatic closure of criminal cases upon the expiry of the time limits for pre-trial investigation time limits. It should also review the current time limits to ensure sufficient time for criminal investigations. Moreover, to ensure a sufficient timeframe to investigate, prosecute and adjudicate corruption and corruption-related offences, Ukraine should strengthen the statute of limitations and the grounds for their interruption/suspension, in line with European standards. Legislative amendments should be adopted to tackle frequent procedural delays in criminal proceedings effectively and to allow civil and administrative cases to be adjudicated by a single judge at the HACC.
NABU’s jurisdiction should be reviewed and expanded to all high-risk public positions (such as the leadership of the President’s Office and heads of regional administrations). Interference in NABU’s exclusive investigative jurisdiction by other law enforcement authorities remains an issue. This undermines NABU’s mandate, and appropriate legal safeguards should be introduced to address the matter. Moreover, competencies need further strengthening, particularly to allow NABU and SAPO to launch investigations and approve investigative actions against Members of Parliament independently of the Prosecutor General.
Legal provisions on conflict of interest and related restrictions need to be revised to address identified gaps, inconsistencies and disproportionate restrictions. The legal framework for whistleblower protection still requires full alignment with the EU acquis.
Strategic documents
Ukraine has achieved a good level of implementation of its current state anti-corruption program and is in the process of adopting a new anti-corruption policy framework for 2026- 2030.
A new anti-corruption strategy for 2026-2030 was developed, but its adoption by Parliament is pending; the new state anti-corruption program will have to be developed and adopted. It will be important that these policy documents set out ambitious yet realistic priority measures in the areas most prone to corruption, such as public procurement, reconstruction, energy, defence, infrastructure, construction and land management, the judiciary and law enforcement, customs and taxation, extractive industries and natural resources. To avoid recurrent implementation challenges, further strengthening of capacities, expertise and resources is needed, including at the NACP. In addition, to improve reform ownership, it is essential to ensure a clear delineation of responsibilities among line ministries and enforcement structures, as well as the regular involvement of political coordination bodies, including those at high level.
Ukraine has not yet undergone GRECO’s fifth evaluation round on corruption and integrity in central governments (top executive functions) and law enforcement agencies.
Institutional framework
Ukraine’s institutional framework for the fight against corruption remained overall effective, and the specialised anti-corruption institutions continued to operate independently and efficiently.
NABU and SAPO systematically investigate allegations of high-level corruption, including cases involving highest-level officials or people exerting significant influence. Case prioritisation has improved and is applied in practice with visible results, including investigations with a high impact. Concerns remain on continuous attempts to exert pressure on NABU and SAPO’s independence and operations. These attempts include ongoing criminal investigations and surveillance of NABU officials by other law enforcement
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and security institutions as well as media campaigns that aim to discredit the institutions and their management.
NABU and SAPO continue to gradually increase their staffing levels but report challenges in attracting new staff. In March 2026, following the resignation of SAPO’s first deputy head in November 2025, the Prosecutor General appointed the selection commission responsible for selecting candidates to SAPO’s managerial positions. The term of the current head of SAPO expires in July 2027 and timely selection and appointment of the new management will be important. SAPO adopted its institutional development strategy for 2026-2028. NABU adopted an action plan in September 2025 for the implementation of the NABU development strategy for 2025-2030. Its timely implementation will be essential to further strengthening institutional capacity and effectiveness.
NABU’s difficulties in accessing impartial forensic examinations in a timely manner should be tackled urgently. NABU still requires independent wiretapping capabilities.
The external independent audit of SAPO should be carried out to ensure proper control and oversight, and the audit recommendations should be implemented. As regards the external assessment of NABU, the previous assessment that was concluded in 2025 recommended changing the assessment frequency from once a year to twice a year, a recommendation that the Parliament has yet to implement. NABU has continued its work on implementing the previous assessment’s recommendations.
Ukraine made good progress with the selection of 22 judge candidates for the HACC by the HCJ and the HQCJ, with the support of the PCIE. In August, the President of Ukraine appointed 17 HACC judges, and the court recruited the necessary auxiliary staff. Also, new permanent premises were allocated to HACC by the government. In November 2025, the HACC adopted its institutional strategy for 2026-2028, which includes measures to reduce its case backlog.
The NACP maintains its central role in anti-corruption policymaking and prevention and adopted its institutional strategy in September 2025. Concerns continue to be raised about its impartiality in some of its operations and its effectiveness, and there were unconfirmed allegations of bribery involving NACP officials following a NABU investigation. The NACP should implement the outstanding recommendations set out in the 2023 independent assessment report of the NACP’s effectiveness. The next independent assessment of the NACP’s effectiveness should be conducted without delay and apply a credible methodology with credible criteria. The asset declaration system still needs to be strengthened to prevent and better detect unexplained wealth. Practical and legal shortcomings affecting the verification process have to be addressed, including through a comprehensive revision and a recalibration of the risk-based prioritisation methodology, which should focus on top officials and cases with significant discrepancies. The personal scope of the obligation to declare assets should be extended to cover staff of private offices of high-level political officials, including advisers and assistants, and top executives of all state-owned enterprises. Legislative amendments should be introduced to minimise risks when declaring cash held outside the banking system.
The NACP has powers to oversee compliance with lobbying regulations. It stepped up its work by setting up a dedicated unit and adopting a specific regulation on monitoring and control, which should be revised in light of the initial implementation experience. The Transparency Register is fully functional and contains all the required information, which is publicly accessible.
The NACP has created sectoral expertise units, which should be further empowered to provide additional methodological support to anti-corruption units and officials in public bodies and state-owned enterprises, with a focus on high-risk sectors. The skills, professionalism, integrity and accountability of anti-corruption officers should also be strengthened.
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The law provides for a comprehensive system of corruption risk management, but the applied practices require further streamlining. The quality of corruption risk assessments and the anti-corruption programmes adopted in public agencies have often been weak: significant risks are not identified, mitigation measures not relevant, and there is no robust mechanism for following up implementation effectively. The NACP should carry out a comprehensive revision of its methodology for corruption risk assessment, including through a sector-specific approach. Further progress is required to better integrate corruption risk management with overall risk management in public-sector institutions. In addition, the system of designated anti-corruption units and staff should be reformed to improve its effectiveness.
The advanced digitalisation of public services has reduced corruption risks in the areas concerned.
Fundamental rights
General framework
The general framework for fundamental rights is satisfactory. Martial law has led to some restrictions, but they have generally been proportional to the security situation and have been applied cautiously. Ukrainian institutions should continuously assess these restrictions and, in consultation with the affected groups, proceed with the required steps to lift them if they are deemed to be unnecessary or disproportionate. A strategy to swiftly restore all restricted rights and freedoms should be developed, to be implemented once security circumstances permit and martial law ends. A substantial reform of the Civil Code is ongoing. It will be important to ensure broad stakeholder consultations and full alignment with European human rights standards and the EU acquis. The application of Ukraine’s domestic sanctions regime should remain within the boundaries set by the European Convention of Human Rights.
International human rights instruments
Cooperation with international human rights bodies and follow-up to their recommendations is satisfactory overall. Ukraine has ratified most of the key international human rights instruments. Following the entry into force of the Rome Statute in January 2025, work is ongoing to ensure comprehensive alignment of the Criminal Code of Ukraine with the Rome Statute and broader international criminal law standards.
European Court of Human Rights
Cooperation with the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) and implementation of its judgments still needs to improve. During the reporting period, the ECtHR found breaches of the European Convention on Human Rights, relating mainly to the protection of property, the right to a fair trial, the right to liberty and security of persons, and the prohibition of torture. As of 31 August 2026, there were 755 cases under enhanced supervision by the Committee of Ministers. These cases predominantly concern issues relating to unlawful arrests, the length of detention on remand, breaches of the right to life, ill-treatment by police, poor detention conditions and lack of adequate medical treatment, as well as the excessive length of criminal and civil proceedings and lack of effective remedy. Ukraine needs to address the systemic and structural issues raised by the Court in the areas of the
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judiciary, law enforcement and human rights, and to ensure the systematic and timely enforcement of ECtHR judgments.
Promotion, protection and enforcement of human rights
The legal and institutional framework for the promotion, protection and enforcement of human rights is broadly in place. The Parliament Commissioner for Human Rights – the Ombudsperson’s office – operates actively and efficiently despite a lack of resources. It is handling an increasing number of complaints and issued 626 recommendations to state authorities in 2025. Although the regulatory and legal framework has not changed, amendments are still needed to ensure the office’s full financial and operational independence in line with the Paris and Venice Principles and full alignment with the directives on standards for equality bodies. In April 2026, the Ombudsperson’s office was re-
accredited with ‘A’ status. In September 2025, a Military Ombudsperson was set up as a permanent auxiliary body under the President of Ukraine to protect the rights of military personnel. Ukraine still needs to finalise the update of its national human rights strategy until 2035 and develop a corresponding action plan through an inclusive public consultation process. Further efforts are still needed to ensure the coordination of state policy and institutional action to support those living under occupation or displaced by the war.
Prevention of torture and other forms of ill-treatment
Ukraine’s legislation provides some legal guarantees for the prevention of torture and ill-treatment. Further alignment with international law and progress on criminal proceedings in torture cases is key to ensuring accountability. Torture and ill- treatment remain a concern in Ukraine’s prison and detention facilities. Investigations by specialised SBI units should become timelier and more effective to ensure prosecution and conviction of those responsible,
including for the excessive use of force. Law enforcement and custodial powers should remain separate and independent external oversight mechanisms strengthened and reflected in the penitentiary laws. Annual public reporting to Parliament on the work of the OPG and the SBI in cases of torture has yet to be introduced.
A new online channel allows prisoners to submit anonymous complaints to the Department on Execution of Criminal Punishments. Senior human rights inspectors under the central
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penitentiary administration can also receive complaints, but their independence from prison management should be strengthened to ensure confidentiality and prevent intimidation or reprisals. Access to adequate healthcare, including specialised services, remains a concern. Training on the medical documentation of bodily injuries continued, but implementation of the Istanbul Protocol needs to be more effective. The recommendations of the Committee for the Prevention of Torture to transfer responsibility for prison healthcare to the Ministry of Health have not been implemented.
The National Preventive Mechanism (NPM) plays a crucial role in monitoring places of detention but requires adequate and sustainable funding, including compensation for CSO monitors participating in NPM visits, and legislative amendments to ensure full operational independence. Implementation of NPM recommendations by public authorities at central and local levels still needs to improve. An external oversight mechanism to prevent ill- treatment in military recruitment centres should be put in place, for instance through regular NPM visits.
Execution of criminal sanctions
The system for executing criminal sanctions, including probation, needs to be further improved. The Criminal Code has not yet been amended to reflect this,andthe mechanism for reducing the length of sentences required for
conditional early release or for the replacement of punishment is not yet operational. Amendments to the Criminal Procedure Code are also needed to enable appeals against the Complaints Commissions’ decisions.
Ukraine should continue improving material detention conditions, medical care and prevention in penitentiary facilities to meet standards set by the Council of Europe’s Committee for the Prevention of Torture and the Commission’s Recommendation on procedural rights of suspects and accused persons in pre-trial detention and on material
detention conditions, including in pre-trial detention centres. Limited capacity and resources reduce the effectiveness of probation services. Access to rehabilitation, including educational and vocational training, should be strengthened to facilitate reintegration and reduce recidivism.
Protection of personal data
The legal framework for the protection of personal data and the capacities of the data protection authority remain insufficient. In the existing model, the Human Rights Commissioner can only identify breaches and initiate proceedings, while court takes final decisions. This model falls short of EU standards requiring independent regulators with autonomous enforcement and sanctioning powers. Key draft laws registered in 2022 are still
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awaiting final adoption. In 2025, the Human Rights Commissioner was consulted on more than 300 legal acts concerning personal data protection rights.
Freedom of thought, conscience and religion
Ukraine provides legal guarantees for freedom of thought, conscience and religion. Incidents of hate speech and intimidation based on religion or belief are rare. The country continued implementing the Law on religious organisations, which prohibits the activities of religious organisations affiliated with the Russian Orthodox Church in Ukraine. Ukraine should continue to uphold international standards on freedom of religion or belief, including ECtHR case law, especially at local and regional level. A preparatory analysis was conducted on safeguards against criminal prosecution for conscientious objection, taking into account the amicus curiae brief of the Venice Commission of March 2025, but a new law on alternative service during martial law remains pending. In July 2026, a draft law to introduce a special coordinator for preventing and combating antisemitism was withdrawn due to the change of government. In April 2026, the law strengthening criminal responsibility for antisemitism was signed by the President.
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Freedom of expression and media freedom
Ukraine provides adequate legal guarantees for freedom of expression and has an overall enabling environment for free, independent and professional media. However, constraints remain due to security risks, economic pressure on the media and restrictions under martial law.
Intimidation of journalists
Efforts to ensure the safety and protection of journalists continue amid Russia’s war of aggression. Journalists and media workers remain directly targeted by Russian forces. Harassment and intimidation of journalists in government-controlled areas continued to be recorded on similar levels as in previous years. Investigations remain uneven and their effectiveness should be improved. At the same time, free legal assistance, including support to journalists facing legal pressure and strategic lawsuits against public participation (SLAPPs), was provided in cooperation with civil society and public authorities. As of September 2026, five SLAPP cases had been registered, while efforts to establish systematic monitoring and strengthen the legal framework to prevent abusive litigation continued, and a parliamentary working group was preparing an anti-SLAPP package. In these efforts Ukraine should ensure alignment with the EU Anti-SLAPP legal framework.
Legislative environment
In January 2026, a law improving the transparency of state and local authorities and access to public information entered into force, requiring greater openness from parliamentary committees. However, other media-related reform initiatives remain stalled in Parliament. The law protecting lawyers from being identified with their clients has raised concerns that it is not in line with the relevant Council of Europe Convention, lacks an adequate protection of freedom of expression and does not ensure legality, legitimacy, necessity, and proportionality. Ukraine should implement preparatory steps to help national authorities fulfil their regulatory responsibilities upon accession and enable civil society to support implementation of the European Media Freedom Act and the Digital Services Act. Operational readiness will require institution-building, awareness-raising and stakeholder engagement.
Implementation of legislation/institutions
Independent media organisations are actively involved in many national working groups, expert councils and advisory bodies, reflecting strong integration into policymaking,
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regulatory and law enforcement processes. The regulator, the National Council on Television and Radio Broadcasting, still lacks the resources to fully carry out its mandate and to reach functional independence.
Public service broadcaster
Ukraine’s public broadcaster, Suspilne, continues to operate independently. Although it received a slight increase in state funding for 2026, but still below the legal requirement. Despite these constraints, Suspilne continued to build its audience and maintain a strong reputation for balanced and impartial coverage. As of 1 January 2026, the state-run channel ‘Rada TV’ ceased broadcasting in the national telethon ‘Unified News’ . In 2026, substantial public funding of around UAH 1.5 billion for the telethon continued, despite declining levels of public trust and outreach. Ukraine should address concerns regarding its impact on media pluralism and the need for its reassessment.
Economic factors
The war continues to severely affect independent media, especially regional and frontline outlets. At the same time, disclosure of ultimate beneficial owners remains inconsistent, with fewer than half of leading media clearly identifying natural persons as ultimate owners, while the national regulator’s public register of media entities which includes media ownership data requires further adjustments in alignment with all EMFA requirements. In addition, civil society noted increases in transparency standards of major online outlets, including basic editorial information, such as leadership and editorial staff. Ukraine should further align its framework with EU law requirements.
Internet
Ukraine has not taken steps to address risks related to the abuse of internet restrictions. The country has also not aligned the use of face-recognition systems and other intrusive technologies with European standards on personal data protection and privacy.
Professional organisations and working conditions
The war continues to create serious safety and financial pressures, particularly for regional and frontline media. Low salaries, fragile job security and declining economic prospects remain a concern, with professional organisations further expanding legal, psychological and emergency support. Working conditions still largely depend on the financial stability of individual media outlets.
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Freedom of assembly and association
Overall, Ukraine provides adequate legal guarantees for freedom of assembly and association. The registration of associations remains accessible without undue religious, ethnic or political restrictions. Authorities continue to exercise restraint when introducing temporary restrictions on the right to peaceful assembly under martial law, but these are not always consistently applied or clearly communicated across the country. The absence of a dedicated framework law for peaceful assembly aligned with European and international standards, combined with martial law powers, continues to create legal uncertainty and uneven practice.
Labour and trade union rights are covered in Chapter 19 - Social policy and employment.
Property rights
The legal and institutional framework for enforcing property rights is broadly in place. Property rights have continued to be generally respected, and the modernisation of the state land registry system continues. An information campaign targeting owners of non-registered real estate acquired before 2013 was launched. The authorities apply property rights
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legislation introduced at the start of the full-scale invasion, in particular on the monitoring of and compensation for property damage. A secure data exchange with the international register of damage was also put in place.
Non-discrimination
Ukraine has established a stable framework of anti-discrimination laws, partially aligned with the relevant EU acquis and Council of Europe standards. However, certain gaps and shortcomings remain, in particular full alignment with the Racial Equality Directive and the directives on standards for equality bodies.
Anti-racism and hate offences
The legal and institutional framework for anti-racism and hate offences is incomplete. Instances of hate offences are generally prosecuted, but gaps remain in implementation and enforcement. As concerns the criminal law framework for hate offences, alignment with the EU acquis is required, in particular the 2008 Framework Decisions on combating racism and xenophobia. The legal framework should include a clear definition of the concept of ‘intolerance’ within Ukrainian criminal law to ensure legal certainty, liability of legal persons, mechanisms to respond to hate speech, as well as ‘descent’ as ground for protection. The Prosecutor General’s order of September 2025 on the Unified Register of Pre-Trial Investigations provides for the systematic collection of hate crime data. Ukraine should continue to strengthen the expertise of law enforcement officers, prosecutors, judges and staff within the Ombudsperson’s office to tackle discrimination, hate speech, and hate crimes more effectively, including through training and capacity building.
Gender equality
The legal and institutional framework for gender equality and combating gender-based violence is partially aligned with the EU acquis. Effective implementation and enforcement, especially at local level, need to be improved. In February 2026, permanent commissions were set up to respond to cases of gender-based discrimination, gender-based violence and sexual harassment within state authorities and the armed forces. Effective coordination with the national equality body, however, has yet to be ensured. The draft state social programme on domestic violence and gender-based violence prevention until 2030 has been developed further by taking into account the recommendations of the Council of Europe’s baseline evaluation report published in September 2026.
Further alignment with the EU acquis is needed, including through the adoption of legislation to align with the Directive on equal treatment between women and men in the access to and supply of goods and services, the Istanbul Convention and Directive on combating violence against women and domestic violence. The availability of specialist support services for victims varies across the country and needs to be strengthened, including access to legal aid and specialised
psychological, social and health services, alongside access to effective state compensation. Local CSOs remain the main providers of support services compensating for gaps in state-level support but faced significant funding cuts and disruptions of services throughout
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2025. Systematic survivor-centred and trauma-informed training for all relevant professionals should continue, particularly for the police, prosecutors, the judiciary, health care and social service providers. The Law on Legal and Social Protection of the Rights of Survivors of Sexual Violence Related to the Aggression of the Russian Federation against Ukraine and provision of Urgent Interim Reparations to Them should be implemented further with stable funding ensured.
Data collection on domestic violence has improved, with law enforcement data disaggregated by type of offence, age, sex and family relationship. However, underreporting persists, particularly among vulnerable groups, such as Roma2 women and women with disabilities. The prevalence of violence against women in Ukraine appears to have been compounded by Russia’s war of aggression. State preventive measures continued to expand, with perpetrator programmes approved in 90% of territorial communities.
Rights of the child
The legal and institutional framework for the rights of the child is broadly in place, but implementation and enforcement need to be improved. Ukraine continued to strengthen its child protection system, including measures for the protection and reintegration of children from territories temporarily occupied by Russia. In November 2025, the National Council for the Protection of Children’s Rights was set up to coordinate child protection policy across the relevant authorities.
Ukraine has demonstrated steady progress in implementing its deinstitutionalisation reform, prioritising the right of every child to grow up in a family environment. Since 2023, the number of children in institutions has fallen but numbers remain high (23 524 children in 2025), especially among children with disabilities, and more targeted efforts to expand specialised family-based care are needed. Most local authorities still lack the resources and capacity to sustain quality, community-based social services and workforce, as well as alternative care options.
On child-friendly justice, Ukraine’s National Strategy on child justice and its Operational Plan for 2025-2028 are in place. Draft laws to further align with the EU acquis and international standardshave been developed but have not yet been registered in Parliament. The restorative justice programme continued, with high mediation successful rates, while amendments to legally mandate the involvement of a lawyer and a psychologist for minors remain pending. The use of diversion and restorative justice should fully respect procedural safeguards and the best interests of the child. Progress was made in expanding child- friendly, interdisciplinary and multi-agency services, bringing the total number of operational Barnahus centres to 16. Their availability should be further expanded and their operation adequately regulated and integrated into the child protection and justice systems. Specialised training for all professionals working with children in the justice system should continue. Ukraine should further prioritise the use of alternatives to detention and non- custodial and rehabilitative measures for children in conflict with the law should be further strengthened.
Persons with disabilities
Ukraine’s legal and institutional framework for the rights of persons with disabilities remains incomplete, with insufficient implementation and enforcement. Due to the impact of Russia’s full-scale invasion, the number of persons with disabilities (both veterans and civilians) continues to grow. Further alignment with EU acquis is needed, notably the European Accessibility Act, and relevant sectoral legislation. Accessibility for persons with disabilities remains insufficient and their meaningful participation and consultation in the reform process
2 In line with the terminology of European institutions, the umbrella term ‘Roma’ is used here to refer to
a number of different groups, without denying the specificities characteristics of these groups.
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needs to be ensured. A new system for determining disability status based on everyday functioning has replaced the previous medical-social expert commissions. However, a comprehensive mechanism for assessing individual functioning across different areas, together with the institutional arrangements for determining disability status, has yet to be fully established. Further efforts are needed to ensure the accessibility the built environment, infrastructure, and services, particularly in the context of reconstruction, and to strengthen mechanisms for persons with disabilities to exercise and claim their rights. Systematic barriers faced by persons with disabilities, particularly women with disabilities, need to be better identified and addressed.
Deinstitutionalisation remains a challenge. Implementation of the Strategy on Deinstitutionalisation of Care for Adults with Disabilities and Elderly Persons until 2034 needs to advance, including through effective coordination through a dedicated body. Quality community-based services supporting independent living remain insufficient, including supported living and day care, and lack sustainable financing. The reallocation of resources from institutional care to community and family support services must be accelerated. Gaps in support for persons with disabilities in situations of particular vulnerability remain, including internally displaced persons with disabilities and older people, leading to continuous or new institutionalisation as a result of evacuation measures. Ukrainian legislation continues to allow for full deprivation of legal capacity and substitute decision-making through guardianship, in particular for persons with intellectual disabilities, contrary to Article 12 of the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities. Supported decision-making models have yet to be developed.
LGBTIQ+ persons
The legal protection of the rights of lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, intersex and queer (LGBTIQ+) persons remains insufficient. Societal acceptance of LGBTIQ+ persons continued to increase, but progress on key legislative reforms remains stalled. No specific LGBTIQ+ equality action plan or strategy has been adopted. Amendments to the Code on Administrative Offences and the Criminal Code to prevent and combat discrimination have yet to be adopted. Same-sex couples continue to lack legal recognition and protection, despite the ECtHR judgment in Maymulakhin and Markiv v. Ukraine. Ukraine is not aligned with the Council of Europe recommendations on sexual orientation and gender identity.
Procedural rights of suspects and accused persons and rights of victims of crime
The legal framework for procedural rights is partially aligned with the EU acquis, but more efforts are needed to align further with the EU acquis on victims’ rights and compensation to crime victims. Ukraine’s criminal procedural law is mostly but not fully aligned with EU standards. The scope of application of procedural rights and the procedure to challenge the quality of interpretation in criminal proceedings needs to be aligned with the EU acquis. Appropriate remedies to violations of the presumption of innocence need to be developed, and aspects related to in absentia proceedings should be improved, in particular as regards the suspect’s and accused person’s awareness of the trial.
Ukraine’s legislation on victims’ rights is not fully aligned with the Victims’ Rights Directive and the Directive relating to compensation to crime victims. The right to an individual needs assessment to determine appropriate protection measures is not yet enshrined in the criminal procedural legislation. Ukraine should adopt a general accessible reparation mechanism for victims of violent intentional crime in line with the EU acquis. In June 2026, the required implementing legislation under the Law on the legal and social protection of victims of sexual violence related to Russia’s war of aggression was adopted. However, the commissions for assessing victims’ applications for immediate reparations need to be put in place swiftly, and the funding of the compensation mechanism properly ensured. Some categories of victims of war crimes continue to face challenges in obtaining victim status and accessing related benefits. In 2025, the free legal aid system provided more than 800 000 instances of legal assistance and eligibility was expanded to include close relatives and
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family members of persons missing under special circumstances. For cases involving children, the quality standards for free legal aid were updated. Interagency collaboration also improved with the introduction of a new system to transfer calls from the police hotline to legal aid services.
Protection of minorities
The legal and institutional framework for the protection of persons belonging to national minorities is broadly in place, and the rights of persons belonging to national minorities continue to be upheld. As part of the implementation of the Action Plan for the Protection of the Rights of National Minorities, which was revised in June 2026, Ukraine introduced several measures in the field of education, culture, the preservation of endangered languages and indigenous groups, including the Crimean Tatars. In September 2025, the Law on vocational education extended the use of EU official languages as languages of instruction to private vocational and professional pre-higher education institutions. The Council of Public Associations of National Minorities (Communities) still needs to develop sufficient capacity to actively represent and promote the interests of national minorities at national level. Stronger central coordination is also needed to strengthen the limited involvement so far of the relevant ministries, implementing bodies, and regional and local administrations in implementing the Action Plan.
Roma
The legal and institutional framework for Roma is largely in place. In March 2026, Ukraine adopted the Action Plan 2026-2028 for the Implementation of the Roma Strategy, and the President of Ukraine proclaimed 31 August as the Romani Language Day. The adoption of resolutions by the Cabinet of Ministers facilitating access to documents is expected to support undocumented Roma. However, implementation and enforcement of Roma policies remain weak, and Roma people still face marginalisation. Social and professional inclusion should be prioritised, including through better access to services at local and national levels. In addition, the relevant authorities would benefit from clear operational guidelines to implement Roma policies effectively on the ground.
Internally displaced persons
Based on June 2026 data from the International Organisation for Migration, 3.9 million people were displaced within Ukraine, and another 5.8 million people fled Russia’s military aggression and were registered by UNHCR elsewhere as of June 2026. In June 2026, the government. adopted a new Strategy of State Policy on Internal Displacement for the period until 2030 and a new law “On Ensuring the Rights and Freedoms of Internally Displaced Persons” was signed by the President. Challenges persist in ensuring the evacuation of displaced older people and persons with disabilities, providing them with accessible facilities and housing and giving them adequate social support. Ukraine still needs to ensure that the protection of people coming from the occupied territories and of internally displaced persons remains a priority.
Citizenship rights
The law allowing Ukrainians to hold dual citizenship of certain other countries, including EU Member States, entered into force in January 2026. Attention should be paid to measures aiming to protect the rights of Ukrainian nationals in occupied territories (in particular children born under occupation) who are forced to accept Russian citizenship. In the event of accession to the EU, Ukraine would need to apply the Court of Justice’s case-law on the loss of EU citizenship.
2.2.2 Chapter 24 - Justice, freedom and security
The EU has common rules for border control, visas, external migration and asylum. Schengen cooperation entails the lifting of border controls inside the EU. Member States
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also cooperate in the fight against serious and organised crime and terrorism, and on judicial, police and customs cooperation, all with the support of the EU Justice and Home Affairs agencies.
Fight against serious and organised crime
The legal framework for serious and organised crime is partially aligned with the EU acquis. The capacity to fight serious and organised crime needs to be improved.
General framework
Legal alignment, strategic and institutional frameworks
Ukraine made no progress in aligning with the EU acquis on the fight against serious and organised crime: this should be prioritised in the next reporting period.
The Criminal Procedure Code should be amended to clearly delineate investigative jurisdiction among pre-trial investigation bodies and to clarify the procedures for transferring criminal proceedings from one pre-trial investigative body to another. Ukraine also needs to adopt a new law on law enforcement agencies (LEAs). This is a crucial step to comprehensively reform the organisation of LEAs, strengthen their accountability and boost integrity measures. Ukraine also needs to update the Law on the fight against organised crime, which is outdated and not in line with the EU acquis,and amend the Criminal Code,particularly relating to the liability of legal entities.
The implementation of the overarching strategic plan on law enforcement reform (OAS AP) is ongoing. According to the Ministry of Internal Affairs, 27% of the measures have been implemented, but many others have been delayed. In February 2026, the Coordination Council in charge of supervising the OAS AP’s implementation was set up. However, the Office of the Prosecutor General (OPG) has not yet nominated its representatives. Considering the crucial role of the OPG in implementing the OAS AP (it is responsible for implementing 103 of the plan’s 198 measures), a representative should be appointed without delay to ensure a steady pace of reform. To effectively fulfil European integration commitments in this policy area, it is crucial to ensure constructive relations between Parliament, Government and the OPG.
In November 2025, Ukraine completed the serious and organised crime threat assessment (SOCTA) for 2021-2024. Based on the SOCTA results, Ukraine needs to finalise a Strategy for Combating Organised Crime for 2026-2030. Ukraine has not fully implemented the 2025 comprehensive action plan to combat organised crime, which was based on the previous SOCTA. Ukraine has still not set up a permanent national coordination body for the fight against organised crime, which is long overdue. There is lack of consensus on which body should take up the role of the national coordinator as well as on its mandate and powers.
The adoption of the Financial Investigation Strategy and its Action Plan are delayed. The Asset Recovery Strategy and its Action Plan expired in 2025, and the successor strategic documents have not yet been adopted. The re-attestation of the staff of the Economic Security Bureau of Ukraine (ESBU) started in November 2025, alongside the selection of new staff. The first round of re-attestation should be completed by February 2027. The ESBU has started to show good results in de-shadowing Ukraine’s economy (i.e. reducing unreported economic activity), despite its very limited capacity. Currently, the ESBU has only 29% of the staff it requires (1 145 out of 4 000). Hiring new staff is complicated as the salaries and other social guarantees of ESBU staff are considerably lower compared with certain other LEAs. Further progress is needed in strengthening the operational independence, status and capacity of the ESBU, including improving access to data.
The selection process for the head of the Asset Recovery and Management Agency (ARMA) had to be relaunched as no candidate was successful in the first selection process. An independent audit of ARMA’s performance was conducted, and the inventory of managed assets was completed. Most of the implementing legislation required to give effect to the
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ARMA reform was adopted, although revisions are needed to address shortcomings in the selection of asset managers and the absence of judicial supervision. Amendments to the Criminal Procedure Code remain necessary to regulate relations between ARMA and public prosecutors.
The reform of the State Bureau of Investigation (SBI) is under preparation. Given the mandate of the SBI, in particular its investigative powers over members of the government and NABU staff, the reform law should include a high level of institutional independence and safeguards. The reform should: (i) provide for the meaningful involvement of international experts, in particular in the transparent and merit-based selection procedure for the head of the SBI; (ii) put in place a mechanism for the attestation of managerial staff with involvement of independent experts nominated by international partners; and (iii) provide for an external performance assessment conducted by independent experts nominated by international partners. Additional efforts are needed to strengthen the SBI’s internal corruption prevention mechanisms.
In the reporting period, no major steps were taken to reform the Security Service (SSU). It is important to focus the SSU’s mandate on national security tasks. Its pre-trial investigation functions should be either transferred to the dedicated LEAs or strictly limited to crimes relating to its core mandate. Effective safeguards are also needed against abuse, and internal and external oversight and anti-corruption mechanisms need to be strengthened. The SSU’s de facto monopoly on wiretapping communications should be lifted. Ukraine needs to institutionalise the mechanisms of public control and oversight in its internal security sector in line with EU Member States’ best practices. The external oversight body, such as an ombudsperson, should be independent, have adequate powers and access to all necessary information to exercise its mandate, and operate at both central and regional levels.
In the reporting period, NABU and SAPO reported undue pressure on their investigations from law enforcement and security agencies, which risks undermining the fight against high- level corruption and trust in Ukraine’s law enforcement. Abuses of powers by LEAs need to be addressed effectively.
There was no progress in introducing merit-based selection procedures for the managerial positions in the central and regional offices of the National Police of Ukraine (NPU) with meaningful involvement of independent experts. In late 2025, the NPU presented the ‘Integrity Police’ IT tool, which helps assess staff compliance with asset declaration obligations under the anti-corruption legislation. However, further efforts are needed to strengthen the integrity framework, the disciplinary mechanism, the internal control system and public oversight of the NPU. This need is highlighted by several corruption cases involving managerial level staff of the NPU that were identified during the reporting period.
Ukraine adopted the Human Resources Management Strategy (HRM Strategy) for LEAs (and the Prosecutor’s Office) until 2030, introducing a modern approach to human capital management on the basis of the principles of equality and non-discrimination. However, additional steps are needed to ensure its proper implementation. Ukraine approved the methodological recommendations on preventing and counteracting possible gender discrimination and sexual harassment in LEAs and the Prosecutor’s Office.
Implementation and enforcement capacity
Ukrainian home affairs institutions continue to demonstrate strong resilience and determination to deliver on their core mandates, while engaging in countering the Russian war of aggression. The risks of war-related crimes linked to trafficking in arms, illicit drugs and human beings remain high.
The implementation of risk and criminal analysis in the field of combating organised crime has been strengthened by institutionalising the SOCTA methodology across the relevant agencies. However, further efforts are needed to strengthen LEAs’ institutional and
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operational capacity to implement strategies got organised crime and their associated action plans.
Intelligence-led policing is at an early stage of development. This is due to: (i) the lack of a single IT law enforcement infrastructure for information and intelligence gathering and sharing; (ii) fragmented and non-interoperable databases and registries; (iii) limited capabilities in using analytical tools; (iv) the lack of a standardised interagency approach to analysis; and (v) the insufficient use of analytical products in decision-making. A draft law on criminal intelligence is under preparation
Interagency cooperation remains weak due to: (i) the lack of a suitable IT infrastructure for sharing information; (ii) the related overly bureaucratic procedures; (iii) a lack of trust; and (iv) the overall reactive approach of LEAs. The powers of LEAs for conducting pre-trial investigations need to be clarified. Frequent disputes about the competence of LEAs to conduct pre-trial investigations sometimes result in the inadmissibility of evidence in court, which undermines complex cases against corruption and serious and organised crime
Efforts to combat large-scale smuggling in Ukraine should be strengthened by making cooperation between the Economic Security Bureau (ESBU) and the State Customs Service (SCS) more operational and effective, strengthening referral mechanisms, improving information exchange and ensuring practical access arrangements.
Ukraine’s capacity to protect witnesses involved in criminal cases effectively is fragmented across LEAs. In addition, Ukraine should strengthen and harmonise forensic expertise ensuring its quality, efficiency and integrity.
In 2025, there was a slight increase in the number of organised groups and criminal organisations identified (2025: 677; 2024: 663). The number of criminal investigations, indictments and completed criminal proceedings increased for the serious crime cases, however the number of criminal investigations and indictments decreased for the organised crime cases.
There is a pressing need to review the law enforcement model to make it more proactive and preventive and reconsider interagency and international police cooperation to make the fight against organised crime more effective.
Financial investigations remain largely underused, except by NABU and ESBU, which have set up specialised units. Similar units should be introduced in the NPU. Data collection on
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financial investigations is expected to improve, following the OPG’s instruction to track them in the Register of Pre-Trial Investigation. Improved skills and tools are needed to ensure that investigators adopt the ‘follow the money’ approach, including access to public and private registers and adequate forensic capacity for economic crime investigations. Practice- oriented methodological guidance and templates have yet to be adopted to ensure the effective implementation of the 2024 Joint Order on financial investigations.
The absence of consolidated statistics on asset freezing and confiscation remains a major obstacle to assessing their effectiveness. Available data point to an insufficient use of confiscation mechanisms in criminal proceedings.
Law enforcement cooperation
Over the period of assessment, Ukraine and Europol have further strengthened their cooperation. There is a regular information exchange, supporting joint operations and analytical work with different Europol units. Organised crime and financial investigations and, increasingly, environmental crime are integrated effectively into EU frameworks such as the European Multidisciplinary Platform Against Criminal Threats (EMPACT). It is expected that international police cooperation will be improved by introducing single points of contact (SPoC). Work is in progress through ongoing reforms spanning from legislative alignment to the development of technical systems.
Ukraine continued to participate in the implementation of 223 operational actions within the framework of 15 operational action plans in ten priority areas of combating crime under the previous EMPACT cycle (2022-2025). The EMPACT cycle (2026-2029) includes 13 operational action plans to address seven EU crime priorities to which NPU is participating. Ukraine is a very active participant in EMPACT framework and participates in 217 operational actions. Ukraine has also taken the role of a co-action leader of four operational actions under the Most Threatening Criminal Networks and Individuals (MTCN-I), Synthetic Drugs and New Psychoactive Substances (SYD/NPS) and Trafficking in Human Beings (THB) operational action plans. Attention should be paid to amendments to certain operational action plans (MTCN-I, Firearms and Explosives) initiated by European partners and agreed with Ukraine in response to new threats related to Russia’s war of aggression.
Ukrainian LEAs are actively integrated into the EU’s common security system, and Ukraine is actively involved in international cooperation in the field of law enforcement. In November 2025, ARMA was invited by the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO) to join a project entitled ‘Safeguarding EU-funded support to Ukraine against Organised Crime infiltration’, implemented under the EMPACT´s MTCN-I operational action plan.
Ukrainian law enforcement officers regularly participate in regional and pan-European training in cooperation with the European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Training (CEPOL). Ukraine is encouraged to make full use of training opportunities provided by CEPOL, including in the area of emerging threats. In 2025-2026 194 Ukrainian law enforcement officers were given access to the LEEd CEPOL educational platform.
To establish a sustainable professional development, Ukraine is encouraged to adopt the sectoral competencies and integrate knowledge acquired through CEPOL capacity-building actions to its law enforcement training system.
Ukraine should accelerate setting up a Passenger Information Unit by adopting a comprehensive legislative framework for processing and exchanging Passenger Name Record (PNR) data. The current fragmented legislative initiatives, led separately by the Security Service of Ukraine and the State Border Guard Service (SBGS), should be consolidated to ensure a more coordinated approach. The authorities should prioritise interagency consultations to reach a final agreement in line with EU standards, particularly for counterterrorism and border security purposes.
Judicial cooperation in criminal matters
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Judicial cooperation needs to be improved. The legal framework for judicial cooperation in criminal matters is partially aligned with the EU acquis to the extent that alignment is already possible. Between September 2025 and August 2026, Ukraine was involved in 120 new cases at the European Union Agency for Criminal Justice Cooperation (Eurojust), including 79 as requesting country. Most cases were related to organised crime, money laundering and fraud. Ukraine participated in 55 joint investigation teams (JITs), including 20 new ones. Ukraine cooperates with the European Judicial Network (EJN) and developed cooperation with the EPPO, which is taking place based on working arrangements. The EPPO sent 3 requests for mutual legal assistance to the Ukrainian authorities in 2025. At the end of 2025, the EPPO had 5 active cases with links to Ukraine.
Crime areas
Investigation and criminalisation of money laundering
Legislative amendments introducing registers of bank accounts and of beneficial owners of trusts continue to be blocked in Parliament. Their adoption should be prioritised, and problematic provisions delaying the registers’ operations and access by law enforcement and authorised bodies should be removed. The planned MONEYVAL assessment was postponed.
In 2025 the track record on money laundering cases improved, with an increase in the number of: (i) criminal proceedings (2025: 3 454; 2024: 3 187); (ii) indictments (2025: 594; 2024: 496); and (iii) convictions (2025: 271; 2024: 157). However, a growing majority of people convicted received suspended sentences with probation (2025: 188; 2024: 105). Courts struggled with increased caseloads, with the backlog increasing by 21% by the end of the year. Judgments ordering confiscation nearly doubled (2025: 96; 2024: 51), yet the overall number remained modest.
In 2025 the State Financial Monitoring Service (SFMS) – Ukraine’s financial intelligence unit – transferred 1 441 case referrals to LEAs and prosecutorial authorities, marking an increase compared with 2024 (1 053). There was, however, a substantial decline in the number of referrals submitted to NABU. The number of requests to foreign jurisdictions fell (2025: 455; 2024: 621), while the already low number of criminal cases initiated on the basis of SFMS materials fell further to 2.5% of the total. To improve the effectiveness of case referrals, as well as communication and trust between the SFMS and LEAs, regular independent audits of effectiveness should be conducted. In addition, a transparent and competitive selection procedure for the head of the SFMS should be introduced, including term limits to its mandate.
Cybercrime
The Internet Organised Crime Threat Assessment (IOCTA) has still not been carried out, but preparatory steps are ongoing. The assessment is crucial for moving to a systematic risk- based approach to the fight against organised cybercrime, in line with European standards. The concept of ‘electronic (digital) evidence’ has still not been incorporated into the Criminal Procedure Code.
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Since the beginning of Russia’s full-scale invasion, Ukraine has made significant efforts to protect its internet systems and databases, including critical infrastructure. According to NPU data, the recorded number of cybercrimes dropped by 46% in 2025 compared with 2024.
Child sexual abuse
At the end of 2025, the NPU’s Cyber Police Department created a dedicated unit to deal with online child sexual exploitation and abuse. The department received direct access to the International Child Sexual Exploitation (ICSE) database in 2026. In 2026, the NPU’s Migration Police Department also created a unit handling sexual exploitation of children on the internet.
Trafficking in human beings
In September 2026, the Cabinet of Ministers approved the new State Programme for Combating Human Trafficking until 2030 Ukraine should appoint a permanent National Coordinator on Trafficking of Human Beings. Further progress is needed in: (i) setting up the National Independent Rapporteur on Human Trafficking; (ii) developing and approving a procedure for information exchange and coordination among entities involved in this area; (iii) improving training for law enforcement officers and other specialists on victim identification, support and assistance and protection of victims’ rights; and (iv) investigating trafficking in human beings and prosecuting traffickers.
In 2025, there was a significant increase in the number of victims of trafficking in human beings in criminal proceedings (340 in 2025; 163 in 2024) and of suspects investigated, indicted and convicted of trafficking in human beings.
Migrant smuggling
The regulation of the Criminal Code on the illegal movement of persons across the state border, including its organisation and facilitation, does not fully reflect the EU’s evolving anti- smuggling approach. Stronger intelligence-led and financial investigation capacity are needed to increase the effectiveness of migrant smuggling investigations.
International cooperation in this area was further strengthened through two international task forces coordinated by Europol. Ukrainian law enforcement authorities participated in two pan-European events as part of EMPACT operational action plans, targeting trafficking in children and trafficking in human beings for labour and sexual exploitation. Ukraine continues to take part in the Global Alliance to Counter Migrant Smuggling and endorsed the Global Alliance Joint Declaration during the second international conference in December 2025.
Trafficking in firearms
The legal framework for the acquisition and possession of firearms needs further alignment with the EU acquis. The Criminal Code of Ukraine criminalises the smuggling of weapons, ammunition, explosives and parts of rifled firearms, but it still does not establish criminal liability for the illicit trafficking of essential components of firearms within the country. Ukraine should amend its Criminal Code to fully comply with international standards, particularly the UN Firearms Protocol. As of September 2026, 23 668 firearms and 14.5 million rounds of ammunition had been declared in line with the law. Ukraine needs to adopt a law on the possession of civilian firearms and ensure the existing legal framework is aligned with the
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EU acquis. Ukraine should also urgently adopt the national roadmap to fight against firearms and other small arms and light weapons and ensure its alignment with the Strategy for Combating Organised Crime for 2026-2030.
Ukraine continued to work with EU Member States to reduce the risk of illicit firearms trafficking in a post-conflict context by engaging in different EMPACT operational actions on firearms and by regularly sharing records of lost, stolen and seized weapons with Europol. Further efforts should be focused on data sharing and putting in place effective cooperation between the National Firearms Focal Point (NFFP) and its counterparts abroad and to integrate all LEAs and other relevant agencies which have competences on firearms within the NFFP. Ukraine should streamline coordination with EMPACT and maximise its contribution to the platform, particularly by improving monitoring of trafficking routes connected to Ukraine. In this regard, the designation of a single national focal point for EMPACT coordination remains an urgent issue. According to the NPU’s operational information, the number of firearms-related crimes, in particular gun violence, is on the rise; however, official state statistics do not reflect this specific type of crime. Ukraine should improve reporting on firearms-related crimes and clarify this inconsistent information.
The number of crimes committed with firearms, explosives and ammunition remains high. In 2025, 5476 criminal proceedings were opened for illegal trafficking in firearms, ammunition and explosives, 4676 suspects were served a notice of suspicion, and 4125 indictments were sent to court.
Cooperation in the field of drugs
Ukraine continued to successfully cooperate with the European Union Drugs Agency. Ukraine should align its national priorities with the EU drugs strategy by improving cooperation between the Ministry of Health and the Ministry of Internal Affairs. The Action Plan on the implementation of the National Drugs Strategy lacks measurable goals and does not consider future developments sufficiently.
Ukraine should further align its legislative framework with the EU acquis on drugs, including with the EU list of new psychoactive
substances included in the definition of drugs. The country should also strengthen its institutional framework in this area, particularly through the set-up of a National Drugs Observatory and the launch of an effective national Early Warning System to ensure the timely exchange of information on psychoactive substances.
The use of drugs and other illegal substances is a growing problem. Drugs, especially synthetic drugs, are sold and widely available across Ukraine, including at the frontline. The illicit production of synthetic drugs continues. Drug monitoring is heavily affected by the war. Cooperation between judicial entities and LEAs should increase, alongside international cooperation in this area, including under EMPACT. A coordinated, joint framework (including LEAs and the armed forces) is needed to: (i) enable rapid referral to support and treatment services; and (ii) support intelligence-led operations to counter drug supply and trafficking in military units.
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Ukraine has taken steps to expand international cooperation on tackling illegal drug production and trafficking. For example, in February 2026, the NPU carried out a successful operation in cooperation with Europol and LEAs from Poland and the Republic of Moldova, leading to the dismantling of 34 illegal drug laboratories and 74 warehouses for storing drugs. The operation also resulted in the seizure of 220 kg of PVP, 156 kg of amphetamine, 17 kg of mephedrone, 7 kg of methamphetamine, 47 kg of cannabis, 7 000 MDMA tablets, 47 kg and 284 litres of phenylnitropropene, and more than 20 tonnes of precursors. 27 million doses of drugs were prevented from entering illegal circulation, and 123 members of criminal groups were served a notice of suspicion.
In 2025 there was a slight increase in notifications, indictments, final court decisions and final convictions in cases related to production and trafficking of drugs compared to 2024. Ukraine needs to make additional efforts to improve drug destruction, drug-sample transfers and data exchange.
Counterfeiting of the euro
Ukraine’s legal framework for the criminalisation of euro counterfeiting is partially aligned with the EU acquis. No progress was observed in ratifying the 1929 Geneva Convention for the Suppression of Counterfeiting Currency. Further steps are also needed on: (i) the harmonisation of definitions; (ii) minimum penalties; (iii) the systematic treatment of aggravated offences; and (iv) the integration of specialised investigative tools.
Counterterrorism, prevention and resilience
The legal framework for the fight against terrorism, countering violent extremism and critical infrastructure protection, as well as resilience of critical entities is partially aligned with the EU acquis.
Fight against terrorism and prevention of radicalisation
Legal alignment, strategic and institutional frameworks
The national system to fight terrorism and the dedicated legislation are comprehensive. The SSU is the main agency in the national system and other relevant institutions are involved, ensuring an integrated approach. Ukraine needs to align its anti-terrorism legislation with the EU acquis, in particular the EU Counter-terrorism Directive and the EU Regulation on Terrorist Content Online, including appointing specific competent authorities to issue removal orders. Ukraine should also ensure compliance with the EU acquis on explosives precursors. In June 2026, Ukraine approved a new concept on combating terrorism. Ukraine should also approve a corresponding action plan for its implementation. The country should also set up a coordination mechanism to develop and adopt a strategy and action plan for preventing and countering violent extremism.
Implementation and enforcement capacity
The institutions in charge of counterterrorism work effectively and professionally. The SSU deals with the terrorism threat from Russia’s war of aggression. Its counterterrorism units are also heavily involved in countering and investigating international crimes committed by the Russian authorities. The SSU is also countering the dissemination of calls for terrorism and sabotage attacks by Russian intelligence agencies against both civilian and military targets. The SSU is carrying out a series of countermeasures with good results; however, Russia continues to intensively recruit perpetrators of terrorist and sabotage attacks, in particular
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among vulnerable groups, such as minors, unemployed people and those with criminal records.
Critical infrastructure protection
Legal alignment, strategic and institutional frameworks
The Law on critical infrastructure protection explicitly references the (EU) Directive 2022/2557 on the resilience of critical entities (CER Directive) as a foundational framework. However, additional steps are required to fully align Ukrainian legislation with the CER Directive. Secondary legislation is partially in place, including on the responsibilities of sectoral and functional bodies. Cybersecurity provisions aligned with the NIS2 Directive are also under development.
Ukraine has created a register of critical infrastructure objects and put in place a sectoral identification process coordinated by the State Service of Special Communications and Information Protection (SSSCIP), covering sectors broadly comparable to those set out in the CER Directive. However, the identification methodology and applicable thresholds are not yet fully harmonised with CER Directive’s criteria, and the designation of critical entities at sectoral level is still incomplete but under development. The national resilience strategy is in development, and there is a national critical infrastructure protection plan framework. Sectoral risk assessment processes are ongoing, led by sectoral bodies under SSSCIP coordination, although systematic all-hazards risk assessments aligned with the CER Directive’s methodology across all 11 sectors have not yet been completed.
The institutional framework is in place. The SSSCIP is the authorised coordinating body, and sectoral ministries are designated as sectoral bodies. The SSU, the NPU, the State Emergency Service, the Ministry of Health, the armed forces and others have functional roles in responding to specific threats. Coordination mechanisms between law enforcement, counterterrorism, civil protection and cybersecurity authorities are legally established, although operational coherence, particularly in active wartime conditions, continues to be tested and refined.
Implementation and enforcement capacity
Ukraine conducts ongoing threat and risk monitoring through the SSSCIP. Threat assessments explicitly cover sabotage, missile and drone strikes, and hybrid threat vectors as core risk categories. However, systematic, cycle-based risk assessments and stress tests across all CER Directive-covered sectors remain incomplete. The SSSCIP itself has identified the absence of a dedicated situational centre and secure interagency information- sharing infrastructure as institutional gaps that currently limit comprehensive risk monitoring capacity.
Migration and asylum
Legal and irregular migration and returns
The legal framework for legal and irregular migration management is partially aligned with the EU acquis. The management of legal and irregular migration needs to be improved.
Legal alignment, strategic and institutional frameworks
Interagency coordination and cooperation between the relevant authorities needs to be strengthened further. Full alignment with the EU acquis has not yet been achieved on: (i) the status of third-country nationals who are long-term residents; (ii) the right to family reunification on the Blue Card Directive; (iii) intra-corporate transferees; (iv) seasonal workers; and
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(v) a single permit for work and residence for third-country nationals. The situational centre for monitoring the migration process and assessing migration risks was formally created in February 2026.
The State Migration Policy Strategy and Action Plan have not been adopted. The legislative framework for a mass influx of migrants is in place, but there is still no permanent and effective mechanism for interagency coordination in the event of a migration crisis. The voluntary returns procedure was rarely applied during the reporting period. The rules on passenger information and visa verification obligations for carriers transporting foreign nationals to Ukraine have not been adopted.
Implementation and enforcement capacity
In 2025, the number of irregular migrants detected by the State Migration Service throughout Ukraine increased compared with 2024. The largest number of migrants detected originated from Moldova, Azerbaijan and Russia. Most irregular migrants were detained for irregular border crossings. Cases of illegal smuggling of people have been registered as criminal offences and investigated by the relevant authorities. Migrant accommodation centres have sufficient capacity, although staffing levels remain below the number of envisaged posts.
The 2007 EU-Ukraine readmission agreement was continuously applied, together with the protocols facilitating its implementation signed between Ukraine and 10 EU Member States. The implementing protocols with Hungary, Spain, Bulgaria and Serbia are awaiting signature. The integrated migration management system is not yet fully operational.
Asylum
While the legal framework on asylum is partially aligned with the EU acquis as it was in force until 12 June 2026, Ukraine should focus on developing its national legal framework and operational capacities on migration and asylum to align with the Pact.The management of asylum needs to be improved.
Legal alignment, strategic and institutional frameworks
Due to a lack of capacity and a shortage of staff, allocated by the State Migration Service of Ukraine, limited support is available to applicants for international protection. Ukraine needs to start developing a roadmap for bilateral cooperation with the EU Agency for Asylum.
Implementation and enforcement capacity
The number of applications for international protection was stable during the reporting period. No cases of refoulement or non- admission at the border were reported, although the capacity to integrate recognised refugees remains limited. In 2025, Ukraine received 55 asylum applications, continuing the decreasing trend since the full-scale invasion began. Ukraine should ensure that the conditions for identifying applicants for
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international protection are in line with the EU acquis.
Visa policy
Ukraine’s visa policy is not fully aligned with the EU’s, in particular the list of countries whose nationals require a visa to enter the EU. Ukraine maintains a visa-free regime with 15 countries that are on the EU list of visa-required third countries3. No steps were taken to further align Ukraine’s visa policy with the EU’s in the reporting period. Ukraine’s alignment of its visa policy should focus on countries whose nationals present illegal migration or security risks to the EU. Ukraine should also make greater efforts to tackle the use of fraudulent documents, including passports. The phasing out of non-biometric passports by 2026 is ongoing. The EU acquis compliance assessment of two draft laws was submitted in March 2026, and they were subsequently revised.
The national visa system is largely aligned with the EU acquis, including on the processing of applications and the criteria and process for issuing visas. The issuing of visas at the border was suspended on 24 February 2022 and has not resumed. The European Commission’s eighth report under the visa suspension mechanism, published in December 2025, concluded that Ukraine continues to meet the visa liberalisation benchmarks. Nonetheless, further efforts are needed, where feasible given the ongoing war.
Schengen governance and external borders
The legislative and strategic framework for the management of external borders is partially aligned with the EU acquis. The management of borders needs to be improved.
Legal alignment, strategic and institutional frameworks
The interagency working group on the coordination of activities in the field of Schengen governance was set up in January 2026. The group is tasked with the preparation of the National Schengen Strategy and the Schengen Action Plan by July 2027, covering the whole Schengen framework. Ukraine should adopt additional legislation on border controls and simplify border and customs procedures to be aligned with the Schengen Borders Code andDirective. Full implementation of the integrated state border management (IBM) action plan for 2023-2025 is needed. A new strategy and an associated action plan for 2026-2028, including clear indicators for its assessment and based on principles of the European IBM, have been developed and are awaiting approval by the President and the Cabinet of Ministers.
Implementation and enforcement capacity
The authorities should put in place clear coordination mechanisms among the security authorities and LEAs, including clearly defined roles and responsibilities, structured information-sharing procedures, and regular joint operational activities. These mechanisms should aim to improve effectiveness and ensure a proper response to security and border management challenges and threats.
The institutional capacity and interagency cooperation mechanisms for the IBM should be further improved. During the reporting period, the Interagency Working Group for IBM met twice. The National Coordination Centre needs to be strengthened to bring tangible operational results. There is still no structured crisis response mechanism. The main challenges affecting the capacity of border management agencies to carry out their work, including border surveillance, are shortages of staff, infrastructure, financial resources and equipment. While border controls meet minimum standards, the technical infrastructure requires a significant upgrade. A comprehensive asset management system for the border
3 Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Belarus, Ecuador, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Mongolia, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Tajikistan, Türkiye, and Uzbekistan.
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agencies is required. Half the border crossing points remain closed. Further efforts by the SBGS and the SCS in the fight against corruption at the border are needed.
The Ministry of Finance has endorsed the use of body cameras by customs officials. The systematic and comprehensive use of these devices should be prioritised, with particular focus on the busiest border crossing points along the Ukraine-Moldova and Ukraine-Hungary borders. The SBGS continues to cooperate with the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (‘Frontex’) on information exchange, joint risk analysis, operations and staff training.
Judicial cooperation in civil and commercial matters
Judicial cooperation in civil and commercial matters needs to be improved. The legal framework in this area is partially aligned with the EU acquis.
Ukraine maintained good cooperation with partners on mutual legal assistance in civil and commercial matters and continues to actively participate in the activities of the European Judicial Network in civil and commercial matters(EJN-civil), in which it participates as an observer. The number of EJN cases involving Ukraine has increased significantly in recent years, from relatively low levels in 2017-2018 (approximately three-four cases) to around 20 cases in 2025, reflecting intensified cooperation. The insolvency regime should be further aligned with the EU acquis.
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2.3. ECONOMIC CRITERIA4
2.3.1. The existence of a functioning market economy
Economic governance
Ukraine continued to advance key reform programmes under EU and IMF frameworks despite the challenging wartime environment. A new four-year IMF programme of USD 8.1 billion was approved in February 2026, releasing USD 1.5 billion of financial assistance. The programme’s first review was completed in July, releasing another USD 690 million. A first instalment of EUR 3.2 billion was released under the Ukraine Support Loan’s Macro- Financial Assistance in June. To date, Ukraine has completed 86 out of 178 measures under the Ukraine Plan, bringing total assistance under the Plan to EUR 29.5 billion. Ukraine also continued implementing the National Revenue Strategy, with 90 measures completed by end-2025. However, important reforms remain delayed, such as those of the simplified tax system, personal income tax, and corporate tax anti-avoidance.
Economic governance has further improved, supported by continued engagement with international partners. In February 2026, the Cabinet of Ministers approved the PFM strategy for 2026-2030. Ukraine also took further steps to strengthen its medium-term budgetary framework, in line with the EU acquis. The integration of spending reviews into the annual budget cycle improved, with the latest 2027 state budget explaining how spending review conclusions are reflected in budget preparation. Spending reviews continued to be carried out in priority areas, including healthcare, social protection, housing and veterans’ policy. In December 2025, the medium-term debt management strategy was adopted, setting debt sustainability targets and measures to deepen the domestic bond market. Public investment management was further strengthened. The 2026 state budget marked the first full budget cycle under the updated PIM procedure. The medium-term plan for priority public investment was prepared alongside the Budget Declaration, which also explained how PIM projects were integrated into budget projections. The NBU refrained from monetary financing in 2025, while preserving managed exchange-rate flexibility and keeping monetary policy focused on returning inflation to its 5% target. The NBU continued to implement its foreign exchange liberalisation strategy gradually, introducing new easing packages in January, April, and August 2026.
4 Unless otherwise indicated, the data in this section are taken from the relevant national sources (State Statistics Service, Ministry of Finance and National Bank of Ukraine).
Table: 2023 2024 2025
Ukraine - Key economic figures
GDP per capita (% of EU-27 in PPS) 30.1 28.7 28.4 28.5
Real GDP growth (% change) -3.4 5.5 3.2 1.8
Activity rate of the population aged 15-70 (%), total1) 61.6 57.0 56.6 57.0
Unemployment rate of the population aged 15-70 (%), total1) 11.8 20.0 14.0 12.0
Employment of the population aged 15-70 (annual growth %) 54.5 46.0 48.2 49.4
Nominal wages (annual growth %) 19.6 17.5 23.1 20.8
Consumer price index (annual growth %) 10.9 12.9 6.5 12.7
Exchange rate against EUR 31.4 39.6 43.5 47.1
Current account balance (% of GDP) -2.1 -2.7 3.8 -5.9
Net foreign direct investment, FDI (% of GDP) -2.3 -2.4 -1.9 -1.2
General government balance (% of GDP) -5.1 -20.1 -17.6 -18.6
General government debt (% of GDP) 61.7 64.2 72.3 80.5
Sources: WiiW, State Statistics of Ukraine, National Bank of Ukraine, Ministry of Finance
2017-22
average
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Macroeconomic stability
Economic growth has lost momentum. Real GDPgrowth remained subdued in 2025, slowing to 1.8%, down from 3.2% in 2024. Relentless Russian attacks on energy infrastructure and unfavourable weather conditions reducing agricultural output aggravated the pre- existing supply-side constraints, weighing on exports. War-related disruptions to Black Sea shipping and access to ports further constrained agricultural exports and increased
transport costs, weighing on producers’ incomes and Ukraine’s capacity to generate export earnings and mobilise domestic tax revenues. Persistent labour shortages bolstered wages, with real wage growth averaging 7% in 2025. This allowed for sustained strong private consumption, which, coupled with growing public expenditure, drove up imports. In the first half of 2026, the economy contracted by 0.2%, as economic activity was constrained by energy shortages and supply chain disruptions.
The current account deficit widened sharply to 15.6% of GDP in 2025, roughly double from its 2024 level. This deterioration was driven by a significant widening of the trade deficit, which reached 27.7% of GDP in 2025 (up from 21.2% in 2024). Imports of goods surged due to war-related defence and reconstruction needs, while exports of goods fell slightly because of a weak harvest. The trend continued in the first quarter of 2026, with the current account and trade deficits widening by 55% and 51% year-on-year, respectively. Gross international reserves reached a record USD 57.3 billion at the end of 2025, before declining steadily driven by sustained NBU foreign exchange interventions and foreign debt repayments that outpaced inflows from international partners to USD 51.3 billion by the end of the first half of 2026, equivalent to more than 4 months of imports.
After declining steadily since mid-2025 thanks to tight monetary policy and falling energy prices, inflation has been rising again. After inflation peaked in the first quarter of 2025 at 14.6%, driven by higher electricity and labour costs, rising food prices, and the depreciation of the hryvnia, the NBU tightened monetary policy. Coupled with conducive domestic supply conditions and falling energy prices, this allowed inflation to fall back to below 8% by the end of the first quarter of 2026, before rising oil and gas prices and war-related disruptions reversed the trend in the second quarter. The hryvnia has continued to weaken by about 7% from around UAH 41.1 per USD in mid-2025 to approximately UAH 44.6 per USD in mid-2026, reflecting a controlled, gradual weakening under the NBU’s managed-float regime.
Ukraine’s fiscal deficit increased slightly in 2025, reflecting the war’s continued budgetary impact. The general government deficit widened to 17.6% of GDP in 2025, from 17.2% in 2024, and remained substantially higher when excluding international grants, at 23.5% of GDP compared with 23.1% in 2024. Tax revenues increased markedly, supported
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by measures such as the rise in the military levy on personal income to 5%. However, these gains were outweighed by very large expenditure needs, particularly for defence and security, which reached 42.8% of GDP in 2025, up from 38.5% in 2024. The Pension Fund’s deficit remained sizeable, at an estimated 2.7% of GDP. Public debt continued to rise, reaching 98.2% of GDP in 20255, while financing remained reliant on concessional external financing and more costly domestic borrowing. The concessional terms of external financing remain essential to ensuring debt sustainability.
Ukraine has made further progress in improving revenue administration and the tax system, but significant structural weaknesses persist. The regulatory framework for compliance risk management has been adopted, supporting the State Tax Service’s transition towards a more risk-based approach. Ukraine also introduced e-audits for large taxpayers and adopted legislation introducing rules for reporting on income earned through digital platforms. Steps were also taken to streamline tax exemptions, including through the elimination of the VAT exemption for low-value imported parcels. Customs reform progressed with the appointment of a new head of the State Customs Service through an open competition involving international experts. However, revenue mobilisation remains constrained by high levels of undeclared work, complex tax compliance procedures, and tax avoidance. Key reforms under the National Revenue Strategy, including reforms of the simplified taxation system, personal income taxation, and corporate tax anti-avoidance are pending. In this context, conditionality under the EU and IMF programmes are a major
anchor for advancing tax reforms. The publication of fiscal data at the general government level remains limited, and access to this data is restricted.
The macroeconomic policy mix has remained broadly appropriate and has helped preserve macroeconomic stability despite substantial pressures stemming from the war. Fiscal policy has continued to accommodate exceptional defence and security needs, while remaining heavily reliant
on external support. Going forward, fiscal policy will need to focus on strengthening domestic revenue mobilisation, improving expenditure efficiency, and safeguarding medium-term fiscal sustainability. The IMF and EU programmes, together with the National Revenue Strategy, should remain key anchors for achieving these goals. Monetary policy has remained appropriately tight to contain inflationary pressures, with the NBU preserving managed exchange-rate flexibility, continuing gradual foreign exchange liberalisation where conditions allowed, and refraining from monetary financing. Risks to macroeconomic stability stem predominantly from the prolonged war, which could further damage productive capacity and infrastructure, trigger renewed outward migration, increase financing needs, and weaken the current account balance.
Functioning of product markets
Business
Despite ongoing reform efforts, Ukraine’s business environment remains constrained by structural and wartime challenges. Business surveys continue to identify labour shortages as the primary economic constraint. But companies also suffer from relatively high energy costs and energy shortages, uncertainty related to hostilities, and the physical
5 Public debt includes the EU’s Ukraine Facility, previous Macro Financial Assistance (MFA) operations, and the Extraordinary Revenue Acceleration (ERA) MFA. Other ERA-related contributions from the US, Japan, Canada and the UK are either treated as revenue or as borrowings not counted towards public debt.
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destruction of infrastructure. Under the Macro-Financial Assistance (MFA) programme, the government has taken important further steps to simplify the VAT registration process for businesses. Progress on implementing the 2024 Action Plan on Deregulation is slow, with only one action implemented, namely the adoption of the Law on the basic principles of state supervision, which mandates all supervisory bodies of the state to shift from a punitive inspection model to a risk-based, preventive approach.
State influence on product markets
The state’s footprint in the economy remains high. Ukraine's economy continues to exhibit features of a wartime economy, with the state playing an increasing role. Government spending increased by 1.3 percentage points to 38.9% of GDP in 2025. Energy price liberalisation for households continues to be deferred. In April 2026, the fixed household electricity tariff of UAH 4.32/kWh was extended until at least November 2026, although the preferential tariff of UAH 2.64/kWh lapsed in May 2026. The moratorium on district heating and gas tariff increases for households set out in the July 2022 Law on gas market regulation during martial law is still in place.
Privatisation and restructuring
Some progress was made on privatisation and restructuring during the reporting period. Proceeds from the privatisation of state property amounted to UAH 3.4 billion in 2025, including UAH 2.2 billion received between September and December 2025, fulfilling Ukraine’s own annual target but coming in lower than the 2024 record volume. For 2026, the privatisation revenue target has been set at a more modest UAH 2 billion, reflecting difficult conditions for state divestment, with several high-profile auctions having failed in late 2025 and early 2026, including for the Odesa Port Plant. On restructuring, the Law regulating the activities of legal entities, which entered into force in August 2025, requires all state-owned enterprises (SOEs) to be converted into joint-stock or limited liability companies (with state ownership) or liquidated. 352 decisions on the transformation of SOEs have already been adopted under this law. War remains the primary obstacle to broader privatisation, complicating the identification of assets, creating risks of destruction of privatisation objects, and making privatisation impossible in occupied or active combat territories. On corporate governance, the government adopted resolutions to bolster safeguards and transparency around supervisory board recruitment processes. In April 2026, Ukraine formally adhered to the OECD Guidelines on Corporate Governance of SOEs and launched preparations for an action plan under OECD guidance to tackle persistent implementation gaps. Progress was achieved during the reporting period as the charters of key SOEs, including Ukrenergo, GTSOU, Ukrhydroenergo, and Energoatom have been revised. However, challenges remain in ensuring that the new governance framework is applied consistently in practice. Political considerations continue to influence some appointments to SOE governance bodies. Alignment with OECD standards will be crucial going forward, in particular to ensure that politicians and individuals in a position to influence the operating conditions of SOEs do not serve on supervisory boards.
Functioning of the financial market
The Ukrainian banking sector has remained resilient despite persistent security risks. Banks continued to hold strong profits and liquidity positions, with short-term liquidity coverage ratios around three times the minimum requirement, supported by a stable funding base in which client deposits accounted for over 90% of liabilities. Solvency indicators also remained robust: the 2025 resilience assessment found that nine banks, representing 18% of sector assets, needed higher capital adequacy ratios, while the sector’s Tier 1 capital ratio remained above 15% in early March 2026, well above minimum requirements. Asset quality improved, with the non-performing loan (NPL) ratio falling to 12.6% in May 2026 from 35.5% in May 2025, partly reflecting legacy NPL write-offs and the good quality of new lending. However, the wider stock of distressed assets remains significant, while their resolution is constrained by the limited use of restructuring procedures and an underdeveloped
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secondary market for distressed assets. Following the update of the Financial Sector Development Strategy in August 2025, Ukraine has taken steps to strengthen financial stability and align with the EU acquis. These include supervisory reforms, the banking resilience assessment, and reforms to financial market infrastructure. In April 2026, the National Securities and Stock Market Commission (NSSMC) approved the concept for a draft law on financial market infrastructure. This law aims to strengthen the operational resilience of market infrastructure and further align with the relevant EU acquis.
Lending continued to recover strongly, although credit penetration is low. Net hryvnia loans to businesses increased by 33.5% year-on-year in February 2026, and net foreign- currency business loans rose by almost 28% year-on-year. Lending growth was broad- based across bank groups and covered companies of different sizes, ownership forms, and sectors. SME lending remained at the core of portfolios and demand for investment loans from large corporates rose in the second half of 2025. Household lending also expanded rapidly, with the portfolio increasing by 34% in 2025, mainly driven by retail loans. The quality of new loans has remained sound, supporting the decline in NPLs and enabling banks to maintain moderate lending rates. Nevertheless, financial intermediation remains shallow: net loans to businesses amount to less than 9% of GDP, while net hryvnia loans to households account for about 3% of GDP. Further implementation of the Lending Development Strategy and Mortgage Lending Strategy will be essential to deepening financial intermediation, while keeping credit risks contained and better targeting public support schemes at firms that need them most. The launch of the Local Development Finance Facility under the National Development Institution should help support reconstruction and recovery by turning local recovery projects into bankable investments and improving access to finance for municipalities, SMEs, and priority sectors.
Functioning of the labour market
Large-scale displacement, demographic losses, and military mobilisation have significantly contributed to labour shortages and rising real wages in 2025. Approximately 50% of businesses reported difficulties in recruiting, particularly in
manufacturing, construction, transport, energy, and healthcare, reflecting persistent skills mismatches and low labour mobility. Women remained disproportionately represented among unemployed people, partly reflecting mobilisation patterns. Young people and internally displaced persons continued to face challenges in integrating into the labour market. Ukraine continued expanding active labour market policies for displaced persons and veterans, including
retraining, employment support, and entrepreneurship programmes. The Population Employment Strategy for the period up to 2030 was adopted in January 2026. Ukraine also took steps to reduce undeclared work in the labour market by adopting a law on digital platforms in June 2026, which aims to bring more activity in the digital sector into the formal economy.
2.3.2. The capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the EU
Education and innovation
Ukraine continued efforts to improve the quality, accessibility and labour market relevance of education despite severe wartime disruptions. An action plan to implement the Strategy for the Development of Higher Education in Ukraine (2022-2032), was adopted in December 2025, aiming to strengthen institutional autonomy and align the sector more
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closely with European Higher Education Area principles. The New Ukrainian School reform continued, together with the roll-out of the Law on preschool education, supported by the adoption of the State Standard of Preschool Education in December 2025, which sets out mandatory learning outcomes and child competencies. The results of the latest PISA assessment (2026) were in line with the 2022 results, despite the combined impact of the COVID-19 pandemic and the war. Demographic decline and war-driven migration of teachers and students continued to weigh on human capital formation. A sizeable increase in salaries for teachers and academic staff in 2026 is expected to improve the profession’s attractiveness and status. A new Law on vocational education entered into force in September 2025, and dual education expanded to 163 VET institutions and over 16 500 students across 115 professions, particularly in construction, transport, energy, and manufacturing. Around 78% of VET graduates were employed in their acquired profession. Research and development expenditure remained below 0.4% of GDP, constraining innovation capacity despite the continued implementation of the Global Innovation Development Strategy to 2030. At the same time, the expansion of domestic defence production supported technological development and resulted in globally relevant products, particularly in unmanned systems and digital technologies.
Physical capital and quality of infrastructure
Ukraine continued to face severe infrastructure challenges due to repeated attacks on critical assets, particularly in the energy sector. Despite the restoration or commissioning of around 4 GW of generation capacity, the energy system remained under severe strain, as around half of total electricity generation capacity was destroyed during the 2025/2026 heating season. Available domestic capacity, at around 10 GW, remained well below peak demand of around 18 GW. Electricity imports helped narrow the gap but did not prevent significant shortages during peak periods, weighing on industrial activity, logistics, and business confidence. Reconstruction and repair efforts increasingly focused on decentralised electricity generation. Below-cost utility tariffs continue to limit SOE resources for reconstruction and repairs. Despite continued efforts to maintain export routes and connectivity, transport and logistics infrastructure also remained affected by war-related damage and security risks, accounting for 20.6% of Ukraine's total physical damage, most of it concentrated in the railway system. Economic losses were driven by disrupted access to Black Sea ports and the continued closure of airspace. Digital infrastructure remained comparatively resilient, including in rural areas. Ukraine made progress in reforming public investment management, with investment planning becoming more closely integrated into the budget cycle, with the Budget Declaration reflecting public investment projects in medium-term expenditure projections.
Sectoral and enterprise structure
The structure of the economy saw a continuous shift towards services. Agriculture remained below pre-war levels despite a gradual recovery, although agricultural products continued to account for most merchandise exports. Industry continued to face high logistics and energy costs, while recent developments pointed to gradual upgrading in parts of the industrial base, in particular through the expansion of defence-related manufacturing, engineering, and dual-use technologies. The service sector continued to expand its relative importance and accounted for around 70% of GDP, supported by digitalisation and wartime adaptation, with ICT and other knowledge-intensive activities increasing their contribution to exports and value added. Economic activity increasingly shifted towards western regions due to displacement and business relocation.
Economic integration with the EU and price competitiveness
Ukraine remained relatively open to trade despite of continued war-related disruptions. The trade-to-GDP ratio
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declined markedly, from 29.7% in 2024 to 25.3% in 2025, reflecting lower agricultural production, as well as the impact of attacks on enterprises, infrastructure, and energy facilities. The EU remained Ukraine’s largest trading partner, accounting for 55.1% of total foreign trade in goods and services, although its share declined slightly from 56.7% in 2024. Ukraine’s trade deficit with the EU widened, as imports from the EU increased, while nominal exports to the EU declined, broadly in line with the overall fall in exports in 2025. At the same time, integration into European value chains continued to strengthen, with exports of processing services to the EU increasing and accounting for close to 89% of Ukraine’s total exports of such services.
Price competitiveness remained under pressure. Although the hryvnia only weakened slightly against the US dollar in 2025, it depreciated more markedly against the euro and in nominal effective terms, reflecting global currency movements. This nominal depreciation provided some support to export price competitiveness. However, this nominal depreciation was insufficient to compensate for the unfavourable inflation differential, leaving the annual average real effective exchange rate stronger than in 2024. Some real depreciation towards the end of the year partly reversed this trend. Rising real wages driven by labour shortages added to cost pressures and reduced competitiveness.
2.4. PUBLIC PROCUREMENT, STATISTICS AND FINANCIAL CONTROL
Chapter 5 - Public procurement
EU rules ensure that the public procurement of goods, services and works in any Member State is transparent and open to all EU economic operators on the basis of non- discrimination and equal treatment.
Institutional set-up and legal alignment
The legal framework on public procurement is partially aligned with the EU acquis. In line with the Strategy for Reforming the Public Procurement System for 2024-2026, the adopted Public Procurement Law represents a significant improvement in alignment with the EU acquis. With its adoption, Ukraine has moved forward with its commitments under the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement (DCFTA) in the area of public procurement, with the exception of the utilities sector, which remains not aligned. However, Ukraine continues to apply exceptions to its public procurement rules, including temporary direct contracting for the protection of critical infrastructure during martial law. Another point of concern is the use of pilot framework agreements for certain construction works without open tenders, limitations to monitoring, transparency of procedures and review mechanisms. In January 2026, the procurement procedure was amended to extend the obligation to disclose beneficial ownership information to all types of procurement.
The PPP and Concessions laws still contain gaps in alignment with the EU acquis. In particular, PPP award procedures are regulated by a separate by-law, the content of which appears to fall outside the applicable EU public procurement rules.
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In January 2026 the two central defence procurement bodies for non-military and military procurement were merged. The lack of legal clarity related to the distinction between conventional and defence procurement, was not resolved, primarily due to the lack of clear definitions. Decentralised defence procurement has allowed for faster delivery of military equipment, although with limited financial oversight. To mitigate risks, special training programmes were launched to educate procurement officers within military units.
Implementation and enforcement capacity
In 2025, contracts worth EUR 19.74 billion were concluded through public procurement (excluding defence and gas purchases), of which 72.3% were awarded -through competitive procedures. The value of contracts concluded by competitive procedures, compared to 2024 increased from EUR 13.51 billion to EUR 14.27 billion. However, 70.6% of the value of contracts under open tenders were assigned in procedures with a single bidder.
The government approved the roadmap and action plan to strengthen the State Audit Service (SAS) and its control mechanisms, defining strategic guidelines and stages for increasing the efficiency of state control over public procurement processes. The SAS continued to carry out monitoring of legal compliance of contract award and implementation, while only a minority of monitoring actions were triggered by automatic risk indicators. In 2025, the SAS identified violations in 63% of monitored procurement, yet the violations identified were challenged in court only in some cases, with a low success rate. In order to facilitate enforcement, the SAS improved procedures to access personal data of individuals committing violations.
The contracting authorities need to continue strengthening the capacity and integrity of management of public procurement processes across all institutions. Progress was made in updating the training offer for procurement managers end economic operators.
Regarding prevention of corruption, law enforcement agencies conducted investigations in several cases related to corruption in public procurement. The operation Midas uncovered alleged large-scale embezzlement in the procurement of a state energy company and high- level political influence in the award of defence contracts. The capacities of contracting authorities, as well as internal and external controls to prevent corruption and bid rigging remain weak, particularly at sub-national level and in state-owned enterprises. Integrity due diligence and exclusion criteria for bidders, alongside the monitoring and enforcement capacity, require further strengthening. The Public Procurement Strategy for 2027-2030 needs to address outstanding issues, ensuring complementarity with the strategic results on public procurement of the State Anti-Corruption Strategy 2026-2030.
Efficient remedy system
The legislation on review of public procurement is largely aligned. However, compliance issues remain, requiring addressing, in particular, time limits to bring review that should have a required length in all sectors and correct application of automatic suspension of public procurement procedure in case of review of award decisions. In 2025, the Antimonopoly Committee (AMCU) received 9 783 complaints, of which 66% were justified. In 2025, 172 decisions were appealed in court out of which 9 were confirmed. The remaining 163 decisions are still under consideration in the courts of the first, appellate and cassation instances.
Chapter 18 - Statistics
European statistics are developed, produced and disseminated by EU Member States, guided by the principles and criteria elaborated in the Regulation on European statistics, such as professional independence, impartiality, reliability, transparency and confidentiality. Common rules are provided for the methodology, production and dissemination of statistical information, which are further specified in sectoral legislation that constitute the EU acquis on statistics.
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On statistical infrastructure, Ukraine should amend the Law on official statistics to ensure the full professional independence of the State Statistics Service of Ukraine (SSSU) and its role in defining the state policy in statistics, and to strengthen the institutional status of the SSSU and its powers regarding coordination of the stakeholders in the national statistical system. Ukraine needs to ensure that the SSSU receives the necessary financial and human resources to fulfil its mandate to produce official statistics and to comply with the EU acquis in statistics. Some progress was achieved in statistical reporting with the legal entities resuming statistical and financial reporting to state statistical bodies in July 2025.
On classifications, Ukraineadopted NACE 2.1-UA (entering into force in 2027), a new NUTS-UA regional classification (entering into force in 2027), and a new version of the nomenclature of industrial products, harmonised with the PRODCOM. On registers, no progress was achieved.
The compilation of macroeconomic statistics, including government finance statistics remains seriously disrupted due to the martial law and no substantial progress was achieved in comparison with the previous year. The Commission encourages Ukraine to conclude a memorandum of understanding between the SSSU, the National Bank and the Ministry of Finance and to set up a working group in macroeconomic statistics.
On social statistics, the SSSU resumed household surveys. Measures were taken to prepare the 2026 household budget survey and the labour force survey. The main interviews for the 2026 household budget survey and the 2025 European health interview survey began in 22 regions. Information on the socio-demographic characteristics of households based on the results of the main interviews are expected to be released in August 2026. The labour force survey began in January 2026, while in March 2026, the survey on income and living conditions (EU-SILC) was introduced in Ukraine for the first time, continuing through July 2026.
On sectoral statistics, the transmission of some datasets to Eurostat has increased in energy, price, transport (for each, several datasets were transmitted), business (datasets on short-term business statistics, on business registrations and bankruptcies by economic activity on a quarterly basis were transmitted) and agriculture statistics (the methodologies on integrated farm statistics and agricultural machinery availability were amended, progress on animal production statistics was achieved). Substantial progress is still expected in the areas of business, trade, science, technology, innovation, environment and tourism statistics.
Chapter 32 - Financial control
The EU promotes the reform of national governance systems to improve managerial accountability, sound financial management of income and expenditure, and external audit of public funds. The financial control rules further protect the EU’s financial interests against fraud in the management of EU funds and the euro against counterfeiting.
Public internal financial control (PIFC)
The strategic framework for PIFC is in place as part of the newly adopted Public Finance Management Reform Strategy for 2026-2030. Continuous progress in strengthening the legal and methodological PIFC framework was demonstrated. Nevertheless, the operational effectiveness of the PIFC system remains limited due to fragmented implementation and varying institutional capacities, and the need for stronger coordination. Further strengthening of the central harmonisation unit’s capacity remains important to support the implementation of the PIFC system.
Efforts continued in supporting the implementation of the internal control framework, notably through the launch of an institutional pilot under the Ministry of Justice and targeted training.
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Implementation of managerial accountability remains uneven, particularly regarding managerial ownership of internal control and risk management practices.
On internal audit, initial steps have been taken to align the internal audit framework with the Global Internal Audit Standards, notably through the preparation of revised national internal audit standards. The establishment of audit committees continued expanding across the public sector. As of January 2026, 42 audit committees have been newly established in key spending units. Further efforts are needed to strengthen the quality, independence, and strategic role of internal audit, and to ensure the effective functioning of audit committees.
External audit
The Accounting Chamber of Ukraine (ACU) continued implementing the existing reform framework, which also plans for the consolidation of its institutional and financial independence. The appointment of six members of the ACU Board, still pending, would strengthen its governance capacity.
On administrative capacity, timely recruitment and filling of vacancies would be better ensured by more solid financial independence. All audits were conducted using the newly approved ISSAI-based audit methodologies, while strengthening their implementation especially through quality management and continuous professional development. The audit coverage of the consolidated financial statement is gradually expanding, with the ACU applying the financial audit methodology to the statements of key budget holders, local government entities, and externally financed programmes.
Parliamentary scrutiny is being gradually reinforced thanks to a better cooperation between the ACU and the relevant committees within the Verkhovna Rada, which starts using ACU’s report more systematically in discussions and for oversight purposes. There remains scope for further progress on these aspects and on strengthening the follow-up mechanisms.
Protection of the EU’s financial interests
The national legislation still needs to be fully aligned with the PIF Directive. A national anti- fraud strategy to protect the EU’s financial interests was adopted in July 2026.
The State Audit Service’s mandate and capacity need to be further consolidated to perform its role as the anti-fraud coordination service (AFCOS). At the moment, it can only provide information on irregularities within the scope of the Ukraine Facility. A corresponding AFCOS network comprising 13 national authorities continued supporting the AFCOS.
A track record in the reporting of irregularities and cooperation with the European Anti- Fraud Office (OLAF) on investigations should continue to be developed. The AFCOS started using the Irregularity Management System in 2025, with 32 irregularities under the Ukraine Facility by the end of the year, of which 23 classified as suspected fraud and one as established fraud.
Protection of the euro against counterfeiting
The ratification of the 1929 Geneva Convention for the suppression of counterfeiting currency would be beneficial to support international cooperation in the area.
3. GOOD NEIGHBOURLY RELATIONS AND REGIONAL COOPERATION
Ukraine is an active participant in several regional formats, including the Eastern Partnership, the Central European Initiative, Black Sea Economic Cooperation, the Organisation for Democracy and Economic Development and the Regional Cooperation Council. Moreover, Ukraine has invested diplomatic capital in improving ties with its neighbours, especially EU Member States. In 2026, Ukraine hosted a successful Ukraine- Southeast Europe Summit in Kyiv.
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The relationship between Ukraine and Hungary was marked by a certain level of tension, reflecting differing perspectives on minority rights, energy cooperation and broader geopolitical alignment. Following the Hungarian parliamentary elections in April 2026, bilateral relations improved, with potential for more forward-looking engagement.
Poland is one of Ukraine’s closest strategic partners in the context of Russia’s war of aggression. Poland provides vital political, humanitarian, economic, technical and defence assistance and hosts the largest number of Ukrainians fleeing Russian military aggression. It also provides logistical hubs to deliver EU humanitarian and civil protection support to Ukraine. Despite disputes over historical issues, both countries have demonstrated a strong political commitment to finding solutions to those longstanding problems. Ukraine and Romania continue to cooperate closely and have recently strengthened bilateral political dialogue by signing the Strategic Partnership Agreement in March 2026. Since early 2022, Romania has provided strong political support to Ukraine, including by facilitating the export of Ukrainian food products through EU solidarity lanes and hosting logistical hubs for the delivery of EU humanitarian and civil protection support.
Ukraine’s relations with Slovakia have been politically strained over military support and energy issues but practical cooperation continued. Slovakia hosts a network of logistical hubs to channel EU in-kind assistance to Ukraine. Slovakia also hosts a significant number of Ukrainians fleeing Russian military aggression under temporary protection arrangements, with one of the highest numbers per capita.
Relations with Bulgaria have been bolstered by Bulgarian political, financial and humanitarian aid for Ukraine and by growing economic ties. Ukraine and Bulgaria share a robust, multifaceted strategic partnership, further strengthened by a Security Cooperation Agreement signed in March 2026.
Ukraine maintains longstanding and close ties with neighbouring Moldova. Bilateral political dialogue has been strengthened at all levels, reflecting Moldova’s strong support for Ukraine in the context of Russia’s war of aggression. The two countries also discuss regional and security issues, the situation in the Transnistrian region and the management of the Nistru River’s water resources, which remains a challenging topic.
Ukraine and Georgia continue to implement a strategic partnership that began in 2017. While Georgia supports Ukraine’s territorial integrity and sovereignty, Ukraine has expressed concerns that Georgia has not aligned itself with EU sanctions against Russia and does not cooperate on military-technical matters. The de facto halt of Georgia’s accession process has led to further political dissonance between the two countries. Despite political relations cooling, some diplomatic channels have reopened.
Türkiye is a partner of strategic significance for Ukraine, with major economic and people- to-people ties, reflected in a bilateral visa-free regime and a free trade agreement (not yet ratified). Bilateral relations have been bolstered since the beginning of Russia’s full-scale war by Türkiye’s technical, humanitarian and military support for Ukraine, and by its co- sponsoring of UN resolutions supporting Ukraine’s territorial integrity and sovereignty. Türkiye has consistently supported Ukraine’s territorial integrity and sovereignty and has continued to highlight its role as facilitator and potential mediator. This was shown when Türkiye facilitated grain export and prisoners’ exchanges and when it hosted three rounds of direct talks between Russia and Ukraine in Istanbul in 2025. Türkiye has refrained from aligning with the EU’s restrictive measures against Russia but continues to collaborate constructively with the EU to identify solutions to sanctions circumvention.
Relations with Albania and Bosnia and Herzegovina are based on their support for Ukraine’s territorial integrity and sovereignty and its condemnation of Russia’s war of aggression. The ties between Ukraine and North Macedonia are strong and deepening through political dialogue, diplomatic support and military assistance in the face of the war.
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Ukraine-Montenegro relations remain strong, bolstered by Montenegro’s continued support in UN forums and on sanctions, trade and technical and military assistance.
Ukraine-Serbia relations have improved, although Serbia has not joined the sanctions against the Russian Federation. High-level contacts between both countries have increased since February 2024, including the first visit to Serbia by President Zelenskyy in August 2026. Serbia is Ukraine’s biggest trading partner in the Western Balkans, and it has also provided by far the most financial and humanitarian assistance to Ukraine of any country in the region.
Ukraine has not recognised the independence of Kosovo* but has indicated continued support for EU-facilitated dialogue between Belgrade and Pristina. On a voluntary basis, Kosovo has aligned with EU restrictive measures relating to Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine.
4. SECURITY, DEFENCE AND RESILIENCE
While continuing to receive the EU’s political, financial, economic and military support, Ukraine is also becoming a substantial contributor to European security, resilience and defence readiness.
The 2024 EU-Ukraine Joint Security Commitments continued to guide cooperation on security, resilience and defence, while complementing bilateral security agreements between EU Member States and Ukraine.
The EU and its Member States increasingly benefitted from Ukraine’s advanced defence and technology innovation, industrial capabilities, cyber expertise and unique operational experience, including in countering hybrid threats. Ukraine also took steps towards closer integration into the European Defence Technological and Industrial Base (EDTIB), contributing to the EU’s long-term security, defence readiness and competitiveness.
The EU’s military support under the Ukraine Support Loan, the European Peace Facility, windfall profits generated by the immobilised Russian assets, and other EU support tools substantially strengthen the security and resilience of both Ukraine and the EU, fostering the transformation and integration of our respective defence industries.
Ukraine also benefits from the support provided by the EU Advisory Mission (EUAM) and the EU Military Assistance Mission (EUMAM), which reinforce Ukraine’s security and resilience while advancing closer cooperation and Ukraine’s integration into the EU’s common foreign, security and defence policy.
Democratic resilience
Despite Russia’s full-scale war of aggression and the constraints of martial law, Ukraine maintained constitutional continuity and functioning democratic institutions, supported by an active civil society. For Ukrainians, the war is not only a fight for territorial integrity and independence, but also a defence of democratic values, civic freedoms and the sovereign right to determine the country’s European future.
Countering hybrid threats in Ukraine extends far beyond military defence. It encompasses resilience against cyberattacks and foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI), including disinformation, sabotage, political interference and attacks on critical infrastructure, requiring coordinated action across government, civil society and the private sector. Ukraine’s experience in countering hybrid threats offer valuable lessons for the EU’s
This designation is without prejudice to positions on status and is line with UNSCR 1244/1999 and the ICJ
Opinion on the Kosovo declaration of independence.
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security, preparedness and societal resilience. Ukraine’s operational experience in civil protection and crisis response can strengthen the EU’s preparedness and resilience, notably through the Union Civil Protection Mechanism (UCPM).
Economic security and resilience
Ukraine continued to strengthen the resilience of its critical infrastructure and energy systems even under intensified Russian attacks. Further integration steps of its electricity system with the European market contributed to both Ukraine’s resilience and wider European energy security.
Ukraine’s strategic importance for the resilience of European supply chains increased. It continued to prioritise the development of critical raw materials. In May 2026, EU and Ukraine endorsed the updated 2026-2027 Roadmap under the EU-Ukraine Strategic Partnership on Critical Raw Materials, and, in June 2026, Ukraine approved a 20-year strategy to develop critical minerals and value-added industries. Developing Ukraine’s critical material sector and ensuring relevant regulatory and investment framework, could diversify European supply chains and reduce strategic dependencies, including in defence, energy and advanced technologies.
Ukraine further developed capabilities relevant to the EU’s economic security agenda. The country continued to strengthen cyber defence capacities and digital governance systems in response to persistent cyber threats. Ukraine’s experience in protecting critical systems against cyberattacks and maintaining the continuity of essential services in wartime, provides a valuable expertise for the EU.
Ukraine continued to expand its capabilities in dual-use and emerging technologies, including autonomous systems, artificial intelligence and defence-related innovation. These capabilities are increasingly reflected in the development and deployment of unmanned systems, including unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs) and maritime drones. Beyond their military applications, such technologies have significant dual-use potential, including for security and emergency services, firefighting, medical and casualty evacuation, and forestry, environmental and border monitoring.
Ukraine is an important contributor to European food security and strategic resilience. Ukraine is a key supplier of feed such as cereals, oilseeds and vegetable oils and has the potential to strengthen the EU’s plant protein autonomy. However, to work closer together, Ukraine will need to align with EU production, food safety and sustainability standards. This will help Ukraine’s deeper integration into European agri-food value chains. Nonetheless, Russia’s increasing attacks on Ukraine grain and port infrastructure are causing significant damage to Ukraine’s agricultural production, storage, distribution and exports, disrupting grain and vegetable oil supply chains, and increasing global food insecurity.
Ukraine should continue efforts to strengthen the resilience of critical infrastructure, gradually meet EU production standards in agriculture, deepen energy market integration with the EU and enhance cyber resilience.
Defence capacity building and defence industrial dimension
Ukraine expanded its defence production and technological innovation, drawing on operational experience to accelerate innovation, particularly in drone and counter drone systems.
Ukraine also strengthened the governance framework for defence exports and committed to a partial lifting of the wartime export ban. As a result, the government issued the first wartime export licences. Authorities also boosted coordination mechanisms aiming at facilitating internationalisation of Ukraine’s defence industry within the framework of Build with Ukraine.
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To advance integration into the European Defence Technological and Industrial Base (EDTIB), Ukraine announced in February 2026 the roll-out of a network of defence technology export hubs across Europe aimed at supporting exports, industrial partnerships and co-production arrangements with European partners. Ukraine and the European Commission signed in July 2026 a Letter of Intent committing to develop a Strategic Defence Industrial Partnership and establish, together with EU Member States, an EU-Ukraine Defence Industrial Pact.
Meanwhile, Ukraine is increasingly integrated into and participating in flagship EU programmes and associated defence innovation ecosystems. Ukrainian entities’ participation in activities supported under the European Defence Fund (EDF), is expected to contribute to innovation, capability development and Ukraine’s integration into the EDTIB. The launch of BraveTech EU linked the EU Defence Innovation Scheme (EUDIS), the EDF, the European Defence Agency and Ukraine’s Brave1 defence innovation platform, creating new opportunities for joint technology development, testing, investment and industrial cooperation.
Cooperation in the field of unmanned systems also intensified. In July 2026, the EU- Ukraine Drone Alliance is bringing together Ukrainian operational experience and rapid innovation cycles with European industrial capacity. The Alliance aims to supporting joint ventures and accelerating the development and production of next-generation drone and counter-drone systems.
The Ukraine Support Loan (UASL), covering 2026-27, provides a major financing framework to support Ukraine’s defence needs and the integration of the Ukrainian and European defence industrial bases. The implementation of the Security Action for Europe (SAFE) instrument and the European Defence Industry Programme (EDIP) and its Ukraine Support Instrument (USI), create additional opportunities for industrial cooperation, joint procurement, co-production, and gradual integration.
Despite growing cooperation, joint production and industrial integration remain constrained by defence export restrictions, intellectual property and technology transfer issues, limited financing, weak supply chain integration and fragmented regulatory and procurement frameworks in Ukraine. Further alignment of technical standards and more transparent procurement practices would facilitate industrial integration, partnerships and co-production.
Civil protection and disaster resilience
Despite Russia's full-scale war of aggression, Ukraine continues improving its resilience through robust civil protection and disaster risk management. Ukraine is an active participant in the UCPM and has proven that its national and local civil protection systems can deal effectively with human-induced crises, while itis improving its capacity to deal with natural hazards.
5. ABILITY TO ASSUME THE OBLIGATIONS OF MEMBERSHIP
CLUSTER 2: INTERNAL MARKET
This cluster covers: the free movement of goods (Chapter 1); freedom of movement for workers (Chapter 2); right of establishment and freedom to provide services (Chapter 3); free movement of capital (Chapter 4); company law (Chapter 6); intellectual property law (Chapter 7); competition policy (Chapter 8); financial services (Chapter 9); and consumer and health protection (Chapter 28).
Chapter 1 - Free movement of goods
The free movement of goods ensures that many products can be traded freely across the EU based on common rules and procedures. Where products are governed by national
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rules, the principle of the free movement of goods prevents these rules from creating unjustified barriers to trade.
General principles
The Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA) provides for the possibility to conclude an Agreement on Conformity Assessment and Acceptance of Industrial Products (ACAA) once Ukraine fully aligns and implements the relevant EU harmonised acquis, and selected product legislation. The preparations for negotiating an ACAA made significant progress in the identified actions, following the adoption of the legislation aiming to align with the EU acquis on accreditation and conformity assessment, and market surveillance, as well as technical regulation on machinery.
Non-harmonised areas
Ukraine is not aligned with all the general principles governing the free movement of goods. It has not started activities for screening national technical regulations for compliance with Articles 34-36 of the TFEU and relevant CJEU case law.
Harmonised area: quality infrastructure
Ukraine’s legislation is fully aligned with the EU acquis on standardisation. The national standards body needs to replace staffing losses and to apply to becoming a full member to the European Committee for Standardisation (CEN), the European Committee for Electrotechnical Standardisation (CENELEC), the European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI) as well as European Association of National Metrology Institutes (EURAMET). Ukraine is aligned to the EU acquis on accreditation and on conformity assessment and is partly aligned on metrology. Ukraine has currently 77 conformity assessment bodies, an increase of 15 since 2025, covering over 20 sectors.
Ukraine is largely aligned with the EU acquis on market surveillance; however Ukrainian market surveillance bodies continue to lack funding and face serious staffing issues. During 2025, the market surveillance authorities conducted 4 130 scheduled and 2 792 unscheduled inspections resulting in 25 556 corrective measures.
Harmonised area: sectoral legislation
During the reporting period, Ukraine adopted legislation intended to be fully aligned with the EU ‘new and global approach’ product acquis on machinery.
No progress was made on alignment with EU ‘old approach’ product acquis.
No developments were recorded on procedural measures.
On anti-corruption, insufficient risk mitigation and effective penalties remain a serious challenge regarding market surveillance, and no progress was made in the reporting period.
Chapter 2 - Freedom of movement for workers
Citizens of one Member State have the right to work in another Member State and must be given the same working and social conditions as other workers.
On access to the labour market, no significant legislative developments took place in the reporting period. Ukraine’s legislation is not aligned with the EU acquis on access to the labour market. EU citizens also do not have access to public posts.
In December 2025, Ukraine adopted a new Employment Strategy, which includes preparatory measures for Ukraine’s future participation in the European Network of Employment Services (EURES) and for the implementation of the acquis on free movement of workers, with the objective of expanding worker mobility and strengthening vacancy and working conditions information exchange.
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On the coordination of social security systems, there were no developments on establishing an electronic system for exchange of social security data. No new agreement on social security coordination was signed with Member States during the reporting period
With regards to the European Health Insurance Card, a national health insurance card has yet to be implemented in Ukraine.
Chapter 3 - Right of establishment and freedom to provide services
EU natural and legal persons have the right to establish themselves in any Member State and to provide cross-border services. For certain regulated professions, there are rules on mutual recognition of qualifications. EU rules on postal services focus on improving the quality of universal service, gradual market opening to competition, and the establishment of an independent regulator.
On the right of establishment and freedom to provide cross-border services, Ukraine should make progressive steps to align with the EU service Directive.
In the area of postal services, Ukraine is partially aligned with the Postal Services Directive and Regulation on cross-border parcel delivery services. Opening of the postal market to full competition is to be completed with the state-owned postal operator retaining a monopoly on delivery of letters and postcards. In February 2026, Ukraine adopted a government resolution on quality standards for the provision of universal postal service aligning with the Postal Services Directive. A draft Law amending the Law on Postal Services is under preparation aiming at aligning Ukrainian legislation with the Regulation on cross-border parcel delivery services, in line with commitments taken by Ukraine under the DCFTA on postal and courier services. In May 2026, Ukraine demonstrated progress in aligning with the acquis on mutual recognition of professional qualifications by developing a test version of the Unified Register of Qualifications. The register enables Ukraine to formally designate regulated professions and facilitates access to information, thereby demonstrating progress towards alignment with Article 57 of the Directive on the recognition of professional qualifications, which governs central online access to information.
Chapter 4 - Free movement of capital
In the EU, capital and investments must be able to move without restrictions, with common rules for cross-border payments. Banks and other economic operators apply certain rules to support the fight against money laundering and terrorist financing.
On capital movements, the National Bank (NBU) continued implementing its strategy to gradually ease the war-related foreign exchange restrictions and transition towards greater exchange rate flexibility. In particular, the NBU introduced limited relaxation of foreign exchange restrictions aimed at supporting the defence industry, facilitating the restructuring of outstanding external loans, and easing exports of agricultural machinery. The NBU also expanded the list of cases where banks may execute certain foreign exchange transactions abroad, including for specific trade-related and public payment purposes. These measures represent continued gradual liberalisation, although significant restrictions introduced under martial law remain in place. As soon as conditions allow, Ukraine should lift the restrictions enacted following martial law and continue the liberalisation of pre-existing restrictions to foreign exchange transactions. In addition, Ukraine should remove the restrictions remaining in national legislation on the acquisition of agricultural land by EU nationals, which are contrary to the EU acquis.
On payments system, work continued with the aim to further align with the Payment Service Directive II. Further work on the legislative framework, including the preparation of amendments and implementing measures by the relevant authorities, is ongoing. Ukraine continued modernising its payment infrastructure, including through the introduction of new functionalities in the System of Electronic Payments based on the ISO 2022 standard, as
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well as further steps towards the development of open banking and instant payment services.
On the fight against money laundering and terrorism financing (AML/CFT), in December 2025, the government resubmitted to Parliament a comprehensive legislative package aiming to align with the AML/CFT EU acquis,including the establishment of the register of accounts and individual bank safes of natural persons and the register of beneficial owners of trusts and similar legal arrangements. The delay in adopting this legislation continues to hinder Ukraine’s efforts to advance alignment with the EU AML/CFT framework. In June 2026, the Parliament adopted legislation limiting the financial monitoring of former politically exposed persons (PEPs). The provisions were amended in October before their entry into force. Ukraine should further align with the EU acquis on politically exposed persons aspects. Further progress is needed in the regulation and supervision of crypto-assets and their service providers. The draft law on virtual assets aiming to align with the Transfer of Funds Regulation was approved by Parliament in first reading in September 2025 and is still pending adoption.
The 4th AML/CFT National Risk Assessment has been adopted in August 2026. The government should now elaborate a comprehensive national plan addressing the identified risks.
In 2025, the Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU) received almost two million reports on financial transactions, an increase of 11% compared to 2024. Banks remained the predominant source of reports, while reporting by the non-financial sector continues to be very limited and requires further strengthening. In 2025, the FIU received 11 523 beneficial ownership discrepancy reports, but the capacity of the Ministry of Justice to process them needs strengthening.
The functioning of the FIU continues to face resource constraints, while its strategic documents have expired and have yet to be renewed. Ukraine should strengthen its operational independence and administrative capacity, including through the introduction of periodic independent effectiveness audits of the AML/CFT system and a transparent competitive selection procedure for the head of the FIU, alongside a time-bound mandate.
Chapter 6 - Company law
The EU has common rules on the formation, registration and disclosure requirements of a company, with complementary rules for accounting and financial reporting, and statutory audit.
In the area of company law and corporate governance, Ukraine modernised the Unified State Register, including through the introduction of functionality for a European Unique Identifier (EUID), technical improvements facilitating the registration, modification and termination of branches and representative offices of foreign legal entities, and the resumption of publication of business-register data in open data format, subject to some restrictions under martial law. Amendments to the Civil Code and other legislative acts regarding the introduction of the procedure for divisions by acquisition were drawn up in 2026. Partial alignment with the EU acquis on fully online registration and disclosure of company information has been carried out. Ukrainian legislation shall continue aligning with the EU acquis regarding the disqualification of directors, particularly for limited liability companies. The National Securities and Stock Market Commission (NSSMC) adopted a resolution providing further clarity on the disclosure framework applicable to issuers of securities, collateral providers, and corporate rights advisers during martial law, including revised deadlines for outstanding annual and interim reporting obligations. The NSSMC also initiated work on updating the national Corporate Governance Code. Ukraine should ensure that the revised code and the monitoring of its implementation closely align with relevant EU acquis and retains strong anti-corruption safeguards. Ukraine should also complete alignment with the Directive 2024/1760 on corporate sustainability due diligence (CSDDD),
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as amended by the Directive (EU) 2026/470 (Omnibus I). The amendments simplified some of the obligations and postponed the transposition deadline to July 2028 and the application deadline to July 2029.
In the area of company reporting and statutory audit, Ukraine prepared draft legislation to amend the Law on Accounting and Financial Reporting, introducing sustainability reporting requirements. Ukraine also prepared draft legislation amending the Law on Audit of Financial Statements and Auditing to introduce requirements related to the assurance of sustainability reporting. Ukraine should adopt these pending pieces of legislation.
Chapter 7 - Intellectual property law
The EU has to a large extent harmonised rules for the legal protection and enforcement of copyright and related rights, as well as of industrial property rights, including trademarks, designs, patents and related supplementary protection certificates (SPCs), geographical indications (GIs), including craft and industrial GIs.
On copyright and related rights, Ukraine continued its work to align its legislation with the EU acquis. Concerns remain notably on collective rights management, in particular, with regard to the accreditation of collective management organisations during martial law, discrepancies between collected and distributed royalties, particularly for EU rightsholders, and transparency of the system as a core requirement of the EU acquis.
On industrial property rights, in October 2025, guidelines on granting legal protection to a trademark that contains or derives from a geographical indication were approved. Further steps are required towards alignment with Regulation 2023/2411 to extend the protection of GIs to craft and industrial products. Ukraine started preparations for the accession to the Geneva Act of the Lisbon Agreement on appellations of origin and geographical indications, including the designation of the competent authority responsible for its application.
On the enforcement of intellectual property rights, Ukraine drafted an IPR Strategy until 2030. The Ukrainian National Office for Intellectual Property and Innovations (UANIPIO) published its consolidated 2025 data on enforcement in July 2026, pointing to a downward trend in the total number of court cases and a gradual increase in the effectiveness of the work of law enforcement agencies (customs, police, Economic Security Bureau) as well as a substantial rise in the UANIPIO’s appeals chamber’s activities. Implementing provisions for the IP-related articles of the new Customs Code, such as simplified procedure to confirm the infringement of IP rights by the rightsholder at the border, require enactment. The growing availability of counterfeit products, including plant varieties, should be addressed, in particular through enhanced interinstitutional cooperation. Specialised trainings were organised for judges, police officers and investigators of the Economic Security Bureau. These trainings should continue and include prosecutors.
On the institutional framework, UANIPIO maintained close collaboration with the European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO), in particular through the EU4IP project. Ukraine advanced its integration with tools and common practices of the European Union Intellectual Property Network. The integration of data on national designs (from UANIPIO Special Information System API) into the EUIPO was completed in July.
Chapter 8 - Competition policy
EU rules protect free competition. They include antitrust rules against restrictive agreements between companies and abuse of dominant position and also include rules on concentrations between companies which would significantly impede effective competition. EU rules also set out a system of State aid control. Governments are only allowed to grant State aid if restrictive conditions are met, with a view to preventing distortion of competition.
Antitrust and mergers
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On the legislative framework, some provisions of the Law on the protection of economic competition and the implementing legislation still need to be aligned with the EU acquis. The Antimonopoly Committee (AMCU) adopted a new Methodology for defining product markets and dominant positions.
On implementation, in the area of antitrust and mergers, AMCU continued adopting decisions in cases for anticompetitive concerted actions, abuse of dominant position and mergers. The amounts of fines imposed by the AMCU as a conclusion to these cases was UAH 773.7 million. AMCU further applied leniency mechanism in three cases, resulting in decisions on full exemption of liability, and did not carry any dawn raid. The AMCU’s enforcement record could be further improved.
State aid
On the legislative framework, draft laws aiming at further aligning the State aid framework with the EU acquis were not adopted yet, including on lifting the suspension of the application of State aid control by the Antimonopoly Committee, and on the separation of accounts between PSO and non-PSO activities in key state-owned enterprises. Ukraine approved further implementing provisions on criteria for assessing the compatibility of State aid to undertakings, namely in the area of transport services and in the area of scientific research, technical development and innovation.
On implementation, in the area of State aid control remains suspended under the martial law, and there is no obligation to notify to AMCU new or modified State aid measures. However, the inventory of state aid measures has been further updated by AMCU.
Chapter 9 - Financial services
EU rules aim at ensuring fair competition among, and the stability of, financial institutions, namely banking, insurance, supplementary pensions, investment services and securities markets. They include rules on authorisation, operation and supervision of these institutions.
On banking and financial conglomerates, in December 2025, the National Bank of Ukraine (NBU) published the results of the 2025 resilience assessment of the banking sector. The NBU reported that the implementation of capitalisation and risk profile strengthening programmes for such banks are underway.
The NBU has further advanced alignment of prudential requirements with the Capital Requirements Regulation/Capital Requirements Directive framework, including on significant exposures, internal audit, risk management, and prudential disclosures. The NBU also reintroduced requirements for banks to form capital buffers starting from 1 January 2027, which further strengthens the resilience of the banking sector.
Legislation on covered bonds was also adopted, aiming to align Ukraine’s legal framework with the Covered Bond Directive.
Progress was made in establishing a framework for non-performing loans (NPL) resolution through the adoption of legislation simplifying debt enforcement procedures.
On bank resolution and crisis management, preparatory work for future alignment with the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD) advanced through EU-funded technical assistance. The DGF applied the bridge bank resolution tool, increasing the operational capacity of resolution mechanisms. The resolution framework remains to be further developed, notably through alignment with BRRD and requirements on deposit guarantee schemes.
On insurance and occupational pensions, the NBU continued strengthening the supervisory and regulatory framework for non-bank financial institutions, including through actions aiming at further alignment with Solvency II principles and the introduction of risk- based supervisory approaches. The NBU also refined its regulatory framework for off-site
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supervision, temporary administration, and detection of unlicensed activities. However, further efforts are needed to align with the EU acquis and to strengthen supervisory capacity.
On financial market infrastructure, the National Securities and Stock Market Commission (NSSMC) started preparatory work for a new Law on Financial Market Infrastructure, defining the legal and institutional framework for trading, clearing, settlement and depository systems. The NSSMC adopted a resolution to improve settlement arrangements through regulated proprietary securities accounts for clearing institutions.
On the securities markets and investment services, as of 1 January 2026, amendments to the Law on State Regulation of Capital Markets and Organised Commodity Markets entered into force, strengthening guarantees of NSSMC independence, clarifying appointment and dismissal procedures, enhancing investigative powers, and updating the framework for market abuse and insider information disclosure.Further improvements are needed to strengthenappointment procedures for NSSMC Commissioners, including through greater involvement of independent members in nomination committees. The NSSMC approved a regulatory alignment roadmap on 23 September 2025, covering priority areas including investment services, market abuse, derivatives, and collective investment schemes. The Law on Credit Rating Agencies entered into force on 1 January 2026. In July 2026, NSSMC became a full signatory of the International Organisation of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) Multilateral Memorandum of Understanding Concerning Consultation and Cooperation and the Exchange of Information.
Legislation on securitisation was also adopted, aiming to align Ukraine’s legal framework with the Securitisation Regulation.
On sustainable and digital finance, in February 2026, the NBU issued recommendations to banks on corporate governance practices aimed at integrating sustainability, environmental, social, and governance considerations. In March 2026, the NBU published an ESG glossary for the financial sector. A draft law aiming to align with the Market in Crypto- Assets Regulation (MiCA) remains to be adopted. On digital operational resilience, a regulation on the implementation of measures to ensure information security and cybersecurity by financial service providers was adopted by the NBU, laying the foundation for alignment with the EU Regulation on digital operational resilience for the financial sector (DORA). Rules on critical information infrastructure within the financial sector were also adopted by the NBU. Gaps remain regarding cross-sectoral testing, third-party ICT risk oversight and harmonised incident reporting.
Chapter 28 - Consumer and health protection
EU rules protect consumers’ economic interests and in relation to product safety, dangerous imitations and liability for defective product. The EU also ensures high common standards for tobacco control, blood, tissues, cells and organs, and medicines for human and veterinary use. The EU also has rules for upholding patients’ rights in cross-border healthcare, and in preparing for and responding to cross-border health threats including communicable diseases.
Consumer protection
On product safety-related issues, the Law on market surveillance and control of non-food products was adopted on 8 April 2026. The adoption of legislation aligned with the general product safety regulation is needed. Ukraine continued working towards gaining access to the European rapid alert system for dangerous consumer products (Safety Gate). On non- safety-related issues, there was no progress.
Public health
On horizontal aspects, progress continued in the health financingreform, including the programme of medical guarantees, increasing funding towards universal coverage and prioritising vulnerable population groups. Health governance needs strengthening. In 2025,
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the approval of a strategy for healthcare system development until 2030 and relative action plan marked a step forward, but their implementation requires sustained political commitment and adequate resourcing.
On e-Health, Ukraine is at an early stage in developing a Health Information System strategy, with fragmented systems persisting, and alignment with the European Health Data Space remains constrained. The Public Health Information platform has a legal basis.
On tobacco control, Ukrainelaunched the ‘eTobacco’ electronic reporting system and took measures to address illicit trade, but gaps remain in supply chain control, due diligence obligations, enforcement capacity, and international cooperation mechanisms.
On communicable diseases, Ukraine strengthened cross-border health threats and public health emergency preparedness. Access to HIV, hepatitis, and tuberculosis prevention, testing, and treatment for people who use drugs is uneven and often inadequate. Immunisation now includes a vaccine against human papillomavirus. Ukraine has implemented a strategy and action plan to combat antimicrobial resistance.
On tissues, cells, and organs, there was no progress on alignment with the EU acquis. On patients’ rights in cross-border healthcare, Ukraine should adopt legislation aligned with the EU acquis.
On veterinary medicinal products Ukraine adopted the Law on veterinary medicine and animal welfare, which has not been sent to the Commission for assessment of its alignment yet. Its implementation remains at an early stage, and most secondary legislation is lacking. This includes key elements such as good manufacturing practices’ requirements for veterinary medicinal products, for which the current transition period in the above-mentioned law ends by 1st July 2027. On medicines for human use, Ukraine’s Law on medicinal products partially aligns with the main provisions of the EU acquis but most secondary legislation is lacking, and additional administrative and enforcement capacity need to be put in place before the law’s entry into force in 2027. Ukraine introduced measures to improve access to medicines and supply chains and established general requirements for planning, organisation, conduct and documentation of the results of clinical trials. On 4thJune 2026, Ukraine approved a resolution establishing the Ukrainian Pharmaceutical Agency, which will begin its operations on 1st January 2027. The selection process of its head is ongoing. Ukraine should ensure that the Agency has the necessary human and financial resources and operates effectively and according to integrity standards.
Ukraine has made significant progress on alignment with the EU acquis on health technology assessment.
On cosmetic products, Ukraine has achieved a high level of alignment with the EU acquis. On medical devices, there was no progress on alignment with the EU acquis.
On mental health, the National Commission on Mental Health was established. The Commission encourages Ukraine to use as reference the Commission Communication on a comprehensive approach to mental health (COM(2023) 298) adopted on 7 June 2023.
Ukraine introduced a national health screening programme for individuals aged 40 years and older, aimed at the early detection of non-communicable diseases, with a focus on cardiovascular diseases. The Commission encourages Ukraine to use as reference the Commission Communication on an EU cardiovascular health plan: the Safe Hearts Plan (COM(2025) 1024) adopted on 16 December 2025. On cancer, Ukraine approved the 2026- 2028 Action Plan for the National Cancer Control Strategy until 2030. Cancer screenings exist for cervical, breast, and colorectal cancers.
On nutrition and healthy lifestyles, the 2026-2028 Action Plan sets practical measures ranging from prevention and awareness to early identification and treatment of alcohol dependence.
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On health inequalities, all population groups are entitled to the same service packages under the programme of medical guarantees. In rural, hard to reach, and heavily war affected areas, however, inequalities persist in both accessibility and quality of health services. The most disadvantaged populations (including Roma, LGBTIQ persons, prisoners, and adult drug users) sometimes experience discrimination or stigmatisation but the situation is gradually improving. At the same time, vertical equity policies, such as preferential treatment and quotas, are being progressively introduced for a broader spectrum of vulnerable groups.
On disabilities, Ukraine adopted a new system for assessing a person’s functioning in daily life and barrier-free principles for the provision of medical and rehabilitation services in healthcare facilities. The Commission encourages Ukraine to use the new EU guidelines on improving access to healthcare for people with disabilities: see at EU launches new guidelines to improve healthcare access for persons with disabilities - AccessibleEU.
The Ministry of Health is expected to adopt a new anti-corruption programme. The government introduced the requirement for health facilities to establish supervisory boards by 2027. Despite limited progress in the mitigation of corruption risks in market surveillance, progress was recorded in corruption repression, with several investigations in market surveillance authorities. Strengthening the governance transparency of the programme of medical guarantees through decision-making, clear institutional roles, and publicly accessible criteria for resource allocation, would constitute a structural anti-corruption measure with significant impact.
CLUSTER 3: COMPETITIVENESS AND INCLUSIVE GROWTH
This cluster covers: digital transformation and media (Chapter 10); taxation (Chapter 16); economic and monetary policy (Chapter 17); social policy and employment (Chapter 19); industrial policy (Chapter 20); science and research (Chapter 25); education and culture (Chapter 26); and customs union (Chapter 29).
Chapter 10 - Digital transformation and media
The EU supports the smooth functioning of the internal market for electronic communications, electronic commerce and audiovisual media services. The rules protect consumers and support the universal availability of modern services.
On digital services, Ukraine continued to expand and upgrade the Diia ecosystem. Diia.AI, the national AI assistant, was launched in late 2025 and continued to evolve during the reporting period. The Diia.Education platform continued to support digital literacy, with more than 2.9 million registered users by 2026. In December 2025, the Ministry of Digital Transformation upgraded the Diia app and portal to improve compliance with accessibility standards and ensure barrier-free access to digital public services. E-Apostille, e-Notary and
other online legal services continued to be implemented, enabling citizens in Ukraine and abroad to carry out legal procedures online. A draft law on digital accessibility was registered in Parliament.
As regards digital services acquis, Ukraine has taken initial steps to establish the institutional framework and build capacity for implementing EU digital legislation. Ukraine needs to take further steps to build the societal and institutional capacity and to establish the legal basis to effectively support the enforcement of the Digital Services Act and the Digital Markets Act as of EU accession, in line with the considerations and requirements outlined at the 2026 TAIEX workshops. Ukraine should also continue to align with the European Interoperability Framework to make public services more efficient and better serve businesses and citizens.
On electronic communications,Ukraine joined the EU’s Roam Like at Home area on 1 January 2026, following alignment with the EU roaming acquis. Ukraine launched consultation in May 2026 on a draft law to strengthen the independence of the National
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Commission for the State Regulation of Electronic Communications, Radio Frequency Spectrum and Postal Services (NCEC). Ukraine also made progress in aligning with the EU acquis in the area of electronic communications infrastructure. Building on partial alignment with the Broadband Cost Reduction Directive (BCRD), Ukraine should continue aligning with the Gigabit Infrastructure Act (GIA) beyond provisions on the single information point, judicial remedies, access point and exemptions for certain types of civil works. Ukraine has not yet been able to fully implement acts related to the regulatory framework for radio spectrum policy, in particular the release of the 700 MHz band from TV broadcasting for mobile communications as a result of security constraints. The allocation of the 700 MHz band to mobile operators planned for 2026, should support the future deployment of 5G networks, including security requirements in line with the 5G Cybersecurity Toolbox.,
Ukraine continued to invest in digital solutions for the delivery of public services and promotion of governance transparency, with positive implications for corruption prevention and public budget savings. Platforms like Diia, Prozorro and DREAM facilitate service delivery, public procurement and reconstruction management and should be further enhanced to ensure end-to-end coverage.
Ukraine made some further progress on open data usage, maintaining more than 35 000 datasets on its open data portal. In September 2025, the government adopted a decision updating the list of datasets subject to publication as open data and identified datasets of high value, contributing to alignment with the Open Data Directive. Alignment with the EU acquis, includingthe Open Data Directive and Data Governance Act, remains partial and requires further legislative amendments.
On digital trust, Ukraine advanced in developing a digital identity wallet aligned with the EU Digital Identity Framework (eIDAS 2.0). The legal act on the functioning of the Integrated Electronic Identification System entered into force, reflecting the principles of the European Digital Identity Framework. The recognition of specific Ukrainian trust services as qualified under EU law is ongoing.
On cybersecurity, Ukraine continued to strengthen its legal framework and institutional capacity, supported by the cybersecurity strategy, updated legislation and the operational role of SSSCIP, CERT-UA and other relevant bodies. Further implementation of the EU acquis is needed to ensure full alignment with the NIS2 Directive.
Cooperation with ENISA and other EU cyber institutions advanced, strengthening Ukraine’s cyber resilience in the context of Russia’s ongoing war of aggression. In March 2026, Ukraine ratified the amendment to its Association Agreement to the EU Digital Europe Programme, enabling access to the EU Cybersecurity Reserve. Access to the EU Cybersecurity Reserve was granted by the Council on 15 June.
Regarding 5G security, Ukraine adopted a Protocol of Intent between the responsible authorities, including an action plan to develop 5G security rules in line with the EU 5G Cybersecurity Toolbox, including the exclusion of high-risk suppliers, and committed to aligning with the 5G Cybersecurity Toolbox. During the reporting period, the draft legislative package that implements the EU 5G Cybersecurity Toolbox has not yet been adopted. The legislative framework should be in place before any commercial assignment of 5G spectrum rights. Meanwhile, 5G pilot projects were implemented in Kyiv, Lviv, Borodianka and Kharkiv. Ukraine should effectively address risks stemming from the use of high-risk suppliers in these pilots.
On media, Ukrainian legislation remains largely in line with the Audiovisual Media Services Directive but is only partially aligned with the European Media Freedom Act (EMFA). As for AVMSD, further alignment requires, among others, removing the requirement for state registration of the media regulator’s legal acts, strengthening legal safeguards for the regulator’s independence, and ensuring adequate financial and human resources. Moreover, while the current media restrictions imposed by martial law, including restricting the
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transmission of programmes and audiovisual commercial content/communications, are still considered necessary to protect Ukraine’s information space in the current security situation, they will need to be reassessed upon lifting of martial law to meet the requirements under the AVMSD.
As for EMFA, Ukraine should continue the legislative works needed to implement the Regulation and ensure compliance with its provisions.
A new legislation entered into force in January 2026 to strengthen certain guarantees for media and journalists and improve access to information. However, a number of draft laws to align with the EU media acquis remain pending, including the draft law aimed to implement the EMFA.
On semiconductors, Ukraine is not fully aligned with the Chips Act. No formal progress was recorded in the reporting period.
On artificial Intelligence (AI), Ukraine should develop the necessary legal, governance and enforcement structures in line with the EU AI Act. Ukraine has adopted the National AI Strategy 2030 and is preparing draft legislation on regulating AI.
In relation to the protection of minors online, a Safer Internet Centre is operating in Ukraine with co-funding received under the Digital Europe Programme.
Chapter 16 - Taxation
EU rules on taxation cover value added tax and excise duties and aspects of corporate taxation. They also cover cooperation between tax administrations, including the exchange of information to prevent tax evasion.
Ukraine continued further aligning the national legislation on indirect taxation with the EU acquis. The temporary VAT exemption for importing electric vehicles into Ukraine was removed in January 2026. In March 2026, the Ministry of Finance adopted an order clarifying the VAT treatment for software programmes aimed at ensuring compliance with Article 24 of the EU VAT Directive. Legislation removing the VAT exemption on low-valued imported parcels was adopted in September 2026. However, further steps are needed to align national VAT rules with the EU acquis. Alignment with EU excise duty rates on alcohol, tobacco and energy products is ongoing, notably with the gradual revision of rates on manufactured tobacco by 2028. Ukraine still needs to align its tax warehousing system for alcohol, tobacco and energy products with the EU acquis.
On direct taxation, there has been no reform of the personal income tax. Moreover, the
corporate income tax is not yet fully in line with the EU acquis. The legislative work is
ongoing to align the national tax corporate framework with the rules of the EU Anti-Tax
Avoidance Directive.
On administrative cooperation and mutual assistance, secondary legislation implementing
the OECD Common Reporting Standard 2.0, which modernises financial account reporting
and brings it closer to the provisions of the EU Directive on Administrative Cooperation (DAC
8), was adopted in June 2026. The Law on certification of digital platform operators was
adopted in June 2026, in line with the provisions of the DAC 7. The first exchange of tax
information under the OECD country-by-country reporting standard corresponding to the
DAC 4 requirements for the reporting year 2024 was carried out in June 2026. Ukraine has
individual double taxation agreements in place with all EU Member States.
On operational capacity and digitalisation, the functionality of the State Tax Service’s online information system was improved with connections to the VAT Information Exchange System (VIES) to verify the validity of VAT identification numbers for taxpayers registered in the EU. The State Tax Service has further modernised tax administration with the e-audit IT
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solution – a digital, risk-based system replacing manual document checks with automated data analysis.
The State Tax Service adopted its Anti-Corruption Programme for 2026-2028. Internal anti- corruption controls resulted in 198 disciplinary sanctions, 17 criminal proceedings and 5 criminal charges. In the reporting period, four regional heads and senior officials of the State Tax Service were charged with bribery, kickbacks and abuse of office, while the acting head was dismissed amidst criminal investigations by anti-corruption authorities.
Chapter 17 - Economic and monetary policy
EU rules require the independence of central banks and prohibit them from directly financing the public sector. Member States coordinate their economic policies and are subject to fiscal, economic and financial surveillance.
In terms of monetary policy, the National Bank of Ukraine (NBU) has maintained its medium-term inflation-targeting framework, reintroduced in September 2024, while continuing a gradual liberalisation of foreign exchange restrictions – most recently in March 2026 – without triggering significant market volatility. Progress has been made in easing capital controls, including expanded dividend repatriation, relaxed settlement deadlines for key export sectors, and targeted exemptions for defence industry transfers. The NBU has avoided direct budget financing since 2023, although permitted under the martial law. However, further efforts are needed to fully comply with the monetary financing prohibition upon the lifting of martial law in Ukraine. In addition, full alignment with the EU acquis requires the adoption of measures to strengthen the independence of the NBU such as explicitly prioritising price stability as the primary objective, providing for safeguards against political interference and dismissal of the NBU Governor or board members and ensuring judicial review rights.
On economic policy, numerical fiscal rules have been continually suspended through the annual budget laws since the start of the Russia’s war of aggression. Medium-term budget planning was reinstated in 2024, bringing it closer to the requirements of EU legislation on medium-term budget frameworks. The 2027–2029 Budget Declaration represented a further step in this direction. It included a policy baseline scenario setting out the trajectory of the main revenue and expenditure indicators under unchanged policies, as well as an active- policy scenario incorporating planned revenue and expenditure measures and explaining how the government intends to achieve its medium-term fiscal objectives. The Budget Declaration also quantified the gap between the fiscal balance under current policies and defined fiscal objectives agreed with the IMF, explained changes in macroeconomic assumptions and deviations between previous forecasts, and included explanations on how public investment projects were reflected in the medium-term fiscal projections. However, further steps are needed to ensure full alignment with EU standards. These include: (i) consolidating general government data in line with the European System of Accounts methodology; and (ii) preparing and publishing detailed medium-term projections for both the baseline and active-policy scenarios covering the general government. Ukraine has not yet established an independent fiscal institution, though initial preparatory steps have been taken. Martial law and security concerns continue to disrupt the collection of key macroeconomic and financial statistics, including those needed for the macroeconomic imbalance procedure, as well as budget reporting.
Chapter 19 - Social policy and employment
EU rules in the social field include minimum standards for labour law, equality, health and safety at work and non-discrimination. They also promote social inclusion and social protection, and social dialogue at EU level.
In the area of labour law, the Ukraine national labour legislative framework needs to be modernised and aligned with the EU acquis. A draft of the new labour code was submitted to
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the Parliament in September 2026. Significant work is needed to further align the draft legislation with the relevant EU acquis.
On occupational health and safety at work (OSH) the current national legal framework has yet to be aligned with the EU acquis and international standards. As a first step, Ukraine should adopt legislation to align with the OSH Framework Directive 89/391/EEC.
Labour inspection legislation is not yet aligned with international labour standards. The capacity of the State Labour Service is limited. Inspection visits for undeclared work increased from 112 in 2024 to 267 in 2025. Inspections on labour safety increased from 695 in 2024 to 1 215 in 2025.
On social dialogue, a new President of the National Tripartite Social and Economic Council (NTSEC) was appointed in May 2026 and a meeting of the Presidium of the NTSEC was held in March 2026. Trade unions reported a lack of meaningful consultations of social partners on draft labour and occupational health and safety legislation, stating this contradicts the MoU signed between the government and social partners in July 2025, which enshrined the signatories’ shared commitment to advancing Ukraine’s labour reforms and strengthening social dialogue, as part of Ukraine’s accession process. An enabling environment for effective social dialogue needs to be ensured and capacities for both bipartite and tripartite social dialogue need to be strengthened.
On employment policy, the State Employment Service (SES) trained 93 000 people in 2025, a 26% increase from 2024. SES assisted 394 000 people to find employment in 2025, 19% more than 2024. In January 2026, a new Employment Strategy until 2030 was approved. In view of the implementation of the Youth Guarantee, the capacities of relevant actors, including the State Employment Service need reinforcing. Building on the State Employment Service’s strong operational resilience, adaptability, and openness to change, further strengthening its strategic and performance management, evidence-based service design and analytical capacities would support the implementation of the Employment Strategy and the Youth Guarantee.
The national budget for social inclusion and protection in 2026 increased by 10%, but adequacy remains a barrier, especially for persons with disabilities and persons in vulnerable situations. Bylaws to operationalise the law on social services need to be adopted and integrated social services at community level should be developed. Basic principles of housing policy legislation were adopted in January 2026, marking a step forward for the adoption of the social housing fund legislation. A new Strategy on Internally Displaced Persons was adopted in June 2026 and the law on basic social assistance was adopted on 13 October 2026.
Implementation of the Strategy for ensuring the right of every child to grow up in a family environment moved steadily forward. While the number has been decreasing, further work is needed as the number of children in institutions remains high (23 524 in 2025) with a significant proportion being children with disabilities. Patronage and adoptions have increased. Most local authorities still lack the resources and capacity to sustain quality, community-based
social services and alternative care options. The delivery of specialised training for professionals in childcare require strengthening, and the adequacy of skilled staff and professionalised social workforce needs enhancing. In this respect, Commission Notice - Guidance on independent living for persons with disabilities should be taken into account.
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On 8 April 2026, Ukraine approved the Action Plan for the implementation of the European Child Guarantee until 2030.
In the field of non-discrimination in employment and social policy, alignment with EU legislation remains incomplete, including as regards the Employment Equality Directive and the Racial Equality Directive. A law amending legislation to ensure the right of persons with disabilities to employment came into effect in January 2026. Ukraine needs to adopt implementing bylaws and ensure that mechanism for reasonable accommodation becomes effective. Legislation on equal treatment in employment and occupation should further align with the EU acquis. Unemployment rates among Roma remain high and more targeted efforts are needed to improve employment opportunities. In February 2026, Ukraine adopted legislation strengthening mechanisms against gender discrimination and sexual harassment in the armed forces.
On equality between women and men in employment and social policy, legislation needs to further align with the EU acquis. Legislative amendments to support families with children and create conditions that facilitate the combination of parenthood and professional activity was adopted in November 2025. Ukraine adopted in May 2026 the 2026-2028 operational plan for the implementation of the National Strategy to Close the Gender Pay Gap for the period up to 2030. Women are still underrepresented in managerial positions in the civil service.
Over the reporting period, the agreement for Ukraine’s participation in the Employment and Social Innovation (EaSI) Strand of the European Social Fund + (ESF+) entered into force.
Chapter 20 - Enterprise and industrial policy
EU industrial policy strengthens competitiveness, facilitates structural change and encourages a business-friendly environment that stimulates small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs).
On enterprise and industrial policy, some progress was made with the implementation of the SME Strategy. As of 25 June 2026, 35 out of 86 implementation measures were self- declared completed, while 47 are in progress, and four are not yet due. The notable measures include a Government Resolution establishing a unified format for business plans submitted under state support programmes for SMEs. The design of a dedicated industrial strategy hasn’t progressed to public consultation or adoption.
The Digital Innovation Development Strategy until 2030 started implementation phase focusing on the first three-year operational plan to integrate artificial intelligence and defence technologies into Ukraine’s economy.
The Law on the Main Principles of State Oversight was adopted in April 2026. The Law establishes the legal and organisational framework for state inspections, and reduces the administrative burden on business entities, notably by introducing audits and insurance, and downsizing the number of inspections.
On enterprise and industrial policy instruments, the Diia.Business project, that is jointly implemented by the Ministry of Digital Transformation and the Entrepreneurship and Export Promotion Office, continued to strengthen the entrepreneurial infrastructure – from new digital instruments (six e-services, five educational programmes, six online courses) to greater access to markets (13 national stands, 680 export consultations and 150 export market studies in 2025).
On small and medium-sized enterprises, the Law on the national development institution, in place since January 2026, sets out operational models and a special mandate to improve access to finance for target groups, mainly MSMEs. In 2025, the 5-7-9% programme delivered over 30 000 loans to businesses. The largest volumes of credit funds were provided for businesses in high war-risk areas, for development of the processing industries and investment projects.
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With regards to the Late Payment Directive, an analysis of the enforcement practices in the EU countries has been done with a view to develop the implementation concept for Ukraine.
On sectoral policies, the government has identified critical raw materials (CRMs) such as lithium, titanium, graphite and rare earths as a priority sector for economic development and integration into EU supply chains. In May 2026, the government endorsed the updated 2026- 2027 Roadmap under the EU-Ukraine strategic partnership for CRMs, and in June 2026 Ukraine has approved a 20-year strategy to develop the CRM and value-added industries, alongside the adoption of the operational action plan through 2028.
Chapter 25 - Science and research
The EU provides significant support for research and innovation ecosystem. All Member States can participate in the EU’s research and innovation programmes and benefit from them, especially where there is scientific excellence and solid investment in research and innovation.
In the area of research and innovation, Ukraine remains an Emerging Innovator, performing at 29% of the EU average in the European Innovation Scoreboard 2025, with the gap with the EU continuing to widen.
Expenditure on research and development remains low, at 0.39% of GDP in 2025.
Amendment to the Law on scientific and scientific-technical activity were adopted in March 2026 regarding research infrastructure and support for young scientists aiming to improve state support.
In February 2026, Ukraine conducted the first reading of the Law on Support and Development of Innovation Activities aimed at improving the regulatory framework, promoting cooperation between academia, research organisations and businesses, and facilitate the commercialisation of research results. An Action Plan 2026-2028 to implement the Strategy for the Development of Innovation Activity until 2030 was also developed. However, the innovation ecosystem needs strengthening, particularly in the areas of technology transfer, access to risk finance, support for deep-tech start-ups, and stronger links between science and industry.
On EU framework programmes, Ukrainian institutions and organsiation participate under 343 Horizon Europe projects, with 110 projects signed since September 2025, with EUR 33.45 millions net EU contribution awarded for Ukraine in the same period.. The increasing use of competitive funding schemes managed directly by the Ministry of Education and Science for institutions under its supervision raises questions about transparency, objectivity and potential conflicts of interest. At the same time, the role of the National Research Foundation of Ukraine (NRFU) as an independent funding body remains constrained by insufficient funding and inconsistencies in the legal framework applying to NRFU. To sustain the capacity to implement Horizon Europe, Ukraine needs to strengthen transparency and governance of its competitive research funding.
In December 2025, Ukraine adopted the European Research Area (ERA) roadmap for 2025- 2027 and in March 2026, the Framework Agreement between Ukraine and the EU on scientific and technological cooperation was renewed.
On Smart Specialisation, nine regions have created and trained regional teams, and conducted the Entrepreneurial Discovery Process in selected regions in 2026. Smart Specialisation Strategies in these regions are expected to be completed and move into the implementation phase.
Ukraine should continue creating and developing the rest of regional teams in order to effectively extend the Smart Specialisation process, acknowledging Ukraine's specific situation, challenges, recovery needs and integration into EU economic and innovation ecosystems
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Chapter 26 - Education and culture
The EU supports cooperation in education and culture through funding programmes and the coordination of Member State policy through the ‘open method of coordination’. The EU and the Member States must also prevent discrimination and ensure quality education for children of migrant workers, including those from disadvantaged backgrounds.
On education and training, Ukraine continued to advance on reforms focusing on system resilience, recovery and alignment with EU best practices. Safe and equitable access to quality education remains challenging. Education management information systems were further developed, but gaps remain in the availability, quality and use of disaggregated education data.
On preschool education, implementation of the Law on Preschool Education continued. A new competence-based State Standard was adopted in December 2025.
On school education, Ukraine continued to implement the New Ukrainian School reform. An updated State Standard for Primary Education was adopted in December 2025. Inclusive education arrangements were updated as well to strengthen individualised support. The reform of specialised upper secondary education advanced with 150 academic lyceums selected to pilot the new model from September 2026, ahead of nationwide implementation in 2027. Ukraine participated d in the Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA) 2025 and prepared for the Teaching and Learning International Survey (TALIS+) 2026.
On vocational education and training (VET), governance reforms progressed with the approval of a model regulation and procedure for establishing supervisory boards in VET institutions, strengthening management and links with labour market needs. The qualifications system was strengthened, including further steps to reference the National Qualifications Framework to the European Qualifications Framework. Work-based learning continued to expand, including dual education. Ukraine remained engaged in the European Alliance for Apprenticeships (EafA) following its national commitment since 2025, demonstrating its commitment to improving youth and adult employment. More local stakeholders should be encouraged to join the Alliance through pledges, enabling them to exchange good practices and strengthen quality apprenticeships.
On higher education, the government updated the Strategy for the Development of Higher Education 2022-2032 and adopted its Operational Plan for 2025-2028 in December 2025. In August 2026, Parliament adopted legislation reforming the model of state financial support for higher education.
Ukraine continued implementing Bologna Process tools, and the National action plan on external quality assurance (2024-2026). A Law on Academic Integrity was adopted in December 2025. It An audit of academic councils for the award of academic degrees was undertaken and 76 academic integrity violations sanctioned.
Ukraine continued to benefit from the international dimension of the Erasmus+ Programme.
Preparations started for establishing a dedicated Erasmus+ national agency, with a view to
participation in the next programme period.
On youth, the State Targeted Social Programme ‘Youth of Ukraine: Generation of Resilience’ (2026-2030) was adopted in January 2026.The National Youth Council commenced its work with a new composition in March 2026.
On sports, amendments to the Law on Physical Culture and Sport strengthened the legal framework for adaptive sport and sport for war veterans. The State Targeted Social Programme for the Development of Physical Culture and Sport until 2030 was adopted in December 2025. Ukraine continued taking part in the European Week of Sport.
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On culture, Ukraine continued implementing the Strategy for the Development of Culture and its operational plan for 2025-2027. Further efforts are required to operationalise the plan’s objectives, align them with the priorities of the local authorities. Ukraine continued full participation in the Creative Europe Programme.
Ukraine made progress in mitigating corruption risks, including by streamlining rules on leasing property of public education institutions, introducing mandatory conflict of interest checks in educational literature assessments, conducting institutional audits and increasing use of digital tools, such as DREAM, for funding and infrastructure investments.
Chapter 29 - Customs union
All EU Member States are part of the EU customs union and follow the same customs rules and procedures. This requires legislative alignment as well as adequate implementing and enforcement capacity, and access to and interoperability with the EU electronic customs environment.
As regards customs legislation, a new draft Customs Code, intended to align national legislation with the EU acquis, was approved in first reading by the Verkhovna Rada on 19 August 2026. Novelties, in line with the EU acquis, relate to customs representation, authorisations, placing goods under a customs procedure, presentation of goods, temporary storage as well as customs control, including on post-clearance control. In addition, the new Code includes provisions on duty relief, implements part of the EU secondary legislation on customs and regulates the organisation of the State Customs Service (SCS).
There was progress in the implementation of the mid-term Plan of measures to achieve the objectives of customs reform within the framework of the National Revenue Strategy for 2024-2030. The use of the common transit procedure was further expanded. Ukraine continues to be an active Contracting Party of the Common Transit Convention and made good progress in updating the IT system to the latest New Computerised Transit System phase (NCTS phase 6 – opt-in).
The number of authorised economic operators (AEO) increased to 130 by August 2026 from 100 in the same period of 2025, with 7 AEO granted also AEO Security and Safety status. Further progress is required on the authorisation on Safety and Security for the mutual recognition of AEOs between the EU and Ukraine.
On customs digitalisation, the updated Strategic Plan for the Digital Development of the State Customs Service until 2030 was approved by the Ministry of Finance in July 2026. The technical specifications for the new Customs Clearance System were adopted to align with EU standards, including enhanced functionalities such as export and import systems. However, these technical specifications have yet to be implemented.
On administrative capacity building, good progress was registered in the reporting period. The new Head of SCS was appointed by the Cabinet of Ministers on 10 April 2026 based on a transparent and accountable competition with the engagement of international experts. Following the appointment of the new Head of the SCS, the re-attestation of the SCS personnel was launched in line with the provisions of the Customs Code. The procedure on re-attestation of staff is pending.
The SCS continued to develop competency-based human resource management.
Combating large-scale smuggling in Ukraine should be strengthened by operationalising and deepening cooperation between the Economic Security Bureau and the SCS.
Efforts to address corruption within the customs administration should be enhanced. The number of disciplinary actions against customs officers and of referrals to law enforcement decreased by nearly half, despite an increase by one third in the reporting of possible corruption offences. Most measures foreseen under the State Anti-Corruption Programme
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2023-2025 were either fully or partially fulfilled, except those aimed at strengthening the SCS’ Public Council and cooperation with businesses and civil society.
CLUSTER 4: THE GREEN AGENDA AND SUSTAINABLE CONNECTIVITY
This cluster covers: transport policy (Chapter 14); energy (Chapter 15); trans-European networks (Chapter 21); and environment and climate change (Chapter 27).
Chapter 14 - Transport policy
The EU has common rules on technical and safety standards, security, social standards, State aid and market liberalisation in road transport, railways, inland waterways, multimodal transport, aviation and maritime transport.
In the transport sector, Ukraine continues to focus on the implementation of the national transport strategy until 2030 and the strategy for developing border infrastructure. Further progress is needed to decarbonise road, air and maritime transport by promoting greater use of alternative fuels and infrastructure and developing and implementing sustainable urban mobility plans (SUMPs). Ukraine is encouraged to strengthen its participation, as an observer, in the work of the Transport Community Treaty.
On road transport, while some steps towards alignment have taken place, the regulatory reforms need to continue aligning with the EU’s social and market acquis. The Law on access to occupation of road transport operator and the secondary legislation to establish a national electronic register of road transport operators are being finalised. Alignment is gradually taking place on working time and rest period rules, including the
mandatory equipment of G2V2 smart tachographs for newly registered vehicles. To ensure continued alignment with the EU acquis, regulatory reforms on road charging and tolling infrastructure, road safety, roadworthiness testing, weight and dimensions, transport of dangerous goods and intelligent transport system (ITS) should be advanced. Regarding roadworthiness testing, further work is needed to ensure the implementation of mandatory periodical roadworthiness inspection of all M and N category vehicles.
On rail transport, Ukraine adopted the Law on railway transport safety and interoperability, laying the foundation for further harmonisation with EU standards. To ensure effective implementation, the necessary legislative and institutional framework for a fully competitive rail market should be established. This requires adoption of the rail market law aligning with the EU acquis and introducing its key elements: functional separation of infrastructure management from provision of transport services, non-discriminatory and transparent access to the infrastructure, an independent infrastructure manager and an independent railway regulatory body. In addition, the creation of a framework for public service obligation (PSO) contracts, capitalising on the PSO pilot scheme for public procurement of long- distance domestic passenger rail transportation services, with approximately EUR 370 million allocated from the state budget for 2026. Additionally, independent national safety authority and accident investigation body should be established.
In maritime transport, harmonisation with the EU acquis, including safety and security standards, port state control and vessel traffic monitoring is needed. Although the Ukrainian flag has been removed from the blacklist of the Paris Memorandum of Understanding on
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Port State Controlist, the structural weaknesses of the flag state administration remain, limiting the attractiveness of its flag registry. Work on establishing a vessel traffic monitoring and information system (VTIMS) is ongoing. Remaining barriers to ensure open and non- discriminatory maritime transport market should be removed, in line with its Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA) commitments.
The development and implementation of inland waterway transport regulations are ongoing, aiming to increase navigation safety and market functionality. Amendments to the river service regulations were adopted and the process for Union recognition of Ukrainian inland waterway crew certificates, and connection to the European Crew Database, is ongoing.
On aviation, the airspace remains closed but there is partial alignment with Union aviation safetyand securityrules. The first Joint Committee meeting under the EU-Ukraine Common Aviation Area Agreement was held. The establishment of an independent slot coordinator and a supervisory authority for airport charges remains outstanding. Regulatory efforts to further align the legislation with EU requirements related to air traffic management and air market operation are needed. Work on sustainable aviation fuels and the formal establishment of a task force for EASA certification of Ukrainian aeronautical products has not begun.
On combined transport, Ukraine has not yet aligned with the Union Combined Transport Directive. Further legislative alignment in passenger rights is needed across all transport modes as Ukraine’s legislation is partially aligned with the EU acquis. Ukraine should in particular specify conditions regarding passengers’ assistance in cases of cancelled or delayed flights, advance payments and accessibility of persons with disabilities and persons with reduced mobility.
On corruption, systematic efforts are required to accelerate the alignment of transport state- owned enterprises with OECD corporate governance standards, ensuring operational independence of supervisory boards and enhancing financial transparency, e.g. publication of road project data under the State Anti-Corruption Programme.
Chapter 15 - Energy
EU energy policy covers energy supply, infrastructure, the internal energy market, consumers, renewable energy, energy efficiency, nuclear energy, nuclear safety, radiation protection and nuclear safeguards.
In terms of security of supply, alignment with the risk preparedness Regulation in the electricity sector and gas security of supply Regulation is still pending. Commercial electricity export capacity from the EU to Ukraine was increased to up to 2.45 GW during the winter of 2025-2026. Together with 250 MW of emergency capacity, this helped balancing Ukraine’s energy system over the winter. Ukraine’s gas transmission system operator GTSOU increased firm capacity at all interconnection points, enabling increased gas imports. Alignment with Regulation 2024/1366 establishing a network code on sector-specific rules for cybersecurity aspects of cross-border electricity flows is still pending.
In the oil sector, Ukraine has established the legal and regulatory framework for its minimum emergency reserves system. The framework is broadly aligned with the requirements of Directive 2009/119/EC, with the main regulatory arrangements now in place. However, implementation of the framework has so far been affected by martial law.
As regards the internal energy market, in April 2026 Ukraine took a major step towards full market coupling with the EU by adopting primary legislation partially aligning with the Electricity Integration Package (EIP). Limited progress on the adoption of EIP-related secondary legislation is ongoing: the National Energy and Utilities Regulatory Commission (NEURC) has adopted a comprehensive plan and adopted three resolutions progressing on the implementation of the EIP. In August 2026, NEURC designated the nominated electricity
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market operator (NEMO), in line with Ukraine Plan requirements. Day-ahead, intraday and balancing markets continue to operate under price caps. Since January 2026, NEURC reviewed single maximum price caps for certain electricity market segments several times. However, Ukraine needs to continue the gradual phase-out of wholesale electricity price caps in all market segments not to limit competitiveness and transparency in the market. In October 2025 and in April 2026, the government prolonged for half a year each, until 31 October 2026, the preferential end-user electricity tariff for households, which is not cost- reflective and has remained unchanged since June 2024. The Public Service Obligation mechanism remains incompliant with the EIP. NEURC continues the implementation of REMIT with improved monitoring and new investigations. In July 2026, NEURC resumed publication of key market-related information that improves transparency.
The debts in the balancing market remain high and require implementation of measures to prevent further accumulation. Tariffs are not cost-reflective and insufficient for investments and maintenance needed for energy and climate reforms. In the coming period, Ukraine needs to remove customs duties and quantitative restrictions on imports and exports of Network Energy with other parties, in line with Article 41 of the Energy Community Treaty. There is little progress to report on the gas market, where the public service obligation for gas-based electricity producers was lifted. Reforms including ensuring compliant unbundling of gas distribution system operators, the gradual phase out of public service obligations and lifting the export ban on natural gas remain an important priority for Ukraine. Work on the gradual liberalisation of energy markets and establishing a financing mechanism for vulnerable customers’ needs to accelerate.
In the area of renewable energy, Parliament adopted legislation in February 2026, addressing shortcomings in Ukraine’s renewable energy support auction schemes after weak participation in early pilot rounds. Work on separating the renewable energy surcharge from the transmission tariff progressed, albeit slowly
Adoption of the legislation introducing simplified permitting procedures for renewable energy investments is a positive step towards alignment with RED II and RED III Directives. Alignment with EU sustainability and greenhouse gas emission criteria for biofuels, bioliquids and biomass remains incomplete.
On energy efficiency, some steps were taken to further align with the EU’s Energy Efficiency (EED) and Energy Performance of Buildings (EPBD) Directives, although capacity constraints remain. Regarding the EE Directive, in October 2025 Ukraine introduced a national target for annual consumption reduction targets as well as energy consumption reduction targets for central government buildings. In July 2026, Ukraine adopted a law providing incentives for district heating and high-efficiency cogeneration and renewable heat sources co-generation, addressing a pre-identified gap in this area. However, several elements of the framework require strengthening, such as the implementation of mandatory energy efficiency criteria in public procurement, establishing a legal framework for applying the ‘energy efficiency first’ principle and embedding it in recovery efforts, strengthening monitoring systems and enforcing high energy efficiency standards. Regarding the EPBD Directive, requirements for nearly-zero energy buildings and a 2026 national plan to improve energy performance of central government buildings were adopted. Additional work is required to implement the 2024 EPBD. As regards the EU Ecodesign Directive, in February 2026, Ukraine adopted a regulation on establishing ecodesign requirements for servers and data storage products, aligned with EU Regulation 2019/424 and applicable from August 2026.
On governance, in November 2025 Operation Midas exposed an alleged large-scale embezzlement and money laundering scheme within Energoatom’s public procurement, implicating top officials, including the then-energy minister. The government responded by overhauling governance in key energy SOEs, revising their charters, restructuring supervisory boards with majority-independent members appointed via competitive selection
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and eliminating qualified majority voting requirements. A model charter was also introduced, while the State Enterprise Guaranteed Buyer was converted into a joint-stock company with updated governance rules. Further corruption risks surfaced in January 2026, when an insider-trading probe was launched on an Energoatom electricity auction. To address systemic vulnerabilities, Ukraine must intensify anti-corruption efforts in the energy sector, embedding targeted measures in the 2026-2030 state anti-corruption strategy. Political influence over the management of energy SOEs should continue to be tackled through effective separation of their management from policymaking. Some progress in this area was achieved with the approval of new charters for both TSOs and key SOEs. However, the independence of the energy regulator NEURC needs to be ensured and related legislative amendments are yet to be adopted. The last two rotations in the position of NEURC Chairman executed within a 16-day period in August 2026, though formally compliant, raise questions about circumvention of legal restrictions on consecutive Chairmanship terms.
Based on an inclusive consultation process, in June 2026 Ukraine adopted an update of its National Energy and Climate Plan (NECP). It extends the sectoral coverage, adds new measures, such as on sustainability criteria for biofuels and renewables uptake in the heating and cooling sector, and sets a more ambitious energy efficiency target. Adoption of a resolution on the monitoring of the implementation of the NECP is pending.
On nuclear energy, nuclear safety, radioactive waste, fuel management and radiation
protection, only minor progress was made on alignment with the Euratom acquis and on
regulatory capacities. Progress is ongoing to ensure Ukraine’s participation in the ECURIE
system. The Supervisory Board of Energoatom was completed, and the selection of a new
management board is ongoing. Onnuclear safeguards, the existing systems of accountancy
and control of nuclear materials in Ukraine still need to be adapted to accommodate for the
safeguards provisions of the Euratom Treaty.
Chapter 21 - Trans-European networks
The EU promotes Trans-European networks (TENs) in the areas of transport, telecommunications and energy to strengthen the internal market and contribute to growth and employment.
On the trans-European transport network (TEN-T), Ukraine has not yet fully aligned with the new TEN-T Guidelines and the Streamlining Directive. Despite infrastructure progress, the legal and institutional frameworks remain in the alignment phase.
To enhance connectivity and regional resilience, Ukraine secured EUR 73.5 million under the 2024 Connecting Europe Facility (CEF) Transport call for the 80 km Mostyska–Sknyliv (Lviv) project, making the first large-scale extension of EU standard gauge rail (1 435 mm) into western Ukraine. Electrification of the Chop–Uzhhorod rail section is in the final stages. A few CEF rail projects connecting Ukraine with EU Member States (Poland, Slovakia, Hungary, Romania) have already been implemented. The country started unlocking the potential of public-private partnerships (PPPs) for TEN-T infrastructure through the launch of the Chornomorsk port concession.
Ukraine should synchronise transport infrastructure planning and implementation with neighbouring countries, in line with the new TEN-T Regulation, prioritise upgrades of transport infrastructure at border crossing points and access routes and accelerate realisation of the key road and rail projects. Ensuring the accessibility of transport infrastructure, particularly for persons with disabilities or reduced mobility, should be addressed. Ukraine should also secure national funding to complement the co-financing offered through the CEF and ensure the timely implementation of its CEF funded projects. In this context, Ukraine is encouraged to participate proactively in the corridor forums in relation to the implementation of the EU Transport Corridors (ETC).
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In TEN-T alignment, the pending legislative definition of network sections hinders technical standards like the European Rail Traffic Management System (ERTMS), alternative fuels infrastructure and intelligent transport systems (ITS). The adoption of the act defining an exhaustive list of road, railway, port and airport sections forming part of the network should be prioritised and duly reflected in the single project pipeline (SPP) and the 2030 national transport strategy operational action plan. Continued efforts are needed to develop sustainable urban mobility plans (SUMPs) for cities with a population over 50 000, in line with the requirements for Union urban nodes.
Ukraine needs to strengthen project management capacity, operationalise the one-stop-shop permitting procedure and fully integrate TEN-T criteria into public investment management (PIM) evaluations. Strengthening road asset management and re-establishing the Road Fund are urgent to address maintenance gaps and ensure network sustainability.
As regards the trans-European energy network (TEN-E), Ukraine needs to align with the revised TEN-E Regulation by adopting the Law of Ukraine on infrastructure projects of public interest in the energy sector (Draft Law No. 13450), tabled in July 2025 and still pending adoption. Projects of mutual interest (PMIs) with Slovakia and Romania are advancing to provide electricity interconnections and enhance import/export potential. Discussions with Moldova on a new Project of Energy Community Interest (PECI) are ongoing to develop a 330 kV transmission line linking Bălți in Moldova with the Dnestrovsk hydropower plant in Ukraine. On natural gas network, physical upgrades of infrastructure in Bulgaria as well as removal of regulatory and administrative barriers increased the transmission capacity of the Trans-Balkan pipeline in the south-to-north direction of 4.2 bcm per year. Ukraine is at an early phase of development of hydrogen projects, including the Central European Hydrogen Corridor with Slovakia, Czechia, and Germany.
Chapter 27 - Environment and climate change
The EU promotes strong climate action, sustainable development and protection of the environment. EU rules contain provisions addressing horizontal environmental issues, climate change, water and air quality, waste management, nature protection, industrial pollution, chemicals, noise and civil protection.
Continued efforts are needed to fully align with the EU environmental and climate acquis and gradually put in place a sound mid-term budgetary framework related to its implementation, including costed financing plans for priority environmental and climate investments. The administrative capacity remains weakened with scattered competencies. This has been further impacted by the merger of the Ministry of Environment into the Ministry of Economy. Workload linked to the EU acquis alignment, together with funding constraints and deprioritisation of environmental issues lead to delayed adoption of legislation and affect implementation. While digitalisation in the environmental and climate sector is progressing, further efforts are required to improve enforcement, prevent corruption, and ensure accountability, particularly by enhancing, monitoring and data collection, governance structures and environmental compliance assurance.
Environment
Ukraine’s horizontal environmental legislation remains only partially aligned with the EU acquis. Continued efforts are needed to ensure full application of environmental impact assessment (EIA) and strategic environmental assessment (SEA) across all relevant plans and projects. Efforts to simplify administrative processes should avoid general exemptions and exclusions of entire project categories and safeguard the EU acquis requirements such as public consultation, assessment of the overall effects of a project, and avoidance of project splitting.
In June 2026, Ukraine joined the European Environment Agency (EEA) and its European Environmental Information and Observation Network (Eionet) as a cooperating country. In September 2025, the government launched a pilot project introducing a new preventive
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approach in environmental control and in April 2026 adopted a revised version of a horizontal law on state surveillance. A primary legislation on environmental control, aligned with the Environmental Control Reform Strategy, still needs to be adopted. Corruption risks remain high, notably in land use, extraction of minerals, forestry, waste management permits and tenders for concessions, while enforcement remains weak. Some progress was made in the deployment of digital tools to enhance the transparency of timber felling and exports. Over 4 900 cases of illegal logging were recorded yet only a small part of the proceeds was recovered in court.
Air quality legislation remains partially aligned with the EU acquis. Full compliance requires further steps, including national emission ceilings, monitoring of volatile organic compounds emissions, better sulphur content monitoring, and improvements in air quality data collection. Six new indicative ambient air quality monitoring stations were installed in 2026.
On waste management, legislation remains partially aligned with the EU acquis. In September 2026, Ukraine adopted a Circular Economy Strategy and its Action Plan By August 2026, 17 regional waste management plans out of 24 have been approved. In February 2026, a procedure for achieving target indicators for the preparation of construction and demolition waste for reuse, recycling and other material recovery was adopted. Overall, implementation and enforcement remain limited and will require an adequate framework and infrastructure on national and regional level to align with the Waste Framework Directive and other sectoral legislation on waste management.
On water quality, legislation remains partially aligned. Implementation of the Water Framework Directive and the Urban Wastewater Treatment Directive continued. Despite security risks, surface water monitoring continued, and in January 2026 the annual state water monitoring programme was adopted. In December 2025, the operational plan for implementing the water strategy for 2025-2027 as well as the state targeted environmental programme for the technical modernisation of municipal sewage and wastewater treatment companies until 2034 were adopted. In June 2026, resolutions amending the procedure for state water monitoring and the special water use permitting system were also adopted. The government continued to promote the river basin management plans at national and local level, but implementation remains challenging. Weak administrative capacity, limited funding, and incomplete alignment with the EU acquis, notably on nitrates, drinking water and wastewater, hampered progress. Ukraine should speed up alignment with the Nitrates Directive, inter alia, to meet its commitment to implement certain EU production standards by the end of 2028, as committed under the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA). Measures to ensure cost recovery while safeguarding access to water and sanitation rights are still needed.
On nature protection, alignment with the EU acquis remains at an early stage, with the Biodiversity Strategy until 2035 and an Action Plan for 2026-2028 adopted in June 2026 as a policy cornerstone in this area. In November 2025, Ukraine also took steps towards alignment with the EUlegislation on deforestation through the adoption of a pilot project resolution on timber exports. In January 2026, the procedure for establishing criteria for classifying invasive alien species was adopted. Ukraine submitted its country reports under the Nagoya and Cartagena Protocols on time. Further alignment is needed on the acquis related to the protection of species and habitats, deforestation, zoos, and genetic resources. Concerns also persist over construction projects, affecting protected areas and areas not yet designated for protection, reflecting limited alignment with the EU nature protection acquis.
On industrial pollution and risk management, alignment oflegislation remains partial. Between September 2025 and March 2026, a set of implementing acts for the operationalisation of the Law on industrial pollution was adopted. In March 2026, a targeted programme to support enterprises implementing best available techniques (BATs) was approved. Ukraine continued working on the integrated environmental permitting system. Alignment with the EU Industrial Emissions Directive still requires additional secondary
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legislation and proper implementation to meet the 2028 alignment target in the revised DCFTA.
Chemical safety legislation is partially aligned. During the reporting period, Ukraine reinforced its cooperation with the European Chemicals Agency. As part of a wider approach to hazardous waste management, Ukraine needs to implement asbestos management rules, set up certified laboratories, and create a registry of landfills licensed to handle asbestos. In the area of biocides, Ukraine needs to align its legislation with the EU acquis and strengthen its capacity for inspection and enforcement.
Ukraine is at early stage of alignment with the EU acquis on noise.
On civil protection, Ukraine is an active participant in the Union Civil Protection Mechanism (UCPM) and contributes to the European Civil Protection Pool (ECPP). It has offered 11 capacities, with two already certified under the UCPM. In 2026, Ukraine made its first UCPM deployment by providing a large wildfire-fighting module to France. It has also registered its first aerial assets in the Common Emergency, Communication and Information System (CECIS) and began their ECPP certification.
In October 2025, Ukraine adopted zoning of territories according to emergency risks linked to high-risk facilities and dangerous geological, hydrological, and meteorological phenomena and processes. In 2025, Ukraine gained access to the Trans European Services for Telematics between Administrations (TESTA) network, a key step towards the CECIS access for the State Emergency Service (SESU), which is still pending.
Ukraine needs to expand UCPM-trained staff, notably English-speaking Incident Commanders and Host Nation Support officers, and increase participation in UCPM exercises and the Knowledge Network. Further work is needed to strengthen the legislative and operational framework for prevention, preparedness, Host Nation Support, interinstitutional coordination, and cross-border cooperation under the UCPM. Ukraine must submit a Disaster Risk Management Summary Report by 31 December 2026, and every three years thereafter.
Climate change
Ukraine made some progress on climate change during the reporting period. In October 2025, Ukraine submitted its first biennial transparency report to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and adopted its Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC) under the Paris Agreement for the period up to 2035, including a target to reduce emissions by more than 65% compared to 1990 levels. This leaves room for a substantial increase in emissions compared to 2024. In April 2026 Ukraine submitted to the UNFCCC Secretariat the National Inventory Document (NID) on greenhouse gas emissions and removals together with the relevant Common Reporting Tables (CRTs), in accordance with the requirements of the Enhanced Transparency Framework (ETF) of the Paris Agreement. Moreover, in June 2026, Ukraine adopted a new Long-Term Low Emission Development Strategy factoring in the objective of reaching climate-neutrality by 2050 and a resolution on the implementation of Article 6 of the Paris Agreement, providing for the establishment of the National Carbon Registry.
In January 2026, Ukraine adopted the resolution establishing a Scientific and Expert Council on Climate Change and Ozone Layer Preservation. On carbon pricing, work is ongoing to extend the scope of Ukraine’s system for monitoring, reporting, verification of greenhouse gas emissions at installation level and accreditation of verifiers (MRVA) to additional ETS sectors, including aviation and shipping, and on developing legislation for a national Emission Trading System (ETS), now under consideration of the Rada. Further efforts to align with road transport and buildings (ETS2 sectors) are needed, as well as to ensure that data is collected at the appropriate level. In March 2026, Parliament rejected the draft law ratifying the Kigali Amendment to the Montreal Protocol and alignment with EU standards on fluorinated gases and ozone-depleting substances remains incomplete. At the same time,
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some progress was made on consumer information of vehicle emissions, as amendments adopted in September 2025 require sellers of new passenger cars to provide standardised information on fuel consumption and CO2 emissions by June 2026.
An updated NECP, covering additional sectors, including agriculture, forestry and land use, was approved by the government in June 2026. The procedure for monitoring and evaluating the implementation of state climate policy, including the NECP, has not yet been adopted.
CLUSTER 5: RESOURCES, AGRICULTURE AND COHESION
This cluster covers: agriculture and rural development (Chapter 11); food safety, veterinary and phytosanitary policy (Chapter 12); fisheries and aquaculture (Chapter 13); regional policy and coordination of structural instruments (Chapter 22); and financial and budgetary provisions (Chapter 33).
Chapter 11 - Agriculture and rural development
The EU’s common agricultural policy supports farmers and contributes to ensuring Europe’s food security. It helps tackle climate change and the sustainable management of natural resources; preserves rural areas and landscapes; and supports the rural economy by promoting jobs in farming, agri-food industries and related sectors. This requires robust management and control systems. There are also common EU rules for marketing standards, quality policy and organic farming.
On horizontal issues, the framework law on agricultural support was adopted, which provides the legal basis for the paying agency, the integrated administration and control system (IACS) and the farm sustainability data network (FSDN). The Farmers Support Fund (a designated paying agency) needs to increase its capacity and become operational to prepare for the administration of the common agricultural policy (CAP) as of the date of accession. Further work is needed to develop an operational agricultural knowledge and innovation system. The advisory services need to be strengthened.
Ukraine reported that in 2025 public support to agricultural producers was provided through SAR, the main support and data management structure, except for the additional payment to family farms towards state social insurance, managed by the State Tax Service of Ukraine. SAR was merged into the responsible Ministry in February 2026. Ukraine should continue developing the IACS, including the land parcel identification system (LPIS), and ensure interoperability of its components. On FSDN, pilots in Poltava and Zhytomyr continued. Activities were also expanded to Lviv, and a liaison unit has been established.
On agricultural markets – common market organisation (CMO),legislative alignment notably on wine and spirits, hops and marketing standards continued. Vineyard and winery registers remain to be developed. The legal framework for producer organisations is still under preparation.
On rural development, support scheme priorities are set out in the 2030 strategy and its operational plan. The current support system remains a mix of area-based and livestock- related measures, schemes for affected areas, demining support, subsidised finance and grants, and machine procurement compensation. Decoupling and conditionality should be introduced to strengthen compliance with the CAP. The LEADER approach should be further developed, translating existing innovation groups into concrete delivery arrangements for rural development.
On quality policy,the legal framework for geographical indications is broadly in place and implementation is progressing, with certification bodies being developed and accreditation work underway. Capacity for certification and official controls needs to be strengthened.
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On organic farming, legislative alignment, monitoring and control need further development. A law to align with the EU acquis on organic production and labelling was adopted in June 2026.
On the fight against corruption, the Ukrainian authorities are obliged to prevent, detect and report irregularities. Public support to the sector requires strengthened financial management, monitoring and control including through digital tools, including the State Agrarian Register (SAR). The land bank has improved leasing procedures of state agricultural land. Enforcement authorities halted large-scale grain misappropriation schemes. Ukraine should avoid re-introducing corruption-prone free-of-charge privatisation schemes of agricultural land.
Chapter 12 - Food safety, veterinary and phytosanitary policy
The EU food safety acquis, including hygiene rules for foodstuff production, ensures a high level of food and feed safety, and a high level of protection of consumer interests. Animal health and welfare are safeguarded, together with plant health, the quality of seeds, plant reproductive material, animal nutrition and the use of plant protection products.
On general food safety, the State Service on Food Safety and Consumer Protection (SSUFSCP) continued its functional reform process. Ukraine continued implementing its food safety framework. Effective implementation continues to be constrained by limited institutional capacity, including laboratories, qualified personnel and functioning state registers. Ukraine continued the digitalisation of food safety-related processes, including tools supporting traceability, certification and official controls. Current limitations to official controls under martial law continued hampering the effective implementation of food safety, veterinary and phytosanitary legislation. Ukraine should resume risk-based controls systematically, based on the transparency system, and enable the full implementation of official controls, in line with its commitment under the revised DCFTA. Ukraine should also step up efforts to reduce corruption risks in the sector, which remain high.
On veterinary policy, animal health legislation is not yet aligned with the EU acquis and key enforcement arrangements, registers and IT systems are not yet fully operational. The amended Law on veterinary medicine and animal welfare entered into force in March 2026. The system for animal disease control remains to be fully aligned with the acquis and vaccination to be stepped up, in particular against rabies.
On animal welfare, further progress was made through the entry into force of legislation on the welfare of animals on farm and at the time of slaughter, the preparation of legislation on the welfare of animals during transport, the ongoing implementation of Ukraine’s animal welfare roadmap for 2025-2027 and the inclusion of relevant measures in the livestock development programme until 2033. In particular, Order 224, adopted in 2021, has entered into force in January 2026, thus legally banning the use of barred cages for laying hens in Ukraine, among other alignments with EU legislation. Effective implementation however remains at an early stage. Official controls are not fully operational, and key implementation tools are not yet in place, including training systems, certificates of competence, registries, checklists and standard operating procedures.
Use of the EU trade control and expert system (TRACES) improved countrywide, with over 38 000 certificates issued since September 2025 until 31 August 2026, for 32 commodities.
On the placing on the market of food, feed and animal by-products, implementing legislation was adopted, including amendments to hygienic requirements for the production and circulation of food products of animal origin and requirements for traceability of animal by-products. Progress was made in strengthening risk management; however, official controls remain only partially aligned with the EU acquis. An EU compliant system of collection, storage and processing of animal by-products is not yet in place in the country.
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On food safety rules and specific rules for feed, new implementing legislation provided for progress in sampling and laboratory analysis of food, traceability of animal by-products and the operation of facilities. As regards specific rules for feed, the amended Law on veterinary medicine and animal welfare includes rules for medicated feed.
On phytosanitary policy, Ukraine advanced towards alignment with EU legislation through the adoption of a new law on plant health, entering into force in January 2028. Initial implementation steps were made with the review of inspection procedures, creation of a professional operator registration system, update of training requirements, and the fully operational electronic phytosanitary certificates (e-Phyto) exchange system. Official use of the e-Phyto system began in February 2025 and over 240 000 e-Phyto certificates have since been transmitted, with more than 180 000 to the EU via TRACES. On 1 November 2025, Ukraine fully transitioned to e-Phyto for exports to the EU, discontinuing paper certificates. On the marketing of seed and other plant reproductive material, the country should first focus on fully aligning with the EU acquis on the rules on plant (PRM) and forest reproductive material (FRM). In addition, Ukraine must establish the necessary institutional frameworks, governance structures, and technical capacities to set up, implement and enforce fully functioning certification systems for PRM and FRM.
In the area of genetically modified organisms (GMOs), Ukraine has advanced in developing acts and preparatory measures to implement and enforce the primary GMO law, which entered into force in September 2026. Further work is needed to ensure sufficient readiness for its implementation and enforcement.
Chapter 13 - Fisheries and aquaculture
TheCommon Fisheries Policy (CFP) lays down rules on fisheries management, protects marine biological resources and limits the environmental impact of fisheries. It also covers control and inspection, market policy, aquaculture and support measures.
Ukraine adopted the framework act for the functioning of the e-Fish system in September 2025 and an operational plan for implementation of the fisheries sector strategy in March 2026.
On fisheries management, Ukraine continued to digitalise administrative procedures through e-Fish, which improved transparency and reduced the administrative burden. The system still requires further development to support EU-aligned traceability, data collection, control and inspection. Priority modules, including related to traceability documents, catch certificates, fisheries data collection and state control, are still to be developed, and financing for the remaining modules has not yet been secured. Further progress on resource and fleet management, including data collection, licensing, control and balancing fishing capacity with available resources, depends on the adoption of the draft law aligning the fisheries sector with the EU acquis.
There was no significant development in the area of inspection and control. The Law on traceability of aquatic biological resources and derived products has been adopted, but its effective implementation depends on implementing legislation and the corresponding roll-out of IT solutions in e-Fish. The lack of a fully effective inspection and control system continues to hamper the fight against illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing. While equipment for scientific monitoring and fisheries management was provided, administrative, inspection and control capacity still needs to be strengthened, in view of full compliance with CFP requirements.
On market policy, further efforts are needed to align with the acquis on marketing standards, labelling, price reporting and market monitoring. On data collectionand scientific advice, the legal framework remains incomplete pending adoption of a draft law, which would introduce fisheries data collection plans and a national correspondent.
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On aquaculture, further efforts are needed to align the legal framework on alien and locally absent species and to finalise and implement the strategic planning framework for aquaculture. The operational plan adopted in March 2026 sets out measures relevant to aquaculture development, including data collection and support for modern production methods, but additional legislative alignment is still required.
On international agreements, Ukraine continued to participate in the work of the General Fisheries Commission for the Mediterranean (GFCM) and became a full member in November 2025. However, reporting gaps remained, notably due to the suspension of Black Sea fisheries activities and limitations in socio-economic and landings data. Further alignment is needed on external fisheries, including an authorisation regime for vessels operating outside Ukrainian waters, and on the implementation of GFCM recommendations.
No progress was made on structural actions, State aid and maritime spatial planning during the reporting period.
Chapter 22 - Regional policy and coordination of structural instruments
Regional policy is the EU’s main tool for reducing regional disparities and investing in sustainable and inclusive socio-economic growth. It is operating through ‘shared management’ between the Commission and EU Member States. The implementation of cohesion policy programmes requires appropriate administrative capacity on programme and project level, the establishment of systems of sound financial management and control and also the fulfilment of other EU acquis elements such as environmental or public procurement legislation.
The reorganisation of the Ministry for Development of Communities and Territories into the Ministry for Communities, Territories and Internally Displaced Persons and Ministry for Recovery, Infrastructure and Transport has impacted reform progress and continuity of previously proposed commitments. Chapter 22 relevant reform actions should be undertaken urgently after the new Ministry is operational.
On the legislative framework, Ukraine adopted a resolution in November 2025 on regional development strategies and criteria for identifying functional types of territories, which still needs to be aligned with the NUTS classification. The 2025 Concept of the National Strategic Planning System aims to strengthen links between long-term, sectoral and regional planning. The Law on the principles of state regional policy still needs to be fully implemented by clarifying the content and structure of local strategic planning documents, facilitating their digitalisation, and linking them to adequate financial resources; strengthen the capacities of regional and local administrations on project development. The 2025 implementation report of the State Regional Development Strategy (SRDS) 2021-2027 and its action plan have been published, however the evaluation of gaps and challenges should be improved. The SRDS Action Plan 2025-2027 was updated to reflect new definition of macro-regions and functional territories, and preparations for drafting the SRDS 2028-2034 have started. The adopted 2026 and 2027 State Fund for Regional Development (SFRD) Regulations indicate limited progress in operationalizing regional development financing and strengthening links between strategic planning and public investment management. Further improvements are needed for a robust SFRD framework, financial allocation methodology and implementing arrangements. A digitalised SFRD system is yet to be fully established. Further efforts are needed for the SFRD alignment with EU cohesion policy principles, ensure transparent project selection, stable multiannual orientation and stronger links between funding decisions and strategic priorities.
In terms of the institutional framework, preparation for the cohesion policy programming architecture should begin, including the provisional designation of managing authorities, intermediate bodies where appropriate, and audit authorities. The capacity of the new Ministry for Communities, Territories and Internally Displaced Persons should be strengthened to coordinate regional policy across sectors and levels of government. The
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involvement of regional and local authorities, civil society and other relevant stakeholders in the preparation and monitoring of regional policy remains limited. Consultation mechanisms remain uneven and often insufficiently institutionalised. The reactivated Interagency Coordination Commission on regional development should become fully operational and ensure regular stakeholder involvement, and coordination between the central and subnational governance level stakeholders. Further efforts are needed to clarify the mandate and optimise the structure of the State Agency for Restoration and Infrastructure Development within the public investment management system, supported by predictable medium-term funding model to enable effective project prioritisation and long-term planning.
On administrative capacity, efforts are needed to invest in staff retention through appropriate remuneration, career development, and continuous training opportunities related to the management, monitoring, evaluation, communication, and control of EU funds including for public procurement. The restructuring of the Ministry into two administrative bodies has created additional challenges for the limited administrative resources and the need for additional coordination between both bodies. No targeted actions to train and retain staff have been identified neither at national nor sub-national levels.
On programming, limited progress was made in establishing a regional policy management system during the reporting period, with the main advances achieved in territorial cooperation programmes with Member States. A strategic planning document for cohesion policy is still needed to identify development needs, define priorities, objectives and expected results, and set out national and, where appropriate, regional programmes. Gaps remain between national, regional and local planning documents, and weak alignment between reconstruction needs, territorial development objectives and sectoral priorities. Programming remains insufficiently integrated and not yet fully based on a coherent medium-term investment logic. The development of each programme should be supported by a project portfolio making use of the full range of cohesion policy instruments, including investment projects, financial instruments and territorial development tools. Ukraine continues to participate in Interreg cooperation programmes, and the EU Strategy for the Danube Region.
On monitoring and evaluation, a monitoring and evaluation framework aligned with EU requirements should be established for future cohesion policy programmes, in line with the partnership principle. This framework should support the systematic assessment of progress towards programme objectives and expected results and ensure the effective involvement of relevant national, regional and local stakeholders throughout the programme cycle.
On financial management, control and audit, Ukraine has made some progress through amendments to state financial control legislation and improvements in internal control. However, the effectiveness of the Public Internal Financial Control system remains limited by fragmented implementation, uneven administrative capacity and weak coordination, including at local level. Further efforts are required to strengthen risk-based management, improve internal audit quality and ensure the effective functioning of audit bodies. Separate accounting and reporting arrangements for EU funds should be established to provide reliable audit trails and financial transparency.
On the fight against corruption, practical impact of anti-corruption programmes adopted at sub-national level remains limited, while the effectiveness of control systems continues to be uneven, particularly at the local level due to capacity and resources. Nevertheless, several integrity tools were piloted, including procurement integrity procedures, integrity plans and internal audits at municipalities. The functionality of the public investment management system DREAM as a transparency and anti-corruption tool should be further enhanced.
Chapter 33 - Financial and budgetary provisions
This chapter covers the rules governing the funding of the EU budget (‘own resources’). These resources mainly consist of: (i) contributions based on the gross national income of
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each Member State; (ii) customs duties; (iii) the non-recycled plastic resource and (iv) a resource based on value added tax. Member States must have the appropriate administrative capacity to adequately coordinate and ensure the correct calculation, collection, payment and control of own resources.
On traditional own resources, Ukraine has already implemented most of the fundamental principles affecting the own resources system. The roadmap was developed by the Ministry of Finance. The Ministry has also prepared Guidelines for the Implementation of the European Union Own Resources Framework to support the establishment of the administrative and procedural framework necessary for managing the EU own resources system in Ukraine.
The system of calculating the VAT-based own resource needs to be developed.
Issues related to national accounts and gross national income (GNI) data are addressed in Chapter 18 - statistics. Issues relating to own resources are addressed under Chapter 16 – taxation, Chapter 29 – Customs union, and Chapter 32 – financial control, while the own resource based on non-recycled plastic waste is linked to Chapter 27 – environment and climate change.
CLUSTER 6: EXTERNAL RELATIONS
This cluster covers: external relations (Chapter 30); and foreign, security and defence policy (Chapter 31).
Chapter 30 - External relations
The EU has a common commercial policy towards third countries, based on multilateral and bilateral agreements and autonomous measures. There are also EU rules on humanitarian aid and development policy.
On the common commercial policy, Ukraine continued to coordinate its positions and align closely with the EU, including within the WTO and its Dispute Settlement Body. Ukraine continued to comply with its WTO transparency obligations, latest domestic measure notification being in June 2026.
In the area of dual-use goods, Ukraine is yet to achieve full alignment with the latest EU acquis, including the annual updates as regards the list of dual-use items. Ukraine is a member of the Australia group, the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the Wassenaar Arrangement and has adopted and maintained a consolidated list of dual-use goods and technologies based on the EU acquis. Ukraine is in the process of aligning with the EU acquis on the screening of foreign direct investments (FDI).
On bilateral agreements with third countries, Ukraine has notified to the WTO of preferential bilateral trade agreements with 18 partners, eight of which do not have a preferential trade agreement with the EU. Ukraine is negotiating further preferential trade agreements with several partners and is also active in modernising existing agreements. In the reporting period, Ukraine ratified a preferential trade agreement with the United Arab Emirates and a free trade agreement with Türkiye, which awaited ratification since its signing in 2023. Meanwhile, the ratification of the modified free trade agreement with Montenegro and the modernised free trade agreement with EFTA is pending. Ukraine should continue to coordinate closely with the EU on international trade negotiations, in particular to ensure that, when it joins the EU, its commitments are compatible with those of the EU. It should also ensure the inclusion of an EU accession-linked expiration clause in the provisions of bilateral free trade and investment agreements.
There are no developments to report on bilateral investment treaties.
Ukraine has a legal framework in place to provide humanitarian aid to other countries. Ukraine has engaged in the provision of development aid by contributing to global food
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security efforts, although it has yet to develop its development policy in line with the relevant EU framework.
Chapter 31 - Foreign, security and defence policy
Member States must be able to conduct political dialogue under EU foreign, security and defence policy, align with EU statements, take part in EU actions, and apply agreed restrictive measures.
Ukraine continued intense political dialogue on foreign and security policy with the EU. During this dialogue, Ukraine consistently demonstrated alignment with the EU’s strategic positions and interests. Ukraine hosted an EU-Ukraine Foreign Ministers meeting in March 2026. The Ukrainian President, Foreign and Defence Ministers and other high-level officials were regularly invited to address the European Council and the Council meetings. The EU and Ukraine continued holding formal meetings under the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement. The EU-Ukraine joint security commitments continue to be implemented and serve as the guiding document for the EU and Member States’ support to Ukraine, complementary to Member States bilateral commitments towards Ukraine.
The institutional framework enabling Ukraine’s participation in common foreign and security policy (CFSP) and common security and defence policy (CSDP) is in place.
As regards the EU common foreign and security policy (CFSP), Ukraine’s alignment with statements by the High Representative on behalf of the EU and decisions of the Council of the EU on restrictive measures was at 99% as of 1 September 2026 and remains the same as in 2025. Ukraine is gradually aligning with the EU acquis on restrictive measures. It has mechanisms in place to ensure effective implementation of EU sanctions. The Criminal Code still needs to be amended, as sanctions evasion is still not a criminal offence in Ukraine. Ukraine should continue strengthening the implementation and enforcement of EU sanctions in line with the EU acquis.
Ukraine is a member of a large number of international organisations with which it maintains a well-established cooperation, including the UN, the Council of Europe, the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe and Organisation for Black Sea Economic Cooperation. Ukraine continued to regularly align with EU positions at the United Nations, including supporting EU initiatives in the UN Human Rights Council. In the context of Ukraine’s diplomatic engagement with global partners in support of just and lasting peace, Ukraine initiated at the UN General Assembly, with EU support, the February 2026 Resolution ‘Support for lasting peace in Ukraine’, marking the fourth anniversary of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. The EU and Ukraine together with Canada initiated the UN General Assembly Resolution ‘Return of the Ukrainian Children’ which was successfully adopted in December 2025. Ukraine is also a member of the UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) for the 2026-2028 term and of the Commission on Narcotic Drugs until 2029. Ukraine was elected to the UNESCO Executive Board for 2025-2029 in November 2025 and is an active member of UNESCO in the area of protection of cultural heritage.
Ukraine is party to the Rome Statue of the International Criminal Court (ICC). Ukraine continues to deepen its cooperation with the Office of the Prosecutor of the ICC to strengthen investigation of international crimes committed in the context of Russia’s aggression against Ukraine. Ukraine has to further align its legislative framework with the provisions of the Rome Statute and its related instruments. In May 2026, Ukraine, together with other 35 countries and the EU, adopted the Enlarged Partial Agreement on the Management Committee of the Special Tribunal for the Crime of Aggression against Ukraine. In May, Ukraine also ratified the Convention establishing an International Claims Commission for Ukraine.
In February 2026, Ukraine adopted a new National Action Plan (NAP) for the Implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security for the period up to 2030, along with an implementation roadmap. In June 2026, Ukraine adopted
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secondary legislation for the implementation of the Law on the Legal and Social Protection of Persons Affected by Sexual Violence related to Russia's Armed Aggression against Ukraine, but the compensation mechanism is still not implemented in practice and the funding for the compensation of survivors is lacking. Women are underrepresented in decision-making related to the peace process, despite calls by the Government Commissioner for Gender Policy and the civil society.
As regards non-proliferation and disarmament Ukraine has regularly aligned with the EU in most international fora dealing with non-proliferation over the reporting period. Ukraine complies with its international obligations under international export control regimes. Ukraine is encouraged to ratify the Arms Trade Treaty to align its legal framework of arms control with the Common Position 2008/944/CFSP and to finalise and adopt its national strategy for countering and preventing illegal trafficking of small arms and light weapons.
On security measures (classified information), Ukraine continued to implement its agreement on security of information with the EU on procedures for the exchange of classified information. Ukraine should further align its legislation with EU acquis on the protection of classified information and adjust its physical and cryptographic measures in the area to be in a position to electronically exchange information classified at higher levels.
On the common security and defence policy (CSDP), cooperation on security and defence matters between Ukraine and the EU and its Member States was significantly increased. Ukraine closely cooperated with EU CSDP missions and benefited from training provided by EUMAM, as well as advisory support of EUAM.
Ukraine has developed substantial institutional capacities and experience in countering relentless hybrid, including cyber and foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI), attacks by Russia and other malign actors. Ukraine continued to cooperate with the EU in the area of countering hybrid threats (including cyber threats and FIMI) based on the joint security commitments of June 2024. Ukraine held the regular EU-Ukraine Cyber Dialogue, and advanced cooperation in countering hybrid threats through a workshop on the exchange of lessons learned. In the context of international security, Ukraine has actively engaged in the negotiations of the final report of the UN Open-ended Working Group on security of and in the use of information and communications technologies 2021-2025, including through alignment with EU statements and submission of national positions. Ukraine should continue to gradually align with EU policies and legislation in the area of countering hybrid, including cyber and FIMI, threats and further strengthen its strategic, legal and institutional framework, as well as societal resilience to such threats. The fight against FIMI and disinformation is especially crucial in less developed regions, as well as among vulnerable groups of the population.
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ANNEX I - RELATIONS BETWEEN THE EU AND UKRAINE
Ukraine applied for EU membership on 28 February 2022 and was granted European perspective and candidate country status in June 2022. On 25 June 2024, following December 2023 European Council decision, the first inter-governmental conference opening the accession negotiations took place. The analytical examination of Ukraine’s level of alignment with EU legislation (screening) was completed in September 2025. On 15 June 2026 the second inter-governmental conference opened negotiations on cluster 1, on 14 July 2026 the third inter-governmental conference opened negotiations on cluster 6, and on 13 October the fourth inter-governmental conference opened negotiations on cluster 2 (internal market) and cluster 3 (competitiveness and inclusive growth). The work is ongoing to open all clusters as soon as possible.
The Association Agreement (AA), including a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA), is the basis for the cooperation between the EU and Ukraine.
The Association Committee in Trade Configuration (ACTC), which oversees the implementation of the DCFTA, met on 2 December 2025.
On 14 October 2025, the European Commission and Ukraine formally adopted the decision to review the DCFTA, which entered into force on 29 October 2025. The agreement provides for a predictable, fair and balanced agreement entailing additional and reciprocal liberalisation, a robust safeguard clause, and Ukraine’s commitment to align to certain EU production standards.
Following the joint decision 2/2025 of the ACTC, reciprocal EU–Ukraine internal market treatment in the roaming sector entered into effect on 1 January 2026. The process is ongoing towards starting negotiations of an Agreement on Conformity Assessment and Acceptance of industrial products (ACAA).
There are still unsolved trade irritants, including a wood ban, export duties on certain oilseeds, a ban on metal scrap as well as a recent trend to apply barriers in the pharmaceutical sector. Certain discriminatory rules persist with regard to EU participation in public-private partnerships and concessions. The suspension of State aid control does not appear to be aligned with the objectives of the DCFTA. These irritants have negative impact on EU companies, which wish to invest in Ukraine.
Regarding bilateral financial assistance, since the Russian invasion, the EU, its Member States and the European financial institutions have stepped up their support in a Team Europe approach, mobilising EUR 231.6 billion for Ukraine’s overall economic, social and financial resilience in the form of emergency macro-financial assistance, budget support, emergency assistance, crisis response, humanitarian aid and military assistance as well as support for people fleeing the war.
The Ukraine Facility has been operational since 1 March 2024 and was established with up to EUR 50 billion in stable, predictable and flexible support for the period 2024-2027 by combining budgetary support (Pillar I), investment incentives (Pillar II) and EU accession- related technical assistance (Pillar III). In 2026, the Ukraine Facility was reinforced by EUR 8.35 billion in additional budget support from the Ukraine Support Loan channelled through the Pillar I. Pillar I was further increased by two contributions from Sweden of overall EUR 253 million and is now amounting to EUR 46.9 billion in total. The Ukraine Plan financed under Pillar I is the main instrument for ensuring Ukraine’s recovery, reconstruction and modernisation, while implementing reforms designed to underpin the country’s accession process. As of October 2026, EUR 32.5 billion has been disbursed in the form of budgetary support for the implementation of the Plan. In addition, under Pillar II, EUR 8.5 billion (88% of the total capacity of EUR 9.6 billion) has been allocated in guarantees and blending (EUR 6.8 billion and EUR 1.7 billion, respectively), aiming to leverage over EUR 25.7 billion in
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investments. Furthermore, under Pillar III, the EU has so far mobilised over EUR 848 million in project-based assistance6. With 15 Member States implementing and/or co-financing a total of 19 EU-funded projects worth EUR 370.9 million, Team Europe continues to play a crucial role in delivering EU assistance to Ukraine.
Since the beginning of Russia’s full-scale invasion, the EU and its Member States have mobilised more than EUR 4.8 billion in humanitarian assistance for Ukraine. The Commission alone has made available over EUR 1.4 billion.
Following the commitment by EU leaders in October 2025 to support Ukraine’s most urgent budgetary and defence needs, on 18 December 2025, the European Council agreed to provide a loan to Ukraine of EUR 90 billion for 2026 and 2027, based on EU borrowing on the capital markets backed by the EU’s budget headroom. The loan provides an indicative EUR 30 billion budget support and EUR 60 billion to strengthen Ukraine’s defence capabilities and the procurement of defence products complementing the EU’s military assistance to Ukraine.
EU Member States have also mobilised EUR 77.9 billion in military support for Ukraine, including EUR 6.4 billion under the European Peace Facility.
In parallel, the European Defence Industry Programme (EDIP), adopted in 2025, includes the Ukraine Support Instrument (USI) of EUR 300 million, which strengthens cooperation between the European and Ukrainian defence industries, while the Security Action for Europe (SAFE), established in 2025 with up to EUR 150 billion in loans to Member States, supports joint defence procurement, including with the participation of Ukrainian entities.
Ukraine is associated to 17 Union programmes: Horizon Europe, Euratom Research and Training Programme, Digital Europe, Fiscalis, Customs, Creative Europe, EU4Health, LIFE, Single Market Programme, Union Civil Protection Mechanism, Connecting Europe Facility, Union Anti-Fraud, Justice, Citizens, Equality, Rights and Values, some components of the Space Programme (Copernicus component, Space Weather Events and Near-Earth Objects sub-components of the Space Situational Awareness component), Employment and Social Innovation (EaSI) strand of the European Social Fund+ (ESF+), and European Defence Fund. Ukraine’s financial obligations for its participation in Union programmes have been suspended owing to Russia’s war of aggression.
6 Please note that this amount includes contributions of external assigned revenue received from Member States and third countries as well as a share of the extraordinary revenues generated by the immobilised Russian sovereign assets.
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ANNEX II – STATISTICAL ANNEX
STATISTICAL DATA (as of 14/09/2026)
Ukraine
Basic data Note 2013 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
Population (thousand) 45 373 i 41 419 iw 40 998 i : : :
Total area of the country (km²) 1) 603 549 w 603 549 w 603 549 w 603 549 w 603 549 w 603 549 w
National accounts Note 2013 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
Gross domestic product (GDP) (million national currency) 2) 1 465 198 5 450 849 5 239 114 6 627 961 7 662 376 8 931 194
pw
Gross domestic product (GDP) (million euro) 2) 138 021 168 960 154 006 167 632 176 270 189 769 pw
GDP per capita (euro) 2) 3) 3 154 w 4 077 w : : : :
GDP per capita (in purchasing power standards (PPS) : : : : : :
GDP per capita (in PPS), relative to the EU average (EU-27 = 100) : : : : : :
Real GDP growth rate: change on previous year of GDP volume (%) 3) 0.0 3.4 - 28.8 5.5 3.2 :
Employment growth (national accounts data), relative to the previous year (%) 2) 4) 0 iw - 2 iw : : : :
Labour productivity growth: growth in GDP (in volume) per person employed, relative to the
previous year (%)
2) 3) 0 w 6 w : : : :
Unit labour cost growth, relative to the previous year (%) : : : : : :
Nominal unit labour cost index based on persons (3 year % change) : : : : : :
Labour productivity per person employed: GDP (in PPS) per person employed relative to EU
average (EU-27 = 100)
: : : : : :
Gross value added by main sectors
Agriculture, forestry and fisheries (%) 2) 10.0 12.7 9.7 8.6 8.4 :
Industry (%) 2) 23.0 23.7 18.9 19.9 20.0 :
Construction (%) 2) 2.9 3.2 1.5 1.8 2.0 :
Services (%) 2) 64.1 i 60.5 i 69.9 i 69.7 i 69.6 i :
Final consumption expenditure, as a share of GDP (%) 2) 90.7 86.9 104.4 102.8 101.1 :
Gross fixed capital formation, as a share of GDP (%) 2) 16.9 13.2 11.9 19.9 18.5 :
Exports of goods and services, relative to GDP (%) 2) 43.0 40.7 35.4 28.3 29.7 :
Imports of goods and services, relative to GDP (%) 2) 52.2 42.0 52.0 49.2 50.0 :
Gross fixed capital formation by the general government sector, as a percentage of GDP (%) 2) 3) : 3 w : : : :
Business Note 2013 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
Industrial production volume index (2015 = 100) 2) : 100.0 63.4 67.6 70.7 69.7
Number of active enterprises (number) 2) 1 524 961 w 1 719 536 w 1 532 287 w 1 675 194 w 1 695 178 w :
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Birth rate: number of enterprise births in the reference period (t) divided by the number of
enterprises active in t (%)
2) 5) 9.4 w 9.4 w 7.9 w : : :
Death rate: number of enterprise deaths in the reference period (t) divided by the number of
enterprises active in t (%)
2) 5) 6.9 w 16.1 w 14.8 w : : :
People employed in SMEs as a share of all persons employed (within the non-financial
business economy) (%)
2) 57.1 iw 64.3 iw 63.9 iw 67.0 iw : :
Value added by SMEs (in the non-financial business economy) (EUR million) 2) : 59 859 iw 57 871 iw 60 679 iw : :
Total value added (in the non-financial business economy) (EUR million) 2) 86 782 w 113 149 w 93 313 w 99 288 w 81 643 w :
Inflation rate and house prices Note 2013 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
Consumer price index (CPI), change relative to the previous year (%) 2) 6) - 0.3 w 9.4 w 20.2 w 12.9 w 6.5 w 12.7 w
Balance of payments Note 2013 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
Balance of payments: current account total (million euro) 2) 3) - 12 441.3 w - 4 706.9 w 5 935.7 w - 9 971.6 w - 15 532.9 w - 30 255.3 w
Balance of payments current account: trade balance (million euro) 2) - 16 666.7 w - 7 026.2 w - 14 751.1 w - 28 053.1 w - 30 534.9 w - 45 241.5 w
Balance of payments current account: net services (million euro) 2) 3) 4 891.2 w 3 368.9 w - 12 064.4 w - 8 090.3 w - 6 941.5 w - 7 003.5 w
Balance of payments current account: net balance for primary income (million euro) 2) - 2 284.4 w - 4 961.0 w 8 481.6 w 4 676.6 w 482.9 w - 1 589.7 w
Balance of payments current account: net balance for secondary income (million euro) 2) 1 618.6 w 3 911.4 w 24 269.7 w 21 495.2 w 21 460.6 w 23 579.4 w
Net balance for primary and secondary income: of which government transfers (million euro) 2) - 666.6 w - 1 271.2 w 15 756.1 w 11 835.4 w 11 431.9 w 14 304.0 w
*3 year backward moving average of the current account balance relative to GDP (%) 2) - 7.5 iw - 0.4 iw 2.2 iw - 0.7 iw - 2.7 iw :
*Five year change in share of world exports of goods and services (%) 2) : 31.3 w - 22.3 w - 29.5 w : :
Net balance (inward - outward) of foreign direct investment (FDI) (million euro) 2) 3) 3 072.3 w 6 391.6 w 60.6 w 4 037.3 w 3 393.4 w 2 215.4 w
Foreign direct investment (FDI) abroad (million euro) 2) 3) 316.3 w - 171.0 w 336.4 w 28.4 w - 147.6 w 96.5 w
of which FDI of the reporting economy in the EU-27 countries (million euro) 2) 3) 306.8 w - 165.3 w - 102.2 w 13.8 w - 62.0 w 117.2 w
Foreign direct investment (FDI) in the reporting economy (million euro) 2) 3) 3 388.6 w 6 220.6 w 397.0 w 4 065.7 w 3 245.8 w 2 311.9 w
of which FDI of the EU-27 countries in the reporting economy (million euro) 2) 3) 536.4 w 4 609.4 w - 146.2 w 3 242.3 w 2 478.8 w 1 604.0 w
*Net international investment position, relative to GDP (%) 2) 3) - 35.1 w - 18.4 w - 12.9 w - 22.0 w - 21.9 w - 33.5 w
Year on year rate of change in gross inflow of remittances (in national currency) from migrant
workers (%)
2) 0.8 iw 1.0 iw 1.0 iw 1.0 iw : :
Public finance Note 2013 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
General government deficit / surplus, relative to GDP (%) 2) 7) - 4.1 w - 3.3 w - 15.6 w - 19.5 w - 17.7 w - 17.6 pw
General government gross debt relative to GDP (%) 2) 8) 38.4 w 49.0 w 77.8 w 83.3 w 91.1 w 101.2 w
Total government revenues, as a percentage of GDP (%) 2) 7) 41.7 w 37.0 w 49.8 w 54.0 w 54.0 w 56.5 pw
Total government expenditure, as a percentage of GDP (%) 2) 7) 45.8 w 40.3 w 65.4 w 73.5 w 71.6 w 74.1 pw
Financial indicators Note 2013 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
Gross external debt of the whole economy, relative to GDP (%) 2) 9) 71.7 iw 67.8 iw 79.7 iw 86.8 iw : :
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Gross external debt of the whole economy, relative to total exports (%) 2) 3)
9)
167.1 w 164.6 w 225.6 w 303.8 w 330.5 w 419.5 w
Money supply: M1 (banknotes, coins, overnight deposits, million euro) 34 761.6 w 41 433.7 w 40 342.0 w 44 143.0 w 48 473.6 w 50 634.4 w
Total credit by monetary financial institutions to residents (consolidated) (million euro) : : : : : :
*Annual change in financial sector liabilities (%) : : : : : :
*Private debt, consolidated, relative to GDP (%) : : : : : :
Interest rates: day-to-day money rate, per annum (%) 3.79 w 6.78 w 11.11 w 12.29 w 5.24 w 6.18 w
Euro exchange rates: average of period (1 euro = … national currency) 10.616 32.261 34.019 39.539 43.469 47.093
Trade-weighted effective exchange rate index, 42 countries (2015 = 100) 142.6 w 91.5 w 88.5 w 78.5 w 73.4 w 69.6 w
*3 year change (T/T-3) in the trade-weighted effective exchange rate index, 42 countries
(2015 = 100)
0.1 iw 0.1 iw - 0.1 iw - 0.2 iw - 0.2 iw - 0.2 iw
Value of reserve assets (including gold) (million euro) 2) 9) 14 779.2 w 27 294.4 w 26 751.2 w 36 459.0 w 41 913.1 w 48 717.9 w
External trade in goods Note 2013 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
Value of imports: all goods, all partners (million euro) 2) 57 100 iw 61 824 w 52 595 w 63 764 w 70 771 w :
Value of exports: all goods, all partners (million euro) 2) 46 914 iw 57 718 w 41 752 w 34 758 iw 38 556 iw :
Trade balance: all goods, all partners (million euro) 2) - 10 187 iw - 4 106 iw - 10 843 iw - 29 005 iw - 32 214 iw :
Terms of trade (export price index / import price index * 100) (number) 99.7 iw 118.9 iw 78.8 iw 79.9 iw 95.4 iw :
Share of exports to EU-27 countries in value of total exports (%) 2) 25.7 iw 39.3 iw 63.6 iw 71.1 iw 64.4 iw :
Share of imports from EU-27 countries in value of total imports (%) 2) 33.8 iw 39.7 iw 49.1 iw 51.2 iw 50.5 iw :
Demography Note 2013 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
Crude rate of natural change of population (natural growth rate): number of births minus
deaths (per thousand inhabitants)
- 3.5 : : : : :
Infant mortality rate deaths of children under one year of age (per thousand live births) 8.0 7.2 : : : :
Life expectancy at birth: male (years) : : : : : :
Life expectancy at birth: female (years) : : : : : :
Labour market Note 2013 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
Economic activity rate for persons aged 20–64: proportion of the population aged 20–64 that
is economically active (%)
2) 3) 72.5 w 71.9 w : : : :
Employment rate for persons aged 20–64: proportion of the population aged 20–64 that are
in employment (%)
2) 3) 67.4 w 64.8 w : : : :
Male employment rate for persons aged 20–64 (%) 2) 3) 73.3 w 70.8 w : : : :
Female employment rate for persons aged 20–64 (%) 2) 3) 62.0 w 59.3 w : : : :
Employment rate for persons aged 55–64: proportion of the population aged 55–64 that are
in employment (%)
2) 3) 40.8 w 41.1 w : : : :
Employment by main sectors
Agriculture, forestry and fisheries (%) 2) 3) 20.0 w 14.1 w : : : :
110
Industry (%) 2) 3) 18.7 w 18.2 w : : : :
Construction (%) 2) 3) 6.1 w 7.0 w : : : :
Services (%) 2) 3) 55.2 w 60.7 w : : : :
People employed in the public sector as a share of total employment, persons aged 20–64
(%)
: : : : : :
People employed in the private sector as a share of total employment, persons aged 20–64
(%)
: : : : : :
Unemployment rate: proportion of the labour force that is unemployed (%) 2) 3) 7.2 w 9.8 w : : : :
Male unemployment rate (%) 2) 3) 8.0 w 9.5 w : : : :
Female unemployment rate (%) 2) 3) 6.2 w 10.1 w : : : :
Youth unemployment rate: proportion of the labour force aged 15–24 that is unemployed (%) 2) 3) 17.4 w 19.1 w : : : :
Long-term unemployment rate: proportion of the labour force that has been unemployed for
12 months or more (%)
2) 3) 1.5 w 2.4 w : : : :
Unemployment rate for persons (aged 25–64) having completed at most lower secondary
education (ISCED levels 0-2) (%)
2) 3) 7.6 w 15.3 w : : : :
Unemployment rate for persons (aged 25–64) having completed tertiary education (ISCED
levels 5-8) (%)
2) 3) 5.6 w 8.5 w : : : :
Social cohesion Note 2013 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
Average nominal monthly wages and salaries (national currency) 2) 3)
10)
3 265 w 14 014 w 14 847 w 17 442 w 21 473 w 25 946 w
Index of real wages and salaries (index of nominal wages and salaries divided by the
inflation index) (2016 = 100)
3)
10)
: 117 w : : : :
Gini coefficient 2) 3)
5)
24 w 24 w : : : :
Poverty gap 2) 3) 20.9 w 21.7 w : : : :
Standard of living Note 2013 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
Number of passenger cars relative to population size (number per thousand population) : : : : : :
Infrastructure Note 2013 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
Density of railway network (lines in operation per thousand km²) 1) 35.8 iw 32.7 iw 32.8 iw 32.7 iw : :
Length of motorways (kilometres) 2) : 15 15 15 : :
Education, Innovation and Research Note 2013 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
Percentage of persons aged 30-34 with a tertiary education level (ISCED 2011 levels 5 to 8) 2) 3) 53.0 w 58.0 w : : : :
Percentage of persons aged 30-34 with a tertiary education level (ISCED 2011 levels 5 to 8),
males
2) 3) 46.5 w 51.4 w : : : :
Percentage of persons aged 30-34 with a tertiary education level (ISCED 2011 levels 5 to 8),
females
2) 3) 59.7 w 64.8 w : : : :
111
Participation in early childhood education (children aged 3 and over) 2) 84.4 w 85.8 w 88.5 w 87.1 w 87.1 w :
Participation in early childhood education (children aged 3 and over), males 2) 84.4 w 86.0 w 88.7 w 87.3 w 87.3 w :
Participation in early childhood education (children aged 3 and over), females 2) 84.5 w 85.6 w 88.4 w 86.9 w 86.0 w :
Low achieving 15-year-olds in reading (%) 2) : : 41.0 w : : :
Low achieving 15-year-olds in mathematics (%) 2) : : 42.4 w : : :
Low achieving 15-year-olds in science (%) 2) : : 34.0 w : : :
Early leavers from education and training: proportion of persons aged 18-24 with at most
lower secondary education (at most ISCED 2011 level 2) who are not in further education or
training
: : : : : :
Early leavers from education and training: proportion of men aged 18-24 with at most lower
secondary education (at most ISCED 2011 level 2) who are not in further education or
training
: : : : : :
Early leavers from education and training: proportion of women aged 18-24 with at most
lower secondary education (at most ISCED 2011 level 2) who are not in further education or
training
: : : : : :
Proportion of persons aged 25-64 having participated in education and training (last 4
weeks)
2) : 0.5 w : : : :
Proportion of persons aged 25-64 having participated in education and training (last 4
weeks), men
2) : 0.5 w : : : :
Proportion of persons aged 25-64 having participated in education and training (last 4
weeks), women
2) : 0.4 w : : : :
Exposure of vocational education and training (VET) graduates to work-based learning (% of
population aged 20-34)
: : : : : :
Share of individuals having at least basic digital skills (% of population aged 16-74) : : : : : :
Share of individuals having at least basic digital skills (% of population aged 16-74), males : : : : : :
Share of individuals having at least basic digital skills (% of population aged 16-74), females : : : : : :
Public expenditure on education relative to GDP (%) 2) 6.4 iw 5.1 iw : : : :
Gross domestic expenditure on R&D relative to GDP (%) 2) 0.73 iw 0.38 iw 0.33 iw 0.32 iw : :
Government budget appropriations or outlays on R&D (GBAORD), as a percentage of GDP
(%)
2)
11)
0.32 w 0.16 w 0.21 w 0.12 w 0.10 w :
Percentage of households who have internet access at home (%) 2) 3)
12)
41.6 w 82.7 w : : : :
Environment Note 2013 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
Index of greenhouse gas emissions, CO2 equivalent (1990 = 100) 45.6 ew 35.8 ew 24.4 ew 19.7 ew : :
Energy intensity of the economy (kg of oil equivalent per 1 000 euro GDP at 2015 constant
prices)
2) 203.0 dw : : : : :
Electricity generated from renewable sources relative to gross electricity consumption (%) 8.9 ew 10.6 w : : : :
Road share of inland freight transport (based on tonne-km) (%) 2) 3) 33.6 w 39.3 w 47.6 w 49.9 w 55.3 w 59.0 w
112
Energy Note 2013 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
Primary production of all energy products (thousand TOE) 83 964 : : : : :
Primary production of crude oil (thousand TOE) 3 167 : : : : :
Primary production of solid fuels (thousand TOE) 38 213 : : : : :
Primary production of gas (thousand TOE) 16 032 : : : : :
Net imports of all energy products (thousand TOE) 31 400 i : : : : :
Gross inland energy consumption (thousand TOE) 116 383 : : : : :
Gross electricity generation (GWh) 194 377 : : : : :
Agriculture Note 2013 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
Agricultural output volume index (at producer prices) (2015 = 100) 2) 102.7 w 119.4 w 89.2 w 99.1 w 92.9 w 86.0 w
Utilised agricultural area (thousand hectares) 1) 41 282.8 w 41 144.2 w 41 144.2 w 41 144.2 w 41 144.2 w 41 144.2 w
Livestock numbers: live bovine animals (thousand heads, end of period) : : : : : 1 804.1
Livestock numbers: live swine (thousand heads, end of period) : : : : : 4 642.4
Livestock numbers: live sheep and live goats (thousand heads, end of period) : : : : : 761.1 i
Raw milk available on farms (thousand tonnes) 2) 11 488.2 w 8 713.9 w 7 762.7 w 7 441.1 w 7 248.6 w 6 856.8 w
Harvested crop production: cereals (including rice) (thousand tonnes) 2) 62 679.8 iw 85 329.9 iw 53 529.6 iw 59 311.7 iw 55 648.3 iw :
Harvested crop production: sugar beet (thousand tonnes) 2) 10 789.0 w 10 853.9 w 9 941.5 w 13 175.8 w 12 798.2 w 11 689.3 w
Harvested crop production: vegetables (thousand tonnes) 2) 10 026.7 w 10 038.3 w 7 579.4 w 8 356.0 w 8 093.9 w 8 230.9 w
Source: Eurostat and/or the statistical authorities in Ukraine
: = not available d = definition differs e = estimated p = provisional i = Eurostat estimate w= data supplied by and under the responsibility of the national statistical authority and published on an "as is" basis and without any
assurance as regards their quality and adherence to EU statistical methodology * = Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure (MIP) indicator
Footnotes:
1) Data of the State Service of Ukraine for Geodesy, Cartography and Cadastre and according to the new Classification of Land
Types.
2) Since 2014, data for Ukraine generally exclude the illegally annexed Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the City of
Sevastopol and the territories which are not under control of the Ukrainian government.
3) Data on Ukraine from the year 2022 onward is limited due to exemption under the martial law from mandatory data submission
to the State Statistics Service of Ukraine, effective as of 3 March 2022, following Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine.
4) Persons aged 15 years and over.
113
5) Excluding data on individual entrepreneurs.
6) Consumer price inflation
7) Cash data (Government finance statistics manual 2014, IMF).
8) State and state guaranteed debt.
9) Assets and debt converted from US dollars to euro using cross rates at the end of the reporting year.
10) Data refer to enterprises and their independent divisions with 10 or more employees.
11) The share of R&D expenditure from the government budget in GDP.
12) Share of persons who used the internet at home.
EN EN
EUROPEAN COMMISSION
Brussels, 4.11.2026 SWD(2026) 690 final
COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT
Albania 2026 Report
Accompanying the document
COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN
PARLIAMENT, THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL
COMMITTEE AND THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS
2026 Communication on EU enlargement policy
{COM(2026) 690 final} - {SWD(2026) 691 final} - {SWD(2026) 692 final} -
{SWD(2026) 693 final} - {SWD(2026) 694 final} - {SWD(2026) 695 final} - {SWD(2026) 696 final} - {SWD(2026) 697 final} - {SWD(2026) 698 final} -
{SWD(2026) 699 final} - {SWD(2026) 700 final}
1
Table of contents
1. Introduction ........................................................................................................................................ 3
1.1. Context ......................................................................................................................................... 3
1.2. Main findings of the report .......................................................................................................... 3
1.3. STATE OF PLAY OF ACCESSION NEGOTIATIONS ......................................................................... 21
2. Cluster 1: The fundamentals of the accession process ..................................................................... 22
2.1. Functioning of democratic institutions and public administration reform ............................... 22
2.1.1 Democracy ........................................................................................................................... 22
2.1.2. Public administration reform .............................................................................................. 25
2.2. Rule of law and fundamental rights ........................................................................................... 28
2.2.1. Chapter 23: Judiciary and fundamental rights ................................................................ 28
2.2.2. Chapter 24: Justice, freedom and security ..................................................................... 47
2.3. Economic criteria ....................................................................................................................... 58
2.3.1. The existence of a functioning market economy ................................................................ 58
2.3.2. The capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the EU ........... 63
2.4 Public procurement, statistics, financial control ........................................................................ 65
Chapter 5: Public procurement ..................................................................................................... 65
Chapter 18: Statistics .................................................................................................................... 67
Chapter 32: Financial control ........................................................................................................ 68
3. Good neighbourly relations and regional cooperation ..................................................................... 69
4. Resilience, security, defence ............................................................................................................. 71
5. Ability to assume the obligations of membership ............................................................................ 73
Cluster 2: Internal market ................................................................................................................. 73
Chapter 1: Free movement of goods ............................................................................................ 73
Chapter 2: Freedom of movement for workers ............................................................................ 74
Chapter 3: Right of establishment and freedom to provide services ........................................... 74
Chapter 4: Free movement of capital ........................................................................................... 75
Chapter 6: Company law ............................................................................................................... 76
Chapter 7: Intellectual property law ............................................................................................. 76
Chapter 8: Competition policy ...................................................................................................... 77
Chapter 9: Financial services ......................................................................................................... 77
Chapter 28: Consumer and health protection .............................................................................. 78
Cluster 3: Competitiveness and inclusive growth ............................................................................. 80
Chapter 10: Digital transformation and media ............................................................................. 80
Chapter 16: Taxation ..................................................................................................................... 82
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Chapter 17: Economic and monetary policy ................................................................................. 83
Chapter 19: Social policy and employment .................................................................................. 84
Chapter 20: Enterprise and industrial policy ................................................................................ 85
Chapter 25: Science and research ................................................................................................. 86
Chapter 26: Education and culture ............................................................................................... 87
Chapter 29: Customs union .......................................................................................................... 88
Cluster 4: The green agenda and sustainable connectivity .............................................................. 89
Chapter 14: Transport policy ........................................................................................................ 90
Chapter 15: Energy ........................................................................................................................ 92
Chapter 21: Trans-European networks ......................................................................................... 93
Chapter 27: Environment and climate change ............................................................................. 94
Cluster 5: Resources, agriculture and cohesion ................................................................................ 97
Chapter 11: Agriculture and rural development ........................................................................... 97
Chapter 12: Food safety, veterinary and phytosanitary policy ..................................................... 98
Chapter 13: Fisheries and aquaculture ......................................................................................... 99
Chapter 22: Regional policy and coordination of structural instruments .................................. 100
Chapter 33: Financial and budgetary provisions ........................................................................ 101
Cluster 6: External relations ............................................................................................................ 102
Chapter 30: External relations .................................................................................................... 102
Chapter 31: Foreign, security and defence policy ...................................................................... 103
Annex I – Relations between the EU and Albania ........................................................................... 106
Annex II: Statistical annex ............................................................................................................... 108
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1. INTRODUCTION1
1.1. CONTEXT
During the reporting period, Albania opened the final remaining cluster of negotiations, met the interim benchmarks under cluster 1 - fundamentals and provisionally closed four chapters. Albania continued to implement the Stabilisation and Association Agreement, and meetings of the joint bodies under the agreement took place.
The Albanian authorities maintained their firm commitment to the strategic goal of EU integration as the country’s key priority, with the aim of closing all chapters of negotiations by the end of 2027. Keeping up the momentum will require swift delivery on high quality EU- related reforms.
The largest civic mobilisation since Albania’s democratic transition has been taking place in Tirana since May 2026 with daily protests which started in opposition to the planned development of a luxury tourism resort in the protected area of Pishë Poro – Narta. Building on the civic movement, student-led protests were organised in October 2026, during which violent incidents took place.
Albania has actively engaged and started delivering on the implementation of the new Growth Plan for the Western Balkans across the four pillars. Under the Reform and Growth Facility (RGF), a performance-based EU instrument supporting the EU accession process, the plan is in line with the country’s reform agenda, which was adopted in late 2024. Up to over EUR 920 million in grants and loans is available to Albania under the RGF by the end of this period. Thus far the Commission concluded that Albania has completed 33 of the 66 steps due until December 2025. Albania also made significant progress on most other steps.
The Commission’s 2026 rule of law report2 covered Albania for the third time.
1.2. MAIN FINDINGS OF THE REPORT
CLUSTER 1: THE FUNDAMENTALS OF THE ACCESSION
Democracy
The legal and institutional framework regarding elections is generally adequate. However, several longstanding recommendations from the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) / Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) and the Venice Commission remain unaddressed. A comprehensive electoral reform is urgently needed, in particular ahead of the 2027 municipal elections.
Daily protests have been taking place since May 2026. The protests were triggered by environmental concerns around construction works in the protected landscape of Pishë Poro – Narta and developed into a broader movement calling for transparency, accountability, anti-corruption efforts and good governance. This is the largest civic mobilisation in Albania since the country’s democratic transition, with tens of thousands of participants joining the protest at its peak. Building on the civic movement, student-led protests took place in
1 This report covers the period from 1 September 2025 to 1 September 2026. It is based on input from a variety of
sources, including contributions from the government of Albania, EU Member States, European Parliament reports and information from various international and non-governmental organisations. It also includes the results of comparative assessments and indices produced by other stakeholders, in particular in the area of rule of law.
The report uses the following assessment scale to describe the state of play: early stage, some level of preparation, moderately prepared, good level of preparation and well advanced. To describe progress made during the reporting period, it uses the following scale: backsliding, no progress, limited progress, some progress, good progress and very good progress. Where appropriate, interim steps have also been used. 2 SWD(2026) 928 final
4
October 2026, during which violent incidents occurred between protestors and the Albanian State Police. No dialogue has taken place so far. All sides should make genuine attempts to engage in constructive dialogue.
Parliament can exercise its powers, including control of the executive and involvement in the legislative process, in a partially effective way. The lack of genuine political dialogue and public consultation activities as well as clashes between the ruling majority and the opposition continued to limit its effectiveness. Parliament further failed to implement some Constitutional Court rulings. The adoption by consensus of amended rules of procedure was a positive development. However, the frequent tabling of legislative initiatives by the Council of Ministers, the systematic rejection of the opposition’s requests to set up inquiry committees, and the politicisation of appointments to constitutional bodies or independent institutions all contributed to limiting Parliament’s oversight of the government.
Albania’s bodies in charge of EU integration are in place. However, expertise on EU processes, planning and interinstitutional coordination must increase to make the process more inclusive, reflect cross-party consensus and involve civil society. Communication efforts on EU integration by the government increased but are still too fragmented. The implementation of the rule of law, functioning of democratic institutions and the public administration reform roadmaps continued and will be monitored under Cluster 1’s horizontal benchmark.
The government continued to show its commitment to EU integration. A substantial government reshuffle took place in February 2026, and further changes were announced in September 2026.
Civil society, including human rights defenders, operate in a partly enabling environment, despite continued negative narratives. Civil society organisations (CSOs) and human rights defenders working on gender and LGBTIQ+ rights were particularly targeted.
Public administration reform
Albania remains moderately prepared on public administration reform. Some progress was made, especially with the adoption of the amendments to the Law on the organisation and functioning of the State Administration. However, the government continued to adopt budget revisions through normative acts, without parliamentary scrutiny. Public consultations were not conducted efficiently on a regular basis or followed by appropriate follow-up actions.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were partially implemented and remain mostly valid. In the coming year, Albania should in particular:
→ improve the quality of Regulatory Impact Assessments (RIAs) and the efficiency of public consultation processes and extend their use to implementing legislation, especially where implementing legislation addresses key substantive elements of the regulatory framework;
→ improve fiscal discipline as well as budgetary oversight by limiting the use of normative acts by the executive for budget revisions, and reinstituting regular budget revision processes;
→ adopt and implement a new legislative framework for the civil service, which includes revised rules on merit-based recruitment, promotion and dismissal in the civil service law at all levels, especially senior level, and begin automating the payroll system again; prepare the implementing legislation and start implementing the new legislative framework for the organisation and functioning of the state administration.
Chapter 23: Judiciary and fundamental rights
5
Albania is between a moderate and a good level of preparation in the area of judiciary and fundamental rights and has made good progress during the reporting period.
Functioning of the judiciary
Albaniais between a moderate and a good level of preparation and has made good progress on the functioning of the judiciary. Albania continued to implement the 2016 justice reform. The vetting process for all judges and prosecutors was fully completed following the finalisation of the appeal phase, further strengthening independence accountability and integrity in the justice sector. Rules on the appointment of non-magistrate members to the High Judicial Council (HJC) and High Prosecutorial Council (HPC) were aligned with those applicable to magistrate members regarding asset and background verifications. The new Chief Special Prosecutor at the Special Prosecution’s Office was appointed through a competitive and transparent process. Challenges remain in conducting timely and qualitative evaluations of magistrates.
The lack of human resources, including magistrates as well as legal and administrative support staff, continues to affect the quality of justice. Attempts by public officials or politicians to exert undue influence on the judicial system, including on SPAK, and personal attacks on magistrates continued during the reporting period. While the backlog of cases has been partly reduced, pressing issues on judicial efficiency, quality and integrity – including court infrastructure, security and the delayed establishment of an electronic case management system – remain to be addressed.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were partially implemented and some remain valid. In the coming year, Albania should in particular:
→ further strengthen accountability and reduce political interference on the judiciary and prosecution services, including by enhancing whistleblower protection within judicial structures, ensuring merit-based and transparent appointments, promotions, evaluations and inspections, in line with the high standards set by the vetting process, and filling magistrate-inspector vacancies at the High Justice Inspectorate;
→ improve the quality of justice, in particular by continuing to fill vacancies and ensuring enough administrative court staff at all levels of the judiciary, increasing the total number of magistrates and legal advisers towards the EU average, and finalising the revision of the initial and continuous training curricula and entrance examination for the School of Magistrates and improving the school’s capacity to deliver judicial training;
→ improve judicial efficiency, including by adopting further measures to increase efficiency at all levels, and further reduce backlog, in line with the Roadmap for Judicial Efficiency, the principles of justice reform and European standards, ensuring the swift implementation of the integrated case management system and expanding the online notification system to all courts of general jurisdiction.
Fight against corruption
Albania is between a moderate and a good level of preparation and has shown good progress overall. The 2024-2030 Anti-Corruption Strategy and its 2024-2026 action plan are being implemented. The Specialised Structure Against Organised Crime and Corruption (SPAK) has continued to demonstrate independence and deliver positive results in fighting high-level corruption, making tangible progress towards a solid track record in the fight against corruption. However, corruption remains a real challenge. Legislation to prevent corruption was further aligned with European standards, including on conflicts of interest and lobbying. Further alignment was achieved on whistleblower protection. Sector-based corruption risk assessments have been initiated and high-level asset declarations published. The actual impact of these and other preventive measures on corruption remains to be demonstrated, considering ongoing high-level corruption investigations.
6
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were partially implemented and some remain valid. In the coming year, Albania should in particular:
→ further strengthen and consolidate the track record of investigation, prosecution and adjudication of corruption cases and secure more final convictions, in particular in high- profile cases. This includes the seizure and final confiscation of criminal assets resulting from corruption-related offences, as well as significantly increasing proactive referrals by relevant state institutions and law enforcement agencies to the Special Prosecution Office (SPO) and General Prosecution Office (GPO);
→ further consolidate the corruption prevention framework by: implementing and monitoring the newly adopted legislative measures; strengthening institutional capacity and engagement in implementing the anti-corruption strategy and legislation; expanding corruption risk assessments in vulnerable sectors, as well as central and local level integrity plans, and implementing their findings; enhancing asset declaration verification by all relevant bodies including the High Inspectorate of Declaration and Audit of Assets and Conflicts of interest (HIDAACI);
→ Strengthen measures to improve the accountability and integrity of the Albanian State Police and the Police Oversight Agency and ensure independence and stability of its leadership.
Fundamental rights
Albania’s legal framework sets out a generally good basis for the protection of fundamental rights. Progress was made with the adoption of the new gender equality and alternative care laws, amendments to the Law on the prevention and protection from violence against women and domestic violence, the remaining pieces of implementing legislation to the Law on personal data protection. Amendments to the Law on protection from discrimination, were also adopted, although full alignment with the acquis is still expected. The pace of progress in advancing prison reform has not matched the ambition required and the conditions within correctional institutions continue to warrant careful attention. The enjoyment of the right to property and of the rights of persons belonging to minorities need to improve. An overall increase in implementation efforts is needed.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were partially implemented and remain mostly valid. In the coming year, Albania should in particular:
→ further ensure effective implementation of the legal framework on the rights of persons belonging to minorities and further increase the capacity and resources of the State Committee on National Minorities and of local authorities;
→ further secure the right to property by concluding first-time land registrations and digitisation of ownership titles and cadastral maps; improving systematically the quality and accuracy of cadastral data; further enhancing integrity, transparency, and effectiveness in delivering cadastral services; accelerating judicial cases for determining land ownerships, and finalising the process of compensations for properties confiscated during the communist regime;
→ implement the recommendations of international monitoring bodies, including of the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CPT); ensure effective implementation of the Law on personal data protection, of the Law on gender equality, including ensuring service delivery to all victims of violence, and of all action plans by ensuring adequate financial and human resources capacities including of the Information and Data Protection Commissioner’s Office; ensure full alignment and effective implementation of the EU acquis on the rights of victims of crime and on procedural rights of suspects and accused persons; and make
7
decisive progress towards full deinstitutionalisation of children, including those with disabilities.
Freedom of expression and media freedom
Albania is between having some and a moderate level of preparation in the area of freedom of expression and made some progress during the reporting period, especially as regards aligning its legislative framework with the EU acquis and European standards. Albania provides insufficient legal guarantees on the freedom of expression while the enabling environment needs to improve for media to operate freely, independently and professionally. Albania exempted registered journalists from criminal provisions on defamation under certain conditions, though full decriminalisation of defamation is yet to be achieved. Media independence and pluralism continue to be affected by economic penetration of the media market by business groups with political links and the overlap of political, business and other interests, the lack of transparency of financing sources, a high concentration of media ownership, as well as intimidation and smear campaigns, strategic lawsuits against public participation (SLAPPs), and the precarious working conditions for journalists. Concerns continued to be voiced about political influence impacting appointments of both the media regulatory authority and the public broadcaster.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were partially implemented and remain largely valid. In the coming year, Albania should in particular:
→ adopt further reforms of the legal and regulatory framework through an inclusive and transparent process to: (i) fully implement measures to ensure transparency of media ownership, strengthen media plurality and editorial independence; (ii) strengthen transparency of media financing from private and state resources; (iii) strengthen the autonomy of the media regulator and the independence of the state broadcaster; (iv) fully repeal criminal provisions on insult and defamation; (v) align civil aspects of defamation with European standards; and (vi) further ensure fair and transparent allocation of state advertising and strengthen access to public information;
→ further ensure zero tolerance for intimidation, threats and smear campaigns, and provide effective protections against strategic lawsuits against public participation (SLAPP) and enforcement in cases of attacks against journalists, including judicial follow-up; further increase capacities for law enforcement bodies to handle cases of violence, including on the margins of protests, and other criminal cases involving journalists, notably by ensuring high human rights compliance in handling incidents involving journalists, through binding instructions, disciplinary, administrative and/or judicial procedures, data collection and capacity building measures;
→ improve Albanian journalists’ working conditions, in particular by strengthening the protection of journalists’ employment and social rights and ensuring that the Labour Code is applied consistently.
Chapter 24: Justice, freedom and security
Albania is between a moderate and a good level of preparation in this area and has made good progress. In particular, the asset recovery office has gradually become operational. Both the national early warning system on new psychoactive substances and the national drugs observatory increased their level of operationality, but challenges remain in terms of capacity and resources. Albania continued to implement its migration strategy, which is aligned with EU priorities, adopted a national contingency plan and established a temporary reception centre for unaccompanied minors. Albania also adopted a Schengen Action Plan.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were partially implemented and therefore remain mostly valid. In the coming year, Albania should in particular:
8
→ further develop the systematic use of financial investigations when dealing with serious and organised crime, including illicit trafficking, terrorism and money laundering;
→ ensure that the national drugs observatory and the national early warning system on the detection of new psychoactive substances become fully and sustainably operational, including through cooperation with the EU Drugs Agency; and adopt a comprehensive drugs strategy, containing both health and law enforcement/security aspects, and a related action plan;
→ further improve the asylum referral system and access to asylum procedures; improve the protection of unaccompanied minors by strengthening legal and policy safeguards and establishing permanent separate reception facilities for them in line with EU standards; continue to address the issue of unfounded asylum applications of Albanian nationals in Schengen and associated countries; and fully implement its roadmap to ensure visa policy alignment with the EU list of visa-required countries outside the EU.
Fight against serious and organised crime
Albania is between a moderate and a good level of preparation and has made good progress. The capacity and effectiveness of the prosecution system (both specialised and general, including at district level) to investigate criminal groups and its use of financial investigations continued to develop. The fight against money laundering and the seizure of assets linked to organised crime were strengthened. SPAK has also further consolidated cooperation with its international counterparts, in particular with EU Member States and EU agencies, to investigate high-risk criminal groups with initial tangible results. Albania reinforced its capacities and cooperation with Member States on cybercrime. Albania also adopted amendments to its Criminal Code, further aligning with the EU acquis on the criminalisation of money laundering, trafficking in human beings, online and offline child sexual abuse and exploitation, as well as drug trafficking and combating terrorism.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were partially implemented and remain largely valid. In the coming year, Albania should in particular:
→ establish a solid track record of investigations, prosecutions and final convictions in all fields of serious and organised crime, including drug trafficking, money laundering and terrorist financing through continued international cooperation, reinforced domestic inter- agency cooperation and methodologies to tackle complex criminal cases, and improved criminal and financial analysis capacity, while ensuring comprehensive alignment with the EU acquis;
→ improve the efficiency of the asset recovery and management system by strengthening operational cooperation of the asset recovery office notably with asset recovery offices in EU Member States, by improving the use of legal instruments to confiscate proceeds of crime and property derived from criminal activities, and by better managing frozen and confiscated property also for social reuse;
→ prioritise the reinforcement of the district prosecution offices by investing in human and technical resources; guaranteeing access to relevant databases and information systems and streamlining inter-agency cooperation to enable joint investigative task forces.
ECONOMIC CRITERIA
The existence of a functioning market economy
Albania has a good level of preparation in developing a functioning market economy and made some progress in this area. The economy maintained strong growth momentum in 2025 thanks to robust domestic demand and tourism. Sustained growth in tourism helped bring down the current account deficit to a historic low in 2025. Inflation remained below the
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central bank's target amid the continued appreciation of the lek. The fiscal deficit widened but stayed below target, and the public debt ratio continued to decline. Despite recent increases, government revenue as a share of GDP remains low, while spending on public investment is repeatedly under-executed. The labour market situation continued to improve, but structural problems, such as emigration, persist. The banking sector remained sound, while lending to the private sector increased. The business environment remains affected by a weak rule of law, limited access to finance for small- and medium-sized enterprises, and shortcomings in the oversight and governance of state-owned enterprises.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were partly addressed and remain largely valid. In the coming year, Albania should in particular:
→ advance the implementation of the Medium-Term Revenue Strategy, finalise the fiscal cadastre and accelerate the adoption of the property tax law;
→ strengthen fiscal risk management and transparency, including regarding risks arising from state-owned enterprises, public-private partnerships, population ageing and climate change;
→ ensure the effective functioning of the National Single Project Pipeline, including the integration of public-private partnerships, and reinforce project appraisal and prioritisation to ensure effective implementation of public investment projects.
The capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the EU
Albania has between some and a moderate level of preparation to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the EU and made some progress in this area. Despite efforts to reduce barriers in accessing education for children with disabilities and those from disadvantaged backgrounds, the education system still faces numerous challenges. Skills gaps persist, and the youth NEET rate (those not in education, employment or training) remains a concern. Transport and digital infrastructure improved, but infrastructure gaps persist. Albania continues to benefit from strong tourism growth, but industry and agriculture remain low-productivity sectors that have been contracting. Manufacturing exports fell for the third consecutive year, reflecting weak external demand, lek appreciation and businesses' limited pricing power.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were partially implemented and therefore remain mostly valid. In the coming year, Albania should in particular:
→ expand and improve the dual VET system to increase the number of graduates and better align skills with labour market needs, while improving the quality of the broader education system;
→ implement the plan to increase public research and development (R&D) expenditure towards the 2030 target of 1% of GDP and strengthen links between businesses and research institutions to develop a more dynamic innovation ecosystem;
→ accelerate the implementation of transport and energy infrastructure projects.
Chapter 5: Public procurement
Albania has between a moderate and a good level of preparation in public procurement. Some progress was made during the reporting period, especially through the adoption of the law on concessions and public private partnerships (PPPs) aligning the legal framework in this area with the EU acquis.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were partially implemented and remain mostly valid. In the coming year, Albania should in particular:
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→ continue efforts to improve competitive procurement procedures and ensure integrity of the procurement function;
→ complete outstanding alignment gaps in the legislative framework with the EU acquis in the areas of public procurement and defence and security procurement;
→ ensure compliance with the EU acquis and the Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA) on intergovernmental agreements and lex specialis concluded with non-EU countries on public procurement.
Chapter 18: Statistics
Albania is moderately prepared in the area of statistics. Some progress was made in improving the compilation of macroeconomic statistics in line with the European System of National and Regional Accounts (ESA 2010).
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were partially implemented and remain largely valid. In the coming year, Albania should in particular:
→ continue increasing the production and dissemination of timely and high-quality data in accordance with the EU acquis in statistics especially in the areas covered by the closing benchmarks;
→ conduct the agricultural census in line with the relevant EU acquis;
→ ensure adequate staffing at the Institute for Statistics (INSTAT) as well as progress on supporting IT systems and data security.
Chapter 32: Financial control
Albania is moderately prepared in the area of financial control. Some progress was made by re-establishing the subcommittee on Public Audit as a mechanism for parliamentary scrutiny over external audit matters.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were partially implemented and remain mostly valid. In the coming year, Albania should in particular:
→ enhance the delegation of financial and management responsibilities, notably by entrusting routine administrative approvals to lower levels, clarifying accountability lines and ensuring that no subordinate unit is accountable to more than one superior unit, upgrade irregularity and fraud management;
→ ensure parliamentary scrutiny through the subcommittee on Public Audit, which has to systematically and effectively conduct hearings, issue recommendations for follow-up and monitor their implementation, with the aim of increasing their level of implementation;
→ fully align with the PIF Directive, strengthen controls and consolidate capacities to protect the EU’s financial interests, ensure appropriate reporting of irregularities and continue implementing both the anti-fraud strategy and action plans agreed with the European Commission to follow up investigations.
CLUSTER 2: INTERNAL MARKET
Chapter 1: Free movement of goods
Albania has between some and a moderate level of preparation on free movement of goods. No progress on alignment with the EU acquis was achieved in the reporting period.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were not fully implemented and remain valid. In the coming year, Albania should in particular:
→ complete the alignment of its legislation with the relevant EU acquis on quality
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infrastructure, i.e. accreditation, conformity assessment and market surveillance;
→ significantly strengthen the enforcement capacity of the market surveillance inspectorate;
→ finalise and adopt an Action Plan to comply with Articles 34-36 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), fully covering the non-harmonised area, with a timeframe for screening all legislation and practices, introducing mutual recognition clauses, and repealing or amending legislation and practices as necessary.
Chapter 2: Freedom of movement for workers
Albania is moderately prepared on freedom of movement for workers. Some progress was achieved by negotiating and concluding further bilateral agreements on social security coordination with EU Member States and further advancing the preparations to connect Albania’s employment services system to the European network of employment services (EURES).
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were partially implemented and therefore remain mostly valid. In the coming year, Albania should in particular:
→ continue alignment of national legislation with the EU acquis on free movement of workers, including access for EU citizens to the labour market and equal treatment of EU workers; continue the enforcement of the Law on foreigners as per the 2024-2030 National Migration Strategy and start the preparation of its new action plan;
→ continue developing the employment service’s IT system, allowing its connection to EURES upon accession; work to ensure technical and organisational preparedness, administrative and financial capacities and resources as well as development of IT infrastructure, systems and relevant databases for full participation in the Electronic Exchange of Social Security Information (EESSI) system and the European Health Insurance Card scheme.
→ conclude additional bilateral agreements on social security coordination with EU Member States.
Chapter 3: Right of establishment and freedom to provide services
Albania is moderately prepared in the area of the right of establishment and freedom to provide services. Some progress was achieved in the reporting period especially by adopting the Law on freedom of establishment and the provision of services.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were partially implemented and therefore remain mostly valid. In the coming year, Albania should in particular:
→ continue efforts to align secondary legislation related to the Law on freedom of establishment and provision of services, as well as sectoral legislation with the EU acquis and ensure appropriate institutional coordination and implementation capacity;
→ continue efforts to align its legislation in the area of mutual recognition of professional qualifications with the EU acquis, as well as training programmes for regulated professions, and ensure appropriate institutional capacities.
Chapter 4: Free movement of capital
Albania has a good level of preparation on free movement of capital. Good progress was made in aligning with the EU acquis through the adoption of the Law on anti-money laundering and laws on payment services. Albania continued its action against money laundering, in particular with the implementation of the 2024-2030 National Strategy on the Fight against Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were partially implemented and remain largely valid. In the coming year, Albania should in particular:
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→ amend the legislation to align with the EU acquis and to fulfil Albania’s obligations under the SAA, ensuring equal treatment for EU and Albanian citizens in land acquisition;
→ continue to implement adopted legislation in the area of payments and continue to enable the regulatory framework and infrastructure for implementing the clone of the TARGET instant payment system;
→ continue to implement the 2024-2030 Anti-Money Laundering and Terrorism Financing Strategy and National Risk Assessment Action Plan 2024-2027.
Chapter 6: Company law
Albania has a good level of preparation on company law. Good progress was made with the adoption of legislation aiming at aligning the legal framework with the EU acquis in the area of corporate law accounting, transparency and audit. The Law on entrepreneurs and commercial companies, the related package on European economic interest groupings, on the European cooperative society and on the statute of European company, were also adopted aiming at full alignment with EU company law acquis.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were largely implemented. In the coming year, Albania should in particular:
→ implement the adopted legislation in the area of audit, accounting and transparency and strengthen the capacities of the competent authorities;
→ implement the Action Plan for full alignment with and implementation of the Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive.
Chapter 7: Intellectual property law
Albania has a good level of preparation on intellectual property rights (IPR). Good progress was made in the reporting period, in particular by adopting the amended law on copyrights, aligning with the EU acquis on industrial designs; and geographical indications; and strengthening the IPR institutional set-up.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were mostly implemented. In the coming year, Albania should in particular:
→ start implementing the new legislation on copyright, industrial designs, geographical indications and the enforcement of IPR;
→ continue to improve the functioning of collective management organisations, especially in terms of enforcement, collection of royalties and payments to rights holders;
→ further strengthen the enforcement of all aspects of the IPR system, through monitoring, budgeting, increased awareness, strengthened institutional capacity and training.
Chapter 8: Competition policy
Albania is between having some and a moderate level of preparation on competition policy. There was limited progress during the reporting period, particularly on legislative alignment with the EU acquis.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were implemented only to a limited extent and remain valid. In the coming year, Albania should in particular:
→ ensure the operational independence of the Authority of State Aid control (SAC) and ensure adequate administrative capacity for its secretariat;
→ further align the legislative framework in the areas of State aid, mergers and anti-trust with the EU acquis;
→ step up efforts to raise awareness of State aid rules among the judiciary, line ministries,
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as well as regional and local authorities, to ensure that the SAC is notified in advance of aid measures and to strengthen the enforcement of competition and State aid rules.
Chapter 9: Financial services
Albania has a good level of preparation on financial services. Some progress was made in aligning the legislative framework, mainly through technical work on full alignment with the Capital Requirements Regulation and the Capital Requirements Directive.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were partially implemented and remain largely valid. In the coming year, Albania should in particular:
→ continue working towards fully aligning Albania’s banking regulation with the amended versions of the Capital Requirements Directive and Regulation (CRD/R), the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD), and the Deposit Guarantee Schemes Directive (DGSD) and ensure that all entities are appropriately regulated and supervised, including the National Development Bank;
→ advance steps for alignment with the EU acquis on insurance and occupational pensions, including the Solvency II Directive;
→ continue efforts to fully align with the EU acquis on capital markets, including securities markets, investment funds, investment services and financial market infrastructures.
Chapter 28: Consumer and health protection
Albania is between an early stage of preparation and having some level of preparation in the area of consumer and health protection. Due to the adoption of a legal package to align with several pieces of EU consumer acquis, there was some progress, however, significant progress is needed on alignment, on both consumer protection and on public health.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were not fully implemented and therefore remain valid. In the coming year, Albania should in particular:
→ adopt the new law on consumer protection to align Albania’s consumer law with many elements of the EU acquis on consumer protection;
→ continue working on alignment with the EU acquis on medicinal products for human and veterinary use, medical devices and tobacco control;
→ increase the financial and human resources in the health sector, specifically in primary healthcare and all-hazard health emergency preparedness, and guarantee equal access to quality health services for vulnerable groups, in particular people with disabilities, women and girls.
CLUSTER 3: COMPETITIVENESS AND INCLUSIVE GROWTH
Chapter 10: Digital transformation and media
Albania has a good level of preparation in the field of digital transformation and media and made good progress during the reporting period. The Law on cybersecurity enabled further alignment with the EU Directive on measures for a high common level of cybersecurity across the EU (NIS 2 Directive). The implementing legislation for the Law on cybersecurity is complete. The new Cybersecurity Strategy 2025-2030 and its action plan for 2025-2027 have been adopted.
Some of the Commission’s recommendations from last year were partially implemented and remain largely valid. In the coming year, Albania should in particular:
→ adopt the decision to extend the roll-out of the 112 emergency number to the whole
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country;
→ finalise the implementing legislation for the Law on electronic communications;
→ prioritise investment in basic and advanced digital skills, increase the number of ICT professionals and support SMEs in adopting advanced digital technologies as per the Digital Economy and Society Index.
Chapter 16: Taxation
Albania is moderately prepared in the area of taxation. Some progress was made in the reporting period, mainly through the implementation of tax administration reforms under the medium-term revenue strategy (MTRS) and the conclusion of the review of tax exemptions.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were partially implemented and remain mostly valid. In the coming year, Albania should in particular:
→ implement the medium-term revenue strategy by addressing tax exemptions, continue tax administration reforms, further improve the use of third-party data and further improve voluntary tax compliance and risk assessment instead of promoting the Fiscal Peace Agreement, which must meet FATF standards;
→ advance the alignment of VAT and excise duties and direct tax legislation with the EU acquis as well as revise tax legislation concerningimported plastic as a good/raw material, to ensure alignment with SAA commitments;
→ continue preparations towards achieving interconnection and interoperability with the common EU IT systems for excise duties and VAT and information exchange mechanisms for taxation, as well as ensure alignment with the DAC directives.
Chapter 17: Economic and monetary policy
Albania has a good level of preparation in the area of economic and monetary policy and has made good progress. Albania adopted a new Law on Bank of Albania to align with the EU acquis.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were partially implemented and remain mostly valid. In the coming year, Albania should, in particular:
→ ensure continuity of the Supervisory Board meetings during the transitory period of appointing new members;
→ implement the Fiscal Council Law to set up an independent fiscal institution; and operationalise budget legislation and practices in line with the requirements of the EU acquis.
Chapter 19: Social policy and employment
Albania is moderately prepared in the area of social policy and employment and made limited progress during the reporting period, which included the national rollout of the Youth Guarantee. More work is needed on alignment with the EU labour law and occupational health and safety acquis, including the area of non-discrimination and equality, including gender equality.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year remain mostly valid. In the coming year, Albania should:
→ continue the alignment of legislation with the EU acquis in the area of labour law and occupational safety and health; increase human and budgetary resources of the State health and social services inspectorates and improve their technical capacities to respond effectively to labour right violations and workplace health and safety risks; increase measures to prevent accidents in the workplace; increase and strengthen
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cross-sectoral coordination;
→ further increase budget allocation for the provision of social services through the Social Fund, including their monitoring, and strengthen the capacity of local governments to ensure funding of social services, including long-term care; develop a coordinated social service referral system to be consistently implemented at local level;
→ strengthen bipartite and tripartite social dialogue and ensure the effective consultation and participation of social partners in policy-making processes, among others via ensuring the effective functioning of the National Labour Council.
Chapter 20: Enterprise and industrial policy
Albania has a good level of preparation in the area of enterprise and industrial policy. Good progress was made, especially through the amendments to the Business Investment Development Strategy and the adoption of the Late Payments Directive.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were partially implemented and remain mostly valid. In the coming year, Albania should in particular:
→ continue the implementation of the Business Investment Development Strategy, notably by ascertaining the needed funding for planned action and report regularly on its implementation;
→ continue improving the business environment by combating the informal economy and providing fair competition between domestic and foreign operators;
→ accelerate efforts to draft and adopt an investment law that would address current challenges faced by investors, while repealing the Law on strategic investors.
Chapter 25: Science and research
Albania is between a moderate and a good level of preparation in the area of science and research. Good progress was made to align with the EU acquis and continue strengthening the innovation eco-system. Albania needs to increase investment in research, science and technology as well as further facilitate collaboration between the public and private sector on research and innovation.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were largely implemented but remain partially valid. In the coming year, Albania should in particular:
→ continue to increase investment in research, in line with its own commitments and the new European Research Area priorities, with a view to reaching 1% of GDP by 2030;
→ strengthen the capacity of strategic public and private stakeholders, with a view to ensuring effective participation in EU framework programmes as well as implementation of key national strategies, including the Smart Specialisation Strategy;
→ enhance efforts to produce reliable statistics and data on innovation, science and technology. Additional efforts are also needed to improve Albania’s classification in the European Innovation Scoreboard.
Chapter 26: Education and culture
Albania has a good level of preparation in the field of education and culture. Good progress was made, in particular by setting up the National Agency for Educational Services, a public legal entity providing educational services, ensuring quality and transparency, and providing technical and professional support as well as recommendations on educational policies. Albania needs to further strengthen the quality and inclusiveness of education on all levels.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were implemented. In the coming year,
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Albania should in particular:
→ further increase public spending on education to further modernise, increase quality and inclusiveness of education and educational facilities, from pre-school to university education;
→ continue improving professional development to enhance capacities of teachers and trainers, with a focus on (i) pedagogical skills to implement the skills-based inclusive approach and (ii) digitalisation from pre-primary to university levels, including VET education; further optimise the VET system to be more attractive, flexible and responsive to evolving labour market needs.
Chapter 29: Customs union
Albania hasa good level of preparation in the area of the customs union. Good progress was made through legal amendments to align with parts of the EU acquis (dual use, precursors), the approval of the IT strategy, including the development and modernisation of key IT systems according to the EU customs requirements, the development of the Common Communications Network/Common Systems Interface (CNN/CSI), and preparations for the development of a new computerised transit system (NCTS) and a new Automated Export System (AES).
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were partially implemented and remain valid. In the coming year, Albania should in particular:
→ adopt and implement the legal provisions on the common transit procedure and continue the implementation of NCTS Phase 6 and of the AES, as well as continue preparations for achieving the interconnection and interoperability of its national customs IT systems with the EU digital customs environment in aligment with EU requirements and standards;
→ put in place the new organisational structure of the Customs Service to strenghten administrative capacity and resilience against corruption in line with the Business Strategy; continue to tackle the smuggling of illicit goods, including tobacco products, corruption and imports of counterfeit products, including by strengthening administrative capacity and improving cooperation between involved authorities, as well as with the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF);
→ adopt the amendments of the Albanian Customs Code and related implementing legislation, providing the basis to implement the national customs IT systems to ensure interoperability with the EU digital customs environment and continue alignment to take account of the progressive application of the new Union Customs Code.
CLUSTER 4: THE GREEN AGENDA AND SUSTAINABLE CONNECTIVITY
Chapter 14: Transport policy
Albania is moderately prepared in the area of transport policy, with some progress achieved in the reporting period. Albania set up a road traffic monitoring centre as part of the implementation of the intelligent transport systems (ITS) and aligned its legislation with the relevant acquis. Albania became a full member of the Mediterranean Memorandum of Understanding on Port State Control relating to the inspection of ships.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were partially implemented and remain mostly valid. In the coming year, Albania should in particular:
→ adopt the new National Transport Strategy, and its accompanying Action Plan, and continue implementing the newly adopted 2026-2030 Road Safety Strategy, in line with the EU acquis and the Transport Community’s road safety action plan;
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→ finalise the reform of the Albanian Road Authority (ARA) to make the Road Asset Management System operational, formalise the inter-institutional Service Level Agreement (SLA), between ARA and the Ministry of Infrastructure and Energy, including the definition of the key performance indicators and establishing dedicated multi-year funding commitments to operate and ensure the maintenance of roads and bridges;
→ implement legislation on railway sector reform, in line with the Transport Community Rail Action Plan and take the necessary steps to secure an operator to operate the reconstructed the railway line Tirana–Durres–Rinas, including the provision of rolling stock.
Chapter 15: Energy
Albania has a good level of preparation in the area of energy. It made good progress, in particular on the internal electricity energy market and on the renewable energy and energy efficiency acquis. A power sector law aligning with the EU’s electricity integration package (EIP) and the Energy Community acquis wasadopted.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were largely implemented, with some remaining valid. In the coming year, Albania should in particular:
→ continue the implementation of the updated 2021-2030 national energy and climate plan (NECP) in line with the 2030 Energy Community targets and recommendations;
→ strengthen the capacity of the Energy Efficiency Agency, continue adopting and implementing secondary legislation, including establishing the energy efficiency obligation scheme, in line with country’s obligations under the Energy Efficiency Directive and strengthen the institutional and technical capacity for the effective implementation and enforcement of energy-labelling regulations aligned with the EU acquis;
→ fully implement the electricity integration package (EIP) and start the verification process with the Commission.
Chapter 21: Trans-European networks
Albania has a good level of preparation in trans-European networks (TENs). Good progress was made, particularly on developing transport and energy networks and legislative alignment.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were partially implemented and remain mostly valid. In the coming year, Albania should in particular:
→ continue the implementation of the trans-European transport networks (TEN-T) five-year rolling workplan of the Transport Community Treaty and continue developing the core energy networks in line with the national strategies and infrastructure investment prioritisation, under the single project pipeline;
→ continue to strengthen administrative capacities to ensure that the adopted legal framework with the EU acquis and the regulations on TEN-T and TEN-E are effectively implemented and enforced;
→ maintain focus on investment to complete the projects on the Western Balkans – Eastern Mediterranean European Transport Corridor.
Chapter 27: Environment and climate change
Albania has some level of preparation in this area and made limited progress over the reporting period. Environmental governance and enforcement deficiencies linked to nature protection – including the 2024 amendments to the Law on protected areas, and the extension of the Law on strategic investments – have led to deterioration on nature protection and contributed to the protests that started in May 2026. Secondary legislation on
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integrated waste management and on extended producer responsibility was adopted in late 2025. Work on water quality implementing legislation is ongoing. On climate change, Albania amended its Law on Climate change and adopted secondary legislation aligning with EU acquis on monitoring, reporting, verification and accreditation (MRVA) of greenhouse gas emission for the purpose of EU Emissions Trading System (EU ETS). The country adopted its national adaptation plan and an updated national energy and climate plan (NECP) for the period 2021-2030 and submitted its new nationally determined contribution (NDC) to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) secretariat. However, further efforts are needed on implementation and enforcement of the environment and climate acquis.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were partially implemented and therefore remain valid. In the coming year, Albania should in particular:
→ achieve alignment, implementation and enforcement of the directives on environmental impact assessment (EIA) and strategic environmental assessment (SEA); prepare financing plans for priority environmental investments; ensure that all infrastructure and tourism investment complies with the EU environment and climate acquis, as well as with national and international obligations related to nature and water protection and ensure public participation;
→ take immediate measures to fight environmental crime and achieve alignment with the directives on environmental crime and environmental liability, and strengthen policy implementation and law enforcement for nature and biodiversity protection, especially in protected areas and for timber trafficking;
→ ensure implementation of MRVA acquis for the purpose of aligning with the full scope of the EU ETS; speed up legislative alignment with the EU climate acquis, and prepare and adopt roadmaps for its implementation upon accession.
CLUSTER 5: RESOURCES, AGRICULTURE AND COHESION
Chapter 11: Agriculture and rural development
Albania is between having some and a moderate level of preparation in agriculture and rural development. Some progress was made in the reporting period, in particular with the establishment of the legal and institutional framework for the Farm Sustainability Data Network (FSDN) and the Land Parcel Identification System (LPIS). Further efforts are needed to swiftly roll out the necessary administrative structures and reinforce technical and human resource capacity.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were partially implemented. In the coming year, Albania should in particular:
→ ensure that the preconditions for the entrustment of budget implementation tasks under the instrument for pre-accession assistance for rural development (IPARD) III programme are met in line with the principles of sound financial management;
→ make progress in establishing the various elements of the integrated administration and control system (IACS), ensuring the administrative and technical capacity for these activities;
→ speed up legislative alignment with the EU acquis, in particular on common market organisation, quality policy and farm sustainability data network (FSDN), and strengthen capacity to implement the legislation.
Chapter 12: Food safety, veterinary and phytosanitary policy
Albania is between having some and a moderate level of preparation on food safety,
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veterinary and phytosanitary policy. Some progress was made over the reporting period concerning alignment of legislation with the EU acquis, notably with the adoption of the Law on Official Controls. Further efforts are needed on the implementation and enforcement of legislation and reinforcing the necessary technical and administrative capacities.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were partially implemented. In the coming year, Albania should in particular:
→ work towards full alignment and, where alignment was reached, implementation, of national legislation with the EU acquis, specifically on official controls, animal health, plant health and animal welfare;
→ complete the categorisation of the food business operators and adopt a national plan for the upgrade of establishments producing food, feed and animal byproducts to meet EU structural standards;
→ strengthen its capacity to design and implement effective surveillance and ensure preparedness and eradication of relevant animal diseases.
Chapter 13: Fisheries and aquaculture
Albania has a good level of preparation in fisheries and aquaculture. Some progress was made, especially through the alignment of legislation with the EU acquis with the adoption of the laws on market policy, aquaculture and data collection, and further alignment of the legislation in several other fisheries-related areas.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were partially implemented and remain valid. In the coming year, Albania should in particular:
→ further strengthen the administrative capacity needed for inspection and control capacities, and for data collection and scientific advice, in line with the EU’s common fisheries policy and the GFCM and other international agreements;
→ implement the regional action plan for small-scale fisheries;
→ adopt measures to support the fishery sector in line with EU State aid rules.
Chapter 22: Regional policy and coordination of structural instruments
Albania is moderately prepared in the area of regional policy and coordination of structural instruments. Some progress was made during the reporting period, especially through further alignment with EU legislation and improvements to the public investment framework.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were partially implemented and therefore remain mostly valid. In the coming year, Albania should in particular:
→ prepare for the effective inter-institutional cooperation needed to implement the EU acquis and strengthen preparations and capacities for the future cohesion policy. This includes preparing a roadmap for administrative capacity building for the Cohesion Policy ecosystem using tested approaches and enhancing coordination, as well as ensuring inter-institutional cooperation in implementing activities;
→ accelerate implementation of programmes under indirect management by the beneficiary country and territorial cooperation programmes with Member States and neighbouring non-Member States and ensure an efficient system for the protection of EU’s financial interests, including the prevention of conflicts of interest and protection for whistleblowers;
→ prepare and start implementing a credible action plan to address the identified gaps in the implementation of territorial cooperation programmes in Albania.
Chapter 33: Financial and budgetary provisions
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Albania has some level of preparation on financial and budgetary provisions. Some progress was made on alignment with the EU acquis in the underlying policy fields that affect the functioning of the EU funding system.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were partially implemented and remain mostly valid. In the coming year, Albania should in particular:
→ enhance efforts to align its legislation with EU rules on VAT and customs duties and continue action to tackle tax evasion and informality;
→ accelerate preparations to increase administrative capacity and coordination mechanisms among key stakeholders in the own-resources system.
CLUSTER 6: EXTERNAL RELATIONS
Chapter 30: External relations
Albania has a good level of preparation in external relations. Good progress was made during the reporting period, in particular by aligning the legislation on foreign direct investment screening and on the dual use goods with the EU acquis and implementing the Central European Free Trade Agreement (CEFTA) protocols.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were mostly implemented. In the coming year, Albania should in particular:
→ implement the Action Plan to align international agreements with the EU acquis;
→ align with the regulation on the screening of foreign investments adopted in 2026, and ensure institutional capacity is available for its proper implementation, and continue regular updates of the domestic legislation, in line with the EU Regulation on dual-use goods;
→ set up the legal framework covering international cooperation and development policy and humanitarian aid, in line with EU policies and principles.
Chapter 31: Foreign, security and defence policy
Albania has a good level of preparation in the field of foreign, security and defence policy. The country continued to make good progress, maintaining its full alignment with the common foreign and security policy (CFSP), including statements by the High Representative on behalf of the EU and Council decisions on restrictive measures.
In April 2026, the second session of the EU-Albania security and defence dialogue was held in Brussels in the framework of the security and defence partnership. Albania also continued its engagement in EU crisis management missions and operations under the common security and defence policy (CSDP).
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were implemented. In the coming year, Albania should in particular:
→ continue to maintain its full alignment with the EU common foreign and security policy, further strengthen its capacity to enforce restrictive measures;
→ consider further increasing its participation in EU crisis management missions and operations;
→ implement the National Strategy against foreign interference and disinformation;
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1.3. STATE OF PLAY OF ACCESSION NEGOTIATIONS
Clusters Chapters/areas Date cluster opened/chapter closed
1. Fundamentals
Cluster opened on 15 October 2024
All chapters open
23 – Judiciary and fundamental rights
24 – Justice, freedom, security
5 – Public procurement
18 – Statistics
32 – Financial control
…Economic criteria
…Functioning of democratic institutions
…Public administration reform (PAR)
2. Internal Market
Cluster opened on 14 April 2025
All chapters open
1-Free movement of goods
2-Freedom of movement for workers
3-Right of establishment and freedom to establish services
4-Free movement of capital
6-Company law
7-Intellectual property rights
8-Competition
9-Financial services
28-Consumer and health protection
3. Competitiveness and inclusive growth
Cluster opened on 22 May 2025
All chapters open, chapters 20, 25 and 26 provisionally closed
10-Digital transformation and media
16-Taxation
17-Economic and monetary policy
19-Social policy and employment
20-Enterprise and industrial policy Provisionally closed in October 2026
25-Science and research Provisionally closed in July 2026.
26-Education and culture Provisionally closed in July 2026.
29-Customs union
4. Green Agenda and sustainable connectivity
Cluster opened on 16 September 2025
All chapters open
14- Transport policy
15- Energy
21-Trans-European Networks
27-Environment and climate change
5.Resources, agriculture and cohesion
Cluster opened on 15 September 2025
11- Agriculture and rural development
12- Food safety, veterinary and phytosanitary policy
13- Fisheries and aquaculture
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All chapters open
22- Regional policy and coordination of structural instruments
33- Financial and budgetary provisions
6. External relations
Cluster opened on 17 December 2024
All chapters open, chapter 30 provisionally closed
30-External relations Provisionally closed in July 2026
31- Foreign, security & defence policy
2. CLUSTER 1: THE FUNDAMENTALS OF THE ACCESSION PROCESS
2.1. FUNCTIONING OF DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS AND PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION REFORM
2.1.1 Democracy
The functioning of democratic institutions in Albania is partially challenged, among others due to a deeply polarised political environment, limited parliamentary oversight over the executive, the urgent need for comprehensive electoral reform, Parliament’s persistent failure to implement some Constitutional Court rulings and the lack of meaningful public consultations. Daily protests have been taking place in Tirana since May 2026. This is the largest civic mobilisation since Albania's democratic transition, with tens of thousands of participants joining the protest at its peak. The protests started around environmental concerns linked to construction works in the protected landscape of Pishë Poro Narta and called for more transparency in the authorisation of large-scale projects, including consultation with the local population. They developed into a broader movement of dissatisfaction with the government and the main opposition party, calling for increased transparency, accountability, anti-corruption and good governance as well as pointing to the cost of living and a lack of investment in areas such as education and healthcare. In September 2026, an initiative aiming to improve the process of public consultation and access to information was launched by the government. Building on the civic movement, student-led protests took place in October 2026 during which violent incidents occurred between protestors and the Albanian State Police, with destruction of public and private property by protestors followed by allegations of excessive violence by the police against protestors and journalists. No dialogue has taken place so far. All sides should make genuine attempts to engage in constructive dialogue. The Constitutional Court continued to be effective in upholding institutional checks and balances, delivering rulings on prominent cases affecting the functioning of the institutions at central and local level.
Elections
During the reporting period, mayoral by-elections took place on 9 November 2025 in the municipalities of Berat, Cërrik, Mat, Tepelena, and Vlora. The participation rate ranged from 12.54% to 39.23%. These elections were held in the second half of the current mayoral mandate. Of the five mayors, four men and one woman were elected.
The OSCE/ODIHR Final Election Observation Report confirmed the preliminary findings, indicating that the May 48
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Graph 1 : Albania - Women in political life
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Source: National- Local Self-Government Support Agency, CEC,PoM EU-27- European Institute for gender equality
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2025 general elections were competitive and professionally conducted but took place in a highly polarised environment and contestants did not enjoy a level playing field. It also found that the legal framework provides an adequate basis for conducting democratic elections, but several shortcomings and ambiguities undermine legal clarity and create uncertainty in implementation. The report provides recommendations to address these shortcomings.
An ad hoc parliamentary Committee tasked with drafting an electoral reform held its first working session in February 2026. This committee ensures equal representation of the ruling party and the main opposition party but does not include any of the other opposition parties, which is regrettable. The ad hoc Committee is due to issue a law on political party financing after consultations with relevant stakeholders and the Venice Commission. Albania needs to ensure alignment with all relevant EU acquis in this area, including Regulation (EU) 2024/900 on the transparency and targeting of political advertising, and taking into account European and international democratic standards.
Parliament
During the reporting period, political polarisation, verbal confrontations and the lack of political dialogue between the ruling party and the main opposition party continued to affect Parliament’s work. Instances of alleged violence led the Parliament’s Ethics Secretariat to suspend six members of the opposition, following a request by the ruling majority. The disciplinary measures were eventually annulled by the administrative court. The ruling majority continued to resist and delay the implementation of some Constitutional Court rulings. Despite tensions over proposals on the new Rules of Procedure, a consensus between the two main parties was reached in May 2026. The ad hoc joint Parliamentary Committee on Administrative and Territorial Reform concluded its mandate in July 2026 without reaching bipartisan consensus on the reform submitted for public consultation. The reform was adopted in October 2026 based on the ruling majority’s proposal.
Parliament’s oversight of the executive remained weak. No meaningful debate was held on the new government programme in September 2025. Appearances by members of the Council of Ministers for question time were irregular. Most legislative initiatives were tabled by the Council of Ministers. When tabled by the Parliament, they were in large part submitted by the ruling party. This diminished Parliament’s ownership of the legislative process and limited cross-party dialogue. Opposition requests to establish inquiry committees were systematically rejected without debate. Following a lengthy delay, Parliament voted against SPAK’s request to lift the immunity of a Member of Parliament, despite repeated requests by the opposition to convene the Council for Regulation, Mandates and Immunity. This raises concerns regarding checks and balances and the principle of equality before the law.
Parliament made appointments to independent institutions, but the politicisation of these appointments remains a serious issue. The Ombudsperson was elected by ruling majority votes only, breaking an established tradition of cross-party consensus. The same process applied to the appointment of a new Commissioner for Protection against Discrimination.
The legal framework for public consultation processes is in place but does not consistently result in timely and transparent follow-up. The recently established tools for public consultation are operational but have limited impact on policymaking. Draft laws tabled often at short notice by ruling majority MPs affected the quality and transparency of the legislative process, often bypassing adequate public consultations.
Women remain under-represented in Parliament, holding 48 of the 140 seats.
EU integration
Albania’s EU integration coordination structures continued their work during the reporting period. Additional financial and human resources are required to face the increased workload linked to accession negotiations, especially for the EU integration units in line ministries and agencies.
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The National Plan for European Integration 2025-2027 is in place. Work is ongoing for the adoption of a new plan.
In September 2025, the standing Parliamentary Committee on European Affairs was merged into a new Committee on European and Foreign Affairs. This Committee is no longer chaired by the opposition, which limits cross-party dialogue and its ability to play an active role in the EU accession. In the reporting period, the Parliamentary Committee for Europe and Foreign Affairs reviewed 20 draft laws and 14 amendments to existing legislation to align legislation with EU acquis. The National Council of European Integration has reduced its activities. Three meetings were held on fulfilling EU accession obligations, but which was only attended by one of the co-chairs.
The government has made efforts to communicate more regularly on EU integration, contributing to increased transparency and public involvement in the EU accession process. However, these efforts are fragmented, dominated by a silo culture between ministries and a lack of communication experts to carry out an effective communication strategy.
Governance
A substantial government reshuffle involving seven ministers took place in February 2026, following a three-month political and institutional deadlock. This was initiated by the SPAK court’s November 2025 decision to suspend the Deputy Prime Minister, as part of an investigation into alleged violations of equality of participation in public tenders.
During the reporting period, both the ruling majority and the main opposition party employed rhetoric discrediting the judiciary or individual members thereof. This raises concerns about the separation of powers.
While predominantly focusing on EU-related reforms in its legislative and policy planning, the government occasionally engaged in legislative activities not in line with the EU acquis and European standards, including the adoption of an amendment to the law on touristic ports (see Chapter 5). The transparency of government decision-making on EU-related reforms did not improve, not did the sufficient allocation of financial and human resources to ensure their sustainability.
On local self-government/decentralisation, the ongoing territorial and administrative reform, coupled with a tendency towards recentralisation, created uncertainty for local self- governments. The lack of political commitment and institutional capacity limited the implementation of the Crosscutting Strategy on Decentralisation and Local Governance 2023–2030. No annual monitoring reports have been published since 2023. The majority of local government revenues continues to come from central government transfers. Capacity development at the local level is expected to increase through the newly established Academy for Local Governance. Multi-level governance has been moderately reinforced thanks to a new ad hoc Advisory Committees within the Consultative Council. Integrity plans were adopted in 44 of the 61 municipalities. Consultation with and accountability to the public at local level remain limited.
Civil society
Civil society, including human rights defenders, operates in a partly enabling environment, but has faced continued negative narratives, including online smear campaigns, particularly targeting those working on women’s rights, gender and LGBTIQ+ rights.
The absence of dedicated safeguards against intimidation, including strategic lawsuits against public participation (SLAPPs), has contributed to a challenging environment for civil society and the protection mechanism must be strengthened. The government’s strategic framework for civil society support expired in 2023, with no indications on the development of a new plan. Structured consultations with civil society, especially in the context of EU accession, must be reinforced to ensure meaningful engagement. While consultation exercises were carried out with CSOs on the Law on donations and sponsorship, concerns
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remain on its potential impact on the enabling environment for civil society including excessive administrative burdens. Additionally, tax incentives remain limited, and public funding levels are insufficient. Progress has been made in the implementation of VAT exemption, addressing a long-standing concern raised by civil society. A new volunteering law improves the legal framework but is still largely regulatory rather than supportive.
2.1.2. Public administration reform
Strategic framework for public administration reform
The strategic framework for public administration is in place.
Implementation of the Strategy on Public Administration Reform 2025–2030 is progressing steadily. However, the 2026 implementation report shows that challenges remain in the pillars for green administration and services.
The implementation of the crosscutting Strategy on Decentralisation and Local Governance 2023–2030 remains limited due to the lack of reliable data or monitoring reports since 2023. The consistent delays in the preparation of the reports undermines the ability of the administration to undertake corrective measures to overcome any implementation challenges.
Greater consistency between policy planning and budgeting is needed, as the financial sustainability of key reforms is heavily dependent on external funding.
Policy development and coordination
The legal basis and the institutional set-up for policymaking are in place, yet there is still room for improvement.
Half of the draft laws proposed by the government in 2025 continued to originate outside the Government Analytical Programme, thereby reducing the effectiveness of legislative planning and undermining the predictability of the legislative process. The Strategic Planning Committee continued to meet regularly and steered the policymaking process. No progress was made on the use of the Integrated Planning System, mainly due to its complexity and the non-functioning supporting IT systems.
The use of regulatory impact assessments (RIAs) for evidence-based policymaking and legislative development continued but needs to further increase. In 2025, 40 out of the 47 RIAs reported by the government were reviewed satisfactorily by the PMO quality control unit, while 43 out of 57 RIAs were considered of sufficient quality in the period from January to August 2026.
However, the RIAs still lack substantial analysis, proposals for alternatives, analysis if impact on affected groups, and cost-benefit assessments. Implementing legislation remains largely exempt from the application of RIAs, but in early 2026, a pilot project was launched to extend RIA requirements to six sub-legal acts. Implementation remains to be assessed.
In 2025, 45 of 47 adopted legal acts were subject to public consultation, while implementing legislation was rarely subject to public consultation. More action is needed to ensure meaningful public consultations, strengthen quality control and guarantee proper follow-up. Stakeholder participation in public consultations, particularly from civil society, should further increase. The government did not systematically follow-up on public consultations, which limited their effectiveness.
Public financial management
The public financial management (PFM) and revenue strategies are in place, and implementation is regularly reported on, indicating satisfactory implementation rates. The legal basis for PFM is mostly in place with a comprehensive organic budget law.
The provisions of the organic budget law are largely followed. However, the practice of
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conducting budget revisions exclusively through a high number of normative acts by the executive has continued, weakening fiscal sustainability, budgetary oversight and transparency. More decisive action is needed to return to regular budget review processes through parliament, including the effective involvement of the public. The independent fiscal oversight body, the Fiscal Council, remains to be set up.
Budgetary reforms advanced, notably with the introduction of climate change budgeting elements and continued implementation of gender responsive budgeting (GRB), where the formal introduction of GRB through the newly adopted Gender Equality Law was also an important benchmark.
The link between strategic priorities and budget programmes improved but should be further strengthened. The national single project pipeline procedures were amended to improve their application and the quality of project feasibility assessments. In December 2025, the revised Law on public-private partnership (PPP) and concessions was adopted, envisaging a clearer inclusion of these projects in the overall investment pipeline. Fiscal risk monitoring has been further strengthened, as evidenced by the first publications of more comprehensive fiscal risk statement covering 2023 and 2024, covering a broader range of risks such as climate and natural disasters and deepening analysis of other fiscal risks.
Nevertheless, continued efforts are needed to improve fiscal risk reporting and analysis for state-owned enterprises and PPPs. Budget commitment compliance should be further strengthened to ensure a structural stabilisation of payment arrears. A new debt strategy was adopted, pursuing the targets of reducing public debt/GDP, extending debt maturities and lowering exchange risk exposure.
Budget transparency is mostly satisfactory with key budget documents regularly published. But further improvement is needed on clear arrangements for consistent collection, consolidation and publication of financial statements from all government-controlled entities, including on extra-budgetary entities, while enhancing coordination between the line ministries and the Institute of Statistics (INSTAT) in this regard.
Public services and human resources management
Public services and human resources management still require improvement.
The amendments to the Law on the civil servant are yet to be adopted. A substantial part of civil service will be regulated through implementing legislation.
The current rules on merit-based recruitment, promotion and dismissal are applied inconsistently. Most civil servants are still recruited through a group or pool recruitment process. Implementation of the 2025 recruitment plan reached 55%. A total of 69% of advertised vacancies were filled, down from 81% in 2024 and below the PAR Strategy target of 100%.
Overall, the gender distribution is 57.8% female and 42.2% male. Women account for 55.% of middle-level managerial positions and 54.% of senior-level managerial positions Three senior positions are still vacant despite the availability of a pool of candidates from the top management- corps group. Opening vacancies for managerial positions to external candidates should remain an exception.
There were eight dismissals from the civil service from January to August 2026, compared with nine dismissals in 2025 and14 in 2024. Regarding the execution of final court decisions on unlawful dismissals, 13 final court decisions were executed in 2025. The enforcement rate of final court decisions on dismissals and reinstatements went down slightly to 85.8%, from 86.6% in 2024.
Timely government enforcement of such decisions remains inadequate. The current Human Resources Management Information System (HRMIS) is still unable to cover the entire public sector and remains unsuitable as an automated payroll system. Efforts to redesign the
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HRMIS accordingly are required. 78 out of 177 institutions have an integrity plan, while at the local level, 44 out of 61 municipalities have an integrity plan. The quality and implementation of integrity plans vary.
The Albanian School of Public Administration continued to provide online training programmes for professional development.
Accountability of administration
The accountability of the administration needs to be further improved.
The revised law on the organisation and functioning of the state administration aiming to reduce the high number (29) of authorities/agencies subordinated directly under the Prime Minister’s Office and bring them under dedicated ministries for increased supervision and accountability and, improve delegation of decision-making power at director level was adopted. Implementation of the revised legal framework for ensuring managerial accountability remains to be assessed.
Further effort is needed to strengthen the right of citizens to good administration. In 2025, only 17% of the recommendations issued by the People’s Advocate (PA) were fully implemented and 56% were implemented partially. The implementation rate requires significant improvement. Cooperation between Parliament and the PA should be enhanced and the relevant institutions should be held accountable.
On transparency and access to information, the Commissioner for the right to information reported a steady number of complaints received in 2025 (861), often resolved after his intervention. Public entities still need to improve compliance with transparency requirements and be more responsive to requests for access to information.
Administrative justice continues to face significant challenges due to the growing backlog (increased to 24 530 cases in 2025) and excessive duration of proceedings at the Appeal Court.
Service delivery to citizens and businesses
Service delivery to citizens and businesses is broadly in place, with room for further improvement.
The implementation of the 2022-2026 Digital Agenda continued to progress, and the offer of online services was further expanded by the government. As of May 2026, the e-Albania portal complies with the Web Content Accessibility Guidelines. However, outstanding accessibility issues for groups in vulnerable situations, including people with disabilities, persist and need to be addressed.
In 2025, the pillar on service delivery remains one of the poorer performers in terms of implementing reforms foreseen in the Action Plan of the PAR Strategy. No progress was made on reducing administrative burden.
2.2. RULE OF LAW AND FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS
2.2.1. Chapter 23: Judiciary and fundamental rights
The EU’s founding values include the rule of law and respect for human rights. An effective (independent, high-quality and efficient) judicial system and an effective fight against corruption are of paramount importance, as is the respect for fundamental rights in law and in practice.
Functioning of the judiciary
Strategic documents
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The Cross-Sector Justice Strategy for 2024-2030 (estimated budget: EUR 56.4 million) and its action plan remain in place, but their implementation needs to be improved, particularly through enhanced monitoring mechanisms, regular stakeholders’ meetings and clear communication. A new regulatory framework for the harmonised collection, reporting and communication of judicial data has been adopted, but additional resources are needed to ensure timely and qualitative reporting.
Management bodies
The efficiency of the High Judicial Council (HJC) and the High Prosecutorial Council (HPC) in appointing, promoting, transferring and evaluating magistrates has improved, enhancing judicial quality and efficiency at first instance courts. The HJC and the HPC have reviewed their internal rules and procedures and adopted new regulatory frameworks, relating to the appointments of Court Chairs, evaluation methodology and transparency. However, the HJC has not yet appointed Court Chairs. Both the HJC and the HPC continue to face challenges in ensuring timely and qualitative evaluations of magistrate performance The communication and planning methodology for the annual evaluation plans should be improved to ensure that all judges are evaluated in a timely manner to access promotion. Coordination between the HJC and the HPC has improved through the organisation of four joint meetings and the adoption of a regulatory framework to ensure the regularity of such meetings and the systematic follow-up of their operational conclusions. The Councils are yet to publish a common action plan based on these operational conclusions to deliver concrete results and ensure its follow-up.
The 2016 justice reform and recent legal changes strengthened the independence of the Councils. Provisions governing the appointment of non-magistrate members to the HJC and HPC have been revised to apply the same standards for background checks and asset verification as those applicable to magistrate members, ensuring an effective, transparent and merit-based process. Effective implementation is yet to be completed. The process to replace lay members has started, where also these standards are expected to be implemented for the first time. The HPC and the HJC still need to further strengthen ethical oversight of their members in practice. Continued training and enforcement of whistleblowing mechanisms within both Councils are necessary. HJC has adopted its internal rules of procedure. Both Councils’ strategic planning and strategic communication remain weak. The rules of procedure to ensure transparency in relation to promotions, appointments and transfers, have been strengthened through legislative amendments, The HJC and the HPC still need to urgently address the lack of specialised resources, notably seconded magistrates and additional staff needed to perform evaluation reports, in a timely and qualitative manner and in line with the high vetting standards, as provided in the law. Councils continue to lack an internal structure and staff to train non-magistrate staff in courts and prosecution offices, as provided for in the law.
Independence and impartiality
The independence and impartiality of the judiciary is satisfactory in the higher-level courts and in the courts of first instance. However, attempts by public officials and politicians, including at the highest levels, to exert undue influence on justice institutions, as well as personal attacks on magistrates at all levels, continued throughout the reporting period. A legal and institutional conflict between the Government and the Councils, stemming from the implementation of the Constitutional Court’s decision on judicial salaries, resulted in the blockage of judicial budgets and failure to pay judicial salaries for the
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month of August. This led to a situation without precedent that seriously affected the functioning of the judiciary and has raised independence concerns. On 18 September 2026 the Parliament adopted legal amendments increasing judicial salaries by 2% and releasing previously unpaid salaries. Associations of judges and prosecutors challenged the new law before the Constitutional Court. In response, the government started the process for a comprehensive reform on judicial salaries. It remains important that planned reforms fully observe CEPEJ standards, the principles established by the Constitutional Court and include meaningful consultations with the judiciary.
The suspension of a high-level official ordered by the SPAK Court, as well as SPAK’s request to the Parliament to lift the official’s parliamentary immunity, triggered significant negative reactions from the executive and legislative branches, including direct attacks against SPAK and judicial institutions. In some high-profile cases, politicians also criticised the Constitutional Court, questioning its authority, or verbally attacking individual judges, which is a concern. The self-governing institutions of the judiciary have remained resilient, issuing public statements and denouncing political pressure. Eight magistrates have been placed under protection, including two judges and six prosecutors. The Bar conducted election procedures this year, in an open and transparent manner. Allocation of cases by law is random, by lot chosen by the Chair or via an electronic system, in those courts that have one. Sometimes, due to lack of staff and magistrates, this can result in a heavy workload.
The Constitutional Court issued a ruling clarifying the calculation of the duration of its members’ mandate, thereby lifting the legal uncertainty surrounding the end of two members’ terms and reconciling the diverging interpretations of the applicable provisions. The process to replace these members is ongoing. The new Chief Special Prosecutor at the Special Prosecution’s Office was appointed through a competitive and transparent process, in line with the highest principles of merit and independence. The appointment of the new Director of the National Bureau of Investigations was also competitive but encountered delays. The HPC still needs to adopt clear internal rules and procedures for future selection processes, including to ensure a smooth, effective, and transparent procedure for the first replacement of SPAK prosecutors whose Constitutional mandate expires in 2028. The HJC still needs to appoint two members of the High Court.
The HPC has opened the appointment process for the General Prosecutor, following a significant delay. The HPC should ensure that the pre-selection and ranking of candidates is conducted in a timely, merit-based, transparent and competitive manner.
While the HJC and HPC have taken steps to improve merit-based appointments and career development, these efforts continue to be undermined by their slow pace in conducting qualitative evaluations for magistrates and the persistent use of transfers as an alternative to merit-based promotions. The transfer of judges and prosecutors requires their consent, except in urgent cases and for a very limited period, in which case such transfers must be duly justified.
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Graph 2.2: Albania - Requests for protection from undue
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Graph 3.2: Albania - Disciplinary procedures Prosecutors -
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Delays in filling judicial vacancies in several courts continued to hamper the consistent application of rules on random allocation of cases.
Accountability
Overall, the accountability of the judiciary is satisfactory. The completion of the comprehensive transitional re-evaluation (vetting) of all judges and prosecutors, the operation of the High Justice Inspector (HJI) and the continued progress in implementing the justice reform have further strengthened accountability. Efforts to prevent corruption post-vetting should be enhanced across the judicial system, including by ensuring appropriate capacities and operational sustainability. The HJI adopted a methodology for asset and background checks during inspections, integrating the high standards set by the vetting. However, it’s implementation is yet to be observed. The new legal provisions adopted in January 2026, which enhance asset and background checks for judicial appointment through improved cross-checking of data, need to be implemented, particularly by strengthening the Councils’ internal capacities.
The vetting process has been successfully finalised, with all cases being re-assessed in second instance by the Special Appeal Court (SAC). The SAC also finalised all reasoned decisions by June 2026. As of 1 April 2026, the final decisions resulted in 397 dismissals and resignations (49% of cases), 348 confirmations in office (43% of cases) and 59 cases of termination (8% of cases) for non- vetting related issues. The International Monitoring Operation (IMO) has ensured continued oversight of the process. The IMO issued 42 recommendations for appeal and fifteen dissenting opinions against Appeal Chamber decisions.
Challenges persist regarding the attractiveness of the position for magistrate-inspectors at the HJI and the institutions faces a high number of magistrate-inspector vacancies. A
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Graph 3.1: Albania - Disciplinary procedures Judges -
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significant increase in the number of inspectors is yet to be observed following recent legal changes, reducing the seniority requirement for magistrate-inspectors. The HJI needs to strengthen its track record of inspections, particularly to prevent corruption cases within the judiciary. Thematic inspections have increased considerably and remain a priority, supported by a plan to coordinate their follow-up with all relevant institutions. While the HJC, HPC, HJI and GPO conducted a first follow-up meeting in relation to the implementation of HJI recommendations, concrete results from other follow-up actions and regular meetings are yet to be observed. No steps have been taken by the HJI, HJC, HPC and the High Inspectorate of Declaration and Audit of Assets and Conflicts of Interest (HIDAACI) to update their internal procedures and ensure additional sufficient staff and resources to improve the quality and efficiency of integrity checks on magistrates and candidate- magistrates in line with high vetting standards. The courts and the Councils continue to apply the Code of Ethics for judges and prosecutors, adopted following the 2016 justice reform. Disciplinary decisions may be appealed, although the Court generally does not rule on the merits, and final decisions on disciplinary measures are taken by the respective Council.
Quality of justice
Thequality of justice still needs to be improved. While there have been some positive developments regarding the overall quality of judicial training, further measures are still needed to address previously reported issues, including thequality, consistency and timely publication of judgments the quality of court infrastructure and the reliability of statistical data.
Some steps have been taken to improve judicial training, such as the revised first-year curriculum, but further improvements are still necessary, including finalising the comprehensive revision of the entry exam Further work is needed on both continuous and initial training, in particular for the second and third years, to address quality limitations, gaps in skilled-based training and the imminent needs of the judicial system. A dedicated admission exam for legal advisors was organised in May 2026. Legislative amendments have been adopted to ban former magistrates who were dismissed or resigned during the vetting from taking up positions as training staff at the School for Magistrates (SoM). Common standards for drafting judicial decisions are being adopted, but few have been implemented yet.
Judicial quality continues to be hampered by the lack of progress in appointing court chairs at all levels and the insufficient number of court staff, particularly legal assistants. The High Judicial Council appointed 44 new judges in first instance courts of general jurisdiction. Five judges from the Special Appeal Chamber were appointed as appeal-level upon the expiry of their mandate. The remaining vacancies at the Appeal Court should be completed as a matter of priority. Quotasdetermined by the HJC and the HPC for the SoM for the 2026- 2029 class remain low. Increasing the number and quality of candidate magistrates and legal assistants admitted to the SoM remains essential to address challenges concerning the quality and efficiency of the judicial system.
An interinstitutional cooperation agreement between the Ministry of Justice, the HJC, the HJI and the SoM on harmonisation of judicial statistics has been signed. Decisive steps should be taken by the HJC and the HPC to ensure its implementation, by enhancing the
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consolidation, publication, reporting, consistency and reliability of statistical data across the judicial system.
The quality of court infrastructure remains generally poor. While temporary premises have been allocated to the General Appeal Court, a stable and final solution has not yet been found. This continues to lead to overcrowding and the practice of hearings taking place in judges’ chambers. No progress was made on providing adequate security standards for
judges and prosecutors. However, the HJC has established a working group and plans to adopt a Court Security Strategy in line with CEPEJ standards. In the meantime, many courts, including the SPAK Court of First Instance, have adopted internal court security rules. The rules adopted by the SPAK Court have raised concerns of among the media community over their on a potential impact on access to justice and the right to information. There was no satisfactory response to the fatal shooting of the Tirana Court of
Appeal judge, in October 2025, did not prompt a satisfactory response from the Councils, the courts and state authorities to ensure the safety of the judiciary at all levels. The fatal shooting of the Tirana Appeals Court Judge, in October 2025, did not prompt a sufficient response from courts, state authorities and the Councils to ensure the safety of the judiciary. At SPAK level, there is scope for greater transparency and verifiability of interrogations, notably through new interrogation rooms, protocols and related safeguards for on their records.
While some steps have been taken to increase the use of mediation services, including training and awareness-raising activities, mediation remains largely underused. The election process of a new Chair of the Chamber prompted debates regarding the number of legally allowed consecutive mandates, the functionality and the efficiency of the Chamber. Attempts to provide for consolidated information on the possibility and incentives to use mediation and increase quality of the service should further continue. The HJC and MoJ are expected to adopt a comprehensivestrategy on mediation.
Access to primary and secondary legal aid in Albania has improved overall, notably through support for local legal aid offices, but challenges remain, particularly the lack of reliable data on the quality of legal representation for vulnerable groups and insufficient funding for civil society organisations helping to deliver legal aid services.
Efficiency
The efficiency of the justice system remains limited. Previously reported shortcomings, including the lack of a modern integrated electronic case management system in courts and prosecution offices, are still not addressed.
While the length of proceedings and backlogs have been reduced in first instance and High Court cases, persistent delays in appeal proceedings continue to hamper the overall efficiency of the system. The publication of final decisions still exceeds the legal deadline, and serious delays continue to be caused by insufficient management of court hearings and absent defence lawyers. The HJC needs to take further decisive steps in implementing its efficiency roadmap, including revision of legislation in line with the general principles of justice reform and European standards.
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The implementation of a modern integrated electronic case management system (ICMS) in courts and prosecution offices continues to face significant delays, with persistent risks to the overall quality of justice. Significant efforts are still needed to improve the digitalisation of justice systems. The piloting of an electronic communication tool between the Tirana District Court and lawyers has continued, but this tool has not yet been rolled out in all courts, limiting its potential to improve access to justice.
Fight against corruption
Track record
The track record in the fight against corruption has remained stable for high-level cases and has improved for non-high-level cases, while further efforts are required in this regard.
The Specialised Structure Against Organised Crime and Corruption (SPAK), comprising the Special Prosecution Office (SPO), the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) and the anti-corruption and organised crime courts (SPAK courts), has continued to
deliver good results and make tangible progress in building a solid track record for the investigation, prosecution and conviction in corruption cases.
In 2025, SPAK recorded an increase of 17.7% in new cases for corruption- related offences. During the year, 34 proceedings were referred to Court with 160 defendants, of which ten proceedings with 13 defendants for high-level corruption. SPAK started investigations linked to the large-scale development project planned within the Pishë Poro-Narta protected landscape, notably into the transfer of property
titles connected to the development planned in Zvërnec. In a separate investigation, SPAK also carried out preventive asset seizures and issued an arrest warrant for one of the
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1st instance 2nd instance 1st instance 2nd instance
Criminal cases Non-criminal cases*
Graph 6.2 - Albania - Efficiency of courts (days)
Disposition time 2023 Disposition time 2024 Disposition time 2025
n/a: non applicable Source: CEPEJ *Civil and commercial cases, administrative cases, non-litigous cases, other cases
97
74
93
n/a
99
77
105
69
102
57
103
79
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
1st instance 2nd instance 1st instance 2nd instance
Criminal cases Non-criminal cases*
Graph 6.1 - Albania - Efficiency of courts (%)
Clearance rate in 2023 Clearance rate in 2024 Clearance rate in 2025
n/a: non applicable Source: CEPEJ
*Civil and commercial cases, administrative cases, non-litigous cases, other cases
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landowners for his alleged involvement in an organised criminal group involved in international drug trafficking and in large-scale money laundering.
SPAK’s capacity in financial investigations has further increased alongside the systematic use of financial investigations, while asset confiscation decisions have fallen from 20 to 8. Albania needs to significantly increase the number of referrals to SPAK from other authorities, which remains too low. SPAK’s capacity and internal organisation to handle a growing workload still requires attention.
The value of seized and confiscated assets in corruption cases has remained limited. During 2025, SPAK seized and confiscated assets amounted to EUR 45.4 million in total, but only EUR 1.2 million referred to high-level corruption proceedings, with the value of confiscated assets limited to approximately EUR 100 000. In 2025, SPAK did not issue any decisions for the seizure of assets in cases involving simple corruption criminal offences. The ratio between seized and confiscated assets is not yet satisfactory, suggesting the need to further implement extended confiscations measures, as well as non-conviction-based confiscations, including third-party and value-based confiscations.
The tracing and recovery of assets have been strengthened, with the aim of gradually reducing this gap and increasing the effectiveness of final confiscations.
Legal framework
The legal framework on corruption is broadly in place. Albania adopted key legislation on conflict of interest and lobbying in alignment with European standards, although anti- corruption legislation will need to be further reviewed in light of the recently adopted EU Directive combating corruption. The law on donations and sponsorships still needs to be adopted. Further alignment was achieved on whistle-blower protection.However, the preventive legal framework continued to have limited impact, particularly in vulnerable sectors. In September 2026, Albania launched public consultations on revisions to the Criminal Procedure Code. It remains important that Albania ensures that future legal changes to criminal legislation are in line with the EU acquis and European standards and also conducive to the country’s efforts to reduce corruption.
Strategic documents
The strategic documents are in place and are adequate. Albania has been implementing the Anti-Corruption Strategy for 2024-2030, targeting vulnerable sectors such as property registration, public-private partnerships, public procurement, health, education, customs and registration, public-private partnerships to local governance and the private sector.
Implementation of the strategy is on track, with around [90% achievement for prevention and awareness policies, and 73,1% for repressive policies. SPAK started to implement the Backlog Reduction Strategy 2025-2027. By mid-2026, SPAK met the target established for cases registered in 2021 with a decrease from 62 to 36 cases. The target of zero for the 83 cases opened in 2020 or earlier was almost met, with 10 cases still pending. The SPAK is implementing specific measures in support of prosecutors with the highest case backlogs to allow to meet the targets.
Institutional framework
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The institutional framework on tackling corruption is in place. However, the effectiveness of preventive measures still needs to be improved, and issues remain with law enforcement aspects.
SPAK continued to demonstrate independence and robust capacities to deliver positive results in fighting high-level corruption. Other bodies tasked with fighting corruption, in particular the General Prosecution Office and the state police, still need to improve their results.
The implementation of the revised Law on the police is underway and has been followed by a partial reorganisation; however, the Albanian State Police has remained highly vulnerable to corruption. The transitional and periodic evaluation of state police officers (‘police vetting’) and the process of integrity verification have continued, but their impact remained limited. In 2025, the Police Oversight Agency continued to receive a high number of complaints from citizens (over 5 500). The Agency recommended disciplinary investigations for 108 employees and referred 444 law enforcement employees to criminal prosecution]. After an employee of the Police Oversight Agency was found to have links to an organised crime group, concerns were raised about the effectiveness of the Agency’s vetting procedure and background checks for its own staff. Two successive changes in the leadership of the Police
Oversight Agency within six months, created concerns and underscored the need to further strengthen accountability and transparency in the Albanian State Police and the Police Oversight Agency.
Allegations of high-level corruption have continued to be under investigation in healthcare, ICT and infrastructure tenders. Several sectors were singled out as high-risk in the anti- corruption strategy. A corruption risk assessment methodology was then adopted, and risk assessments were initiated in several of these sectors such as public procurement, healthcare and education. Albania developed a cross-sector coordination manual to support the implementation of the recent anti-corruption strategy. Meanwhile, resources and capacity of the state institutions to monitor and evaluate the outcomes of preventive measures remained limited, and their long-term impact has yet to be demonstrated. The quality and implementation of the integrity plans and transparency programmes at central and local levels varied. More efforts are also needed to address business integrity in contact with public administration and along supply chains.
During the reporting period, declarations of assets for some 365 officials, members of Parliament and government, members of justice institutions, and mayors, were published, allowing public scrutiny and enhancing transparency for such declarations. The effectiveness and transparency of asset declaration verifications need to be further strengthened to systematically address non-declaration or concealment of assets. This should include the adoption of risk-based approaches, as such undeclared or concealed assets tend to be uncovered only during investigations into corruption or related offences. Coordination with financial investigation and law enforcement needs to improve for effective asset checks and follow-up. Only 10 whistleblowing cases were registered in 2025. Meanwhile, the number of reporting entities increased following the new law adopted in December 2025.
The number of whistleblower reports remains low. During 2025, the High Inspectorate of Declaration and Audit of Assets and Conflicts of Interest (HIDAACI) reviewed 11 new whistleblower reports and eight requests for protection against retaliation.
Fundamental rights
General framework
The general framework for fundamental rights provides an overall good basis of protection, while further alignment with the EU acquis in selected areas is still needed. The implementation and enforcement of fundamental rights need to be improved.
International human rights instruments
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The cooperation with international human rights monitoring bodies remains satisfactory but improvement in the follow-up to their recommendations is still needed. Albania is party to the main international human rights instruments. Albania has committed to developing a comprehensive monitoring and data collection system to assess the level of implementation of human rights legislation, policies, and strategies. Albania continued benefitting from its observer status at the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights.
European Court of Human Rights
Albania continues to ensure good cooperation with the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). During the reporting period, the Court found breaches of the European Convention on Human Rights relating mainly to the right to respect for private and family life, the right to a fair trial, and the right to liberty and security. Albania faces challenges in implementing ECtHR judgments. By 31 December 2025, Albania had 63 ECtHR judgments pending execution compared with 58 in 2024, of which 28 leading cases were under enhanced supervision by the Committee of Ministers. Albania still needs to ensure effective implementation of these judgments, notably in the Strazimiri v. Albania case, regarding the inhumane and degrading treatment of forensic psychiatric patients and prisoners with mental disorders. Individual remedies to address unlawful expropriation and demolition of property in the Sharxhi and others v. Albania case have still not been implemented.
Promotion, protection and enforcement of human rights
The legal and institutional framework for the promotion, protection and enforcement of human rights needs to be improved. Effective promotion and enforcement of human rights remain challenging notably regarding the right to property and children’s rights. The Ombudspers on (People’s Advocate) is accredited as an A-status National Human Rights
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Institution and continued to exercise its mandate satisfactorily. The Parliament appointed the new Ombudsperson in December 2025 and the new Commissioner for Protection against Discrimination in May 2026, following prolonged institutional deadlocks. The election of the new Ombudsperson was challenged by the opposition in front of the Constitutional Court. The Court ruled that the procedure was lawful. The functioning of the regional offices of both institutions was still affected by shortages in human and financial resources. The largest number of complaints received by the Ombudsperson in 2025 pertained to the quality of and equality in access to public services (256 complaints, 14% overall). The implementation rate of its recommendations remains low overall, thereby impeding the effective exercise of fundamental rights. The Ombudsperson should follow-up on stated intentions to strengthen the effectiveness, transparency and accountability of the institution.
Prevention of torture and other forms of ill-treatment
Albania continues to provide adequate legal guarantees on the prevention of torture and other forms of ill-treatment. While Albania generally legally complies with its international obligations, in practice the country should take all measures to ensure that all allegations made against the police are investigated promptly. The functioning of the National Preventive Mechanism remained satisfactory; however, the follow-up of its recommendations remains low. No progress was made in the implementation of Albania’s action plan to address the main findings and recommendations of the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment. Serious concerns persist over overcrowding of detention premises, poor internal case management procedures, lack of medical and therapeutic staff, high rates of inmate deaths due to poor health and inadequate material detention conditions in general. No steps have been taken to address serious concerns over the conditions for prisoners with mental health issues and forensic patients.
Execution of criminal sanctions
Improvements still need to be made to the system for execution of criminal sanctions, both in detention facilities and in cases of probation, in line with European Commission Recommendations including on procedural rights of suspects and accused people subject to pre-trial detention and on material detention conditions. Corruption, poor healthcare and a shortage of staff in the penitentiary systemand detention centres are continued concerns. In 2026, the
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occupancy rate declined and a general amnesty law was approved. The probation service is operational, but prevention and rehabilitation still need to be improved. The use of electronic monitoring, suspended since 2019, needs to be reintroduced urgently. Special attention should be paid to deradicalising prisoners.
Protection of personal data
The legal framework for the protection of personal data is aligned with the EU acquis, but the human and financial resource capacities of the Information and Data Protection Commissioner’s (IDP) Office need to be strengthened for it to perform its expanded tasks, which include monitoring the implementation of the lobbying legislation. All required pieces of implementing legislation related to the personal data protection law were adopted. Public awareness about personal data protection and public institutions’ preventive capacity remains low. The IDP is systematically consulted on draft legislation and initiatives that can affect personal data. Public and private data controllers should continue their efforts and openness to follow up the IDP’s recommendations. This includes following up concerns related to the “Smart Cities” initiative, which includes the installation of intelligent cameras and other AI-driven applications for traffic monitoring, law enforcement and public security across the country.
Freedom of thought, conscience and religion
Albania provides adequate legal guarantees on freedom of thought, conscience and religion. The issue of restitution of properties belonging to religious groups that were expropriated during the communist era remains unresolved. Some religious groups remain vulnerable due to financial dependence from third parties.
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Freedom of expression and media freedom
Intimidation of journalists
While the institutional framework for the protection of journalists is in place, the deterrent impact of procedural safeguards remains limited. Cases of intimidation and threats against journalists, including by high-ranking state officials and police officers, became more prominent through smear campaigns and strategic lawsuits against public participation (SLAPPs), politically motivated physical and verbal attacks, and disinformation. Investigative and female journalists were targeted to a greater extent. Media freedom organisations denounced 42 cases of violations of journalists’ safety in 2025 (down from 52 in 2024). The amendments to the Criminal Code adopted by the Parliament in January 2026 strengthened the protection of journalists against violence and serious threats by increasing sanctions related to attacks against them. Journalists still have limited access to legal assistance, and systematic monitoring of judicial cases involving journalists remains limited.
Despite some efforts made in judicial follow up on cases involving threats or attacks against journalists by police, prosecution and judges, impunity remained prevalent due to the continued lack of a robust track record of investigations and judicial action. The State Police recorded 21 cases involving journalists, including six complaints related to threats to life or
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bodily harm and 14 involving other forms of threats or harassment. According to the General Prosecution Office, nine referrals involving journalists which were carried over from previous years were reviewed between in 2025, while the number of newly referred cases for the same year was six. For the first quarter of 2026, the General Prosecutor has received seven new referrals. Nevertheless, perception surveys conducted by independent media organisations indicate low awareness of these judicial and law enforcement mechanisms and limited confidence in institutional responses.
Digital threats and online harassment continued. Serious concerns persist regarding privacy violations, as journalists’ personal and professional data continue to be misused by unauthorised entities. Institutional mechanisms for reporting, addressing and mitigating digital threats remain insufficient. There is still a lack of systemic monitoring and reporting on judicial cases involving journalists. Access to legal assistance and support from media outlets remain limited for journalists.
Legislative environment
Albania has taken some steps towards aligning the legislative framework with the EU acquis, notably with the European Media Freedom Act. In January 2026, Albania adopted amendments to the Law on Audiovisual Media to increase media ownership transparency. However, media independence and plurality continued to be negatively affected by the high market concentration and the lack of transparency in media financing, especially in electoral contexts, and of economic interests, including public funding. Provisions on defamation were abrogated with the aim of protecting registered journalists under certain conditions. Albania is expected to fully decriminalise defamation. Albania needs to align with the EU Anti-SLAPP legal framework and Council of Europe standards on Anti-SLAPP. The structured dialogue between Albanian institutions and media actors on media reform progressed throughout 2025 from thematic consultations to formal recommendations for legislative consideration to the government and the Parliament. The extent to which recommendations of the platform are reflected will depend on further developments in 2026 as Albania continues efforts to conduct a broader media reform. The Law on access to information remains broadly aligned with European standards, although shorter and binding deadlines for responses to journalists are still to be introduced based on best European practices.
Implementation of legislation/institutions
The independence of the Audio-Visual Regulatory Authority (AMA) still isn’t guaranteed and the appointment procedure for its board members leave room for political and corporate influence. Shortcomings remain in enforcing the Broadcasting Code on media outlets that air pre-recorded political content during electoral campaigns. The implementation of the National Strategy against Foreign Interference and Disinformation 2025-2030 remains at a very early stage. In June 2026, a Parliamentary Subcommittee on Public Information Integrity, Disinformation, and Foreign Interference was established.
Shortcomings remain in the implementation of the Law on access to public information. Public authorities continue the practice of withholding information based on generic references to ‘public interest’ that continue to not be clearly defined. Journalists and civil society organisations, who are mostly affected, face delays, refusals, or incomplete responses to information requests. In 2025, the Commissioner for the Right to Information and Personal Data Protection received 386 complaints from journalists concerning the refusal to provide information and official documents. Of these, 311 cases were resolved by granting the requested information during the administrative review process. Twelve recommendations on institutional transparency were issued by the Information and Data Protection Commissioner.
Public service broadcaster
The public broadcaster Radio Television (RTSH) has faced significant financial as well as labour-related issues leading to an intensified public debate on how to reform the
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broadcaster. Concerns remain over the independence of RTSH including the election and appointment processes of its Director-General and Steering Council members. Following a detailed assessment by the European Broadcasting Union (EBU), a reform support mission for RTSH was launched in 2026 to address identified issues including in the broadcaster’s structure with the aim of aligning with European standards in this area.
Economic factors
High ownership concentration and opaque funding practices still compromise media independence and plurality. The legal framework continues to lack provisions on clear and transparent distribution of public sector advertising in line with international standards. Standard public procurement rules in the advertising procurement procedure can still be circumvented. Some steps have been taken towards establishing an audience measurement system. A Joint Industry Committee, including representatives of national and regional broadcasters, the RTSH, and marketing agencies, was formally registered as an independent legal entity in September 2025. The influence of politically affiliated business groups, particularly during the pre-electoral period, continued to raise concerns.
Internet
Online media remains unregulated. In March 2026, the Constitutional Court ruled that the 2025 government decision to introduce a temporary blanket ban on a major social media platform on grounds of negative effects on the public was unconstitutional, not based on the law and harmed freedom of expression and freedom of press. Media outlets generally have limited cybersecurity capacity. Several cyberattacks against the media took place during the reporting period. The Government has launched the process of aligning with the Digital Services Act.
Professional organisations and working conditions
The polarisation of the media landscape, limited resources and the use of inflammatory rhetoric in public debate continue to hinder the weak self-regulation in the media sector. Support to self-regulatory initiatives and promotion of sector-wide adherence to ethical codes still needs to be ensured.
Journalists continue to face job insecurity and poor working conditions. Self-censorship and pressure from political actors and media owners, continued. Issues remain with unpaid salaries and excessive workloads, particularly in local and online media. The State Labour Inspectorate continue to receive new formal complaints by media freedom organisations. Self-censorship remains widespread, driven by political pressure, legal threats and economic dependence.
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Freedom of assembly and association
Albania provides adequate legal guarantees to freedom of assembly and association, and regulation of assemblies is adequate.
Labour and trade union rightsare covered in Chapter 19 - Social policy and employment.
Property rights
The legal and institutional framework for the enforcement of property rights is largely in place. However, the effective exercise of these rights has remained limited. Significant challenges persist, due to uncertain ownership titles and property boundaries. Corruption continues to be perceived as widespread and constitutes a significant share of complaints and corruption-related investigations.
The State Cadastre Agency (SCA) stayed on track in implementing its digitalisation roadmap and made substantial progress. By June 2026, Albania completed the digitalisation of all
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ownership titles and reference documents and scanned an additional 17% of the remaining paper-based cadastral maps Progress has also been achieved in first-time land registration, reaching [95.4%] of cadastral zones by July 2026. Nevertheless, most cadastral data still require systematic accuracy verification and improvement.
The SCA adopted and has effectively implemented its first integrity plan and communication strategy, initiated a corruption risk assessment, and began revising key business processes to strengthen transparency, efficiency, and the quality of cadastral services. It has also enabled online payment of service fees, and improved connection with the notarial system.
The legalisation process for informal constructions, scheduled for completion by the end of 2028, is ongoing. Between April and July 2026, the total number of legalisation applications handled by the local directorates reached 46 931. The number of positive decisions increased to 43 681. However, the legalisation process remains slow and places additional pressure on cadastral services.
Progress has been slow on compensations for properties confiscated during the communist era. Out of the more than 26 000 requests for compensation accepted by the specialised Agency for Treatment of Property (ATP), ownership and compensation values were recognised 20 554 decisions cases and only 968 of them were effectively executed with compensations paid out. The major issue has remained that only 10% of the property value can be compensated, and that value is still based on the government’s 2016 valuation map dating, with prices often significantly below current market values. Many applicants seek higher compensations in court, despite the significant backlog.
Non-discrimination
The legal and institutional framework on non-discrimination has improved, while the capacities of equality bodies still need to be strengthened.
Albania needs to more consistently and effectively implement strategic measures including by earmarking adequate resources in the area of combating discrimination and strengthening the rights of lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, intersex and queer (LGBTIQ+) persons, Roma3 and Egyptians, people with minority racial or ethnic background, and persons with disabilities, including sectoral non-discrimination action plans.
Amendments to the anti-discrimination law further aligned the legal and institutional framework for non-discrimination with the EU acquis, including on racial equality and on standards for equality bodies, and European standards. However, several compliance issues and gaps in implementation and enforcement remain. In 2025, the Commissioner for Protection against Discrimination (CPD) handled a higher number of cases of alleged discrimination compared to 2024, reflecting increased public awareness of institutional mechanisms for addressing discrimination.
Anti-racism and hate offences
Laws on hate offences require further alignment with EU acquis and European standards. Better enforcement capacity, including data collection and statistics as well as greater awareness raising and reporting are particularly needed. Human rights defenders and CSOs working on gender and LGBTIQ+ rights were particularly targeted by hate speech during the reporting period. In 2025, the CPD handled 26 cases of alleged hate speech, mainly on the grounds of gender identity and sexual orientation, confirming hate speech in two of the cases. Additional training, capacity building and awareness about hate crime is needed among law enforcement and justice professionals. A total of 25 cases of hate crime were reported to the police in the 2025 and 17 from January until June 2026.
3 In line with the terminology of European institutions, the umbrella term ‘Roma’ is used here to refer to a number
of different groups, without denying the specificities of these groups.
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Gender equality
The legal and institutional framework for gender equality and combating gender-based violence is largely in place, but legislative alignment with the EU acquis as well as implementation and enforcement are insufficient. Implementation of the National Strategy for Gender Equality 2021-2030 and its Action Plan as well as ensuring adequately funded referral mechanisms at municipal level remain weak. Eleven local gender action plans have been approved, while an additional three are being prepared. The implementation has resulted in several activities at local level supporting among other female entrepreneurs. Women living in rural and remote areas, women with disabilities, Roma and Egyptian women, and lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, intersex and queer (LGBTIQ+) persons continue to face multiple and intersecting forms of discrimination.
Critical concerns persist regarding violence against women and domestic violence, which are severely under-reported due to social norms and associated stigma. 47% of women and girls report having been victims of intimate partner violence. Concerns also remain regarding the police’s limited capacity, enforcement and accountability in handling cases of violence against women, as well as inconsistencies in court decisions.
The number of femicides decreased compared with 2023 but remains a concern. The establishment of a national Femicide Watch is expected to contribute to an increased level of awareness and monitoring of the issue. Ensuring adequate sustainable funding for specialised services, including long-term and emergency shelters in Albania, is essential, alongside strengthening their accessibility. Particular attention should be paid to, specialised support services, including healthcare, free legal aid and the reintegration and rehabilitation of victims of gender-based violence. Furthermore, serious concerns remain regarding online violence and harassment targeting women. Data collection on gender equality needs to be updated and strengthened, especially for gender-based and domestic violence. Such data should, as minimum, be disaggregated by sex, age, relationship between the victim and the offender and type of offence. The adoption of the Gender Equality Law caused significant
8
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2023 2024 2025
Graph 13.2: Albania - Violence against women - femicides*
Source: Ombudsman Observatory on Femicide
*Data changes compared to 2025 annual report are due to
establishment of the Observatory on Femicide which
revisited past cases based on a new methodology.
5198 5587 5530
809 1064 836
0
1000
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2023 2024 2025
Graph 13.1: Albania - Violence against women and men
(including domestic and sexual violence)
Police reports Final criminal convictions
Source: Albanian State Police and Ministry of Justice
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public debate especially on the definition of gender. Some provisions of the law are currently being challenged in the constitutional court.
Rights of the child
The legal and institutional framework on rights of the child is incomplete, and implementation needs to be improved. Only 64% of the measures in the 2021-2026 National Agenda on the Rights of the Child (NARC) have been fully implemented. Albania needs to adopt a NARC for 2027-2030. Albania should reinforce the National Council for Child Rights and Protection and the State Agency for the Rights and Protection of the Child.
Laws and policies intended to protect minors from child marriage are incomplete or applied inconsistently. Unified processes on data collection and analysis at central and local level merit improvement. Child protection services remain insufficient. Abuse, exploitation, neglects and violence and sexual violence against children, including online, remain a critical area of concern. The increase in the number of child protection workers led to a greater number of cases managed. This is a positive development and needs to be sustained but remains insufficient. Albania adopted a new alternative care law (with implementing legislation still pending adoption) and updated the national deinstitutionalisation plan. While the deinstitutionalisation of (i) children outside parental care and (ii) children with disabilities continued at a steady pace, the high concentration of children with disabilities in institutions remains of concern. Operationalising more community and family-based service centres at local level, including specialised services, should be a key priority. Special care should also be given to children in street situations.
Albania has undertaken significant reforms to ensure a child-friendly justice system. However, weaknesses persist in institutional capacity, service availability, interinstitutional coordination and data-driven decision making. In addition, infrastructure challenges further undermined the effectiveness of the system as specialised facilities fail to meet EU and international standards, reducing the ability of children in contract with the law to effectively participate in the justice process and enjoy child-friendly treatment. The introduction of diversion measures for children in conflict with the law has improved, however rehabilitation programmes are not implemented consistently and uniformly. Attention should be paid to the increasing number of children in conflict with the law who are below the age of criminal responsibility.
Persons with disabilities
The legal and institutional framework on the rights of persons with disabilities is incomplete and implementation and enforcement need to be significantly improved. Albania’s framework legislation in this field is still only partially compliant with the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (UNCRPD), and Albania is yet to ratify the Optional Protocol to the UNCRPD providing for an individual or groups of individuals complaints’ mechanism. Progress continued on the inclusion of persons with disabilities, with the approval of the 2026 – 2030 National Action Plan, marking a significant shift towards the model of social and economic inclusion and participation of persons with disabilities.
Progress also continues on the implementation of the biopsychosocial assessment, in line with UNCRPD recommendations, but service provision needs to be strengthened. Limited action was taken to tackle discrimination against persons with disabilities, which represents the highest number of alleged discrimination cases handled by the CPD during the reporting period. Albania has taken initial steps aiming to align with the European Accessibility Act. Further efforts are needed to improve accessibility for persons with disabilities and ensure full alignment with the EU acquis. There has been steady progress on deinstitutionalisation, but more effort is needed to move towards independent living and inclusion of persons with disabilities.
LGBTIQ+ persons
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The legal and institutional framework for the protection of the rights of LGBTIQ+ persons needs to be improved, as they still face high levels of discrimination and discreditation. Negative public attitudes, both online and offline, have further increased. Albania does not provide for legal recognition and protection of same-sex couples, as required by ECtHR case-law It also lacks a framework for legal gender recognition, which is not in line with ECtHR case-law and raises concerns as regards alignment with relevant CJEU case-law. After a three-year delay, the Ministry of Health adopted Albania’s first medical protocol for gender-affirming hormone therapy, brining hormone treatment into the public healthcare system end eliminating a longstanding barrier to healthcare access for transgender people.
Apart from the adoption of the medical protocol, no additional progress was recorded in the implementation of the measures under the LGBTIQ National Action Plan 2021-2027 due to lack of political will and resources. In addition, there is still a lack of inclusive data collection. During the reporting period, discrimination against LGBTIQ+ persons has been prevalent and LGBTIQ+ activists have been particularly targeted by hate speech. On 23 May 2026, the Tirana Pride took place peacefully with the participation of a high-ranking member of the government.
Procedural rights of suspects and accused persons and rights of victims of crime
The legal framework on procedural rights is incomplete, and the protection of victim’s rights needs to improve. The legal framework for legal aid is comprehensive, and primary and secondary legal aid are delivered at central and local levels. However, the assessment of the new judicial map on legal aid, and its compatibility with EU standards still needs to be carried out. The financial resources and the inter-institutional coordination to uphold the right of victims of crime remain insufficient, including for access to information and related legal compensation. Access to legal aid or adequate legal advice in due time, particularly affecting the most vulnerable groups in criminal proceedings, remains an issue.
Issues related to the procedural rights of suspects and accused persons persist and should be addressed, including serious aspects pertaining to the right to information in criminal proceedings, the protection of the presumption of innocence, the right of access to a lawyer from the earliest stages in the investigations and access to legal aid in due time. Pre-trial detention continues to remain the main coercive measure imposed pending investigations and trial. Relevant institutions should take measures to ensure that better use is made of alternative measures to detention.
Protection of minorities
The legal framework for the protection of persons belonging to minorities is generally aligned with European standards. Persons belonging to minorities continued to face discrimination. The implementation of secondary legislation related to self-identification faced shortcomings with a high number of applications returned and registered by the authorities for non- compliance with the procedures. In March 2026, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, in collaboration with the Committee on National Minorities, organised a series of events intended to raise awareness and inform local communities about the self-identification procedure for national minorities.
The legal framework still needs to be effectively implemented, notably by allocating adequate resources at all levels and by staffing and training local authorities (including on data collection), based on annual projections. In October 2025, Albania reviewed the procedures for selecting the members of the Committee on National Minorities addressing most of the recommendations of the European Commission and of the Advisory Committee of the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities. The budget of the State Committee on National Minorities increased in 2026, while the institutional fund for the minority related projects was doubled for 2025 and 2026 compared with previous years.
Roma
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The legal and institutional framework on Roma needs to be further improved. Roma people continue to face discrimination. A new National Action Plan for equality, inclusion and participation of Roma and Egyptians in Albania (2026-2030) was adopted in June 2026. The overall employment rate of Roma and Egyptians continues to be very low. Their access to additional out-of-pocket health services remains financially constrained. Challenges persist in civil registration, as DNA testing is still required. The implementation of the Poznan commitments needs to be significantly improved. The institutional capacity of the Ministry of Health and Social Protection, where the National Roma Contact Point is placed, needs to be strengthened. Additional efforts and resources are required to accelerate the inclusion of Roma and Egyptians, tackle anti-gypsyism, discrimination and educational and physical segregation, promote Roma participation and reduce the gaps with the rest of the population.
Citizenship rights
Albania needs to align with the EU acquis on EU citizenship rights. This should include an analysis of alignment and implementation needs arising from directive on the right of EU citizens and their family members to move and reside freely in the Member States. It should be carried out across all policy areas affected, with alignment timely planned accordingly. The legal basis allowing for the development of an investor citizenship scheme still needs to be repealed, to ensure full compliance with EU law4 – such schemes pose risks as regards security, money laundering, tax evasion, terrorist financing, corruption and infiltration by organised crime.
2.2.2. Chapter 24: Justice, freedom and security
The EU has common rules for border and migration management, visa policy, and asylum. Schengen cooperation entails the lifting of border controls inside the EU. There is also cooperation in the fight against serious and organised crime and terrorism, and judicial, police and customs cooperation, all with the support of the EU Justice and Home Affairs agencies.
Fight against serious and organised crime
The legal framework on serious and organised crime is partially aligned with the EU acquis. The capacity to fight against serious and organised crime needs to be improved.
General framework
Legal alignment, strategic and institutional frameworks
The new strategy on the prevention and fight against serious and organised crime for 2026- 2030 and its action plan were adopted in June 2026. The 2026 Serious and Organised Crime Threat Assessment was endorsed in June 2026 as well but is not yet publicly available.
Albania amended its Criminal Code in January 2026, further aligning with the EU acquis on the fight against serious and organised crime. Additional amendments to the Criminal Code are needed to fully align with the EU acquis on serious and organised crime, including on cybercrime. In September 2026, Albania launched public consultations on revisions to the Criminal Procedure Code. It remains important that Albania ensures that future legal changes to criminal legislation are fully in line with the EU acquis and European standards and also conducive to the country’s efforts to fighting serious and organised crime and protecting the efficiency of investigations.
44 See judgement of 29 April 2025, Commission v Malta (Citoyenneté par investissement), C-181/23, JudgementECLI:EU:C:2025:283.
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The legal framework for the establishment of the Asset Recovery Office (ARO) is in place. The ARO within the Albanian State Police is now fully staffed and all implementing legislation has been adopted. Its full operationalisation is expected to lead to increased asset seizure, including through international cooperation with peer entities, and subsequent confiscation.
The capacity of the Agency for the Administration of Seized and Confiscated Assets should be reinforced, particularly in terms of operational procedures to promote the transparent use of assets and their timely management to preserve their economic value.
The recruitment process of ten judicial police services officers within the National Bureau of Investigations (NBI) was still not finalised during the reporting period. The number of state databases to which the SPO and NBI have access has increased from 19 to 22 and reached a sufficient level, but further improvements in analysis capabilities are needed.
District prosecution offices (DPOs) continued to operate under severe constraints, particularly high caseloads and limited staff, insufficient specialisation in financial investigations and limited analytical capacity for complex cases. These systemic shortcomings continue to hinder early detection of organised crime, money laundering and corruption cases, while also weakening the evidentiary strength of cases later referred to the SPO.
Implementation and enforcement capacity
Albania continued to make progress towards a solid track record of investigations, prosecutions and final convictions in all fields of serious and organised crime, including money laundering and terrorist financing. SPAK kept on delivering positive results in the fight
against high- risk organised crime networks, notably in cooperation with EU Member States and EU agencies. Further efforts are needed to reach final decisions, including final convictions, notably on cases of
cybercrime, trafficking in human being, firearms-related offences and money laundering.
Criminal and financial investigation analysis and methodologies need to be strengthened. Financial investigation techniques in the ordinary and special jurisdiction need to be improved, including on identification, analysis and preservation of digital evidence for cryptocurrency and virtual assets. Financialinvestigations continued to be prioritised by SPAK and their use in parallel with serious, organised crime and money laundering cases should continue to increase in all jurisdictions.
Albania is encouraged to increase its use of preventive seizure and confiscation of assets, including non-conviction-based confiscation and third-party confiscation.
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In 2025, Albania reported about EUR 61 million worth of seized assets (EUR 21 million in 2024) and EUR 1.9 million worth of confiscated assets (EUR 10 million in 2024). Further efforts are needed to show a more consistent ratio between seizure and confiscation.
There is still no strategic or systematic approach to
identifying and confiscating criminal assets that are abroad or unreachable. Albania needs to steadily implement rules on extended confiscation and precautionary asset freezing, to prevent the assets losing their economic value.
There is a need to guarantee the timely and proper management of seized and confiscated assets, including virtual assets and cryptocurrency, as no state-owned digital wallet is available. The reuse of confiscated assets for social purposes is to be further expanded.
International efforts in building the institutional capacity of the Albanian State Police are weakened by the low staff retention and unjustified internal mobility of trained staff. Albania needs to ensure merit-based, transparent and predictable career progression, particularly in highly specialised areas (i.e. criminal analysis, cybercrime, environmental crimes, use of special investigative measures, etc.)
Law enforcement cooperation
In 2025, Albania participated in several high-level international police operations in different fields, spanning over drugs trafficking, high-level organised criminal groups, organised property crime. The country should continue to strengthen its cooperation with international partners, in particular with EU Member States and EU agencies.
Albania deployed its second liaison officer to Europol in March 2026. The country remains actively engaged in the European Multidisciplinary Platform against Criminal Threats (EMPACT) and took part in 120 operational actions carried out in the period 2024-2025. Albania has reduced its engagement in the new EMPACT cycle but continues to demonstrate proactive involvement. The country registered for 88 Operational Actions for 2026-2027, compared to 120 in 2024-2025. It leads two actions focused on Migrant Smuggling and Cyber and co-leads three actions since February 2026. Albania is strongly encouraged to maintain its qualitative engagement in EMPACT.
Albania continued to participate in the INTERPOL I-24/7 system.
Cooperation between Albania and the European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Training (CEPOL) continued. To establish a sustainable professional development, Albania is encouraged to adopt the sectoral competencies and integrate knowledge acquired through CEPOL capacity-building actions to its national law enforcement training system.
The revision of the working arrangement with CEPOL is still ongoing.
There is need to provide targeted training to all actors involved in combating environmental crime, including administrative entities, field investigators, investigative magistrates and trial judges, to ensure a coherent and effective enforcement chain.
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Judicial cooperation in criminal matters
The legal framework for judicial cooperation in criminal matters is partially aligned with the EU acquis to the extent that alignment is already possible. Judicial cooperation in criminal matters with EU Member States, the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO) and Eurojust remains broadly satisfactory. Albania cooperates with EPPO based on working arrangements. In 2025, the EPPO did not send any mutual legal assistance requests to Albania but had six active cases with links to Albania at the end of the year. Between September 2025 and March 2026, Albania was involved in 78 new cases at Eurojust, including 49 as requesting country. Most Eurojust cases are related to organised crime, drug trafficking and money- laundering. Albania participated in 27 joint investigation teams in 2025 (25 in 2024), including 5 new ones. Most of the teams (15) continue to work in the field of narcotics.
Capacities to recognise and enforce foreign criminal judgments need to be strengthened, including extradition procedures, to sustain the continuity of investigations and effective international cooperation.
Crime areas
Investigation and criminalisation of money laundering
Albania further aligned its legislative framework with the EU acquis on criminalisation of money laundering, with the January 2026 amendments to its Criminal Code.
Albania continued to strengthen the fight against money laundering. The 2024-2030 national strategy against money laundering and terrorist financing adopted in July 2024 needs to be implemented effectively by all relevant actors in coordination with relevant law enforcement authorities. (See also Chapter 4 – Free movement of capital)
Cybercrime
Further alignment with the EU acquis on cybercrime is needed. Albania reinforced its capacities and cooperation with Member States on cybercrime, but needs to further develop its technical capacity to investigate cybercrime by improving interception capabilities and digital devices examination.
Child sexual abuse
The Albanian Criminal Code was aligned with the EU acquis on child sexual abuse and exploitation both online and offline. Comprehensive alignment with the EU acquis beyond the Criminal Code should be foreseen.
Trafficking in human beings
The legal framework was further aligned with the EU acquis, following amendments to the Criminal Code. Domestic child trafficking forced begging and child labour are still a concern despite policies that are consistent with international standards.
1027 743
597
1187
620
935
2104
1163
1532
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500
1000
1500
2000
2500
2023 2024 2025
Graph 15: Albania - Requests for mutual assistance in
criminal matters
Incoming requests Outgoing requests Total Source: General Prosecutor Office
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109 96 87
56 82 95
0
50
100
150
200
2023 2024 2025
Graph 16: Albania - Victims of trafficking
in human beings*
Children Adults Female
Source: National data collected via the organised crime and corruption track record (OCCTR) e-platform
* Total of victims and potential victims identified
Albania has continued to implement its national action plan (2024–2025) and adopted standard operating procedures for the protection of victims and potential victims of trafficking in December 2025. A new strategy 2026-2030 and related action plan needs to be adopted. Following the restructuring of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the anti-trafficking sector was upgraded to a Directorate.
Albanian authorities need to strengthen their capacity to detect, investigate and prosecute traffickers and fully implement the National Referral Mechanism for victims of trafficking. Albania should mitigate trafficking risks for migrant workers and urgently address the increasing number of cases in this group via enhanced labour inspections and reinforced capacities to investigate and prosecute these cases. In October 2025, the Albanian State Police contributed to an international operation leading to the dismantling of an international network involved in trafficking in human beings, leading to several arrests and the identifications of victims.
Migrant smuggling
Albania has renewed its engagement in the Global Alliance to Counter Migrant Smuggling by taking part in the second ministerial conference in December 2025 and by endorsing the Global Alliance Joint Declaration. Albania also participated in the Senior Officials’ Meeting of the Global Alliance in July 2026.
Trafficking in firearms
On small arms and light weapons (SALW), Albania should focus its efforts on aligning with EU acquis on marking and on further aligning with the EU acquis on alarm and signal weapons
In December 2025, a National Strategy for SALW control and explosives 2025–2030, along with the Action Plan 2025–2028 was adopted. In addition, Albania adopted a law on the import, export and transit of firearms in January 2026, which is aligned with the relevant EU acquis and with a view to ensuring compliance with the UN Firearms Protocol. A new chair of the national SALW commission was appointed during the reporting period.
Albania’s operational response related to trafficking of weapons and ammunition included the seizure of 690 weapons (from 636 the previous year) and 26 351 pieces of ammunition (from 32 411) in 2025. Explosive seizures inland dropped from 242 in 2024 to 87 in 2025. No destruction of Small Arms and Light Weapons was reported in 2025.
Cooperation in the field of drugs
Cooperation in the field of drugs has improved, but further efforts are needed.
Albania needs to adopt a comprehensive drugs strategy, containing both health and law enforcement/security aspects, and related action plan, aligned
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with the corresponding EU strategic framework.
The amendments to the Criminal Code adopted in January 2026 aligned with the criminal provisions of the EU acquis on illicit drug trafficking. Furthermore, with the adoption of two revised laws on respectively drugs and drug precursors, Albania achieved further alignment with the EU acquis. Regular updates to the legal framework on illicit drug trafficking and drug precursors will be needed, notably to follow the periodic amendments of the EU lists of new psychoactive substances and drug precursors.
The National Drugs Observatory (NDO) within the Ministry of Health improved its functioning but still needs to become fully operational by ensuring sufficient resources, and capacities, including on data collection and management. The functioning, resources and output of the National Early Warning System (NEWS) on the detection of new psychoactive substances set up within the Albanian State Police need to be increased, particularly regarding laboratory capacities to detect new psychoactive substances. Full staffing and staffing stability need to be achieved in both structures, along with strong engagement with civil society and with the development of relevant standard operating procedures
Implementation of the working arrangement with the EU Drugs Agency has improved, but requires more proactive engagement, better interinstitutional coordination and regular information exchange.
Concerning the law on the control of the cultivation and processing of the cannabis plant and production of its by-products for medical and industrial purposes, Albania has adopted 20 pieces of implementing legislation out of 26, including security-related provisions. Strong safeguards to prevent cannabis from being diverted to unintended use are essential and should be further developed and strictly implemented once the cultivation and processing start.
The number of operations in the field of narcotics in cooperation with international partners increased from 82 in 2024 to 122 in 2025. Operational cooperation to tackle drug production and trafficking in and via Albania and to dismantle Albanian organised crime groups should be further pursued.
There has been a significant decrease in drugs destruction in 2025. The number of cases of drug production and trafficking remained broadly stable in 2025 (compared with 2024), but with a decrease in the number of individuals and legal entities receiving a final court decision and/or a final conviction.
Airborne remote sensing deployed to detect and monitor cannabis plantations with Italian assistance continues to yield results, with 106 894 plants of cannabis identified and destroyed in 2025.
Counterfeiting of the euro
The corresponding legislation is broadly in line with the EU acquis on the suppression of counterfeit currency.
All aspects of customs cooperation are covered in Chapter 29 – Customs Union.
Counter-terrorism, prevention and resilience
Fight against terrorism and prevention of radicalisation
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The legal framework for the fight against terrorism and for countering violent extremism is partially aligned with the EU acquis. The fight against terrorism and the countering of violent extremism is broadly satisfactory.
Legal alignment, strategic and institutional frameworks
In January 2026, Albania amended its Criminal Code, further aligning with the EU Directive on combating terrorism. However, full compliance with the EU acquis should be ensured, notably on explosive precursors.
Albania has made progress in implementing the 2023-2025 strategy but should adopt a new strategy and action plan post-2025 and allocate adequate resources for their implementation. Albania has a strategy against money laundering and terrorist financing 2024-2030 and related action plans are in place.
Following the adoption of the new Joint Action Plan on Preventing and Countering of Terrorism and Violent Extremism for the Western Balkans, Albania finalised a national roadmap for its implementation in September 2026..
Implementation and enforcement capacity
The terrorist risk level assessment increased from low to medium due to the overall geopolitical situation, including the crisis in Iran, also in connection to presence of the Iranian opposition group Mojahedin e-Khalq in Albania.
Law enforcement and justice institutions in charge of counterterrorism work professionally and effectively. However, investigative and prosecutorial capacities need to be enhanced, especially at local level. Albania is encouraged to apply the methodology developed with the support of the Counter Terrorism Support Network (CTSN) to prepare a domestic terrorism trend and situation report.
In 2025, the Albanian State Police referred seven cases of criminal offences with terrorist intent to the Special Prosecution Office (SPAK). In June 2026, the Special Court Against Corruption and Organized Crime (GJKKO) convicted 13 Albanian citizens on terrorism- related charges for joining terrorist organisations such as ISIS and other formations in Syria.
The rehabilitation and reintegration of the 44 family members of Albanian foreign terrorist fighters returned from Syria/Iraq through repatriation operations continue to be handled effectively. In 2026, six additional Albanian national returned from Syria. Authorities should allocate an adequate budget for this work, to ensure sustainability in the medium and long term. Around 40 Albanian citizens are believed to still be in Syria/Iraq, half of whom are women
The regional security councils and the local public safety councils continue to be instrumental for the prevention of radicalisation and the coordination between the national and local levels.
Online radicalisation, radicalisation in prisons and terrorist content online continued to be major challenges, notably for young people. Monitoring of online content poses difficulties as institutional capacities and resources are limited.
Critical infrastructure protection
Legal alignment, strategic and institutional frameworks
The legal framework for critical infrastructure protection is not aligned with the EU acquis. The protection of critical infrastructure needs to be improved.
Implementation and enforcement capacity
The level of preparation to protect critical infrastructure remained low. The Law on the protection of critical infrastructure should be aligned with the EU Directive on the resilience of critical entities.
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Migration and asylum
Legal and irregular migration and returns
The legal framework for legal and irregular migration management is partially aligned with the EU acquis. The management of legal and irregular migration is broadly satisfactory.
Legal alignment, strategic and institutional frameworks
The implementation of a national migration strategy (2024-2030) and its action plan (2024- 2026) has continued, but there is a need for stronger coordination with all relevant services beyond the Ministry of Internal Affairs and strengthened monitoring of the implementation. Implementing legislation and administrative provisions related to the Law on foreigners were adopted in the course of 2026.
Albania needs to strengthen its active engagement in the European Migration Network, where it obtained observer status in June 2025.
Implementation and enforcement capacity
Albania cooperates with the EU, its agencies and Member States in implementing the EU action plan on the Western Balkans, which continued to support a joint management of migration through the region. In 2025 most irregular migrants were nationals of Pakistan, Egypt and Afghanistan. Irregular arrivals increased by 25% in comparison with 2024, but figures remain relatively low. The authorities’ regular and timely reporting on irregular migration flows and asylum has continued, but the quality and accuracy of data should be improved.
Albania currently has enough reception capacity with around 600 beds, including 220 beds in the asylum reception centre in Babrru.
The situation of unaccompanied and separated minors is still a pressing issue in Albania. The government endorsed a reception facility for unaccompanied minors run by an NGO through the signature of a Memorandum of Understanding in December 2025. However, work needs to be accelerated to set up a permanent, separate reception and accommodation facility for unaccompanied minors in 2026. Due to an insufficient legislative framework, the long-standing and unclear division of powers and responsibilities among various state authorities responsible for unaccompanied minors persists, exacerbated by weak interinstitutional coordination. Unaccompanied minors need to be included in an effective national integrated child protection system, and child protection services should be present during the pre-screening at all border crossings as a standard practice.
Albania adopted an updated national contingency plan for the possible arrival of a substantial number of migrants and applicant for international protections in December 2025.
As concerns readmission with the EU, Albania’s readmission agreement with the EU is functioning well, and 12 implementing protocols, further facilitating its implementation, are in place with 14 Member States. According to data provided by the Member
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States to EUROSTAT in 2025, 11 960 Albanian nationals were ordered to leave the EU, and 8 205 were effectively returned, bringing the return rate to 69% (up from 54% in 2024). The electronic readmission case management system (e-RCMS) with Belgium has been put into operation.
Cooperation between Albania and European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex) on return operations is very good. The reintegration of returnees, especially the most vulnerable, still needs improvement.
Regarding returns to third countries, Albania should increase the ability to conduct returns of migrants with no legal rights to stay in the country. The number of third country nationals voluntarily returned from Albania to their countries of origin remained very low: 25 assisted voluntary return requests were processed in 2025 compared with 24 in 2024. Albania needs to make progress in establishing practical cooperation on returns of non-EU nationals with the main countries of origin and to actively step up engagement with these countries.
Albania should ensure that legal pathways developed for non-EU nationals prevent irregular secondary movements to the EU.
Asylum
While the legal framework on asylum is largely aligned with the EU acquis as it was in force until 12 June 2026, Albania should focus on developing its national legal framework and operational capacities on migration and asylum to align with the Pact.
Legal alignment, strategic and institutional frameworks
The Law on asylum is largely aligned with the EU acquis, but implementation, including of its secondary legislation, needs to be improved. Cooperation with the European Union Asylum Agency (EUAA) on its implementation continues under the second phase of the Albania-EUAA cooperation roadmap (2024-2027) endorsed in October 2024.
Albania has the required institutions in place to handle asylum claims, but their capacity needs to be improved. This requires additional investment into capacity building and coordination, not only among different institutions, such as border authorities, child protection units, social services and asylum institutions, but also between the local
and central governance levels.
Implementation and enforcement capacity
Albania remains primarily a transit country. According to information provided by the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the number of asylum applications increased from 63 to 144. Out of all arriving migrants apprehended for the first time, 8.5% lodged an asylum request (up from 7.5% in 2024).
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Challenges persist in the capacity of Border and Migration Police to identify people who could be in need of international protection, including unaccompanied minors and those with specific needs, and refer them to adequate services. Ongoing challenges in access to the asylum procedure, including long waiting times for the registration of asylum applications following entry, continue to be of concern. The responsible Directorate at the Ministry of Internal Affairs needs to develop stronger technical capacity and human resources to assess asylum cases and make well-informed decisions.
In 2025, Albania granted refugee status to 7 people, and granted subsidiary protection to 13 applicants.
Visa policy
Despite progress, Albania’s visa policy is still not fully aligned with the EU’s, in particular the list of countries whose nationals require an entry visa.
Albania still has a visa-free regime with eight countries that are on the EU list of visa- required countries, of which six enjoy permanent visa exemption (Armenia, Azerbaijan, China, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, and Türkiye) and two have a temporary visa waiver (Qatar, Saudi Arabia) lasting from April to December. The latter practice is incompatible with the EU acquis. Additionally, Albania grants visa-free access to non-EU nationals who hold a 10-year residence permit in the United Arab Emirates, provided the permit is valid for at least one year at the time of entry. In November 2025, Albania adopted a roadmap towards full alignment with the EU visa policy, with the envisaged deadlines for terminating each visa- free regime, both permanent and seasonal. In March 2026, Albania removed Indonesia, Oman and Thailand from the list of countries benefiting from a temporary visa waiver.
The Commission’s Eighth Report under the Visa Suspension Mechanism of 19 December 2025 concluded that Albania had taken steps to address most of the previous recommendations. As a matter of priority, Albania is expected to fully align its visa policy with the EU’s. Among others, it must continue actions to further reduce unfounded asylum applications by Albanian nationals to EU Member States, maintain and further tighten measures to prevent overstays by Albanian nationals in the Schengen area and proceed to a more rigorous screening of non-EU nationals arriving visa free in Albania.
Schengen governance and external borders
The legislative and strategic framework for the management of external borders is partially aligned with the EU acquis. The management of borders is broadly satisfactory.
Legal alignment, strategic and institutional frameworks
Albania adopted a Schengen Action Plan in January 2026. Implementation of the plan will ensure efficient and holistic implementation of the Schengen acquis, upon accession to the EU or joining the Schengen area, including as regards further investment in infrastructure, equipment, staffing and training. The Deputy Minister of the Internal Affairs, who serves as the negotiator for Chapter 24, also serves National Schengen Coordinator. The
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establishment of a National Mechanism for Schengen Coordination and Cooperation is still pending.
Implementation and enforcement capacity
The implementation of the updated Frontex Status Agreement of June 2024 is progressing well.
Implementation of the national integrated border management strategy 2021-2027 is ongoing. In 2025, Albania carried out 1 076 joint patrols in line with respective protocols with Italy, Montenegro, North Macedonia and Kosovo*, a slight increase from 2024.
The government adopted a decision on the establishment and functioning of the National Coordination Centre for Integrated Border Management in August 2026. The total information management system (TIMS) is out-dated and still suffers from security and data protection vulnerabilities, which need to be urgently addressed.
Judicial cooperation in civil and commercial matters
The legal framework for judicial cooperation in civil and commercial matters is partially aligned with the EU acquis to the extent that alignment is already possible.
* This designation is without prejudice to positions on status and is line with UNSCR 1244/1999 and the ICJ
Opinion on the Kosovo declaration of independence.
304 272 272253
163 109
557
435 381
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500
600
2023 2024 2025
Graph 20: Albania - Requests for mutual assistance in civil
matters
Incoming requests Outgoing requests Total Source: Ministry of Justitce/ Foreign Relations and Judicial Cooperation Department
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2.3. ECONOMIC CRITERIA5
2.3.1. The existence of a functioning market economy
Economic governance
The government remained committed to stability-oriented macroeconomic policies and growth-enhancing reforms. In 2025, the fiscal deficit rose but was below the target, mainly resulting from an under-execution of capital spending. The practice of amending the budget via normative acts rather than by using the regular legislative process continued, with four revisions to the 2025 budget, and one to the 2026 budget. The implementation of the medium-term revenue strategy (MTRS) 2024-2027 progressed broadly as planned, focusing primarily on tax administration measures rather than changing tax policies6. Albania’s Economic Reform Programme, submitted to the European Commission in January 2026, reaffirmed the government’s commitment to maintaining macroeconomic stability and ensuring compliance with fiscal rules, while advancing socio-economic and structural reforms to support sustainable growth and economic convergence with the EU.
The implementation of the policy guidance set out in the conclusions of the Economic and Financial Dialogue of May 2025 has been partial. Albania continued to comply with the fiscal rules, resulting in public debt reduction. While a review of tax expenditures was conducted, no concrete plan to reduce them was put forward. Preparatory work on establishing a fiscal council advanced, though the council has not yet been set up. The Fiscal Risk Directorate strengthened the monitoring of state-owned enterprises (SOEs), but it should more regularly publish comprehensive fiscal risk data. Pension sustainability analysis improved. Efforts to strengthen public investment management continued, but
5 Unless otherwise indicated, the data in this section are taken from the relevant national sources (INSTAT,
Ministry of Finance and Bank of Albania). 6 In 2025, tax revenue gains attributable to the MTRS amounted to ALL 15.96 billion or 0.6% of GDP, supported by continued formalisation efforts, particularly in tourism and construction, which contributed to increases in declared wages, social security contributions and VAT receipts.
2023 2024 2025
Albania - Key economic figures
GDP per capita (% of EU-27 in PPS)1) 31 38 42 43
Real GDP growth 3.2 4.0 4.0 3.7
Activity rate of the population aged 15-64 (%), total 69.4 75.4 75.7 76.3
female 61.4 69.8 69.3 70.1
male 77.5 81.0 82.3 82.7
Unemployment rate of the population aged 15-64 (%), total 12.4 10.1 9.4 9.3
female 12.2 10.3 10.0 10.6
male 12.5 9.9 8.9 8.2
Employment of the population aged 15-64 (annual growth %) 1.6 1.6 -1.6 -1.4
Nominal wages (annual growth %) 4.5 14.0 9.8 8.6
Consumer price index (annual growth %) 2.6 4.8 2.2 2.2
Exchange rate against EUR 125.0 108.8 100.7 97.8
Current account balance (% of GDP) -7.4 -1.7 -2.4 -0.7
Net foreign direct investment, FDI (% of GDP) 7.2 5.8 5.4 4.9
General government balance (% of GDP) -3.4 -1.3 -0.7 -1.8
General government debt (% of GDP) 68.8 57.6 54.2 53.0
Notes :
1) Eurostat
Sources: INSTAT, Central Bank of Albania, Ministry of Finance and Eurostat
2017-22
average
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effective project execution remained constrained, leading to a persistent under execution of capital spending.
Macroeconomic stability
Albania's economy sustained its strong growth trajectory in 2025. Following 4% GDP growth in 2024, economic activity expanded by 3.7% in 2025, driven by strong domestic demand, including higher public spending, steady investment growth supported by favourable financing conditions, and resilient private consumption. Consumption benefited from robust wage growth, rising employment (particularly in services) and low inflation. Tourism continued to support service exports despite signs of slowing, while goods exports declined, partly due to the appreciation of the lek. Nevertheless, the contribution of net exports to growth turned positive, as imports increased more modestly. Most sectors recorded positive output growth, with construction, real estate activities and public services remaining among the main contributors to growth, while agriculture and industry contracted. In the first quarter of 2026, economic activity remained resilient in the face of external headwinds, with GDP registering an annual growth rate of 3.7%. Albania’s GDP per capita in purchasing power standards reached 43% of the EU average in 2025, compared with an average of 31% during 2017- 2022.
The current account deficit narrowed to a historic low. It stood at 0.7% of GDP in 2025, down from 2.4% in 2024. The goods trade deficit narrowed despite continued weakness in goods exports, which declined for the third consecutive year; reflecting weaker demand in key European markets, rising labour costs and lek appreciation. The improvement was mainly driven by slower import growth, with the imports-to-GDP ratio declining in 2025, more than offsetting the fall in exports. These trends particularly affected labour-intensive sectors such as textiles and footwear. Furthermore, the services surplus widened on the back of strong tourism-driven export growth. The secondary income surplus was marginally below its 2024 level, as remittances edged down to 4.1% of GDP despite their nominal increase, while the primary income deficit narrowed significantly from 0.8% to 0.2% of GDP, mainly due to a decline in primary income credit. In the first quarter of 2026, the current account deficit kept narrowing, supported by tourism revenues and remittances. In 2025, net foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows declined to 4.9% of GDP from 5.4% a year earlier, but still more than fully covered the current account deficit, with real estate remaining the largest recipient. International reserves rose to EUR 7.3 billion in December 2025, covering over seven months of imports. Gross external debt continued its downward trend, standing at around 40% of GDP by end-2025.
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2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
Graph 21: Albania - Real GDP growth and
contributions
Priv. cons. Gov. cons. GFCF
Stocks Net exports Real GDP growth
Source: WiiW, INSTAT, own calculations
% y-o-y
-20
-10
0
10
2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
Graph 22: Albania - Current account selected
components and FDI
Workers' remittances balance
Goods and services trade balance
Current account balance
Net FDI
% of GDP
Source: IMF, Central Bank of Albania
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Inflation remained below the Bank of Albania's 3% target throughout 2025. Annual inflation averaged 2.2% in 2025, unchanged from 2024, although it increased slightly over the year, from 1.9% in January to 2.3% in December. Price pressures remained contained, mainly reflecting subdued imported inflation driven by low commodity prices and the continued appreciation of the lek, which led to intensified foreign exchange interventions by the Bank of Albania7. At the same time, domestic inflationary pressures strengthened gradually, driven by higher rents, tourism- related services and solid wage growth, with core inflation remaining around 3%. In the context of below-target inflation, the Bank of Albania reduced the policy rate from 2.75% to 2.5% in July 2025 and has maintained this stance since then. Inflation continued to rise in 2026, reaching 3.2% in August, mainly driven by higher transport, food and housing prices.
The fiscal deficit in 2025 was lower than planned, mainly due to the under- execution of capital spending. It increased from 0.7% of GDP in 2024 to 1.8% in 2025, but remained below the budget target of 2.4%, as capital spending continued to fall short of plan, while revenues benefited from robust economic activity, anti-informality measures, and the implementation of the MTRS. In line with the relevant fiscal rules, the primary balance recorded a surplus of 0.3% of GDP, down from 1.4% in 2024, while the public debt ratio declined to below 53% of GDP, mainly reflecting strong nominal GDP growth and the appreciation of the lek. However, gross financing needs remained high.
The 2026 budget, approved in December 2025, envisages a deficit of 2.3% of GDP, reflecting higher investment and social spending. Budget execution in the first half of 2026 pointed to a fiscal surplus on higher VAT revenues. Increasing the public-revenue-to-GDP ratio, still constrained by high levels of informality and tax expenditures8, remains important to sustain investment in physical and human capital while maintaining the downward trajectory of public debt.
Although Albania finalised a comprehensive Tax Expenditures Report in 2025, no concrete plans to reduce tax expenditures have been put forward, as policy efforts remain focused on aligning VAT and excise rates with EU requirements. The government proposed a draft law on property tax, which aims to establish a market value-based property tax system and to strengthen the institutional framework for property tax administration. The 2026 Fiscal Package also introduced a Fiscal Peace Agreement, including partial debt forgiveness for liabilities incurred during January 2015-December 2024, and the write-off of tax debts older than 10 years. The Fiscal Peace Agreement raises concerns about the potential risks it poses to tax morale, as well as the need to impose safeguards on anti-money laundering aspects (see Chapter 16 – Taxation and Chapter 33 - Financial and budgetary provisions).
7 The Albanian lek’s appreciation trend against the euro continued throughout 2025, despite intensified foreign exchange interventions by the Bank of Albania, with the ALL/EUR exchange rate reaching 96.7 by Q4-2025. In
response to sustained appreciation pressures, the Bank of Albania purchased EUR 630.8 million (around 4% of GDP) through a combination of scheduled auctions to increase foreign exchange reserves and direct purchases intended to moderate further appreciation of the lek. Interventions were sterilised, while broad money growth accelerated over the course of the year. In 2026, the lek continued to appreciate, with the euro trading at ALL 93.36, its lowest level since the euro's introduction, down 4.15% year-on-year. 8 For example, in 2025 the Parliament extended the application period for tax incentives benefiting luxury hotels to 2026.
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40
60
80
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2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
Graph 23: Albania - Fiscal developments
Primary balance (lhs) Interest (lhs)
GG balance (lhs) Public debt (rhs)
Source: Ministry of Finance
% of GDP
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Progress in strengthening the regulatory framework for public investment management (PIM) has not yet translated into commensurate improvements in implementation. Amendments adopted in 2025 updated PIM procedures, including provisions related to the National Single Project Pipeline (NSPP) and feasibility study requirements. In addition, a new public-private partnership (PPP) law was adopted, requiring PPP projects to be integrated into the NSPP and subjected to standard PIM procedures from September 2026 onwards. While these reforms could strengthen project appraisal and fiscal oversight, implementing guidelines and by-laws still need to be aligned with the new legislation. At the same time, project planning and execution remain hampered by capacity constraints, insufficient project preparation, cost overruns and procedural lapses. The recurring shortfall in capital spending execution points to difficulties in implementing the reformed framework on the ground.
Albania's macroeconomic policy mix remained appropriate, preserving stability while sustaining strong growth. Fiscal rules were complied with, as the primary balance remained in surplus and the public debt ratio continued to decline, supported by strong nominal GDP growth and the appreciation of the lek. With inflation remaining below the central bank target, monetary policy was eased.
Functioning of product markets
Business environment
Structural weaknesses continue to weigh on Albania's business environment, with rule of law, corruption and informality remaining the most persistent concerns. While businesses acknowledge some progress on justice reform, weaknesses in the rule of law are compounded by administrative burdens, including cumbersome licensing procedures and inconsistencies in case law. Curbing tax evasion and broadening the formal economy remain key policy priorities. Informality, estimated at around one third of GDP9, is high, including in tourism, where many short-term rental operators remain outside official registers, limiting oversight and leaving formal employment and tax revenue lagging behind the sector's growth. The MTRS, inter alia, aims to address this through improved tax administration and formalisation.
The investment climate is further weighed down by weaknesses in legal certainty and property administration. Businesses frequently question the transparency of strategic investor status, PPPs and concession contracts. Furthermore, recent protests over large tourism and coastal development projects have further highlighted weaknesses in legal certainty, land ownership and environmental safeguards. Albania completed the digitalisation of approximately 4.3 million property cards by June 2026, continued work on the initial registration of private and public properties, and on the full digitalisation of physical cadastral maps. However, incomplete and inconsistent property registration continues to deter investment by creating ownership uncertainty and disputes. More broadly, public service delivery remains heavily centralised in Tirana, leaving rural businesses and regions underserved. Continuation of judicial reform measures, enhancing legal certainty and simplification of business procedures will be essential for creating a more predictable, transparent and investment-friendly business environment.
State influence on product markets
The adoption of a unified investment law has been further delayed, and the Law on Strategic Investment has been extended until end-2026. Under the Reform Agenda, Albania committed to analyse the existing FDI legal framework and adopt a unified investment law by December 2026, to ensure a level playing field and fair treatment for all investors. In the meantime, in April 2026 Albania approved a special regime for the
9 World Bank Informal Economy Database.
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construction of touristic ports, granting additional privileges to strategic investors and bypassing standard public procurement procedures, raising concerns about transparency and equal treatment.
The Bank of Albania has extended its SME financing programme. Launched in early 2025, the scheme aims to improve credit access for SMEs, particularly in agriculture, a sector that accounts for only 2% of business loans. Under the scheme, EUR 250 million in financing is channelled through commercial banks and backed by a EUR 30 million sovereign guarantee covering up to 70% of loan principal. A memorandum of understanding, signed in May 2026 between the government, the BoA, and commercial banks, extended the programme until 2027 and broadened its scope to include farmers with a fiscal identification number. It remains important to ensure that the scheme is fully aligned with appropriate governance, supervision and regulatory standards.
Privatisation and restructuring
SOEs pose significant fiscal risks, and their governance remains in need of improvement. Fiscal risks stem primarily from government loans and guarantees to SOEs and PPPs, particularly in the energy sector, which concentrates over 80% of guaranteed debt, although the overall stock of guarantees edged down to 1.1% of GDP in 2025. In June 2026, Albania adopted a Decision of the Council of Ministers to strengthen transparency in the selection, composition and functioning of SOEs’ supervisory boards. The Ministry of Finance’s Fiscal Risk Unit continued monitoring 12 SOEs, and technical assistance is ongoing to improve their financial reporting and performance monitoring. The 2025 Fiscal Risk Statement was also published, although broader coverage is envisaged. Moreover, strengthening oversight and improving transparency in SOE reporting remain essential for containing fiscal risks and ensuring a level playing field.
Functioning of the financial market
The banking sector remained well-capitalised and profitable, with non-performing loans falling to their lowest level since 2008. Banks maintained a capital adequacy ratio of 20.4% in December 2025, well above the 12% minimum requirement, supported by strong liquidity positions. Profitability declined but remained positive, with return on assets falling to 1.9% from 2.2% and return on equity to 15.8% from 18.3% a year earlier. The non- performing loan ratio declined to 3.8% in May 2026. Private sector credit accelerated, driven by higher demand and favourable financing conditions, reaching 35% of GDP by end-2025, with. growth exceeding 14% year-on-year in the first half of 2026. Nevertheless, financial intermediation remained limited, while capital markets remained underdeveloped. Moreover, government securities continued to represent a high share of bank assets, exposing banks to sovereign risk. Albania also still lacks a legal framework for private equity and venture capital, although crowdfunding legislation, in preparation since 2024, is expected to be adopted in 2026. At the same time, bank supervision remained prudent amid continued strong credit growth. Progress was made in collecting data on banks' exposure to the real estate sector and monitoring credit standards, and the Bank of Albania introduced borrower- based macroprudential measures, including loan-to-value and debt service-to-income limits, in response to rapid mortgage growth and rising residential real estate prices, while doubling the countercyclical capital buffer to 0.5%, effective from December 2025. Oversight of non- bank financial institutions should continue to be strengthened. Two new banks were licensed during the reporting period.
The establishment of the National Development Bank (NDB) raised concerns over its design and supervision. Following the final approval of the Law on the NDB by Parliament in March 2025, the NDB continued preparations to start operations, including the recruitment of key staff and the adoption of the founding charter. While the NDB is intended to support sectors lacking access to the formal banking system or facing very high borrowing costs, its envisaged design as a retail deposit-taking institution, although not yet implemented, raises
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concerns regarding supervision, the level playing field in the banking sector, and fiscal risks from publicly guaranteed deposits (see Chapter 9 – Financial services).
Functioning of the labour market
The labour market showed moderate improvements during the reporting period, though structural challenges persist. In Q2-2026, labour force participation (15-64 age group) rose by 0.1 pps year-on-year to 76.3%, the employment rate increased by 0.1 pps to 69.2%, and unemployment edged down by 0.1 pps to 9.3%. Nominal wage growth averaged 9.8% year-on-year, while the monthly minimum wage was raised by 25% to ALL 50,000 on 1 January 2026. Youth unemployment (15- 29 age group) fell from 19.1% to 15.1% at end-2025, but subsequently picked up to 17.7% in Q2-2026. However, structural weaknesses persist. Informal employment is widespread, well-targeted active labour market policies remain insufficient, skills mismatches constrain workforce adaptability, and inadequate care services limit women's labour market participation10. Emigration of skilled workers and demographic decline11 are further reducing the labour force and adding long- term pressure on social protection systems. Social protection coverage remains inadequate, with the risk of poverty or social exclusion standing at 40.5%, nearly double the EU average of 24.2%. Tripartite collaboration between labour market institutions remains weak. The government introduced pension bonuses from 2026, though they risk undermining contribution-benefit linkages, straining public finances and reducing incentives for formal sector participation.
2.3.2. The capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the EU
Education and innovation
Persistent gaps in education quality and reach continue to constrain the development of a skilled workforce. Albania continued implementing the National Education Strategy (2021-2026) and the National Employment and Skills Strategy (2024-2030), yet concerns remain regarding low attainment, high dropout rates (particularly in rural areas and marginalised communities), and limited access to early childhood education. The NEET rate for people aged 15-29 stood at around 20% in 202512. Teachers remain insufficiently trained, curricula outdated and infrastructure in need of modernisation. The 2025 PISA results confirm persistent skills mismatches13. However, Albania has made efforts to reduce access barriers for children with disabilities and disadvantaged backgrounds. On vocational training, dual VET enrolment increased and was expanded from 10 to 15 schools, though it remains below the regional average, with curricula alignment to the European Qualifications Framework and quality assurance framework still in progress(see Chapter 26 – Education).
Public spending on research and development (R&D) remains well below ambition.
10 A significant gender gap persists in labour force participation, with a difference of approximately 13 pps.
between men (82.3%) and women (69.3%) (OECD SME Policy Index for Western Balkans and Türkiye, 2026). 11 According to INSTAT, Albania's population fell by 1.2% in 2025 to around 2.3 million, driven by net emigration
of over 28,000 people, and declining birth rates. 12 OECD (2025); Eurostat (2024). 13 Albanian students scored 435 in science, 433 in mathematics and 408 in reading, with only 1.9% reaching top
proficiency and 27.8% failing to reach basic proficiency across all three subjects. Overall, results point to a widening gap between educational outcomes and labour market needs (PISA 2025 Results (Volume I) (EN)).
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Graph 24: Albania - Labour market trends
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Unemployment rate (lhs) Participation rate (rhs)
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Albania’s R&D spending has increased from 0.18% of GDP in 2023to 0.3% of GDP in 2024
14. Major increases are required in line with Albania’s plan to reach the 2030 target of 1% of GDP. Albania began implementing the Smart Specialisation Strategy, yet further efforts are needed to incentivise private sector investment in R&D and strengthen cooperation between businesses and universities.
Physical capital and quality of infrastructure
Infrastructure investment advanced across transport, energy and digital networks, but implementation challenges persist. In transport, works continued on the TEN-T network, including the Adriatic-Ionian Highway and Corridor VIII, while construction of the Tirana- Durrës railway and airport rail link is ongoing, with operationalisation expected in the first half of 2027. The construction of the Vlora airport concession, which is located near the protected Narta Lagoon, stalled due to a shareholder dispute which led to legal proceedings, and the tender for a new commercial port in Porto Romano was cancelled after the sole remaining bidder failed to submit a final offer. In energy, work continued on the 400 kV interconnection with North Macedonia, and preparations advanced for a submarine electricity interconnection with Italy, potentially strengthening Albania's role as a regional renewable energy hub. Investment in renewables and energy efficiency continued, and the. largely renewable-based generation mix meant that the EU Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism did not affect Albania’s electricity exports in the first quarter of 2026. However, this mix remains heavily reliant on hydropower, exposing the sector to hydrological and climate-related risks and highlighting the need for investment in grid reinforcement, storage, generation diversification, and climate-resilient water infrastructure (see Chapter 15 - Energy).
Digital infrastructure also advanced. Following the granting of 5G licences in November 2024, coverage reached 71.3% of populated areas by Q3 2025, while fixed broadband subscribers grew by 7.4% and mobile broadband coverage by 11.9%. Albania benefited from the EU-funded WiFi4Municipalities programme, extending free public Wi-Fi to 61 municipalities, and INSTAT data show that 97.7% of households had internet access in 2025. However, digital adoption in the business sector remains limited and is largely concentrated in basic activities such as digital marketing, rather than in more complex, productivity-enhancing tools. Only 31.8% of enterprises employ ICT specialists, pointing to gaps in digital skills that could constrain productivity gains.
Sectoral and enterprise structure
While the services sector continues to expand, agriculture retains a structurally significant role in the Albanian economy. Services accounted for around 49% of GDP in 2025, driven by stable tourism growth. Construction retained a solid contribution at 12.6% of GDP (11.9% in 2024). Industry and manufacturing faced headwinds from weak external demand and lek appreciation, with their shares in GDP falling to 10.1% and 6.5% respectively in 2025. Agriculture, whose share of GDP has fallen from over 21% in the early 2020s to 14.6% in 2025, continued to play a structurally significant role, with a share of employment still well above the EU average.
Small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) dominate Albania's economy but face structural challenges. In 2024, SMEs employed 82% of the workforce and generated 78.1% of value added in the non-farm economy. SMEs also represented around 70% of total goods exports. The number of newly registered fully foreign-owned companies reached 1 423 in 2024, an increase of 11% on the previous year. Structural constraints include skills and labour shortages, limited access to finance, widespread informality, and weak
14 INSTAT (2025), Research and Development, 2024.
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digitalisation and internationalisation15.
Economic integration with the EU and price competitiveness
The EU remains Albania's main trading and investment partner. In 2025,the EU accounted for 57% of total goods trade, absorbing 72.5% of merchandise exports and providing 51% of goods imports. Italy, Kosovo, Greece and Germany were the leading export destinations, while Italy, China, Türkiye and Greece were the main import partners. Trade openness remained broadly stable at around 80% of GDP. The EU also remained the
principal source of FDI, with its share of FDI stocks at 53.8%, compared to 54.1% in 2024. Albania's price competitiveness nevertheless deteriorated, driven by the appreciation of the lek and rising nominal wages, which weighed on goods exports. Manufacturing exports declined for a third consecutive year, pointing to a structural rather than cyclical trend. This reflects the sector’s concentration in low value- added activities, as well as rising input and labour costs. At the same time, services exports, notably travel services, have increasingly outweighed goods exports. Their value more than doubled between 2019 and 2024, and they now account for around 80% of total exports. Despite strong growth and continued EU integration, Albania's convergence potential remains constrained by low productivity, weak innovation capacity, and limited participation in higher value-added segments of European value chains.
2.4 PUBLIC PROCUREMENT, STATISTICS, FINANCIAL CONTROL
Chapter 5: Public procurement
EU rules ensure that public procurement of goods, services and works in any Member State is transparent and open to all EU companies on the basis of non-discrimination and equal treatment.
Institutional set-up and legal alignment
The legal framework on public procurement is largely aligned with the EU acquis. Some important gaps still need to be addressed. The transitional provision providing a derogation for international consultancy agreements in ‘areas of strategic interest’ should be repealed. Albania’s defence and security procurement legislationstill requires further work to align with the EU acquis.
A new Law on concessions and public-private partnerships (PPPs) aligned with the EU acquis was adopted in December 2025. The new law, which applies as of September 2026, abolishes unsolicited proposals and provides strengthened provisions for project selection as well as reporting and contract follow up. Secondary Implementing legislation, including on the monetary thresholds of PPPs/concessions and on the common procurement vocabulary was also adopted during the reporting period. The introduction of new exemptions to the
15 OECD SME Policy Index for Western Balkans and Türkiye, 2026.
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Graph 25a: Albania - Exports of goods
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Graph 25b: Albania - Imports of goods
EU CEFTA Other Source: WiiW, INSTAT
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applicability of public tenders, such as through the amendment to the law on touristic ports, should be carefully considered.
Albania introduced changes to centralised procurement. The mandate and obligatory use of the Central Procurement Operator CPO (a state-owned company under the Ministry of the Economy) was expanded significantly in 2025 to all procurement procedures with an estimated value above ALL 1 million (approx. EUR 10 500).
Implementation and enforcement capacity
Albania’s public procurement market represented 7.6% of GDP in 2025 (16.5% in 2024). There were 5 766 procurement procedures in 2025 (6 811 in 2024). The share of negotiated procedures without prior publication among all procedures was stable (2.4% from 2.3% in 2024) but increased in total value share (2.8% in 2025 compared with 0.4% in 2024). 23.5% of tenders in 2025 were awarded with only one bidder, which increased to 29% in high-value procedures. There is still a large share of cancelled tenders (38%). Both the number and the value of framework contracts; dropped, although the medium-term trend remains one of increased use (ratio). Price based evaluation continues to dominate awards. Most economically advantageous tender criteria (MEAT) were applied in 5.5% of procedures, and 24.8% awarded values. The medium-term trend is of increased use of MEAT, even if it was lower in terms of value than in 2024.
The use of PPPs and concessions remains very low. In 2025, only one procedure was launched, and none was awarded.
The authorities need to continue to build capacity throughout the public procurement system, including in the implementation of the organisation provisions of the new PPP law. The start of the programme of certification of procurement staff in contracting authorities is positive and should continue to be accompanied by a corresponding training offer. Technical specifications to upgrade the electronic procurement system have been prepared to include the use of AI.
On prevention of corruption in public procurement, Albania should continue to focus on further strengthening the functioning of the overall system to increase transparency, competition, compliance and professionalisation. There have been a substantial number of judicial convictions, investigations and indictments on procurement related charges over the last year.
Efficient remedy system
The constitution and the PPL contain provisions on the right to legal remedy that are mostly in line with the Directives on remedies. The number of appeals submitted to the Public Procurement Commission is relatively stable (1 152 in 2025). In 2025, the PPC made 1 007 decisions, 73 of which were challenged in the administrative court.
Chapter 18: Statistics
European statistics are developed, produced and disseminated by EU Member States, guided by the principles and quality criteria set out in the Regulation on European statistics, such as professional independence, impartiality, reliability, accessibility and statistical confidentiality. Common rules are provided for the methodology, production and dissemination of statistical information, which are further specified in sectoral legislation that constitute the EU acquis on statistics.
On the statistical infrastructure, Albania’s legislation is in line with the EU acquis and respects the principles of European Statistics Code of Practice. Most classifications are in line with the EU acquis, and ongoing updates are taking place. Despite the staff increase to 260 INSTAT continues to face capacity constraints and staff turnover. Coordination in the statistical system improved through the signature of a new Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between INSTAT and the Bank of Albania (BoA) and the trilateral MoU between
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INSTAT, BoA and the Ministry of Finance. INSTAT should start transitioning towards electronic data collection to increase efficiency. In view of its ambition to improve the access and increase the use of administrative data sources, data exchange protocols need to be concluded with the holders of administrative data, in view of the ambition to increase the access to and use of administrative data INSTAT has to increasingly use the Statistical Register of Building and Dwellings (SRBD) for statistical production. INSTAT needs to continue investing in its IT infrastructure.
On macroeconomic statistics, Albania implemented a further major revision of national accounts in June 2026 to, among others, incorporate new data, e.g. from the 2023 population and housing census. The Institute of Statistics (INSTAT) continued the regular transmission of GNI and GDP data to Eurostat, under the ESA 2010 transmission programme. Further progress is needed to compile and transmit data fully aligned with ESA 2010. For government finance statistics (GFS) and excessive deficit procedure (EDP), GFS data for 2010-2025 were transmitted free for publication, while EDP data were provided for 2022-2025. Progress has been made in improving the consistency between annual financial and non-financial accounts. However, data gaps persist, and further work is needed to ensure that EDP and GFS data are compiled and transmitted in full compliance with ESA 2010. In particular, additional progress is required on quarterly GFS data and on completing the EDP tables questionnaire.
In 2025, Albania started providing monthly balance of payments data to Eurostat, but it needs to improve timeliness and the length of the time series.
In addition, data gaps remain in the areas of statistics on research and development, international trade in goods, harmonised indices of consumer prices, foreign direct investment and the international investment position.
On business and trade statistics, short-term statistics are produced with monthly turnover and industrial production indices transmitted to EUROSTAT for the first time in 2026but some data sets are still not transmitted to Eurostat. Data gaps also remain for structural business statistics, business demography and foreign affiliates statistics. PRODCOM statistics are produced in compliance with the European Business Statistics (EBS) regulation. Innovation statistics were transmitted to EUROSTAT for the first time.
On social statistics, final results from the 2023 population and housing census were published on the geodata hub. The thematic analysis of census data continues. Regular data transmission to Eurostat needs to resume. Albania provided data from the 2022 structure of earnings survey but no quarterly labour cost index nor job vacancy statistics. Implementation of the 2021 EU labour force survey methodology started in 2026, but it still needs to be completed and regular data transmission to Eurostat restored. Albania started the fieldwork for the European Health Interview Survey (EHIS) wave 4 and needs to continue work to align EU-SILC with the EU acquis.
Agricultural statistics are partly aligned with the EU acquis. The law on the agricultural census was adopted in July 2026. The agriculturalcensus has been postponed to autumn 2027 and further steps to ensure that it will be organised accordingly need to be taken. Albania needs its results to ensure compliance with the integrated farm statistics (IFS) regulation.
Environmental and energy statistics arepartly aligned with the EU acquis andfurther efforts are needed. Significant efforts should be made on transport statistics, including the organisation of the road freight transport survey for which the relevant administrative data were released in July 2026.
Chapter 32: Financial control
The EU promotes the reform of national governance systems to improve managerial accountability, sound financial management of income and expenditure, and external audit
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of public funds. The financial control rules further protect the EU’s financial interests against fraud in the management of EU funds and the euro against counterfeiting.
Public internal financial control (PIFC)
A strategic framework for PIFC is in place and an annual PIFC report is consistently prepared and adopted by the council of ministers. A central harmonisation unit is in place providing oversight and support for internal control and internal audit.
The internal control system remains partially effective as per the assessment of the PIFC report, with further efforts needed to move toward an effective system, including improved formalisation of delegation structures and further improvement in risk assessment capability.
Although managerial accountability is embedded in the legislation, the number of administrative decisions delegated to lower levels remains relatively limited in practice. The delegation provisions in the financial management and control law (FMC) law will need to be attuned to the recently adopted law on state organisation and the foreseen new law on civil service when adopted.
The legislative framework on internal audit is in line with international standards. Work on a new law on internal audit is ongoing, which should also address the number and size of internal audit units. The PIFC report shows that most required internal audit units have been established, but that many still face challenges in achieving full compliance with set-up requirements. A revised manual on internal audit was adopted in October 2025, to reflect the modified global internal audit standards (GIAS). The implementation of the system for certification of auditors continued, including the advanced certification scheme.
External audit
The legalframework safeguards the independence of the Albanian State Audit Institution (ALSAI), while financial independence should be strengthened in practice. Administrative capacity is ensured through 215 staff out of a planned 243 at ALSAI. The quality of audit work continued to comply with relevant international standards. On parliamentary scrutiny, the Sub-Committee on Public Audit was re-established with new rules of procedures and held its first meeting in January 2026. Its focus should now be to restart work on substance, developing a steady track record of systematic and effective hearings and adopting follow-up recommendations on all ALSAI reports. Cooperation between ALSAI (through the relevant Directorate) and the sub-committee did not progress effectively. The level of implementation of recommendations should increase, given that 70% were fully implemented or under implementation.
Protection of the EU’s financial interests
Full legislative harmonisation with the PIF Directive is needed to improve the level of alignment with the EU acquis. The first annual report on the implementation of the national anti-fraud strategy for 2025 was concluded, showing activities on training, analysis of irregularities and a review of the existing structures of the anti-fraud coordination service (AFCOS). The role of the authorities of the AFCOS network should be clarified in relation to protecting the EU’s financial interests.
The effective cooperation with the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) and the solid track record of operational assistance with the European Commission on investigations should be kept up. Albania should continue working on establishing a solid track record on reporting of irregularities. In 2025, national authorities reported 14 cases of irregularities via the Irregularity Management System (IMS) all classified as non-fraudulent, and a review of IMS data was undertaken to improve reliability of reporting.
Protection of the euro against counterfeiting
In July 2026, the United Nations included the ratification by Albania of the 1929 Geneva Convention on the Suppression of Counterfeiting Currency Albania in the UN Registry. This
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largely aligned the relevant legal framework with the EU acquis. The Law on the Bank of Albania (BoA), the Criminal Code and a set of implementing legislation issued by the BoA provide a harmonised definition of counterfeiting and establish a National Analysis Centre (NAC), the Coin National Analysis Centre (CNAC), and the National Counterfeit Centre (NCC).
3. GOOD NEIGHBOURLY RELATIONS AND REGIONAL COOPERATION
Good neighbourly relations and regional cooperation form an essential part of Albania’s European integration process. They contribute to stability, reconciliation and a climate conducive to addressing open bilateral issues and the legacies of the past.
Albania continued to actively engage in several regional cooperation initiatives, such as the Central European Free Trade Agreement (CEFTA), the Energy Community, the Transport Community, the South-East European Cooperation Process (SEECP) and the Regional Cooperation Council (RCC). Albania assumed the CEFTA Chairmanship on 1 January 2026 and in March 2026 organised in Tirana a high-level event on the presentation of CEFTA priorities and work programmes for 2026, in cooperation with the CEFTA Secretariat.
The sixth annual EU-Western Balkans Summit took place in Brussels in December 2025, followed by the EU-Western Balkans Summit in Tivat in June 2026, reaffirming the EU membership perspective of the Western Balkans and exploring measures to further advance gradual integration.
Albania has actively engaged in the regional dimension of the Growth Plan for the Western Balkans, hosting in November 2025 the Western Balkans leaders meeting, which took stock of the EU Growth Plan progress two years after its adoption.
On the Common Regional Market (CRM), at the Berlin process summit in London in October 2025, the leaders of the region endorsed a revised and streamlined action plan to implement the Green Agenda for the Western Balkans, adopted a Western Balkans Climate Adaptation Roadmap and committed to make progress in the promotion of regional mobility and implementation of relevant regional agreements and CEFTA decisions.
The roadmap for roaming between the Western Balkans and the EU entered the first phase of implementation. In February 2026, the Commission proposed launching negotiations with Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Montenegro, North Macedonia and Serbia to integrate them into the EU’s ‘Roam Like at Home’ regime. Twelve major decisions were agreed by the CEFTA Joint Committee in October 2024, following an agreement between CEFTA members that allowed decision making in the organisation to be unblocked. A decision was finally taken on the appointment of a director for CEFTA after the post had been vacant for two and a half years. This had a significant negative impact of the work of CEFTA and, for a short period, saw the Commission suspend its support.
Albania generally maintains good bilateral relations with other enlargement countries and neighbouring EU Member States.
Relations with Bosnia and Herzegovina improved after the reopening of the Albanian embassy in Sarajevo in 2025, and the two countries’ representatives continued to make high-level visits.
Albania’s relations with Kosovo remained good overall. Kosovo ranks among the leading
foreign investors in the country. Several high-level Albanian officials conducted official visits
to Pristina in early 2026. Kosovo’s Foreign Minister visited Tirana for the Diaspora Summit
where a 2026–2030 Joint National Diaspora Strategy was reconfirmed. Albania is advancing
joint defence projects and defence cooperation with Croatia and Kosovo. Following the
Kosovo Specialist Chambers (KSC) verdicts in the war crime cases against former leaders
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of Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), the Albanian Parliament issued a statement, backed by
majority and opposition, voicing indignation and committing to close coordination with
Kosovo.
Relations with Montenegro remained good. High-level and political contacts continued.
Relations with North Macedonia remained good. High-level visits between Albania and North Macedonia continued in 2026, including the visit of North Macedonia’s Foreign Minister in February 2026 in the framework of Corridor VIII ministerial meeting. In April 2026, construction began on a high-voltage power line linking North Macedonia and Albania enabling cross-border electricity trade. Albania is still critical of the treatment of the ethnic Albanian minority by the authorities of North Macedonia, especially in view of the use of minority languages as stipulated in the Ohrid Agreement.
Relations with Serbia remained good overall. In February 2026, the Albanian Prime Minister and Serbian President co-signed an op-ed calling for accelerated integration into the EU, focusing on the common market and the Schengen area, without a right of veto on decision-making. In April 2026 Albanian and Serbian Foreign Ministers held a bilateral meeting. Albania requested the opening of a General Consulate in Bujanovac. In the reporting period, Serbia continued to react negatively to the signing of Albania’s joint declaration of defence cooperation with Croatia and Kosovo.
Relations with Türkiye are very close. In October 2025, the President of Albania met in Tirana with Turkish Vice President Cevdet Yilmaz. In January 2026, and April 2026, Albanian Foreign Minister conducted an official visit to Türkiye to participate to the Balkans Peace Platform. In 2025, Türkiye was Albania’s third largest trade partner, and economic relations continued to expand, with an Albania-Türkiye Investment Forum held in October 2025.
Relations with Georgia remained good. Albania supports Georgia’s territorial integrity and sovereignty and appointed a non-residential ambassador in December 2025. Albanian and Georgian Foreign Ministers held a bilateral meeting in April 2026.
Relations with the Republic of Moldova remained good, agreements are in place on free trade, investment protection and the avoidance of double taxation. The President of Albania visited Moldova in January 2026.
Relations with Ukraine remained very good, with both countries mutually supporting each other’s European integration aspirations. A joint statement was signed between the Albanian and Ukrainian Foreign Ministers condemning the Russian Federation's aggression against Ukraine as a grave violation of the UN Charter and the norms of international law and underling the importance of holding the Russian Federation accountable for crimes against Ukraine. Albania expressed readiness to join the NATO PURL programme (Prioritised Ukraine Requirements List) to provide military assistance to Ukraine and has supported the Ukraine Centre for Rehabilitation with medical equipment. In April 2026, the Albanian government issued a decision allowing Ukrainian citizens to stay in Albania without a residence permit until 30 March 2027.
Relations with Greece improved, and political contacts continued. In May 2026, the national Albanian gas operator signed an agreement with the Greek subsidiary of US company Venture Global to import up to 1 billion cubic metres (bcm) per year of liquid natural gas from 2030.Albania’s Foreign Minister visited Greece in December 2025, underlining the two countries’ NATO alliance, Friendship Treaty and shared European perspective. Greece has consistently linked its support for Albania’s EU accession to the respect for the rule of law and the rights of the Greek minority in Albania. In October 2026, the Ministers of Culture of Greece, Albania and North Macedonia signed a joint statement on cross-border cooperation for the protection of the Prespa region’s unique and exceptionally valuable cultural and
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natural environment. The three countries commit to cooperate in support of the inscription of the Prespa region on the UNESCO World Heritage List as Mixed World Heritage Property.
Relations with Italy are very good. In November 2025, Albania and Italy held a first intergovernmental meeting in Rome under the strategic partnership bilateral status, resulting in the signing of 15 agreements and memoranda of understanding across key areas, including defence, health, environment, energy and cybersecurity. Following legal challenges by Italian courts and an ECJ judgment on the designation of a third country as a ‘safe country of origin’, the Italian detention centre on Albanian territory initially foreseen for asylum applicants was converted into a pre-return detention centre in 2025. Italian courts submitted requests for preliminary rulings to the CJEU regarding the centres in Albania and their compatibility with EU rules on detention of asylum applicants among other aspects. The judgments were still pending during the reporting period.
4. RESILIENCE, SECURITY, DEFENCE
Albania has a clear strategic orientation anchored in the EU accession process. It continues to align with the EU’s common foreign and security policy, including restrictive measures, and contributes significantly to EU crisis management operations and missions.
Democratic resilience
Albania’s security-related challenges to its democratic institutions are largely related to hybrid threats, including foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI) and disinformation, which can exacerbate political polarisation and affect democratic processes. The revision of the legislative framework around elections should meet the challenges of modern influence campaigns, including transparency of political advertising, political party financing and the use of social media in election campaigns. The EU-Albania Security and Defence Dialogues could be used to discuss further the countering of hybrid threats. Capacity-building should increase, including through targeted training and improved inter- institutional coordination, building on TAIEX support. Albania needs to leverage its membership of the Hybrid Centre of Excellence in Helsinki to develop expertise and set up a horizontal coordination mechanism.
Economic security and resilience
Albania’s strategic geographic location presents opportunities for alternative trade routes and investment, as well as deeper integration into the European market, supporting supply chain resilience. However, the economy is exposed to external shocks due to its high reliance on tourism, remittances and FDI. Participation in global value chains remains concentrated in textiles, footwear, agrifood, and tourism-related services, with FDI inflows reaching EU 1.8 billion in 2025 (around 6% of GDP). Its largely low-carbon electricity system relies heavily on hydropower. While Albania produces 98% of its electricity consumption, it remains dependent on diminishing water resources. Renewables account for 46.6% of Albania's energy consumption, nearly double the EU average of 24.5%. Yet, changing weather patterns threaten the country's hydroelectric advantages, as Albania is dependent on electricity imports during dry periods. Albania has the great potential for increased and long-term EU supply chain integration, particularly in the critical raw materials sector through large titanomagnetite deposits for titanium and vanadium, chromite for chromium mining capabilities as a strategic asset, copper mining capabilities as well as one nickel and several small to medium sized iron-nickel deposits that are currently being exploited. Albania has fully embraced the AI transition, with a focus on the automation of public procurement procedures to reduce corruption. Following recent cyber-attacks, Albania has developed cyber defence capabilities (see Chapter 10 – Digital transformation and media). Further efforts are needed to strengthen resilience to hybrid threats. Albania should continue to align with EU digital standards, including in the field of AI and cyber-security.
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Defence capacity building and defence industrial dimension
Albania is well positioned to contribute to the EU’s defence readiness given its consistent
and continuous CFSP alignment, its NATO membership and interoperability, and its strategic
location for military mobility across the Western Balkans and Europe, in particular via the
Adriatic region.
In terms of defence capacity building, Albania benefits from EUR 49 million under the
European Peace Facility (EPF, an off-budget instrument, through three bilateral assistance
packages, enabling it to actively contribute to the CSDP. It also benefits from EPF support at
regional level, as a non-EU participating nation in the Balkan Medical Task Force.
Albania’s defence production capacity is limited. The country's defence sector comprises 22 registered companies and eight major defence-related product importers in both the private and public sectors. Efforts have increased to revitalise the sector. A state-owned enterprise was established in 2024 to mutualise the production capacities of three production plants. Moreover, entities established in the EU or in an associated country and subject to control by Albania or by an Albanian entity could be eligible for funding under the European Defence Industrial Programme (EDIP). Albania, Kosovo and Croatia signed a Memorandum of Understanding in March 2025 on defence cooperation. A MoU was also signed between the state-owned enterprise and an Italian defence company to revitalise the Pashaliman shipyards.
Civil protection and disaster resilience
Albania continues improving its resilience by further strengthening its civil protection and disaster preparedness capacities in line with the EU Preparedness Union Strategy and in the framework of the Union Civil Protection Mechanism (UCPM).
5. ABILITY TO ASSUME THE OBLIGATIONS OF MEMBERSHIP
CLUSTER 2: INTERNAL MARKET
This cluster covers: free movement of goods (Chapter 1); freedom of movement for workers (Chapter 2); right of establishment and freedom to provide services (Chapter 3); free movement of capital (Chapter 4); company law (Chapter 6); intellectual property law (Chapter 7); competition policy (Chapter 8); financial services (Chapter 9) and consumer and health protection (Chapter 28). This cluster is key to Albania’s preparations for the requirements of the EU’s internal market and is very relevant for the development of the Common Regional Market.
Chapter 1: Free movement of goods
The free movement of goods ensures that many products can be traded freely across the EU based on common rules and procedures. Where products are governed by national rules, the principle of the free movement of goods prevents these rules from creating unjustified barriers to trade.
General principles
Albania has a national roadmap for alignment with the acquis, as well as an Action Plan for legal alignment and capacity building in the medium (2023-2025) and long term (2026-2030) and should continue to speed up alignment with the acquis.
Non-harmonised area
Albania continued to work on preparing an Action Plan for screening national technical regulations to comply with Articles 34-36 of the TFEU in the non-harmonised area. This work should be completed and the Action Plan adopted as rapidly as possible.
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Harmonised area: quality infrastructure
During the reporting period, no further staff was recruited by the Ministry of Economy and Innovation (MEI). The State Inspectorate of Market Surveillance (SIMS) carried out 895 inspections across different product sectors, 400 less than in the last reporting period, which points to the need to reinforce market surveillance. The number of administrative measures remained stable at 43.
Albania’s legislation on accreditation, on market surveillance and on conformity assessment remains partially aligned with the EUacquis. It has a high level of alignment in the area of standardisation. The General Directorate of Standardisation’s (DPS) application to become a full member of the European Committee for Standardisation (CEN) and the European Committee for Electrotechnical Standardisation (CENELEC) was rejected In September 2025. CEN/CENELEC concluded that laws aligned with EU harmonised legislation must be fully in force and effectively implemented at the time of application. National standards are adopted in line with EU standards. DPS will be able to re-submit its membership application to CEN/CENELEC once it has ensured full alignment and implementation of the relevant EU acquis. The General Directorate of Accreditation (GDA) is the single national accreditation body under MEI. The General Directorate of metrology remains fully staffed and operational. Albania has not yet prepared its legislation to be aligned with the EU requirements on notification of national legislation.
Harmonised area: sectoral legislation
While a substantial amount of preparatory work was observed, there was no progress on completing alignment with some of the EU ‘new and global approach’ product legislation.
There was also no progress on completing alignment with ‘old approach’ product legislation, including on registration, evaluation, authorisation and restriction of chemicals (REACH); chemical classification, labelling and packaging (CLP), good laboratory practice (GLP), or motor vehicles. Albanian legislation remains partly aligned on drug precursors, though the list of controlled substances already complies with the relevant lists in the EU acquis.
There was also no progress on completing alignment with procedural measures. Albania remains partly aligned with the EU acquis on the return of cultural objects unlawfully removed from the territory of an EU Member State
Albania has anti-corruption measures in place on transparency on accreditation, conformity assessment, tariffs, legal acts and the activities of public bodies. Some agencies and the customs administration that perform market surveillance have rules on transparency, ethics and conflicts of interest, and are subject to audits. However, more efforts are needed in terms of enforcement.
Chapter 2: Freedom of movement for workers
Nationals of one Member State have the right to work in another Member State and must be given the same working and social conditions as other worker nationals of that Member State.
On access to the labour market, in 2025, Albania issued 18 156 work permits, of which 3 130 of these were for EU citizens. Following the 2025 amendment to the Law on foreigners Albania needs to implement relevant secondary legislation. Employment in civil service positions and in the state police require Albanian citizenship.
A 2024-2030 national migration strategy is in place, accompanied by a 2024-2026 action plan.
Albania continues to take steps to be able to integrate in the European network of employment services (EURES) upon accession. The migration sector of National Agency for Employment and Skills (NAES) covers the role of the National EURES Coordination
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Office.
On the coordination of social security systems, in the reporting period, Albania concluded an agreement with Poland bringing the number of bilateral agreements on social security coordination with member states to 11 (Belgium, Luxembourg, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Germany, Austria, Bulgaria, Croatia, Romania, Italy and Poland) and with non-EU countries to 6 (Swiss Confederation, Montenegro, Kosovo, North Macedonia, Türkiye, Serbia and Canada). Furthermore, Albania concluded negotiations on a bilateral agreement on employment and social security with Slovenia and is in negotiations with Latvia and Moldova.
On future participation in the Electronic Exchange of Social Security Information (EESSI) system a targeted training was held with the Social Insurance Institute on the coordination of social security systems in EU Member States.
Some progress was made to further align legislation with the acquis on the European Health Insurance Card. The Working Group for EHIC Alignment has been established and worked to prepare a Regulatory Impact Assessment (RIA).
Chapter 3: Right of establishment and freedom to provide services
EU natural and legal persons have the right to establish themselves in any Member State and to provide cross-border services. For certain regulated professions, there are rules on mutual recognition of qualifications. EU rules on postal services focus on improving the quality of universal service, gradual market opening to competition, and the establishment of an independent regulator.
On the right of establishment and freedom to provide cross-border services, Albania’s National Business Centre operates as a one-stop-shop for registering businesses and issuing licences, authorisations and permits. The National Agency for Information Society (AKSHI) needs to properly plan and budget for the maintenance of eAlbania platforms to ensure seamless delivery of e-services (such as tax filing, reporting and cadastre) and prevent delays. In April 2026, Albania adopted the Law on freedom of establishment and the provision of services designed to ensure alignment with the EU Services Directive. Work is ongoing to harmonise with sectoral legislation, in line with the services action plan, including a roadmap, timelines for alignment and institutional responsibilities across the regulated sectors.
In the area of postal services, Albanian legislation is aligned with the EU acquis. The implementation of the 2021-2026 Postal Strategy continued. In October 2025, the Electronic and Postal Communications Authority (AKEP) designated the Albanian Post SA as universal postal service provider, and granted an individual Authorisation for an extended period of five years valid until 2030. As of June 2026, 32operators providing postal services were registered, operating under the general authorisation granted by AKEP.
Adraft revised law on mutual recognition of professional qualifications and a national action plan for regulated professions, both aiming to align with the Professional Qualifications Directive (PQD) were prepared and submitted for public consultation, however, further alignment efforts are needed, including on full alignment with the acquis as well as the alignment of the training programs for regulated professions.
Chapter 4: Free movement of capital
In the EU, capital and investments must be able to move without restriction, with common rules for cross-border payments. Banks and other economic operators apply certain rules to support the fight against money laundering and terrorist financing.
As regards capital movements, Albania has yet to align with the EU acquis and meet its obligation under the Stabilisation and Association Agreement enabling EU nationals and entities to acquire agricultural land.
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On payments systems, Albania has adopted the Law on payment services aiming to align with PSD2 and E-Money Directive in the reporting period. The Bank of Albania (BoA) amended the existing payment system framework, enabling migration to ISO 20022 and SEPA standards for the domestic market and enhancing the efficiency of electronic payments. According to BoA data, electronic payments increased by 23% in 2025. The Central Bank has announced plans to go live through instant payment system (TIPS clone) by November, and therefore commercial Banks have already started the testing phase. Following Albania’s entry into the geographical scope of the single euro payments area (SEPA) in 2024, 27 payment service providers started processing SEPA credit transfers in October 2025.
On the fight against money laundering and terrorism financing, Albania has adopted a Law on anti-money laundering aligned with the 6th Money laundering directive. The BoA amended in April the Regulation on prevention of money laundering and terrorism financing, introducing a requirement of the relevant governing bodies, to approve, the policy document setting out internal rules and procedures for defining risk management preventive measures.
Albania continued to implement the 2024-2030 Strategy on the prevention of money laundering and terrorism financing, and the action plan of the national risk assessment 2024- 2027. Albania’s assessment in Moneyval’s sixth round of evaluations is ongoing. Between September 2025 and March 2026 there were 1 203 suspicious activity reports were filed and the financial intelligence unit (FIU) referred 90 cases to the law enforcement agencies. During the reporting period, the FIU has conducted 68 inspections (26 on-site and 42 off- site). In April 2026, the BoA amended the regulation on granting licence and the exercise of banking activity of banks and branches of foreign banks in Albania, aiming to address the previous MONEYVAL recommendations, enhancing due diligence requirements. The BoA adopted also amendments to the regulation on the prevention of Money laundering and terrorist financing, introducing requirements on adoption of policy documents and preventive measures undertaken to manage risks.
Chapter 6: Company law
The EU has common rules on the formation, registration and disclosure requirements of a company, with complementary rules for accounting and financial reporting, and statutory audit.
In the areas of company law and corporate governance, work has continued to align the legislative framework with the EU acquis. This was the case for in particular for the codified company law Directive, and the Directive on cross-border mergers, divisions and conversions through amendments to the Law on business registration and to the Law on entrepreneurs and companies, as well as the Shareholder Rights Directive and the takeover bids Directive. Albania does not have a stand-alone corporate governance code for listed companies. Having such a code for listed companies is an OECD principle. Efforts are still needed to remove the remaining barriers to the digitalisation of procedures (online proceedings and electronic signatures), which shall also be made accessible to individuals and businesses not resident in Albania, in order to align with the Directive on digital tools and to ensure the interconnection of Albania’s Commercial Register with the EU system of business registers by the time of accession. Albania should also complete alignment with the amended Directive on corporate sustainability due diligence (CSDDD). The amendments simplified some of the obligations and postponed the transposition deadline to July 2028 and the application deadline to July 2029.
In the area of company reporting and statutory audit, Albania’s public oversight board adopted three regulations to align with the EU acquis on statutory audit, covering the quality assurance control framework, disciplinary measures and interinstitutional cooperation and exchange of information. In July 2026, Albania adopted the Law on transparency requirements to align with the transparency Directive and the amendments to the Law on
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accounting and financial statements, aiming at alignment with the EU acquis.
Chapter 7: Intellectual property law
The EU has to a large extent harmonised rules for the legal protection and enforcement of copyright and related rights, as well as of industrial property rights, including trademarks, designs, patents and related supplementary protection certificates (SPCs), geographical indications (GIs), including craft and industrial GIs.
In the area of copyright and related rights, the new law on copyright was adopted to align the legal framework with the EU acquis.
The institutional set-up on intellectual property rights has been strengthened. Albania adopted laws on industrial design and on geographical indications for crafts and industrial products to align with the EU acquis industrial property rights. Nine additional staff joined the Supervisory Council of the General Directorate of Industrial Property, with the aim to improve efficiency in the examination of trademarks and patent applications. 661 patent applications were submitted in 2025, of which 10 were national patent applications and 648 were issued by the European Patent Office seeking protection in Albania. In 2025, 2 344 international applications for trademark registrations were received, a small decrease compared with 2024, and 1 995 national applications, a small increase. 1 705 trademarks were registered, a significants increase from the 1 020 registered in 2024. Applicants for industrial design reached 26 in 2025, down from 35 in 2024. In 2025, the Directorate of intellectual property rights within the State Inspectorate for Market Surveillance carried out 495 inspections, resulting in 50 administrative sanctions.
Chapter 8: Competition policy
EU rules protect free competition. They include antitrust rules against restrictive agreements between companies and abuse of a dominant position, and also include rules on concentrations between companies which would significantly impede effective competition. EU rules also set out a system of State aid control. Governments are only allowed to grant State aid if restrictive conditions are met, with a view to preventing distortion of competition.
Antitrust and mergers
Albania’s legislative framework is broadly in line with the EU acquis and the SAA.
In 2025, to further align its implementing legislation with the EU acquis, the Competition Commission adopted implementing legislation related to vertical, specialisation as well as research and development agreements. The institutional framework is based on the Albanian Competition Authority (ACA), which is an operationally independent authority. It reports to Parliament and enjoys adequate prerogatives. On enforcement capacity, the ACA’s remained stable with 46 staff members. There is a need to invest in digital forensic and detection tools for the ACA to handle complex investigations. On implementation, between September 2025 and September 2026, the ACA issued 111 decisions, including four on prohibited agreements, 27 on abuse of a dominant position and 55 authorising concentrations. The ACA should continue to raise awareness, strengthen capacity and enforcement of competition rules.
State aid
On the legislative framework, the framework Law on State aid largely reflects Articles 107 and 108 TFEU but the implementing legislation remains partly aligned with the EU acquis.
On the institutional framework, the State Aid Commission (SAC) is responsible for implementing the Law on State aid. Its operational independence, which is required by the SAA, is not guaranteed as it belongs to the Ministry of Finance.
The SAC’s enforcement capacity remains insufficient, and the staffing of its secretariat needs to significantly increase. On implementation, in the reporting period, the SAC
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adopted2 decisions on the authorisation of State aid related to the fund for micro, small and medium-sized enterprises. The SAC can issue decisions on illegal and incompatible aid and order recovery but has not done so yet. The enforcement track record on State aid control needs to be significantly improved. Prior notification of aid measures was sporadic and advocacy activities among grantors are needed.
Liberalisation
The Law on State aid applies to all legal and natural persons performing an economic activity. There has been no investigation of State aid for public undertakings or undertakings with special or exclusive rights.
Chapter 9: Financial services
EU rules aim at ensuring fair competition among financial institutions and the stability and integrity of financial markets, namely in the fields of banking, insurance, supplementary pensions, investment services and securities. They include rules on authorisation, operation and supervision of these institutions.
In the area of banking and financial conglomerates, Albania adopted the Law on banks to align with the EU acquis. Albania introduced new reporting templates and requirements related to early warning indicators and the operational risk events register. In June 2026 the Bank of Albania (BoA) adopted a regulation on the systemic risk buffer methodology in July it adopted the regulation on digital operational resilience. In March 2026, the BoA granted an operation license to the first fully digital bank in Albania, bringing the total number of commercial banks to 12. During the reporting period, the BoA completed four full scope on- site inspections on banks. The Resolution Plans under the 2025 Resolution planning cycle were adopted, and BoA communicated to the banks the interim minimum requirement for own funds and eligible liabilities requirement. The BoA has worked on operational guidelines to improve bank resolvability and has started preparing for the revision of the Resolution Law starting with a gap analysis with the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD). Albania should ensure that all entities are appropriately regulated and supervised. Reform efforts to align with the EU acquis should be increased. Technical work on drafting the Law on Supplementary Supervision of Credit Institutions, Insurance undertakings and investment firms with financial conglomerates was completed and are at the final stage of adoption.
Regarding the National Development Bank (NDB) the Central Bank’s supervisory role on the NDB needs to be safeguarded to ensure strong governance and oversight and Albania should take all necessary actions to preserve the level playing field in the banking sector.
Albania remains partially aligned with financial markets infrastructure legislation. Albania is carrying out preparatory work for alignment with parts of the EU acquis, including the European Market Infrastructure Regulation (EMIR). Further progress is needed in this area.
In the area of insurance and occupational pensions, preparatory work for a new law on insurance and reinsurance is ongoing, with adoption foreseen in 2027, as well as on legislation aiming to align with the acquis on motor insurance and occupational pensions. In November 2025 the entry into force of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS17) was postponed to 1 January 2028. The Albanian Financial Services Agency (AFSA) is coordinating implementation with the insurance undertaking.
On securities markets and investment services,Albania is preparing draft legislation aiming to align with the EU acquis on markets in financial instruments, market abuse, UCITS and alternative investment funds.
On sustainable and digital finance, and AFSA continued preparatory work to align with the EU acquis on sustainable finance, as well as worked on a draft law aiming to align with the Market in Crypto-Assets Regulation (MiCA). AFSA is preparing draft regulations on digital operational resilience for the entities under its remit.
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Chapter 28: Consumer and health protection
EU rules protect consumers’ economic interests and also ensure product safety, prevent dangerous imitations and establish liability for defective products. The EU also guarantees a high level of protection of public health and in particular also ensures high common standards for tobacco control, blood, tissues, cells and organs, and human and veterinary medicinal products. The EU also has rules for upholding patients’ rights in cross-border healthcare and in preparing for and responding to serious cross-border health threats, including communicable diseases.
Consumer protection
On horizontal aspects, Albania has a 2023–2030 cross-cutting strategy on consumer protection and market surveillance in place. In reporting period, the Consumer Protection body (CPC) received complaints, though no information was available on how this was dealt with. Albania should finalise and adopt its new package of law on consumer protection, which is designed to align with many elements of the EU acquis in this area, including on consumer rights, on unfair business-to-consular commercial practices, on the pricing of products offered to consumers, on empowering consumers for the green transition, on promoting the repair of goods, on sale of goods and digital content and on distance and off- premises contracts. Dedicated consumer protection offices are now hosted by 22 municipalities. There have not been any developments on enforcement and redress.
Market surveillance remained inactive in e-commerce and package tourism, which continue to operate largely unregulated. On product safety, Albania is yet to align with the new EU acquis on general product safety. Albania is partly aligned on product liability. (For information on market surveillance, see Chapter 1 – Free movement of goods).
Public health
In 2025 public health expenditure was around 2.7% of GDP, and 9.6% of public expenditure. While expenditure increased per se, the relative share of health spending declined. Primary health care remains underfunded. In 2025, spending was approximately 28% lower than planned, further widening the gap between population needs and available resources. In terms of financial protection, out-of-pocket healthcare expenses remained critically high at 48.27% (2023) (compared to the EU average of around 15%). Albania’s population is ageing, driven by lower fertility rates, increased life expectancy, and emigration. Shortages of essential medicines in hospitals and medical devices remains a critical challenge, the country needs to develop and apply new pricing, reimbursement, coverage policies, and models for medicines. An electronic system for collecting and reporting health information of medical records (HIS) has been set up, though there is no dedicated legal framework regulating the handling of electronic health records (EHRs), and ehealth services continue to be fragmented.
On tobacco control, measures have contributed to a steady decline in tobacco use but did not reach the target of a 30% reduction by 2025. Albania still needs to align fully with the EU tobacco control acquis. The ban on smoking in indoor public areas is insufficiently and unequally enforced.
National legislation on communicable diseases and serious cross-border health threats remain partly aligned with the EU acquis, and all the communicable diseases in the relevant EU acquis are covered in Albania by case-based, disease-specific, laboratory-based, sentinel, active, and syndromic surveillance (for groups of diseases), and participatory and event-based surveillance systems. The uptake of the HPV vaccine has increased steadily and seasonal influenza vaccine coverage for high-risk groups has been maintained. A new epidemic and pandemic preparedness plan was adopted in April 2026. Albania needs to fight disinformation, which can lead to vaccine hesitancy.
There were no developments on reduction of harmful use of alcohol, or on drug abuse
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and prevention, where prevention activities remain sporadic. On non-communicable diseases, the national cancer control plan is in place, and three screening programmes are ongoing (on colorectal, breast, and cervical cancer). A cancer registry is not yet created. The 2023–2026 Mental Health Action Plan is in place, and a gradual transition from institution‑centred care toward more community‑based, person‑centred and rights‑respecting models is underway, while maintaining inpatient services for cases where they remain clinically necessary. Cardiovascular disease control is part of Albania’s 2022-2030 Programme for the Control of Non-Communicable Diseases, which foresees universal screening and basic preventive services to all residents aged 35–70 years, supporting early detection and management of cardiovascular diseases.
Albania has established national legislation for substances of human origin (SoHO), though implementation remains limited. It needs to finalise and adopt an Action Plan for the implementation of Regulation 2024/1938/EU on standards of quality and safety for substances of human origin intended for human application. was no progress in alignment of human medicinal products, on medical devices, in vitro medical devices and veterinary medicinal products on medical devices, on health technology assessment, on patient’s rights in cross-border healthcare, on cosmetics, or on health technology assessment, all of which remain to be aligned with the EU acquis]. Albania has a One Health Action Plan on antimicrobial resistance (AMR), adopted in 2022, and has expressed willingness to address the antimicrobial resistance (AMR) through strengthened governance, surveillance systems, increased laboratory capacity, infection prevention and control, awareness raising, and evidence-based policies and practices.
On health inequalities, statistical data, policies, and monitoring mechanisms remain insufficient, especially in regard to access ad service delivery to groups in vulnerable situations, including Roma and Egyptian communities, persons with disabilities, LGBTIQ+ persons, sex workers and drug users. There were no new developments on access to health for women, including on sexual and reproductive health. Malnutrition remains a critical issue, and childhood obesity and anaemia in pregnant women remain concerning. The National Action Plan for equality, inclusion and participation of Roma and Egyptian (2026 – 2030) focusing on the Roma health mediators was adopted in June 2026).
While legislation recognises the right of people with disabilities to health services, implementation is incomplete, with no dedicated budget for home visits. Despite improvements to physical accessibility to healthcare facilities, physical shortcomings remain. Accessibility and usability criteria for persons with disabilities are not included in procurement for medical equipment, and they are not covered by health-related information. The Home Health Care Service expands access for patients with limited mobility, but it has not been supported by adequate funding.
On anti-corruption, market surveillance bodies have rules on transparency, ethics and conflicts of interest and are subject to audits. There are anti-corruption measures in place on cosmetics, and control systems on pharmaceutical manufacturers and to track veterinary medicine stocks, though enforcement remains a challenge. The health sector was identified as a vulnerable sector in the draft National Anti-Corruption Strategy 2024-2030 and corruption remains a systemic concern.
CLUSTER 3: COMPETITIVENESS AND INCLUSIVE GROWTH
This cluster covers: digital transformation and media (Chapter 10); taxation (Chapter 16); economic and monetary policy (Chapter 17); social policy and employment (Chapter 19); industrial policy (Chapter 20); science and research (Chapter 25); education and culture (Chapter 26); and customs union (Chapter 29).
Chapter 10: Digital transformation and media
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The EU supports the smooth functioning of the internal market for electronic communications, electronic commerce and audiovisual services. The rules protect consumers and support the universal availability of modern services.
On electronic communications, limited progress was made in implementing the 112 single European emergency number. During the reporting period, several implementing acts under the Law on electronic communications were adopted. Furthermore, the Law on electronic communications aims to fully incorporate the provisions transposing the EU roaming acquis (including those related to the European Electronic Communications Code and Body of European Regulators for Electronic Communications). It seeks to align its regulatory framework with the EU roam like at home (RLAH), as a step towards possible participation in the EU RLAH area and accelerated integration into the EU digital market.
By the end of 2025, the number of fixed broadband internet subscribers exceeded 733 000, representing an increase of around 6% compared with the previous year. The fixed broadband penetration rate among households reached 97% at the end of 2025, about 5 percentage points higher than in the previous year.
Mobile broadband usage continued to improve during the reporting period. In 2025, an active mobile user consumed on average 10.38 GB of mobile broadband data per month, up 16% compared with 2024. According to official data, 5G technology covers up to 40% of the population.
However, the country still needs to release the 700 MHz band from broadcasting use to allow its use for mobile communications, including 5G. Implementation of the EU 5G Cybersecurity Toolbox measures should also continue. The Council of Ministers Decision on the approval of the methodology for assessing the risk profile at the national level of suppliers and providers of 5G network equipment was approved in April 2026.
The Law on measures to reduce the costs for very high-capacity networks - Gigabit Infrastructure Act was adopted on is expected to be adopted within 2026, fully aligning Albania with the EU acquis on the Gigabit Infrastructure Act.
In the area of digital services and specifically online public services, 95% of applications for 1,257 public services were offered online during the reporting period. Albania took steps to further align its legislative framework with the EU acquis, notably with the Audiovisual Media Services Directive (AMSD), the Digital Services Act (DSA), as well as with the Digital Markets Act (DMA). Albania held a public consultation on a first draft of a Law on Digital Services. However, further efforts are needed to address the emerging digital divide and strengthen citizens’ ability to use e-services independently. Albania also contributed to cross-border interoperability capacity building exercises linked to the monitoring mechanism under the Interoperable Europe Act. Albania needs to take further steps to build the societal and institutional capacity and to establish the legal basis to effectively support the enforcement of the DSA and the DMA as of EU accession, in line with the considerations and requirements outlined at the 2026 TAIEX workshops. In addition, further efforts are needed to ensure compliance with accessibility standards and barrier-free access to digital public services.
On digital skills, the ICT curricula for first, second, and third grade have been extended to smart labs in 300 pilot schools, up from 100 in 2025.
On digital trust and cybersecurity, Albania continued to strengthen its cybersecurity architecture and capacities. The authorities advanced work on critical information infrastructure in both the public and private sectors and significantly expanded the operational coverage of the national Security Operations Centre. The implementing legislation for the Law on cybersecurity, which seeks to align with NIS2 Directive, has been complete. Cybersecurity capacities need to be further strengthened, including through awareness-raising activities and targeted training. The Law on electronic identification and trust services, aligned with the eIDAS Regulation, was adopted in May 2026. Separately,
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further efforts are needed to align with the ePrivacy Directive.
On media, authorities need to ensure that the Audiovisual Media Authority is provided with sufficient material and technical resources to increase its media monitoring and reporting capacity.
On artificial intelligence (AI), Albania should focus on developing AI regulation and the necessary governance and enforcement structures in line with the EU AI Act. The draft National AI Strategy 2026-2030 has been finalised and submitted to line ministries for consultation.
On anti-corruption, effective whistle-blower protection and secure reporting mechanisms should be ensured in line with Albania’s strengthened legal and institutional framework. The Law on whistleblowing and whistleblower protection requires public institutions to establish internal reporting mechanisms that guarantee confidentiality, protection against retaliation and procedural safeguards for reporting persons. Its scope also extends to breaches involving public funds, EU funds, procurement, data protection and other high-risk areas relevant to the digital and information society sector.
In relation to the protection of minors online, a Safer Internet Centre was established in Albania with co-funding received under the Digital Europe Programme.
Chapter 16: Taxation
EU rules on taxation cover value-added tax, excise duties as well as aspects of corporate taxation. They also cover cooperation between tax administrations, including the exchange of information to prevent tax evasion.
Albania has been implementing its medium-term revenue strategy (MTRS) and met the target for the increase in tax revenue in 2025. This was attributed in large part to the targeted formalisation and compliance improvement efforts in the tourism and construction sectors.
As part of the 2026 fiscal package, Albania adopted the law on tax and customs debt cancellation, which fully cancels tax and customs liabilities from before 2014 and partially cancels tax liabilities from 2015 to 2024 against payment of part of the principal debt. This measure is expected to bring additional revenue and reduce part of the sizeable tax debt stock but poses future tax compliance risks.
Albania also adopted a Fiscal Peace Agreement, which raises concerns as it offers eligible taxpayers the possibility of a lighter tax audit regime for a limited time, and the possibility to re-declare financial statement elements at a highly reduced rate in exchange for payment of a pre-determined profit tax set at the previous year’s taxable profit with an 18% growth margin.
On indirect taxation, the standard VAT rates remained unchanged. A substantial number of VAT exemptions and reduced rates not set out in the EU acquis remain and none were removed in the reporting period, although the June 2025 tax exemption review provided some tax expenditure assessment of them. As part of the fiscal package 2026, the VAT law was amended to align Albania’s framework for the flat-rate compensation scheme for farmers with Directive 2006/112; introducing a 10% flat-rate compensation and clarifying the calculation method.
The national tax legislation imposes tax on imported plastic as good/raw material, which stands in contradiction to the commitment under the SAA.
Excise taxation is partially aligned with the EU acquis regarding excise duty for alcohol and alcoholic beverages, tobacco, energy products and general rules for the production, keeping, storage, movement and controls on excisable products. Alignment on EU excise minima on tobacco products is ongoing, through a gradual and scheduled increase of cigarette excise rates from 2025 to 2033, which continued to be applied. Albania still needs to move to a
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mixed excise duty structure (ad valorem and specific) for cigarettes. National legislation providing for a preferential rate of tax for ‘Albanian rakia’ produced by private individuals is not aligned with EU legislation. Excise duty rate on some fuel products are still below the EU minimum according to energy tax Directives.
On direct taxation, the income tax law is partially aligned with the EU acquis. A broader overhaul of income tax legislation with EU acquis is under preparation, including mergers and anti-tax-avoidance provisions.
On administrative cooperation and mutual assistance, Albania is preparing legal amendments to fully align with the Directive on administrative cooperation (DAC) . Albania has double taxation agreement with 23 Member States and committed to conclude agreements with the four outstanding ones – Denmark, Cyprus, Portugal and Lithuania. The agreement with Lithuania has been signed but is yet to be ratified.
Albania has exchanged financial account information with 85 jurisdictions (including 26 EU Member States) in 2025 and has received information from 88 jurisdictions (including all 27 EU Member States) within the framework of the OECD common reporting standard. A framework for country-by-country reporting as per OECD BEPS (Base Erosion and Profit Shifting) is in place. Albania signed Subject to Tax Rule (STTR) multilateral instrument in September 2025, which has not yet been ratified.
The tax administration has an active strategic plan, in addition to the targets foreseen under the MTRS. On operational capacity, there were 174vacancies in the tax administration in June 2026 (similar to the amount in 2025 (179). An integrity and ethics plan is in place. An HR development strategy was adopted. Support systems are in place, including electronic filing and fully digital fiscal system.
Chapter 17: Economic and monetary policy
EU rules require the independence of central banks and prohibit them from directly financing the public sector. Member States coordinate their economic policies and are subject to fiscal, economic and financial surveillance.
On monetary policy, Albania has a high level of alignment with the EU acquis on the prohibition of privileged access of the public sector to financial institutions. The legislation is aligned with the EU acquis on the central bank independence and on the prohibition of monetary financing to the public sector. The Law on the Bank of Albania (BoA) was adopted in October 2026. Due to the end of mandate in December for six out of the nine members of the Supervisory Board, the Central Bank lacked the quorum to hold meetings until March, when the new members were appointed. Albania needs to ensure that the appointment of all members of the Supervisory Council is conducted in a timely manner as delays create operational risks for the BoA’s functioning.
On economic policy, numerical fiscal rules, including those on the primary balance and the debt ratio, are in place, promoting fiscal prudence (see also Section 2.3 - Economic criteria). Budget revisions continued to be endorsed through normative acts in 2025, and during 2026. Albania aligned with Directive 2011/85/EU on requirements for budgetary frameworks. Albania also adopted a guideline on the preparation and publication of the report on deviations of macroeconomic, fiscal, and budgetary forecasts. Work progressed on addressing the remaining alignment requirements, including the adoption of the law on the Fiscal Council. An MoU between INSTAT, the Bank of Albania, and the Ministry of Finance was signed in May, to strengthen inter-institutional data exchange and coordination mechanisms.
Albania is aligned with the requirements on the coordination and surveillance of economic policies laid down by the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. Its active participation in the Economic Reform Programme (ERP) exercise has contributed to developing the administrative capacity of the country relevant for this chapter. Albania
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submitted the 2026-2028 ERP on 15 January 2026. Albania’s ERP outlines the country’s key macroeconomic and fiscal policies. The policy guidance jointly adopted at the 2025 Economic and Financial Dialogue has been partially implemented. Albania's ERP would benefit from stronger analysis of long-term fiscal sustainability, a more comprehensive assessment of fiscal risks and the budgetary impact of key fiscal measures, and a more systematic use of productivity indicators.
Chapter 19: Social policy and employment
EU rules in the social field include minimum standards for labour law, equality, and non- discrimination, health and safety at work. They also promote social inclusion and social protection, and social dialogue at EU level.
On labour law, there was limited progress in the reporting period. An Inter-institutional working group for the approximation of legislation regulating labour relations with the acquis of the European Union was established to ensure the involvement of relevant ministries, government agencies responsible and social partners.
On health and safety at work, there was limited progress in the reporting period. The policy document for health and safety at work and its 2025-2030 action plan is being implemented. The Interministerial Council of Occupational Health and Safety and its technical secretariat were established in February 2026. An inter-ministerial network of occupational safety and health coordinators was also set up.
On labour inspection activities, the use of Intelligent Risk Assessment Matrices (MIRA) increased from 75% in 2024 to 84% in 2025. Strengthening of the capacities of the social services inspectorate continued alongside a 6.3% increase of social care services inspections. In 2025, 96% of all work-related accidents were reported by employers, indicating a steady level of reporting and investigation. There was a 35% increase of accidents classified as work-related, underlining sectors with high risk in terms of occupational safety and health (OSH). The human and technical capacities of the Labour and Social Services Inspectorate have been continuously strengthened and should remain a priority. The interface between MIRA and the e-inspection platform would further increase its efficiency, transparency and quality.
On social dialogue, the tripartite consultation process is currently limited to providing information. Bipartite social dialogue is not sufficiently developed. The National Labour Council convened only once in the reporting period. Capacity building for social partners needs to increase.
On employment policy, the implementation of the 2023-2030 National Employment and Skills Strategy continued with an increase of beneficiaries of the Youth Guarantee, implementation of the exit strategy for recipients of economic aid, and integration of persons with disabilities in the labour market. Despite the progress, the labour market still faces challenges with a skills mismatch, a large share of inactive NEETs, and continuous youth migration, which will need to be addressed adequately. In June 2026, the Youth Guarantee Implementation Plan (2026-2028) was approved, marking the transition from a pilot programme in three municipalities to a nationwide rollout.
On labour force participation and unemployment rate see the statistical annex and the section on the functioning of the labour market under 2.3 Economic criteria.
On social protection and inclusion, the Strategy for Social Protection continues to be implemented. The Government created the conditions for the implementation of the European Child Guarantee in March 2026, by approving the 2026-2030 National Action Plan for the European Child Guarantee.
The 2025 social fund budget rose by 14%, supporting 57 municipal services and 19 regional specialised care services. Work continued on establishing local social funds, but no indexation mechanism exists for economic aid benefits. Social protection spending (9.6% of
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GDP) remains far below the EU average (20.5%), with only 5% allocated to social care. Local governments spend less than 2% of their budget on social services. In 2026, through the social fund mechanism, the national map of social services was expanded with 14 new services. The National Electronic Register of Social Care Services (NERCS) is not yet fully functional.
There has been steady progress on deinstitutionalisation, but more efforts are needed to move towards independent living and inclusion of persons with disabilities, taking into account the Commission Guidance on independent living and inclusion.
On the inclusion of Roma and Egyptians, further efforts are needed to strengthen the human resources allocated within the Ministry of Health and Social Protection (MoHSP) for Roma policy coordination, as well as to improve labour market mobility and combat discrimination.
On non-discrimination in employment and social policy, alignment with the EU acquis remains incomplete, in particular regarding the Employment Equality Directive and the Racial Equality Directive. By the end of 2025, the number of registered jobseekers with disabilities increased to 8 196 (up from 2 656 in 2023). In 2025, the Commissioner on Protection from Discrimination addressed six cases of alleged racial discrimination and four cases of disability-based discrimination in employment.
On equality between women and men in employment and social policy, persistent gender inequality in employment remains. In 2025, the unemployment rate stood at 8.15% for men and 10.58% for women, while the gender pay gap stayed at 4.9%. The implementation of the law on gender equality aims to tackle these disparities. Albania still has to align its legislation with the gender equality acquis in the area of social policies and employment, including work-life balance, pay transparency and women on boards, and to implement targeted measures to address the gender gap in employment.
There has been no progress in preparing for the participation in the European Social Fund.
Chapter 20: Enterprise and industrial policy
EU industrial policy strengthens competitiveness, facilitates structural change and encourages a business-friendly environment that stimulates small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs).
On enterprise and industrial policy principles, Albania continued to implement the business and investment development strategy (BIDS), and the Smart Specialisation Strategy. Albania adopted amendments to the BIDS to extend its duration to 2030 and align it with EU industrial strategy. Albania needs to speed up efforts to adopt a new Law on investment to replace the Strategic Investment Law and provide for a level playing field and fair treatment between investors. Albania has intensified its investment promotion activities attracting the interest of investors in the country through participation in international fairs (such as the EU-Western Balkans Investment Conference) and bilateral investment events with EU and non-EU Member states.
Despite improvements, ineffective public consultation processes when adopting legislation
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Graph 25: Albania - Economic activity rate by sex
Economic activity rate of the population aged 15-64 (%)
Unemployment rate of the population aged 15-64 (%), total Source: ECFIN
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and excessive bureaucracy have impacted the business environment. Clarity on implementation of legislation would provide predictability to businesses. stability to businesses.
On enterprise and industrial policy instruments, Albania aligned with the EU late payments directive.Better coordination between state institutions and businesses is needed to ensure SMEs are better informed and target a larger group of beneficiaries under clear and transparent procedures. In this context, the Government together with the Central Bank and the Commercial Banks are working on a program ‘Double your entrepreneurship’, to raise awareness of SMEs about available credit line for businesses and help them prepare bankable projects. There was no progress on further alignment with the EU’s definition on SMEs. In December 2025, Albania adopted an action plan to improve implementation of its SME policy.
Albania showed renewed interest in the Single Market Highway initiative. A first Single Market Highway workshop may lay the grounds for a Single Market Highway in Albania still this year. Albania is also participating in the Single Market Programme and is a member of the Enterprise Europe Network. On sectoral policies, the rise of energy prices, goods and services caused by the Middle East conflict led Albania to adopt temporary measures to support the operators of public transport, and re-introduced until June 2026, the transparency board on fuel prices, setting a price cap on diesel and gasoline. A temporary measure for a 20% reduction of excise of fuel was also put in place. The government continued to implement actions to develop Albania’s defence industry, and the transfer of assets to Albanian Investment Corporation for further development and re-vitalisation programmes. Albania worked on strengthening the governance of SOEs and adopted in June 2026 a CoM Decision aiming increased transparency and governance on selection, composition and functioning of SoEs supervisory boards On tourism, Albania should further develop sustainable tourism management, strengthen consumer protection and the collection and use of tourism data, in line with relevant EU policies and initiatives.
Chapter 25: Science and research
The EU provides significant support for research and innovation. All EU Member States can participate in the EU’s research and innovation programmes and benefit from them, especially where there is scientific excellence and solid investment in research and innovation.
On research and innovation policy, Albania has made steady progress by adopting and implementing legislation and policies aligned with the EU acquis and by reinforcing its administrative and technical structures. The required legislation to ensure effective implementation of the Law on Science and Scientific Research and the 2023-2030 National Strategy for Science, Technology and Innovation were adopted. Albania made progress in implementing the European Research Infrastructure Consortium (ERIC) acquis and further aligning its national research policies with the European Research Area. Albania took steps to meet the target of 1% of GDP by 2030 for investment in research and science. Nonetheless, funding for R&D in 2025 amounted to only 0.3% of GDP. Further action remains necessary to increase public funding of research and development, to provide more incentives to the private sector to increase R&D expenditure, and to improve cooperation between the private sector and universities.
The Albanian innovation eco-system was strengthened by the establishment of Innovation4Albania, a new innovation agency, placed under the Ministry of Economy and Innovation. More should be done to ensure that other strategic institutions, including the National Agency for Scientific Research and Innovation, are adequately resourced. The implementation of the Smart Specialisation Strategy should be prioritised along with the continued implementation of the Law on Science and Scientific Research as well as the 2023-2030 National Strategy for Science, Technology and Innovation.
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In December 2025, Albania adopted an action plan to progress towards being classified as a moderate innovator under the European Innovation Scoreboard (EIS). Albania’s summary innovation index currently stands at 41,6% of the EU average and it has slightly decreased compared to 2025. As regards the EU framework programmes, Albania is fully associated to Horizon Europe. In the reporting period 15 grants were signed for a total EU net contribution of EUR 3.78 million for Albania, making it the most successful year to date.
After the successful assessment of its Climate City Contract, Elbasan was awarded the EU Mission Label under the Climate-neutral & Smart Cities mission.
Researchers from Albania participated in 95.6% of actions of the European Cooperation in Science and Technology (COST).
Chapter 26: Education and culture
The EU supports cooperation in education and culture through funding programmes and the coordination of Member State policies through the ‘open method of coordination’. The EU and the Member States must also prevent discrimination and ensure quality education for children of migrant workers, including those from disadvantaged backgrounds.
Albania has the necessary institutional and policy framework in place, as demonstrated by the set up in March 2026 of the National Agency for Educational Services. Public spending on education in 2024 reached approximately 2.6% of GDP compared with 2.1% in 2023. This remains below the EU average of 4.8% in 2024.
66 343 children were enrolled in pre-school education, 0.7% more than the previous school year (65 914). In basic education, 243 764 pupils were enrolled (48% girls), 2.7% less than the previous year (250 617), of which 132 018 (54.16%) in primary education and 111 745 (45.84%) in lower secondary education. 88 837 pupils were enrolled in upper secondary education, showing a decrease of 0.4% (89 190). Overall, according to INSTAT data for the academic year 2025-2026, 515 040 pupils and students were enrolled in formal education, with a decrease of 1.7% compared with the previous year (528 602). In the same period, 399 258 pupils were enrolled in pre-university education, marking a decrease of 1.66% (405 989). The process of updating key competences continued for primary, lower secondary and upper secondary education.
Albania took part in the 2024 Teaching and Learning International Survey. According to the 2025 Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA), 61% of students in Albania attained at least basic proficiency in science, 55% in mathematics and 50% in reading. While results remain below the OECD average, they have improved compared to the last assessment in 2022. A roadmap targeting low-scoring students is in place. Albania also participated in the Progress in International Reading Literacy Study (PIRLS) 2026 assessment.
On vocational education and training (VET), the dual VET system was expanded to reach fifteen schools and enrolment in dual VET of twelfth-grade students increased from 203 in 2024-2025 to 372 in 2025-2026. The share of all students enrolled in VET public schools was stable (19.35% compared with 19.05% in 2024-2025). This met the National Employment and Skills Strategy target but falls short of the target having one-third of pupils in VET. Several legislative provisions are in place, including those related to the validation of non-formal and informal learning. Lifelong learning qualifications have been integrated into the Albanian Qualifications Framework. In June 2026, Albania put in place a complete regulatory framework which includes lifelong learning qualifications in the national catalogue of professional qualifications. However, adult learning participation remains limited.
Albania is an active member of the European Alliance for Apprenticeships (EAfA) since 2015 with 12 pledges from local organisations, and has increasingly promoted public-private partnerships to help strengthen apprenticeships and accelerate learners’ transition into employment. The country has also improved its participation in the European Apprentices
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Network.
On higher education, Albania’s membership in the European Higher Education Area (Bologna process) continued, but implementation of the key commitments needs to be improved, based on the results of the 2024 implementation report. An Action Plan of the Policy for Higher Education 2030 was adopted, the Higher Education Information Management System (HEMIS) has been established, and the Central Inspectorate of Pre- University Education, which enhances oversight and ensures legal compliance across pre- university educational institutions, was established.
Progress was made on the improvement of inclusive education and child centred practices in preschool as well as the approximation with the EU “Early Childhood Education and Care Quality” framework. There were 5 208 children with disabilities in the pre-university education in 2025-2026, an 11.23% increase compared to 2024-2025. Students with special needs attending special schools in 2025-2026 dropped to 399 compared to 453 in 2024- 2025. The number of assistant teachers increased marginally from 2 266 to 2 670 (public and private schools). The registration of Roma and Egyptian children in pre-university education was relatively stable, reaching 12 811 in 2025-2026. 15 000 teachers completed training on inclusive education. Albania revised its curricula for years 1, 6, and 10 to promote cultural diversity and include Roma and Egyptians’ history and culture. Albania still needs to ensure effective implementation of the legal framework regarding the exercise of minority education rights.
On digital and green skills, Albania is implementing its 2025-2030 digital agenda action plan for education and undertook teacher development initiatives to enhance digital skills. No progress was reported on the installation of smart labs over 600 public primary and upper secondary schools.
In 2025, Albania continued to demonstrate a strong performance within the international dimension of the 2021-2027 Erasmus+ programme. Overall, 2025 saw the highest level of institutional engagement since its launch, with a total of 762 recorded instances of participation by Albanian institutions. Albania started the preparations of national structures for the association to the Erasmus+ programme.
Albania advanced the governance of sports by establishing grant distribution criteria and procedures for national sports organisations ensuring oversight by relevant ministries and councils to enhance transparency and efficiency in sports funding. In 2025, Albania did not take part in the European Week of Sport.
Albania adopted by-laws regarding the implementation of the Law on youth, including regulations for the organisation of the Youth Talent Programme. The implementation of the 2022-2029 National Youth Strategy continued.
On culture, the 2026-2030 National Strategy for Culture was adopted in July 2026, integrating the Culture Compass for Europe. Implementing legislation for the Law on cultural heritage and museums has been adopted. Albania continued to participate fully in the EU 2021-2027 Creative Europe programme.
On anti-corruption in the field of education and culture, Albania integrated anti-corruption topics into pre-university education, in line with its anti-corruption strategy and action plan.
Chapter 29: Customs union
All Member States are part of the EU customs union and follow the same customs rules and procedures. This requires legislative alignment as well as adequate implementing and enforcement capacity and access to and interoperability with the EU electronic customs environment.
On customs legislation, Albania’s customs code continues to be broadly aligned with the EU acquis. Legal amendments were adopted in 2026 to further align with the acquis on drug
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precursors and on dual use goods. The levying of scanning fees for customs declarations continues to contravene the Stabilisation and Association Agreement and is not aligned with the Union Customs Code. Authorities should also prepare to take over the responsibility for assessing of scans to relieve the service provider.
The preparations to join the Common Transit Convention and amend the transit procedures legislation continued. The contract to develop and implement the software for the new computerised transit system (NCTS) at national level is being implemented. The alignment of datasets and workflows of the national design document for AES is in the process.Common Communications Network/Common Systems Interface (CNN/CSI) gateway has been set-up. The development of the national single window has started after procurement of a system developer in January 2026. The Council of Ministers approved the 2025–2030 Strategy for the modernization and harmonisation of Albanian customs information systems with the EU Systems, with an accompanying action plan.
Albania is continuing its authorised economic operator (AEO) programme. The number of AEOs increased by 5 to 23. Awareness-raising activities on the benefits of the programme continued.
Risk Management procedures in place are in line with the UCC and use electronic data processing techniques. A dedicated risk selectivity module (and automated environment that enables a risk-based selectivity) is integrated with the customs clearance system. However, the risk management process and customs control system should be further modernised and automated.
The national rules on cash and goods transported in travellers’ baggage should be aligned with the EU acquis.
On administrative and operational capacity, the Albanian Customs Administration (ACA) reports 970 employees, and 104 vacancies. A human resources strategy was recently approved. Efforts should increase to ensure recruitment, particularly of critical profiles related to alignment targets. Ongoing training will need to increasingly focus on EU systems, including through use of EU e-learning modules. To cope with all the IT investments, there is a need to upgrade human resources and capacity, also within ACA. The ACA has been implementing its Business Strategy (2023-2027) focusing on digitalisation, trade facilitation and protection of financial interest. An actio plan for 2026 – 27 was adopted in May 2026. An IT strategy and accompanying action plan for the Albanian customs systems were adopted by the Council of Ministers in November 2025. A contract for the upgrade of the core customs management system (ASYCUDA World) in line with EU requirements was concluded. Work is ongoing to ensure CCN/CSI connectivity with central EU applications.
Albania is actively particpating in the Customs programme cooperation acitivites with EU Memebr States, being a full memebr of the programme for the current iteration 2021-2027.
In terms of prevention of corruption, a department for anti-corruption and ethics is in place, tasked with processing cases and complaints received. The Code of Ethics sets out the rules and principles of conduct that all employees of the customs administration must follow. Albanian Customs Administration adopted an Integrity action plan aimed at strengthening integrity.
CLUSTER 4: THE GREEN AGENDA AND SUSTAINABLE CONNECTIVITY
This cluster covers: transport (Chapter 14); energy (Chapter 15); trans-European networks (Chapter 21); and environment and climate change (Chapter 27).
Chapter 14: Transport policy
The EU has common rules on technical and safety standards, security, social standards, State aid and market liberalisation in road transport, railways, inland waterways, multimodal
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transport, aviation and maritime transport.
Regarding the general transport acquis, the national transport strategy and its 2026-2030
action plan are yet to be adopted. The strategy promotes wider uptake of sustainable urban mobility plans and supports a coordinated transition to sustainable, low-carbon, and inclusive urban mobility across Albanian cities. The government is in process of undertaking the Strategic Environmental Assessment for the draft Strategy with the aim to adopt it by the end of 2026.
Albania has aligned with the intelligent transport systems (ITS) directive which now needs to be made fully operational. The National Traffic Monitoring and Control Centre was established, deploying ITS infrastructure across 200 km of priority roads, including sections of the Western Balkans Eastern Mediterranean corridor.
A law to align the national legal framework with the regulation on electronic freight transport information (eFTI) was adopted by the Albanian Parliament in June 2026.
Albania has continued to actively participate in the work of the Transport Community, but no significant progress was made on the implementation of the six action plans and the dedicated smart and sustainable mobility strategy for the Western Balkans. There was also limited progress on the implementation of the next-generation Transport Community action plans endorsed in 2025.
On road transport, road safety remains a concern, with fatality rates above the EU average and persistent discrepancies between national data and WHO’s higher and unresolved estimates. The growth in vehicle numbers, which exceeded one million at the end of 2025, contributes to a worsening road safety situation. The 2026-2030 Road Safety Strategy (RSS) and its accompanying 2026-2028 action plan were adopted in July 2026 after going through public consultation. They are essential to address the recent rise in fatal road traffic accidents 16.
In addition, the Road Code was amended to strengthen administrative measures for serious road-traffic offences, including unlicensed driving, offences by young drivers, speeding, mobile-phone use while driving and driving under the influence of alcohol.
Funding needed for a Community database on road accidents (CARE) aligned crash data system is being secured with the World Bank under Transport and Trade Facilitated Project. 2. The creation of a dedicated road safety agency is not planned in the short-term. The country needs to strengthen its inspection capacity on periodic roadworthiness tests, while further progress was made to align with the EU acquis. Albania remains partially aligned with the Directive on road infrastructure safety management.
The Albanian Roads Authority (ARA) reform is supported through EU- and World Bank-
16 In the year 2025, EU average road fatalities per million inhabitants in the EU was 43 against 85 for
Albania, Source: Transport Community Secretariat: https://www.transport-community.org/wp- content/uploads/2026/05/Preliminary-data-on-road-fatalities-for-2025-for-publishing.pdf
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Graph 26 - Road fatalities in Albania per 100 000 inhabitants
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funded technical assistance. However, the road asset management system is not yet operational, and a Service Level Agreement (SLA) has not been in place including the definition of key performance indicators and the establishment of dedicated funding mechanisms for road and bridge maintenance.
On rail transport, while the Railway Safety Authority is functional the staffing process is still ongoing. A Director of the Railway Regulatory Authority was appointed, but it still lacks the operational capacity to fulfil its mandate. The Railway and Accident Investigation Authority remains non-operational. Albania needs to continue its efforts to align with the EU rail safety and interoperability rules, including the electronic register of vehicles and the rail infrastructure asset management system (RIAMS). Regarding the rail network, rehabilitation of the Durrës–Tirana line and construction of the new airport connection progressed, with both expected to be completed by mid-2027. In this regard, an expression-of-interest phase for the Albanian Rail Passenger Operations Public Service Contract was launched on 1 June, with tender to be launched by the end of 2026. However, there is a serious risk that rolling stock will not be available by completion of the railway.
On maritime transport, Albania remains on the grey list of Paris Memorandum of Understanding on Port State Control. It became a full member to the Mediterranean Memorandum of Understanding on Port State Control in January 2026, significantly enhancing its regional cooperation on maritime safety, vessel compliance, and port inspections.
A regulation on vessel-traffic monitoring and information system (VTMIS), is expected to be adopted soon. Implementation is ongoing, with technical procedures being developed and staff trained. The investigation into hazardous waste being loaded onto container ships at Durrës Port is ongoing.
Albania still needs to fully align with the Regulation establishing a European Maritime Single Window environment. No further progress has been made in the area of inland waterway transport.
On aviation, some progress was noted with implementation of the EU acquis through the adoption of implementing legislation on administrative procedures, glider operations, air traffic control licences and certificates as well as information security risks.
On multimodal transport, has not yet aligned with the combined transport directive.
On passenger rights, in the reporting period Albania drafted the law to ensure alignment with the EU regulation concerning the rights of passengers when travelling by sea and inland waterways.
On anti-corruption in the transport sector, weak enforcement of Albania’s anti-corruption strategy and fragmented responsibilities undermine integrity and accountability. Transparency, oversight and integrity safeguards should be strengthened, with particular attention to procurement and contract management of high-value infrastructure projects. Priority should be given to consistent risk monitoring, clear accountability arrangements and the effective implementation of auditing and reporting measures.
Chapter 15: Energy
EU energy policy covers energy supply, infrastructure, the internal energy market, consumers, renewable energy, energy efficiency, nuclear energy and nuclear safety, radiation protection and nuclear safeguards.
On security of supply, the national legislation is partially aligned with EU acquis for gas, whereas for electricity the alignment with the risk-preparedness Regulation is pending. A law on safety reserves for oil and its by-products was adopted within September 2026. Improvements in reporting and establishment of a central oil stockholding are still needed.
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On the internal energy market, Albania’s day-ahead electricity market is operational and is coupled with the respective market in Kosovo. The Power Sector Law was adopted by Parliament in June 2026. Together with five network codes and guidelines previously approved by the National Regulatory Authority, the new legislative package aims to align with the electricity integration package (EIP). This helps Albania to move closer to integration with the EU’s internal energy market. The full integration with the EU's internal electricity market is pending full alignment with EIP subject to the verification process established by the Energy Community Secretariat and the European Commission. Albania is now expected to implement a 15-minute imbalance settlement period. Regarding regional cooperation, Albania’s transmission system operator signed a contract with SEleNe, which will act as a regional coordination centre and support the development of regional capacity calculation solutions.
Electricity prices are still not fully liberalised. Customers connected at high and medium voltage levels (10 kV, 20 kV, 35 kV and 110 kV) operate in the deregulated market. As of January 2026, the remaining category of medium-voltage customers (6 kV) has also been transitioned to the liberalised market, except for customers with special status who continue to be supplied under regulated conditions. Regulated tariffs remain applicable to all low- voltage (0.4 kV) customers, which is not aligned with the requirements of the Electricity Integration Package (EIP).
There is no operational natural gas market in Albania. On the Regulation on Wholesale Energy Market Integrity and Transparency (REMIT), the Energy Regulatory Authority (ERE) has aligned the REMIT “light” Regulation, as adapted and adopted in the Energy Community, except for the market rules. ERE’s institutional capacity has been strengthened, particularly in market integration, including through the recruitment and training of additional staff. Further capacity building and continuous training remain necessary.
On renewable energy, the decision on the approval of the rules, procedures, and net billing support scheme, as well as the rights and responsibilities of renewable self-producers, was adopted in May 2026. In June 2026, ERE adopted the first market readiness report, concluding that day-ahead market is not sufficiently liquid to trigger the conversion of the power purchase agreements into contracts for difference. The legislation on biofuels and renewable transport fuels was adopted in June 2026, including on sustainability criteria for biofuels, bioliquids and biomass fuels and greenhouse gas emission reductions. Albania is expected to harmonise its legislation for full alignment with those provisions for the transport sector, heating and cooling and electricity. The Ministerial Guideline on the establishment of the renewable energy communities, was adopted on 29 June 2026.
Some progress was made on energy efficiency. A Law on energy efficiency aiming to fully align with the EU acquis is expected to be adopted within October 2026. The timely adoption of the remaining secondary legislation will be essential to ensure full alignment. Key challenges include aligning national and municipal energy efficiency planning, strengthening auditor capacity, supporting groups in vulnerable situations, and increasing funding for public building renovations to meet 2030 targets. Further efforts are also needed to strengthen the institutional framework, including the establishment of a National Energy Efficiency Fund, energy efficiency obligations, scheme and strengthening the role of the Energy Efficiency Agency in implementation, monitoring and reporting as well as strengthening capacities of local government units, especially in terms of technical expertise, monitoring and reporting systems, digital tools, and inter-institutional coordination.
In the area of governance, Albania adopted its updated 2021-2030 National Energy and Climate Plan (NECP) in August 2026 which plays a critical role in supporting the deployment of renewable energy and achieving the country’s energy and climate objectives.
Albania made no progress in the reporting period on nuclear energy, nuclear safety, and radiation protection. In addition to accelerating efforts to align with Euratom legislation,
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participate in the European Community Urgent Radiological Information Exchange (ECURIE) and the European Radiological Data Exchange Platform (EURDEP), Albania should strengthen the capacities of the National Nuclear Agency Institute of Nuclear Physics as well as the Radiation Protection Commission Institute of Radiation Protection. On nuclear safeguards, upon EU accession, Albania would need to adapt its existing systems for the accountancy and control of nuclear materials to ensure they can accommodate the safeguards provisions of the Euratom Treaty.
On anti-corruption in the energy sector, transparency challenges remain in relation to regulated electricity pricing. Further advancing the digitalisation of permit-granting procedures for energy projects, both at central and local level, will improve transparency and administrative efficiency.
Chapter 21: Trans-European networks
The EU promotes trans-European networks (TENs) in the areas of transport, telecommunications and energy to strengthen the internal market and contribute to growth and employment.
On transport networks, progress has been made to align the strategic framework with the EU acquis through implementation of the Regulation on the European Union guidelines for the development of the Trans-European Transport (TEN-T) Network.In March 2026, the 2027–2029 document of priority policies was prepared, setting out priority projects for the core and comprehensive regional transport network, including the Western Balkans–Eastern Mediterranean (WBEM) Corridor. Further efforts are needed to secure sustainable financing and improve administrative capacity for developing, implementing and monitoring TEN-T.
The development of the core road network has progressed, especially in the Adriatic-Ionian Corridor (AIC) and road Corridor VIII. Construction works are ongoing on road corridor VIII covering sections from Lekaj to the border with North Macedonia. Four public private partnership (PPP) contracts were signed for the development of the AIC, including the construction of road segments between Milot and Fier. Further efforts are needed to make the Road Asset Management System operational.
As regards the rail network, the rehabilitation of the Durrës-Tirana line and the construction of a new line to the international airport progressed and is expected to be completed by mid- 2027. The expression of interest phase for the Albanian Rail Passenger Operations Public Service Contract was launched on 1 June, and a tender will be launched by the end of 2026.:. At the same time, key operational gaps, including the absence of network statements, infrastructure access agreements, and train dispatching protocols, need to be addressed. The rehabilitation of Corridor VIII is progressing with substantial EU support already in place. Works on the Durrës-Rrogozhinë section, the first segment of the corridor, are currently at the procurement stage. The Rrogozhinë-Pogradec section is undergoing final detailed design, while preparations are underway for the feasibility study of the final Albanian segment between Pogradec and the border with North Macedonia to determine the most suitable cross-border connection point between the two countries. No concrete steps were taken to shift freight activities from the ports of Durrës and Vlora to the port of Porto Romano. The government maintains its decision that the state budget will be used to fund the new port of Porto Romano. However, the tender for the works on the new commercial port in Porto Romano, Durrës, was cancelled after the only remaining bidder failed to submit a final financial bid before the deadline. Preventing corruption is crucial to avoid criminal infiltration in the transportation and logistics chain.
On energy networks, Albania adopted legislation aiming to align with the revised Regulation on Trans-European Networks for Energy (TEN-E) with a Council of Ministers decision on the approval of the rules for the development of regional and trans-European energy infrastructure projects.
The only gas network in Albania is the Trans-Adriatic Pipeline (TAP) which only transits gas
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from Azerbaijan to Italy through the country. For electricity, Albania remains connected to Greece, Montenegro and Kosovo through high voltage networks of 400 kV, 220 kV, and 110 kV. The 400 kV interconnection line between Elbasan in Albania and Bitola in North Macedonia is still under construction.
During the reporting period, some advancements were made in developing Albania’s regional electricity connections in line with the Central and South-Eastern Europe Energy Connectivity (CESEC) action plan on electricity and renewable energy and the Projects of Energy Community Interest (PECI) projects including the 400 kV internal ring (Rashbull Tirana2) reconfiguration of the 400 kV grid and the new 400 kV Albania-Kosovo interconnection.
Chapter 27: Environment and climate change
The EU promotes strong climate action, sustainable development and protection of the environment. EU rules contain provisions addressing, horizontal environmental issues, climate change, water and air quality, waste management, nature protection, industrial pollution, chemicals, noise and civil protection.
Environment
In terms of horizontal legislation, Albania still needs to substantially improve alignment with and implementation of the environmental impact assessment (EIA) and the strategic environmental assessment (SEA) Directives. Persistent weaknesses in institutional capacities hamper coordination, planning and investments. The quality of EIAs remains inadequate and recommendations are occasionally implemented or ineffectively monitored. Public participation in decision-making processes remains limited and enforcement of horizontal legislation insufficient. A draft law improving public consultations for environment related matters was submitted for consultation. The effectiveness of inspection and enforcement mechanisms remain a concern. Albania needs to make significant steps to improve environmental monitoring and strengthen administrative capacity to meet EU standards.
A law establishing a National Environmental Fund underwent public consultation. A decision to establish the Green Tree Fund was adopted, which requires any construction project to plan tree planting. Albania still needs to align with the Environmental Crime Directive and tackle environmental crime, especially in protected areas. Inter-ministerial collaboration on environmental issues is to be developed.
On air quality, a dedicated Directorate for Air Quality and Environmental Statistics was set- up within the Ministry of Environment in January 2026, which represents an important organisational step. Albania is amending the Law on the protection of ambient air quality to align with the new Air Quality Directive and is revising its national strategy. Two additional automatic air monitoring stations were put in place, but further efforts are needed. Increases in administrative and technical capacity are still needed to monitor air quality and to implement the acquis.
On waste management, in January 2026 the government established the National Agency for Waste Economy (AKEM), as a joint-stock, state-owned company to be the national waste treatment operator. However, AKEM still has low capacity and expertise. Albania adopted the laws on integrated waste management and on extended producer responsibility (EPR) to align with the relevant EU acquis. Implementing legislation still needs to be adopted. Albania still needs to ban single-use plastics to progress towards alignment with the EU Single-Use Plastics Directive, address littering and take urgent action to enable the functioning and upgrading of the integrated waste management systems. The pilot project on municipal waste separation at source in Berat is ongoing, while the Përmet municipality has also started separate collection for some waste typology.
On water quality, further alignment with the EU acquis was achieved through implementing
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legislation, with three decisions of the Council of Ministers approved during the reporting period. Five of the seven River Basin Management Plans (RBMP) are implemented (Drin- Buna, Semani, Ishmi, Erzeni and Mati rivers), with two (Drin-Buna and Seman) being updated (second cycle). Six of the seven Flood Risk Management Plans have been prepared and are under approval. The national water quality monitoring programme is still limited in scope and geographical coverage. A bathing water monitoring programme has been implemented over the bathing season. Local conflicts around water abstraction from rivers and protected areas, and the lack of consultation with local communities and environmental CSOs continues to raise concerns. Water supply and sewerage services remain low. The percentage of wastewater treated remains very low despite an increase of treatment capacity in the coastal area.
Urgent progress is required on the alignment with the EU acquis on nature protection, in particular the Habitats and Birds Directives. Environmental governance and enforcement issues as well as deficiencies linked to nature protection, including the 2024 amendments to the Law on protected areas, and the extension of the Law on strategic investments have led to deterioration on nature protection and became a root cause of the protests which have taken place in Albania since May 2026.
Works for hospitality and urban plans in the Buna-Velipoja Protected Landscape, which is in the list of the potential Natura 2000 sites in Albania, are ongoing amid protests by the local population. Despite some improvements in the administration and monitoring of protected areas, the approval of three development permits and the carrying out of preparatory works in the Pishë Poro-Nartë protected landscape, the lack of public consultation and of environmental impact assessment in this candidate Emerald site continued to raise concerns. The construction of the Vlora Airport continued in the same protected area, despite repeated requests for an environmental impact assessment by the Standing Committee of the Bern Convention in December 2023, 2024, 2025 and 2026. Works have been suspended due to a legal dispute between shareholders.
Albania should advance the identification, pre-designation, and protection of the sites that will be covered by the Natura 2000 network. Forest management should have strong guarantees to protect biodiversity and its natural functioning, over the economic interest. Moreover, the country also adopted a “Mountain Package” law, intending to promote investment projects in forests and pastures through fiscal incentives and land acquisition facilities for investors that could have significant negative implications for local land use and environmental management.
On industrial pollution and risk management no progress was made due to continued capacity and financial constraints.
On chemicals, no progress was recorded. Implementing legislation on REACH and the Biocidal Products Regulation is required, as well as accompanying administrative structures and. more resources for inspection and enforcement.
Regarding noise, no progress was made on the development of strategic noise maps and action plans. Data also remains inaccessible to the public.
On civil protection, as a participating State of the Union Civil Protection Mechanism (UCPM), Albania continues to actively participate in the relevant activities, including in disaster risk management reporting to the Commission and the UCPM capacity building for disaster prevention and preparedness. However, Albania's emergency response resources are often insufficient, and further decisive steps to integrate with the UCPM are necessary. Specifically for wildfires, Albania needs to follow up on the recommendations of an advisory mission carried out in January 2026 to assess Albania’s wildfire management system, which provide a roadmap for preparedness and response following the severe 2024–2025 fire seasons. In particular, Albania needs to establish a coherent national legal and governance framework, professionalise wildfire management, and modernise communication and
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information systems. The National Agency of Information Society (NAIS) and the National
Civil Protection Agency (NCPA) are connected to the Trans-European Services for Telematics between Administrations (TESTA) and need to connect to the Common
Emergency Communication and Information System (CECIS), which will allow a real time exchange of information during emergencies.
Climate change
Over the reporting period Albania made good progress on alignment with EU climate acquis, but the country’s ability to integrate climate change into sectoral strategies and plans remains limited. The Ministry of Environment has established a Directorate for Climate Change composed of eight staff members.
In December 2025, Albania amended the climate law to increase alignment with the provisions of the EU Emissions Trading System (EU ETS) Directive, and the climate adaptation provisions of the European Climate Law. However, the climate law should be further updated to reflect the EU’s 2050 climate neutrality target. The country should also develop a long-term low-carbon development strategy consistent with this goal. In June 2026, Albania adopted an updated National Adaptation Plan (NAP) and submitted to the Energy Community secretariat its National Energy and Climate Plan in August 2026.
The amended Climate Law and two pieces of implementing legislation were adopted by the government in July 2026 which set the legal basis for the monitoring, reporting, verification and accreditation (MRVA) system covering the full scope of the EU ETS with Albania aiming to fully implement MRVA for power generation, heavy industry and aviation sectors by the end of 2026. Implementation of MRVA in the shipping and ETS 2 sectors (buildings, road transport and small industry) is due to be achieved by the end of 2027. Albania shall ensure that all operators and regulated entities submit their monitoring plans and receive greenhouse gas (GHG) permits on time, so they are ready to start monitoring as 1 of January 2027 or, for shipping and ETS 2 sectors, 1 January 2028. Albania also needs to take decisive steps to introduce carbon pricing. This will ensure easier integration into the EU ETS upon accession. Lastly, Albania should prepare and adopt a roadmap for EU ETS implementation, outlining actions to ensure full legislative alignment with the relevant acquis.
Albania still needs to align with the EU acquis on fluorinated greenhouse gases, ozone- depleting substances, on emissions from the Land and Use, Land Use Change and Forestry (LULUCF) sector and climate legislation concerning road transport (CO2 performance standards, car labelling and fuel quality). To this end, Albania should develop and adopt a plan for putting arrangements in place to align, implement and enforce the EU climate acquis upon its accession to the EU.
Albania submitted its first biennial transparency report in October 2025, and updated in September 2026 its Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC) for 2035 under the Paris Agreement, in line with efforts to limit global warming to 1.5°C.
CLUSTER 5: RESOURCES, AGRICULTURE AND COHESION
This cluster covers: agriculture and rural development (Chapter 11); food safety, veterinary and phytosanitary policy (Chapter 12); fisheries and aquaculture (Chapter 13); regional policy and coordination of structural instruments (Chapter 22); and financial and budgetary provisions (Chapter 33).
Chapter 11: Agriculture and rural development
The EU’s common agricultural policy supports farmers and contributes to ensuring Europe’s food security. It helps tackle climate change and the sustainable management of national resources; maintains rural areas and landscapes across the EU; and keeps the rural
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economy alive by promoting jobs in farming, agri-food industries and associated sectors. This requires strong management and control systems. There are also common EU rules for marketing standards, quality policy and organic farming.
On horizontal issues, Albania needs to build-up its institutional capacity and align its policy, financial management and control systems with the common agriculture policy (CAP). During the reporting period, some progress was made in developing the integrated administration and control system (IACS). An implementation plan for its establishment is being developed. The farm register still needs to be fully aligned with the EU acquis. Setting up the land parcel identification system (LPIS) has advanced and needs to continue. In this regard, Albania has established the financial framework for LPIS implementation until 2028, with an overall envelope of EUR 8 m. Two pilot exercises have been completed, which included testing on-the-spot verification, overlapping declarations and quality-control procedures. These resulted in the selection of a reference parcel model and standard parameters for minimum parcel size, land cover and land use categories and landscape features. Albania is also developing an implementation plan on the setting up of the future paying agency.
Albania made progress on the setting-up of a farm sustainability data network (FSDN). On 31 August 2026, Albania adopted a Ministerial Order which establishes the national legal and institutional framework for FSDN, transforming the Farm Accountancy Data Network into the Farm Sustainability Data Network and extending its scope to environmental and social sustainability data. The advisory system reform remains at an early stage and capacity remains low.
On agricultural markets - common market organisation (CMO), legislation in the wine sector was adopted in December 2025 and is partially aligned with the EU acquis. Further efforts are needed to continue legislative alignment and strengthen the institutional capacity for implementation.
On rural development, Albania submitted its request for entrustment with budgetary tasks for the IPARD III Programme on 1 April and 18 June 2026.
No progress was made to align the legislation on quality policy with the EU acquis during the reporting period.
On organic farming, the implementinglegislation to the Law on organic production, labelling of organic products and their control, which would further alignnational ruleswith the EU acquis, remains pending.
On the fight against corruption, the Albanian authorities are obliged to prevent, detect and report irregularities.
Chapter 12: Food safety, veterinary and phytosanitary policy
The EU food acquis including hygiene rules for foodstuff production ensures a high level of food and feed safety and a high level of protection of consumers’ interests. Animal health and welfare and the safety of food of animal origin are safeguarded together with plant health, the quality of seeds, plant reproductive material, and animal nutrition and the use of plant protection products.
On general food safety, the legal framework remains partially aligned with the EU General Food Law Regulation. The Law on Official Controls (OCR) was adopted in June 2026. Institutional reforms are necessary, especially for merging the National Food Authority (AKU) with the National Veterinary and Plan Protection Authority (NVPPA). Moreover, the division of inspection tasks between AKU and the General Inspectorate should become clearer. Further efforts are required on inspection statistics, data management and transparency. Albania should improve the implementation and enforcement of official controls legislation, including allocation of adequate administrative and financial resources as well as to prepare and adopt an action plan for aligning official controls with EU requirements. Official
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laboratories have not yet been designated in accordance with official control regulation principles. For the official laboratory network, validated screening methods to guarantee the reliability of results for the relevant species and commodities still need to be put in place. Further efforts are needed to improve capacity development, accreditation and validation of methods. Border controls also need to be strengthened, and active border control posts should be aligned with the EU requirements upon accession.
On veterinary policy, work on alignment of implementing legislation related to the Animal Health Law continued. Albania has established the core structures to manage the animal health system, which is broadly functional. Legislation, surveillance, laboratory capacity and official controls provide a basis to manage disease risks and to progress towards alignment with the EU acquis. Outbreak management for major category ‘A’ diseases is generally effective, and compulsory programmes for brucellosis and bovine tuberculosis help maintain low prevalence levels. However, several system elements are not yet mature. Traceability, surveillance analysis and laboratory capacity for specific pathogens are not fully developed, which reduces the system’s ability to detect risk trends early, prioritise controls and demonstrate progress. Preparedness remains uneven across diseases and eradication programmes lack measurable targets and herd-status recognition.
Albania needs to adopt measures to align actions with the regional approach on the control and eradication of rabies, including continuing the vaccination campaigns against rabies, and to intensify surveillance as it is the only true indicator to declare a rabies-free zone.
Albania needs to improve alignment on animal welfare. Specific efforts are required on the requirements for the protection of laying hens on farm and at time of killing, as well as the monitoring of broiler welfare at the slaughterhouse. Greater efforts are also needed on enforcement, including ensuring adequate administrative capacity to put in place the certificates and approval systems required by the EU acquis.
Regarding the placing on the market of food, feed and animal by-products, Albania prepared the national residue monitoring plan for 2026. The authorities need to strengthen enforcement of legislation and risk management in this area. Albania should address the gaps on the legal framework, the disposal in landfills, the training of official veterinarians and operators and the effectiveness of the current system of official controls. Albania has made progress in aligning its legal framework on animal by-products, although further work on secondary legislation and implementation guidance is necessary. Albania has yet to put in place an EU-compliant system of collection, storage and processing of animal by-products.
On food safety rules, Albania initiated the process of assessment and categorisation of the establishments, but significant work is still needed. On pesticide residues, Albania has yet to improve the enforcement of actions taken in the event of non-compliance and increase transparency. Albania needs to develop a national programme to improve milk quality. No progress was reported on specific rules for feed and significant work remains necessary.
On phytosanitary policy, Albania adopted the plant health law and continued working on its implementation. Albania has to establish the multiannual survey programme for quarantine pests and put in place the plant passport system for all sectors, including forestry, natural and urban areas. Further efforts are needed to improve pesticide residues monitoring in Albania.
On the marketing of seed and other plant reproductive material, Albania should focus on fully aligning its national legislation with the EU acquis on the rules plant and forest reproductive material (PRM and FRM). In addition, Albania must establish the necessary institutional frameworks and technical capacities to implement and enforce the EU acquis effectively and focus on setting a functional seed certification system.
No progress was reported on genetically modified organisms, and significant work remains necessary.
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On the fight against corruption, the national Cross-Cutting Anti-Corruption Strategy aims to ensure accountability and ethical governance. Albania should continue its efforts to strengthen transparency and accountability, particularly in phyto-sanitary and veterinary inspections. Measures to prevent corruption risks and ensure the integrity of inspection and certification processes should be reinforced.
Chapter 13: Fisheries and aquaculture
The common fisheries policy lays down rules on fisheries management, protects living resources of the sea and limits the environmental impact of fisheries. This includes setting catch quotas, managing fleet capacity, rules on control and inspection, rules on markets and aquaculture and support for fisheries and coastal communities. Further, it promotes a sustainable aquaculture.
Regarding resource and fleet management, Albania’s legislation is broadly in line with the recommendations of the General Fisheries Commission for the Mediterranean, which has adopted several management plans for the sustainable exploitation of fish stocks applying to Albania. Efforts are ongoing to implement the EU common fisheries policy into the national legislation.
On data collection, data on fishery production is regularly maintained and updated. However, further efforts are needed to align on data collection requirements on sharks, eels, biological data collection, recreational fisheries and discard plans. Further improvements on scientific capacity and data management are also needed.
Regarding inspection and control, the capacity to monitor fishing activity 24/7 to combat illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing is in place, based on a functional and operational vessel monitoring system (VMS). The online electronic inspection system provides for a transparent procedure, secure data recording and transmission to the relevant authorities. However, full alignment with the EU acquis and additional monitoring capacities are still required.
On market policy, legislation was aligned with the EU acquis on common market organisation.
Regarding aquaculture, ten contracts were granted in the district of Durres and Saranda for mussel and fish production. Further progress was made on preparation of the legal basis for the use of alien and absent species.
Regarding international agreements on fisheries and aquaculture management, Albania continued to fully implement the General Fisheries Commission for the Mediterranean (GFCM) recommendations and it should continue to actively participate in GFCM activities.
No progress was made on structural action, State aid and maritime spatial planning during the reporting period.
Chapter 22: Regional policy and coordination of structural instruments
Regional policy is the EU’s main tool for reducing regional disparities and investing in sustainable and inclusive socio-economic growth. It is operating through ‘‘shared management’’ between the Commission and EU Member States. The implementation of cohesion policy programmes requires appropriate administrative capacity on programme and project level, the establishment of systems of sound financial management and control and also the fulfilment of other EU acquis elements such as environmental or public procurement legislation.
Regarding the legislative framework, Albania has established a framework aligned with EU requirements, including the NUTS classification. However, this framework is currently not used for territorial analysis or evidence-based policy design. The Council of Ministers has not yet adopted a decision on the establishment of the partnership principle in line with the European Code of Conduct on Partnership. Albania progressed in its readiness to meet the
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enabling conditions of the Common Provisions Regulation (CPR) with the update of the planning for required investments in water and wastewater sectors. The updated Chapter 22 action plan needs to be endorsed by the Council of Ministers. The harmonisation of the European Grouping of Territorial Cooperation legislation should advance.
Regarding the institutional framework, staff turnover and organisational changes, especially with SASPAC as the Technical Secretariat to the Strategic Planning Committee, have negatively impacted preparations under this chapter. The lack of institutional continuity is an issue with the appointment in September 2025 of a 5th chapter negotiator in the last three years. Implementation of the closing benchmarks needs to accelerate, with clear identification and allocation of responsibilities among institutions expected to perform key Cohesion policy functions, and technical work in the sub-groups of the Interinstitutional Working Group for Chapter 22 needs to advance, to meet the deadlines set in the Chapter 22 action plan.
On administrative capacity, progress was made in strengthening staff retention within the IPA III management and control system through the adoption of a dedicated staff retention policy, supported by a financial incentive framework, in July 2026. Effective implementation of a staff retention policy remains critical for structures dealing with EU funds under indirect and shared management, along with accelerating the implementation of IPA III Sector Operational and Interreg cooperation programmes. Additional administrative capacity at the national and sub-national levels is required to support the partnership principle, multi-level governance, public consultations, and citizen engagement. SASPAC needs to coordinate partnership arrangements and communication on EU funds, while sector institutions and the Association of Municipalities are to ensure the effective involvement of stakeholders and local self-government units throughout the programming and implementation cycle. Understaffing and high turnover at SASPAC have disrupted operations and limited preparations for 2028-2034 Cross-Border Cooperation and Interreg programmes. Inter- institutional coordination with clear separation of functions and duties should be strengthened, building on the Reform Agenda coordination process, to improve effectiveness. Training for the cohesion policy ecosystem should be coordinated centrally to ensure complementarity and be designed and delivered by practitioners.
On programming, the territorial and urban dimensions should be systematically integrated into national sectoral policies. A comprehensive national framework for regional development remains to be established. Local self-government units need to strengthen their capacities for future cohesion policy, align development strategies with EU policy directions, including the 2025 EU Agenda for Cities, and prepare investment plans in cohesion sectors. While the National Single Project Pipeline is regularly updated and categorises projects by maturity, it excludes municipal-led projects and does not cover all relevant cohesion sectors. The National Association of Municipalities of Albania should be involved in policy planning and further strengthen its capacities. Active engagement of Albanian stakeholders in the EU Strategy for the Adriatic and Ionian Region should be promoted.
On monitoring and evaluation, administrative capacity has improved but requires further strengthening. Sectoral and IPA monitoring committees, as well as the Monitoring Committee of the Reform Agenda, meet regularly to discuss implementation progress. However, monitoring and national evaluation systems still need further alignment with cohesion policy requirements. In territorial cooperation, the prolonged lack of monitoring capacity within the National Authority raises concerns about the ability to fulfil programme implementation responsibilities, with potentially serious consequences for Albanian beneficiaries and partners, as well as at programme level.
On financial management, control and audit, the adoption of a new procedure for assurance declaration on the use of EU funds in June 2026 was a positive step. Particular attention should be paid to strengthening accounting and financial management systems, ensuring complete audit trails, improving the reliability and reconciliation of accounts,
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enhancing internal control arrangements, and implementing audit recommendations in a timely manner. The so far limited use of Simplified Cost Options and financing not linked to costs should be further explored to promote a stronger results-based approach. A permanent and transparent mechanism to ensure co-financing of multi-annual programmes in budget planning needs to be established. Integrated management information systems should support the recording, monitoring and reporting of EU funded operations throughout the programme cycle. Given the increasing use of performance-based financing under cohesion policy, administrative capacity for internal audit should be further strengthened.
On the fight against corruption, anti-corruption and anti-fraud measures need to be effectively implemented, in line with the new Inter-Sectoral Strategy for Anti-corruption 2024- 2030 and the National Anti-Fraud Strategy 2025-2027. Closer coordination between the Ministry for Public Administration and Anti-Corruption, the Ministry of Finance and SASPAC is essential. Preventing and managing conflicts of interest and protecting persons who report breaches of EU law must be prioritised in practice.
On visibility, transparency and communication, the SASPAC website has been established. The IPA network of communication officers for EU funds is not operational.
Chapter 33: Financial and budgetary provisions
This Chapter covers the rules governing the funding of the EU budget (‘own resources’). These resources mainly consist of: (i) contributions based on the gross national income of each Member State; (ii) customs duties; (iii) the non-recycled plastic resource and (iv) a resource based on value-added tax. Member States must have the appropriate administrative capacity to adequately coordinate and ensure the correct calculation, collection, payment and control of own resources.
On traditional own resources, Albania has continued to implement the 2024-2027 Medium-term revenue strategy (MTRS) and the 2024-2027 Strategy on public finance management. Implementation of the MTRS includes reform measures in both tax policy review and tax and customs administration efficiency with the aim of an additional increase of revenues by 1.8% of GDP at the end of 2027. To sustain revenue mobilisation, increase the government revenue-to-GDP ratio, and reduce tax evasion, a continued implementation of the MTRS, alongside progress with tax policy reforms, notably the adoption of the property tax law and the finalisation of the fiscal cadastre are required. The June 2025 evaluation of all tax exemptions still needs to be followed by concrete action on starting to remove some identified exemptions, in line with European Commission’s recommendation under the Economic Reform Program urging Albania to prepare proposals to reduce tax expenditure. As a result of mid-year monitoring of the implementation of the MTRS, Albania assessed some progress in the area of e-invoicing and data exchange with other institutions to identify high-risk taxpayers.
On VAT, tax exemptions remain a concern on domestic revenue mobilisation both at the central and local level. In 2026, Albania introduced a “fiscal peace” package enabling the write-off of tax liabilities older than 2014 and partial/conditional debt forgiveness for liabilities occurred during January 2015-December 2024. There has been good progress in proceeding quickly with VAT refund for businesses. The General Directorate of Taxes and the General Directorate of Customs are responsible for reporting on VAT collection and calculation of net VAT collected, on an annual basis, a requirement which will become mandatory upon Albania’s accession to EU.
On administrative infrastructure, progress is needed on creating the relevant institutions involved in the own-resources system and coordination body, and on implementing rules, in line with the EU acquis.
The legal provisions setting out the criteria for initiating public financial inspection, in cases of any irregularities, and serious financial mismanagement situations are in place. The general tax directorate and the general customs directorate continued their work on
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identification of tax evasion and fraud. (See also Chapters 1, 16, 29 and 32 on actions against corruption). Preliminary analysis and practices on calculation of the weighted average rate (WAR) for 2025, based on the VAT model, and on calculation of negative and positive corrections to revenue were conducted during the reporting period. In August 2026, Albania has drafted and sent for publication the new Law on Albania’s contribution to the EU’s budget.Continued efforts are needed to formalise the widespread informal economy, improve the exhaustiveness of the national accounts and GDP/GNI calculations and combat tax evasion and customs duty fraud.
CLUSTER 6: EXTERNAL RELATIONS
There are two chapters in this cluster: external relations (Chapter 30) and foreign, security and defence policy (Chapter 31).
Chapter 30: External relations
The EU has a common commercial policy towards non-EU countries, based on multilateral and bilateral agreements and autonomous measures. There are also EU rules in the field of humanitarian aid and development policy.
On the common commercial policy, Albania continued to coordinate its positions and align its policies closely with those of the EU, including within the World Trade Organisation (WTO) and its Dispute Settlement Body. Albania continued negotiations with Public Procurement Agreement (GPA) parties and attended the formal and informal sessions of the GPA committee that were held during the reporting period. As regards the WTO joint initiative on e-commerce, Albania supported the outcome agreed in 2024 and its incorporation into Annex 4 of the WTO Agreement. However, it did not join the other 67 WTO members, including the EU, who, during the 14th WTO Ministerial Conference (MC14) announced their intention to apply the agreement on an interim basis as soon as possible.
Albania continued its constructive role in the negotiations on CEFTA items under protocols six and seven and worked on implementation of the Common Regional Market action plan. In April 2026, the Albanian parliament adopted the Law on ratification of Additional Protocol 7 on Dispute Settlement. In February 2026, Albania completed the internal procedures for ratifying (i) the CEFTA joint committee decision on trade related aspects of intellectual property rights and (ii) the joint committee decision on facilitation of trade in services provided by travel agencies and tour operators.
In the area of dual-use goods, export controls of international transfers of military goods and dual-use items are applied in accordance with the 2018 Law which was amended with the March 2026 Law on state control on international transfers of military goods and dual use items and technologies. The Law provides a single system covering both dual-use items and military goods and is aligned with the relevant EU acquis. Albania adopted the EU dual-use list for 2025 in May 2026. In April 2026, Albania adopted a government’s decision providing for the screening of foreign direct investment (FDI) aligning with the relevant EU acquis. Albania has yet to align with the new EU framework for the FDI screening.
On bilateral agreements with third countries, Albania is a party to 46 bilateral investment treaties (BITs) in force, 22 of which have been concluded with 23 EU Member States. Five free trade agreements (FTAs) are in force, with the EU (SAA), CEFTA, EFTA, Türkiye and the United Kingdom. Albania ratified in April 2026 the decision of the joint FTA committee with Türkiye on amendments to the agreement between the two parties related to the concept of ”originating products” and methods of administrative cooperation. Albania adopted in February 2026 the action plan on aligning the international agreements with the EU acquis.
As regards prevention of capital punishment and torture, Albania adopted in January 2026 through a government Decision the list of goods that have no practical use other than
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for capital punishment or torture punishment, which are subject to state control of international transfers, in line with the EU acquis.
The regulatory framework for international cooperation in development policy and humanitarian aid remains to be developed. To this end, on 28 May 2026, Albania adopted the Roadmap on Sustainable Development Goals 2026-2030.
Chapter 31: Foreign, security and defence policy
Member States must be able to conduct political dialogue under the EU foreign, security and defence policy, align with EU statements, take part in EU actions, and apply restrictive measures.
Albania remained actively engaged in political dialogue with the EU on foreign and security policy issues. In April 2026, the second session of the EU-Albania Security and Defence Dialogue took place in Brussels. Albania participated in the EU-Western Balkans meetings of Political Directors in Sarajevo in October 2025, in Brussels in April 2026 and in Kruje in October 2026, the informal meetings of the Foreign Ministers in Brussels in November 2025 and in May 2026, as well as in the EU-Western Balkans Summit in Brussels in December 2025 and in Tivat in June 2026.
The institutional framework enabling Albania’s participation in the EU common foreign and security policy (CFSP) is in place and operational. During the reporting period, Albania remained fully aligned with CFSP (statements by the High Representative on behalf of the EU and Council Decisions on restrictive measures).
Albania has legal and institutional arrangements in place to deal with the implementation of the EU restrictive measures it has aligned with. In March 2026, Albania adopted a regulation establishing detailed procedures for the functioning of the Committee on International Restrictive Measures. However, Albania’s capacity for the technical implementation and enforcement of the complex EU restrictive measures should be further strengthened.
Albania continued its active cooperation with the UN and other international organisations,including the Council of Europe. Albania is a member of the UN Human Rights Council for 2024-2026 and will host the next NATO Summit. Albania continued to align with most EU positions in multilateral fora on a regular basis, including co-sponsoring the UN General Assembly resolution on “Support for lasting peace in Ukraine” in February 2026. Albania is a member of the Coalition of the Willing, the International Coalition for the Return of Ukrainian Children and participated in the High-Level Meeting organised in Brussels in May 2026. Albania also signed the Convention establishing the International Claims Commission for Ukraine regarding claims for damages, loss, or injury caused by Russia’s invasion in December 2025. Furthermore, Albania has in place a national action plan 2023-2027 on Women, Peace and Security. Albania also continues to be a member of the Organisation for Islamic Cooperation.
Albania is party to the Rome Statue of the International Criminal Court. Albania has made progress in aligning with the Council Decision 2011/168/CFSP of 21 March 2011 and with the related EU guiding principles on bilateral immunity agreements.
Albania is a founding member of the US-led Board of Peace, initiated by the US President in January 2026.
On conflict prevention,Albaniamaintained itssupport for EU measures and instruments including through UN and NATO missions such as KFOR in Kosovo. Albania also expressed readiness to deploy troops as part of the International Stabilization Force for Gaza mandated by the UNSC Resolution 2803 of November 2025.
On non-proliferation and disarmament, Albania is a party to most international treaties and conventions. Its new National Strategy for the Control of Small and Light Weapons,
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Ammunition and Explosives 2025–2030, along with the Action Plan 2025–2028, was approved in December 2025. In addition, a new national Strategy for the non-proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction 2026-2028 with its action plan for implementation was adopted in November 2025. Albania’s law, organisation, and operations of the national arms export control system remain aligned with the EU Common position 2008/944. Albania’s accession process to join the Wassenaar Arrangement remains blocked by one of the Participating States. The EU Special Envoy for Disarmament and Non-Proliferation visited Albania in July 2026.
In terms of security measures, Albania maintains the necessary procedures in place to ensure the operational implementation of the security of information agreement with the EU.
Albania continued its participation in EU military crisis management missions and operations under the common security and defence policy (CSDP). In addition to EUFOR Althea in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Albania now also contributes to EUNAVFOR ASPIDESfor maritime security in the Red Sea, the Indian Ocean and the Gulf. The country’s participation in the EU Battlegroup Concept with a light company-sized unit continued. Albania continues to contribute to regional cooperation in military medicine through the Balkan Medical Task Force. It participates in training activities of the European Security and Defence College (ESDC).
Regarding hybrid threats, Albania has a national security strategy with a strong focus on building capacities to counter hybrid threats, a National Cybersecurity Strategy 2025-2030 and action plan 2025-2027, (see under Chapter 10 – Digital transformation and media) and a national strategy against foreign interference and disinformation in place. Further institutional and capacity building efforts are required to build societal resilience against foreign interference and information manipulation, including disinformation and all other forms of hybrid threats. The country is member of the European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats (Hybrid CoE). In October 2025, Tirana hosted the third NATO Cyber Defence Conference. Additionally, Albania has actively engaged in the first negotiations in the new UN Global Mechanism on Information and Communications Technologies in the Context of International Security.
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ANNEX I – RELATIONS BETWEEN THE EU AND ALBANIA
Albania is a candidate country since 2014. The first Intergovernmental Conference on accession negotiations took place on 19 July 2022. On the same day, the Commission launched the analytical examination of the acquis – the ‘screening’ process. Intergovernmental conferences were convened to open accession negotiations on cluster 1 – fundamentals (October 2024), cluster 6 – external relations (December 2024), cluster 2 – internal market (April 2025), cluster 3 – competitiveness and inclusive growth (May 2025), cluster 4 – the green agenda and sustainable connectivity (September 2025) and cluster 5 – resources, agriculture and cohesion (November 2025). The Commission presented its Interim Benchmark Assessment Report in March 2026, followed by an intergovernmental conference in May 2026.
Albania has been participating in the stabilisation and Association process since 1999. The Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA) between Albania and the EU came into force in April 2009. The transitional period of the SAA ended on 31 March 2019, and since 1 April 2019, Albania is fully associated with the EU. In the reporting period, Albania continued to implement, overall, its commitments under the SAA. Regular political and economic dialogue has continued through the relevant joint bodies under the SAA. The Stabilisation and Association Parliamentary Committee met in October 2024 and in June 2025. The first meeting of the Joint Consultative Committee with the European Economic and Social Council Committee took place in April 2025. The third meeting of the Joint Consultative Committee with the Committee of the Regions took place in June 2026. The Stabilisation and Association Parliamentary Committee took place in July 2026.
The SAA and its Interim Agreement, applied since 2006, have allowed progressive trade liberalisation and mutual duty-free access for most goods. Since 2000, Albania has also benefited from the ”autonomous trade measures”. The EU is the main trading partner of Albania, followed by CEFTA countries. Trade integration with the EU is high. In 2024, the EU remained the main trading partner of Albania, accounting for 57.4% of Albania’s total trade in goods (71.7% of total exports and 51.5% of total imports). Albania’s total trade in 2024 was worth EUR 12.6 billion. The country’s trade deficit with the EU amounted to EUR 1.9 billion in 2024. Albania’s trade in goods with CEFTA represented around 9.7% of total trade in 2024, as compared with 10.3% in 2023.
Visa liberalisation for citizens of Albanian citizens travelling to the Schengen area has been in force since December 2010. A readmission agreement between the EU and Albania has been in force since 2006. The Commission’s eighth report under the visa suspension mechanism in 202517 concluded that Albania continues to meet the visa liberalisation requirements.
Albania has continued to fully align itself with all EU CFSP positions and declarations during the reporting period. Albania continued to participate in EU crisis management missions and operations under the CSDP,notably EUFOR Althea in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the EU’s Naval Force (EUNAVFOR) Operation ASPIDES, expressing readiness to step up its contributions.
A Security and Defence Partnership between Albania and the EU was signed in December 2024 and the EU-Albania Security and Defence Dialogue was launched in April 2025 in Tirana, with a second edition held in Brussels in April 2026.
Albania benefits from bilateral assistance measures under the European Peace Facility (EPF). Three assistance measures were adopted since 2024, with the last one approved in May 2026, for an overall support worth EUR 49 million. The objective of EPF support is to strengthen the operational effectiveness, mobility and protection of the Albanian Armed
17 COM(2025) 792 final and SWD(2025) 429 final.
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Forces18. The Balkans Medical Task Force, in which Albania participates, benefits from a EUR 6 million 2022 support measure under the EPF.
Under the Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance 2021 – 2027 (IPA III)19, a fourth financing decision of EUR 67.35 million for the Annual Action Plan 2024 supports the fight against corruption, local governance and economic development, food safety, forests, and employment and social inclusion. In addition, the financing decision of EUR 130 million for three 2024-2027 operational programmes supports efforts in digitalisation, advancing Albania’s green agenda, and youth employment. The IPA III financing decision for 2025- 2027 for the Western Balkans adopted in July 2025 allocated EUR 100 million for programmes in Albania on justice sector reform and human rights, support for rule of law, democracy, and good governance, critical raw materials and the EU integration process. These programmes are complemented by a significant package of multi-country programmes. The rural development programme IPARD III (EUR 94 million EU contribution) has not yet started, due to the ongoing entrustment process. Albania also participates in five cross-border cooperation programmes, transnational cooperation programmes and EU programmes.
Under the Reform and Growth Facility (RGF), Albania’s indicative maximum allocation amounts to EUR 922.1 million. Disbursement of EU funds under the RGF is conditional on compliance with the preconditions, general conditions and on delivery of reforms set out in the Reform Agenda. As of May 2026, EUR 212.8 million (including pre-financing) in total have been released for Albania. This funding comprises both grants and loans, with a majority portion being channelled directly through the WBIF and used for infrastructure projects in the country. The release of the funding is based on the achievement of 33 out of 66 reform steps due in this period.
Albania has signed cooperation agreements with all EU justice and home affairs agencies of the EU. Albania participates in two transnational cooperation programmes. Albania participates with IPA support in these EU programmes: Erasmus+, Creative Europe (Culture and Media strands), Horizon Europe and the European Cooperation in Science and Technology (COST – Agency funded under Horizon Europe), Customs 2020, Fiscalis 2020, Single Market Programme, Justice Programme, Citizens, Equality, Rights and Values Programme (CERV), EU Fundamental Rights Agency (FRA) (as an observer), the Digital Europe programme, Union Civil Protection Mechanism, European Solidarity Corps (youth component - volunteering). To improve the sustainability in local public finances and to enhance the implementation of effective green budgeting practices, Albania is participating as an observer in a pilot project under the Technical Support Instrument.
As of April 2026, the Western Balkans Investment Framework (WBIF) has supported Albania to the amount of approximately EUR 479 million, in the form of IPA III grants for flagship projects in the areas of clean energy, the environment and climate, the digital future, and sustainable transport. Western Balkans Investment Framework has also supported additional 5 infrastructure projects with a total contribution of EUR 80 million financed under the Reform and Growth Facility.
The EU provides support via IPA and the Foreign Policy Instrument to strengthen Western Balkans partners’ resilience in facing hybrid threats, including cyber and foreign information manipulation and interference.
18 Council Decision (CFSP) 2024/1979, Council Decision (CFSP) 2025/1562 and Council Decision (CFSP) 2026/1153. 19 Official Journal L 330, 20.9.2021.
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ANNEX II: STATISTICAL ANNEX
STATISTICAL DATA (as of 14/09/2026)
Albania
Basic data Note 2013 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
Population (thousand) 2 898 i 2 830 i 2 794 i 2 762 i 2 391 i 2 363 i
Total area of the country (km²) : 28 791 e 28 791 e 28 791 e 28 791 e 28 791 e
National accounts Note 2013 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
Gross domestic product (GDP) (million national currency) 1 356 283 1 870 218 2 150 558 2 365 186 2 517 279 2 648 505 p
Gross domestic product (GDP) (million euro) 9 670 15 272 18 075 21 739 24 995 27 075 p
GDP per capita (euro) 3 340 5 430 6 510 : : :
GDP per capita (in purchasing power standards (PPS) 7 665 10 307 12 067 : : :
GDP per capita (in PPS), relative to the EU average (EU-27 = 100) 29.2 31.0 33.4 : : :
Real GDP growth rate: change on previous year of GDP volume (%) 1.7 9.0 4.8 4.0 4.0 p :
Employment growth (national accounts data), relative to the previous year (%) : : : : : :
Labour productivity growth: growth in GDP (in volume) per person employed, relative to the previous year (%)
: : : : : :
Unit labour cost growth, relative to the previous year (%) : : : : : :
Nominal unit labour cost index based on persons (3 year % change) : : : : : :
Labour productivity per person employed: GDP (in PPS) per person employed relative to EU average (EU-27 = 100)
: : : : : :
Gross value added by main sectors
Agriculture, forestry and fisheries (%) 21.2 20.3 19.3 18.4 17.7 16.9 p
Industry (%) 14.6 13.4 13.9 13.6 12.8 11.7 p
Construction (%) 16.5 14.4 13.9 13.8 14.1 14.6 p
Services (%) 47.7 i 51.8 i 52.9 i 54.1 i 55.4 i 56.9 pi
Final consumption expenditure, as a share of GDP (%) 87.6 83.5 82.7 81.6 81.4 82.2 p
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Gross fixed capital formation, as a share of GDP (%) 28.1 27.5 26.0 24.6 24.3 24.2 p
Exports of goods and services, relative to GDP (%) 28.8 31.0 36.9 38.0 36.3 37.0 p
Imports of goods and services, relative to GDP (%) 46.7 44.4 47.5 43.9 43.2 42.6 p
Gross fixed capital formation by the general government sector, as a percentage of GDP (%) 4.5 wd 7.0 wd 6.1 wd 5.8 wd 5.3 wd 5.0 wd
Business Note 2013 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
Industrial production volume index (2015 = 100) 1) 97.8 100.0 102.9 94.0 87.0 84.7
Number of active enterprises (number) : 104 031 113 460 117 291 119 030 p :
Birth rate: number of enterprise births in the reference period (t) divided by the number of enterprises active in t (%)
10.9 w 12.9 w 12.9 w 10.8 w 12.5 w :
Death rate: number of enterprise deaths in the reference period (t) divided by the number of enterprises active in t (%)
: 1.0 w 0.6 w 0.7 w 1.3 w :
People employed in SMEs as a share of all persons employed (within the non-financial business economy) (%)
: 81.1 83.5 83.4 : :
Value added by SMEs (in the non-financial business economy) (EUR million) : 4 125 i 5 599 i 6 877 i : :
Total value added (in the non-financial business economy) (EUR million) : 5 424 7 141 8 794 : :
Inflation rate and house prices Note 2013 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
Consumer price index (CPI), change relative to the previous year (%) : 2.3 d 6.6 d 5.3 d 2.6 d 2.3 d
Balance of payments Note 2013 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
Balance of payments: current account total (million euro) : - 1 166.2 - 1 062.9 - 269.6 - 608.1 - 179.7
Balance of payments current account: trade balance (million euro) : - 3 828.9 - 4 267.8 - 4 539.8 - 5 593.1 - 5 959.0
Balance of payments current account: net services (million euro) : 1 795.8 2 400.4 3 351.7 3 876.0 4 470.8
Balance of payments current account: net balance for primary income (million euro) : - 211.0 - 314.5 - 277.9 - 192.5 - 50.5
Balance of payments current account: net balance for secondary income (million euro) : 1 077.9 1 118.9 1 196.4 1 301.5 1 359.1
Net balance for primary and secondary income: of which government transfers (million euro) : 48.6 31.4 20.3 18.9 18.1
*3 year backward moving average of the current account balance relative to GDP (%) : - 8.0 - 7.4 - 4.9 - 3.2 :
*Five year change in share of world exports of goods and services (%) : 21.4 24.6 53.4 56.0 112.1
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Net balance (inward - outward) of foreign direct investment (FDI) (million euro) : 988.8 i C 1 253.6 i 1 337.3 i :
Foreign direct investment (FDI) abroad (million euro) : 53.3 C 244.9 242.2 :
of which FDI of the reporting economy in the EU-27 countries (million euro) : 27.3 C 98.9 99.1 :
Foreign direct investment (FDI) in the reporting economy (million euro) 953.2 w 1 043.3 w 1 361.9 w 1 500.4 w 1 581.4 w 1 633.2 w
of which FDI of the EU-27 countries in the reporting economy (million euro) : 679.8 736.3 912.3 861.6 :
*Net international investment position, relative to GDP (%) : - 50.2 - 47.3 - 42.1 - 40.9 :
Year on year rate of change in gross inflow of remittances (in national currency) from migrant workers (%)
5.7 i 5.0 i 4.6 i 4.3 i 4.2 i :
Public finance Note 2013 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
General government deficit / surplus, relative to GDP (%) - 3.2 wd -2.8 wd -3.0 wd -0.8 wd -0.3 wd -1.1 wd
General government gross debt relative to GDP (%) 63.7 wd 70.1 wd 60.0 wd 54.6 wd 51.5 wd 49.7 wd
Total government revenues, as a percentage of GDP (%) 25.7 wd 30.0 wd 28.5 wd 29.0 wd 29.6 wd 30.2 wd
Total government expenditure, as a percentage of GDP (%) 28.9 wd 32.9 wd 31.4 wd 29.8 wd 29.9 wd 31.3 wd
Financial indicators Note 2013 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
Gross external debt of the whole economy, relative to GDP (%) : 64.0 i 54.0 i 46.3 i 40.7 i 38.0 i
Gross external debt of the whole economy, relative to total exports (%) 228.9 w 205.3 w 145.0 w 119.8 w 111.6 w 102.3 w
Money supply: M1 (banknotes, coins, overnight deposits, million euro) 2 109.4 w 5 727.5 w 6 184.6 w 7 436.6 w 8 616.0 w 10 000.9 w
Total credit by monetary financial institutions to residents (consolidated) (million euro) 7 256.3 12 220.4 13 659.5 : : :
*Annual change in financial sector liabilities (%) : 11.6 - 3.4 : : :
*Private debt, consolidated, relative to GDP (%) 71.7 54.5 48.8 : : :
Interest rates: day-to-day money rate, per annum (%) 2) 3.80 w 0.65 w 1.55 w 3.20 w 2.90 w 2.62 w
Euro exchange rates: average of period (1 euro = … national currency) 140.260 122.460 118.980 108.800 100.710 97.820
Trade-weighted effective exchange rate index, 42 countries (2015 = 100) : : : : : :
*3 year change (T/T-3) in the trade-weighted effective exchange rate index, 42 countries (2015 = 100)
: : : : : :
Value of reserve assets (including gold) (million euro) : 938.9 - 71.8 911.5 262.5 1 129.9
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External trade in goods Note 2013 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
Value of imports: all goods, all partners (million euro) 3 699 6 545 8 002 8 038 8 889 9 070
Value of exports: all goods, all partners (million euro) 1 761 3 012 4 090 4 044 3 698 3 537
Trade balance: all goods, all partners (million euro) - 1 938 - 3 533 - 3 912 - 3 994 - 5 191 - 5 533
Terms of trade (export price index / import price index * 100) (number) : 100.0 iw 95.3 iw 103.2 iw 95.3 iw 95.3 iw
Share of exports to EU-27 countries in value of total exports (%) 76.2 iw 72.2 iw 73.4 iw 70.8 iw 71.6 iw :
Share of imports from EU-27 countries in value of total imports (%) 63.5 iw 54.4 iw 51.6 iw 50.9 iw 51.4 iw :
Demography Note 2013 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
Crude rate of natural change of population (natural growth rate): number of births minus deaths (per thousand inhabitants)
5.3 - 1.2 0.2 0.9 0.5 0.5
Infant mortality rate deaths of children under one year of age (per thousand live births) 7.9 8.4 6.5 6.1 : :
Life expectancy at birth: male (years) 76.0 73.6 77.4 : 78.4 b :
Life expectancy at birth: female (years) 80.1 77.7 80.9 : 82.4 b :
Labour market Note 2013 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
Economic activity rate for persons aged 20–64: proportion of the population aged 20–64 that is economically active (%)
67.6 ew 75.1 ew 79.1 ew 81.4 w 81.6 w 82.3 w
Employment rate for persons aged 20–64: proportion of the population aged 20–64 that are in employment (%)
56.7 ew 66.3 ew 70.4 ew 73.4 w 74.1 w 74.9 w
Male employment rate for persons aged 20–64 (%) 64.8 ew 74.6 ew 77.4 ew 79.6 w 81.2 w 82.1 w
Female employment rate for persons aged 20–64 (%) 49.3 ew 58.3 ew 63.7 ew 67.5 w 67.4 w 68.0 w
Employment rate for persons aged 55–64: proportion of the population aged 55–64 that are in employment (%)
51.1 ew 60.0 ew 67.4 ew 70.9 w 70.8 w 72.8 w
Employment by main sectors
Agriculture, forestry and fisheries (%) 44.0 ew 33.8 ew 33.9 ew 37.2 w 36.7 w 33.8 w
Industry (%) 9.7 ew 13.8 ew 14.3 ew 12.2 w 12.5 w 12.9 w
Construction (%) 7.1 ew 8.1 ew 7.6 ew 7.4 w 7.9 w 7.4 w
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Services (%) 39.2 ew 44.3 ew 44.2 ew 43.2 w 42.8 w 45.9 w
People employed in the public sector as a share of total employment, persons aged 20–64 (%)
17.8 ew 17.1 ew 16.1 ew 18.2 w 19.0 w 18.0 w
People employed in the private sector as a share of total employment, persons aged 20–64 (%)
82.2 ew 82.9 ew 83.9 ew 81.8 w 81.0 w 82.0 w
Unemployment rate: proportion of the labour force that is unemployed (%) 15.9 ew 11.6 ew 11.0 ew 9.6 w 8.5 w 8.6 w
Male unemployment rate (%) 17.8 ew 11.4 ew 10.6 ew 9.3 w 8.0 w 7.5 w
Female unemployment rate (%) 13.5 ew 11.8 ew 11.4 ew 9.9 w 9.2 w 9.8 w
Youth unemployment rate: proportion of the labour force aged 15–24 that is unemployed (%) 31.4 ew 27.1 ew 24.9 ew 24.5 w 22.8 w 21.5 w
Long-term unemployment rate: proportion of the labour force that has been unemployed for 12 months or more (%)
11.5 ew 7.3 ew 7.4 ew 6.8 w 6.5 w 6.2 w
Unemployment rate for persons (aged 25–64) having completed at most lower secondary education (ISCED levels 0-2) (%)
13.6 ew 9.8 ew 9.3 ew 8.3 w 8.3 w 9.3 w
Unemployment rate for persons (aged 25–64) having completed tertiary education (ISCED levels 5-8) (%)
: 8.4 ew 8.4 ew 7.3 w 5.5 w 4.8 w
Social cohesion Note 2013 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
Average nominal monthly wages and salaries (national currency) 3) 52 150 ew 57 190 ew 61 898 ew 70 539 ew 77 485 ew 83 878 ew
Index of real wages and salaries (index of nominal wages and salaries divided by the inflation index) (2016 = 100)
: 104 ew 106 ew 115 ew 124 ew 131 ew
Gini coefficient : 33 31 30 : :
Poverty gap : 25.5 24.6 25.2 22.5 :
Standard of living Note 2013 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
Number of passenger cars relative to population size (number per thousand population) 118.0 212.0 232.0 292.0 328.0 :
Infrastructure Note 2013 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
Density of railway network (lines in operation per thousand km²) : 7.8 i 7.1 i 8.8 i 8.8 i :
Length of motorways (kilometres) 0 25 25 25 49 :
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Education, Innovation and Research Note 2013 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
Percentage of persons aged 30-34 with a tertiary education level (ISCED 2011 levels 5 to 8) 15.7 ew 32.1 ew 38.4 ew 36.5 w 37.8 w 38.6 w
Percentage of persons aged 30-34 with a tertiary education level (ISCED 2011 levels 5 to 8), males
12.7 ew 25.4 ew 31.9 ew 31.2 w 34.0 w 33.7 w
Percentage of persons aged 30-34 with a tertiary education level (ISCED 2011 levels 5 to 8), females
18.3 ew 39.3 ew 45.5 ew 42.0 w 42.5 w 44.3 w
Participation in early childhood education (children aged 3 and over) : 76.9 w 82.2 w 82.9 w 94.2 w 97.5 w
Participation in early childhood education (children aged 3 and over), males : 78.5 w 83.1 w 84.3 w 93.8 w 98.0 w
Participation in early childhood education (children aged 3 and over), females : 75.2 w 81.1 w 81.5 w 94.6 w 97.0 w
Low achieving 15-year-olds in reading (%) : : 73.7 : : :
Low achieving 15-year-olds in mathematics (%) : : 73.9 : : :
Low achieving 15-year-olds in science (%) : : 67.4 : : :
Early leavers from education and training: proportion of persons aged 18-24 with at most lower secondary education (at most ISCED 2011 level 2) who are not in further education or training
30.6 ew 16.8 w 15.5 w 15.7 w 15.4 w 12.0 w
Early leavers from education and training: proportion of men aged 18-24 with at most lower secondary education (at most ISCED 2011 level 2) who are not in further education or training
: : : : : :
Early leavers from education and training: proportion of women aged 18-24 with at most lower secondary education (at most ISCED 2011 level 2) who are not in further education or training
: : : : : :
Proportion of persons aged 25-64 having participated in education and training (last 4 weeks)
1.5 w 0.8 w 0.6 w 0.7 w 1.6 w 2.1 w
Proportion of persons aged 25-64 having participated in education and training (last 4 weeks), men
1.7 w 0.8 w 0.7 w 0.6 w 1.3 w 2.1 w
Proportion of persons aged 25-64 having participated in education and training (last 4 weeks), women
1.4 w 0.8 w 0.6 w 0.8 w 1.9 w 2.2 w
Exposure of vocational education and training (VET) graduates to work-based learning (% of population aged 20-34)
: 2.5 w 2.4 w 1.6 w 1.9 w 3.9 w
Share of individuals having at least basic digital skills (% of population aged 16-74) : 23.8 : 23.3 : 27.7
Share of individuals having at least basic digital skills (% of population aged 16-74), males : 24.2 : 25.1 : 28.1
Share of individuals having at least basic digital skills (% of population aged 16-74), females : 23.5 : 21.6 : 27.2
Public expenditure on education relative to GDP (%) 3.3 iw 3.1 iw 2.9 iw 2.9 iw 3.0 piw :
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Gross domestic expenditure on R&D relative to GDP (%) : 0.19 0.20 : : :
Government budget appropriations or outlays on R&D (GBAORD), as a percentage of GDP (%)
: : 0.17 e 0.24 e 0.30 :
Percentage of households who have internet access at home (%) : 90.9 98.4 97.7 98.2 99.3
Environment Note 2013 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
Index of greenhouse gas emissions, CO2 equivalent (1990 = 100) : : : : : :
Energy intensity of the economy (kg of oil equivalent per 1 000 euro GDP at 2015 constant prices)
241.2 188.1 172.7 165.7 160.9 :
Electricity generated from renewable sources relative to gross electricity consumption (%) 62.7 94.4 103.0 105.4 105.2 :
Road share of inland freight transport (based on tonne-km) (%) : : : : : :
Energy Note 2013 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
Primary production of all energy products (thousand TOE) 2 034 1 823 1 607 1 799 1 682 :
Primary production of crude oil (thousand TOE) 1 207 712 657 642 621 :
Primary production of solid fuels (thousand TOE) 1 131 148 188 119 :
Primary production of gas (thousand TOE) 15 44 38 38 42 :
Net imports of all energy products (thousand TOE) 604 i 553 i 705 i 488 i 613 i :
Gross inland energy consumption (thousand TOE) 2 365 2 298 2 209 2 202 2 236 :
Gross electricity generation (GWh) 6 959 8 963 7 003 9 006 8 256 :
Agriculture Note 2013 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
Agricultural output volume index (at producer prices) (2015 = 100) : : : : : :
Utilised agricultural area (thousand hectares) : 1 165.6 1 164.4 1 044.6 1 126.5 :
Livestock numbers: live bovine animals (thousand heads, end of period) : 336.8 297.7 263.4 272.0 275.0
Livestock numbers: live swine (thousand heads, end of period) : 159.2 137.3 114.8 104.0 74.7
Livestock numbers: live sheep and live goats (thousand heads, end of period) : 2 255.8 i 2 093.3 i 1 846.5 i 1 791.7 i 1 735.7 i
Raw milk available on farms (thousand tonnes) : : : : : :
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Harvested crop production: cereals (including rice) (thousand tonnes) : 691.4 690.9 701.3 649.9 :
Harvested crop production: sugar beet (thousand tonnes) : 24.4 21.3 20.4 17.8 17.8
Harvested crop production: vegetables (thousand tonnes) : : : : : :
Source: Eurostat and/or the statistical authorities in Albania
: = not available
b = break in time series
C = confidential value
d = definition differs
e = estimated
p = provisional
i = Eurostat estimate
w= data supplied by and under the responsibility of the national statistical authority and published on an "as is" basis and without any assurance as regards their quality and adherence to EU statistical methodology
* = Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure (MIP) indicator
Footnotes:
1) Based on NACE Rev. 2. Coverage is Sections B to D.
2) Annual average of the Tribor rate – interbank rate for overnight loans.
3) Public sector only.
EN EN
EUROPEAN COMMISSION
Brussels, 4.11.2026 SWD(2026) 691 final
COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT
Bosnia and Herzegovina 2026 Report
Accompanying the document
COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN
PARLIAMENT, THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL
COMMITTEE AND THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS
2026 Communication on EU enlargement policy
{COM(2026) 690 final} - {SWD(2026) 690 final} - {SWD(2026) 692 final} -
{SWD(2026) 693 final} - {SWD(2026) 694 final} - {SWD(2026) 695 final} - {SWD(2026) 696 final} - {SWD(2026) 697 final} - {SWD(2026) 698 final} -
{SWD(2026) 699 final} - {SWD(2026) 700 final}
1
TABLE OF CONTENTS
1.INTRODUCTION ...................................................................................................................................................... 3 1.1. CONTEXT ............................................................................................................................................................... 3 1.2. MAIN FINDINGS OF THE REPORT ................................................................................................................................. 4 1.3. ASSESSMENT OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE STEPS SPECIFIED IN THE COMMISSION’S RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CANDIDATE
STATUS 20
2. CLUSTER 1: THE FUNDAMENTALS OF THE ACCESSION PROCESS .................................................................. 22
2.1. FUNCTIONING OF DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS AND PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION REFORM ................................................... 22
2.1.1. Democracy ......................................................................................................................................... 22
2.1.2. Public administration reform .................................................................................................................... 25 2.2. RULE OF LAW AND FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS............................................................................................................ 28
2.2.1. Chapter 23: Judiciary and fundamental rights .................................................................................. 28
2.2.2. Chapter 24: Justice, freedom and security ......................................................................................... 46 2.3. ECONOMIC CRITERIA .............................................................................................................................................. 57
2.3.1. The existence of a functioning market economy....................................................................................... 57
2.3.2. The capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the EU .................................. 62 2.4. PUBLIC PROCUREMENT, STATISTICS AND FINANCIAL CONTROL ......................................................................................... 64
Chapter 5: Public procurement ........................................................................................................................... 64
Chapter 18: Statistics .......................................................................................................................................... 65
Chapter 32: Financial control .............................................................................................................................. 67
3. GOOD NEIGHBOURLY RELATIONS AND REGIONAL COOPERATION ................................................................... 68
4. RESILIENCE, SECURITY, DEFENCE ...................................................................................................................... 70
5. ABILITY TO ASSUME THE OBLIGATIONS OF MEMBERSHIP ................................................................................ 71
CLUSTER 2: INTERNAL MARKET ....................................................................................................................................... 71
Chapter 1: Free movement of goods ................................................................................................................... 71
Chapter 2: Freedom of movements for workers ................................................................................................. 73
Chapter 3: Right of establishment and freedom to provide services .................................................................. 73
Chapter 4: Free movement of capital.................................................................................................................. 74
Chapter 6: Company law ..................................................................................................................................... 74
Chapter 7: Intellectual property law ................................................................................................................... 75
Chapter 8: Competition policy ............................................................................................................................. 75
Chapter 9: Financial services ............................................................................................................................... 76
Chapter 28: Consumer and health protection ..................................................................................................... 77 CLUSTER 3: COMPETITIVENESS AND INCLUSIVE GROWTH ...................................................................................................... 79
Chapter 10: Digital transformation and media ................................................................................................... 79
Chapter 16: Taxation ........................................................................................................................................... 81
Chapter 17: Economic and monetary policy ....................................................................................................... 81
Chapter 19: Social policy and employment ......................................................................................................... 82
Chapter 20: Enterprise and industrial policy ....................................................................................................... 84
Chapter 25: Science and research ....................................................................................................................... 85
Chapter 26: Education and culture ..................................................................................................................... 86
Chapter 29: Customs union ................................................................................................................................. 88 CLUSTER 4: THE GREEN AGENDA AND SUSTAINABLE CONNECTIVITY........................................................................................ 88
Chapter 14: Transport policy ............................................................................................................................... 88
Chapter 15: Energy.............................................................................................................................................. 90
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Chapter 21: Trans-European Networks ............................................................................................................... 91
Chapter 27: Environment and climate change .................................................................................................... 92 CLUSTER 5: RESOURCES, AGRICULTURE AND COHESION ........................................................................................................ 94
Chapter 11: Agriculture and rural development ................................................................................................. 94
Chapter 12: Food safety, veterinary and phytosanitary policy ........................................................................... 95
Chapter 13: Fisheries and aquaculture ............................................................................................................... 96
Chapter 22: Regional policy and coordination of structural instruments ........................................................... 97
Chapter 33: Financial and budgetary provisions ................................................................................................. 98 CLUSTER 6: EXTERNAL RELATIONS.................................................................................................................................... 98
Chapter 30: External relations ............................................................................................................................ 98
Chapter 31: Foreign, security and defence policy ............................................................................................... 99 ANNEX I – RELATIONS BETWEEN THE EU AND BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA ............................................................................ 102 ANNEX II – STATISTICAL ANNEX ..................................................................................................................................... 104
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1.INTRODUCTION1
1.1. CONTEXT
Bosnia and Herzegovina applied for EU membership in February 2016. The Commission adopted an Opinion2 on the membership application in May 2019, setting out 14 key priorities. In December 2022, the European Council granted Bosnia and Herzegovina candidate country status3 on the understanding that eight steps specified in the Commission’s recommendation4 are taken. Following the Commission’s recommendation5, the European Council decided in March 2024 to open accession negotiations with Bosnia and Herzegovina. The European Council invited the Commission to prepare the negotiating framework with a view to its adoption by the Council the moment all relevant steps set out in the Commission’s recommendation of October 2022 have been taken6.
While the authorities broadly continued to publicly declare their commitment to the strategic goal of EU integration, the reporting period was marked by increasing disengagement from the EU path on the part of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The work of the executive and legislature continued to be hindered by the lack of a functioning ruling coalition, and key EU- related reforms still need to be adopted. In parallel, Bosnia and Herzegovina pursued bilateral cooperation and strategic investments with other external partners while international positions towards the country evolved. The reporting period was marked by continued fallout from the criminal conviction and removal of Milorad Dodik from the office of the President of the Republika Srpska entity, including institutional changes and early entity Presidential elections. In May 2026, High Representative Christian Schmidt announced his resignation, and in June 2026 his deputy Louis Crishock was appointed Acting High Representative on an interim basis, awaiting the appointment of a new High Representative. While the severe political tensions in Bosnia and Herzegovina reported last year initially subsided, political posturing, divisive rhetoric and anti-EU narratives increased ahead of the general elections. Historical revisionism, genocide denial, and glorification of war crimes were prominent among some political leaders, particularly in the Republika Srpska entity, as seen following the death of convicted war criminal Ratko Mladić. His funeral in Belgrade was attended by leaders and politicians from the Republika Srpska entity and prompted strong reactions in the country and the region. Such instances are fundamentally incompatible with EU values. Following the October 2026 general elections, Bosnia and Herzegovina should proceed with setting up all executive and legislative bodies and show a renewed commitment to deliver swiftly on EU reforms, in line with the EU acquis and European standards, addressing all relevant steps to progress on its EU path.
Bosnia and Herzegovina showed some engagement towards implementing the Growth Plan for the Western Balkans across its four pillars. In September 2025, Bosnia and Herzegovina
1 This report covers the period from 1 September 2025 to 1 September 2026. It is based on input from a variety of sources, including contributions from the government of Bosnia and Herzegovina, EU Member States, European Parliament reports and information from various international and non- governmental organisations. It also includes the results of comparative assessments and indices produced by other stakeholders, in particular in the area of rule of law. The report uses the following assessment scale to describe the state of play: early stage, some level of preparation, moderately prepared, good level of preparation and well advanced. To describe progress made during the reporting period, it uses the following scale: backsliding, no progress, limited progress, some progress, good progress and very good progress. Where appropriate, interim steps have also been used. 2 SWD(2019) 2022 final, COM(2019) 261 final. 3 European Council conclusions, 15 December 2022. 4 COM(2022) 528 final. 5 COM(2024) 129 final. 6 European Council conclusions, 21 and 22 March 2024, paragraph 30.
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adopted its Reform Agenda as envisaged under the Reform and Growth Facility (Growth Plan for the Western Balkans). Bosnia and Herzegovina still needs to sign and ratify the Facility and Loan Agreements, appoint a Reform and Growth Facility Coordinator, establish a monitoring and reporting structure and urgently proceed with implementing the reforms it has committed itself to. As a result of the delayed submission of the Reform Agenda, Bosnia and Herzegovina is operating under a shortened implementation period and with a reduced indicative allocation. The grace period for the first tranche of reforms is set to expire at the end of 2026. Should the legal framework and applicable conditions not be in place by then, Bosnia and Herzegovina will lose out on the corresponding funds.
1.2. MAIN FINDINGS OF THE REPORT
CLUSTER 1: THE FUNDAMENTALS OF THE ACCESSION PROCESS
Democracy
The legal and institutional framework regarding elections requiressubstantial reforms. Constitutional and electoral reforms are needed to ensure political equality and non- discrimination of all citizens. Issues of electoral integrity remain, in line with findings from international bodies. All political stakeholders must respect the independence of the Central Electoral Commission (CEC).
Parliament can exercise its powers in a partially effective way. Legislative output remained low and parliamentary sessions of the House of Peoples were regularly disrupted. Oversight over the executives remained weak.
The institutions in charge of the EU integration process are broadly in place but need to be strengthened, and key appointments need to be made. The Council of Ministers needs to: (i) strengthen the role of the Directorate for European Integration (DEI); (ii) develop and adopt a national programme for the adoption of the EU acquis; (iii) facilitate policy dialogue within the Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA) bodies; (iv) urgently appoint the National Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance Coordinator (NIPAC) under IPA III and (v) urgently appoint a Reform and Growth Facility Coordinator and establish a related monitoring and reporting structure. Following the European Council decision to open accession negotiations in March 2024, the country needs to appoint an operational chief negotiator.
Governance is increasingly unsatisfactory. The functioning of the executive and legislature was hindered by political fragmentation, and key EU-related reforms still need to be adopted. Independent institutions remain weak. All levels of government show signs of state capture. The period following the conviction of Milorad Dodik was marked by legal uncertainty. The Republika Srpska entity assembly appointed three governments during the reporting period, two of which resigned amid disputes over their legitimacy. Constitutional Court decisions must be fully recognised and enforced by the Republika Srpska entity, and judicial vacancies filled swiftly.
Civil society, including human rights defenders,operate in a constrained environment. No significant actions were taken towards ensuring an enabling environment for civil society (Opinion key priority 11). Financial constraints overall, and restrictive legislation in the Republika Srpska entity in particular, restricted the space for civil society. Bosnia and Herzegovina should establish meaningful and systematic consultations with civil society and introduce a transparent funding framework for civil society organisations (CSOs).
Public administration reform
Bosnia and Herzegovina is between an early stage of preparation and having some level of preparation in public administration reform. There was limited progress in this
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area during the reporting period. Steps were taken to improve the country’s revenue administration and performance by establishing an IT system for programme budgeting and fiscal planning, which has supported the preparation of the 2026 programme budgeting at some levels. The adoption of the 2023-2027 revised countrywide action plan on public administration reform is pending at state level and in the Republika Srpska entity. The validity of the 2021-2025 public financial management (PFM) strategy was prolonged by state-level institutions until the end of 2026, following its expiration at the end of 2025. The adoptions of individual PFM strategies at other levels of government are not yet completed and the new comprehensive 2027-2031 PFM strategy is not yet finalised. On the civil service, progress is uneven and the regulatory framework is not aligned with merit principles. Bosnia and Herzegovina needs to complete essential steps to improve the overall functioning of its public administration by ensuring a professional and depoliticised civil service and a coordinated countrywide approach to policymaking (Opinion key priority 14).
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were not implemented and remain valid. In the coming year, Bosnia and Herzegovina should in particular:
→ adopt the action plan of the 2023-2027 countrywide strategic framework on public administration reform together with the new comprehensive 2027-2031 PFM strategy;
→ ensure a coordinated and well-harmonised approach to legislative alignment with the EU acquis across all levels of government, in particular by adopting the outstanding legal framework for countrywide sectoral strategic planning at state level;
→ amend and harmonise civil service laws in line with the principle of merit-based employment at state, entity and cantonal level.
Chapter 23: Judiciary and fundamental rights
Bosnia and Herzegovina has some level of preparation to implement the EU acquis and European standards in the area of the judiciary and fundamental rights. No progress was made during the reporting period, including on addressing the related Opinion key priorities. Despite legislative activities in both houses of Parliament concerning the new Law on the High Judicial and Prosecutorial Council and the Law on the Courts of Bosnia and Herzegovina, both laws still need to be adopted, in line with European standards.
Functioning of the judiciary
Bosnia and Herzegovina is between an early stage of preparation and having some level of preparation on the functioning of the judiciary (Opinion key priority 6). No progress was made during the reporting period with negative developments in ensuring the credibility and integrity of asset declarations and the verifications process through external monitoring. There were no positive developments in relation to other aspects, including addressing the findings of the expert report on rule of law issues (the ’Priebe Report’)7. Serious shortcomings in the functioning of the judicial system continued to undermine citizens’ rights and the fight against corruption. Legislative reforms and integrity checks are key to rebuilding public trust in the justice system.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were not met and remain valid. In the coming year, Bosnia and Herzegovina should in particular:
→ urgently appoint judges to the vacancies at the Constitutional Court, ensuring its full composition and functioning; and, for the courts in general, consistently appoint judges based on merit, without prevalence of ethnic criteria, and appraise the performance of judges based on quality criteria;
7 The ’Priebe Report’ is available online on the website of the EU Delegation to Bosnia and Herzegovina.
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→ finalise and adopt a Law on the High Judicial and Prosecutorial Council (HJPC) and a Law on the Courts of Bosnia and Herzegovina in line with Venice Commission recommendations, also ensuring that the challenges identified when implementing the integrity-related provisions introduced in 2023 are addressed effectively; fully implement the integrity-related provisions of the Law on the HJPC to establish a robust system for verifying asset declarations under close external monitoring, including by restoring the conditions for the effective external monitoring of asset declarations with the external selection arrangements for monitoring experts instead of a process controlled by the HJPC.
→ adopt a new justice sector reform strategy; complete the registration of sentences of international criminal tribunals in domestic criminal records; and implement effectively the revised national war crimes strategy, particularly by boosting regional cooperation.
Fight against corruption
Bosnia and Herzegovina is between an early stage of preparation and having some level of preparation in the fight against corruption (Opinion key priority 7). No progress was made. The political authorities continuously failed to tackle widespread corruption and instead actively obstructed progress, leading to extended stagnation and continued signs of state capture. The 2024 state-level Law on the prevention of conflict of interest has still not been implemented effectively. The Federation entity failed to adopt new legislation on the prevention of conflict of interest, even though it has not had enforceable legislation on the matter since 2013. The Federation entity’s special departments for fighting corruption, organised crime and inter-cantonal crime, set up in 2025 after an 11-year delay, still have not achieved operational efficiency or ensured effective implementation of the law. No efforts were made to harmonise anti-corruption legislation across the country or to remedy operational inefficiency and political interference (including pressure and intimidation). This continued to result in selective and opaque judicial follow-up to corruption cases of public resonance. The track record on fighting corruption remains weak, with very few convictions, in particular in high-level cases. Gaps remain regarding rules on conflicts of interest, verification of asset declarations and protection of whistle-blowers. The Sarajevo Canton continued to demonstrate tangible results in these areas. Targeted risk assessments and dedicated measures are needed to address corruption in the most vulnerable sectors.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were not implemented and remain valid. In the coming year, Bosnia and Herzegovina should in particular:
→ complete the legislative and institutional framework across the country in line with European standards and step up implementation of the rules on the prevention of conflicts of interest and the protection of whistle-blowers;
→ demonstrate progress towards establishing a track record of proactive investigations, prosecutions and convictions in high-level corruption cases; in this context, improve cooperation between the police and prosecutors’ offices;
→ professionalise corruption prevention bodies across the country by ensuring their permanent status and upholding their financial and operational independence.
Fundamental rights
The general framework for fundamental rights needs to be improved, as the continued absence of legal and strategic documents increasingly impairs the authorities’ ability to uphold fundamental rights. The country did not adopt constitutional and electoral reforms to ensure that all citizens are able to effectively exercise their political rights, notably to bring the country’s Constitution into line with the Sejdić-Finci case law of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) (Opinion key priority 4.f), as well as implement relevant decisions of the Constitutional Court. Further progress is required across key priorities 9-13. Some bylaws on the Federation entity’s Law on protection from domestic violence and violence
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against women were adopted, but there is a lack of data on implementation. The legal framework on procedural rights for suspects and accused persons and on the rights of victims of crime remains incomplete.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were not implemented and remain valid. In the coming year, Bosnia and Herzegovina should in particular:
→ implement court rulings to end divided education (’two schools under one roof’);
→ ensure full respect, protection and promotion of the freedom of assembly, association and expression, and refrain from actions that may adversely impact the exercise of those freedoms;
→ harmonise and improve legislation against domestic and gender-based violence to meet international standards and align laws across the country with the Gender Equality Law to increase the public and political participation of women.
Freedom of expression and media freedom
There is some level of preparation in the area of freedom of expression. No progress was achieved during the reporting period, including in guaranteeing freedom of expression and of the media and the protection of journalists (Opinion key priority 12). Media freedom continues to experience deep stagnation, with worrying signs of deterioration. The challenges faced by public broadcasters continue, and the authorities failed to ensure their sustainable and stable financing, impacting also editorial independence. In particular, the situation of the state public broadcaster Radiotelevizija Bosne i Hercegovine (BHRT) further deteriorated, and it remains at serious risk of shutting down. The legal disputes between the three public broadcasters continue. Further steps are needed to ensure the full implementation of the countrywide network of contact points for the safety of journalists.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were not implemented and remain valid. In the coming year, Bosnia and Herzegovina should in particular:
→ ensure the protection of journalists and systematic institutional follow-up to threats and violence against them;
→ ensure the financial sustainability and political independence of public broadcasters and harmonise entity legislation with the state-level Law on the public broadcasting system;
→ adopt legislation on both transparency in media ownership and criteria for public advertising; and ensure that defamation is decriminalised across the country.
Chapter 24: Justice, freedom and security
Bosnia and Herzegovina has some level of preparation in the area of justice, freedom and security. Limited progress was made in this area, including on Opinion key priorities 7 and 8. Bosnia and Herzegovina (i) adopted action plans on fighting trafficking in human beings; (ii) introduced biometric data gathering in the visa application process; (iii) finalised the operational plan with the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (‘Frontex’), building on the finalisation of the status agreement with the EU and enabling the deployment of the European Border and Coast Guard standing corps officers; and (iv) adopted relevant bylaws on the Law on border control. The authorities failed to take action to further align with the EU’s visa policy, and instead reinstated and extended the seasonal visa exemptions that are not in line with the EU acquis, representing backsliding in this area. There was no further action in taking over responsibility for migration management. While broadly aligned with the EU acquis, legislation on migration management is often not harmonised across the country, and institutional cooperation and coordination remain weak, leading to uneven implementation.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were partially implemented and
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therefore remain broadly valid. In the coming year, Bosnia and Herzegovina should in particular:
→ take over responsibility for managing migration, including by adopting and implementing a comprehensive transition plan on migration management and the rulebook on the management of reception centres; guarantee access to quality and effective asylum procedures;
→ amend legislation on trafficking in human beings, migrant smuggling and terrorism in line with the EU acquis;
→ align with EU visa policy, in particular for non-EU countries presenting irregular migration or security risks to the EU, implement a passenger data-exchange (advanced passenger information – API) system, and introduce security measures to better screen visa-free arrivals.
Fight against serious and organised crime
Bosnia and Herzegovina is between an early stage of preparation and having some level of preparation in the fight against serious and organised crime. Some progress was made, in particular with the adoption of: (i) a list of criminalised psychoactive substances; (ii) the new Serious and Organised Crime Threat Assessment (SOCTA), in line with Europol methodology; and (iii) the rulebook on the implementation of the Law on anti-money laundering and countering the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT). Systemic shortcomings continue to hinder the operational cooperation and investigative capacity of law enforcement agencies due to fragmented criminal legislation, poor institutional coordination and insufficient resources. Financial investigations and asset seizures and confiscations remain insufficient. A proactive approach is essential to stop criminal infiltration in the political, legal and economic systems and to tackle the political capture of law enforcement institutions.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were partially implemented and therefore remain broadly valid. In the coming year, Bosnia and Herzegovina should in particular:
→ regularly establish specialised multi-agency investigation teams for complex cases; set up an asset recovery office and put in place capacities for the management of crime proceeds at state level; strengthen financial investigations;
→ improve civilian oversight mechanisms over all police forces; consistently appoint police directors based on merit;
→ further align the legislation on the possession of weapons by civilians and on explosives with the EU acquis; establish a firearms focal point.
ECONOMIC CRITERIA
The existence of a functioning market economy
Bosnia and Herzegovina is at an early stage of preparation and made no progress during the reporting period in establishing a functioning market economy. GDP growth remained relatively resilient despite external headwinds, such as weaker international demand and the Middle East crisis, but slowed from 2.1% in 2025 to 1.7% in the first quarter of 2026. Output growth was supported mainly by domestic demand. Employment growth decelerated further, while the continued outflow of workers contributed to labour shortages and upward pressure on wages. Higher energy prices and wages drove inflation up in 2025 and the first half of 2026. Financial markets and the currency remained stable, although delays in aligning with international norms resulted in the country’s grey-listing by the Financial Action Task Force
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(FATF). The authorities’ commitment to EU accession-related reforms remained partial. Economic governance suffered from a very short-term policy approach and insufficient cooperation between key stakeholders at entity level. The business environment continued to be negatively affected by a highly fragmented internal market, reduced predictability of official policies, and long-standing weaknesses in the rule of law framework.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were not implemented and remain valid. In the coming year, Bosnia and Herzegovina should in particular:
→ strengthen the functioning of the country’s internal market through the adoption and implementation of the necessary harmonised regulations enabling the mutual recognition of licences and certificates between the entities;
→ bolster analytical and policy-formulation capacity, among others by agreeing on the national accounts sectorisation of the general government sector; and increase the transparency and efficiency of the public sector, in particular by aligning the country’s public sector accounting and fiscal reporting standards with those of the EU.
→ Improve the targeting and efficiency of social spending, including through a broader application of means-testing methods.
The capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the EU
Bosnia and Herzegovina is between an early stage of preparation and having some level of preparation and made no progress in coping with competitive pressure and market forces within the EU. The overall quality of education remains inadequate, and no significant progress has been made in improving the situation. The country continues to lag behind in the energy and digital transitions. Economic integration with the EU remains high, but overall trade with the EU is still below potential. Labour shortages contribute to wage increases that exceed productivity growth, which could negatively affect the country’s external price competitiveness.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were not implemented and therefore remain valid. In the coming year, Bosnia and Herzegovina should in particular:
→ improve the quality of education and training in the country, in particular by accelerating the modernisation of curricula and improving skills-needs projections with a view to better aligning them with labour market needs;
→ improve the quality of public finance by increasing the share of government capital spending in GDP, in particular by focusing on transport and energy infrastructure, improving environmental standards, and applying international best standards in public procurement;
→ improve the management of public investment and accelerate the implementation of investment projects that have undergone a clear, positive cost-benefit assessment.
Chapter 5: Public procurement
Bosnia and Herzegovina has some level of preparation in public procurement. No progress was made in this area during the reporting period.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were not implemented and remain valid. In the coming year, Bosnia and Herzegovina should in particular:
→ further align the Law on public procurement with the EU acquis and develop a roadmap to harmonise the legal framework on public-private partnerships and concessions with EU standards, including measures for improved coordination;
→ develop the electronic procurement system and increase its use to ensure transparency;
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→ increase staffing levels and strengthen capacity in the Public Procurement Agency and the Public Procurement Review Body.
Chapter 18: Statistics
Bosnia and Herzegovina is at an early stage of preparation on statistics. Limited progress was made in the reporting period, although some new statistics was produced. Bosnia and Herzegovina should improve coordination, decision-making processes, cooperation and the legal basis to develop the national statistical system and ensure progress in key areas.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were not implemented and remain valid. In the coming year, Bosnia and Herzegovina should in particular:
→ adopt the law for the agricultural census, and secure the necessary budget allocation to conduct it;
→ adopt a roadmap for preparing the next population and housing census;
→ finalise the classification of regions equivalent to the NUTS (nomenclature of territorial units for statistics) classification.
Chapter 32: Financial control
Bosnia and Herzegovina has some level of preparation and made limited progress in the area of financial control. Steps were taken to improve external audit through the adoption of Strategic Development Plans 2026-2030, improved application of quality audit management system at state level, improved implementation of external audit recommendations and outreach activities in the reporting period.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were only partially implemented and remain valid. In the coming year, Bosnia and Herzegovina should in particular:
→ improve managerial accountability by introducing the delegation of decision-making responsibilities to senior civil servants at entity level and implementing related regulations at state level more effectively;
→ set up and improve the oversight function for identifying fiscal risk in public companies, particularly at entity level, and ensure data collection on the public internal financial control (PIFC) of public companies at all levels of government via the relevant IT application;
→ improve external audit effectiveness through stronger parliamentary scrutiny of audit reports in legislative assemblies and stronger coordination among parliaments, audit authorities and governments at state and entity level on the implementation of external audit recommendations in public sector.
CLUSTER 2: INTERNAL MARKET
Chapter 1: Free movement of goods
Bosnia and Herzegovina is at an early stage of preparation on the free movement of goods. No progress was made in this area during the reporting period.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were not implemented and remain valid. In the coming year, Bosnia and Herzegovina should in particular:
→ draw up a list of technical regulations on the free movement of goods that are currently in force and start to repeal legislation and standards across the country that conflict with EU legislation and European standards in this area;
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→ adopt a countrywide strategy for quality infrastructure;
→ examine all existing legislation and administrative practices in the non-harmonised areato assess whether they comply withArticles 34-36 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and plan how to address all non-compliant elements.
Chapter 2: Freedom of movements for workers
Bosnia and Herzegovina has some level of preparation in the freedom of movement for workers. No progress was made in this area during the reporting period.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were not implemented and therefore remain valid. In the coming year, Bosnia and Herzegovina should in particular:
→ start developing a countrywide database on vacancies;
→ continue negotiating and concluding new bilateral agreements on social security with EU Member states;
→ start preparing for the alignment of national legislation with the EU acquis on free movement of workers, including access for EU nationals to the labour market and equal treatment of EU workers.
Chapter 3: Right of establishment and freedom to provide services
Bosnia and Herzegovina is at an early stage of preparation on the right of establishment and the freedom to provide services. No progress was made during the reporting period.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were not implemented and therefore remain valid. In the coming year, Bosnia and Herzegovina should in particular:
→ develop a countrywide law on services in line with the EU Services Directive, including by setting up a point of single contact and remove the remaining barriers to setting up a single economic space;
→ Finalise and adopt a countrywide strategy and countrywide law on postal services, and align legislation with the EU postal acquis, including the Postal Services Directive and the Regulation on cross-border parcel delivery services to gradually open the postal services market to competition;
→ align legislation with the EU acquis on mutual recognition of professional qualifications, including with the Directive on recognition of professional qualifications and with the Directive on a proportionality test, before regulating any new profession.
Chapter 4: Free movement of capital
Bosnia and Herzegovina is moderately prepared in the area of free movement of capital. There was limited progress in aligning with the EU acquis in this area during the reporting period. Both entities adopted legislation on the physical cross-border transfer of cash and while progress was made towards alignment with the EU acquis on payment services, significant shortcomings remain in the anti-money laundering and countering the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT) framework, as reflected by Bosnia and Herzegovina’s placement on the list of jurisdictions under increased monitoring by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF).
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were only partially implemented and remain valid. In the coming year, Bosnia and Herzegovina should in particular:
→ Urgently implement the FATF Action Plan, further align the AML/CFT framework with the EU acquis, and address the outstanding recommendations of MONEYVAL’s fifth-round mutual evaluation report.
→ Ensure effective access by competenent authorities to beneficial ownership information across the country in line with the EU acquis, including, through the interconnection of
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exisiting registers;
→ further expand the scope of, simplify procedures for, and reduce administrative requirements related to short-term capital transactions, and amend its legislation to comply with SAA commitments on the acquisition of real estate by EU citizens;
Chapter 6: Company law
Bosnia and Herzegovina has some level of preparation in the area of company law. Limited progress was made in this area during the reporting period notably with the adoption of a new Law on accounting and auditing in the Republika Srpska entity. Significant gaps remain in the alignment with the EU acquis on company law, company reporting and statutory audit.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were not implemented and therefore remain valid. In the coming year, Bosnia and Herzegovina should in particular:
→ finalise the review of company law legislation and identify the amendments needed to further align with the EU acquis, on digital tools and processes, cross-border operations and shareholder rights;
→ improve the connection and coordination of business registers among the entities and the Brčko District;
→ continue aligning the legislative framework on accounting, financial reporting, company reporting, and statutory audit across the country, including by harmonising the relevant legislation across the entities and the Brčko District.
Chapter 7: Intellectual property law
Bosnia and Herzegovina is moderately prepared on intellectual property law. Some progress was made in this area during the reporting period as the Laws on patents, trademarks and trade secrets, as well as on topographies of semiconductor products were adopted.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were partially implemented and remain mostly valid. In the coming year, Bosnia and Herzegovina should in particular:
→ adopt and implement a new strategy on intellectual property and implement the existing strategy on the enforcement of intellectual property rights (IPRs);
→ further align the legal framework on copyright and related rights with the EU acquis;
→ amend the industrial property laws on designs and on craft and industrial geographical indications, to align them with the EU acquis.
Chapter 8: Competition policy
Bosnia and Herzegovina has some level of preparation on competition policy. There was no progress in this area during the reporting period. The country has not yet removed ethnic-based decision-making procedures and vetoes from the Competition Council and State Aid Council (Opinion key priority 4.g).
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were not implemented and remain valid. In the coming year, Bosnia and Herzegovina should in particular:
→ amend the Law on competition and the Law on State aid to revise decision-making procedures in order to remove ethnic-based veto rights in line with the EU acquis;
→ improve the enforcement record on State aid by ensuring that State aid measures are notified by the granting authorities to the State Aid Council before they are approved;
→ in line with the SAA, ensure that the State Aid Council operates independently and align
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the existing aid schemes with the EU acquis.
Chapter 9: Financial services
Bosnia and Herzegovina is between having some and a moderate level of preparation on financial services. There was no progress in this area during the reporting period. Coordination among supervisory authorities and enforcement bodies needs to improve significantly.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were not implemented and remain valid. In the coming year, Bosnia and Herzegovina should in particular:
→ continue the work towards full alignment of its banking regulations with the EU acquis, including by introducing consolidated supervision of banking groups and financial holding companies across the country and strenghtening supervisory powers;
→ continue efforts to align its regulation on non-banking sectors with the EU acquis, including insurance, investment funds, securities markets and financial market infrastructures;
→ strengthen coordination and harmonisation of the regulatory and supervisory framework across the country to ensure consistent implementation and enforcement of the financial services acquis.
Chapter 28: Consumer and health protection
Bosnia and Herzegovina is at an early stage of preparation on consumer protection and public health. Limited progress was made in this area during the reporting period, as the country ratified the Protocol to Eliminate Illicit Trade in Tobacco Products.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were not implemented and remain valid. In the coming year, Bosnia and Herzegovina should in particular:
→ further align the state-level Law on consumer protection and product safety with the EU acquis;
→ align its tobacco-control legislation with the EU acquis at all levels of government and enforce it, and fully implement the protocol to eliminate the illicit trade in tobacco products;
→ further align state-level legislation with the EU acquis on all health-related issues most urgently on substances of human origin and on human and veterinary medicinal products, as well as in the area of e-Health, and put in place an oversight system to ensure efficient coordination across the whole country.
CLUSTER 3: COMPETITIVENESS AND INCLUSIVE GROWTH
Chapter 10: Digital transformation and media
Bosnia and Herzegovina is at an early stage of preparation on digital transformation and media. No progress was achieved in this area, except for the completion of phase two of the digital switchover.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were partially implemented and therefore remain largely valid. In the coming year, Bosnia and Herzegovina should in particular:
→ adopt a framework strategy for access to broadband networks;
→ develop and adopt legislation on electronic identity and trust services for electronic transactions, in line with the EU Digital Identity Framework Regulation; and develop a
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legislative framework on cybersecurity in line with the EU acquis;
→ develop and adopt a law on electronic communications and electronic media in line with the EU acquis.
Chapter 16: Taxation
Bosnia and Herzegovina has some level of preparation on taxation. No progress was achieved in this area. Bosnia and Herzegovina adopted the necessary bylaws for the amendments to the Law on value added tax (VAT) refunds on the purchase of a first property started in 2025. Countrywide harmonisation remains insufficient, hindering progress towards a single economic space.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were only partially implemented and remain largely valid. In the coming year, Bosnia and Herzegovina should in particular:
→ further align its legislation on VAT and excise duties with the EU acquis, particularly for beer and energy products; commit to automatically exchanging financial account information based on the OECD common reporting standard;
→ take further steps for the organization of the administrative capacity and ensuring staffing levels of the Indirect Taxation Agency (ITA);
→ start preparations for interconnection and interoperability with the common EU IT systems for taxation.
Chapter 17: Economic and monetary policy
Bosnia and Herzegovina made limited progress and is at an early stage of preparation on economic and monetary policy. The Economic Reform Programme (ERP) was submitted on time. However, the timeliness of the data provided was limited and internal inconsistencies remained. Cooperation and coordination of macroeconomic and fiscal policies remain a challenge, as evidenced by the repeated delay in preparing and adopting the global fiscal framework or in agreeing on the state budget.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were only partially implemented and remain largely valid. In the coming year, Bosnia and Herzegovina should in particular:
→ maintain the integrity of the currency board arrangement and the independence of the Central Bank;
→ further strengthen the analytical capacities of all institutions responsible for fiscal accounting and planning, and improve procedures for preparing the ERP in order to ensure compliance with the requirements;
→ adopt the global fiscal framework and the budgets of all levels of government in a timely manner.
Chapter 19: Social policy and employment
Bosnia and Herzegovina has some level of preparation on social policy and employment. There was no progress in this area. Serious challenges still need to be addressed in employment, social dialogue, social inclusion and social protection.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were not implemented and therefore remain valid. In the coming year, Bosnia and Herzegovina should in particular:
→ adopt a countrywide employment strategy, putting in place additional capacity for implementation and monitoring;
→ finalise and adopt the Youth Guarantee implementation plan in line with the EU model and guidance, and prepare for the piloting to start;
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→ introduce a uniform minimum level of benefits and protection for maternity leave throughout the country, starting by harmonising the definitions of maternity, paternity and parental leave.
Chapter 20: Enterprise and industrial policy
Bosnia and Herzegovina remains at an early stage of preparation in the area of enterprise and industrial policy. Limited progress was made in this area during the reporting period. Both entities took several steps in support of competitiveness, employment of businesses and the industrial base. The Republika Srpska entity amended its Law on registration of business entities, adopted a new Law on incentives, amended the laws on publicly owned enterprises (POEs) and SME development and adopted three decisions providing incentives for SMEs and strengthening entrepreneurial infrastructure. The Federation entity took decisions for the allocation of incentives for SME investments. The Republika Srpska entity adopted its 2026-2032 social entrepreneurship development strategy and a new tourism law.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were not implemented and therefore remain valid. In the coming year, Bosnia and Herzegovina should in particular:
→ adopt regulation allowing for the mutual recognition of licences and certificates between the entities and ensure that the e-registration of companies and business registers across the country are interconnected and fully operational, including e-signature/e- stamps;
→ take first steps towards aligning with the Late Payments Directive;
→ accelerate improvements to the investment environment to attract sustainable investments that integrate with the domestic industrial base.
Chapter 25: Science and research
Bosnia and Herzegovina has some level of preparation on science and research. No progress was made in this area during the reporting period. Research capacities remain very limited.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were not implemented and therefore remain valid. In the coming year, Bosnia and Herzegovina should in particular:
→ develop a new strategy and action plan for scientific development and finalise the development and adoption of a Smart Specialisation Strategy;
→ continue efforts to strengthen Bosnia and Herzegovina’s participation in the Horizon Europe programme and strengthen its network of national contact points;
→ improve reporting on research and innovation statistics by reporting on at least 24 European Innovation Scoreboard indicators.
Chapter 26: Education and culture
Bosnia and Herzegovina is at an early stage of preparation on education and culture. There was no progress in this area during the reporting period, however Bosnia and Herzegovina took steps to develop a national qualifications framework.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were only partially implemented and therefore remain valid. In the coming year, Bosnia and Herzegovina should in particular:
→ Adopt a national qualifications framework (NQF) referenced to the European qualifications framework;
→ continue implementing the action plan to improve quality assurance with a view to joining the European Association for Quality Assurance (ENQA);
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→ ensure continued participation in international assessment studies8, intensifying preparations to join the 2029 Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA) and implement findings to improve PISA results.
Chapter 29: Customs union
Bosnia and Herzegovina has some level of preparation on customs union. There was some progress in this area during the reporting period. Bosnia and Herzegovina continued preparations to join the Common Transit Convention, and a decision implementing the Law on customs policy was adopted by the Council of Ministers.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were partially implemented and remain largely valid. In the coming year, Bosnia and Herzegovina should in particular:
→ continue preparations to apply the common transit procedure; connect its transit system to the common IT infrastructure of the new computerised transit system; and start preparations towards achieving interconnection and interoperability of its customs IT systems with the EU’s electronic customs environment;
→ strengthen the administrative and operational capacity of the Indirect Taxation Authority in combating customs fraud, in particular the smuggling of tobacco products by finalising the accreditation of the laboratory and implementing a new administrative structure, and by cooperating with the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF);
→ increase post-clearance checks based on risk analysis, expand the use of simplified procedures for compliant economic operators, in particular by increasing the number of authorised economic operators, and implementing the CEFTA Protocol on the mutual recognition of authorised economic operators.
CLUSTER 4: THE GREEN AGENDA AND SUSTAINABLE CONNECTIVITY
Chapter 14: Transport policy
Bosnia and Herzegovina has some level of preparation in transport policy. No progress wasachieved in the reporting period in this area.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were not implemented and therefore remain valid. In the coming year, Bosnia and Herzegovina should in particular:
→ set up a lead agency for road safety and a countrywide system to collect data on road fatalities and serious injuries;
→ bolster the independence of, strengthen the capacity of, and ensure sufficient funding for all bodies at state and entity level in the area of transport;
→ adopt a strategic framework and legislation to implement intelligent transport systems (ITS) in road transport, in line with Bosnia and Herzegovina’s Reform Agenda.
Chapter 15: Energy
The country remains at an early stage of preparation on energy. No progress was made in this area during the reporting period. Bosnia and Herzegovina is continuing with plans for gas-related infrastructure projects, including the Southern Interconnection gas pipeline. Strengthening energy security must not undermine climate objectives..
8 Programme for International Student Assessment – PISA, Trends in International Mathematics and Science Study – TIMSS, Progress in International Reading Literacy Study – PIRLS, International Computer and Information Literacy Study – ICILS, Teaching and Learning International Survey – TALIS.
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The Commission’s recommendations from last year were not implemented and therefore remain valid. In the coming year, Bosnia and Herzegovina should in particular:
→ adopt gas and electricity laws and bylaws at state and entity levels in compliance with the EU’s third energy package, adopt and implement the Electricity Integration Package, and ensure the full alignment of entity-level laws on electricity and gas to ensure coupling with the EU electricity market;
→ adopt state-level legislation and improve entity-level legislation on renewable energy and energy efficiency;
→ adopt the 2021-2030 National Energy and Climate Plan (NECP), in line with Energy Community targets.
Chapter 21: Trans-European networks
Bosnia and Herzegovina has some level of preparation on trans-European networks (TEN). There was limited progress in this area, notably with the continuation of works across five sections of the Corridor Vc motorway, while two were completed and another opened.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were only partially implemented and therefore remain valid. In the coming year, Bosnia and Herzegovina should in particular:
→ continue developing the planned extension of the trans-European transport networks (TEN-T) and trans-European networks for energy (TEN-E) in line with the priorities identified and accelerate the preparatory work and maintain focus on investments to ensure the timely completion of the Western Balkans – Eastern Mediterranean European Transport Corridor;
→ accelerate the implementation of connectivity reform measures and continue to regularly adopt amended multiannual maintenance plans for the road and rail core networks;
→ align its legislation with the EU acquis on guidelines for trans-European energy infrastructure.
Chapter 27: Environment and climate change
Bosnia and Herzegovina is between an early stage of preparation and having some level of preparation in the area of environment and climate change. No progress was made in this area during the reporting period.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were not implemented and therefore remain valid. In the coming year, Bosnia and Herzegovina should in particular:
→ ensure coordinated implementation and monitoring of the countrywide environmental approximation strategy and formalise a procedure for the merit-based and transparent appointment of a focal point for Bosnia and Herzegovina in environmental conventions;
→ adopt a state-level climate law and countrywide environmental protection and climate strategies and action plans in line with the EU acquis; submit a new nationally determined contribution to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC); and urgently align with the EU acquis on monitoring, reporting, verification and accreditation (MRVA) of greenhouse gas emissions;
→ adopt the required legislation at all levels of governance and action plans to introduce the single European emergency number 112 across the country.
CLUSTER 5: RESOURCES, AGRICULTURE AND COHESION
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Chapter 11: Agriculture and rural development
Bosnia and Herzegovina is at an early stage of preparation on agriculture and rural development and made no progress in this area.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were not implemented and therefore remain valid. In the coming year, Bosnia and Herzegovina should in particular:
→ adopt a multiannual, countrywide strategy for agriculture and rural development, and harmonise support measures across the country in line with the EU acquis;
→ adopt a state-level Law on organic production and a state-level Law on quality policy, and ensure a clear distribution of competences, and adopt implementing legislation on wine, in line with the EU acquis;
→ set up the administrative structures required for the common agricultural policy.
Chapter 12: Food safety, veterinary and phytosanitary policy
Bosnia and Herzegovina has some level of preparation in this area. No progress was made over the reporting period.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were not implemented and therefore remain valid. In the coming year, Bosnia and Herzegovina should in particular:
→ introduce an inter-laboratory comparative test system, increase the number and administrative capacity of official controls;
→ set up the system of national reference laboratories in food/feed analysis hygiene, veterinary and phytosanitary inspections in line with the EU acquis;
→ adopt legislation on food safety, on animal health, on animal welfare and on plant health, in line with the EU acquis and adopt the OECD seed schemes, particularly for agricultural seeds and forestry.
Chapter 13: Fisheries and aquaculture
Bosnia and Herzegovina is at an early stage of preparation in this area, and no progress was made during the reporting period.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were not implemented and therefore remain valid. In the coming year, Bosnia and Herzegovina should in particular:
→ for fisheries, prepare and adopt a countrywide strategic document and the state-level legislative framework;
→ for aquaculture, prepare and adopt a countrywide strategy and the state-level legislative
framework;
→ harmonise the methodology for data collection for fish and fishery/aquaculture products across the country and set up the relevant statistical system.
Chapter 22: Regional policy and coordination of structural instruments
Bosnia and Herzegovina remains at an early stage of preparation in regional policy and the coordination of structural instruments. No progress was made during the reporting period.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were not implemented and therefore remain valid. In the coming year, Bosnia and Herzegovina should in particular:
→ develop and adopt a countrywide strategy guiding preparations for structural and cohesion funds and regional development;
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→ urgently appoint a NIPAC for IPA III, and strengthen institutional and administrative capacity to manage EU funds;
→ improve public investment management and adopt an updated single-country project pipeline covering priority sectors, based on a sound, transparent and inclusive methodology.
Chapter 33: Financial and budgetary provisions
Bosnia and Herzegovina is at an early stage of preparation on financial and budgetary provisions. No progress was made in this area.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were not implemented and remain valid. In the coming year, Bosnia and Herzegovina should in particular:
→ strengthen capacity and inter-agency cooperation to combat tax and customs fraud;
→ further improve the capacity of the Indirect Tax Authority to implement customs legislation effectively;
→ adopt a master plan for the production of national accounts for Bosnia and Herzegovina.
CLUSTER 6: EXTERNAL RELATIONS
Chapter 30: External relations
Bosnia and Herzegovina has some level of preparation in external relations. No progress was made in this area during the reporting period.The capacity to tackle key challenges in trade policy has yet to be strengthened.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were not implemented and therefore remain valid. In the coming year, Bosnia and Herzegovina should in particular:
→ finalise its accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO);
→ fully implement the 2021-2024 Common Regional Market (CRM) action plan (in particular by urgently implementing the Central European Free Trade Agreement (CEFTA) additional protocol 5 on trade facilitation and the additional protocol 6 on trade in services); take the necessary steps to implement additional protocol 7 on dispute settlement; and implement actions under the new action plan for 2025-2028;
→ start the process of establishing a development and humanitarian aid policy.
Chapter 31: Foreign, security and defence policy
Bosnia and Herzegovina has some level of preparation in the field of foreign, security and defence policy. There was some progress as Bosnia and Herzegovina maintained full alignment with the common foreign and security policy (CFSP) during the reporting period, including statements by the High Representative on behalf of the EU and Council decisions on restrictive measures. However, the implementation of restrictive measures still faces significant hindrances by those ministries and bodies controlled by the SNSD party, which are also stepping up cooperation with Russian counterparts. The Republika Srpska entity authorities continue to maintain frequent contacts with Russia at the highest levels. The Law on targeted financial sanctions, adopted in May 2025, remains to be further aligned with the EU acquis.
The recommendations from last year were not implemented and therefore remain largely valid. In the coming year, Bosnia and Herzegovina should in particular:
→ continue to ensure full alignment with the EU CFSP;
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→ ensure thorough implementation of EU restrictive measures the country has aligned with, and make efforts to close the space for foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI);
→ align legislation and procedures with EU standards on the marking and deactivation of small arms and light weapons (SALW), including for seized and confiscated weapons.
1.3. ASSESSMENT OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE STEPS SPECIFIED IN THE COMMISSION’S
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CANDIDATE STATUS
Step 1: ensure a track record in the functioning at all levels of the coordination mechanism on EU matters, including by developing and adopting a national programme for the adoption of the EU acquis.
The Directorate for European Integration finalised the programme for EU integration, and submitted it to the European Commission in March 2024. This programme for EU integration is a key step towards putting in place the national programme for the adoption of the EU acquis (NPAA); it should be revised in line with the Commission comments provided in May 2024, in view of agreement with the Commission on the NPAA. The Council of Ministers should urgently appoint the national IPA coordinator (NIPAC) for IPA III.
Step 2: adopt, as a matter of priority, integrity amendments in the existing Law on the High Judicial and Prosecutorial Council.
The Parliament adopted the integrity amendments to the HJPC Law in September 2023, further corrected in January 2024. In March 2026, the HJPC adopted amendments to its internal rules, representing a negative development for the independent external monitoring of its asset declarations department which should be addressed.
Step 3: adopt a new law on the High Judicial and Prosecutorial Council and adopt the law on the Courts of Bosnia and Herzegovina
Despite legislative activities in both houses of Parliament concerning the new Law on the High Judicial and Prosecutorial Council and the Law on the Courts of Bosnia and Herzegovina, both laws still need to be adopted, in line with European standards.
Step 4: adopt the law on prevention of conflict of interest.
The law on the prevention of conflict of interest was adopted by Parliament in March 2024. The law aims to improve compliance at state level, although it is not yet fully in line with European standards. The state-level commission in charge found 5 cases of conflicts of interest in 2025 and handed down one sanction.
Step 5: take decisive steps to strengthen the prevention and fight against corruption and organised crime.
A law on anti-money laundering and countering terrorism financing (AML/CFT) was adopted
in February 2024 and the rulebook on the implementation of the law was subsequently
adopted in December 2025. A permanent coordination body on AML/CFT is in place.
In January 2025, Bosnia and Herzegovina adopted a law on personal data protection, based
on which the Eurojust cooperation agreement was signed and ratified. In July 2026, the
Council of Ministers adopted the working arrangement agreed between Eurojust and the
Ministry of Justice of Bosnia and Herzegovina for the implementation of the international
agreement, which was subsequently signed in October 2026. A strategy and action plan on
public procurement 2024-2028 has been adopted by the Council of Ministers in March 2024.
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Bosnia and Herzegovina should strengthen cooperation among law enforcement agencies,
and adopt a strategic approach towards fighting serious and organised crime, and follow up
the recommendations from the 2026 Action Plan developed by the Financial Action Task
Force (FATF) after its placement on the list of jurisdictions under increased monitoring by the
FATF.
Progress in tackling high-level corruption still needs to be seriously stepped up in order to
establish a credible track record. Indictments were confirmed against some senior officials,
and investigations are ongoing. No new final conviction was recorded.
Step 6: decisively advance work to ensure effective coordination, at all levels, of border management and migration management capacity, as well as ensuring the functioning of the asylum system.
In terms of migration management, reception capacities are sufficient and readmission agreements and implementing protocols continue to be implemented. Bosnia and Herzegovina needs to assign an appropriate budget for migration management, continue efforts for the return of irregular migrants to their countries of origin and take further steps to ensure a functioning asylum system. Obstacles persist to ensuring quality and effective access to asylum procedures. Authorities should establish concrete plans to take responsibility over migration management and reduce dependence on international organisations and donors.
In January 2025 Bosnia and Herzegovina adopted a law on border control aimed at aligning with the EU acquis. Since 2025, Frontex deploys standing corps in the country. A 2024-2029 strategy and action plan on integrated border management is in place. Bosnia and Herzegovina did not further align with the EU visa policy.
Step 7: ensure prohibition of torture, notably by establishing a national preventive mechanism against torture and ill-treatment.
In October 2019 the Constitutional Court repealed the reference to death penalty in the Constitution of the Republika Srpska entity. In August 2023 the Parliament amended the Law on the human rights Ombudsman to designate it as national preventive mechanism against torture and ill-treatment – an international obligation of the country.
Step 8: guarantee freedom of expression and of the media and the protection of journalists, notably by ensuring the appropriate judicial follow-up to cases of threats and violence against journalists and media workers.
A countrywide network of contact points in prosecutors’ offices and law enforcement agencies was set up across the country to monitor cases of threats and violence against journalists and media workers. The authorities need to ensure its sustainability and demonstrate a track record in institutional follow-up. Political influence over public broadcasters persists, and their financial sustainability is to be urgently ensured, pending the adoption of a new law on the public broadcasting system.
* * *
2. CLUSTER 1: THE FUNDAMENTALS OF THE ACCESSION PROCESS
2.1. FUNCTIONING OF DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS AND PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION REFORM
2.1.1. Democracy
The functioning of democratic institutions in Bosnia and Herzegovina is challenged by persistent discriminatory elements in the constitutional structure, the constant misuse of entity and ethnic-based vetoes for political purposes, and divisive rhetoric and actions of the Republika Srpska entity that systematically undermine the legal and constitutional order. The Republika Srpska entity still does not recognise all rulings of the Constitutional Court of
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Bosnia and Herzegovina.
Bosnia and Herzegovina needs to bring in line its constitutional framework with European standards and ensure the functionality of its institutions to be able to take over EU obligations. While a decentralised state structure is compatible with EU membership, Bosnia and Herzegovina will need to reform its institutions to be able to effectively participate in EU decision-making and to fully implement and enforce the acquis.
Elections
The country needs to urgently adopt constitutional and electoral reforms to ensure that all citizens are able to effectively exercise their political rights, notably bring the country’s Constitution into line with the Sejdić-Finci case law of the ECtHR (Opinion key priority 4.f). The working group established to prepare draft amendments to the Constitution and the Election law did not agree on a proposal.
Bosnia and Herzegovina held general elections on 4 October 2026. According to the preliminary findings and conclusions of the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) / Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) Election Observation Mission (EOM), there was genuine competition, contestants were largely able to reach voters and the election day proceeded in an orderly manner. For the first time, Bosnia and Herzegovina introduced countrywide use of electoral information and communication technologies to address longstanding electoral integrity concerns. The EOM noted the considerable efforts of the election administration amid institutional and operational constraints, while also observing technical difficulties in the use of the technologies, complex procedures in the voting and counting processes, and issues with secrecy of the vote. The EOM further noted that issues pertaining to misuse of administrative resources, election dispute resolution, campaign finance oversight, and dissuasive sanctions remain unaddressed. The voting procedures for voters with disabilities were regulated by bylaws enacted by the Central Election Commission.
Early elections for the President of the Republika Srpska entity were held on 23 November 2025 and partially repeated on 8 February 2026 due to irregularities. The Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) / Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) Special Election Assessment Mission described these elections as overall professionally administered but marred by inflammatory rhetoric and polarising narratives. It identified several challenges, including the abolishment of all political party financing from entity, city and municipal budgets by the Republika Srpska entity assembly in May 2025. The law on financing of political organisations was subsequently repealed by the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina in March 2026. The election featured no women candidates.
Bosnia and Herzegovina still needs to address outstanding and new recommendations by the OSCE/ODIHR, the Council of Europe’s Group of States against Corruption (GRECO) and the Venice Commission (Opinion key priority 1). These include: (i) transparency of parties and electoral campaign financing; (ii) transparency and targeting of political advertising and (iii) the registration of political parties. Bosnia and Herzegovina needs to ensure alignment with all relevant EU acquis in this area, including Regulation (EU) 2024/900 on the transparency and targeting of political advertising, taking into account European and international democratic standards.
Reports of fraud in elections
11 2 2
8
57
10 16
142
19.2% 20.0%
12.5%
5.6%
34.2% 32.1%
25.6%
34.9%
0.0%
5.0%
10.0%
15.0%
20.0%
25.0%
30.0%
35.0%
40.0%
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
Number of MPs Number of ministers Number of party leaders
Mayors
Graph 1 : Bosnia and Herzegovina- Women in political life
Women Total % National % EU 27
Source: National- Central Election Commission
EU-27- European Institute for gender equality
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rarely lead to prosecution. The CEC still needs to strengthen its ability to monitor compliance on political party financing. All political stakeholders must respect its independence, including by refraining from threatening to dismiss its members.
Political parties lack democratic internal policies and structures, including policies to promote the representation of women and minorities. During the reporting period, one party elected a woman leader, and only a few women occupy such leadership positions. The legislative framework, including the Election law, should be aligned with the state-level gender equality law to increase women’s public and political participation.
Parliament
The Parliamentary Assembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina adopted only 12 laws during the reporting period, of which five were adopted under urgent procedure. The use of urgent legislative procedures was considerable at entity level. The state budget for 2025 was adopted only in November 2025, and a state budget for 2026 was adopted in July 2026.
The Republika Srpska entity assembly appointed three governments during the reporting period. Two of them resigned amid challenges before the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina regarding the legitimacy of their appointment. In October 2025, the Republika Srpska entity assembly declaratively repealed some laws already struck down by the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Republika Srpska entity assembly should comply with its long-overdue constitutional obligation and immediately appoint judges to vacancies at the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Federation entity assembly should complete the appointment of successors for two retiring Constitutional Court judges. The oversight of the executive remains weak, including at local level. Assemblies do not monitor executives’ compliance with the recommendations of independent institutions.
EU integration
Policy dialogue with the EU continued within the ninth cycle of subcommittees under the SAA, though meetings were repeatedly hampered by contestation of agenda items and delays in submitting supporting documentation on the part of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Stabilisation and Association (SA) Parliamentary Committee took place regularly (Opinion key priority 3), and the SA Committee of the eighth cycle was held in September 2025. The Council of Ministers has yet to act on Commission recommendations from 2022 and 2025 to facilitate policy dialogue within SAA bodies, including by simplifying procedures, empowering the DEI to submit preparatory documents to the European Commission without unnecessary and lengthy political adoption, and appointing permanent delegates to sectoral subcommittees.
Coordination on EU matters needs to be significantly improved to focus on countrywide harmonised alignment with the EU acquis and its effective enforcement. The DEI should step up its role in assessing countrywide alignment with the EU acquis. As an outstanding obligation under the SAA, Bosnia and Herzegovina needs to develop and adopt a national plan for the adoption of the EU acquis (NPAA, Opinion key priority 2) that takes into account Commission comments and reflects on the role that all levels of government play in EU acquis alignment.
The Council of Ministers should urgently appoint a NIPAC for IPA III. The Commission would welcome the appointment of the DEI Director to perform this function as in previous financial periods. Bosnia and Herzegovina should also urgently appoint a chief negotiator for EU accession negotiations. This is important with a view to the start of the explanatory meetings with the Commission on the EU acquis (part of the screening), based on the materials already received by Bosnia and Herzegovina in 2024. Political disagreements on the applicable procedure resulted in contradictory approaches, with separate proposals in the Council of Ministers and the House of Representatives. In March 2026 the Constitutional Court annulled the decision of the House of Representatives and requested the
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Parliamentary Assembly to regulate the appointment of the Chief Negotiator within six months.
Governance
The members of the Presidency convened regularly but continued to present diverging stances during the reporting period. The Presidency adopted the 2026 state budget in July 2026 and ratified the 2025-2027 IPA Financing Agreement in August 2026. The Council of Ministers of Bosnia and Herzegovina met regularly but its work remained hindered by the absence of a functioning coalition, and key EU-related reforms still need to be adopted. The aftermath of Milorad Dodik’s conviction saw a period of legal uncertainty. In July 2026, the Constitutional Court upheld the constitutionality of the High Representative’s criminal code amendments under which the case was prosecuted. Independent institutions remain weak.
Civil society
The space for civil society remained constrained during the reporting period, with no significant actions taken towards ensuring an enabling environment for civil society (Opinion key priority 11). Financial constraints overall and the restrictive legislation previously adopted in the Republika Srpska entity – in particular criminal penalties for defamation and the law targeting civil society groups as ‘foreign agents’, although the latter has since been repealed by the Constitutional Court – restricted the space for civil society.
No action was taken to align legislation on public consultations across the country and ensure meaningful and systematic consultations with civil society. The e-consultation web platform remains underutilised and is not in use at entity or cantonal level, where most legislation of public interest is adopted. Implementation of the first national strategy for the development of civil society and the related action plan is lacking and constrained by the absence of an advisory body for cooperation with CSOs.
Human rights defenders and activists dealing with sensitive issues in particular continued to be targeted and subject to threats, harassment, verbal abuse, smear campaigns and even physical attacks, and to strategic lawsuits against public participation (SLAPPs). The authorities continue to fail to condemn and properly investigate such attacks. Women activists and environmental rights defenders in particular face increasing pressures. Women’s associations reach multiple vulnerable groups in society, and grassroots organisations maintain a key role in policy advocacy.
There is no countrywide framework for the transparent, systematic and impartial distribution of public funds to associations, and CSOs continue to face administrative burdens, including disproportionate tax inspections. The functioning of CSOs and independent media outlets was impacted by financial constraints, including the continued impact of reduced third-party funding. There is no State-level legal framework on volunteering, which is regulated by the entities and the Brčko District.
2.1.2. Public administration reform
Strategic framework for public administration reform
The implementation of the 2018-2027 strategic framework has remained marginal, undermined by a general lack of political support. Approximately 75% of activities remain unimplemented since the adoption of the action plan in 2020. The coordination arrangement, also called the Common Platform, facilitated the finalisation in November 2024 of a revised action plan for public administration reform for 2023-2027. However, its effectiveness remains to be improved. This new action plan on public administration reform still needs to be adopted by the Council of Ministers and in the Republika Srpska entity, whereas adoption has taken place in the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Brčko District. Reforms are hindered by a lack of political steering, as the coordination board has not convened since 2024. Also, effective coordination at technical level remains weak.
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Policy development and coordination
The legal framework for policy development and coordination is fragmented, as only the entities have such a framework in place, while the state level legislation on countrywide sectoral planning is pending adoption. State level institutions need to be strengthened in coordinating countrywide policies. Although there are procedures in place for medium-term planning, monitoring and reporting across all levels, there is still no coordinated approach to medium-term and annual priority setting. The country still needs to ensure effective monitoring and alignment of policies, with annual budgets and government working plans at each level of government, and credible costing on sectoral policies. The institutional framework remains fragmented, with insufficient oversight functions on quality of policies, and the various centres of government remain poorly coordinated with one another. There is no methodology in place that has strong quality assurance or a conflict-resolution mechanism for harmonised legislative alignment with the EU acquis.
Implementation of the legal framework for evidence-based policymaking across all levels of government remains weak. In 2025, the Republika Srpska entity launched the e- consultation platform, alongside the existing state-level platform. The lack of common standards for monitoring and reporting hampers public and governmental scrutiny of policy implementation.
Public financial management
The validity of the 2017-2025 strategy for the reform of public financial management (PFM) has been extended by state-level institutions until December 2026, and the process is ongoing for the other levels. Systemic weaknesses remain, including weak and complex monitoring methodologies and insufficiently harmonised indicators across levels of government. Bosnia and Herzegovina needs to ensure that there is a credible and sustainable PFM strategy in place. The new comprehensive 2027-2031 PFM strategic framework still needs to be finalised. The implementation of programme budgeting was promoted through IT systems and digitalisation efforts, methodologies, which has already led to the development of the programme budget 2026 in the Federation entity. The full operationalisation of IT systems requires legal changes and more consistent application across all administrative levels, alongside stronger adherence to budget calendars and improved links with medium-term fiscal planning. Basic elements of the PFM system still need to be put in place, including: (i) regular adoption of a state budget; (ii) credible costing of sectoral policies, both annually and in the medium term; and (iii) budget transparency.
Fiscal risk monitoring remains underdeveloped, particularly for public enterprises and municipalities, while an independent fiscal oversight body still needs to be set up at state level and in the Federation entity. Further key reforms that still need to be completed in the PFM area include: (i) better linking of the annual strategic planning and budgeting processes in the annual and medium term; (ii) strengthening capacities, coordination and funding mechanisms in the area of public investment management; and (iii) continuing to implement the laws on programme budgeting and adopting such legislation in the Republika Srpska entity.
As regards budget transparency, the country still scores very low in public participation in the budget process. The framework of budget classification is aligned with international standards, but consolidated reporting remains incomplete. In-year budget reporting varies between monthly and quarterly cycles across the country, and detailed data on budget users across state and entity level remains insufficient. Legislative scrutiny of the budget remains limited.
Public service and human resources management
Civil service laws are still not harmonised with one another, and merit principles are not enshrined in the recruitment, promotion and dismissal of civil servants.
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Reform efforts towards a depoliticised and professional civil service remain uneven, despite work continuing on improving job descriptions, competency profiles and job families in the Federation entity. Overall, the legal criteria for dismissals, disciplinary procedures and appeals continue to be insufficiently applied. Entity-level laws do not require the best candidate to be appointed, allowing for political influence in recruitment, particularly for senior management positions. At cantonal level, selection still depends on ethnic background rather than merit. The excessive use of acting positions continued during the reporting period, especially in the Republika Srpska entity. Constitutional rules on the general representation of the population in the public service should not be interpreted as requiring strict ethnic proportionality, and the legislation should ensure that ethnicity does not prevail over professional merits in recruitment.
Civil servants’ remuneration remained inconsistent across the country due to differences in salary legislation, job classification and pay grades, and to the absence of job evaluations. These factors hinder fairness and transparency in remuneration. Criteria for awarding salary supplements are unclear, and no information is published on salary grids by job category. A broad salary reform is required across all levels of government.
The quality and capacity of human resources management (HRM) remain highly fragmented. The Federation entity continued implementing the 2022-2027 strategy for the development of HRM, achieving tangible results such as the implementation of various HRM tools and attracting the highest number of candidates to civil service vacancies compared with other levels. Overall, efforts are needed to strengthen the transparent monitoring and planning of HRM performance, related capacity and data collection, particularly at state level and in the Republika Srpska entity. Progress is visible in the Federation entity, which developed the first HRM monitoring report based on the upgraded HRM methodology on data collection. At state level, despite the adoption of a regulation establishing a register of employees, the effective monitoring of recruitment and selection of candidates remains a challenge. The transparency of data collection in HRM should be improved, in particular in the Republika Srpska entity. There has been no legislative development on whistle-blower protection or on the declaration of assets.
Gender balance in top management positions in the Federation entity (where 42% of those positions are occupied by women is slightly better than the average in OECD-EU countries, but the low share of women in top management positions in the state institutions (27%) and in the Republika Srpska entity (33%) is a concern.
Accountability of administration
There was no improvement in the regulatory framework or practices for enhanced accountability of public administration. In 2025, the results of the comprehensive analysis of public administration, conducted by the public administration reform coordinators at all levels of government, identified structural inefficiencies and gaps in accountability, transparency and service delivery. The delegation of tasks and responsibilities from top to middle managers remains weak, impairing operational efficiency. Responsibilities overlap, creating convoluted accountability chains, and the distribution of workload remains inefficient and fragmented.
The state-level and Brčko District laws on access to public information still need to be brought fully in line with international standards on the independence of the appeal process. Open data portals need to be established. Data protection and access to information rules are still interpreted to safeguard private rather than public interests. Ombudsman recommendations are insufficiently implemented, undermining independent oversight effectiveness.
Service delivery to the public and businesses
There is no comprehensive policy on service delivery. A lack of clarity around institutional roles and functions in this area hampers the steering of reforms at technical level. The lack
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of a supportive legislative framework and political commitment is an obstacle to improving the interoperability of public services. However, steps have been taken to secure data exchange between institutions, and a roadmap has been developed to steer reform.
On digitalisation, despite the absence of a countrywide approach, there are some positive developments at entity and cantonal level. In the Republika Srpska entity, progress is being made on the e-government platform, including offering online administrative services to the public. The Sarajevo Canton is extending its e-services through its e-portal, allowing the public to submit administrative requests and access certificates and registry services.
2.2. RULE OF LAW AND FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS
2.2.1. Chapter 23: Judiciary and fundamental rights
The EU’s founding values include the rule of law and respect for human rights. An effective (independent, high-quality and efficient) judicial system and an effective fight against corruption are of paramount importance, as is respect for fundamental rights in law and in practice.
Functioning of the judiciary
Strategic documents
Bosnia and Herzegovina still needs to adopt a new strategy and related action plan for the reform of its justice sector, which expired in 2020. By the end of 2025, the HJPC reported 68% implementation of planned activities and 36% implementation of intended outcomes of the 2024-2026 HJPC Reform Programme Action Plan. The HJPC should strengthen its analytical reporting on the implementation of the 2024-2026 action plan and support more effective donor coordination. In this context, the adoption of a monitoring, evaluation and reporting framework for its strategy and action plan to ensure the security of judicial officeholders and protected witnesses is a positive step.
Management body
The HJPC acts as the judiciary’s single self-governance body, but its independence and integrity should be strengthened, including by reinstating randomisation for ethnicity and gender in the appointment of its members. The HJPC’s staffing remains partially dependent on international donors, and the asset declaration department is understaffed.
The budget of the HJPC needs to be increased to complete the recruitment of staff to the asset declaration department and to ensure that the state budget takes over the funding of all HJPC staff by 2027.
The HJPC introduced measures aimed at strengthening internal accountability and reporting across both the prosecution and court systems through enhanced monitoring frameworks. Chief prosecutors are evaluated using a standardised methodology tracking the implementation of their work programmes at mid-term and end-of-mandate. Similarly, the performance of the courts is monitored through case resolution plans and instructions designed to improve efficiency and reduce backlogs, particularly in cases involving corruption and organised crime. While these developments represent a step forward in strengthening oversight and performance management, their overall impact on the efficiency and effectiveness of judicial protection (e.g. in cases of domestic violence and attacks on returnees, journalists and activists) and judicial response to crime still needs to be ascertained.
Independence and impartiality
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The independence and impartiality of the judiciary need to be improved. Integrity plans are in place in almost all courts and prosecutors’ offices in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Ethics codes are in place and included in initial training. A violation of the ethics codes compromising the reputation and integrity of the judiciary constitutes a disciplinary offence. In 2025, 8 cases were initiated by the HJPC and 2 were concluded (1 resulting in a 10% salary reduction for three months, 1
being dismissed). In 2026, 3 cases were initiated and 2 were concluded (1 resulting in a 20% salary reduction for three months, 1 being dismissed).
Undue internal and external pressure on the judiciary continued. A threat-reporting mechanism is in place but relatively limited and the response of the HJPC to these cases is inconsistent. The undue transfers of prosecutors involved in sensitive investigations further undermined the perception of independence within the Bosnia and Herzegovina Prosecutor's Office, raising concern of possible conflict of interest. Both the HJPC and Office of Disciplinary Counsel have failed to address the related complaints adequately and efficiently.
Legal safeguards are in place to ensure the independence of judicial appointments, yet appointments in which ethnic balance is prioritised over merit continue. The reasoning for such decisions remains insufficient, including when the ranking of candidates is not respected. Judicial appointments should be guided primarily by merit, with ethnic considerations being considered only when candidates are equally ranked.
Despite having an efficient randomised case allocation system in place, the number of manually reallocated cases has increased and continues to be a concern. Each reallocation is nonetheless supported by a written decision. Out of 778 060 cases, 6.5% were reallocated without any reasoning (50 852), which is significantly less than in the past reporting periods but still an issue requiring further efforts. As the number of manual reallocations of cases remains high, HJPC members, court presidents and chief prosecutors should receive tailored training with a component on data analysis.
Accountability
The accountability of the judiciary needs to be improved. The prioritisation of corruption cases involving judicial office-holders and the introduction of a six-month reporting obligation by the HJPC continued to improve trial continuity and scheduling discipline in several courts. However, the further strengthening of active trial management and enforcement of procedural discipline remains necessary. These cases should be processed efficiently and effectively. Without breaching confidentiality, prosecutors’ offices should also promptly share
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Validation Rejection Pending
Requests received Outcome of decisions
Graph 2.1: Bosnia and Herzegovina - Requests for protection
from undue influence - Courts
2023 2024 2025 n/a: not available Source: HJPC
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Requests received Outcome of decisions
Graph 2.2: Bosnia and Herzegovina - Requests for protection
from undue influence -Prosecutors
2023 2024 2025 n/a: not available Source: HJPC
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the relevant results of their investigations with the Office of Disciplinary Counsel for disciplinary action.
The efficiency and effectiveness of the judicial asset declaration system is constrained by systemic weaknesses, in particular understaffing, limited digitalisation, ambiguities in the legal framework, and gaps in both domestic and international data access. The credibility of the asset declaration department of the HJPC depends on addressing bottlenecks and
incomplete verification coverage, which could undermine its intended impact.
Following suspension of the electronic submission of asset declarations due to a ruling by the Personal Data Protection Agency (PDPA) in June 2026, many judges and prosecutors obtained qualified electronic signatures to enable asset declarations to be submitted electronically in 2026, with mandatory electronic submission from 2027. With funding for only 10 out of 17 staff positions remaining unchanged, full funding must be secured without delay to ensure that the HJPC asset declaration department functions at full capacity.
An EU-funded external monitoring mechanism has been in place since September 2024, with a mandate to monitor the functioning of the revised asset declaration system and issue independent recommendations to the asset declaration department. The department should carefully and fully consider the External Monitoring Operation (EMO)’s recommendations, some of which remain unimplemented.
In April 2026, the HJPC adopted amendments to the book of rules on the declaration of assets and interests. These changes have modified the operational environment of the EMO in breach of an agreement with the Commission, in particular by replacing the external selection arrangements for monitoring experts with a process controlled by the HJPC. Following these changes, the EMO was discontinued in June 2026. This has eroded the safeguards for the independence and credibility of the EMO, representing a negative development in terms of establishing effective external monitoring of the revised asset declaration system. The HJPC must swiftly reverse these changes and restore the conditions for experts to monitor asset declarations effectively, as required by law.
More broadly, the HJPC is expected to demonstrate full commitment to the integrity framework by respecting the functional independence of the asset declaration department and avoiding restrictive interpretations or practices that undermine the effectiveness of the system. All relevant stakeholders are expected to provide complete and timely information to the department. The new HJPC Law should address the challenges that have been
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31 2828
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26 23
16
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2023 2024 2025
Judges
Graph 3.1: Bosnia and Herzegovina - Disciplinary
procedures Judges - outcome of procedures
Initiated Completed Sanctions pronounced Source: CEPEJ
9 8
6 5
11
6 5
11
4
0
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4
6
8
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12
2023 2024 2025
Prosecutors
Graph 3.2: Bosnia and Herzegovina - Disciplinary
procedures Prosecutors - outcome of procedures
Initiated Completed Sanctions pronounced Source: CEPEJ
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identified in implementing the integrity amendments. Disciplinary procedures continue to have little dissuasive effect despite their relatively high number. No action was taken by the HJPC disciplinary bodies to remedy serious breaches of judicial integrity for HJPC disciplinary bodies, which is a concern.
Quality of justice
The quality of justice needs to be improved. Performance appraisals lack nuance and therefore remain ineffective. The vast majority of judges and prosecutors, including in managerial roles, are assessed as having exceptional performance. The HJPC applied new appraisal criteria, of which qualitative criteria account for only 10% of the overall evaluation. The HJPC should conduct a systematic review of the first appraisal cycle under the new criteria, focusing on the application of qualitative assessment, scoring consistency and recurring issues to strengthen confidence in the appraisal system.
The HJPC should take on a stronger coordination role for training judges and prosecutors. Selecting and assessing trainers, devising programmes and evaluating the impact of training should be closely monitored and improved where needed. The total training budget for 2025 increased by 11.9% compared with 2024.
Measures previously introduced by the HJPC on the transparency of the judiciary, including in the publication of both judgments and hearing schedules, are positive and should continue to be improved. The court decision database, the case law portal and the list of cases of public interest (including war-crimes and high-level corruption cases) continued to grow.
The panels for the harmonisation of judicial practice adopted 5 positions in 2025 (5 in 2024). The HJPC should closely monitor the impact of the panels’ work. The HJPC database of
appellate court legal positions should further serve as a tool for ensuring uniform judicial practice across the country. In July 2025, the HJPC adopted new rules of procedure for the panels, replacing the previous ad hoc model with a more structured and predictable mechanism. Ultimately, the country needs to put in place a judicial body capable of ensuring consistent interpretation of the law and harmonisation of case law across the country (Opinion key priority 4.e)
679
227 119
1025
30 23.4
269
n/a 83
352
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1st instance 2nd instance Supreme Court
Total Per 100 000 inhabitants - Bosnia and
Herzegovina
Per 100 000 inhabitants - EU27 (2024)
Graph 4: Bosnia and Herzegovina - Number of justice
professionals - 2025
Judges Prosecutors
n/a: not available Source: CEPEJ
202
120 136
203
128 135
203
121 120
0
50
100
150
200
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Settlement agreements Finalised court-related mediations
Mediators Mediation cases
Graph 5: Bosnia and Herzegovina - Alternative dispute
resolution
2023 2024 2025 Source: CEPEJ
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No steps were taken to adopt the mediation strategy proposed by the HJPC in 2022 as part of the alternative dispute resolution mechanisms. Legislation on legal aid remains fragmented across the country, to the detriment of the most vulnerable, and a needs assessment remains to be conducted.
Access to justice for persons with disabilities is supported by a legal framework, but its effective and consistent implementation remains incomplete. Reasonable accommodations in judicial proceedings and legal aid are not yet uniformly ensured across jurisdictions, with persistent physical, communication and procedural barriers.
Efficiency
The efficiency of justice needs to be improved. The length of court proceedings in first- instance cases (excluding utility cases) increased slightly, from 292 days in 2024 to 299 days in 2025. In October 2025, the Federation entity adopted a law to protect the right to trial within a reasonable time, the impact of which still needs to be ascertained.
In 2025, the total budget for the judiciary, including the HJPC, was EUR 228.17 million, up from EUR 212.8 million in 2024. Although this spending on the judiciary is above average for the Western Balkans, funds remain insufficient for investments. Ensuring sufficient financing of judicial institutions is a responsibility of the executives at all levels of government. This leads to difficulties in budget planning and negotiations over budget inequalities, which have a negative effect on equal access to justice. The role of the HJPC in budget planning and negotiations for judicial institutions should be strengthened.
The backlog of pending court cases at first instance decreased by 5%, which still amounted to over 1.6 million cases at the end of 2025. No steps were taken to urgently amend entity-level legislation to transfer the enforcement of small and uncontested claims from courts to professional bailiffs.
In 2025, prosecutorial institutions experienced an overall increase in workload, with a 9% rise in caseload compared with the previous year, primarily driven by a backlog of unresolved cases from previous years. Continued focus on staffing capacity, early case management and targeted supervision will be essential to stabilise and gradually reduce backlog levels.
101 96
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118
93 99
116 109
93 98
109 109
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1st instance 2nd instance 1st instance 2nd instance
Criminal cases Non-criminal cases*
Graph 6.1 - Bosnia and Herzegovina - Efficiency of courts (%)
Clearance rate in 2023 Clearance rate in 2024 Clearance rate in 2025
Source: CEPEJ *Civil and commercial cases, administrative cases, non-litigous cases, other cases
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Graph 6.2 - Bosnia and Herzegovina - Efficiency of courts (days)
Disposition time 2023 Disposition time 2024 Disposition time 2025
Source: CEPEJ *Civil and commercial cases, administrative cases, non-litigous cases, other cases
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The case management system produces reliable, detailed statistics and reports on case flow, human resources and length of judicial proceedings, contributing to timely delivery of judicial data to the CEPEJ (Council of Europe Commission for the Evaluation of the Efficiency of Justice). Pilot courts have begun implementing the electronic submission of requests and the issuance of electronic certificates of non-conviction, marking an important step towards broader digitalisation of judicial services. The HJPC needs to step up its oversight and management of the performance of the judicial system.
Domestic handling of war crime cases
In 2025, the International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals (IRMCT) received 104 assistance requests from Bosnia and Herzegovina and facilitated the transfer to Serbia of case files involving Serbian nationals. Based on the memorandum of understanding with the IRMCT, 10 convictions from international tribunals were registered in the records kept at state level, compared with 16 in the Federation entity, while the registration of 18 judgments was pending. The Republika Srpska entity registered none of the 44
convictions that had been forwarded to them. While 82% of the war crimes cases identified in 2013 have been resolved, challenges persist, including unavailable suspects, limited regional cooperation, and legal inconsistencies. The deadline for implementing the revised national war crimes strategy has been extended for an additional three years until
31 December 2028. Efforts to fulfil its objectives need to be redoubled.
Between 1 January and 31 December 2025, prosecutor’s offices resolved 73 war crimes cases involving 462 individuals, at the reporting and investigation stages. This represents a 31% decrease in the number of cases resolved compared with 2024, when 106 war crime cases involving 701 individuals were resolved.
As of 31 December 2025, 215 war crime cases remained pending before prosecutor’s
offices in Bosnia and Herzegovina. These included 117 cases involving 294 unavailable individuals. Compared with 2024, this represents a decrease of 6% in the number of cases involving unavailable individuals and 15% in the number of individuals concerned.
As of the same date, the courts recorded 106 cases involving 106 unavailable individuals, representing a 4% increase in the number of such cases compared with 2024.
During 2025, prosecutor’s offices transferred six war crimes cases to the competent authorities of other countries (4 to Serbia, 2 to Croatia) for further prosecution. During the
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same period, the courts transferred one case to Croatia.
Fight against corruption
Track record
The track record on the fight against high-level and non-high-level corruption cases needs to be seriously stepped up. The trial against the former director of the Intelligence and Security Agency (OSA) and the former President of the Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina started over a year after indictment. Investigations are still ongoing against the former Minister of
Security, the former mayor of Sarajevo, and the former Director of the Border Police (who remains at large in Croatia), among others. Almost five years after a criminal report was filed against the former mayor of Sarajevo on corruption charges, and two years of investigation, the Federation entity Special Department for fighting corruption, organised crime and inter- cantonal crime suspended the investigation. This decision is subject to appeal. It remains essential
that prosecution and judicial services ensure independent, effective and impartial judicial follow-up to these cases. Following the signature of a memorandum of cooperation between the Sarajevo Canton prosecution, police and anti-corruption office in 2025, the Court confirmed indictments against 14 persons, a majority of whom are public office holders.
The substantive provisions of the Law on the prevention of conflict of interest are applied inconsistently. The commission in charge found 5 cases of conflicts of interest in 2025, but handed down just 1 sanction, since in the other cases the persons concerned were no longer in office at state level. The transparency of the commission’s work was not ensured systematically, and decisions and other data were not made public in the reporting period. The number of state-level officials who complied with their obligation to submit financial reports for the verification of asset declarations continued to decrease (261 out of 600, or 24 fewer officials than in 2024). The lack of consequences for non-compliance hampers the effectiveness of this system.
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Graph 7.1: Bosnia and Herzegovina - High level corruption
cases - Data on number of individuals/legal entities involved
New investigations Indictments Final court decisions Final convictions Acquittals Plea bargains
Source: National data collected via the organised crime and corruption track record (OCCTR) e-platform
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122
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Graph 7.2: Bosnia and Herzegovina - Non-high level corruption
cases - Data on number of individuals/legal entities involved
New investigations Indictments Final court decisions Final convictions Acquittals Plea bargains
Source: National data collected via the organised crime and corruption track record (OCCTR) e-platform
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No law enforcement agency has submitted any report on high-level corruption to the Prosecutor’s Office of Bosnia and Herzegovina since 2022. During 2025, law enforcement agencies submitted only five reports on ordinary corruption to the Prosecutor’s Office of Bosnia and Herzegovina. This poor track record needs to be addressed by executive authorities to guarantee accountability. The State Investigation and Protection Agency (SIPA) maintains a highly formalistic approach to the collection of evidence, and the lack of cooperation between law enforcement bodies, with limited exchange of intelligence, remains problematic. The instruction for prosecutors and authorised officials on detecting crime, endorsed by the HJPC in 2023, should be put into practice.
A specialised team of 39 prosecutors from 13 prosecutors’ offices continued to efficiently investigate cases based on evidence from the SKY ECC communications tool. Prosecutors should continue to show firm determination in prioritising and finalising investigations of mid- and high-level corruption cases arising out of the SKY ECC tool and ensure efficient judicial follow-up to those cases.
Legal framework
The legal framework on the fight against corruption is missing and not harmonised across the country. The 2024 state-level Law on the prevention of conflict of interest is not effectively implemented nor fully aligned with international standards, and no corresponding bylaws were adopted. In July 2026, the Council of Ministers failed to adopt the bylaws because the Chairperson of the Commission for deciding on conflicts of interest in the institutions of Bosnia and Herzegovina had not been appointed by Parliament, as legally required. Notwithstanding, the Commission has been functioning for the past two years without a Chairperson, and thus far no issues had been raised by the Council of Ministers. The legislative framework on the protection of whistle-blowers is still incomplete, not harmonised and not fully in line with the EU acquis. Where applicable, very few or no requests for protection were received, with the exception of Sarajevo Canton, where 8 requests out of 11 were granted. The Agency for the Prevention of Corruption and the Coordination of the Fight against Corruption (APIK) did not grant protection to any of the three requests received. In two of these cases, the decisions were not legally justified, as the stated grounds for refusal are not contemplated in the law.
There is no legislation to prevent and address corruption effectively in the private sector, nor is there any regulation of lobbying. Data protection laws continue to be implemented in a way that protects private over public interests. GRECO’s Fourth Interim Compliance Report, finds that Bosnia and Herzegovina has improved its implementation of anti-corruption recommendations, with 6 out of 15 recommendations satisfactorily implemented. GRECO therefore notes that Bosnia and Herzegovina is no longer subject to the non-compliance procedure. Notwithstanding, recommendations related to harmonising conflict-of-interest legislation, parliamentary oversight, and judicial independence remain unimplemented for 11 years. Public procurement represents one of the most corruption-prone sectors in Bosnia and Herzegovina, where despite the numerous irregularities identified, only a small number of cases have resulted in criminal investigations. Analytical capacities to detect corruption patterns in public procurement at national level were limited, data access was fragmented and the interoperability of information systems was low. The Sarajevo Canton anti-corruption office developed proactive analytical approaches and tools for monitoring corruption and abuse of employment processes and for monitoring investors in the construction sector.
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Strategic documents
The strategic documents in this area are partly in place. The 2024-2028 state-level strategy and action plan on anti-corruption continues to be implemented, according to APIK’s first monitoring report presented in 2025. Further reports should also assess the effectiveness or impact of measures. The approach is fragmented throughout the country. Entities and cantons need to update and align their strategies to ensure a harmonised approach. They also need to ensure adequate funding and to monitor implementation in a coordinated manner. APIK should engage proactively with entities and cantons in adopting, updating and aligning such strategies.
The Sarajevo Canton’s anti-corruption office has produced annual assessments of all corruption-prone processes in the canton’s institutions, in addition to targeted risk assessments. Targeted risk assessments and dedicated measures are needed to address corruption in the most vulnerable sectors in other cantons.
Institutional framework
The institutional framework on the fight against corruption is still not fully in place and needs to be improved in the areas of both preventive measures and law enforcement. Corruption prevention bodies continued to be ineffective and uncoordinated. APIK needs to meaningfully and independently fulfil its function as main coordinator and central point for anti-corruption activities, promote the implementation of GRECO recommendations and alignment with corruption related legislation with international standards. The position of director of APIK has been vacant since October 2024.
The authorities need to significantly strengthen the independence of corruption prevention bodies at entity and cantonal level and improve their human and material resources. While the Sarajevo Canton anti-corruption office continued to retain an adequate framework, ensuring a sufficient level of independence and resources, progress across the country continues to be uneven. The special anti-corruption departments within prosecution offices at state level and in the Republika Srpska entity need to deal effectively with high-level corruption cases. Their independence and accountability need to be significantly strengthened. Specialised departments in the Federation entity’s Prosecutor’s Office and Supreme Court finally became operational in April 2025 but have yet to achieve operational efficiency and ensure effective application of the law.
The criminal justice policy and institutional and legislative frameworks across the country are largely ineffective and inadequate. Investigative capacities are insufficient and penalties do not ensure deterrence. Frequent conflicts of jurisdiction led to case transfers and slowed down proceedings. The police failed to launch investigations proactively, and investigations are still seriously hampered by both a lack of cooperation between law enforcement agencies and prosecutors’ offices and a lack of effective monitoring of police work by prosecutors. The selective unwillingness of the police – including at state level – to cooperate with prosecutors, particularly in high-level corruption cases, remains concerning. Plea bargaining is frequent and often involves lenient penalties. It should be used strategically instead, to co-opt defendants in obtaining information and evidence.
High-level corruption cases continued to be plagued by selective judicial follow-up, legal mistakes, negligence, abuse of procedures and questionable court decisions. Pressure, interference and verbal attacks on judicial office-holders continued, including by politicians, without a systemic and efficient response by the HJPC. Law enforcement agencies and the judiciary should take a more proactive stance in combating organised crime and corruption, free from outside interference.
The risk of undue interference with prosecutorial independence was evident in the operations of the Prosecutor’s Office of Bosnia and Herzegovina, where a practice was introduced requiring panels of two or more prosecutors to reach decisions by consensus in ‘sensitive’ cases. This decision-making practice does not have legal basis, significantly
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undermines the independence of the lead prosecutor assigned to the case and risks undermining accountability. Internal dynamics in the Prosecutor’s Office of Bosnia and Herzegovina have visibly deteriorated, following undue transfers of prosecutors working on politically sensitive cases. Investigations in prominent cases were suspended without legally justified reasoning.
Fundamental rights
General framework
No action has been taken to address the gaps on fundamental rights. The legal framework needs to be improved. Its enforcement is insufficient.
International human rights instruments
Cooperation with international bodies that monitor human rights and the follow-up to their recommendations is insufficient. Bosnia and Herzegovina still needs to address the recommendations from the January 2025 Universal Periodic Review of the UN Human Rights Council. The country is encouraged to seek observer status in the EU Agency for Fundamental Rights and should replicate the Agency’s data collection methodology.
European Court of Human Rights
Cooperation with the ECtHR and the implementation of its judgments need to be improved. During the reporting period, the ECtHR found breaches of the European Convention on Human Rights with regard to property rights, right to fair trial and general prohibition of discrimination. There are 6 discrimination-related cases under enhanced supervision by the Committee of Ministers related to electoral rights. The Sejdić and Finci, Zornić, Šlaku, Pilav and Begić and Begić 2 rulings (i.e. Sejdić-Finci group of cases) require constitutional amendments to ensure political equality among all citizens.
Promotion, protection and enforcement of human rights
The legal and institutional framework for the promotion, protection and enforcement of human rights remains incomplete and needs to be improved. Bosnia and Herzegovina lacks a policy framework that includes countrywide strategies on human rights, non-discrimination and the protection of persons belonging to minorities. A revised Action Plan for Social Inclusion of Roma and the Action Plan on children are also not in place. The Law on protection of minorities and the Law on protection of human rights defenders were not adopted. Several strategic documents and laws have been drafted but their adoption remains blocked. Consequently, the protection of human rights remains uneven across the country.
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Bosnia and Herzegovina
EU average Bosnia and Herzegovina
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01.09.2024 01.09.2025
Graph 8: Bosnia and Herzegovina - ECtHR judgments
New allocated applications Judgments Breaches Pending applications Source: ECtHR
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The Ombudsman institution should act more proactively and efficiently, and its independence needs to be strengthened. The Ombudsman has not opened any minor offence proceedings for non-compliance in the past 11 years, despite the lack of implementation of its recommendations, nor has it initiated or
intervened in any administrative or judicial proceedings. The majority of unimplemented recommendations relate to access to information, management, ministerial and government appointments, discrimination and employment relations.
Prevention of torture and other forms of ill-treatment
Bosnia and Herzegovina provides insufficient legal guarantees on the prevention of torture and ill-treatment. The follow-up to cases of alleged torture and ill- treatment needs to be improved. The Ombudsman institution is operating as a national preventive mechanism against torture and ill- treatment. In 2025, it issued guidelines for its work, selected a related list of external experts and established a centralised register of institutions subject to monitoring. Despite these developments, the national preventive mechanism remains at an early stage of implementation. Systemic problems remain in ensuring humane and dignified treatment of detainees and uniform standards across the country. In 2025, the Ombudsman’s institution received 100 complaints (107 in 2024) related to the treatment of detainees, particularly with regard to healthcare, accommodation and hygiene conditions in detention units and the conduct of prison administrations and relevant ministries. The competencies of management and operational staff in prisons and the police should be improved through regular access to specialised trainings. An effective probation system should still be introduced and aspects of health care should be improved.
Execution of criminal sanctions
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Police Prisons
Graph 10: Bosnia and Herzegovina - Torture / Ill
treatments / Excessive use of force
Reported cases Criminal convictions Administrative decisions n/ a: not available Source: n/a
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The system for the execution of criminal sanctions (including probation) needs to be improved. Minimal standards of prison/detention are to be developed in order to standardise and align all the facilities with the standards of the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CPT). The continued absence of both a countrywide strategy and reliable statistics in this area remains a concern. The relevant laws need to be harmonised across the country and brought into line with European and international standards. Prison directors need to be appointed based on merit. Detention and prison facilities, prison regimes and reintegration programmes, including for women, need to be improved. Overcrowding, poor material conditions, and inadequate healthcare services in places of detention continue to raise concerns.
Protection of personal data
The legal framework for the protection of personal data has been significantly strengthened and the 2025 Law on data protection is in line with the EU acquis. To implement the law, the PDPA prepared guidance material and public information for citizens as well as training sessions for public officials, private companies and banks. No breaches of the law were reported during the reporting period. Implementation and enforcement of the new law are at an early stage and should be closely monitored. The authorities should balance data
protection rules with freedom of information and transparency obligations. The capacities of the PDPA were increased through the recruitment of four additional employees compared with 2024. The mandate of the Director of the PDPA expired in November 2025. Authorities should ensure the appointment of a politically independent director and guarantee the operational independence of the Agency without undue interference.
The Agency should be provided with adequate human, technical and financial resources to exercise effectively the expanded supervisory powers conferred by the new Law. The state- level Parliament must consult the Agency on legislative proposals, but entities’ and cantons’ legislative assemblies are still not required to do so.
Freedom of thought, conscience and religion
Bosnia and Herzegovina provides adequate legal guarantees on freedom of religion and belief. The meetings of the Inter-Religious Council proceeded regularly in accordance with its annual schedule, alongside an increased public presence. Incidents of hate speech, vandalism, intimidation and attacks targeting religious sites and religious symbols continued to be reported across the country and notably in some returnee community areas. Concerns remain regarding the inconsistent investigation and prosecution of hate-motivated incidents. There are very few indictments and convictions, in part due to the high burden of proof
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Graph 12: Bosnia and Herzegovina - Data protection
2023 2024 2025 Source: Data Protection Agency of BiH
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required to establish intent and inconsistent case law.
Transitional justice
There is no policy framework on transitional justiceand dealing with the past. Bosnia and Herzegovina needs to promote an environment conducive to reconciliation in order to overcome the legacies of the war (Opinion key priority 5). Despite a few good examples at municipal level, no progress was made on reconciliation-related matters. Political leaders continued to engage in historical revisionism, including genocide denial and glorification of war criminals, which increased especially in the Republika Srpska entity following the death of Ratko Mladić. Narratives contesting established facts and the independence or impartiality of international and domestic tribunals were prominent. Criminal complaints concerning the glorification, denial and trivialization of war crimes have sharply increased. In October 2025, the Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina issued the first final conviction for genocide denial/glorification.
The authorities took no steps to adopt countrywide criteria on the rights of civilian victims of wartime torture or to address the August 2019 decision of the UN Committee against Torture on providing redress to victims of wartime torture through an effective reparation scheme, including compensation and a formal apology. Entity-level laws need to be improved. The Republika Srpska entity has not taken measures to waive court fees for victims of wartime torture. The Federation entity and the Brčko District continue the uneven implementation of legislation to grant the status of civilian victims of war to children born of wartime sexual violence. Positive initiatives continue at local level, often driven by civil society, including women’s and veterans’ groups working for peacebuilding, reconciliation and remembrance. (For missing persons, see Section 3 – Good neighbourly relations and regional cooperation).
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Freedom of expression and media freedom
The legal guarantees on freedom of expression and the enabling environment for media freedom need to be improved.
Intimidation of journalists
Political pressure, verbal attacks, intimidation and threats against journalists – in particular women journalists – persisted,including by high-level politicians. These issues continued to be downplayed by authorities. There is no sustained track record in institutional follow-up on the countrywide network to monitor these cases. In 2025, the HJPC registered 25 cases of attacks against journalists (compared with 36 cases in 2024). The BH Novinari journalists’ association received 50 complaints in 2025 (54 in 2024), of which 12 cases were resolved by the courts in favour of journalists, including 6 strategic lawsuits against public participation (SLAPP). Another 26 cases are ongoing, 1 of which is before the ECtHR. In 2025, the Ombudsman received 20 complaints related to media (9 in 2024). The use of SLAPPs continues to fuel self-censorship. This underlines the urgency to align with the EU Anti- SLAPP legal framework.
Legislative environment
Constitutional and legal guarantees remain unevenly implemented. Defamation is still not decriminalised across the country. Criminal penalties for defamation in the Republika Srpska entity continue to have a chilling effect. In 2025, according to HJPC data, 88 criminal complaints for defamation were filed in the Republika Srpska entity, of which 2 indictments were confirmed, resulting in 1 conviction with a fine, while 1 criminal case remained pending before the courts as of 31 December 2025. Despite having been repealed, the Republika Srpska entity law targeting civil society groups continues to have adverse effects on freedom of association and expression, with self-censoring effects from certain activities in order to avoid potential retaliation.
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Implementation of legislation/institutions
The Communications Regulatory Agency (CRA) still lacks political and financial independence. The procedure to appoint its management needs to be reformed so as to limit political influence. The legislative framework does not yet provide adequate safeguards to ensure the full financial and political independence of the CRA, including in relation to the selection procedures for the CRA Board and Director.
Public service broadcaster
Progress was not made in ensuring the financial sustainability of the public broadcasting system, including the state-level public broadcaster, BHRT. Deprived of stable funds, and in lengthy court litigation with entity-level broadcasters, BHRT remains in serious danger of shutting down. Legal disputes between the Republika Srpska, Federation and state-level public broadcasters continue.
No steps were taken to protect state and entity-level public broadcasters from political influence exerted through their politically controlled steering boards. Radio Televizija Republike Srpske (RTRS) continues to spread Russian disinformation, including both on Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine and on Bosnia and Herzegovina’s EU path. Local broadcasters funded by cantonal and municipal authorities remain subject to political pressure and influence.
Economic factors
There is no legislation on transparency in media ownership, including on the prevention of hidden media concentration, transparency in public advertising, or the criteria for distributing media subsidies. Non-transparent and arbitrary media outlets financing from public budgets at different levels of government, alongside reductions in funding from foreign donors, remained a critical concern for media freedoms impacting also editorial independence. The advertising practices of public companies such as telecom and advertising agencies linked to political parties continue to harm media integrity.
Internet
Hate speech and disinformation continue to spread on online platforms, as self-regulation of online media remains largely ineffective. Criminal prosecution is still limited to cases of incitement of religious and ethnic hatred online. According to a 2025 mapping report conducted by the Press and Online Media Council in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 60% of informative web portals operate with a partial or missing legal notice (impressum), lacking essential transparency regarding ownership and editorial responsibility.
Freedom of artistic expression is guaranteed by law and generally respected. However, some themes, such as reconciliation, women’s rights and LGBTIQ+ issues face opposition, particularly in the Republika Srpska entity.
Professional organisations and working conditions
Journalism remains a precarious profession, with low wages or job security. Labour rights are barely respected, unionisation remains low, and there are no branch collective agreements for media workers. The situation is even worse for women journalists. Compliance with the Press and Online Media Council’s media code remains inconsistent. Bosnia and Herzegovina’s journalists association and the free media helpline recorded the highest number of dismissals of journalists due to donor withdrawals in 2025.
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Freedom of assembly and association
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The legal guarantees to freedom of assembly and association and the regulation of assemblies need to be improved.
These guarantees vary across the country, as four cantons (Sarajevo, Herzegovina-Neretva, Bosnian Podrinje and Tuzla) and Republika Srpska have yet to align the legal framework with European standards. No steps were taken in the reporting period to harmonise cantonal and entity laws with each other and with European standards, notably on grounds for restriction of freedom of assembly and the responsibility of organisers.
Freedom of association continues to face challenges. Although the law adopted in the Republika Srpska entity in February 2025 targeting civil society groups as ’foreign agents’ was repealed in May 2025 by the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina, civil society organisations (CSOs) report self-censoring over fear of a backlash from authorities. Judicial proceedings for alleged offences, frequent inspections and other forms of administrative pressures persisted. In the West Herzegovina Canton, CSOs were required to complete re-registration within one year in line with the Law on associations adopted in February 2025, contributing to further fragmentation of the legal framework and placing an additional burden on CSO operations. This deadline was extended for a one-year period.
Labour and trade union rights are covered in Chapter 19 – Social policy and employment.
Property rights
The legal and institutional framework for enforcing property rights is incomplete. No steps were taken to update and interconnect the entity-level cadastral and land registry databases and no solution was found to pending repossession cases. The Commission for real property claims of displaced persons and refugees remains inoperative. There is no legislative framework on restitution claims, which are handled case by case. The Federation entity needs to amend its legislation in line with several ECtHR cases on occupancy rights (Đokić, Mago, Alekšić cases). In two additional cases (Omeragić, Santrač) the ECtHR established violations of property related rights, bringing the overall number of ECtHR cases to 152.
Non-discrimination
The legal and institutional framework on non-discrimination is not fully aligned with the EU acquis, includingas regards the Racial Equality Directive and the Directives on Standards for Equality Bodies. There is still no countrywide non-discrimination strategy. The 2009 Law on the prohibition of discrimination is not applied effectively, which results in a fragmented level of protection throughout the country. In 2025, the courts received 1 111 discrimination cases (1 738 in 2024). Discrimination is still under-reported, particularly on the workplace, and judicial practice in addressing discrimination is inconsistent (in particular on burden of proof), lengthy and hardly enforced. The Ombudsman registered 309 cases of discrimination in 2025, which represents a significant increase on the 196 cases registered in 2024. The cases mostly relate to workplace harassment and ethnic discrimination. The Herzegovina- Neretva and Central Bosnia cantons continue to ignore the 2014 and 2021 rulings of the Federation entity Supreme Court, which require eliminating the practice of ‘two schools under one roof’ to ensure inclusive and non-discriminatory education for all students.
Anti-racism and hate offences
Legislation on hate crime and hate speechis harmonised across the country’s four criminal codes but still needs to be fully aligned with the EU acquis and European standards. Entity- level legislation criminalises hate speechonly when causing national, racial and religious hatred and still needs to be aligned with the EU acquis and European standards. There are very few indictments and convictions, due to a failure to identify acts as hate crimes and the high burden of proof to establish intent. In addition, case law is inconsistent. Hate speech remains present in official discourse, and there is insufficient monitoring or enforcement of online offences.
Gender equality
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The legal and institutional framework on gender equality and combating gender-based violence is incomplete, and implementation/enforcement needs to be improved. No steps were taken towards harmonising legislation on gender equalityacross the country nor is the legislation enforced effectively. The 2023-2027 gender action plan still lacks funds and monitoring. Despite being required by law, gender impact assessments are still not carried out. Although the country has developed a partial gender equality index, institutions need to improve data collection, including on gender-based violence.
The legal framework was strengthened in the Federation in the previous reporting period, but some bylaws are still lacking and data collection on implementation is insufficient. Due to the lack of a harmonised framework, reporting on femicides across the country is incomplete. While gender-based and domestic violence is one of the most-reported crimes across the country, evidence suggests that it is still under-reported. Prosecution and sentencing remain slow and inconsistent. Improvements are also needed on issuing and enforcing protective measures, ensuring the availability of specialised support services, legal aid and safe accommodation. The institutional response to femicide remains insufficient and exposes systemic institutional shortcomings. Prosecution and sentencing remain inconsistent. Women from ethnic minorities, particularly Roma9 women and women in rural areas, face additional discrimination and obstacles in accessing services, evading violence and assuming visibility and leadership roles.
Women’s rights organisations experience significant pushback to their advocacy, and their members receive threats. Conservative groups systematically aim to roll back women’s rights and gender equality under the guise of promoting traditional values, including through intimidation.
Rights of the child
The legal and institutional framework on rights of the child is not in line with the EU acquis, and implementation is not harmonised across the country. Bosnia and Herzegovina should draw guidance from key European Commission recommendations, in particular on integrated child protection systems. The draft action plan on protecting the rights of the child remains to be adopted. The authorities should step up the institutional response to guarantee the protection of all children. In 2025, the Ombudsman received 404 complaints on children’s rights, a 35.12% increase on the 299 complaints received in 2024. The country needs to accelerate the deinstitutionalisation process and urgently develop action plans to implement the related roadmaps.
No action was taken to ensure child-friendly justice. Relevant entity-level laws are not
9 In line with the terminology of the European institutions, the umbrella term ’Roma’ is used here to refer to a number of different groups, without denying the specificities of those groups.
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Graph 13.1: Bosnia and Herzegovina - Violence against women (including domestic and
sexual violence)
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Graph 13.2: Bosnia and Herzegovina - Violence against women - femicides
n/a: not available Source: BiH Agency for Gender Equality
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harmonised or implemented. There are still no separate, specialised units for the accommodation of children during pre-trial detention and in police stations. Alternatives to the detention of children still need to be made available and applied wherever possible. Only limited reintegration measures are available to children upon their release from detention or state custody. In June 2026, there were 23 minors in prison (20 in FBiH and 3 in RS) out of which 7 minors have reached the age of majority.
Persons with disabilities
The legal and institutional framework on the rights of persons with disabilities continues to be incomplete, and implementation and enforcement need to be improved. No steps were taken to align legislation with the EU acquis, including in the area of accessibility, or to develop models for supported decision-making that promote the independence and autonomy of persons with disabilities. The Council for Persons with Disabilities needs to be further involved in all relevant legislative processes. The lack of dedicated funds hinders progress. Persons with disabilities, including children, continue to face hurdles, stigma and discrimination in accessing education, healthcare, employment and social assistance. The situation for persons with disabilities in detention also need to be improved, particularly for those accommodated in non-renovated facilities. The authorities also need to improve data collection, including sex-disaggregated data. Many children with disabilities continue to be placed in residential institutions. Bosnia and Herzegovina took no steps to develop, adopt and implement a deinstitutionalisation strategy to support the gradual transition towards independent living and the inclusion in the community, through the development of community, home and family-based services and support. In October 2025, the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina adopted the Strategy for the Improvement of the Rights and Position of Persons with Disabilities.
LGBTIQ+ persons
LGBTIQ+ persons face high levels of discrimination, and the legal protection of their rights is insufficient. Bosnia and Herzegovina needs to renew and fully implement the 2022-2026 action plan on the rights of LGBTIQ+ persons. The seventh Sarajevo Pride Parade took place peacefully in June 2026. Hate crimes and hate speech against LGBTIQ+ persons remain widespread, including harmful comments by public figures, and remain insufficiently prosecuted, despite existing legal provisions. In February 2026, the Cantonal Court in Sarajevo issued the first final judgment establishing discrimination against LGBTIQ+ persons on the grounds of sexual orientation, gender identity and sex characteristics. The Court also found that public calls for the isolation and exclusion of LGBTIQ+ persons constituted hate speech and encouraged discriminatory treatment. This case is significant in demonstrating that hate speech can be penalised through civil anti-discrimination mechanisms, even where criminal prosecution is limited, and reflects a gradual expansion of judicial protection beyond ethnically motivated hate speech. There was still no institutional follow-up to the March 2023 physical attack on LGBTIQ+ activists in Banja Luka. No action was taken to provide for legal recognition and protection of same-sex couples, as required by ECtHR case-law. The lack of a framework for legal gender recognition also raises concerns as regards relevant ECtHR and CJEU case-law. Intersex and transgender persons continue to be particularly marginalised.
Procedural rights of suspects and accused persons and rights of victims of crime
The legal framework on procedural rights for suspects and accused persons and on the rights of victims of crime is insufficiently aligned with the EU acquis. Legislation is not aligned with the EU acquis on victims’ rights, including on compensation to victims of crime, although related services are available. The extent to which in particular witnesses and victims can enjoy their rights remains uneven across the country. No action was taken to harmonise the four criminal procedure codes in force across the country and ensure their consistent enforcement. Bosnia and Herzegovina needs to ensure the effective enjoyment of
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procedural rights and safeguards under EU acquis, such as the right of access to a lawyer and to information, in particular during situations of deprivation of liberty. In October 2025, the Federation entity adopted a law to protect the right to trial within a reasonable time, the impact of which remains to be ascertained.
Protection of minorities
The legal and institutional framework for the protection of persons belonging to minorities is incomplete, and they continue to face discrimination. No progress was made towards adopting a countrywide strategy on persons belonging to minorities, and their participation in political and public life remains low. The Councils of National Minorities should proactively develop practical, political and legislative initiatives to promote this. Members of national minorities and non-affiliated citizens still cannot run for the Presidency and House of Peoples, in breach of the ECtHR Sejdić-Finci case law, pending the adoption of constitutional reforms to ensure the political equality and non-discrimination of all citizens.
Roma
The legal and institutional framework on Roma should be improved. Roma remain the most vulnerable and disadvantaged minority due to stereotypes, prejudices, discrimination and antigypsyism, leading to social exclusion. Funds are insufficient to implement the Action Plan for the Social Inclusion of Roma, which should be aligned with the EU Strategy for Roma Inclusion for 2020-2030 and a new action plan on social inclusion of Roma women and men for the 2026-2030 period is still pending adoption. The implementation of the Poznań Declaration commitments remains insufficient. Discrimination in employment remains rampant. Roma women face multiple forms of discrimination and are often victims of gender- based and domestic violence, trafficking in human beings, including labour exploitation of children, and forced early marriages. Too many Roma children still drop out of school, unemployment rates are very high (in particular for Roma women), and access to healthcare remains limited, in particular for children and elderly persons.
Refugees and internally displaced persons
Bosnia and Herzegovina continues to host around 90 000 wartime refugees and internally displaced persons, with over 1 000 families still living in 45 collective centres and in alternative accommodation. The authorities still need to provide them with sustainable housing solutions and access to services, in line with the objectives of Annex VII to the Dayton Peace Agreements.
Citizenship rights
Citizenship rights are still hindered by constitutional and legal structures that restrict political participation and equality, especially for minority groups. Challenges in accessing documentation persist, with some groups facing difficulties in obtaining or verifying citizenship, which limits their ability to exercise their rights.
2.2.2. Chapter 24: Justice, freedom and security
The EU has common rules for border and migration management, visa policy, and asylum. Schengen cooperation entails the lifting of border controls inside the EU. There is also cooperation in the fight against serious and organised crime and terrorism, and judicial, police and customs cooperation, all with the support of the EU Justice and Home Affairs agencies.
Fight against serious and organised crime
The legal framework on serious and organised crime is partially aligned with the EU acquis.
The capacity to fight against serious and organised crime needs to be improved.
General framework
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Legal alignment, strategic and institutional frameworks
Police legislation needs to be further aligned with European standards and harmonised across the country. This legal gap hampers police operational capacities, accountability and integrity at all levels. Police oversight mechanisms through independent parliamentary boards need to be further strengthened. No new Minister of Security was appointed. The Director and Deputy Director of the Federation entity’s police administration were appointed in March 2026, following seven years of acting tenures. SIPA continues to be led by a director whose mandate expired in 2024. A new Deputy Director was appointed in November 2025. Standardised selection criteria for police recruitment are needed to minimise political interference, particularly for senior managers. The professionalism, integrity and accountability of law enforcement agencies need to be significantly improved across the country.
The legal framework on the fight against organised crimeis partially aligned with the EU acquis. A strategy to fight organised crime for 2023-2026 continues to be implemented through action plans. A new strategy and corresponding action plans for the fight against organised crime need to be adopted for the following period. In November 2025, Bosnia and Herzegovina adopted a new Serious and Organised Crime Threat Assessment (SOCTA), in line with Europol methodology.
Legislation on witness protection is largely aligned with international and European standards. SIPA’switness protection unit further improved its operational response in the area of risk analysis and international relocation. The implementation of the framework for designating the status of witnesses requires additional improvements.
Implementation and enforcement capacity
Systemic shortcomings remain in operational cooperation between state- and entity-level law enforcement agencies, at times due to political interference.
The country needs to step up the fight against cross-border organised crime. Law enforcement agencies need to proactively launch investigations and strengthen intelligence- led policing. Although the number of new investigations has remained rather stable with 54 cases (57 in 2024), the number of cases of new indictments, final court decisions and final convictions all decreased. The number of joint investigation teams (JITs) formed in 2025 fell sharply to 17 from 64 in 2024.
The cases concluded by plea bargaining decreased slightly to 16 (20 in 2024).
Bosnia and Herzegovina should put in place state- level capacities for asset confiscation and management by adopting the Law on asset confiscation and management in line with the EU acquis and establishing or designating
an asset recovery office. Extended and third-party confiscations are rarely used. By law, the confiscation of assets requires a
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court conviction, which is not in line with the EU acquis and international standards. Bosnia and Herzegovina needs to align with the EU acquis on non-conviction based confiscation and confiscation of unexplained wealth linked to criminal conduct. In 2025, authorities initiated 40 financial investigations in parallel to serious and organised crime cases, including 25 in relation to organised crime cases (compared to 27 in 2024), and 15 in relation to other serious crime cases. Guidelines issued by the HJPC in 2019 need to be implemented effectively. In 2026, the Sarajevo Canton’s Prosecutor’s Office signed an agreement with the Tax Administration to enable more effective cooperation in financial investigations.
Overall, crucial efforts to trace and freeze illegal gains from criminal activities remain inadequate, even with some positive cases led by the state-level and Sarajevo Canton prosecutors’ offices. Thefreezing, management and confiscation of criminal assets are not applied effectively. The value of assets confiscated in 2025 continued to decrease, to EUR 6 million in 163 cases (from EUR 7.6 million in 163 cases in 2024 and EUR 8.4 million in 128 cases in 2023). There are barely any extended confiscations, which prevents the disruption of criminal networks.
The electronic exchange of data among the records of police authorities and prosecutors’ offices needs to be improved. Forensic capacity remains fragmented. Authorities should establish an operational countrywide DNA database, ensure sufficient capacity for DNA profiling and systematically exchange forensic data with other countries as needed. The creation of a new automated fingerprint information system (AFIS) is long overdue.
The capacity of law enforcement to handle gender-based violence cases has improved over the past decade, but gaps remain due to a lack of specialisation and high staff turnover.
Law enforcement cooperation
There were some actions as regards joint operations tackling serious and organised crime. However, both the exchange of intelligence and cooperation among law enforcement remain insufficient. Intelligence-led policing should be systematically used. Tools for practical cooperation between prosecutors’ offices and the police still require structural improvements, and there have been no positive changes in the quality of the reports, the collection, analysis and sharing of data, or the capacity of specialised JITs. Bosnia and Herzegovina took part in international operations, and cooperation with Europol is good and stable, in particular on migrant smuggling, drug trafficking and organised property crime. Cooperation in the field of cybercrime, the fight against terrorism, and financial and economic crime has room for improvement.
Bosnia and Herzegovina has significantly stepped up its engagement in the EU’s European Multidisciplinary Platform Against Criminal Threats (EMPACT) cycle for 2026-2027. It registered for 140 operational actions, compared with just 25 in the previous cycle, and also holds five operational action co-leader positions, including on migrant smuggling. Bosnia and Herzegovina should ensure that its involvement is targeted and strategic across the actions, with clear priorities, focused contributions and effective operational input.
Bosnia and Herzegovina needs to revise the working arrangement for cooperation with the EU Agency for Law Enforcement Training (CEPOL). The authorities are invited to step up their participation in training activities offered by the agency. To establish a sustainable professional development, Bosnia and Herzegovina is encouraged to adopt the sectoral competencies and integrate knowledge acquired through CEPOL capacity-building actions to its law enforcement training system.
The advanced passenger information (API) system has not been established, nor have passenger information units (PIUs). The country needs to adopt legislation to introduce the passenger name record (PNR) system.
Judicial cooperation in criminal matters
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The legal framework for judicial cooperation in criminal matters is partially aligned with the EU acquis. Judicial cooperation in criminal matters needs to be improved. Bosnia and Herzegovina has working arrangements in place with the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO). In 2025, the EPPO sent two requests for mutual legal assistance to the authorities of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Moreover, the EPPO had six active cases with links to
Bosnia and Herzegovina at the end of 2025. Between September 2025 and March 2026, Bosnia and Herzegovina was involved in 10 new cases at Eurojust, most related to illegal trading, corruption and money laundering. Bosnia and Herzegovina continued its participation in five ongoing JITs. In July 2026, the Council of Ministers adopted the working arrangement agreed between Eurojust and the Ministry of Justice of Bosnia and Herzegovina implementing the international agreement signed between the European Union and Bosnia and Herzegovina in 2025. The working arrangement was subsequently signed in October 2026.
Crime areas
Investigation and criminalisation of money laundering
The rulebook on the implementation of the Law on AML/CFT was adopted in December 2025. Bosnia and Herzegovina needs to urgently address the remaining strategic deficiencies in AML/CFT following the 2024 Moneyval recommendations and the 2026 Action Plan developed by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF). In addition, the authorities should consider setting up an asset recovery office as a priority. A beneficial ownership register of legal persons that would ensure a central access point for competent authorities is still not established.
For money laundering as a stand-alone crime, there were 48 investigations against 68 individuals and 40 convictions against 44 individuals (compared with 39 investigations and 30 convictions against 36 individuals in 2024), resulting in only 5 prison sentences for 6 individuals. In 2025, the HJPC adopted two sets of obligatory guidelines for all courts and prosecutors’ offices, comprehensively regulating data consolidation, internal institutional monitoring mechanisms and qualitative prosecution standards in dealing with money laundering cases.
Cybercrime
The authorities should strengthen their capacity to tackle cybercrime effectively and further align the legislation on cybercrime with the EU acquis and European standards. Bosnia and Herzegovina ratified the second additional protocol to the Budapest Convention on Cybercrime in September 2026. The country also needs to complete its strategic framework on fighting cybercrime. At present, a strategy is in place only in the Republika Srpska entity.
Child sexual abuse
The legislation on child sexual abuse online and offline needs further alignment with the EU acquis. The authorities should strengthen their ability to tackle online child sexual abuse. Law enforcement authorities continue to cooperate with Europol in the fight against child
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Graph 15: Bosnia and Herzegovina - Requests for mutual assistance in criminal matters
Incoming requests Outgoing requests n/a: not available Source: MoJ
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sexual exploitation and the abuse of children online. Yet the rate of convictions remains very low.
Trafficking in human beings
The legal framework on trafficking in human beings still needs to be aligned with the EU acquis. Following the adoption of the state-level action plan to implement the 2024-2027 strategy in this area, Zenica-Doboj Canton action plan is still pending adoption. The task force for fighting trafficking in human beings and irregular migrationremained the only coordination body in Bosnia and Herzegovina tackling both crimes, together with a state coordinator for fighting trafficking in human beings. The special department in the Prosecutor’s Office of Bosnia and Herzegovina is now fully staffed. Evidentiary proceedings in this area still require additional standardisation. According to the fourth evaluation round of GRETA (Group of experts on action against trafficking in human beings), further efforts are needed to strengthen the criminal justice response to trafficking in human beings, including by providing sufficient human and financial resources to the police, making use of special investigation techniques to gather evidence, and ensuring that trafficking offences are prosecuted as such and lead to proportionate and dissuasive sanctions.
The detection, identification and compensation of victims of trafficking in human beings need to improve. The Prosecutor’s Office of Bosnia and Herzegovina continued its coordination efforts, and the number of new investigations increased slightly to 17 (compared to 14 in 2024). However, the number of final convictions decreased to 3 cases against 7 individuals (compared to 5 cases against 12 people in 2024. In 2025, the number of potential victims detected (65) increased compared with 2024 (37), with a growing share of female victims (68%) and a large majority of child victims (77%). The
number of international potential victims detected more than doubled (to 28) compared with 2024 (13). Roma, particularly women and children, as well as migrants and applicants for international protection – especially unaccompanied minors – are especially vulnerable. Growing demand for foreign workers has increased vulnerabilities to labour exploitation. International cooperation has successfully continued through operational task forces and JITs.
Migrant smuggling
Joint preventive operations against trafficking in human beings and smuggling in temporary reception centres continue to yield results, but the central investigation office within the Border Police still lacks staff. Despite the increase in new investigations, the number of final convictions for migrant smuggling decreased significantly to 14 cases against 24 individuals (from 48 cases against 66 individuals in 2024). Joint operations in border areas led by the State Prosecution Office helped limit the violent and migrant smuggling activities of migrant organised crime groups.
There was a marked improvement in cooperation with Europol on migrant smuggling in 2025. Bosnia and Herzegovina was actively involved in two regional operational task forces targeting migrant smuggling networks operating across the Western Balkan migratory route. The country continued to participate in the Global Alliance to Counter Migrant Smuggling
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Graph 16: Bosnia and Herzegovina -
Victims of trafficking in human beings*
Children Adults Female
Source: National data collected via the organised crime and corruption track record (OCCTR) e-platform
* Victims identified in the course of criminal proceedings by the
Prosecutor's office.
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during 2025, endorsed the Global Alliance Joint Declaration and participated in the second Senior Officials’ Meeting of the Global Alliance in July 2026. Bosnia and Herzegovina also registered for almost all operational actions under the migrant-smuggling Operational Action Plan (OAP) for the new EMPACT cycle. Beyond quantitative participation, it should now emphasise substantive contributions to this OAP.
Trafficking in firearms
On firearms control, the country still needs to establish a firearms focal point and align the criminal codes with the UN Firearms Protocol. The legislation on the possession of weapons by civilians and on explosives needs to be harmonised across the country and further aligned with the EU acquis. The country needs to progress in implementing effectively the objectives of the second phase of the regional roadmap on small arms and light weapons (SALW) control and the Strategy for the control of SALW adopted in April 2025. The state- level criminal code on the illicit production and trade of weapons, military equipment and dual use goods needs to be amended.
On trafficking in firearms, a total of 1 228 firearms, 27 581 pieces of ammunition, 153 pieces of mine explosives and 17.9 kg of explosives were seized in 2025, which represents an overall decrease compared with 2024. There were 174 investigations against 202 individuals for firearms-related crime, with 183 convictions against 195 individuals.
Cooperation in the field of drugs
The legal framework for cooperation in the field of drugs needs to be improved, as does the quality of this cooperation in practice.
The legal framework is only partly aligned with the EU acquis. The law still requires the entire quantity of drugs seized in a case to be presented as evidence in court proceedings. There is still no new strategy on drugs, nor action plan against drug trafficking. However, the Sarajevo Canton’s 2024-2028 strategy and action plan on drugs are both being implemented efficiently, resulting in a tenfold increase in the amount of drugs seized by Sarajevo Canton police in 2025 compared with 2024, and the
introduction of drug tests during traffic checks/operations and of drug counselling for minors. In May 2026, Bosnia and Herzegovina adopted amendments to the Law on Traffic Safety leading to significantly stricter penalties for driving under the influence of drugs.
In April 2026, the Council of Ministers of Bosnia and Herzegovina adopted amendments to the list of narcotic drugs, psychoactive substances, plants from which narcotic drugs can be obtained and precursors. This is a significant step forward, as the list of criminalised psychoactive substances had not been updated since 2011.
2341 2431 2530
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1951 2007 19111884 1954
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Graph 17.1: Bosnia and Herzegovina - Cases related to production
and trafficking of drugs- Data on number of individuals/legal
entities involved
New investigations Indictments Final court decisions Final convictions Acquittals Plea bargains
Source: National data collected via the organised crime and corruption track record (OCCTR) e-platformn/a: not available
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2023 2024 2025
Graph 17.2: Bosnia and Herzegovina - Drugs - volumes
seized and destroyed in kg
Source: National data collected via the organised crime and corruption track record (OCCTR) e-platform n/a: not available
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Bosnia and Herzegovina should step up cooperation with the European Union Drugs Agency (EUDA), designate a correspondent agent for the EUDA, and put in place a working arrangement. Bosnia and Herzegovina should also: (i) set up a national drugs observatory; (ii) provide information in line with EUDA requirements; (iii) introduce an early warning system; and (iv) establish a focal point for drug issues for the entire country.
Bosnia and Herzegovina remains both a transit country and final destination for drugs. The commission responsible for drug destruction carried out three destructions in the reporting period.
Counterfeiting of the euro
Bosnia and Herzegovina’s legislation on the elimination of counterfeit currency is not aligned with the EU acquis. The four criminal codes in force across the country are not in line with the EU acquis on protection against counterfeiting. Law enforcement and judicial authorities are in place to deal with counterfeit currency.
Counter-terrorism, prevention and resilience
Fight against terrorism and prevention of radicalisation
Legal alignment, strategic and institutional frameworks
The legal framework for the fight against terrorism is partially aligned with the EU acquis.
The legal framework for countering violent extremism is not aligned with the EU acquis.
Criminal legislation needs to be amended to align the list of criminal offences with the EU acquis and ensure stricter sanctions for terrorism. Legislation on explosives precursors and the rights of terrorism victims still needs to be aligned with the EU acquis. The country needs to urgently address the Moneyval-recommended actions on countering the financing of terrorism and the 2026 FATF Action Plan.
Implementation and enforcement capacity
The fight against terrorism needs to be improved.
The countering of violent extremism needs to be improved.
Cooperation among authorities responsible for countering terrorism – at both strategic and operational level – needs to become more structured and efficient. The meetings of the Counter-Terrorism (CT) Task Force resumed in December 2025 after a standstill due to the political situation. The response to terrorist attacks needs to be reviewed and better prepared by developing standard operating procedures. Bosnia and Herzegovina actively participates in the counter-terrorism support network (CTSN) established with CEPOL support, and is encouraged to apply the methodology developed with the support of the CTSN to prepare a domestic terrorism trend and situation report.
The 2021-2026 strategy and action plans against terrorism and violent extremism, as well as the bilateral arrangement with the EU under the previous Joint Action Plan on Counter terrorism for the Western Balkans, are insufficiently implemented. Bosnia and Herzegovina needs to adopt a new strategy for preventing and countering terrorism and violent extremism for the upcoming period and implement the national roadmap for implementation of the new Joint Action Plan on Preventing and Countering of terrorism and Violent Extremism for the 2026-2030 period. The criminal code still needs to be amended in line with the EU acquis.
There were no repatriations of foreign terrorist fighters during the reporting period, and around 160 citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina (including 41 women and 77 children) remain in Syria and Iraq. Bosnia and Herzegovina needs to develop a comprehensive reintegration policy.
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In 2025, 14 new investigations for terrorism were initiated against 14 individuals (the same number as in 2024), with 1 final conviction (compared with 3 in 2024). Security agencies and authorities need to develop a coordinated approach to prepare the release from prison of terrorism offenders who have served their sentences, and provide assistance to help them disengage from violent extremism.
Bosnia and Herzegovina needs to further develop its capacity to investigate and prosecute the financing of terrorism and address threats posed by new technologies. No steps were taken to improve capacities to deal with cryptocurrencies and online content. Authorities should improve collaboration with the EU internet referral unit at Europol and proactively exchange information via the Europol contact point. Specific measures need to be put in place to counter terrorist content online and prevent online radicalisation, in particular of young people.
Civil society and the institutions responsible for labour, social welfare, education, young people and health at all levels of government need to be included more effectively in efforts to prevent terrorism and radicalisation and in implementing the counter-terrorism strategy.
Critical infrastructure protection
Legal alignment, strategic and institutional frameworks
Legislation on the protection of critical infrastructure and the resilience of critical entities still
needs to be developed and adopted at all levels of government (such a law is in place only
in the Republika Srpska entity and is not aligned with the EU acquis).
Migration and asylum
Legal and irregular migration and returns
The legal framework for managing legal and irregular migration is partially aligned with the EU acquis.
The management of legal and irregular migration needs to be further improved.
Legal alignment, strategic and institutional frameworks
The country should adopt a new strategy and action plan on migration and asylum supported by adequate budgetary allocations, drawing on the implementation results of the 2021-2025 strategy. In 2025, Bosnia and Herzegovina issued 6702 work permits for foreign employment which represents an increase of 15% compared with 2024, reflecting labour market demands. Authorities should develop a comprehensive approach to labour migration and ensure that a due diligence mechanism is in place to prevent labour exploitation and that legal pathways for third country nationals prevent irregular secondary movements to the EU.
Implementation and enforcement capacity
Bosnia and Herzegovina failed to make progress in taking over responsibility for managing temporary reception centres. Authorities did not adopt the transition plan on migration management nor the rulebook on the management of reception centres. Following the closure of Ušivak temporary reception centre in March 2026, the Ministry of Security and the Service for Foreigners’ Affairs have not yet established the conditions necessary to host families and unaccompanied minors in the Blažuj temporary reception centre.
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The competent agencies remain significantly understaffed, and only very limited funding is available to manage migration. Coordination and the sharing of responsibility among all levels of government remain insufficient. The contingency plan to respond to heightened migratory flows was developed in 2015 and has not been updated since. The number of people who entered the country irregularly continued to decrease.
Bosnia and Herzegovina needs to improve the legal framework and implementation procedures for voluntary and forced return, which are still mostly based on donors’ assistance. In 2025, Bosnia and Herzegovina carried out fewer voluntary returns to countries of origin than in 2024 (361 in 2025 against 446 in 2024) and 7 forced returns (compared with 14 in 2024).
Bosnia and Herzegovina has readmission agreements with the EU, which continued to be implemented, together with protocols – further facilitating their implementation – signed with 13 Member States. A total of 391 citizens were returned under these agreements. Accelerated readmission procedures with neighbouring countries remain suspended, except with Croatia. Discussions to conclude readmission agreements with third countries and further agreements or arrangements with countries of origin should continue. In 2025, Bosnia and Herzegovina accepted 2 588 migrants returned from Croatia under the bilateral readmission agreement (down from 3 255 in 2024). Violent collective expulsions of migrants and applicants for international protection back into Bosnia and Herzegovina (‘pushbacks’) continued to be reported.
Asylum
While the legal framework on asylum in Bosnia and Herzegovina is broadly aligned with the EU acquis as it was in force until 12 June 2026, authorities should focus on developing its national legal framework and operational capacities on migration and asylum to align with the Pact.
The management of asylum procedures needs to be improved.
Legal alignment, strategic and institutional framework
Bosnia and Herzegovina needs to guarantee access to quality and effective asylum procedures. Cooperation with the European Union Asylum Agency is constructive, and the implementation of the 2025-2027 roadmap is underway. The staffing of the Asylum Sector of the Ministry of Security was largely completed in 2026, with one position still vacant. The new premises for registration and refugee status determination interviews at the Ministry of Security were completed in September 2026.
Implementation and enforcement capacity
The average processing time for asylum requests continued to increase compared to 2024 with significant delays in refugee status determination (RSD) interviews, which creates a backlog and can delay access to rights for those in need of international protection. There continues to be an over-reliance on subsidiary protection. Of the 175 applications lodged in 2025, 6 people received refugee status and 55
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2023 2024 2025
Graph 19.1: Bosnia and Herzegovina - Asylum Applications
Source: Service for Foreigners' Affairs
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received subsidiary protection.
Practical obstacles to accessing the asylum procedure remain. One of these obstacles is that applicants for international protection cannot register their claims on their own initiative, despite this being provided for by law. Further alignment is needed on strengthening the asylum and reception systems, particularly to ensure the standardised examination of applications for international protection and systematic access to procedural guarantees. Unaccompanied migrant children face specific challenges, such as accessing safe accommodation and asylum procedures.
In 2025, a total of 300 Ukrainian refugees resided in Bosnia and Herzegovina (275 in 2024), benefiting from renewable temporary residence on humanitarian grounds for six months.
In preparation for future participation in the EU asylum and migration framework, the country should make its fingerprint systems compatible with Eurodacstandards.
The budget for the integration of refugees is sufficient. The Delijaš asylum centre has good reception conditions and despite remaining underutilised the number of residents in 2025 more than doubled to 42 residents (only 20 residents on average in 2024).
In 2025, 870 asylum applicants from Bosnia and Herzegovina were registered in the EU-27 (down by 39% from 1 420 in 2024).
Visa policy
Bosnia and Herzegovina’s visa policy is not fully aligned with that of the EU, in particular in what concerns the list of countries whose nationals require a visa to enter the EU. Bosnia and Herzegovina must terminate visa-free regimes with 10 countries, including 7 with a permanent visa exemption: Azerbaijan, Qatar, Kuwait, Türkiye, Russia, China and Vanuatu, and also stop granting seasonal visa-waivers (incompatible with the EU acquis) to nationals of Bahrain, Oman and Saudi Arabia. In 2026 Bosnia and Herzegovina didn’t make any progress on visa alignment, but to the contrary, further extended the duration of seasonal visa-waivers from 30 to 60 days. This runs counter to its commitment to terminate one visa- free agreement per year during the period of 2025-2027 and to the repeated recommendations of successive Visa Suspension Mechanism Reports. The increase in seasonal visa waivers in 2025, compounded by the increase in application of such measures in 2026 represents backsliding. These unfavourable developments may increase the risk of irregular migration to the EU via the Western Balkans route.
Pending full alignment with the EU visa policy, Bosnia and Herzegovina should apply additional security measures, such as increasing the capacity of border guards and engaging with non-EU countries and airlines. Procedures for applying for and issuing visas are harmonised with the EU acquis. Following the adoption of the rulebook on the registration of biometric features of foreigners in 2025, authorities deployed the equipment in diplomatic and consular offices worldwide. There are significant delays in the process of starting to use external service providers and commercial intermediaries. Bosnia and
88.0%
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Bosnia and
Herzegovina
EU 27
average
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Herzegovina
EU 27
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Bosnia and
Herzegovina
EU 27
average
2023 2024 2025
Graph 19.2: Bosnia and Herzegovina - Asylum recognition rate
(%)
n/a: not available Source: Ministry of Security Sector for Asylum
*EU averages reflect positive decisions at first instance for refugee status, humanitarian status and subsidiary protection status
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Herzegovina still does not have a fully functional central visa information system.
The country still does not have full control over the procurement and manufacturing of biometric travel documents. Security features and procedures for applying for and issuing travel documents, notably biometric passports, are fully aligned with EU standards.
Schengen governance and external borders
The legislative and strategic framework for the management of external borders is partially aligned with the EU acquis.
The management of borders needs to be improved.
Legal alignment, strategic and institutional frameworks
Bosnia and Herzegovina failed to take tangible steps to establish a national Schengen governance framework, including by adopting a Schengen action plan or appointing a national Schengen coordinator. Following the adoption of the Law onborder control in 2025, authorities adopted the corresponding bylaws. Implementation of the 2025-2029 strategy and action plan for integrated border management is satisfactory.
Following the signature of the Frontex status agreement in 2025, the operational plan was adopted and Frontex began deploying standing corps officers with executive powers in Bosnia and Herzegovina. As of September 2026, there were approximately 130 standing corps deployed. Cooperation between the Border Police and Frontex primarily covers border surveillance and border check. The joint risk analysis centre requires improvements with regard to personnel management, data access and data sharing. Establishment of the National (Operational) Coordination Centre is in early stages and requires additional improvements as per EU standards, notably in real-time data and information exchange.
Implementation and enforcement capacity
Despite the adoption of the new classification of positions in July 2025, the Border Police remains understaffed, with almost a quarter of vacancies still not filled.
Inter-agency border surveillance operations led by the Border Police provide limited results due to insufficient manpower in all law enforcement agencies. Border Police cooperation with neighbouring countries continued, with joint operations, patrols and meetings taking place. Border infrastructure and equipment still require further improvements and increased investments. Additional closures of illegal border crossings, notably with Montenegro, resulted in decreased drug- and cigarette-smuggling activities. The Border Police continued to attend anti-corruption training.
Judicial cooperation in civil and commercial matters
Judicial cooperation in civil and commercial matters needs to be improved. The country still needs to accede to core instruments under the Hague Conference on Private International Law.
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2.3. ECONOMIC CRITERIA10
2.3.1. The existence of a functioning market economy
Economic governance
Repeated political stalemates and a short-term policy focus continue to negatively affect economic governance. Policy formulation and implementation have continued to be impeded by short-term-oriented and highly politicised decision-making processes, institutional fragmentation and insufficient cooperation among key stakeholders. Recurring delays in agreeing on the budget for country-level institutions continued to impede their functioning and erode their capacities. The quality and credibility of fiscal policy suffer from its focus on short-term objectives, such as raising public sector wages and non-targeted social transfers. Wage rises well beyond productivity increases have undermined competitiveness. Long-term challenges, such as tackling brain drain and the lack of qualified labour needed to increase the country’s growth potential, have not been addressed. Limited action has been taken to address the upcoming application of the EU’s CBAM. Progress in overdue structural reforms has remained very limited. The 2026 Economic Reform Programme (ERP) was submitted in time, which is an important improvement on previous years. However, the programme’s quality continues to suffer from a lack of internal consistency and insufficient cooperation between the various stakeholders. The country has yet to sign and ratify the Facility and Loan Agreements under the Reform Agenda, which, if implemented, would unlock EU financing in exchange for reforms.
Implementation of the policy guidance jointly adopted at the May 2025 Economic and Financial Dialogue with the EU has remained limited. Limited progress has been made to improve the country’s statistics, especially in the area of public finance. The currency board
10 Unless otherwise indicated, the data in this section are taken from the relevant national sources (the statistical office, Ministry of Finance and central bank).
2023 2024 2025
Bosnia and Herzegovina - Key economic figures
GDP per capita (% of EU-27 in PPS)1) 33 35 37 36
real GDP growth 2) 3.3 3.8 2.6 2.1
Activity rate of the population aged 15-64 (%), total 56.8 59.8 61.8 62.8
female 44.7 47.0 49.3 50.2
male 68.8 72.3 74.0 75.1
Unemployment rate of the population aged 15-64 (%), total 17.6 13.3 12.8 12.3
female 20.9 16.9 16.7 16.6
male 15.5 11.0 10.2 9.5
Employment of the population aged 15-64 (annual growth %)1) 2.4 2.9 3.1 1.3
Nominal wages (annual growth %) 4.8 13.0 9.8 14.0
Consumer price index (annual growth %) 3.0 6.1 1.7 4.0
Exchange rate against EUR 1.96 1.96 1.96 1.96
Current account balance (% of GDP)2) -3.2 -2.1 -3.5 -3.2
Net foreign direct investment, FDI (% of GDP) 2) 2.6 3.3 3.4 1.6
General government balance (% of GDP) 0.1 -1.2 -1.8
General government debt (% of GDP) 33.1 25.3 25.5 25.6
Notes :
1) Eurostat
2) Expenditure side GDP, Agency for statistics data revision 30 December 2025
Sources: BiH Agency for Statistics, Central Bank of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Eurostat
2017-22
average
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arrangement continued to function well. Some steps were taken at entity level to improve public investment management. No steps were taken to clarify the constitutional competence for setting up a central (countrywide) register of bank accounts of private individuals in line with the EU acquis. The bank resolution framework is not fully operational.
Macroeconomic stability
Economic activity weakened in 2025 and the first quarter of 2026. Real GDP growth decelerated from 2.6%11 in 2024 to 2.1% in 2025 and to 1.7% in the first quarter of 2026. The main sources of growth were private consumption and gross capital formation, although both components increased at a slower pace than one year earlier. The process of catching up with EU living standards has remained slow, with GDP per capita in purchasing power standards actually declining to 36% of the EU27 average in 2025, only five percentage points higher
than 10 years ago.
The current account balance benefited from weaker domestic demand, with the deficit dropping from 3.2% in 2025 of GDP to 2.8% in the four quarters to Q2 2026. Nominal exports increased by 5.6% in 2025 and the first seven months of 2026. The value of imports accelerated from 4.5% in 2025 to 6.8% year-on-year in the first seven months of 2026. The secondary income balance, which includes transfers from migrant workers, remained largely unchanged as a percentage of GDP. Net foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows declined from 3.4% of GDP in 2024 to 1.5% in 2025 but recovered slightly to 2.3% of GDP in the year to the first quarter of 2026. The main source of foreign capital inflows remained reinvested earnings. The foreign exchange reserve coverage remained at comfortable levels in Q1-2026, equivalent to 7.0 months of imports of goods and services.
Price pressures have increased. Average annual inflation in 2025 was 4%, up from 1.7% in 2024. Headline inflation increased from 4.3% in the second half of 2025 to 4.6% in the first six months of 2026. The main drivers of inflation in early 2026 were sharp price increases for transport (+12.1%) and housing and electricity (9.8%), while food prices rose by 1.9%. The quality of inflation measurement suffers from a lack of disaggregated data, in particular from the Republika Srpska entity. The country’s statistics office does not yet publish core inflation data, although the central bank has started publishing its own estimates. The publication of an EU-harmonised inflation indicator is impeded by insufficient resources and insufficient
11 Value calculated according to the expenditure approach.
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2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
Graph 21: Bosnia and Herzegovina -
Real GDP growth and contributions
Priv. cons. Gov. cons. GFCF Stocks Net exports Real GDP growth
Source: BiH Agency for Statistics, own calculations
% y-o-y
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4
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2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
Graph 22: Bosnia and Herzegovina - Current
account selected components and FDI
Personal transfers (= Workers' remittances)
Goods and services trade balance
Current account balance (rhs)
Net FDI (rhs)
% of GDP
Source: Central Bank of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Agency for statistics
57
cooperation between the entities’ statistical agencies. These shortcomings continue to hinder the analysis of inflationary dynamics.
While no official country-level fiscal data are yet available for 2025 and 2026, the country’s fiscal position in 2025 appears to have benefited from stronger-than- expected revenue performance, while the budgetary plans for 2026 envisage a marked increase in both spending and the deficit. Preliminary estimates of the Ministry of Finance point to a country-level fiscal deficit of 0.3% of GDP in 2025, lower than the initial target of 0.7%.The main reason for the improvement in the estimated 2025 outcome was markedly stronger revenue growth (+11.3% year-on-year, compared with a projected +4.1%), benefiting from strong wage increases (+14% in 2025 after +9.8% in 2024), which boosted receipts of social security contributions and income taxes. One-off factors, such as the disbursement of accumulated budgetary reserves to cover liabilities related to the Viaduct case, also contributed to the strong revenue increase. However, this was partly offset by higher expenditure (+11% instead of the projected +2.6%), mainly driven by public consumption (rising by 10.4% instead of a planned 3.8%) and social transfers (+9.2% instead of +3.7%). Public investment is estimated to have increased by 15.8% in 2025, instead of an initially planned reduction of 0.4%. The public debt-to-GDP ratio rose from 25.0% at the end of the first quarter of 2025 to 25.8% in the first quarter of 2026, mainly driven by an increase in short-term debt denominated in domestic currency, but benefitting from an inflation driven relatively strong increase in nominal GDP. However, IMF estimates point to a significantly higher deficit of 1.8% of GDP in 2025 and project a continued increase in the country-level fiscal deficit to around 4% or more in 2026 and 2027. Should this deficit path materialise, the country could face medium-term sustainability risks, higher financing costs, and a significant increase in the debt ratio.
The quality and sustainability of public finances deteriorated further. Repeated permanent increases in current spending in response to temporary inflation-driven revenue gains, continue to structurally weaken the country’s fiscal position. While the budgets initially adopted for 2026 suggested a 1.8 percentage point increase in the fiscal deficit, to 2.1% of GDP, the supplementary budget adopted by the Republika Srpska entity breached its existing budget rule and could, if fully implemented, increase the country-wide general government deficit to as much as 4% of GDP. To finance these spending increases, the authorities have increasingly relied on international capital markets. Coordination between the entities in accessing these markets is virtually non-existent, raising the risk of an uncontrolled build-up of external liabilities and a deterioration in the country’s credit ranking. Overall, the assessment of the country’s fiscal position remains severely constrained by: (i) a lack of timely country-level fiscal data; (ii) weak compliance with EU accounting standards; and (iii) the significant stock of payment arrears and contingent liabilities.
The macroeconomic policy mix has continued to fall short of adequately addressing the country’s main challenges. Bosnia and Herzegovina’s currency board arrangement, while serving as an anchor of stability, constrains the scope for monetary policy. As a result, fiscal policy is the key macroeconomic policy tool to manage aggregate demand. However, there is no longer a countrywide ex ante fiscal coordination among the key stakeholders, although this is in conflict with existing legislation. This continues to weaken the country’s capacity to pursue a coherent and coordinated fiscal policy at country level. Consequently,
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2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
Graph 23: Bosnia and Herzegovina -
Fiscal developments
Primary balance (lhs) Interest (lhs)
GG balance (lhs) Public debt (rhs)
% of GDP
Source: Central Bank of Bosnia and Herzegovina
58
both the fiscal stance and the structural fiscal position have deteriorated further. At the same time, despite a planned marked increase in 2025, public investment remains low and continues to limit the country’s growth potential. This short-term fiscal approach does not address the country’s structural challenges and results in slow convergence with the EU.
Functioning of product markets
Business environment
The institutional and regulatory business environment has remained weak and fragmented. While property rights are generally well defined, their enforcement remains inefficient in certain sectors, particularly in property registration. Prolonged judicial proceedings hinder contract enforcement, especially in resolving commercial disputes. Bureaucratic and technical barriers continue to stifle business activity and impede the functioning of the country’s internal market. Notable examples of those impediments are: (i) the requirement to obtain identical licences or permits in each administrative region or local jurisdiction; (ii) inconsistent local regulations and standards, such as those governing construction permits; and (iii) the obligation to pay a wide array of entity and/or canton specific local taxes and fees. These impediments stifle competition and discourage both domestic and foreign investment. The unresolved issue of state property has a negative impact on infrastructure investment. Consequently, the number of foreign greenfield investors and the expansion of mid-sized enterprises have remained exceptionally low. Furthermore, the social dialogue between government authorities and social partners remains inadequate, undermining the quality of reforms, notably socio-economic reforms.
The level of corruption and the size of the informal economy remain substantial. According to Transparency International’s corruption perceptions index for 2025, Bosnia and Herzegovina remains the second-worst performer among the Western Balkan countries. The recently established state-level Commission for Deciding on Conflicts of Interest (CDCI) has yet to start operating effectively. The informal economy remains substantial, constituting up to one third of total economic activity. While undeclared work generates significant employment and income, it distorts competition and undermines tax revenues. Combined with under-reported wages, this reduces pension entitlements, heightens poverty risks for older people and exacerbates the fiscal strain on formally employed workers.
State influence on product markets
The state maintains a significant role in the economy. When looking at public administration, healthcare, education and publicly owned enterprises (POEs), roughly one third of the country’s total employment is accounted for by the public sector. Many of these enterprises remain unreformed despite persistent underperformance. Public procurement processes remain overly complex, compounded by weak administrative capacity. This creates opportunities for corruption and fosters a bias towards domestic suppliers, conflicting with EU acquis requirements (see also Chapter 5 – Public Procurement). Price regulation remains widespread, with controls expanding further following the recent energy price increases. The most recent official State aid report (2024) indicates relatively low levels of direct support (1.2% of GDP). However, indirect subsidies, such as tolerating the accumulation of payment arrears, especially in the area of collecting taxes or social contributions, continue to distort fair competition. Oversight of State aid remains inadequate, hindered by partial alignment with EU legal standards and inconsistent enforcement across the country. The State Aid Council’s authority and operational capacity remain limited, further weakening compliance.
Privatisation and restructuring
No progress has been made in restructuring POEs, and critical issues, such as governance oversight and professional management, are not yet sufficiently addressed. Despite controlling strategic sectors (including energy and transport), many of these enterprises suffer from politicised decision-making, low productivity and chronic
59
inefficiencies, placing a substantial financial burden on taxpayers. Currently, around 540 POEs operate under various levels of public ownership, employing roughly 10% of the total workforce and a quarter of all public-sector workers. Their collective debt stands at 28% of GDP, with a disproportionate share of short-term liabilities. Additionally, contingent liabilities with a high risk of materialisation amount to about 8% of GDP, yet debt monitoring and risk management remain inadequate. Nearly half of these enterprises rely on explicit or implicit budgetary support, further straining public finances. While legislation nominally requires transparent board appointments, in practice, political interference persists. Many POEs also benefit from lenient enforcement of tax and social contribution obligations, leading to accumulated payment arrears that account for two thirds of all fiscal arrears. This results in unfair wage premiums, giving them an unjust competitive advantage over private firms. Efforts to restructure, dissolve or privatise POEs have been minimal, in particular, a state ownership policy is missing. The Republika Srpska entity amended its Law on Public Enterprises, to improve transparency, efficiency, cost-effectiveness and supervision. However, implementation has not yet started. So far, no countrywide consolidated financial report on the POE sector has been produced and significant data gaps exist, in particular in the Federation entity. The Republika Srpska entity still has not published an updated central register of POEs, while the Federation entity has yet to establish operational units for POE supervision.
Functioning of the financial market
The financial sector remained stable. However, credit risks are on the rise and transparency remains insufficient in some areas. Banks maintained robust capital and liquidity buffers, while profitability remained solid. Bank deposits increased by 10.3% year- on-year in the second half of 2025 and maintained this growth in the first half of 2026, mainly driven by household deposits. Nominal credit also increased at a similar rate, keeping the loan-to-deposit ratio close to 77%. Bank lending as a share of GDP rose from 46.9% at the end of 2024 to 48.2% at the end of 2025 and to 48.4% at the end of June 2026. This rapid increase could raise credit risks and further accelerate growth in real estate and housing prices. Nevertheless, the non-performing-loan ratio continued to decline, from 3.2% at the end of 2024 to 2.4% at the end of 2025 and to 2.1% at the end of June 2026. However, credit risks appear markedly higher in some smaller, domestically owned banks. The banking system’s overall capital-adequacy ratio remained high, at 19.9% at the end of June 2026. This is well above the regulatory minimum of 12%. The return-on-equity (ROE) ratio dropped from 16% at the end of 2024 to 14.7% at the end of 2025 but recovered to 15.5% by mid-2026. The return on assets (ROA) declined marginally, from 2.2% at the end of 2024 to 2.1% by mid-2026. However, delays in aligning with international standards for anti-money laundering and counter-terrorism financing resulted in the country being grey-listed by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) (see also Chapters 4 - Free movement of capital and 9 - Financial services). In June, the Central Bank applied for accession to the Single Euro Payments Area (SEPA), which would integrate the country into the European payments area and facilitate payment transactions for citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Furthermore, in July the central bank launched the TIPS instant payment system. The size of the non-bank financing sector and the capital markets remained small, fragmented and underdeveloped, with stock market capitalisation amounting to about 21.9% of GDP at the end of 2025. In addition, the active issuer base has been shrinking in recent years. Access to credit remained difficult for many micro and small companies.
Functioning of the labour market
The labour market situation shows signs of a weakening, as key structural challenges, such as high levels of youth and long-term unemployment, low labour participation, and labour
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Graph 24: Bosnia and Herzegovina -
Labour market trends (15-64 age group)
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shortages, have not been sufficiently addressed. Registered employment was 0.4% lower year-on-year in the second half of 2025 and remained 0.6% lower in the first half of 2026. Job losses occurred mainly in manufacturing, but also in trade and accommodation, while employment increased in public administration, construction and the health sector.
However, according to Labour Force Survey (LFS) data, the unemployment rate dropped to 12.2% in the second quarter of 2026, markedly lower than the 13.1% recorded a year before. Youth unemployment among those aged 15-24 stood at 32.9% in the second quarter, compared with 33.9% a year earlier. The implementation of the Youth Guarantee scheme, launched in 2023, has been further delayed.
A relatively high inactivity rate among women contributes to a low overall participation rate. Informal employment also remains high, accounting for around one third of the labour force. In addition, a significant number of workers continued to leave the country, contributing to labour shortages and undermining the country’s medium-term growth potential. In response, the authorities have increased the quotas for foreign employment permits. However, these remain insufficient, particularly for qualified workers.
As a result of declining employment and unemployment, the labour force continued to shrink, falling by 0.9% year-on-year in the second quarter of 2026, while the working age population declined by 0.1% year-on-year. Long-term unemployment remains a significant issue, with 69% of unemployed people having looked for a job for more than one year. This nevertheless represents an improvement compared with 75% a year earlier. In particular, the share of people unemployed for more than 4 years fell markedly. The main causes for persistently high long-term unemployment are skills mismatches and insufficient job opportunities. Measures to address high youth and structural unemployment and skills mismatches have remained limited and fragmented across cantonal and entity levels. Recorded real wages grew by 14% in the second half of 2025 and by 8.8% in the first half of 2026, while labour productivity growth during this period was significantly lower, at around 2- 2.5% annually. Wage increases exceeding productivity growth could also add to inflationary pressures.
2.3.2. The capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the EU
Education and innovation
Measures to develop the country’s human capital have remained insufficient. The country’s education system is fragmented across 14 stakeholders at country, entity and cantonal levels. Insufficient coordination and cooperation among these stakeholders have led to significant inefficiencies, as well as wide variations in curricula and standards. Public spending on education amounted to around 4% of GDP in 2022, below the EU average of 4.7% in 2023. As a result of these inefficiencies, the education system’s use of financial resources remains among the least efficient in the region12. Moreover, weak coordination has resulted in the absence of common education standards and in disparities in the quality of teacher training and performance evaluation. The country stopped participating in the PISA assessment in 2020, thereby abandoning an important source of evidence for education policy. Although the country joined the European Alliance for Apprenticeships (EAfA) in autumn 2024, it has so far failed to translate this commitment into tangible measures to improve its vocational education and training system or to boost youth employment. Investment in research and development has remained low, while the lack of coordination in this area has further reduced spending efficiency. No progress was made during the reporting period in improving the functioning of science and technology parks.
12 European Training Foundation (2025): Key Policy Developments in Education, Training and
Employment – Bosnia and Herzegovina, p. 30.
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Physical capital and the quality of infrastructure
Bosnia and Herzegovina’s fixed capital stock remains insufficient to support stronger growth. Persistent political deadlocks and uncertainty, along with limited progress in improving public investment management, have weighed on both private and public investment. As a result, Bosnia and Herzegovina has not been able to achieve a stronger growth trajectory. Net FDI inflows, at 1.5% of GDP in 2025, remain significantly lower than in other countries in the region. Some progress has been made in recent years, largely supported by foreign financing, in improving road infrastructure, and there have been local initiatives to attract investment. The energy sector continues to rely heavily on lignite coal and records high CO2 emissions per unit of energy produced. Efforts to diversify the energy mix, including by enabling solar-generated electricity to access the national grid, remain insufficient. However, the sector still lacks a unified and internationally recognised regulatory framework, which continues to hamper international investment in renewable energy sources. Environmental standards remain low and are often not enforced. This has negative consequences for public health, and, consequently, for labour productivity. The authorities have taken steps to reduce the country’s dependence on a single gas supplier by deciding to develop an alternative supply route. However, the currently planned approach is not aligned with the EU’s decarbonisation goal for 2050.
The level of digitalisation of government services remains low. Insufficient coordination, cooperation and data exchange between different administrative authorities continue to slow urgently needed progress. A notable example is the failure to agree on countrywide harmonisation of e-signature systems. Furthermore, appropriate legislation and a countrywide regulatory agency aligned with European standards are still lacking.
Sectoral and enterprise structure
Bosnia and Herzegovina’s production structure continued to shift gradually towards services, particularly wholesale and retail trade. The share of production-oriented sectors (manufacturing, electricity production and water management) in total value added declined between 2019 and 2025 (from 35.2% of gross value added to 30.5%), while the share of trade and tourism, IT, and administrative services increased (from 33.1% to 37.1% of gross value added). The number of registered active companies has increased in recent years. However, this growth has been driven mainly by micro companies (0-9 employees) in the trade sector. Some 90% of all companies are small and micro-enterprises with fewer than 50 employees.
Economic integration with the EU and price competitiveness
Trade and investment integration with the EU remained high. During the reporting period, Bosnia and Herzegovina’s exports became even more oriented towards the EU, mainly due to stronger trade ties with the country’s key partners, notably Croatia, Germany and Austria. As a result, the share of trade with the EU increased from 73.8% of total trade in the first seven months of 2025 to 76.7% in the first seven months of 2026, while trade with the CEFTA countries dropped from 17.0% to 15.5%. Bosnia and Herzegovina’s trade openness (exports and imports as a percentage of GDP) increased slightly, from 95.5% of GDP in 2024 to 96.8% in 2025. This remains relatively low given the small size of the
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Graph 25a: Bosnia and Herzegovina -
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economy. The composition of the country’s exports is not very diversified and still relies heavily on basic metals, machinery and chemical products. About two thirds of the FDI stock originates from EU countries. The country’s share in EU-27 commodity imports has remained broadly unchanged during the last five years, at around 0.24%.
Domestic wage pressures affect the country’s external competitiveness. Significant nominal wage increases in 2025 and 2026 could negatively affect the country’s external price competitiveness. The nominal effective exchange rate of the domestic currency remained relatively stable between June 2025 and June 2026, largely due to its peg to the euro. Based on the consumer price index as a deflator, Bosnia and Herzegovina’s real effective exchange rate showed a marked appreciation at the beginning of the assessment period, driven by inflation differentials with imports trading partners such as Italy, Slovenia and Germany. However, this was largely offset by a similar depreciation in May and June. As a result, compared with a year earlier, the real effective exchange rate was broadly unchanged in June (-0.1% year-on-year).
2.4. PUBLIC PROCUREMENT, STATISTICS AND FINANCIAL CONTROL
Chapter 5: Public procurement
EU rules ensure that public procurement of goods, services and works in any Member State is transparent and open to all EU companies on the basis of non-discrimination and equal treatment.
Institutional set-up and legal alignment
The legal framework is partially in line with the EU acquis. The public procurement strategy for 2024-2028 and its action plan are being implemented with delays.
There were no developments in reforming the legal framework for concessions and public-private partnerships (PPPs), which remains fragmented and not aligned with basic EU principles, lacking strategic planning and efficient review mechanisms. The competent institutions at state and entity level still need to develop a roadmap to harmonise the legal framework with the EU acquis including measures for improved coordination and consistent application throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina.
Implementation of the 2014 Law on public procurement is still lagging behind. Further alignment is necessary with EU procurement principles, practices, procedures and concepts, including innovation partnership, dynamic purchasing system, electronic catalogues, best price-quality ratio and life-cycle costing. Tender procedures are still paper based with every bid requiring certified documentation towards economic operators. Further reforms are needed to fully integrate electronic communication and information exchange into the procurement process to enhance efficiency and reduce bureaucracy. Despite improvements, the system still lacks user-friendly features or communication functionalities to achieve its full impact.
Implementation and enforcement capacity
The share of the public procurement market in the total nominal GDP for 2025 is 11.5%, representing an increase from 9.8% in 2024. The average number of bids received per public procurement procedure remains low at 1.62 in 2025.
The administrative capacities of the Public Procurement Agency (PPA) continue to be insufficient to properly monitor the award and implementation of contracts and identify irregularities in procurement procedures. Better coordination is needed between the Competition Council and the audit and judiciary institutions. The overall percentage of contracts awarded in public procurement procedures in 2025 based on the lowest price criterion was 86.1%. The use of the negotiated procedure without prior publication of all awarded contracts in 2025 amounted to 3.8% and represents a decrease as compared with
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previous years (5.1% in 2024, 6.1% in 2023). The overall percentage of tenders that received only one compliant bid was 11.2%, which represents a sharp decrease from over a half in 2024. There is a continuous lack of mechanisms to coordinate the interpretation of public procurement legislation among key institutions.
The institutional capacity to manage public procurement processesis weak. Specialised procurement functions need to be established in each contracting authority. More efforts are needed to improve integrity and avoid conflicts of interestin public procurement, which remains prone to irregularities and vulnerable to corruption. The cooperation between the courts and civil society needs to be strengthened.
Efficient remedy system
The legislation on the right to legal remedy is partially in line with the EU acquis. The Procurement Review Body continues to face insufficient technical capacity and a high volume of appeals (1 684 in 2025), compounded by challenges with case law accessibility, prolonged appeals and legal loopholes disrupting procurement processes. Lower number of appeals and higher fees and stricter admission requirements lowered the number of repetitive and abusive complaints (which previously prolonged the procurement timelines).
Chapter 18: Statistics
European statistics are developed, produced and disseminated by EU Member States, guided by the principles and quality criteria laid down in the Regulation on European statistics, such as professional independence, impartiality, reliability, accessibility and statistical confidentiality. Common rules are provided for the methodology, production and dissemination of statistical information, which are further specified in sectoral legislation that constitute the EU acquis on statistics.
As regards statistical infrastructure, the Law on statistics still needs to be aligned with European standards and integrate the principles of the European statistics code of practice. The Agency for Statistics of Bosnia and Herzegovina (BHAS) needs to strengthen its coordination role towards other national authorities producing official statistics.
On classifications and registers, the statistical business register is in place, but further actions are necessary to improve its quality. MoUs and related technical protocols with the High Judicial and Prosecutorial Council (HJPC), the Indirect Taxation Authority (ITA), Service for Foreign' Affairs and the Finance Directorate of Brčko District were signed on 15 September 2026 allowing for data exchange between these institutions and statistical offices in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The main statistical classifications are in place but need updating. Regarding the NUTS classification, Bosnia and Herzegovina should define NUTS level 3 regions as soon as possible, and local administrative units (LAU) lists since 2019.
On macroeconomic statistics, further efforts on national accounts are needed to reach full compliance with the ESA 2010 Transmission Programme. The updated GNI inventory is expected in early 2027, and a master plan to align national accounts needs to be agreed among the three statistical institutes at state and entity level. Bosnia and Herzegovina should improve sector coverage, timeliness and coverage of transactions of government finance statistics (GFS) and excessive deficit procedure (EDP) tables, in line with ESA 2010, and resume their regular submission to Eurostat. In February 2026, the Central Bank of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Agency for Statistics of Bosnia and Herzegovina signed a Memorandum of Understanding in the field of GFS to strengthen inter-institutional cooperation.
On business and trade statistics, structural business statistics and the business register are medium compliant while short-term business statistics is at low compliance. Regarding statistics on international trade in services, the completeness of datasets needs to be improved, but compliance is otherwise high, which is also the case for international trade in goods statistics. Bosnia and Herzegovina started transmitting inward FDI data to Eurostat
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and is advised to compile and transmit outward FDI data, as well as FDI statistics broken down by activity.
On science, technology and innovation statistics, the overall compliance level is low. However, Bosnia and Herzegovina conduct the biannual Community Innovation Survey (CIS). As no data needed to be transmitted to Eurostat in 2025, the compliance status is for the transmission in 2024 (CIS 2022). Bosnia and Herzegovina is encouraged to continue the ongoing efforts to produce high-quality data on business innovation for 2024.
On social statistics, statistics on Income and Living Conditions still require improvements to be validated and published. Bosnia and Herzegovina should finalise and adopt the Law on census of population, households and dwellings, adopt the roadmap for its implementation and carry out the census. The labour force survey is highly compliant, with a need to further improve timeliness. Healthcare expenditure data and metadata were transmitted to Eurostat while Bosnia and Herzegovina is encouraged to further develop public health statistics.
On agricultural statistics, preparations continued forthe agricultural census, but the law on the agricultural census needs to be adopted to conduct it in 2027.
On energy statistics, further work is needed to improve timeliness and the transmission of missing datasets. Bosnia and Herzegovina has continued to improve transport statistics with quarterly rail data on freight and passenger transport regularly transmitted to Eurostat, and highly compliant air traffic statistics. Regarding environmental statistics, data are being transmitted to Eurostat for Environmental Taxes by Economic Activities (ETEA). Data on Economy-Wide Material Flow Accounts was transmitted to Eurostat for 2023.
For the first time, detailed energy consumption data in industry were provided to Eurostat for the 2022–2024 reference period. The 2025 ICT surveys in households and enterprises were conducted in full compliance with the EU acquis.
Chapter 32: Financial control
The EU promotes the reform of national governance systems to improve managerial accountability, sound financial management of income and expenditure, and external audit of public funds. The financial control rules protect the EU’s financial interests against fraud in the management of EU funds and protect the euro against counterfeiting.
Public internal financial control (PIFC)
The implementation of the strategic and legislative frameworks across all levels of government remains inconsistent, PIFC strategies 2020-2025 have expired, and a countrywide approach on PIFC is planned to be integrated in the new 2027-2031 PFM strategic framework that still needs to be adopted. Such delays do not support a harmonised, countrywide approach to reform implementation by the PIFC coordination board. Annual PIFC reports for 2025 were adopted at state and entity level.
The legal framework for internal control is largely in place at all levels of government, but implementation lags behind. Lack of reporting on fiscal risks of public companies in the annual PIFC reports and ineffective fiscal oversight function undermine internal control. Management and control systems remain inadequate and inconsistent, posing significant challenges for risks, irregularities and fraud.
Managerial accountability guidelines are still to be developed in the Republika Srpska entity, while they are in place for state institutions and the Federation entity. Delegation of authority remains limited to the political level and not to senior civil servants. Fragmented, complex and unaccountable administrative structures and the lack of clear lines of accountability hinder the development of PIFC.
Internal audit practice is in line with international standards. Challenges persist in quality assurance, methodological consistency, staffing of internal audit functions, comprehensive planning, and implementing audit recommendations. Internal audit remains absent in the
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Brčko District. Additionally, the lack of quality assurance frameworks aligned with the international professional practices framework (IPPF) remains a significant weakness, undermining the credibility and effectiveness of internal audits. While some training was undertaken, the capacities of central harmonisation units at all levels need to be improved to support institutions in implementing recommendations on PIFC.
External audit
The functional, organisational and financial independence of State audit institutions (SAIs) is set out in the legal framework and is yet to be anchored in the Constitution.
The administrative capacity of SAIs needs to be strengthened at all levels of government, however SAIs have undertaken continuous efforts to improve external audit effectiveness. A new Strategic Development Plan 2026-2030 was adopted across all levels of authorities, focusing on digital transformation and modernisation of audit processes. The modular and customisable audit management system (AMS) for all four SAIs was made operational to streamline audit workflows, improve traceability, and enhance compliance with international standards, with the aim to improve the quality of audit work and further enabling activities were undertaken to prepare the rolling out of the system including preparation of a training program. Activities on building a quality management system in accordance with the revised international standards of state audit institutions 140 were carried out in the reporting period.
Implementation of SAI’s recommendation has improved moderately. However, a continuous rate of 28%-55% of SAI’s recommendations remain unimplemented across the public sector. Some efforts were undertaken by SAIs to strengthen their impact by supervising the implementation of recommendations, conducting follow-up audits, and publishing databases of recommendations issued. Parliamentary scrutiny still needs to be improved and there has been no steps to ensure higher usage of audit reports by legislative assemblies. The Republika Srpska entity still needs to adopt a communication strategy on external audit.
Protection of the EU’s financial interests
The legal framework is yet to be aligned with the EU acquis, notably the PIF Directive. There is no anti-fraud strategy in place. An anti-fraud coordination service (AFCOS) and a supporting AFCOS network should be set up to facilitate effective exchange of information and cooperation with the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) and the European Commission, as envisaged in the anti-corruption strategy. National authorities have not yet set up yet their workflow related to the use of the IMS.
Protection of the euro against counterfeiting
Bosnia and Herzegovina has not ratified the 1929 Geneva Convention for the suppression of counterfeiting currency. The legal framework is yet to be assessed against the EU acquis.
3. GOOD NEIGHBOURLY RELATIONS AND REGIONAL COOPERATION
Good neighbourly relations and regional cooperation form an essential part of Bosnia and Herzegovina’s European integration process. They contribute to stability, reconciliation and a climate conducive to addressing open bilateral issues and the legacies of the past.
Bosnia and Herzegovina maintained its involvement in a number of regional cooperation initiatives such as the CEFTA, the Energy Community, the Transport Community, the South-East European Cooperation Process (SEECP) and the Regional Cooperation Council,
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of which it hosts the seat13.Bosnia and Herzegovina chaired the Migration, Asylum, Refugees Regional Initiative (MARRI) from June 2025 to June 2026 and concluded its chairmanship of the EU Strategy for the Danube Region (EUSDR) in December 2025.
The EU-Western Balkans Summits took place in Brussels in December 2025 and in Tivat in June 2026, reaffirming the EU membership perspective of the Western Balkans and exploring measures to further advance gradual integration. Bosnia and Herzegovina has actively engaged in the regional dimension of the Growth Plan for the Western Balkans, participating in both ministerial and leaders’ meetings.
On the Common Regional Market (CRM), at the Berlin Process summit in London in October 2025 the leaders of the region endorsed a revised and streamlined action plan to implement the Green Agenda for the Western Balkans, adopted a Western Balkans Climate Adaptation Roadmap and committed to making progress in the promotion of regional mobility and implementation of relevant regional agreements and CEFTA decisions. At the Berlin Process ministerial meeting held in Belfast in October 2025, the Declaration on Women, Peace and Security in Defence and Security Institutions was adopted, as a result of the Gender Equality Forum held in Sarajevo in September 2025. Bosnia and Herzegovina has ratified four of the five regional mobility agreements. The country still needs to ratify the mobility agreement on freedom of movement with identity cards, signed in November 2022. In February 2026, Bosnia and Herzegovina adopted the first annual report of the Coordination Team for the establishment of the CRM on the implementation of the Action Plan for the period October 2024-October 2025.
The roadmap for roaming between the Western Balkans and the EUentered its first phase of implementation during the reporting period. In February 2026, the Commission proposed launching negotiations with Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo*, Montenegro, North Macedonia, and Serbia to integrate them into the EU’s ‘Roam Like at Home’ regime.
Bosnia and Herzegovina continued to cooperate closely with Croatia, Montenegro and Serbia under the Sarajevo Declaration Process to find sustainable solutions for refugees and persons displaced by the conflicts in the 1990s. Following the closure of the Regional Housing Programme, Bosnia and Herzegovina made no progress towards completing the remaining housing units to ensure the sustainable return of up to 3 100 families, despite a commitment to do so.
Despite progress during the reporting period on the issue of missing persons, 7 572 people are still missing as a result of the conflict in the 1990s. Sixty-five missing persons were identified in 2025. Regional efforts are needed through the missing persons group established in 2018 under the Berlin Process.
Bosnia and Herzegovina generally maintains good bilateral relations with other enlargement countries and neighbouring EU Member States.
Relations with Albania are good, building on the reopening of the Albanian embassy in Sarajevo in 2025.
Representatives of the two countries continued to make high-level visits. There are no
13 Bosnia and Herzegovina also actively participates in initiatives such as the Brdo-Brijuni Process; the Central European Initiative; the Adriatic-Ionian Initiative; the EU Strategies for the Danube Region and for the Adriatic-Ionian Region; the Migration, Asylum, Refugees Regional Initiative (MARRI); the Regional School of Public Administration (ReSPA); the Regional Youth Cooperation Office in the Western Balkans (RYCO); the South-East European Cooperation Process; and the Western Balkans Fund.
* This designation is without prejudice to positions on status, and is in line with UNSCR 1244/1999 and the ICJ Opinion on the Kosovo declaration of independence.
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official relations with Kosovo, as Bosnia and Herzegovina does not recognise its independence, but they interact in the framework of regional cooperation.
Relations with Montenegro are good, with occasional high-level bilateral visits. Discussions at presidential level were held on strengthening economic ties and regional cooperation. The joint border crossing Zupci-Sitnica on the Trebinje-Herceg Novi route was officially opened. The agreed border demarcation is yet to be physically marked and illegal border crossings eliminated. Occasional developments in the Republika Srpska entity have sparked strong reactions from high-level Montenegrin officials.
Relations with North Macedonia are good, with occasional high-level bilateral visits. Bilateral agreements in place focus on cooperation on EU integration and on economic cooperation.
Developments around the death of Ratko Mladić put the overall good bilateral relations with Serbia under strain. In February 2026, bilateral political consultations between the two Ministries of Foreign Affairs took place in Sarajevo. In August 2026, the Serbian President visited the Republika Srpska entity and communities with a majority Serb population in the Federation entity. Milorad Dodik continued to be received frequently and at a high level in Serbia. Every year, senior political leaders from Serbia also attend the unconstitutional Republika Srpska entity celebrations on 9 January and other entity-level events. The two countries need to reach an agreement on state borders, including on two dams on the Drina River and a part of the Belgrade-Bar railway. As a signatory to the Dayton / Paris Peace Agreement, Serbia is obliged to respect Bosnia and Herzegovina’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.
Türkiye is a strong international supporter of the country, and exchanges at high level are frequent.
Relations with Georgia are good. A visa-free regime is in force.
Relations with the Republic of Moldova are good, with sporadic bilateral contacts. A visa- free regime is in force. Although both countries are part of CEFTA, trade flows remain low.
Bosnia and Herzegovina supports the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Ukraine, condemning Russia’s war of aggression. Bilateral relations are generally good but have been affected by the support for Russia’s war of aggression expressed by the political leadership of the Republika Srpska entity and by the continued failure to implement restrictive measures against Russia and Belarus by ministries controlled by the SNSD party. In June 2026, Bosnia and Herzegovina became the 50th member of the International Coalition for the Return of Ukrainian Children.
Relations with Croatia are overall good, although they are affected by outstanding bilateral issues. High-level bilateral visits took place during the reporting period. The 1999 border agreement has not been ratified by either side. Implementation of the 2001 succession agreement has been affected by issues of private property and acquired rights. Bosnia and Herzegovina continued to object to Croatia’s plan to build a facility for radioactive waste at Trgovska Gora near the border. In April 2026, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia signed an agreement to construct the Southern Gas Interconnection pipeline, linking the two countries’ gas systems. Following the launch of the EU Entry Exit System, in May 2026, Croatia amended its Law on Foreigners and announced the issuing of a national visa in order to facilitate cross-border mobility for professional drivers from third countries, including from Bosnia and Herzegovina.
4. RESILIENCE, SECURITY, DEFENCE
As an EU candidate country, Bosnia and Herzegovina continued to align with the EU’s common foreign and security policy during the reporting period and contributes to EU crisis
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management operations and missions. It is an overall security beneficiary, with continued military and civilian international supervision present in the country. As the country progresses on the EU path, it should also increase capacities in the areas of sanctions implementation, defence industry, economic security and democratic resilience. The EUFOR Althea military operation remains present in the country, supporting local authorities in maintaining a safe and secure environment.
Democratic resilience
Bosnia and Herzegovina would benefit from establishing a policy framework for addressing hybrid threats, including foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI) and disinformation. Bosnia and Herzegovina should step up actions towards building societal resilience against FIMI and all other forms of hybrid threats.
Economic security and resilience
In terms of economic security and resilience, although only 3% of the energy supply comes from natural gas, the country remains fully dependant on one single source from Russia.Bosnia and Herzegovina is pursuing plans for gas infrastructure projects, including the Southern Interconnection. Strengthening energy security must not undermine climate objectives. On cybersecurity, the country’s capacity to contribute to artificial intelligence and emergent technologies would be improved by alignment with the EU AI Act, the Digital Services Act and the Digital Markets Act. Bosnia and Herzegovina holds significant critical raw material resources and exports both raw and processed metals. To realise this potential, the related regulatory framework together with the environment and health protection framework, would need to be substantially strengthened.
Defence capacity building and defence industrial dimension
In terms of defence capacity building, the Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina benefit from assistance from the European Peace Facility, an off-budget instrument, in demining, as well as chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear protection, with a total of EUR 35 million through bilateral measures to date. In December 2025, the country approved the modernisation package for its Armed Forces. It also benefits from EPF support at regional level, as a non-EU participating nation in the Balkan Medical Task Force.
Bosnia and Herzegovina’s defence industry is modest in size with an export-oriented and regionally significant ammunitions production. The country’s defence industrial cooperation is shaped by its close cooperation with NATO through the Partnership for Peace programme and the country's first Individually Tailored Partnership Programme. Regarding the EU defence industrial programmes, in the framework of the European Defence Programme (EDF) and the European Defence Industry Programme (EDIP), entities established in the EU or in an associated country and subject to control by Bosnia and Herzegovina, or by a body established in Bosnia and Herzegovina, could be eligible for funding, provided that guarantees provided by the EU Member State or associated country of establishment are made available to the Commission. So far this has not materialised.
Civil protection and disaster resilience
On civil protection, Bosnia and Herzegovina cooperates with the EU on disaster risk
reduction, prevention, preparedness and response. The country actively participates in the
Union Civil Protection Mechanism (UCPM), strengthening its capacity to deal with major
emergencies. The country’s resilience would benefit from developing a civil protection and
disaster preparedness system capable of withstanding major shocks.
5. ABILITY TO ASSUME THE OBLIGATIONS OF MEMBERSHIP
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CLUSTER 2: INTERNAL MARKET
This cluster covers: the free movement of goods (Chapter 1); freedom of movement for workers (Chapter 2); right of establishment and freedom to provide services (Chapter 3); free movement of capital (Chapter 4); company law (Chapter 6); intellectual property law (Chapter 7); competition policy (Chapter 8); financial services (Chapter 9), and consumer and health protection (Chapter 28).
Chapter 1: Free movement of goods
The free movement of goods ensures that many products can be traded freely across the EU based on common rules and procedures. Where products are governed by national rules, the principle of the free movement of goods prevents these rules from creating unjustified barriers to trade.
General principles
Bosnia and Herzegovina does not have a coherent legislative and institutional framework for the production, distribution and marketing of industrial products. No countrywide approach or strategy exists for alignment with the EU acquis and conflicting regulations have not been repealed.
Non-harmonised area
No steps were taken to align with the obligations of Articles 34-36 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. No specific body is empowered to provide notifications of technical regulations.
Harmonised area: quality infrastructure
The legal bases and administrative structures to ensure technical regulations, standards, conformity assessment, accreditation, metrology and market surveillance are not aligned with the EU acquis and remain fragmented. A countrywide strategy for the quality infrastructure is still not in place and coordination among competent institutions remains weak. The standardisation, accreditation, and market surveillance bodies remain understaffed.
In 2025, the Institute for Standardisation adopted 1 324 European standards. However, conflicting mandatory ex-Yugoslav standards have still not been systematically withdrawn.
On accreditation, the designation of conformity assessment bodies and conformity assessment procedures are not applied consistently throughout the country. There are 186 conformity assessment bodies in Bosnia and Herzegovina, one more than last year, comprising 97 testing laboratories, four medical and 11 calibration laboratories, six product certification bodies and 68 inspection bodies.
Rules on metrology are not applied evenly across the country, undermining legal certainty and the single economic space. The Institute of Metrologyneeds to cooperate and coordinate its activities with the entities’ metrology bodies. The Law on units of measurement was adopted in June.
Market surveillance is still largely based on mandatory standards and pre-market inspections. In 2025, 177 market surveillance inspections were carried out on 146 products (less than in 2024), leading to 9 526 products being withdrawn from the market, of which 6 358 were destroyed.
Harmonised area: sectoral legislation
On the EU ‘new and global approach’ product acquis, no alignment with the EU acquis has taken place over the past 14 years. Legislation aimed to align with the EU acquis is not applied across the country as its legislative framework is fragmented. The Republika Srpska entity implements its legislation separately, contrary to a ruling of the Constitutional Court.
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There was no progress on alignment with the EU ‘old approach’ product acquis, including on registration, evaluation, authorisation and restriction of chemicals (REACH) and on strengthening administrative capacity in this area, or on classification, labelling and packaging (CLP), or with procedural measures.
There are no anti-corruption measures in place to monitor risks in product safety and no measures to ensure the transparency of public bodies when inspecting products for market surveillance and conformity assessment.
Chapter 2: Freedom of movements for workers
Nationals of one Member State have the right to work in another Member State and must be given the same working and social conditions as other worker nationals of that Member State.
Conditions for EU citizens to access to the labour market in Bosnia and Herzegovina are set in the Law on foreigners. The laws on the employment of foreigners in the entities and the Brčko District are not yet fully harmonised with the state-level law. In 2025, a total of 4 584 new work permits were issued, 2 118 were extended, and 800 were revoked. For 2026, the quota was set at 7 427 permits, including 5 077 new permits and 2 350 renewals. Employment in the public administration is reserved for citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
Bosnia and Herzegovina still lacks the countrywide database of vacancies required to join the European Employment Services (EURES) network upon accession.
The coordination of social security schemes remains fragmented, with limited administrative capacity and cooperation among authorities. Bosnia and Herzegovina has agreements on social security in place with 18 EU Member States; no new agreements were finalised. Social insurance agreements are in place with Slovenia, Serbia, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Austria, Germany and Hungary.
There was no progress on the European Health Insurance Card (EHIC) over the reporting period.
Chapter 3: Right of establishment and freedom to provide services
EU natural and legal persons have the right to establish themselves in any Member State and to provide cross-border services. For certain regulated professions, there are rules on mutual recognition of qualifications. EU rules on postal services focus on improving the quality of universal service, gradual market opening to competition, and the establishment of an independent regulator.
The legislation on the right of establishment and on the freedom to provide cross-border services is not aligned with the EU acquis. No significant steps were taken toward adopting a countrywide Law on services, nor was any sectoral legislation reviewed to prepare for alignment with the EU Services Directive. The point of single contact is yet to be established. A countrywide audit of administrative and technical barriers is essential to foster a single economic space and enable cross-country business operations. Strong coordination among all levels of government is a prerequisite to ensure legislative alignment in this area.
The legal framework for postal services is partially aligned with the EU postal acquis. A state-level strategy should be adopted to facilitate the gradual postal market opening to competition. The country-wide postal legislation needs to be further aligned with the Postal Services Directive and the Regulation on cross-border parcel delivery services. Work is underway to engage relevant stakeholders in consultations. The institutional capacity of the Agency for Postal Traffic needs strengthening to be able to monitor postal market developments and ensure compliance with the new postal market rules.
On mutual recognition of professional qualifications, Bosnia and Herzegovina is not yet aligned with the EU acquis. The legislation does not provide for the mutual recognition of
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qualifications for regulated professions and minimum training requirements for access to certain professions. The national qualifications framework is not yet referenced to the European qualifications framework. The contact point on regulated professions is not fully functional as the legislation remains fragmented across the country. A detailed list of regulated professions is also still lacking.
Chapter 4: Free movement of capital
In the EU, capital and investments must be able to move without restrictions, with common rules for cross-border payments. Banks and other economic operators apply certain rules to support the fight against money laundering and terrorist financing.
As regards capital movements, there was limited progress on the liberalisation of short- term capital restrictions. Both entities adopted legislation on physical cross-border transfer of cash aiming to align with the 2024 Law on prevention of money laundering and terrorism financing. The Republika Srpska entity simplified the reporting of foreign credit transactions by allowing for the electronic submission of respective reports, reducing administrative requirements. Nevertheless, restrictions remain on certain short-term capital transactions, including conditions attached to the granting of loans.
Bosnia and Herzegovina does not provide for equal treatment of foreign and domestic natural persons for the acquisition of real estate, as access depends on reciprocity. This should have been remedied by 2021, in line with SAA commitments. Foreigners also cannot own agricultural land.
Regarding payments, Bosnia and Herzegovina made progress towards alignment with the EU acquis on payments. Both entity parliaments adopted Laws on Payment Services aiming to align with significant parts of the Payment Services Directive 2. In the Federation entity, legislation on electronic money and payment accounts was adopted in July 2026. Beyond legislative alignment, work continued to modernise the domestic payment infrastructure under the TIPS Clone project and cooperation with international partners to improve payment interoperability.
On the fight against money laundering and terrorism financing (AML/CFT), Bosnia and Herzegovina was placed on the list of jurisdictions under increased monitoring by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) on 19 June 2026 due to persistent strategic deficiencies in its AML/CFT framework. Bosnia and Herzegovina needs to urgently implement the FATF Action Plan and address the outstanding recommendations of MONEYVAL’s fifth-round mutual evaluation report.The AML/CFT framework requires further alignment with the EU acquis, including by ensuring effective nationwide access by competent authorities to beneficial ownership information, for instance through the interconnection of existing registers. Sustained implementation of the FATF Action Plan and strengthened institutional coordination will be essential to address remaining deficiencies and support further alignment with the EU acquis.
Chapter 6: Company law
The EU has common rules on the formation, registration and disclosure requirements of a company, with complementary rules for accounting and financial reporting and statutory audit.
On company law and corporate governance, Bosnia and Herzegovina’s legislation is aligned to a limited extent with the EU acquis and needs to be reviewed and harmonised across the country. Bosnia and Herzegovina needs to simplify and harmonise the requirements for businesses and companies to register and operate across the country in a single economic space, notably by interconnecting and coordinating the business registers in the entities and the Brčko District. Further alignment with the EU acquis is needed, notably on digital tools and processes in company law, cross-border operations (mergers, divisions,
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conversions) and shareholder rights, including long-term shareholder engagement. Bosnia and Herzegovina should also complete alignment with the Directive 2024/1760 on corporate sustainability due diligence (CSDDD), as amended by the Directive (EU) 2026/470 (Omnibus I).
On company reporting and statutory audit, the legislation is aligned to a limited extent with the EU acquis. Further efforts are needed, particularly on company reporting and transparency requirements for listed companies. As regards financial reporting, the legislation in both entities and the Brčko District prescribes the use of international financial reporting standards (IFRS) for annual and consolidated accounts of all legal persons. In the Republika Srpska entity, a new Law on Accounting and Auditing was adopted, introducing updated requirements on financial reporting, sustainability reporting, and statutory audit. Nevertheless, Bosnia and Herzegovina still needs to designate a single competent authority with ultimate responsibility for the oversight of statutory auditors across the country, in line with the EU acquis, and strengthen coordination among existing audit oversight authorities.
Chapter 7: Intellectual property law
The EU has to a large extent harmonised rules for the legal protection and enforcement of copyright and related rights, as well as of industrial property rights, including trade marks, designs, patents and related supplementary protection certificates (SPCs), geographical indications (GIs), including craft and industrial GIs.
The intellectual property strategy has expired and has still not been replaced. The strategy requires an update in light of developments to the EU acquis including on the aspects of artificial intelligence and related advancements. Preparations to further align with the acquis on copyright and related rights remain in the initial stages.
On industrial property rights, Bosnia and Herzegovina adopted the Law on patents, trademarks and trade secrets and the Law on topographies of semiconductor products. Bosnia and Herzegovina still has not acceded to the European Patent Convention as required by the SAA.
Regarding enforcement, the Indirect Taxation Authority (ITA) received 78 requests for customs measures based on protected trademarks, two on design, two on patent, two on copyright or related rights. It issued three decisions on the temporary detention and seizure of goods. The State Investigation and Protection Agency (SIPA) investigated 12 cases. The administrative and judicial capacity of enforcement institutions on intellectual property rights is insufficient, and their coordination needs to improve. Training and awareness-raising should continue, in particular for court officers. Bosnia and Herzegovina continued collaboration with the European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO), notably as regards integration into EUIPO databases and networks.
Chapter 8: Competition policy
EU rules protect free competition. They include antitrust rules against restrictive agreements between companies and abuse of dominant position and also include rules on concentrations between companies which would significantly impede effective competition. EU rules also set out a system of State aid control. Governments are only allowed to grant State aid if restrictive conditions are met, with a view to preventing distortion of competition.
Antitrust and mergers
The legislative framework on antitrust and mergersis partially aligned with the EU acquis. The Law on competition of Bosnia and Herzegovina largely mirrors the rules in the EU treaties on restrictive agreements and abuse of dominant position but needs to be aligned with the most recent EU acquis, including implementing legislation.
As for the institutional framework, the functioning of the Competition Council is
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significantly impeded by ethnic-based decision-making, as decisions require support by at least one representative from each constituent people to be adopted. The Law on competition needs amendments to revise voting procedures in line with the EU acquis. Regarding enforcement capacity, the staff of the Competition Council needs to increase its expertise.
On implementation, in 2025 the Competition Council took 33 decisions and imposed fines in four proceedings. It also issued 20 expert opinions. The Competition Council should improve its enforcement record, in particular (i) on cartels, by conducting more on-site inspections and by raising awareness on its leniency programme, and (ii) on mergers, by imposing remedies where necessary. The judiciary’s capacity to handle complex competition cases is improving but needs further strengthening. To tackle distortions of unfair competition in the market, the cooperation with other regulatory bodies needs to increase.
State aid
The legislative framework, including the Law on the State aid system, is partially aligned with the latest EU acquis and SAA provisions. The implementing legislation is uneven across the country. Bylaws on de minimis aid were adopted in the Federation entity in March 2025, in the Republika Srpska entity in February 2026, and at state level in July 2026. The legislation on de minimis aid, on services of general economic interest and on the purpose and conditions for granting State aid needs to be aligned with the EU acquis in the Brčko District. A regional aid map has not yet been drawn up, and the existing aid schemes have not been aligned with the EU acquis and the SAA provisions.
As for the institutional framework, the functioning of the State Aid Council is significantly impeded by ethnic-based decision-making, as decisions require support by at least one representative from each constituent people to be adopted. The Law on State aid needs amendments to revise voting procedures in line with the EU acquis.
The State Aid Council has insufficient enforcement capacity and is unable to fulfil its mandate. All its eight members have been appointed and carry out their duties alongside their primary jobs by meeting once a month. With only seven staff members, its secretariat also needs reinforcement.
On implementation, the State Aid Council issued four decisions in 2025 and two decisions in 2026. Most State aid measures are put in place by granting authorities without notification or prior approval. Transparency of State aid measures is not ensured in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
Liberalisation
On liberalisation, the Law on competition and the Law on State aid apply to public undertakings and undertakings with special or exclusive rights. These rules need to be enforced. The rules on financing services of general economic interest are not fully aligned with the EU acquis.
Chapter 9: Financial services
EU rules aim at ensuring fair competition among financial institutions, and the stability and integrity of financial markets, namely in the field of banking, insurance, supplementary pensions, investment services and securities. They include rules on authorisation, operation and supervision of these institutions.
On banking and financial conglomerates, legislation requires further alignment with the latest EU acquis on capital requirements (Regulation and Directive). Both entity-level banking agencies identified and published lists of systemically important banks.
The country continued implementing the methodology for the supervisory review and evaluation process (SREP). New legislation should introduce stronger corrective and
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enforcement powers of supervisors and a consolidated supervision of banking groups and financial holding companies across the country.
Regarding bank resolution, no concrete steps have been taken to further align with the EU acquis. The institutional and legal framework, including the absence of a countrywide resolution fund, in line with the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive and other key elements of the EU resolution framework are missing.
Regarding insurance and occupational pensions, limited progress was made. The Board of the Insurance Agency of Bosnia and Herzegovina became operational. Although steps were taken towards further harmonisation of compulsory motor third-party liability insurance between the entities, full market liberalisation of the insurance market remains outstanding. The Republika Srpska entity amended its legislation on voluntary pension funds and pension schemes. Overall, entity-level legislation remains fragmented and alignment with the EU framewrok on insurance and occupational pensions is still at an early stage.
In terms of financial market infrastructure, no measures were taken to further align with the EU acquis on securities clearing, settlement and post-trade services.
On securities markets and investment services, the entity-level legislation and regulatory bodiesremain neither harmonised across the country nor aligned with the EU acquis. Coordination between the entities still needs to improve. Brčko District adopted relevant legislation and is preparing to operationalise the third stock exchange in the country. The authorities should ensure its regulatory and market infrastructure is aligned with EU acquis and contributes to the integration of Bosnia and Herzegovina’s fragmented capital markets. The legal framework for investment funds in the Republika Srpska entity continued to be implemented. However, legislation remains fragmented across the entities and is not aligned with the EU acquis. The Federation entity has yet to amend the Law on securities markets, aiming to align it with EU acquis.
On sustainable and digital finance, there were no developments in the reporting period. There is no legal and regulatory framework for digital identity, and banks can only offer hybrid solutions.
On anti-corruption, the AML/CFT framework was strengthened through the adoption of the Law and the establishment and the establishment of a permanent coordination body. A beneficial ownership register of legal persons that would ensure a central access point for competent authorities is still not established.
Chapter 28: Consumer and health protection
EU rules protect consumers’ economic interests and also ensure product safety, prevent dangerous imitations and establish liability for defective products. The EU also guarantees a high level of protection of public health and in particular also ensures high common standards for tobacco control, blood, tissues, cells and organs, and human and veterinary medicinal products. The EU also has rules for upholding patients’ rights in cross-border healthcare and in preparing for and responding to serious cross-border health threats, including communicable diseases.
Consumer protection
On horizontal aspects, the 2006 state-level Law on consumer protection remains not aligned with the latest EU acquis. Countrywide alignment with the latest EU acquis is needed, including on digital markets, on addressing the risk of unequal protection of consumers across the country, and on consumer credit and distance marketing of financial services. Administrative capacities, notably of the Ombudsman institution, need to be further improved. The Ombudsman’s office for consumer protection issued decisions and provided legal advice in 1 100 consumer complaints in 2025.
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An annual state consumer protection programme has still not been prepared by the Consumer Protection Council, and the legal framework for product safety is still not aligned with the EU acquis. The state-level Market Surveillance Agency continues to implement a reactive market surveillance mechanism based on the information on unsafe products and is publishing notifications on unsafe products on its website, as well as the weekly reports of the EU safety gate rapid alert system.
Public health
While there was no progress in the adoption of a public health strategy at state level or in the Brčko District, strengthening of primary health care (PHC) systems has continued, including efforts to shift towards multi-disciplinary, integrated and patient-centred service delivery. Early childhood health, malnutrition and nutrition outcomes remain a concern. Nutrition and early childhood development services remain uneven and insufficiently institutionalised across the country. Conditions in hospitals and maternity hospitals need to be improved and obstetric violence eliminated. Nutrition is not sufficiently integrated into PHC and early childhood healthcare, and access to counselling and caregiver support remains limited. Early childhood health, malnutrition and nutrition outcomes remain a concern. There is no state-level health information strategy and there were no developments on e-Health in the reporting period.
On tobacco control, legislation in the entities and the Brčko District is still not aligned with the relevant EU acquis. The Federation entity Law on tobacco control is not fully enforced due to lack of controls. There is no systematic monitoring of the implementation World Health Organization (WHO) Framework Convention on Tobacco Control. In September 2026, the country ratified the Protocol to Eliminate Illicit Trade in Tobacco Products and should, as a matter of priority, fully align its legislation and practices with obligations arising from it.
There was no progress on alignment with the EU acquis on medicines for human use or on veterinary medicinal products or on medical devices or on health technology assessment. Patients have only limited access to certain medicines, due to long registration and control procedures. The legal framework on blood, tissues, cells and organs is not aligned with the EU acquis, and there is no administrative capacity to apply it. The cooperation between the entities’ transfusion institutes remains very limited, with no countrywide oversight system to ensure efficient coordination.
Legislation on serious cross-border health threats, including communicable diseases, is not aligned with the EU acquis. Coordination among the entities and state institutions on communicable disease surveillance and response needs to be strengthened. While Bosnia and Herzegovina’s participation in the technical activities of the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) remains limited, it has initiated the development of ‘centres for disease prevention and health promotion’ linked to PHC facilities, including pilot-testing. Immunisation coverage has not yet fully recovered to pre-pandemic levels, and gaps persist in reaching vulnerable populations, including children in rural areas and marginalised communities. National legislation is not aligned with the EU acquis on patient’s rights in cross-border healthcare. There were no developments on anti-microbial resistance in the reporting period.
Measures to promote healthy lifestyles and prevent non-communicable diseases have been partially implemented by the competent institutions of the entities and the Brčko District, especially through establishment of centres for prevention of diseases and promotion of health as pilots in a few medical centres in both entities in Bosnia and Herzegovina. On cancer, both entities have cancer registers, however there is no countrywide cancer control plan or early detection programme, while the Republika Srpska entity has an early detection programme. Recently, the alignment of screening programmes and the establishment of identical/mutually compatible databases in both entities of Bosnia
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and Herzegovina have been initiated that are also harmonised with best EU practices. There was no progress on mental health, on drug abuse prevention and harm reduction, or on nutrition and physical activity. Civil society groups work to reduce harmful use of alcohol and prevent related disorders.
On health inequalities, access to healthcare remains a key challenge, especially for marginalised groups including Roma, women from rural areas and women with disabilities. Women and girls often lack health insurance and face poorly organised sexual and reproductive healthcare. Migrants, asylum-seekers, and refugees have access to healthcare services. Public health institutions are responsible for medical screenings as part of the registration process in reception centres and family medicine, paediatrics, mental health services, dental care, and laboratory services, as well as gynaecology, physical rehabilitation, and radiology are also provided in temporary reception centres.
On access to healthcare for people with disabilities, despite a comprehensive legal framework, generally aligned with international standards, including the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, access to healthcare for persons with disabilities in Bosnia and Herzegovina remains uneven in practice. Structural fragmentation of the health system, combined with disparities in insurance coverage across entities and cantons, results in unequal access to services. Physical inaccessibility of some healthcare facilities, limited availability of specialised, disability-specific, and community-based services, especially in rural and remote areas, further restrict effective and inclusive healthcare for persons with disabilities.
Persistent corruption at all levels continues to significantly affect healthcare policy and delivery of healthcare services throughout the country, especially high-level corruption and when procuring essential medical equipment and medications for most severe diseases. Addressing corruption in this sector requires comprehensive reforms, strengthening the legal framework, boosting transparency and accountability, and encouraging a professional culture of integrity.
CLUSTER 3: COMPETITIVENESS AND INCLUSIVE GROWTH
This cluster covers: Digital transformation and media (Chapter 10); Taxation (Chapter 16); Economic and monetary policy (Chapter 17); Social policy and employment (Chapter 19); Industrial policy (Chapter 20), Science and research (Chapter 25); Education and culture (Chapter 26); and Customs union (Chapter 29).
Chapter 10: Digital transformation and media
The EU supports the smooth functioning of the internal market for electronic communications, electronic commerce and audiovisual services. The rules protect consumers and support the universal availability of modern services.
On electronic communications, Bosnia and Herzegovina did not progress in aligning the legislation with the EU acquis, including the Broadband Cost Reduction Directive and Gigabit Infrastructure Act. Bosnia and Herzegovina still needs to adopt a telecommunications sector policy and to develop a broadband strategy. The granting of radio spectrum licences for 5G mobile communications remains delayed. The Communications Regulatory Agency (CRA) continues to lack financial and political independence.
On digital services, Bosnia and Herzegovina made no progress in adopting a countrywide strategy and action plan for the development of an information society. No action was taken to develop an open data policy. Bosnia and Herzegovina needs to take steps to build the societal and institutional capacity and to establish the legal basis to effectively support the enforcement of the Digital Services Act (DSA) and the Digital Markets Act (DMA) as of EU accession. Bosnia and Herzegovina needs to align with the DSA, the DMA and the Interoperable Europe Act. This includes ensuring compliance with accessibility standards
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and cross-border access to digital public services. There is still no coordinated and jointly planned approach for the digital transformation of public services across the country, and data exchange between public services remains very limited.
On digital trust and cybersecurity, Bosnia and Herzegovina still lacks a comprehensive legislative framework for the security of networks and information systems. No countrywide single point of contact has been designated, and one or more computer security incident response teams need to be established to facilitate strategic cooperation and information exchange. The continued absence of a comprehensive cybersecurity framework increases exposure to cyber threats. Bosnia and Herzegovina needs to continue implementing the EU 5G Cybersecurity Toolbox, including by assessing the risk profile of suppliers and putting in place appropriate restrictions and exclusions for high-risk suppliers. Progress was not made in adopting legislation on electronic identification and trust services for electronic transactions in line with the EU acquis. The EU recommendation to establish a single supervisory body for the whole country remains valid. There were also no significant steps toward ensuring the interoperability of electronic signature throughout the country. In June 2026, the Personal Data Protection Agency prohibited the Agency for Identification Documents, Registers and Data Exchange (IDDEEA) and the Indirect Taxation Authority from processing personal data for qualified electronic signatures, but the Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina suspended that decision in July 2026 pending its final ruling, so IDDEEA continues issuing them. The Republika Srpska entity Law on electronic identification, trust services in electronic business and electronic documents in force since June 2026 creates a separate entity-level supervisory structure for trust services and digital identity, contradicting the EU's recommendation to establish a single supervisory body for the whole country.
As regards media, Bosnia and Herzegovina’s legislative framework remains insufficient. Bosnia and Herzegovina needs to align with the Audiovisual Media Services Directive and the European Media Freedom Act. Analogue terrestrial broadcasting by TV stations was suspended, completing the switch to digital terrestrial broadcasting for public broadcasting services. A public services broadcasting corporation should be established as a separate legal entity as provided for by the Law on the public broadcasting system. Bosnia and Herzegovina should also revise the financing model for local public broadcasters to ensure their financial sustainability and political independence and strengthen the protection of journalists and media workers. Without stable, independent and adequately funded public service media, the country cannot fulfil core obligations related to media pluralism, digital transformation and democratic accountability.
On artificial intelligence (AI), Bosnia and Herzegovina should start developing the necessary governance and enforcement structures in line with the EU AI Act.
The whistle-blower protection system in Bosnia and Herzegovina remains fragmented and uneven. There is no whistle-blower protection law at the Federation entity level, while Brčko District, Sarajevo Canton, the Republika Srpska entity, and the state level have applicable legislation that is not fully aligned with the EU acquis and requires improvement. Provisions guaranteeing anonymity and confidentiality of disclosures are in place at state level. All mentioned laws contain provisions defining that confidentiality and anonymity must be ensured. In order to report misconduct, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Sarajevo Canton opened a toll-free phone line for whistle-blowers. Reports can be submitted in person, in writing, or electronically, in all areas where legislation is in force.
Chapter 16: Taxation
EU rules on taxation cover VAT, excise duties and aspects of corporate taxation. They also cover cooperation between tax administrations, including the exchange of information to prevent tax evasion.
The legislative framework for indirect taxation is partially aligned with the EU acquis. In June 2026, Bosnia and Herzegovina adopted the necessary bylaws for the amendments to
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the Law on value added tax (VAT) to allow VAT refunds on the purchase of a first real-estate property. The exemption for capital duty taxation has been removed.
As regards excise duties on tobacco, alcohol and energy, and general rules for the production, keeping, storage, movement and controls on products that are subject to excise duties, alignment of the legislation with the EU acquis is needed.
On direct taxation, the tax and social contribution regimes in the two entities still differ, hindering progress towards a single economic space. Amendments have been adopted to the law on income tax.
On administrative cooperation and mutual assistance, Bosnia and Herzegovina has not yet committed to automatically exchanging financial account information based on the OECD single global standard.
Concerning operational capacity and digitalisation, the various tax administrations should further improve coordination, cooperation and data exchange. The administrative capacity and staffing levels of the ITA remain insufficient. Bosnia and Herzegovina needs to improve cooperation between the Indirect Taxation Authority and the tax administrations, including through joint audits. The Federation entity adopted a new Law on the Fiscalisation of Transactions, introducing a comprehensive reform of the fiscalisation system and to a digital, software-based model. The new system is based on the Electronic System for Recording Transactions (ESET), which enables the electronic recording and fiscalisation of transactions and the transmission of data to the Tax Administration through a central fiscalisation platform.
Chapter 17: Economic and monetary policy
EU rules require the independence of central banks and prohibit them from directly financing the public sector. Member States coordinate their economic policies and are subject to fiscal, economic and financial surveillance.
As regards monetary policy, the currency board anchors the convertible mark (BAM) to the euro. The Central Bank’s objective of currency stability is not fully in line with the primary objective of monetary policy in the EU, which is price stability. The Law on the Central Bank does not ensure the bank’s unconditional personal and financial independence. Furthermore, the Law is not fully aligned with the EU acquis as regards the prohibition of monetary financing.
Regarding economic policy, fiscal rules remain at entity level and there is no independent fiscal institution to monitor and enforce compliance countrywide. The country did not adopt in time the global fiscal framework, as set by law, to provide a countrywide medium-term budgetary framework as guidance for the coordinated and timely adoption of the annual budgets by all levels of government.
The Economic Reform Programme (ERP) was submitted on time but there were no significant improvements in the quality of the reporting, as the provided historic macroeconomic data was largely outdated, and inconsistencies between the various parts remained. The policy guidance, jointly agreed in May 2025, was implemented only to a limited degree, as in the preceding year. The Directorate for Economic Planning of the Council of Ministers still lacks sufficient resources, competences and political support to efficiently coordinate the process.
Chapter 19: Social policy and employment
EU rules in the social field include minimum requirements for labour law, equality and non- discrimination health and safety at work. They also promote social inclusion and social protection, and social dialogue at EU level.
To fully align with EU acquis regarding labour law, the legal framework requires further improvement in several areas, notably as regards the protection of workers from
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discrimination. Implementation remains inadequate, especially on social dialogue, protection of workers and the enforcement of labour inspections.
The bylaws on health and safety at work regulating specific aspects of occupational safety and health need to be adopted and harmonised with the EU acquis throughout the country. Enforcement and implementation of legislation remain partial, especially when it comes to inspection capacity, prevention of injuries, investment in safety and training, and risk assessment. Data collection and dissemination on work-related injuries and diseases needs to be improved. No countrywide data are collected on accidents and fatalities.
Social dialogue is weak at all levels, with no significant improvements. Social partners are not sufficiently involved in the design and implementation of policies. Their capacities are low and need to be strengthened, particularly in the private sector. There are no general collective agreements, and only few concluded sectoral collective agreements, mainly in the public sector. Entity-level Economic and Social Councils operate unevenly, and there is no such body at state level. Significant gaps remain in ensuring freedom of association for trade unions and the right to collective bargaining. There is a persistent lack of bipartite and tripartite social dialogue and the effective consultation and participation of social partners in policy-making processes.
A countrywide employment policy strategy remains pending adoption by the Council of Ministers, 12 years after the previous one expired in 2014. Informal employment remains high. Bosnia and Herzegovina should intensify active labour market policy measures to reduce long-term unemployment. Public employment services are burdened by administering social benefits rather than assisting active jobseekers. Registration with public employment services gives access to social benefits including basic health insurance, encouraging even informal workers and inactive persons to register as unemployed. While both entities now have strategies that embed the Youth Guarantee, Bosnia and Herzegovina needs to swiftly complete and adopt the Youth Guarantee implementation plan.
Regarding labour force participation and unemployment rate see the statistical annex and the section on the functioning of the labour market under 2.3 Economic criteria.
There are no countrywide strategies on poverty reduction, social protection and inclusion, nor is there a state-level monitoring system. The social protection system in Bosnia and Herzegovina remains underdeveloped, ineffective and highly fragmented across administrative levels, resulting in significant disparities in eligibility criteria, benefit levels, and access to services. The country needs to both ensure a uniform definition of disability in line with international conventions and harmonise eligibility criteria for, rights to, and standards of social protection. For persons with disabilities, institutional care is still prevalent, accessibility remains a challenge, and there are only few community services to support independent living. The process of de-institutionalisation of children and adults with disabilities should be accelerated taking into account the Commission Notice – Guidance on independent living for persons with disabilities aiming at facilitating de-institutionalisation and independent living. The Federation entity adopted a law aiming to enhance the legal position of one group of children with disabilities (15 – 18 years of age) and to align with the principles of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child. Implementation of the European Child Guarantee did not progress. A large number of people is not covered by public health insurance while eligibility conditions and coverage differ among entities and cantons. Cooperation between social service centres and employment services is not well established. No measures were taken to address child exploitation, child begging and child poverty. Roma children are particularly vulnerable to the worst forms of child labour. Therefore, Bosnia and Herzegovina needs to align with the Directive on the protection of young people at work. The country needs to ensure health insurance for all children. Bosnia and Herzegovina should adopt countrywide measures to improve the living conditions of older people.
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In the field of non-discrimination in employment and social policy, alignment with the EU acquis remains incomplete, including the Employment Equality Directive and the Racial Equality Directive. Furthermore, on the policy side, there are still no comprehensive strategies or action plans in this field. Most public bodies do not have mechanisms for dealing with complaints of mobbing and discrimination in line with the country’s Law on non-discrimination.
The principle of equal opportunities gender equality and equal treatment of women and men in matters of employment and social policy is regulated by the laws on gender equality and anti-discrimination, and by the entity-level labour laws, but enforcement remains low. Due to poor efficiency of courts, non-discrimination proceedings may last for years. Rights prescribed by
the EU Directive on work-life balance for parents and carers are only partially recognised by law. The country needs to establish uniform minimum maternity leave benefits across the country and harmonise the definition of maternity, paternity and parental leave to eliminate discrimination. Despite existing legislation on workplace sexual harassment, enforcement remains weak. Bosnia and Herzegovina is stagnating or declining across most areas of the Gender Equality Index 2024, and the gap to the EU average continues to grow. Particular attention should be paid to people experiencing multiple and intersecting forms of discrimination and socio-economic disadvantage, including where gender intersects with disability, ethnic origin, age or poverty. Access to affordable childcare and early childhood education facilities remain limited. The tax-benefit system is predominantly reflecting traditional gender roles.
The Gender Equality Law of Bosnia and Herzegovina has only general provisions on equal rights to access economic activities. In 2022 (last data available), the management structure of the selected companies consisted of 15% women and 85% men. The implementation of the gender action plan (2023-2027) demonstrated a commitment to gender equality, with some efforts made to address violence against women by strengthening the capacity of state institutions, promoting social inclusion of marginalised groups and catalysing women economic empowerment. Activities in ensuring data collection have been initiated in order to ensure calculation of the full Gender Equality Index calculation, but challenges remain. Efforts to improve data collection should also ensure, where possible, the availability of sex- disaggregated and intersectional data to identify inequalities affecting different groups of women and men and to inform evidence-based policy-making. The country has embedded gender responsive budgeting (GRB) in its legislation since 2009, with gender indicators required in budget planning with entity-level implementation. Family benefits and caregiving income recognition exist, but they are modest and inconsistent. Active harmonisation with EU systems has not been achieved. The alignment with the Pay Transparency Directive has not started.
Since 2025, Bosnia and Herzegovina participated in the ‘Employment and Social Innovation’ (EaSi) strand of the European Social Fund Plus (ESF+), allowing CSOs and public administrations to develop social innovation practices, capacity building actions, and social and employment policies.
72.3%
47.0%
74.0%
49.3%
75.1%
50.2%
10.9% 16.7%
10.2% 16.7%
9.5% 16.6%
0.0%
10.0%
20.0%
30.0%
40.0%
50.0%
60.0%
70.0%
80.0%
Men Women Men Women Men Women
2023 2024 2025
Graph 25: Bosnia and Herzegovina - Economic activity rate
by sex
Economic activity rate of the population aged 15-64 (%)
Unemployment rate of the population aged 15-64 (%), total Source: ECFIN
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Chapter 20: Enterprise and industrial policy
EU industrial policy strengthens competitiveness, facilitates structural change and encourages a business-friendly environment that stimulates small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs).
On enterprise and industrial policy principles, there is still no countrywide industrial strategy and no state-level body promoting policy consistency between industrial strategies. Industrial policy is incoherent between entities, which constrains the effectiveness and overall impact of policy measures. The degree of correspondance of the country’s industrial policy to the EU priorities remains therefore very low. In February 2026, the Republika Srpska entity adopted an action plan for the implementation of its industrial strategy until 2028.
Limited steps were taken to improve the business environment, which remains fragmented and administratively burdensome. To accelerate access to data, the Republika Srpska entity amended its Law on registration of business entities in January. However, high barriers to starting a business, rules on taxes and para-fiscal (non-tax) charges and regulatory differences across various levels of government still need to be addressed. Separate business registers make it harder for companies to operate throughout the country. (See Chapter 6 – Company law). As for investment environment, the council of foreign investors in the Republika Srpska entity held two sessions since establishment in 2025. However, the resolution rate of commercial disputes remains low, and arbitration weakly developed.
Functional mechanisms and capacities for effectiveoversight and governance of POEs are still not fully implemented. The Republika Srpska entity has established functional oversight units, but it still lacks a fuctional register of POEs. The Republika Srpska entity established a legal framework for the POEs register in December 2025 and recently completed the software, through which POEs shall upload the data in the upcoming period. The Federation entity has functional register of POEs and has formally established oversight and management units, but these units are still not functional. (See Section 2.3 Economic criteria – privatisation and restructuring)
A broad campaign on CBAM was implemented throughout the country. However, the preparations for the green and digital transitions, resilience, and global competitiveness of industry remain at a very early stage. A greater focus on green investments in manufacturing is needed, notably for a more diversified sourcing of energy. The financial support for introducing innovations in green and digital transformation needs to be improved, in particular for SMEs, including start-ups.
Both entities continued to provide incentives for SMEs, to raise competitiveness through technological modernisation and energy efficiency. The Republika Srpska entity adopted a new Law on incentives in April 2026 with the aim to maintain current levels of competitiveness and employment among business operators. In December 2025, it adopted its social entrepreneurship development strategy 2026-2032 and amendments to the laws on SME development, as well as three decisions aimed at providing incentives for SMEs and strengthening entrepreneurial infrastructure. The Federation entity has continuously implemented support measures to help businesses maintain employment, including through the adoption in February 2026 of three decisions for the allocation of incentives for SME investments. There are still no countrywide guidelines for harmonisation of SME support in line with the EU Small Business Act. The alignment of the legislation with the EU acquis still needs to be assessed.
There is no improvement of transparency and accountability in the use of public funds. The capacity and funding to perform monitoring and evaluations of enterprise and industrial policy measures are still overly limited, and the statistical data remain insufficient.
As for enterprise and industrial policy instruments, no progress was made in aligning the legislation on late payments in commercial transactions with the EU acquis.
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Bosnia and Herzegovina continues to participate in the EU Single Market programme through two entity-based consortia selected under the Enterprise Europe Network.
As regards sectoral policies, the Republika Srpska entity adopted in June 2026 a new tourism law, which establishes the framework for tourism planning, governance and development. The Federation entity continued the development of sectoral development strategies for key industries, including wood-processing, metal and electrical, and construction materials sectors, to strengthen the industrial policy framework and enhance sectoral competitiveness. The Federation entity started the preparation of two key legislative acts in the tourism sector: a Law on tourism, which establishes the framework for tourism planning, governance and development, and a Law on residence tax (See chapter 16 Taxation). These initiatives aim to establish a more coherent regulatory and financial framework for the development of the tourism sector.
Chapter 25: Science and research
The EU provides significant support for research and innovation. All Member States can participate in the EU’s research and innovation programmes and benefit from them, especially where there is scientific excellence and a solid investment in research and innovation.
The legislative framework on research and innovation policy remains fragmented and needs to be improved. Bosnia and Herzegovina needs to develop and adopt a new strategy and action plan for scientific development, as well as a Smart Specialisation Strategy.
The estimated total allocations for research and innovation remain below 0.3% of GDP, which is far below the European Research Area objective. There is no countrywide policy on topics related to the European Research Area, as decisions are made by each university.
Bosnia and Herzegovina has not yet joined the GÉANT association. To join the
GÉANT Association and benefit from the wider European Research and Education
Community, the establishment of a National Research Education Network Organisation
(NREN) is needed.
A positive development is the opening of the EIT Community Hub in Sarajevo which will serve as the national gateway to the EIT Community, connecting innovators, researchers, universities, startups, companies and public institutions in Bosnia and Herzegovina with Europe’s largest innovation ecosystem.
Bosnia and Herzegovina is included in the European Innovation Scoreboard with performance at 28% of the EU average in 2026. The country’s performance is below the average of ‘emerging innovators’ (46%) and the performance gap with the EU is increasing. Relative weaknesses are R&D expenditure in the public sector, venture capital expenditures and direct and indirect government support of business R&D. In addition, further progress should be made to ensure reliable and comprehensive statistics on research and innovation, useful for instance for the European Innovation Scoreboard and the European Research Area.
Researchers from Bosnia and Herzegovina participated in 89.3% of actions of the European Cooperation in Science and Technology (COST).
Bosnia and Herzegovina is associated to the Research and Innovation Framework Programme Horizon Europe. In the reporting period, 26 grants with participation from Bosnia and Herzegovina were signed with a total EU net contribution for Bosnia and Herzegovina of EUR 3,37 million.
The City of Sarajevo participates in the EU Mission “100 Climate-Neutral and Smart Cities by 2030”. In this context, it recevied the EU Mission Label for Climate-Neutral and Smart Cities in April 2026 which marks an important milestone in achieving Sarajevo’s long-term sustainability and climate goals.
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Chapter 26: Education and culture
The EU supports cooperation in education and culture through funding programmes and the coordination of Member State policies through the ‘open method of coordination’. The EU and the Member States must also prevent discrimination and ensure quality education for children of migrant workers, including those from disadvantaged backgrounds.
On education and training, Bosnia and Herzegovina needs to move from a content- oriented towards a competency-based approach to education. Transformation and harmonisation of curricula is needed to ensure systemic regulation of learning and teaching process.
Public spending on education amounted to around 4% of GDP in 2022, below the EU average of 4.7% in 2023.
Concerning international assessments of school education, Bosnia and Herzegovina did not take part in the 2024 TALIS assessment After failing to participate in two PISA rounds (2022 and 2025), preparations to join the 2029 PISA need to intensify. No systemic measures have been taken to address the findings of earlier tests.
Although the legal framework is in place, there is still no mechanism to systematically measure or monitor the quality of education inputs, outputs or outcomes, and data does not feed into the policymaking process. Due to demographic changes, the number of students is in decline.
Disputes over education continue, while systemic solutions are not in place to ensure inclusive and non-discriminatory education, eliminating the practice of ‘two schools under one roof’. The common core curriculum remains incomplete and is not applied throughout the country, and the availability of teaching of the national group of subjects remains limited. Despite Constitutional Court decisions, the name of the Bosnian language is still not recognised in schools in the Republika Srpska entity, leading to recurrent friction. Biased narratives on wartime heroes and victims are present in all curricula, contributing to a politicised education.
With regard to inclusiveness, several positive measures were implemented under the Roadmap for Improving Inclusive Education. In particular, the Council of Ministers adopted a decision in September 2025 to strengthen efforts to promote quality education for all citizens. All education authorities should step up work to implement the 2020 roadmap, meeting all recommendations and reporting on it. Infrastructure and fundings are needed for the education of children with special needs.
There is no countrywide coordinated approach and only limited effort in supporting the digital transformation of education and training, including on digital skills, also ensuring that core teacher competencies are properly developed. The authorities need to strengthen their efforts, in line with the EU digital education action plan 2021-2027. Further efforts are needed following the prior establishment of an advisory board for digital education.
A countrywide policy document on vocational education and training (VET) has been in place since 2021, based on the Riga conclusions. However, no noticeable progress on implementation followed. Positively, Bosnia and Herzegovina has been a member of the European Alliance for Apprenticeships (EAfA) since 2024, demonstrating its commitment to improving youth and adult employment. The country should encourage more local stakeholders to join the Alliance through pledges, enabling them to exchange good practices and strengthen quality apprenticeships. Nevertheless, adults learning participation remains low, with only 1.8% of adults aged 25-64 training in 2025, against an EU target of 60% for 2030. In this context, measures to promote life-long learning of adults (including women), such as the introduction of individual learning accounts, need to be stepped up.
Bosnia and Herzegovina is a member of the European Higher Education Area (EHEA). On higher education, according to the 2024 Bologna Process implementation report, the country
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needs to ensure full implementation of the key commitments, especially with regards to national qualifications frameworks, automatic recognition and quality assurance.
Bosnia and Herzegovina’s national qualifications framework (NQF) is not yet referenced to the European qualifications framework (EQF), nor is there a mechanism for the validation of prior learning. Cooperation continued between the two accreditation agencies, one at state level and one in the Republika Srpska entity. The Agency for Development of Higher Education and Quality Assurance of Bosnia and Herzegovina (HEA) is undergoing an external review coordinated by the European Association for Quality Assurance in Higher Education (ENQA) on whether and how the agency meets the expectations of the European Standards and Guidelines for Quality Assurance in the EHEA.
Bosnia and Herzegovina benefits from the international dimension of the 2021-2027 Erasmus+ programme. Under the guidance of the European Commission, as of 2025 Bosnia and Herzegovina started the preparations of national structures for the association to the Erasmus+ programme, which includes the setting up of a dedicated national agency. Relevant progress is expected to allow full participation during the next programme period. Four universities from Bosnia and Herzegovina have been selected as partners in alliances funded by the European Universities Initiative.
Regarding youth, young people in the country face several challenges, while having very little if any access to decision-making. In December 2025, the Youth Council of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina was formally established. The formation of the Youth Council is a long awaited milestone in the implementation of the Federation entity’s youth policy. Since then, the Youth Council has met twice. In March, the Youth Council adopted its work programme for 2026. Among other objectives, the Youth Council intends to report each year on the situation of young people in the Federation.
Bosnia and Herzegovina continued to participate in the European Week of Sport.
In the area of culture, Bosnia and Herzegovina continues to implement measures under the UNESCO Convention on the protection and promotion of the diversity of cultural expression. The country still has to ensure a permanent solution to the legal status and financing for the seven ‘cultural institutions of national significance for Bosnia and Herzegovina’. Bosnia and Herzegovina continues to participate fully in the Creative Europe 2021-2027 programme.
The budget allocation for culture at all levels of government would improve with longer-term, multiannual funding decisions to provide financial stability for cultural creation and operation. Bosnia and Herzegovina would benefit from establishing formal partnership structures enabling transparent and organised participation in cultural policymaking.
Bosnia and Herzegovina embedded ‘anti-corruption education’ as a general prevention pillar in its national 2024–2028 strategy but during the reporting period it has not adopted a dedicated sectoral anti-corruption strategy for education, and structural integrity gaps.
Chapter 29: Customs union
All Member States are part of the EU customs union and follow the same customs rules and procedures. This requires legislative alignment as well as adequate implementing and enforcement capacity and access to and interoperability with the EU electronic customs environment.
The ITA is in charge of implementing the customs legislation and policies, which should be further aligned with the EU acquis including the Union customs code. The new customs policy law has been drafted but has not yet been adopted. Four companies have been recognised as authorised economic operators (AEOs). The customs tariff and classification of goods are aligned with the EU’s combined nomenclature. The country continues to apply the Pan-Euro Mediterranean Convention and has begun adopting the transitional rules of origin in trade with the EU.
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Bosnia and Herzegovina is an observer in the Common Transit Convention and intends to join it once it has met all legal and technical requirements, including upgrading its new computerised transit system, which has been operational since August 2022. An implementing Decision to the Law on customs policy law was adopted by the Council of Ministers in the reporting period. Bosnia and Herzegovina should continue aligning with the EU acquis its provisions on the customs enforcement of intellectual property rights. The country should implement the CEFTA additional protocol 5 on the mutual recognition of AEO programmes. Bosnia and Herzegovina should improve cooperation, including with the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF), and step up the use of anti-fraud tools to combat cross- border smuggling of tobacco products and other illicit activities. Bosnia and Herzegovina has yet to accede to the Protocol to Eliminate Illicit Trade in Tobacco Products. In October 2025 the Council of Ministers approved joining the latter Protocol. The exchange of customs information within the framework of mutual administrative assistance to detect, prevent and combat customs fraud needs to be made effective and fully operational.
The administrative and operational capacity of the Indirect Taxation Authority should be substantially strengthened, especially in operational posts. The risk management system needs further improvement, and customs authorities still perform 30% of checks physically (decrease from 40% in 2025). Bosnia and Herzegovina needs to align its customs IT systems with EU requirements to achieve interoperability with the common customs IT systems.
CLUSTER 4: THE GREEN AGENDA AND SUSTAINABLE CONNECTIVITY
This cluster covers transport (Chapter 14); energy (Chapter 15); trans-European networks (Chapter 21); and environment and climate change (Chapter 27).
Chapter 14: Transport policy
The EU has common rules on technical and safety standards, security, social standards, State aid and market liberalisation in road transport, railways, inland waterways, multimodal transport, aviation and maritime transport.
Regarding the general transport acquis, Bosnia and Herzegovina continues to implement its transport strategy valid until 2030, while an updated strategy with more realistic actions and deadlines is still pending adoption. Reforms in the transport sector have been insufficient for several years. The country should speed up proper implementation in all modes of transport. Activities mostly relate to infrastructure projects while little or no attention is given to delivering on the commitments contained in the Transport Community Treaty (TCT), its action plans and elements arising from the smart and sustainable mobility strategy for the Western Balkans. Sustainable urban mobility plans should be developed following EU practice, respecting environmental and social standards. An overall strategy for an intelligent transport system covering all modes of transport is yet to be adopted and appropriate resources should be allocated for its implementation.
On road transport, the implementation of road safety legislation remains a concern, as the number of crashes and fatalities is still very high. Discrepancies persist between domestic and WHO data. There is still no lead agency for road safety or countrywide system to collect data on road crashes. No developments to report in the area of transport
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Graph 26 - Road fatalities in Bosnia and Herzegovina per 100 000
inhabitants
Bosnia and Herzegovina EU average Source: Transport community
n/a: not available
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of dangerous goods. The legislation on road infrastructure safety management is yet to be aligned with the EU acquis, including on inspections and audits. Alignment on social and market rules in road transport is also needed. In January 2026, the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina approved the additional protocol to the Convention on the Contract for the International Carriage of Goods by Road (CMR) on electronic consignment note.
On rail transport, half of the railway infrastructure remains unsafe, outdated and unreliable, and cannot enable suitable international transit. Bosnia and Herzegovina should align the Law on railways with the fourth EU railway package, notably to open the railway market, separate infrastructure management and transport operations, and strengthen the independence and administrative capacity of the regulatory body, the safety authority and the investigation body. The country still should adopt a multiannual maintenance plan for the entire network. Bosnia and Herzegovina should use modern systems in line with EU rail interoperability and safety standards to build or rebuild railway sections. At entity level, railway legislation aiming to provide non-discriminatory access to the network should be brought in line with the EU acquis.
Bosnia and Herzegovina needs to prepare and adopt legislation on maritime transport in line with the EU acquis,enabling the country to become a maritime shipping flag holder. On inland waterway transport, Bosnia and Herzegovina should adopt state-level legislation in line with the EU acquis to ensure the safety of navigation and maintenance of inland waterways.
The 2009 Law on civil aviation needs to be aligned with the requirements of the European Common Aviation Area Agreement (ECAA). The authorities should continue efforts to address the chronic lack of adequately trained and qualified staff within the Bosnia and Herzegovina Directorate of Civil Aviation (BHDCA), which increases the risks of safety oversight. Bosnia and Herzegovina adopted implementing legislation on air traffic flow management, aimed at further alignment with the EU acquis.
Bosnia and Herzegovinahas not started to develop its policy, institutions, legal and regulatory framework on multimodal transport. Bosnia and Herzegovina has not yet aligned with the EU acquis on combined transport.
No developments to report regarding EU passenger rights as regards rail, bus and coach and waterborn transport, although the legislation on air passenger rights as well as regarding persons with disabilities and persons with reduced mobility is aligned with the EU acquis.
There were no developments on anti-corruption measures.
Chapter 15: Energy
EU energy policy covers energy supply, infrastructure, the internal energy market, consumers, renewable energy, energy efficiency, nuclear energy and nuclear safety, radiation protection, and nuclear safeguards.
No significant steps were taken to establish a compliant legal framework governing the security of supply in electricity, which needs to be redirected from coal to renewables, nor of supply in gas. No developments to report in the gas and oil sectors to align the legislative framework with the EU acquis.
Although only 3% of the energy supply comes from natural gas, the country remains fully dependent on one single source from Russia. Full implementation of the Regulation on the security of gas supply is pending, including development of risk assessment, preventive action plan and emergency plan. The country needs to adopt and enforce new legislation for the unbundling, certification, and operation of the gas transmission system operator in line with the third energy package.
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In April 2026, the Federation entity adopted a Law on the Southern Interconnection gas pipeline project without consulting the EU on the alignment with the gas acquis, despite the need to prioritise renewable options and to reduce supply risks.
On emergency oil stocks, no substantial progress was made at state level towards establishing the legal and institutional framework required by the EU acquis. The allocation of responsibilities between state-level and entity-level institutions remains unresolved.
At entity level, developments continued to diverge. The Federation entity took some steps towards establishing compulsory stocks of petroleum products, including build-up of strategic reserves and efforts to expand storage capacity. However, the stockholding system remains at an early stage of development, and further substantial efforts are needed to meet the 90- day requirement. In the Republika Srpska entity, no substantial steps were taken on establishing compulsory stocks of petroleum products.
In response to the current oil market disruption, both entities introduced price intervention measures. The Republika Srpska entity implemented partial fuel price refunds, while the Federation entity regulated retail margins on petroleum products. These developments highlighted the need for stronger contingency planning and improved coordination among the competent institutions to mitigate economic and financial risks impact of global oil supply disruptions.
To ensure the opening of the internal energy market, Bosnia and Herzegovina needs to adopt outstanding electricity and gas legislation. Bosnia and Herzegovina is late in aligning with the Electricity Integration Package, which is a precondition for market integration. This, among others, includes unbundling and certification of the transmission system operator, appointing the nominated electricity market operator (NEMO) and establishing the power exchange and day-ahead and intra-day markets. A new law on the regulator, electricity transmission and the electricity market, aimed at aligning with the Electricity Integration Package, is yet to be adopted. The entity-level laws need to be fully harmonised with this legal framework and be implemented. The unbundling of the distribution system operator within the three incumbent utilities remains incomplete, with progress stalled in the Federation entity pending additional legal amendments, while in the Republika Srpska entity legal and accounting unbundling of distribution companies is completed but their functional unbundling remains outstanding. For electricity, the independence of regulatory authorities at all levels is still hampered by political interference. The regulatory authority is not equipped with legal powers to regulate the gas sector.
For gas, the wholesale and retail market remains closed without adequate regulatory oversight and lacks transparency, particularly on setting prices for end consumers.
A state-level legal framework is still lacking on renewable energy, although both entities and the Brčko District continued to prepare implementing legislation. Both entities and the Brčko District need to launch renewable energy support scheme auctions. An electronic register on issuance, cancellation and trade of guarantees of origin (GOs) is in place in the Republika Srpska entity, while the Federation entity signed an agreement with a service provider in August 2026 to introduce it.
Amid large potential, there were positive developments on renewable electricity capacity, with five wind parks in place and an increasing number of solar plants (including ten solar parks). Current plans for new renewable energy sources capacity should be swiftly implemented. Hydropower planning is still being carried out without complying with the Espoo Convention. Despite existing legal obligations, environmental impact assessments are not consistently prepared, which lead to protests and court challenges. (See Chapter 27 – Environment and climate change)
No progress was made in aligning legislation on energy efficiency with EU acquis, including the energy performance of buildings.Incentive measures must be gender- and class- balanced.
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In the area of governance, Bosnia and Herzegovina needs to finalise and adopt the 2021-2030 National Energy and Climate Plan (NECP) in line with the 2030 Energy Community targets.
As regards nuclear energy, nuclear safety, radioactive waste management and radiation protection, the country finalised the outstanding actions required to join the European Community Urgent Radiological Information Exchange (ECURIE). Bosnia and Herzegovina has also established the necessary technical arrangements to use the required communication tools for notifying radiological emergencies. On nuclear safeguards, upon EU accession the existing systems of accountancy and control of nuclear materials in Bosnia and Herzegovina would need to be adapted to accommodate for the safeguard provisions of the Euratom Treaty.
There were no developments on anti-corruption measures.
Chapter 21: Trans-European Networks
The EU promotes trans-European networks (TENs) in the areas of transport, telecommunications and energy to strengthen the internal market and contribute to growth and employment.
On transport networks, Bosnia and Herzegovina should accelerate the implementation of connectivity reform measures and continue adopting multiannual maintenance plans for the entire road and rail core networks. More efforts are required to strengthen mutual relations and cross-border cooperation with neighbouring countries on border crossing agreements.
Bosnia and Herzegovina should continue with the development of the planned extension of the core trans-European transport networks (TEN-T) and trans-European networks for energy (TEN-E) in line with the priorities identified in the Economic and Investment Plan for the Western Balkans, the Green Agenda and the Transport Community’s five-year rolling work plan.
The updated single project pipeline for priority TEN-T connectivity projects was adopted in September 2025, and the implementation of some projects has started. In relation to the Corridor Vc motorway, works have continued across five sections, and started on an additional one, while two sub-sections were successfully opened (Poprikuše – Nemila and Putnikovo Brdo - Medakovo). The Federation entity needs to close the financing gap to complete the construction of the motorway. As regards the infrastructural investments located in the Republika Srpska entity, specifically those related to Corridor Vc, given the continuing stalemate at the state level over several important decisions, including those related to the Reform Agenda under the Growth Plan, the Commission has decided to end the earmarking of EU grants for one of the two suspended projects (railway project). An agreement with Croatia on the category of border crossings was reached in June 2026, including the Svilaj and Gradiška border crossings. The Gradiška border crossing with Croatia was opened on a temporary basis, following structural damage to the bridge in May.
On rail infrastructure, after previous finalisation of the design studies for the Doboj – Rasputnica – Miljacka railway section, there were no further developments. Effort is needed to accelerate progress on the rail core network where investments continue to be limited. Rehabilitation activities are ongoing for the navigability of the Sava river, and completed in the Brčko Port, while tendering for the demining activities is in its final stage, and the start of works is expected within this year.
On energy networks, Bosnia and Herzegovina still needs to align with the revised TEN-E Regulation. Following adoption of the single project pipeline in September 2025 in the energy sector, the implementation of priority projects is yet to start. Bosnia and Herzegovina still needs to develop its regional electricity connections in line with the Green Agenda for the Western Balkans, the Central and South-Eastern Europe Energy Connectivity (CESEC) action plan on electricity and renewable energy and the Projects of Energy Community
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Interest involving Bosnia and Herzegovina, in particular increasing the capacity of the existing 220 kV interconnection with Montenegro (220 kV overhead line Trebinje – Perućica), and the Trans-Balkan Corridor: double overhead line 400 kV Bajina Bašta (Serbia) – Višegrad (Bosnia and Herzegovina) / Pljevlja (Montenegro).
Chapter 27: Environment and climate change
The EU promotes strong climate action, sustainable development and protection of the environment. EU rules contain provisions addressing horizontal environmental issues, climate change, water and air quality, waste management, nature protection, industrial pollution, chemicals, noise and civil protection.
Environment
Horizontal legislation is aligned with the EU acquis to a limited extent. No significant steps were taken in implementing countrywide environmental approximation and environmental protection strategies, in aligning with horizontal directives on environmental impact assessment (EIA) and strategic environmental assessment (SEA), environmental liability, infrastructure for spatial information (INSPIRE), and environmental crime, or in strengthening access to information and public participation in decision-making in line with obligations under the Espoo Convention on EIA in a transboundary context. Bosnia and Herzegovina should ensure the quality of the preparation and implementation of environmental investments – including the transparency of procedures, compliance with EIA and SEA and other elements of the horizontal acquis – to set up an institutional structure to deliver coordinated, strategic planning for environmental investments. The country still needs to formalise a procedure for merit-based, transparent appointment of a focal point for Bosnia and Herzegovina to ensure its undisputed representation in environmental conventions to which the country is a signatory.
On air quality, Bosnia and Herzegovina needs to develop a countrywide strategy to systematically and efficiently combat air pollution. Bosnia and Herzegovina should accelerate the establishment of a coordinated and well-functioning countrywide air monitoring network to provide reliable data for the government and citizens.
In the area of waste management, Bosnia and Herzegovina needs to adopt a countrywide strategyfocusing on the requirements of the waste framework strategy, circular economy, the EU plastic strategy and the Directive on single-use plastics. Bosnia and Herzegovina needs to align with the Landfill Directive as well as with the EU acquis on sewage sludge, batteries, packaging, polychlorinated biphenyls / polychlorinated terphenyls and end-of-life vehicles.
On water quality, a consistent and harmonised countrywide strategy and a sustainable investment plan on water management and urban wastewater management are lacking. There is no state-level legislation that regulates water management, and alignment with the EU acquis is very fragmented. Specific plans for implementing EU legislation on drinking water, urban wastewater and flood risk management need to be adopted. Bosnia and Herzegovina needs to adopt a roof report on river basin management plans, on flood hazards and risks plans, as well as a revised action plan for flood protection and river management.
On nature protection, further alignment with the EU acquis should take place in a coordinated manner across the country. Bosnia and Herzegovina needs to adopt the list of potential Natura 2000 sites and implementing legislation and set up a biodiversity monitoring system. The Convention on international trade in endangered species of wild fauna and flora (CITES) needs to be fully implemented. Bosnia and Herzegovina should prepare legislation to ratify and become a party to the Nagoya Protocol to the 1992 Convention on biological diversity.
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Regarding industrial pollution control and risk management, the pollutants release and transfer register (PRTR) protocol to the Aarhus Convention still needs to be ratified. Bosnia and Herzegovina needs to ensure the implementation of its national emissions reduction plan (NERP). The country needs to align with the EU directives on industrial emissions, eco- labelling and eco-management and audit schemes, as well as with the Seveso III Directive on the control of major-accident hazards involving dangerous substances.
On chemicals, the country needs to ensure alignment with EU regulations on registration, evaluation, authorisation and restriction of chemicals (REACH), on classification, labelling and packaging of substances and mixtures (CLP), and on biocidal products (BPR), as well as appoint the responsible bodies. Bosnia and Herzegovina still needs to implement the Rotterdam Convention on trade of hazardous chemicals, to which it is a party. There has been no progress in acceding to the Minamata Convention on Mercury.
Significant further efforts are needed to align with the EU acquis on environmental noise.
On civil protection, Bosnia and Herzegovina is a Participating State of the Union Civil Protection Mechanism (UCPM) and actively participates in the activities including in disaster risk management reporting to the Commission. Bosnia and Herzegovina has benefitted from the UCPM capacity building for disaster prevention and preparedness. However, further efforts are needed to integrate its systems to the UCPM. The country should establish trans- European services for telematics between administrations (TESTA) as a precondition for connecting to the common emergency communication and information system (CECIS). In the meantime, Bosnia and Herzegovina should establish CECIS LITE allowing better exchange of information during emergencies. Adequate early warning systems and risk- based planning are needed for a more proactive approach to disaster risk reduction across the country. Bosnia and Herzegovina still has to adopt legislation to introduce the single European emergency number (112) across the whole country. Both entities and the Brčko District should afterwards implement such a law. The country should continue forming emergency response unit at the national level in line with requirements for the civil protection modules of the UCPM.
Climate change
No significant steps were taken in the area of climate change during the reporting period. Bosnia and Herzegovina should urgently step up its efforts to align with the EU climate acquis.
Bosnia and Herzegovina needs to adopt a state-level climate law and a countrywide long-term climate strategy consistent with the EU’s 2050 climate neutrality objective. The country should urgently align with and implement the EU acquis on monitoring, reporting, verification and accreditation (MRVA) for the purpose of introducing carbon pricing and aligning with the EU emission trading system (ETS) in its full scope.
Bosnia and Herzegovina needs to finalise and adopt its National Energy and Climate Plan (NECP). The country still needs to align with EU acquis on fluorinated greenhouse gases, ozone-depleting substances, on emissions from the land and use, land use change and forestry (LULUCF) sector and climate legislation concerning road transport (CO2 performance standards, car labelling and fuel quality).
The country needs to step up the implementation of its revised nationally determined contribution (NDC) and submit without delay a new and ambitious NDC to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in line with the efforts to limit global warming to 1.5°C. Furthermore, the country should submit their first biennial transparency report without delay.
Bosnia and Herzegovina urgently needs to significantly strengthen its administrative capacity in the sector in order to make progress in aligning with the EU climate acquis. Awareness- raising activities should be strengthened.
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CLUSTER 5: RESOURCES, AGRICULTURE AND COHESION
This cluster covers: agriculture and rural development (Chapter 11); food safety, veterinary and phytosanitary policy (Chapter 12); fisheries and aquaculture (Chapter 13); regional policy & coordination of structural instruments (Chapter 22); and financial & budgetary provisions (Chapter 33).
Chapter 11: Agriculture and rural development
The EU’s common agricultural policy supports farmers and contributes to ensuring Europe’s food security. It helps tackle climate change and the sustainable management of national resources; maintains rural areas and landscapes across the EU; and keeps the rural economy alive by promoting jobs in farming, agri-food industries and associated sectors. This requires strong management and control systems. There are also common EU rules for marketing standards, quality policy and organic farming.
On horizontal issues, Bosnia and Herzegovina did not progress in setting up the administrative structures required for the common agricultural policy (CAP), including a paying agency, nor in developing elements of an integrated administration and control system (IACS) or a farm sustainability data network (FSDN). The country needs to substantially improve the data collection and processing system for planning agricultural and rural development policies, and ensure its implementation, monitoring and reporting. The implementation of the Strategic plan for rural development 2023-2027 – framework document, endorsed in October 2024, has not advanced. The country needs to develop a multiannual countrywide strategy on agriculture and rural development beyond the scope of the existing framework document for rural development, improve sector coordination and strengthen administrative capacity at all levels of government. It should also harmonise farm advisory services across the country.
As regards agricultural markets - common market organisation (CMO), Bosnia and Herzegovina did not progress in setting up its regulatory framework in line with the EU acquis. Bosnia and Herzegovina still needs to adopt implementing legislation to the state- level Law on the organisation of the market of wine and set up a register of grapes and wine producers and a vineyard register.
Bosnia and Herzegovina made no advances in harmonising rural development programmes and support measures across the country. No progress was made to improve and align the state level legal framework on quality policy with the EU acquis and ensure clarity in the distribution of competences. There was also no progress in adopting a state- level Law on organic farming and production, in line with the EU acquis, and in the harmonisation of the related regulatory framework across all levels of government.
On the fight against corruption, Bosnia and Herzegovina authorities are obliged to prevent, detect and report irregularities.
Chapter 12: Food safety, veterinary and phytosanitary policy
The EU food acquis including hygiene rules for foodstuff production ensure a high level of food and feed safety, and a high level of protection of consumers’ interests. Animal health and welfare, and the safety of food of animal origin, are safeguarded together with plant health, the quality of seeds, plant reproductive material, animal nutrition and the use of plant protection products.
On general food safety, Bosnia and Herzegovina has to put in place a network of national reference laboratories and to increase the capacity of existing laboratories, including on accreditation, sampling and testing of notifiable diseases.
Improving the official controls system remains crucial, particularly for animal identification and the registration of holdings to ensure data reliability. Alignment has yet to be ensured for
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the surveillance of notifiable diseases, particularly for early detection system and raising awareness among farmers.
Further work remains necessary to prepare and adopt the state law on official controls, and to update the national Law on general food safety.
On veterinary policy, the country needs to substantially strengthen the control, prevention and eradication of transmissible animal diseases, Further work remains necessary to adopt national laws on animal health and animal welfare. Further efforts are needed to improve coordination for the management of animal disease outbreaks. The central system for management of animal disease notification and outbreak information, as well as the central animal identification and registration systems for sheep, goats, pigs and horses, are yet to be aligned with the EU acquis.
On the placing on the market of food, feed and animal by-products, Bosnia and Herzegovina has yet to align its food and feed control system with the EU acquis. Further reforms are still necessary at all levels of government, particularly for official control authorities and laboratories. There is yet no countrywide strategy nor effective system for managing animal by-products. On food safety rules and its specific rules for feed, Bosnia and Herzegovina has yet to improve the implementation of a harmonised food and feed hygiene policy package that applies to all establishments.
On phytosanitary policy, the country has yet to adopt key national laws, notably on plant health and on plant protection products. The country has yet to align its national legislation with the EU acquis on the rules for the authorisation of plant protection products in commercial form and for their placing on the market, use and control. Reforms are still needed for Bosnia and Herzegovina to align its legislation to the plant health law and be able to implement the most important aspects of it such the issuance of plant passports and to set up national reference laboratories providing phytosanitary checks. Surveys, early detection and eradication of pests must be strengthened. The adoption of countrywide programmes for surveillance of quarantine pests for all agriculture crops and forests remains important, not only for potatoes which are exported to the EU.
On the marketing of seed and other plant reproductive material, the country should focus on aligning its national legislation with the EU acquis on the rules plant (PRM) and forest reproductive material (FRM). Membership in the OECD schemes is a first step in that direction. Bosnia and Herzegovina should then focus on establishing the necessary structures and capacities to implement and enforce a functioning system for the certification of seed and FRM, including regarding the registration and evaluation of varieties (PRM) and basic material (FRM), inspections and controls, and supervision of operators.
On genetically modified organisms (GMOs) there was no advancement reported and further work remains necessary. Competent authorities at all levels of government need to be strengthened and a national reference laboratory is yet to be set up to test, control and monitor the presence of GMOs in food and feed.
On the fight against corruption measures, the general anti-corruption legal framework equally applies to food safety, veterinary and phytosanitary, with no specific provisions in place for the sectors yet.
Chapter 13: Fisheries and aquaculture
The common fisheries policy lays down rules on fisheries management, protects living resources of the sea and limits the environmental impact of fisheries. This includes setting catch quotas, managing fleet capacity, rules on control and inspection, rules on markets and aquaculture and support for fisheries and coastal communities. Further, it promotes a sustainable aquaculture.
Bosnia and Herzegovina needs to develop a countrywide policy and legislative framework for fisheries and a strategy for aquaculture to prepare for the EU’s common fisheries policy
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(CFP). The country needs to substantially strengthen its institutional capacity and administrative structures to support small-scale and/or inland fisheries and aquaculture.
There were no steps forward on resource and fleet management. Bosnia and Herzegovina needs to set up a fleet register and a system for management and control of fishing activities in line with the CFP. On inspection and control, the country needs to improve and harmonise the data on catches and landings per type of fishery and improve methodologies and planning for data collection. Bosnia and Herzegovina has yet to set up structural actions and State aid measures with the EU acquis.
On market policy, Bosnia and Herzegovina needs to establish most of the provisions of the EU acquis on the CMO in fishery and aquaculture products, among others setting up a framework to recognise producers’ organisations.
Regarding international agreements, Bosnia and Herzegovina continues to cooperate with the General Fisheries Commission for the Mediterranean (GFCM) as part of the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), to which it is a cooperating non-contracting party.
There were no developments to report on aquaculture or on maritime spatial planning during the reporting period.
On the fight against corruption measures, the general anti-corruption legal framework equally applies to fisheries and aquaculture, with no specific provisions in place for the sector yet
Chapter 22: Regional policy and coordination of structural instruments
Regional policy is the EU’s main tool for reducing regional disparities and investing in sustainable and inclusive socio-economic growth. It operates through ‘shared management’ between the Commission and EU Member States. The implementation of cohesion policy programmes requires appropriate administrative capacity on programme and project level, the establishment of systems of sound financial management and controls and also the fulfilment of other EU acquis elements such as environmental or public procurement legislation.
On the legislative framework, in the areas underpinning regional development (see Chapters 5, 8, 15, 19, 27, 32), Bosnia and Herzegovina needs to increase alignment with the EU acquis and standards, and to commit to regional development reforms, including definition of the planning regions (e.g. NUTS) and their powers, statistical profile and financing. The country needs to adopt a countrywide strategy to guide the process.
The institutional framework for the management of EU funds is not yet in place. The country has not yet appointed a national IPA coordinator (NIPAC) for IPA III to steer the programming and the use of the EU funds, and to drive reforms under this chapter. The absence of a NIPAC may be considered as a fundamental weakness in the management and control system, especially under shared management. There is no countrywide strategic framework guiding the preparations for the structural and cohesion funds and regional development. The coordination is challenging due to institutional and administrative fragmentation and lack of quality statistical and administrative data to support a common strategic vision.
The administrative capacity for programming and managing EU pre-accession funds remains weak due to delays in public administration reform and the absence of efficient IPA structures including a NIPAC and a Reform and Growth Facility coordinator. The administration has a limited understanding of the EU regional and cohesion policy.
On programming,following the programming of the remaining IPA III programmes 2025-2027, the related Financing Agreement was ratified in August 2026. Although the Reform Agenda was adopted in September 2025, Bosnia and Herzegovina still needs to sign and ratify the Facility and Loan Agreements, appoint a Reform and Growth Facility
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Coordinator, establish monitoring and reporting structures, and urgently proceed with implementing the committed reforms. The delayed submission of the Reform Agenda has already shortened the implementation period and reduced the indicative allocation.
Bosnia and Herzegovina needs to improve capital investment planning and maintain an up- to-date single project pipeline to guide EU and domestic investments across priority sectors through a transparent and inclusive methodology. The country continues to build experience in regional policy through participation in Interreg programmes (three cross-border programmes and three transnational programmes, as well as three inter-regional programmes).
Regarding monitoring and evaluation, Bosnia and Herzegovina needs to significantly improve the quality of monitoring and reporting on the use of the EU funds, and to ensure a higher rate of implementation of recommendations from the SAA process and the IPA monitoring committee. In absence of a NIPAC, the IPA monitoring committee has not taken place since May 2022.
On the financial management, control and audit system, Bosnia and Herzegovina needs to put in place a roadmap for establishing the management and control systems for the structural and cohesion instruments and ensure their implementation.
On fight against corruption, anti-corruption and anti-fraud measures need to be put in place and enforced in close coordination among anti-corruption bodies at all levels of government.
Chapter 33: Financial and budgetary provisions
This chapter covers the rules governing the funding of the EU budget (‘own resources’). These resources mainly consist of: (i) contributions based on the gross national income of each Member State; (ii) customs duties; (iii) the non-recycled plastic resource and (iv) a resource based on value added tax. Member States must have the appropriate administrative capacity to adequately coordinate and ensure the correct calculation, collection, payment and control of own resources.
There was no progress in the underlying policy areas that indirectly affect the own-resources system. (For progress in these areas, see Chapters 16 – Taxation, 17 – Economic and monetary policy, 18 – Statistics, 29 – Customs union, and 32 – Financial control)
There were few actions taken towards improving the capacity of the ITA and in implementing an accounting system for customs duties to distinguish between recovered and outstanding debts, in line with the EU’s traditional own resources accounting. ITA allows uploading files from the customs and other subsystems into the single account ledger. The VAT law is still to be aligned with the EU acquis, notably on special schemes and exceptions.
On the gross national income (GNI) resource, Bosnia and Herzegovina makes use of the definitions and accounting rules of ESA 2010 to compile its GNI. Setting up a countrywide accounts system is a long-standing priority that should be tackled with urgency, notably by adopting a master plan to that aim, in line with ESA 2010.
In terms of administrative infrastructure, Bosnia and Herzegovina still has to ensure the provision of sufficient human and administrative resources to ensure the full and correct application of relevant rules in line with EU acquis on payments into the EU budget. Administrative structures and implementing rules need to be better coordinated to ensure correct forecasting, calculation, accounting, collection, payment and monitoring of own resources.
CLUSTER 6: EXTERNAL RELATIONS
This cluster covers: external relations (Chapter 30); foreign, security and defence policy
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(Chapter 31).
Chapter 30: External relations
The EU has a common commercial policy towards third countries, based on multilateral and bilateral agreements and autonomous measures. There are also EU rules on humanitarian aid and development policy.
On the common commercial policy, Bosnia and Herzegovina needs to conclude negotiations for its accession to the WTO. Bosnia and Herzegovina needs to fully implement the 2021-2024 Common Regional Market action plan, including the CEFTA additional protocol 5 on trade facilitation and CEFTA additional protocol 6 on trade in services. Bosnia and Herzegovina ratified the additional protocol 7 on dispute settlement, thus contributing to implementing the 2025-2028 Common Regional Market action plan.
Bosnia and Herzegovina applies export controls on dual-use goods under its 2003 legislation, which needs to be aligned with the EU dual-use export control acquis, including the annual updates to the list of dual-use items. Bosnia and Herzegovina has yet to align with the EU acquis on the screening of FDI.
As regards bilateral agreements with third countries, Bosnia and Herzegovina needs to further strengthen its administrative capacity and improve cooperation and coordination among all levels of government to ensure consistency of implementation and enforcement. The country has 37 bilateral investment treaties in force, including 18 treaties with 19 EU Member States.
The regulatory framework for international cooperation in development policy and humanitarian aid still needs to be developed. The country is a recipient of aid programmes and has so far provided humanitarian aid only ad hoc. Bosnia and Herzegovina is encouraged to establish a legal framework, according to EU policies and principles, and to build dedicated administrative structures.
Chapter 31: Foreign, security and defence policy
Member States must be able to conduct political dialogue under the EU foreign, security and defence policy, align with EU statements, take part in EU actions, and apply agreed restrictive measures.
Bosnia and Herzegovina actively engaged in political dialogue with the EU on foreign and security policy issues. Bosnia and Herzegovina hosted the 12th EU Western Balkans meeting of Political Directors in Sarajevo in October 2025. It participated in the Political Directors meeting in Brussels in April 2026 and in Kruje in October 2026, the informal meetings of the Foreign Ministers in November 2025 and in May 2026, as well as in the EU- Western Balkans Summit in Brussels in December 2025 and in Tivat in June 2026.
The country’s foreign policy strategy expired in 2023 and has not been renewed; therefore, Bosnia and Herzegovina is encouraged to adopt a new foreign policy strategy. Its implementation was affected by frequent divergent positions within the Presidency, also in relation to domestic developments, Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, the Middle East and the UN General Assembly resolutions. Rules and practices based on ethnic quotas in appointing the diplomatic and consular staff have a negative impact on the capacity of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, adversely affecting the country’s foreign policy objectives.
Bosnia and Herzegovina maintained full alignment with the EU common foreign and security policy (CFSP) during the reporting period, including statements by the High Representative on behalf of the EU and Council Decisions on restrictive measures, thereby signalling its clear commitment to the EU path. However, implementation of CFSP across the country remains uneven, mainly because of the Republika Srpska entity’s authorities' unwillingness to fully implement the statements and measures against Russia, as well as the
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entity authorities’ frequent contacts with Russia at the highest level. Bosnia and Herzegovina needs to fully align with EU acquis on targeted financial sanctions for terrorism, financing of terrorism and financing of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.
Alignment with EU restrictive measures remains politically contested as the member of the Presidency elected from the Republika Srpska entity advocated for a neutral stance and the former Republika Srpska entity President openly supported Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine. Despite the country’s formal alignment with EU restrictive measures, their implementation remains uneven, notably in areas under the responsibility of ministries controlled by the SNSD party, including continued operation of flights from Russia and the broadcasting Russian state-sponsored media. Bosnia and Herzegovina should continue to strengthen its capacity to implement and enforce international sanctions, including EU restrictive measures with which it has aligned and further adopt legislation aligned with the relevant EU acquis.
Regarding cooperation with international organisations, Bosnia and Herzegovina is an active member of major international organisations, including the United Nations, the Council of Europe and the OSCE. Bosnia and Herzegovina aligned with nearly all EU positions at the United Nations, the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe and the Council of Europe, including on Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, including co-sponsoring the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) resolution on “Support for lasting peace in Ukraine” in February 2026 and voting in favour of UNGA resolution on “Return of Ukrainian Children” in December 2025. In June 2026, Bosnia and Herzegovina became the 50th member of the International Coalition for the Return of Ukrainian Children. The country has been participating in NATO’s Membership Action Plan (MAP) since 2019. In 2025, NATO and Bosnia and Herzegovina agreed on a new Individually Tailored Partnership Programme (ITPP, 2025–2028) and in 2026, the Council of Ministers unanimously adopted the related Reform Programme for 2025, outlining specific goals in line with the requirements for the MAP. An action plan on Women, Peace and Security (WPS) with specific funding pending adoption since 2023, although some parts of the WPS Agenda are now integrated directly into Bosnia and Herzegovina's Gender Action Plan.
A bilateral immunity agreement between Bosnia and Herzegovina and the United States is still in place, granting US nationals exemption from surrender to the International Criminal Court. This is not in line with the Council Decision 2011/168/CFSP of 21 March 2011 nor with the related EU guiding principles on bilateral immunity agreements. Alignment with the EU position is needed.
Bosnia and Herzegovina supports all EU measures and instruments for conflict prevention.
On non-proliferation and disarmament, Bosnia and Herzegovina is a party to most international treaties and conventions, but it does not yet participate in multilateral export control regimes. Alignment with the EU Common Position 2008/944 on arms export control is complete. Bosnia and Herzegovina is a party to the Arms Trade Treaty but still needs to establish effective measures to prevent diversion of arms and ammunition. It also submitted an application to become a Participating State of the Wassenaar Arrangement. Its non- proliferation strategy has expired.
As regards the control of small arms and light weapons, Bosnia and Herzegovina is implementing the regional roadmap 2025-2030. In 2025, progress was achieved as the marking and registration of firearms was successfully concluded in the Brčko District, Posavina Canton, and Canton 10. While the Sarajevo Canton achieved measurable progress in marking firearms in early 2026, the continued implementation of these efforts remains contingent upon the securing of further international donations and technical support. The country still needs to mark and register all weapons of security forces into a single register to ensure adequate traceability.
In terms of security measures, the country continued to implement the agreement with the
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EU on security procedures for exchanging and protecting classified information. The national security authority (NSA) under the Ministry of Security is understaffed. The Law on the protection of classified information needs to be further aligned with EU standards, entrusting supervision to the NSA.
On the common security and defence policy (CSDP), the Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina (AFBiH) continued to contribute to the EU Training Mission (EUTM) in the Central African Republic. Bosnia and Herzegovina is invited to further step up participation in CSDP military missions and operations. Bosnia and Herzegovina contributes to regional cooperation in military medicine through the Balkan Medical Task Force (BMTF). It participates in training activities of the European Security and Defence College (ESDC).
Bosnia and Herzegovina does not have an overall assessment or a policy framework for addressing hybrid threats and its public institutions remain vulnerable to serious cyberattacks. Banja Luka-based provider M-tel continued to carry the signal of the RT channel, despite Bosnia and Herzegovina’s alignment with relevant EU sanctions against Russia. The country also aligned with EU statements on hybrid and cyber. Additionally, Bosnia and Herzegovina has actively engaged in the first negotiations of the new UN Global Mechanism on Information and Communications Technologies in the Context of International Security. Bosnia and Herzegovina needs to make clear efforts building resilience against FIMI, including disinformation and all other forms of hybrid threats.
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ANNEX I – RELATIONS BETWEEN THE EU AND BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
The Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA) entered into force in June 2015. Policy dialogue in the joint bodies under the agreement continued. The SA Committee was held in September 2025. The country also participates in the economic and financial dialogue between the EU and the Western Balkans and Türkiye.
Under the SAA and its interim agreement (which commenced application in 2008) there has been progressive trade liberalisation and mutual duty-free access for most goods. Since 2000, Bosnia and Herzegovina has also been benefiting from the EU’s autonomous trade measures (ATMs) in favour of the Western Balkans. The country joined the Central European Free Trade Agreement (CEFTA) in 2007. The EU is Bosnia and Herzegovina’s main trading partner, accounting for 63.5% of its trade in goods (73.1% of exports and 58.1% of imports), for a total trade volume of EUR 15.2 billion in 2025.
Bosnia and Herzegovina applied for EU membership in February 2016, and in May 2019 the Commission adopted its Opinion setting out 14 key priorities in the areas of democracy and functionality, rule of law, fundamental rights, and public administration reform. In December 2022, the European Council granted Bosnia and Herzegovina candidate country status on the understanding that a number of steps are taken, as outlined in the October 2022 Commission recommendation. The European Council decided on 21 March 2024 to open accession negotiations with Bosnia and Herzegovina. The European Council invited the Commission to prepare the negotiating framework with a view to its adoption by the Council the moment all relevant steps set out in the Commission’s recommendation of October 2022 are taken.
Visa liberalisation for citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina travelling to the Schengen area has been in force since December 2010, and a readmission agreement has been in force since 2008. The Commission’s seventh report under the visa suspension mechanism in December 2024 concluded that the country continues to meet the visa liberalisation benchmarks. In accordance with Regulation (EU)2026/46414, candidate countries and potential candidates are, in principle, designated since 2026 as safe countries of origin at Union level.
In the reporting period, Bosnia and Herzegovina fully aligned with the EU CFSP and continued to participate in EU crisis management missions and operations under the CSDP. The EUFOR Altheamilitary operation remained deployed in the country, retaining deterrence capacity to support a safe and secure environment. The UN Security Council has extended EUFOR Althea’s executive mandate until November 2026.
The AFBiH benefit from EUR 35 million in assistance from the European Peace Facility (EPF), which increases their capacity to participate in CSDP military missions and operations. Their demining battalion, which is essential for achieving a mine-free Bosnia and Herzegovina, received EPF support to purchase vehicles and metal detectors. The AFBiH also received EPF support in chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear protection, and mobility assets and take part in the EUR 6 million EPF Balkan Medical Task Force assistance measure.
The EU is the main donor of financial assistance to Bosnia and Herzegovina, with EUR 539.6 million under the Instrument for Pre-accession (IPA) II 2014-2020 and EUR 379.7 million under IPA III 2021-2027. The fundamentals of EU accession – good governance, rule of law and human rights – receive 43.97% of the IPA III assistance, while
14 REGULATION (EU) 2026/464 OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL of 24 February 2026 amending Regulation (EU) 2024/1348 as regards the establishment of a list of safe countries of origin at Union level
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56.03% target sustainable and inclusive growth. EU assistance also includes funding for civil society and co-financing for participation in EU programmes.
Since 2009, Bosnia and Herzegovina also received EU assistance of EUR 1.1 billion through the Western Balkans Investment Framework (WBIF), leveraging total investments of EUR 6.7 billion. Overall, under the Economic and Investment Plan (EIP), Bosnia and Herzegovina benefits from EUR 1 billion of IPA funds, mobilising additional funding of EUR 2.9 billion for priority high-impact projects.
Under the Reform and Growth Facility, Bosnia and Herzegovina may benefit from up to EUR 976.6 million in loans and grants, following the 10% cuts enacted in July 2025 due to the late submission of their Reform Agenda. Disbursements will follow delivery on reforms as set out in the Reform Agenda that Bosnia and Herzegovina adopted in September 2025 and subject to the ratification of the Facility and Loan Agreements.
The EU provides support to strengthen Bosnia and Herzegovina’s resilience to hybrid threats, including cyber threats and FIMI.
Bosnia and Herzegovina participates in three cross-border cooperation programmes (Interreg / Croatia – Bosnia and Herzegovina – Montenegro; IPA – Bosnia and Herzegovina – Montenegro; IPA – Serbia – Bosnia and Herzegovina), as well as in transnational cooperation for the Adriatic-Ionian region, the Danube region and the Euro Mediterranean region. Additionally, Bosnia and Herzegovina participates in interregional cooperation programmes, such as Interreg Europe or Urbact IV.
Bosnia and Herzegovina participates in eleven EU programmes: Fiscalis, Customs, Single
Market Programme (Improving the competitiveness of enterprises, particularly SMEs, and
supporting their access to markets strand), Creative Europe, CERV (Citizens, Equality,
Rights and Values), Horizon Europe, EU4Health, Digital Europe, Union Civil Protection
Mechanism, ESF+ (EaSI strand – Employment and Social Innovation), Justice. In addition,
Bosnia and Herzegovina can take part in certain Actions of the Erasmus+ Programme.
ANNEX II – STATISTICAL ANNEX
STATISTICAL DATA (as of 14/09/2026)
Bosnia and Herzegovina
Basic data Note 2013 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
Population (thousand) 3 836 i : 3 464 pi 3 441 pi 3 417 pi 3 407 pi
Total area of the country (km²) 51 209 w 51 209 w 51 209 w 51 209 w 51 209 w 51 209 w
National accounts Note 2013 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
Gross domestic product (GDP) (million national currency) 26 779 39 145 45 618 49 920 53 752 56 551
Gross domestic product (GDP) (million euro) 13 692 20 015 23 324 25 524 27 483 28 914
GDP per capita (euro) 3 570 i : 6 733 pi 7 417 pi 8 043 pi 8 486 pi
GDP per capita (in purchasing power standards (PPS) 8 000 11 000 12 400 13 600 13 800 :
GDP per capita (in PPS), relative to the EU average (EU-27 = 100) 30.1 i : : : : :
Real GDP growth rate: change on previous year of GDP volume (%) 2.3 7.4 4.2 2.0 3.2 2.1
Employment growth (national accounts data), relative to the previous year (%) 0 1 2 1 2 :
Labour productivity growth: growth in GDP (in volume) per person employed, relative to the
previous year (%)
2 6 2 1 2 :
Unit labour cost growth, relative to the previous year (%) - 2 - 1 12 11 8 :
Nominal unit labour cost index based on persons (3 year % change) 3.1 6.3 15.6 23.2 34.6 :
Labour productivity per person employed: GDP (in PPS) per person employed relative to EU
average (EU-27 = 100)
55 55 57 58 59 :
Gross value added by main sectors
Agriculture, forestry and fisheries (%) 8.0 6.0 5.7 5.5 5.4 5.2
Industry (%) 21.6 24.6 24.2 22.7 21.2 20.0
Construction (%) 4.6 5.1 5.2 5.4 5.6 5.7
Services (%) 66.0 i 64.3 i 64.9 i 66.3 i 67.8 i 69.0 i
Final consumption expenditure, as a share of GDP (%) 109.4 89.2 87.7 88.8 88.5 89.7
Gross fixed capital formation, as a share of GDP (%) 21.5 21.6 22.6 23.8 24.4 25.8
Exports of goods and services, relative to GDP (%) 33.7 42.8 48.3 43.9 40.7 41.0
Imports of goods and services, relative to GDP (%) 54.2 53.9 61.9 55.7 54.1 54.1
Gross fixed capital formation by the general government sector, as a percentage of GDP (%) : : : : : :
Business Note 2013 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
Industrial production volume index (2015 = 100) 91.5 99.9 100.9 97.0 93.1 91.5
Number of active enterprises (number) : 78 877 81 436 84 211 86 920 :
Birth rate: number of enterprise births in the reference period (t) divided by the number of
enterprises active in t (%)
: : : : : :
Death rate: number of enterprise deaths in the reference period (t) divided by the number of
enterprises active in t (%)
: : : : : :
People employed in SMEs as a share of all persons employed (within the non-financial
business economy) (%)
: 91.7 91.8 91.7 91.5 :
Value added by SMEs (in the non-financial business economy) (EUR million) : 7 175 i 8 709 i 9 723 i 10 829 i :
Total value added (in the non-financial business economy) (EUR million) : 11 228 13 419 14 484 15 718 :
Inflation rate and house prices Note 2013 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
Consumer price index (CPI), change relative to the previous year (%) 1) - 0.1 w 2.0 w 14.0 w 6.1 w 1.7 w 4.0 w
Balance of payments Note 2013 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
Balance of payments: current account total (million euro) - 728.4 - 295.3 - 1 022.5 - 545.5 - 951.2 - 929.6
Balance of payments current account: trade balance (million euro) - 3 629.5 - 3 666.0 - 5 206.6 - 5 245.2 - 5 957.3 - 5 988.9
Balance of payments current account: net services (million euro) 830.2 1 445.6 2 036.7 2 241.2 2 287.0 2 195.8
Balance of payments current account: net balance for primary income (million euro) 182.3 - 255.2 - 306.1 - 123.7 - 54.6 0.2
Balance of payments current account: net balance for secondary income (million euro) 1 888.6 2 180.4 2 453.6 2 582.2 2 773.8 2 863.3
Net balance for primary and secondary income: of which government transfers (million euro) 61.4 47.7 20.9 17.7 23.0 - 2.2
*3 year backward moving average of the current account balance relative to GDP (%) - 7.8 - 2.3 - 2.9 - 2.7 - 3.3 - 2.9
*Five year change in share of world exports of goods and services (%) : 22.6 16.2 14.1 13.0 23.2
Net balance (inward - outward) of foreign direct investment (FDI) (million euro) : 561.3 i 802.6 i 949.8 i 816.1 i :
Foreign direct investment (FDI) abroad (million euro) : 43.7 45.4 105.5 85.2 :
of which FDI of the reporting economy in the EU-27 countries (million euro) : 33.5 20.6 74.0 14.0 :
Foreign direct investment (FDI) in the reporting economy (million euro) : 605.0 848.0 1 055.3 901.3 :
of which FDI of the EU-27 countries in the reporting economy (million euro) : 256.9 433.6 525.5 690.5 :
*Net international investment position, relative to GDP (%) - 56.4 - 28.9 - 25.4 - 20.6 - 20.1 - 20.1
Year on year rate of change in gross inflow of remittances (in national currency) from migrant
workers (%)
: 7.8 i 7.9 i 7.6 i 7.8 i :
Public finance Note 2013 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
General government deficit / surplus, relative to GDP (%) : : : : : :
General government gross debt relative to GDP (%) : : : : : :
Total government revenues, as a percentage of GDP (%) : : : : : :
Total government expenditure, as a percentage of GDP (%) : : : : : :
Financial indicators Note 2013 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
Gross external debt of the whole economy, relative to GDP (%) 2) 72.9 iw 57.5 iw 51.6 iw 47.1 iw 47.3 iw :
Gross external debt of the whole economy, relative to total exports (%) 2) 216.1 w 134.3 w 106.8 w 107.1 w 116.3 w 113.8 w
Money supply: M1 (banknotes, coins, overnight deposits, million euro) 3) 3 423.4 w 9 166.2 w 10 163.8 w 11 051.4 w 12 327.4 w 13 717.5 w
Total credit by monetary financial institutions to residents (consolidated) (million euro) : : : : : :
*Annual change in financial sector liabilities (%) : : : : : :
*Private debt, consolidated, relative to GDP (%) : : : : : :
Interest rates: day-to-day money rate, per annum (%) : : : : : :
Euro exchange rates: average of period (1 euro = … national currency) 1.956 1.956 1.956 1.956 1.956 1.956
Trade-weighted effective exchange rate index, 42 countries (2015 = 100) 100.2 w 107.4 w 109.1 w 111.6 w 113.4 w 115.0 w
*3 year change (T/T-3) in the trade-weighted effective exchange rate index, 42 countries
(2015 = 100)
0.0 iw 0.0 iw 0.0 iw 0.1 iw 0.1 iw 0.1 iw
Value of reserve assets (including gold) (million euro) 362.5 1 377.8 72.8 26.5 555.4 131.0
External trade in goods Note 2013 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
Value of imports: all goods, all partners (million euro) 7 756 11 042 14 641 14 197 14 651 15 315
Value of exports: all goods, all partners (million euro) 4 285 7 298 9 190 8 538 8 219 8 679
Trade balance: all goods, all partners (million euro) - 3 472 - 3 744 - 5 451 - 5 659 - 6 432 - 6 637
Terms of trade (export price index / import price index * 100) (number) 90.4 iw 100.0 iw 96.7 iw 101.0 iw 102.5 iw 105.7 iw
Share of exports to EU-27 countries in value of total exports (%) 73.0 iw 72.8 iw 73.6 iw 73.0 iw 73.1 iw 73.1 iw
Share of imports from EU-27 countries in value of total imports (%) 59.2 iw 58.9 iw 56.9 iw 59.0 iw 59.2 iw 58.1 iw
Demography Note 2013 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
Crude rate of natural change of population (natural growth rate): number of births minus
deaths (per thousand inhabitants)
- 1.3 : - 4.2 p - 2.8 p - 3.2 p - 3.2 p
Infant mortality rate deaths of children under one year of age (per thousand live births) : : : : : :
Life expectancy at birth: male (years) : : : : : :
Life expectancy at birth: female (years) : : : : : :
Labour market Note 2013 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
Economic activity rate for persons aged 20–64: proportion of the population aged 20–64 that
is economically active (%)
: 63.4 b 63.6 64.3 66.6 67.7
Employment rate for persons aged 20–64: proportion of the population aged 20–64 that are
in employment (%)
: 52.6 b 53.9 55.9 58.2 59.5
Male employment rate for persons aged 20–64 (%) : 66.0 b 67.7 69.5 71.9 73.5
Female employment rate for persons aged 20–64 (%) : 39.1 b 40.0 42.1 44.3 45.2
Employment rate for persons aged 55–64: proportion of the population aged 55–64 that are
in employment (%)
: 35.6 b 36.3 38.6 40.9 41.9
Employment by main sectors
Agriculture, forestry and fisheries (%) : 9.4 bi 7.3 i 7.6 i 7.7 i 7.1 i
Industry (%) : 24.4 bi 25.4 i 25.1 i 24.2 i 23.9 i
Construction (%) : 9.1 bi 9.2 i 9.2 i 9.5 i 9.5 i
Services (%) : 57.0 bi 58.2 i 58.0 i 58.6 i 59.5 i
People employed in the public sector as a share of total employment, persons aged 20–64
(%)
4) 5) 20.4 w 19.8 bw 19.0 w 19.0 w 19.0 w 19.5 w
People employed in the private sector as a share of total employment, persons aged 20–64
(%)
4) 5) 79.6 w 80.2 bw 81.0 w 81.0 w 81.0 w 80.5 w
Unemployment rate: proportion of the labour force that is unemployed (%) : 17.4 b 15.4 13.2 12.6 12.2
Male unemployment rate (%) : 14.4 b 12.6 10.9 10.1 9.4
Female unemployment rate (%) : 22.0 b 19.8 16.7 16.6 16.5
Youth unemployment rate: proportion of the labour force aged 15–24 that is unemployed (%) : 38.3 b 35.1 30.1 30.2 32.5
Long-term unemployment rate: proportion of the labour force that has been unemployed for
12 months or more (%)
: 13.4 11.4 9.6 9.0 9.1
Unemployment rate for persons (aged 25–64) having completed at most lower secondary
education (ISCED levels 0-2) (%)
: 24.7 b 25.1 22.9 24.0 21.4
Unemployment rate for persons (aged 25–64) having completed tertiary education (ISCED
levels 5-8) (%)
: 11.3 b 10.7 9.0 7.5 7.1
Social cohesion Note 2013 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
Average nominal monthly wages and salaries (national currency) 827 w 998 w 1 122 w 1 263 w 1 381 w 1 570 w
Index of real wages and salaries (index of nominal wages and salaries divided by the
inflation index) (2016 = 100)
: : : : : :
Gini coefficient : : : : : :
Poverty gap : : : : : :
Standard of living Note 2013 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
Number of passenger cars relative to population size (number per thousand population) 202.0 284.0 p 292.0 p 306.0 p 321.0 p 336.0 p
Infrastructure Note 2013 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
Density of railway network (lines in operation per thousand km²) 20.1 iw 19.9 iw 19.9 iw 19.9 iw 19.9 iw 19.9 iw
Length of motorways (kilometres) 50 218 231 231 242 :
Education, Innovation and Research Note 2013 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
Percentage of persons aged 30-34 with a tertiary education level (ISCED 2011 levels 5 to 8) : 28.8 b 28.6 28.2 26.7 28.0
Percentage of persons aged 30-34 with a tertiary education level (ISCED 2011 levels 5 to 8),
males
: 23.9 b 23.4 23.5 21.3 22.5
Percentage of persons aged 30-34 with a tertiary education level (ISCED 2011 levels 5 to 8),
females
: 34.0 b 34.1 33.1 32.6 33.8
Participation in early childhood education (children aged 3 and over) 6) : 25.0 w 29.6 w 43.6 w 45.0 w 49.2 w
Participation in early childhood education (children aged 3 and over), males 6) : 25.2 w 29.6 w 44.1 w 45.3 w 49.3 w
Participation in early childhood education (children aged 3 and over), females 6) : 24.7 w 29.6 w 43.2 w 44.7 w 49.2 w
Low achieving 15-year-olds in reading (%) : : : : : :
Low achieving 15-year-olds in mathematics (%) : : : : : :
Low achieving 15-year-olds in science (%) : : : : : :
Early leavers from education and training: proportion of persons aged 18-24 with at most
lower secondary education (at most ISCED 2011 level 2) who are not in further education or
training
: 4.7 b 3.6 4.2 3.8 3.0
Early leavers from education and training: proportion of men aged 18-24 with at most lower
secondary education (at most ISCED 2011 level 2) who are not in further education or
training
: 4.9 b 3.9 5.2 5.0 2.9
Early leavers from education and training: proportion of women aged 18-24 with at most
lower secondary education (at most ISCED 2011 level 2) who are not in further education or
training
: 4.4 b 3.3 3.1 2.5 3.0
Proportion of persons aged 25-64 having participated in education and training (last 4
weeks)
: 2.1 b 1.8 1.8 1.6 1.8
Proportion of persons aged 25-64 having participated in education and training (last 4
weeks), men
: 2.0 b 1.6 1.5 1.2 1.5
Proportion of persons aged 25-64 having participated in education and training (last 4
weeks), women
: 2.1 b 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.2
Exposure of vocational education and training (VET) graduates to work-based learning (% of
population aged 20-34)
: : : : : 15.5
Share of individuals having at least basic digital skills (% of population aged 16-74) : 34.7 : 30.1 : 36.3
Share of individuals having at least basic digital skills (% of population aged 16-74), males : 36.3 : 30.8 : 37.4
Share of individuals having at least basic digital skills (% of population aged 16-74), females : 33.2 : 29.3 : 34.9
Public expenditure on education relative to GDP (%) : 4.2 iw 4.1 iw : : :
Gross domestic expenditure on R&D relative to GDP (%) 0.32 0.19 : : : :
Government budget appropriations or outlays on R&D (GBAORD), as a percentage of GDP
(%)
: 0.18 p : : : :
Percentage of households who have internet access at home (%) : 75.5 : 81.6 84.2 88.2
Environment Note 2013 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
Index of greenhouse gas emissions, CO2 equivalent (1990 = 100) 70.6 w 76.3 w 76.3 ew 76.3 ew : :
Energy intensity of the economy (kg of oil equivalent per 1 000 euro GDP at 2015 constant
prices)
: 420.4 399.8 372.7 359.4 :
Electricity generated from renewable sources relative to gross electricity consumption (%) : 46.4 48.5 51.7 52.7 :
Road share of inland freight transport (based on tonne-km) (%) 7) 68.7 w 78.8 w 78.4 w 77.4 w 80.9 w 84.3 w
Energy Note 2013 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
Primary production of all energy products (thousand TOE) : 5 223 5 313 5 278 4 854 :
Primary production of crude oil (thousand TOE) : 0 0 0 0 :
Primary production of solid fuels (thousand TOE) : 3 121 3 348 3 192 2 926 :
Primary production of gas (thousand TOE) : 0 0 0 0 :
Net imports of all energy products (thousand TOE) : 2 002 i 1 921 i 1 726 i 1 923 i :
Gross inland energy consumption (thousand TOE) : 7 374 7 310 6 951 6 919 :
Gross electricity generation (GWh) : 18 536 16 381 17 185 15 932 :
Agriculture Note 2013 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
Agricultural output volume index (at producer prices) (2015 = 100) : : : : : :
Utilised agricultural area (thousand hectares) 1 726.5 e 1 865.8 e 1 110.4 e 1 113.7 e 1 148.5 e :
Livestock numbers: live bovine animals (thousand heads, end of period) 447.0 e 339.5 339.2 330.1 : :
Livestock numbers: live swine (thousand heads, end of period) 530.0 e 569.6 471.6 400.7 447.5 :
Livestock numbers: live sheep and live goats (thousand heads, end of period) 1 089.0 i 1 083.2 i 1 041.6 i : 1 161.1 i :
Raw milk available on farms (thousand tonnes) : : : : : :
Harvested crop production: cereals (including rice) (thousand tonnes) 1 236.7 e 1 425.1 e 1 173.7 b 1 110.0 e 1 219.3 e :
Harvested crop production: sugar beet (thousand tonnes) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 :
Harvested crop production: vegetables (thousand tonnes) 304.2 e 292.7 e 238.2 b 238.0 e 319.9 e :
Source: Eurostat and/or the statistical authorities in Bosnia and Herzegovina
: = not available b = break in time series e = estimated p = provisional i = Eurostat estimate w= data supplied by and under the responsibility of the national statistical authority and published on an "as is" basis and
without any assurance as regards their quality and adherence to EU statistical methodology * = Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure (MIP) indicator
Footnotes:
1) Consumer price inflation.
2) Based on IMF balance of payments manual, sixth edition.
3) M1 money supply comprises cash outside banks and transferable deposit in domestic currency of all domestic sectors
(except central government deposits).
4) The public sector includes NACE Rev. 2 Sections O, P and Q while the private sector includes other NACE Sections.
5) From January 2021, the Agency for Statistics of Bosnia and Herzegovina began to apply the new, redesigned methodology
of the Labour Force Survey.
6) Since 2023, children who attended a preschool programme prior to enrolling in school and who did not regularly attend
preschool are also included.
7) Data not collected on inland waterways. Road share of inland freight transport based on road and rail transport.
1
EN EN
EUROPEAN COMMISSION
Brussels, 4.11.2026 SWD(2026) 692 final
COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT
Kosovo* 2026 Report
Accompanying the document
COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN
PARLIAMENT, THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL
COMMITTEE AND THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS
2026 Communication on EU enlargement policy
{COM(2026) 690 final} - {SWD(2026) 690 final} - {SWD(2026) 691 final} - {SWD(2026) 693 final} - {SWD(2026) 694 final} - {SWD(2026) 695 final} - {SWD(2026) 696 final} - {SWD(2026) 697 final} - {SWD(2026) 698 final} -
{SWD(2026) 699 final} - {SWD(2026) 700 final}
*This designation is without prejudice to positions on status, and is in line with UNSCR 1244/1999 and the ICJ Opinion on the Kosovo declaration of independence.
2
Table of Contents 1. Introduction ........................................................................................................................... 4
1.1. Context ............................................................................................................................ 4
1.2. Main findings of the report ............................................................................................. 4
2. The fundamentals of the accession process ........................................................................ 21
2.1. Functioning of democratic institutions and public administration reform ............... 21
2.1.1. Democracy.......................................................................................................... 21
2.1.2. Public administration reform ................................................................................. 24
2.2. Rule of law and fundamental rights .............................................................................. 27
2.2.1. Chapter 23: Judiciary and fundamental rights ....................................................... 27
2.2.2. Chapter 24: Justice, freedom and security ............................................................ 46
2.3. Economic development and competitiveness .............................................................. 58
2.3.1. The existence of a functioning market economy ................................................... 58
2.3.2. The capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces in the EU ..... 63
Public procurement, statistics, financial control .................................................................. 66
Chapter 5 – Public procurement ...................................................................................... 66
Chapter 18 – Statistics ...................................................................................................... 67
Chapter 32 – Financial control ......................................................................................... 68
3. Good neighbourly relations and regional cooperation ........................................................ 70
4. Normalisation of relations between Kosovo and Serbia...................................................... 71
5. Resilience, security and defence .......................................................................................... 74
6. European standards ............................................................................................................. 75
Cluster 2: Internal market .................................................................................................... 75
Chapter 1 – Free movement of goods ............................................................................. 75
Chapter 2 – Freedom of movement for workers ............................................................. 76
Chapter 3 – Right of establishment and freedom to provide services ............................ 77
Chapter 4 – Free movement of capital ............................................................................ 77
Chapter 6 – Company law ................................................................................................ 78
Chapter 7 – Intellectual property law .............................................................................. 79
Chapter 8 – Competition policy ....................................................................................... 80
Chapter 9 – Financial services .......................................................................................... 81
Chapter 28 – Consumer and health protection ............................................................... 82
Cluster 3: Competitiveness and inclusive growth ................................................................ 83
Chapter 10 – Digital transformation and media .............................................................. 83
Chapter 16 – Taxation ...................................................................................................... 84
3
Chapter 17 – Economic and monetary policy .................................................................. 85
Chapter 19 – Social policy and employment ................................................................... 85
Chapter 20 – Enterprise and industrial policy .................................................................. 88
Chapter 25 – Science and research .................................................................................. 88
Chapter 26 – Education and culture ................................................................................ 89
Chapter 29 – Customs union ............................................................................................ 91
Cluster 4: The Green agenda and sustainable growth ......................................................... 92
Chapter 14 – Transport .................................................................................................... 93
Chapter 15 – Energy ......................................................................................................... 94
Chapter 21 – Trans-European networks .......................................................................... 95
Chapter 27 – Environment and climate change ............................................................... 96
Cluster 5: Resources, agriculture and cohesion ................................................................... 98
Chapter 11 – Agriculture and rural development ............................................................ 98
Chapter 12 – Food safety, veterinary and phytosanitary policy ...................................... 98
Chapter 13 – Fisheries and aquaculture .......................................................................... 99
Chapter 22 – Regional policy and coordination of structural instruments .................... 100
Chapter 30 – External relations ..................................................................................... 101
Chapter 31 – Foreign, security, and defence policy ....................................................... 102
Annex I – Relations between the EU and Kosovo .............................................................. 104
Annex II – Statistical data ................................................................................................... 106
4
1. INTRODUCTION1
1.1. CONTEXT
2026 marks 10 years since the EU-Kosovo Stabilisation and Association Agreement came into force in April 2016. Kosovo formally applied for EU membership in December 2022. The Kosovo authorities have continued to declare EU integration as Kosovo’s strategic choice. That commitment has high and steady support from the population and broad support across the entire political spectrum.
Political fragmentation continued throughout the reporting period, amounting to two sets of early parliamentary elections and the failure to elect a President. While the Assembly was established and functional between early February and April 2026, the government has been in a caretaker status for most of the reporting period. A political agreement has finally been reached on 6 October leading to the election of a new President together with amendments to the Law on the Kosovo Specialist Chambers and Specialist Prosecutor’s Office.
The EU-facilitated Dialogue on normalisation of relations between Kosovo and Serbia continued during the reporting period. Domestic political preoccupations on both sides hindered decisive steps towards implementing the 2023 Ohrid Agreement on the path to normalisation and its implementation annex. Constructive engagement in the normalisation process is also a requirement under the Reform and Growth Facility for the Western Balkans. An EU-facilitated agreement on the Law on foreigners allowing foreign workers and students in the Serbia-supported health and education services to apply for work and residence permits was agreed on 14 March 2026 within the short window between two elections.
After the smooth and orderly transfer of local governance in northern Kosovo following the 2025 local elections, the Commission lifted the measures vis-à-vis Kosovo that had been in place since May 2023. Accordingly, the delivery of financial assistance and the meetings of stabilisation and association bodies resumed.
This year’s report introduces Chapter 31 (on foreign, security and defence policy) in order to report on Kosovo’s convergence and its alignment with the common foreign and security policy under the EU-Kosovo Stabilisation and Association Agreement.
Kosovo continued to engage in and started to deliver on the implementation of the Growth Plan for the Western Balkans.
1.2. MAIN FINDINGS OF THE REPORT
THE FUNDAMENTALS OF THE ACCESSION PROCESS
Democracy
The framework for elections is broadly aligned with international standards.
Kosovo held municipal elections on 12 October 2025 and early parliamentary elections on 28 December 2025 and on 7 June 2026. Voter turnout in the December 2025 elections was moderate at 45%, but declined to 37% in June 2026, suggesting a growing voter fatigue and
1 This report covers the period from 1 September 2025 to 1 September 2026. It is based on input from a variety of sources, including contributions from the government of Kosovo, EU Member States, European Parliament reports and information from various international and non-governmental organisations. It also includes the results of comparative assessments and indices produced by other stakeholders, in particular on the rule of law.
The report uses the following assessment scale to describe the state of play: early stage, some level of preparation, moderately prepared, good level of preparation and well advanced. To describe progress made during the reporting period, it uses the following scale: backsliding, no progress, limited progress, some progress, good progress and very good progress. Where appropriate, interim steps have also been used.
5
a degree of public dissatisfaction with the frequency of electoral cycles. Overall, the elections were peaceful, competitive and well managed.
Attempts to politicise the work of the Central Election Commission were observed, though the Election Complaints and Appeals Panel and the Supreme Court effectively handled complaints. While the electoral campaign was competitive, there were instances of regulatory gaps in pre-campaign activities, misuse of public resources, digital campaigning and campaign finance. The Independent Media Commission struggled with oversight, and electoral disinformation was inadequately addressed.
The Assembly can exercise its powers, albeit with significant shortcomings, including repeated use of fast-track procedures, prolonged paralysis and suspension of activity. While women representation in the Assembly at 34.2% exceeded the quota of 30% set by the law and women held key positions including Assembly Speaker, sustained efforts are needed to broaden participation. Non-majority communities remain well-represented through constitutional guarantees, though their participation is eclipsed by ongoing polarisation among the main ruling and opposition parties. Oversight of the executive was strongly limited due to the political crisis, with weak checks and balances and misused governance mechanisms.
The institutions in charge of the EU integration process have been restructured. A chief negotiator / national coordinator for the Reform and Growth Facility was appointed, and a high-level executive commission was established to coordinate the EU accession process. Stabilisation and Association Agreement bodies continued to meet, and agreements relating to the Reform and Growth Facility were ratified in February 2026. However, progress remains uneven due to instability and political gridlock. Inclusive dialogue with the civil society and non-majority communities remains essential.
As regards governance, the caretaker government operated with limited powers during the Assembly hiatus, briefly resuming full functions only in February 2026 and then again beyond the reporting period in September 2026. Challenges in relations between central institutions and municipalities persist. Coordination remains reactive, with municipalities facing delays and capacity issues. Despite de-escalation and progress brought by peaceful and inclusive local elections and the election of Kosovo Serb mayors in northern municipalities, those municipalities continue to be hampered in exercising municipal powers.
Civil society organisations (CSOs),including human rights defenders, operate in an overall enabling environment, but face politicisation and polarisation, especially during elections. They are consulted inconsistently and late, with limited incorporation of their input. The new ‘Strategy for cooperation with CSOs’ should be approved to ensure funding predictability among other things and address financial sustainability challenges.
Public administration reform
Kosovo has some level of preparation in public administration reform. Some progress was made during the reporting period, including through the launch of centralised recruitments, publishing a first-time annual report on public-service human resource management, the further expansion of digital services, and strengthening administrative justice.
However, there are still considerable gaps in the implementation of the strategic and legal framework. There are extensive delays in the adoption of internal organisations of public administration bodies and the finalisation of job classifications and systematisation, which remain key for modernising Kosovo’s administration.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were partially implemented. In the coming year, Kosovo should, in particular:
→ improve the stability, transparency and professionalisation of the civil service by amending the Law on Public Officials in full alignment with EU recommendations and
6
accelerate the process of rationalisation of independent agencies;
→ speed up the civil service modernisation by (i) finalising the adoption of internal organisations of state administration bodies, and completing the job classification and systematisation of the civil service, and (ii) decreasing the number of acting positions and further implement measures towards gender equality;
→ further improve the public financial management legislative framework to strengthen internal control, budgetary discipline and compliance, incorporate fiscal risk analysis in strategic planning and budgeting, and promote sound public investment management.
Chapter 23: Judiciary and fundamental rights
Kosovo is between an early stage of preparation and having some level of preparation to apply the EU acquis and European standards on the judiciary and fundamental rights and made limited progress.
Functioning of the judiciary
Kosovo is between an early stage of preparation and having some level of preparation and overall made no progress on the functioning of the judiciary. Undue influence from internal and different external elements, such as political and economic interests, not only remains a significant obstacle to independence and impartiality, but in some respects has intensified. The package of draft laws on the justice system has not yet been adopted, which is preventing much-needed reforms in the area. This has negatively affected efforts to strengthen the accountability and efficiency within the judiciary and prosecution. On 6 October 2026, the Assembly adopted amendments to the Law on the Kosovo Specialist Chambers (KSC) and Specialist Prosecutor’s Office. On 22 October the Law was returned back to the Assembly by the President for reconsideration. The amendments as proposed raise serious concerns regarding Kosovo’s international commitments and the compliance with basic rule of law principles, in particular judicial independence, the protection of victims and witnesses, the continuity of procedural rights, and effective accountability for war crimes. The amendments also raise concerns regarding their constitutionality.
The challenges in ensuring that the amendments to the Law on the KPC are effectively implemented indicate limited perception of accountability and commitment to reform, as well as continued influence of vested interests. There are notably concerns regarding retroactively issued warrants and the application of relevant procedures and safeguards. The Venice Commission's recommendations on the Law on KPC will need to be fully reflected in the future amendments.
Nevertheless, some positive developments were achieved on issues such as the selection of the Chief State Prosecutor and changes to the Kosovo Prosecutorial Council (KPC) membership in line with amended legal framework, despite the challenges.
The insufficient representation of Kosovo Serbs in the judiciary remains a serious concern, as it negatively affects the multi-ethnic character of the justice system and undermines the 2015 Dialogue Agreement on justice.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were partially implemented and remain largely valid. In the coming year, Kosovo needs, in particular, to:
→ ensure adoption of legislation deriving from the Joint Statement of Commitment in line with the Venice Commission (VC) recommendations, including a renewed consultation on the revised draft legislation; strengthen the effectiveness of existing mechanisms on integrity, accountability and efficiency within the judiciary and prosecution, with a focus on the implementation and monitoring responsibilities of the KJC and KPC;
7
→ establish a clear responsibility framework for all management functions in the Councils, Courts, and Prosecution Offices, including transparent monitoring and accountability systems and robust corrective measures to address poor performance;
→ strengthen the accountability and efficiency of judges and prosecutors in handling high- level corruption cases, other high-profile cases, and gender-based violence cases, while upholding procedural discipline and case management rules.
Fight against corruption
Kosovo is between an early stage of preparation and having some level of preparation in the fight against corruption and made limited progress. Regarding non-high-level corruption cases, final court decisions and convictions significantly increased. However, there was a decline in the number of final court decisions and convictions in high-level corruption cases. Kosovo still does not have a comprehensive strategic framework for tackling corruption, and there is no coherent approach to strengthening anti-corruption efforts.
The Law on the protection of whistle-blowers is in line with the latest EU legislation in this area. The number of whistleblowing reports received by the Agency for the Prevention of Corruption (APC) rose substantially, almost doubling compared to last year, indicating a higher tendency to report corrupt practices. Moreover, the APC demonstrated a proactive approach and satisfactory follow-up when referring cases to other competent law enforcement authorities for further action. It handled the submission and registration of asset declarations successfully but needs to take further efforts to strengthen the effective control and verification of declarations.
Most public institutions submitted integrity plans on time, but they need to be implemented more effectively. At the same time, Kosovo continued conducting risk assessments in sectors particularly exposed to corruption.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were partially implemented and remain largely valid. In the coming year, Kosovo should:
→ improve prevention and detection of corruption by further enhancing the capacity of the Agency for the Prevention of Corruption in staffing and expertise, and by ensuring public institutions adopt integrity plans and fully implement them, including through adequate reporting mechanisms;
→ ensure enforcement of existing anti-corruption legislation and adopt a national strategy and action plan against corruption for 2026-2028, in line with European best practices and standards;
→ strengthen efforts to improve the quality of investigation in high-level corruption cases; increase the capacity of the Special Investigative Unit of the police and ensure its effective cooperation with the Special Prosecution Office.
Fundamental rights
The legal and institutional framework for promoting, protecting, and enforcing human rights is largely in place, but stronger implementation is needed. Ongoing efforts to align legislation with international human rights standards, including those enshrined in the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, are commendable but require greater momentum. The Assembly also needs to swiftly launch a transparent process for selecting the Ombudsperson and deputies following the establishment of institutions after the 2026 elections.
Recent enforcement operations in northern Kosovo, including the demolition of private properties without adequate due process, point to shortcomings in the effective protection of property rights: irreversible measures are implemented while court challenges remain
8
pending, raising concerns regarding access to effective legal remedies.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were partially implemented and remain largely valid. In the coming year, Kosovo should:
→ promptly appoint the Ombudsperson and Deputy Ombudspersons, as well as the Commissioner of the Information and Privacy Agency, through a transparent, merit- based, and expeditious process, as well as ensure the proper implementation of their respective annual reports;
→ strengthen gender mainstreaming of legislation, regulations, and policies; adopt the programme for gender equality and the national action plan for Women, Peace, and Security; strengthen the role and resources of the National Coordinator on Domestic Violence, Violence against Women, and Gender-Based Violence; establish a multiannual funding scheme for shelters; adopt a strategy on the rights of the LGBTIQ+ persons and an anti-racism strategy;
→ strengthen the protection and effective enjoyment of human rights – particularly the rights of persons belonging to non-majority communities, freedom of thought, conscience and religion, the rights of persons with disabilities, children, and victims of crime – as well as procedural rights. Ensure the effective implementation of existing mechanisms for the protection of these rights, and adopt the Law on status recognition, services and benefits for persons with disabilities.
Freedom of expression and media freedom
Kosovo has some level of preparation and made limited progress. Radio Television of Kosovo (RTK, the public broadcaster) and the Independent Media Commission (IMC) board members were mostly appointed, with four RTK board seats still vacant. New laws on the IMC and RTK remain to be adopted.
The Kosovo Judicial Council prioritised handling of cases involving media and CSOs. While the media landscape remains pluralistic, it continues to face challenges related to transparency in media ownership and financial sustainability. The environment in the Serb- populated areas and especially in the north of Kosovo remains restrictive, fostering self- censorship among the public, media and civil society.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were partially implemented and remain largely valid. In the coming year, Kosovo should:
→ continue improving the capacity of the prosecutorial, judicial and law-enforcement authorities to handle cases related to violence and threats against journalists and other media workers;
→ develop protocols and training on the protection and safety of journalists, including early- warning and rapid-response mechanisms; launch a structured dialogue with media representatives; improve the working conditions of journalists and media workers, and strengthen professional reporting;
→ adopt a new Law on the Independent Media Commission, fully aligned with the EU acquis and European standards; review the Law on the Radio Television of Kosovo to ensure sustainable funding, and provide funding in line with the current law preserving the public broadcaster’s independence.
Chapter 24: Justice, freedom and security
Kosovo has some level of preparation in the field of justice, freedom and security and made some progress in this area, notably through: (i) the adoption of the Law on anti- money laundering and combating the financing of terrorism, (ii) the establishment of the confiscation fund, (iii) the adoption of the Supreme Court guidelines on the adjudication of money laundering cases, (iv) the adoption of the new organisational structure by the Ministry
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of Internal Affairs; (v) the finalisation of the national risk assessment on money laundering and terrorist financing; and (vi) the continued implementation of activities stemming from the Serious and Organised Crime Threat Assessment.
Kosovo signed the updated Joint Action Plan on counterterrorism for the Western Balkans and submitted the national roadmap for its implementation. Kosovo showed proactiveness in preventing violent extremism and radicalisation by closing down informal mosques and requiring them to comply with legal and administrative criteria. The Special Prosecution Office operationalised several Joint Investigation Teams.
In the field of migration, Kosovo achieved some success in reducing the number of unfounded asylum applications, and the authorities continued awareness-raising efforts regarding the rights and obligations attached to visa-free travel in the EU. The revised contingency plan to manage migration flows, the new comprehensive migration strategy 2026-2030 and the new draft Integrated Border Management strategy however remain pending.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were partially implemented. In the coming year, Kosovo should, in particular:
→ increase the number of final convictions for money laundering; set up a national centre for countering terrorism and violent extremism;
→ adopt the amended Law on foreigners;
→ progressively align its visa policy with the EU list of visa-required third countries; adopt and start to implement the migration strategy 2026-2030, the new IBM strategy, and the contingency plan to manage migration flows.
Fight against serious and organised crime
Kosovo has some level of preparation in the fight against organised crime and made some progress in this area, notably through the adoption of (i) the Kosovo Police strategic development plan, (ii) the strategy on integrated intelligence-led policing and community policing, (iii) the Kosovo Police human resources strategy, and (iv) through the development of operational capabilities in seizing and managing crypto assets.
The doubling of police intelligence structures at both central and local levels, combined with the introduction of dedicated neighbourhood/sector officers, resulted in increased analytical capacities, improved mapping of organised crime and enhanced capacity to initiate proactive investigations.
International police cooperation improved significantly, especially the use of Europol's Secure Information Exchange Network Application (SIENA). The high number of requests and responses in civil and criminal matters exchanged with EU Member States demonstrate Kosovo’s commitment to combating transnational organised crime. Moreover, the track record on final convictions of organised crime cases substantially improved.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were partially implemented. In the coming year, Kosovo should, in particular:
→ continue to strengthen the efficiency of the criminal confiscation regime and increase the use of confiscation tools by the prosecution and police;
→ adopt the national strategy against organised crime and its action plan in accordance with EU standards; improve the investigation and prosecution of high-profile organised crime cases, including by advancing investigative technological capacities; conduct financial investigations systematically and in parallel to criminal investigations;
→ adopt a new Law on narcotic drugs, psychotropic substances and precursors aligned with the EU acquis
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ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND COMPETITIVENESS
The existence of a functioning market economy
Kosovo has some level of preparation and made some progress in developing a functioning market economy. Economic activity slowed down due to a weaker growth in household consumption and a less supportive external environment. Despite robust revenue performance, the headline budget deficit slightly rose in 2025, partly due to large pre- election increases in social spending and public wages, which also weigh on the 2026 budget and hamper efforts to reduce inflationary pressures and contain external imbalances. Although public debt remains low, fiscal challenges persist, stemming from a narrow tax base, inefficiencies in public investment management, poorly targeted social benefits, and governance and weak financial performance of publicly owned enterprises (POEs). The labour market is characterised by low participation and still high unemployment rates, particularly among women and vulnerable groups. The banking sector remains sound but further strengthening of supervision remains important amid robust lending growth. Some progress was made in improving the business environment and reducing the large informal economy, but rule-of-law weaknesses continue to hinder private sector development.
The Commission’s recommendations from the previous year were partially implemented. To improve the functioning of the market economy, Kosovo should, in particular:
→ broaden the revenue base by identifying and gradually eliminating tax loopholes and exemptions;
→ improve public spending efficiency by better targeting social benefits and advance the reform of the social assistance scheme, including by completing the pilot phase of testing a new eligibility model and adopting relevant legislation;
→ mitigate fiscal risks by enhancing governance, accountability and financial performance of POEs.
The capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces in the EU
Kosovo is between an early stage of preparation and some level of preparation and made limited progress in terms of its capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces in the EU. The education system is not sufficiently aligned with labour market needs. Limited progress was made in improving transport infrastructure and expanding renewable energy sources. The digital transformation of the economy is progressing steadily. Micro and small enterprises account for a very large share of the economy and struggle to compete on international markets. However, trade openness has increased significantly over the last 6 years.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were partially implemented and remain largely valid. To improve competitiveness and foster sustainable long-term growth, Kosovo should, in particular:
→ accelerate reforms to better align the education system with labour market demands, including by adopting the amended legal framework for vocational education and training (VET) and adult learning;
→ establish simplified and transparent procedures for the development and permitting of renewable energy projects;
→ foster private-sector investment and improve mechanisms to attract foreign direct investment (FDI) in strategic sectors, with a focus on high value-added production, services, and innovation.
Chapter 5 – Public procurement
Kosovo is between having some and a moderate level of preparation and made limited progress in this area. Kosovo continued applying the most economically advanced tender
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criteria and slightly reduced the use of negotiated procedures without prior publication of a contract notice.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were partially implemented and remain largely valid. In the coming year, Kosovo should:
→ adopt a new Law on Public Procurement and a new Law on Public-Private Partnerships/Concessions in line with the EU acquis and Reform Agenda commitments; develop respective implementing legislation and secure its proper enforcement;
→ ensure that the Procurement Review Body (PRB) is fully operational and functionally independent, with a strengthened capacity to ensure its review process is timely, effective and transparent and less dependent on short-term legal expertise;
→ upgrade the electronic procurement platform in line with the planned Law on public procurement and improve its efficiency.
Chapter 18 – Statistics
Kosovo has some level of preparation in the area. Some progress was made, including on Government Financial Statistics, improved data transmission to Eurostat and the appointment of National Statistical Council.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were partially implemented. In the coming year, Kosovo should in particular:
→ conclude interinstitutional Memoranda of Understanding to ensure better access to and use of administrative data sources and strengthen interinstitutional cooperation among holders of such data; enhance its capacity to report government finance statistics in line with ESA 2010, while ensuring ongoing monitoring of compliance;
→ intensify preparations for the next agriculture census by ensuring adequate resources and full coverage of the territory;
→ fill vacant positions in the Kosovo Agency of Statistics to strengthen the capacities with a particular emphasis on information technology.
Chapter 32 – Financial control
Kosovo has some level of preparation and made no progress in the area of financial control.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were not addressed and remain valid. In the coming year, Kosovo should in particular:
→ adopt new legislation on public financial management, strengthening the public internal financial control, on external audit and on protection of the EU financial interests and the euro, and ensure administrative capacity across the public financial management system for its implementation;
→ strengthen the managerial accountability of budget users at both central and local levels, on the grounds of robust evaluation of the performance of the management and control systems;
→ improve the implementation of the National Audit Office’s (NAO) recommendations to ensure effective enforcement and strengthen the parliamentary oversight.
CLUSTER 2: INTERNAL MARKET
Chapter 1 – Free movement of goods
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Kosovo is between having some and a moderate level of preparation in this area and made no progress.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were not implemented and remain valid. In the coming year, Kosovo should, in particular:
→ adopt the Law on inspection and product conformity and the Law on metrology to further align with the EU acquis and fully implement the new Law onmarket surveillance and ensure the enforcement capacities of market surveillance inspectors;
→ sign a European Accreditation Multilateral Agreement, and increase the enforcement capacity of conformity assessment bodies;
→ ensure full alignment with more of the EU “new and global approach”’, “old approach” product acquis and procedural measures.
Chapter 2 – Freedom of movement for workers
Kosovo has some level of preparation in the field of free movement for workers and made no progress.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were not implemented and remain valid. In the coming year, Kosovo should, in particular:
→ make progress on concluding additional bilateral agreements on social security coordination with EU Member States and develop IT infrastructures for the European Health Insurance Card (EHIC) and Electronic Exchange of Social Security Information (EESSI) purposes, as well as administrative capacities in this regard;
→ continue the preparations to join the European Network of Employment Services (EURES);
→ start to work on legislation on the supplementary pension rights of mobile workers.
Chapter 3 – Right of establishment and freedom to provide services
Kosovo is moderately prepared and made limited progress, notably in the area of professional qualifications. Kosovo ratified CEFTA Additional Protocol 6 on trade in services and published its list of regulated professions. However, sectoral laws are yet to be aligned with the EU Services Directive and the point of single contact (PSC) is not fully functional.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were partially implemented. In the coming year, Kosovo should, in particular:
→ accelerate the implementation of the action plan on the harmonisation of sectoral legislation with the EU Services Directive, fully align Law on Services with the EU Services Directive and launch a functional and informative PSC;
→ implement Kosovo legislation aligned with the EU postal acquis and strengthen institutional capacity to monitor and ensure compliance with the new postal marked rules;
→ adopt a Law on the recognition of professional qualifications and align with the Directive on a proportionality test.
Chapter 4 – Free movement of capital
Kosovo is moderately prepared and made good progress with the adoption of a new Law on payment services, aligning with the EU Payment Services Directive 2 and the Electronic Money Directive 2 and with the adoption of a new Law on prevention of money laundering and terrorist financing aimed at aligning with the EU acquis.
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The exchange of information and the framework on the fight against money laundering and terrorism financing have improved.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were implemented to a large extent. In the coming year, Kosovo should, in particular:
→ continue the gradual liberalisation of capital movements, including on foreign exchange operations;
→ following the adoption of the Law on the prevention of money laundering and terrorist financing, ensure the effective implementation of the legislation in this area, including by adopting necessary implementing legislation and standard operating procedures and making the Beneficial Ownership Register operational;
→ continue to strengthen interinstitutional cooperation and step up action in the fight against money laundering and terrorist financing and build a track record on increased monitoring, supervision, financial intelligence, investigation and reporting in the fight against economic and financial crime and further strengthen supervisory capacities.
Chapter 6 – Company law
Kosovo has some level of preparation, with limited progress made in further aligning its legal framework with the EU acquis on company law and on business registration.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were partially implemented and remain largely valid. In the coming year, Kosovo should, in particular:
→ finalise and adopt the draft Law on Business Organisations and continue aligning company law legislation with the EU acquis;
→ further align with the most recent acquis on the use of digital tools and processes in company law and on cross-border conversions, mergers and divisions;
→ further align its legal framework with the EU acquis on company reporting, country-by- country reporting, corporate sustainability reporting and transparency on capital markets, while strengthening the independence, effectiveness and sustainable funding of audit oversight structures, and ensuring the professional independence of auditors and audit firms.
Chapter 7 – Intellectual property law
Kosovo is moderately prepared and made limited progress by further aligning with copyright and related rights.
Although the Commercial Court handled intellectual property rights (IPR) cases efficiently, Kosovo needs stronger institutional capacity and resources to implement and enforce IPR laws effectively.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were partially implemented and remain largely valid. In the coming year, Kosovo should in particular:
→ improve the implementation of the adopted legislation, with a focus on strategic planning and capacity-building;
→ adopt implementing legislation for industrial property laws, including on topographies of semiconductor products and trade secrets, and ensure effective implementation of the Law on copyright and related rights;
→ adopt a comprehensive long-term strategy on industrial property rights.
Chapter 8 – Competition policy
Kosovo has some level of preparation and made no progress in this area.
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Kosovo's enforcement of competition and State aid legislation remained unsatisfactory. The draft Law on State aid was not yet adopted.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were not implemented and remain valid. In the coming year, Kosovo should in particular:
→ establish operationally independent and functional State Aid and Competition authorities, in line with SAA and Reform Agenda obligations;
→ further align the legislative framework in the area of competition and State aid with the EU acquis;
→ ensure sufficient enforcement of competition and State aid legislation and increase coordination among all stakeholders, including ministries, regulators and the judiciary.
Chapter 9 – Financial services
Kosovo is moderately prepared and made some progress with the entry into force of the new Law on banks and further alignment with the EU acquis on capital requirements as well as bank resolution and recovery requirements.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were partially implemented. In the coming year, Kosovo should, in particular:
→ strengthen the capacities of the banking recovery and resolution authority, establish a Resolution Fund, and enhance the supervisory capacity to implement risk-based supervision, including Supervisory Review and Evaluation Process (SREP) requirements;
→ continue efforts to align its legal framework with the EU acquis on securities markets, investment funds, investment services, financial markets infrastructure and digital finance;
→ align its legal framework with the Directive 2014/49/EU on deposit guarantee schemes and the Solvency II Directive (Directive 2009/138/EC); and ensure that relevant legislation is implemented.
Chapter 28 – Consumer and health protection
Kosovo is at an early stage of preparation in this area. There was limited progress, with the strengthening of reporting of communicable diseases.
The implementation of reforms in the health sector has stalled.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were partially implemented and remain largely valid. In the coming year, Kosovo should, in particular:
→ adopt the Law on consumer protection and start aligning with the latest EU product safety acquis;
→ advance health financing and health digitalisation reforms to ensure progress towards universal health coverage and improve the efficiency and quality of health services;
→ ensure rigorous implementation of tobacco control, in line with the relevant EU acquis and international obligations.
CLUSTER 3: COMPETITIVENESS AND INCLUSIVE GROWTH
Chapter 10 – Digital transformation and media
Kosovo has some level of preparation in the area of digital transformation and media, and made no progress. A limited number of available online services, fragmented platforms,
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and cybersecurity risks remain a challenge.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year remain valid. In the coming year, Kosovo should, in particular:
→ align its legislation with the European Electronic Communications Code and the EU NIS2 Directive;
→ ensure that telecommunication and media regulators are given appropriate resources to fulfil their mandates independently, and develop a solution to ensure that the public service broadcaster is sustainably funded;
→ implement number portability to ensure effective use of numbering resources and encourage competition.
Chapter 16 – Taxation
Kosovo has some level of preparation in this area, with limited progress made, notably by implementing risk-based audits, enforcement and digitalisation, as well as improving compliance audits and measures against informal economy.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were partially implemented and remain largely valid. In the coming year, Kosovo should, in particular:
→ initiate a tax policy revision (including gender-responsive tax policy review) and broaden the tax base, including further legal alignment with the EU acquis;
→ prioritise the use of domestic and international third-party data to address international tax avoidance and evasion;
→ strengthen the administrative and professional capacity of the Tax Administration of Kosovo (TAK) by setting out clear rules on jobs, gender-responsive recruitment practices, performance evaluation, merit-based promotion and transfers.
Chapter 17 – Economic and monetary policy
Kosovo is moderately prepared and made limited progress in this area. During the reporting period, the Central Bank of Kosovo (CBK) continued efforts to strengthen its governance. Weaknesses remain in better linking the annual budgetary process with the medium-term policy framework.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were partially implemented and remain largely valid. In the coming year, Kosovo should, in particular:
→ improve the quality of macroeconomic forecasting within the budgetary process;
→ align its budgetary framework with the EU acquis.
Chapter 19 – Social policy and employment
Kosovo has some level of preparation in this area. Limited progress was made, in particular in the implementation of reforms by the Labour Inspectorate and reforms of the social assistance schemes.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were partially addressed and remain largely valid. In the coming period, Kosovo should, in particular:
→ adopt pending legislation, namely amendments to the Law on labour, a new Law on employment and a new Law on health and safety at work to align with the EU acquis, notably in relation to equality and non-discrimination in employment and parental leave;
→ continue the reform of social assistance schemes and increase the funding and quality of service delivery at the municipal level, including by introducing a specific grant for social services in the Law on local finance;
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→ continue the preparations for a full roll-out of the Youth Guarantee Scheme and adopt policies that promote the employment of women.
Chapter 20 – Enterprise and industrial policy
Kosovo is moderately prepared in the area and made limited progress by continuing to implement the 2030 Strategy for Industrial Development and Business Support.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were partially implemented and remain largely valid. In the coming period, Kosovo should, in particular:
→ move forward with the implementation of the Strategy for Industrial Development and Business Support for 2030, and the sustainable economic growth pillar of the National Development Strategy for 2021-2030;
→ improve the capacity of the Ministry of Industry, Entrepreneurship, Trade and Innovation;
→ complete the establishment of the two separate investment promotion and SME support agencies, and ensure that both are sufficiently resourced.
Chapter 25 – Science and research
Kosovo is at an early stage of preparation in the area of science and research and made no progress.While 2025 saw an increase in Kosovo’s budget for scientific research, along with some efforts to participate in Horizon Europe, Kosovo still needs to strengthen its commitment to science and research, especially by adopting strategies and laws.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were partially implemented and remain largely valid. In the coming year, Kosovo should, in particular:
→ finalise and adopt the Smart Specialisation Strategy;
→ adopt the Law on innovation and entrepreneurship and the Innovation Strategy 2030+ to create a system that can provide reliable data on research and innovation, science and technology indicators in Kosovo, with the aim to join the European Innovation Scoreboard;
→ increase participation in Horizon Europe and establish transparent and easily accessible data on public funding for research and innovation in Kosovo.
Chapter 26 – Education and culture
Kosovo has some level of preparation in the field of education and culture. There was limited progress, mainly in early childhood education and care, where enrolment continued to rise, in vocational education and training where dual provisions were expanded, and through the adoption of a curriculum for children aged 0-6.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were partially implemented. In the coming year, Kosovo should, in particular:
→ finalise and adopt the National Education Strategy 2035+, with an emphasis on foundational literacy and numeracy, further expansion of early childhood education and care, and the inclusion of vulnerable groups and minority communities;
→ adopt pending draft laws, in particular the Law on VET and adult education, the Law on textbooks, and revision the Law on Higher Education, including provisions on academic freedom, institutional autonomy and labour market relevance;
→ strengthen quality assurance at all levels of education and evidence based policy- making, including by completing the education management information system, introduce graduate tracking and acting on the findings of the Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA), the Teaching and Learning International Survey (TALIS)
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and the International Computer and Information Literacy Study (ICILS); and improve budget planning and execution, in particular for school infrastructure.
Chapter 29 – Customs union
Kosovo is moderately prepared and made some progress in this area, notably by expanding the use of publicly operated customs terminals, reducing customs terminal fees, increasing revenue collection, fighting customs fraud and strengthening the capacities of Kosovo Customs.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were partially implemented. In the coming year, Kosovo should, in particular:
→ finalise and approve the implementing legislation for the new Customs and Excise Code, in line with the EU requirements; ensure validation of Authorised Economic Operator (AEO) programme by CEFTA;
→ continue to strengthen the administrative and professional capacities of Kosovo Customs by approving the administrative structure and by implementing the Customs and Excise Code rules, particularly related to performance evaluation, combating customs fraud, in particular smuggling of tobacco products by cooperating with the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF); ensure improved simplified procedures;
→ continue the development of the digital customs systems, adopt an IT strategy and action plan and continue the development of the digital customs systems for modern service delivery.
CLUSTER 4: THE GREEN AGENDA AND SUSTAINABLE CONNECTIVITY
Chapter 14 – Transport policy
Kosovo has some level of preparation in the area of transport and made limited progress, notably in aviation safety.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were partially implemented and remain largely valid. In the coming year, Kosovo should, in particular:
→ invest in road maintenance and inspections; continue road safety campaigns; and set up an effective monitoring mechanism for collecting crash data;
→ align its legal framework with the EU rail acquis, particularly the fourth railway package for both the market and technical pillar;
→ ensure sufficient capacity and resources to implement the intelligent transport system (ITS) strategy; and align the legislative framework with the EU passenger rights acquis across all modes of transport.
Chapter 15 – Energy
Kosovo has some level of preparation in the area of energy and made limited progress, notably through investments in energy efficiency upgrades for public and residential buildings.
The recommendations from the previous period were partially implemented and remain largely valid. In the coming period, Kosovo should, in particular:
→ adopt its National Energy and Climate Plan (NECP) and the package of energy laws to ensure alignment with the Electricity Integration Package; and organise the next round of renewables auctions;
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→ advance the environmental upgrade of the Kosovo B thermal power plant and the works for decommissioning the non-working parts of the Kosovo A thermal power plant;
→ improve the implementation of energy efficiency legislation, including on energy performance of buildings, and continue energy efficiency investments.
Chapter 21 – Trans-European Networks
Kosovo has some level of preparation in the area. No progress was made during the reporting period.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were not implemented and remain valid. In the coming year, Kosovo should, in particular:
→ strengthen its institutional and administrative capacity to implement strategic infrastructure projects;
→ continue implementing pending transport and energy connectivity projects;
→ complete the first phase and second phase of Rail Route 10 from Mitrovica - Fushë Kosovë/Kosovo Polje to the border with North Macedonia and proceed with the signalling works.
Chapter 27 – Environment and climate change
Kosovo is at an early stage of preparation in this area and made no progress during the reporting period. The Ministry of Environment and Spatial Planning was decoupled from the Ministry of Infrastructure following the government formation in February 2026; however, the final restructuring of that ministry is still pending.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were not implemented and remain valid. In the coming year, Kosovo should, in particular:
→ take appropriate measures to manage protected areas and prevent them from becoming contaminated, while taking the local communities’ needs into account in their management;
→ amend the Law on waste management;
→ align the Law on climate change with the EU monitoring, reporting, verification and accreditation (MRVA) acquis, and adopt and implement secondary legislation.
CLUSTER 5: RESOURCES, AGRICULTURE AND COHESION
Chapter 11 – Agriculture
Kosovo has some level of preparation and made no progress in agriculture and rural development, including as regards the legal framework.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were not implemented and remain valid. In the coming year, Kosovo should, in particular:
→ strengthen the administrative and technical capacity of the Department of Rural Development Policy (Managing Authority), and initiate the recruitment process for the Agency for Agricultural Development (Paying Agency) following the approval of the Regulation on Internal Organisation in January 2026;
→ amend the Law on advisory services for agriculture and rural development and adopt the implementing legislation on the market organisation for agricultural products;
→ adopt the new Law on agricultural land and take urgent and effective measures to stop the loss of agricultural land.
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Chapter 12 – Food safety, veterinary and phytosanitary policy
Kosovo is moderately prepared in the area of food safety, veterinary and phytosanitary policies. No progress was made during the reporting period.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were not implemented and remain valid. In the coming year, Kosovo should, in particular:
→ strengthen the financial and administrative capacity of the implementing bodies, including by increasing the number and expertise of the staff;
→ adopt legislation on animal welfare and the Law on animal health; approve the 5-year development plan for disease monitoring and control; and ensure appropriate financial and human resources for their implementation;
→ prepare a national plan to upgrade food, feed and animal by-product establishments to meet EU standards.
Chapter 13 – Fisheries and aquaculture
Kosovo remains at an early stage of preparation in this chapter and made limited progress by starting the creation of the inventory of fish species.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were partially implemented and remain largely valid. In the coming year, Kosovo should, in particular:
→ adopt a multiannual strategy for aquaculture and strengthen the administrative capacities of the implementing bodies by increasing the number and expertise of the staff;
→ draft a Law on fisheries and aquaculture and further align its market policy with the EU acquis;
→ finalise the inventory of fish species covering the entire territory of Kosovo.
Chapter 22 – Regional policy and coordination of structural instruments
Kosovo remains at an early stage of preparation in the area of regional policy and coordination of structural instruments. Some progress was made during the reporting period, notably on programming and monitoring of the EU funds.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were partially implemented. In the coming year, Kosovo should, in particular:
→ accelerate the implementation of the regional development strategy to address regional disparities, and regularly report on its implementation in an inclusive and transparent manner;
→ further improve administrative capacity for programming, management, control, monitoring and evaluation of EU funds, notably strengthen the internal control framework and internal audit capacity, and establish functioning anti-fraud coordination services;
→ urgently strengthen public investment management, by adopting: (i) updated single and sector project pipelines, based on sound, transparent and inclusive public investment selection; and (ii) a methodology for effectively and transparently managing government expenditure on public infrastructure.
CLUSTER 6: EXTERNAL RELATIONS
Chapter 30 – External relations
Kosovo has some level of preparation in the area of external relations and has made some progress. Kosovo continued the implementation of the Common Regional Market
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(CRM) Action Plan priorities and ratified the CEFTA additional protocols on trade facilitation, trade in services, and dispute settlement. Twelve decisions were adopted by the CEFTA’s Joint Committee in 2025, under Kosovo’s chairmanship.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were partially implemented. In the coming year, Kosovo should, in particular:
→ continue implementing actions under the Common Regional Market Action Plan 2025- 2028 and implement the CEFTA Additional Protocol (AP) 5 on trade facilitation, AP 6 on trade in services and AP 7 on dispute settlement;
→ approve the Regulation on the establishment of the trade facilitation enquiry point and align with the EU acquis on the screening of foreign direct investment (FDI);
→ start the process of establishing a development and humanitarian aid policy.
Chapter 31 – Foreign, security, and defence policy
Kosovo has some level of preparation in the field of foreign, security and defence policy. In line with the EU-Kosovo Stabilisation and Association Agreement, during the reporting period, Kosovo reached full alignment with the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy, including statements by the High Representative on behalf of the EU and Council decisions on the EU’s restrictive measures. At the same time, the lack of stable institutions and of systematic alignment procedures has hindered swift alignment.
In the coming year, Kosovo should, in particular:
→ continue its full alignment with the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy and establish a systemic alignment process;
→ further align the legislation on small arms and light weapons with EU acquis, namely the Law on weapons and the Law on the civil use of explosives;
→ make credible effort to reduce the space for foreign information manipulation and interference.
***
2. THE FUNDAMENTALS OF THE ACCESSION PROCESS
2.1. FUNCTIONING OF DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS AND PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION REFORM
2.1.1. Democracy
The functioning of democratic institutions was negatively affected by the prolonged absence of a functioning Assembly and delays in government formation. This weakened legislative oversight, constrained checks and balances, and slowed reform implementation.
Elections
Kosovo held municipal elections on 12 October 2025 and early parliamentary elections on 28 December 2025 and on 7 June 2026. All were peaceful, competitive and generally well managed.
Election administration demonstrated adequate capacity to organise voting, including under compressed timelines. Following shortcomings in vote counting and results management that marred the December 2025 elections, the tabulation and administration of results significantly improved during June 2026 elections.
Voter turnout decreased between the two early parliamentary elections from over 45% down to 37%, suggesting a growing voter fatigue and a degree of public dissatisfaction.
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Despite repeated attempts to politicise the Central Election Commission (CEC), including efforts to prevent the certification of Srpska Lista and its results, oversight mechanisms
functioned effectively and the politicisation attempts had eased by the time of the June 2026 elections. The dispute resolution mechanisms acted effectively and promptly to address complaints.
Electoral campaigns were competitive, but significant regulatory gaps persisted in pre- campaign activities, campaign finance and third-party financing,
misuse of public resources, digital campaigning and online political advertising. Combined with weak transparency and oversight of campaign financing, disinformation undermined electoral integrity and created unequal conditions. These shortcomings disproportionately affected smaller parties, non-majority community parties, and women-led initiatives. Outstanding recommendations from the 2025 EU election expert and observation mission reports should be addressed. Kosovo also needs to ensure alignment with all relevant EU acquis in this area, including Regulation (EU) 2024/900 on the transparency and targeting of political advertising, taking into account European and international democratic standards.
Women’s participation showed mixed trends. While the legal quota ensures representation on candidate lists, the number of women candidates declined. In municipal elections, only around 10% of mayoral candidates were women, and only one was elected. Women candidates continued to face structural barriers, including limited access to resources and visibility. Violence against women in politics, including hate speech and discriminatory language, was evident during all three electoral cycles.
Accessibility for persons with disabilities during elections remained limited.
Following the 7 June elections, the CEC appointments were made belatedly and remain incomplete, with the Commission still lacking one of its 11 members due to a political disagreement over its composition.
Parliament
The Assembly exercised its powers in a severely constrained manner. Prolonged institutional paralysis and political gridlock led to a near-complete suspension of parliamentary activity and the Assembly’s dissolution in November 2025. The short-lived newly elected Assembly, constituted on 11 February 2026, remained fragile due to political disputes, procedural ambiguities, extensive use of fast-track procedures, and absence of cooperation.
The Constitutional Court played a significant role in addressing gridlocks, restoring legal certainty and preserving safeguards for the representation of non-majority communities, by issuing several rulings on the Assembly’s constitution and the election of a Deputy Speaker from the Kosovo Serb community. This exposed systemic weaknesses and inadequate compliance with constitutional and procedural requirements.
Women’s representation stood at just above the legal quota of 30% during both legislatures covered in the reporting period: 33.33% (40 of 120 MPs) following December 2025 elections
41
5 4 1
120
19
52
38
32.0%
26.3%
7.7%
2.6%
34.2% 32.1%
25.6%
34.9%
0.0%
5.0%
10.0%
15.0%
20.0%
25.0%
30.0%
35.0%
40.0%
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
Number of MPs Number of ministers Number of party leaders
Mayors
Graph 1 : Kosovo - Women in political life
Women Total % National % EU 27
Source: National- Central Election Commission, Official site of Kosovo Assembly and Government
EU-27- European Institute for gender equality
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and 34.2% (41 of 120 MPs) after June 2026 elections. Women held key leadership positions, including the Speaker of the Assembly and seven out of 16 committee chairs. Sustained efforts are nonetheless needed to further strengthen their political participation.
Non-majority communities remain represented through constitutional guarantees, though their participation was at times eclipsed by ongoing polarisation.
Despite the ruling coalition’s strong majority, it did not engage in strategic cooperation with the opposition, thereby stalling key EU integration reforms and preventing consensus on the election of the President.
Law-making was often unpredictable and insufficiently inclusive, with limited stakeholder consultation, weak integration of civil society input and inconsistent gender mainstreaming.
Parliamentary oversight of the executive was strongly limited, and opposition rights were weakened by polarisation, boycotts, and lack of structured dialogue.
Political discourse in the Assembly remains highly polarised, with instances of discriminatory rhetoric, hate speech and sexist language. The Assembly lacks effective disciplinary tools to address discriminatory rhetoric and hate speech. Fostering an Assembly-wide constructive political dialogue, strengthening adherence to procedural rules, improving legislative quality and consultation process, and enhancing oversight functions are essential to restore the Assembly’s role in democratic governance and EU integration.
The Assembly needs to urgently proceed with the appointment of its Secretary-General as well as appointments to key independent institutions, including the Constitutional Court and Ombudsperson, the Procurement Review Body, the State Aid Commission, and the Competition Authority.
EU integration
The government appointed a chief negotiator/national coordinator for the Reform and Growth Facility (RGF), a step that demonstrates continued political commitment to European integration.
The government also established an Executive Commission to coordinate the EU accession process.
The Assembly ratified the agreements relating to the RGF on 13 February.
Progress on EU-related reforms remained uneven due to prolonged political instability, Assembly inefficiencies, and post-electoral gridlock.
Although the political situation improved after the government formation, the effectiveness of the new EU integration structures is yet to be demonstrated.
Before the elections, the Parliamentary Committee for European Integration struggled to fulfil its role, with procedural delays and limited administrative capacity weakening coordination on EU-related reforms.
Stabilisation and Association Agreement bodies continued meeting during the reporting period, following the lifting of EU measures.
Governance
The government was in caretaker status for most of the reporting period, which constrained governance effectiveness and delayed structural reforms. Full functions were only briefly resumed following the government formation in February 2026 and again beyond the reporting period in September 2026. During the reporting period, numerous newly elected members of the Assembly continued to simultaneously serve in their functions in the executive, which appeared incompatible with the provisions in the Constitution and the Law on government. Transparency of decision-making was formally maintained, but the absence of parliamentary scrutiny reduced the effectiveness of accountability mechanisms.
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Independent regulatory authorities and the Ombudsperson continued to operate, though their overall impact was limited.
Coordination between central and local levels remains largely reactive, affecting the implementation of delegated responsibilities and local development planning.
The election of Kosovo Serb mayors in northern Kosovo in December 2025 was a significant step in restoring representative local government. However, northern municipal leaderships face significant obstacles, including lack of access to full archives and staff recruited by the previous municipal administrations not mastering the language of the majority community in the municipalities and not duly representing the community makeup. The relations between the central level authorities and all Kosovo Serb majority municipalities remain strained, with concerns over language compliance, procedural hurdles and the police and Ministry of Local Government Administration at times limiting the exercise of municipal competencies or activities duly approved by municipal authorities.
Representation of non-majority communities in governance structures remains inadequate both at central and local level. The appointment of two Kosovo Serb deputy ministers in March 2026 - without formal endorsement by a majority of Kosovo Serb MPs as mandated by the Constitution - raised concerns about minority representation and weakened their constitutional rights.
Civil society
Civil society actors operate within a generally enabling legal framework, but there are increasing concerns related to politicisation and polarisation, particularly during electoral periods, when critical voices may be labelled as partisan or oppositional.
While mechanisms to involve civil society in decision-making exist, consultations often fall short of the expected standards. Authorities do not consistently apply the regulatory framework or meaningfully consider input from civil society. The government needs to respect the consultation period, duly consider such input and provide feedback, and publish updated draft proposals and final consultation reports. The government should ensure that online platforms for public consultations function effectively.
The government should, in particular, organise more systematic and meaningful consultation with civil society organisations (CSOs), advocating for non-majority communities’ rights, women’s rights, rights of the child, and the rights of persons with disabilities. Consultations at local level and in rural areas should also be improved. Reports of political figures targeting human rights defenders raise concerns and require appropriate follow-up.
The government needs to approve a new strategy for cooperation with civil society to ensure a transparent, inclusive and sustainable civic space. It should also allocate adequate human and financial resources to the Office for Good Governance/Office of the Prime Minister (OGG/OPM) for its implementation and establish the Council for Government Cooperation with Civil Society.
Financial sustainability remains a key challenge. The regulation on civil society funding is in place, but a structured approach to public funding, including timely reporting, should be developed to ensure predictability. The legislation needs to be amended to enable tax- deductible donations from businesses and individuals to civil society.
Women’s rights organisations are experiencing financial limitations that threaten their sustainability, due to limited public support and shifting donor priorities. Despite these constraints, they continue to play a key role in analysing and monitoring the implementation of laws and policies, raising awareness, holding institutions accountable and providing essential services. Kosovo Serb CSOs remain active, especially in the north, but operate in a challenging environment, marked by limited funding opportunities and political sensitivities. Decreasing funding from external donors has negatively affected CSOs from other non-majority communities as well.
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2.1.2. Public administration reform
Strategic framework for public administration reform (PAR)
The strategic framework for public administration is in place. There is a need to accelerate the implementation of the PAR Strategy 2022-27 and its Action Plan 2025-2027. There should be a stronger steering of the PAR agenda through data-driven discussions, including regular PAR Council meetings at political level. In general, the implementation of the PAR strategy framework remains dependent on donor funding.
Policy development and coordination
The establishment of a new Ministry of Digitalisation and Public Administration in early 2026 could enhance PAR coordination and implementation; however, strengthening implementation capacities remains critical for effective policy development.
The policymaking system needs to be further improved by strengthening the use of regulatory impact analysis to enhance governance effectiveness. Public consultations need to be more systematically conducted and the follow-up consistently ensured. The Strategic Planning Office within the Office of the Prime Minister continued its efforts to further strengthen the planning, monitoring, and reporting, including through the ongoing mid-term assessment of the National Development Strategy 2030.
There has been no progress on gender mainstreaming or on ensuring inclusive and evidence-based policy development. While gender equality officers exist in most ministries and municipalities, their institutional role is hampered by insufficient capacities, lack of specialised training, and limited involvement in the early stages of legislative drafting.
Public financial management
While broadly in place, the public financial management framework needs to be upgraded through a new public financial management strategy and modernised legal framework to improve planning and prioritising the capital investments, budget execution, internal financial control and budget transparency and oversight. The preparation of the public financial management reform strategy 2027-2030 is ongoing but progress on the strategic and legal framework stalled due to the challenging political context in the reporting period.
On budget management, progress in connecting the e-procurement and the financial management information systems and in analysing and quantifying the fiscal risk statements must be further consolidated. Notwithstanding the shortcomings of the 2026 budget adoption process, the credibility of budget should be further improved through stronger links between strategic planning, annual and multiannual budgeting. Kosovo has to strengthen the functioning, oversight and fiscal risk management of state-owned enterprises, including by reflecting this objective in the new public financial management strategy. The integration of a gender perspective throughout the budget cycle to ensure that public resources contribute to gender equality outcomes remains at an early stage. Strengthening budget discipline, financial control and accountability remains a priority.
No progress has been made in public investment management, where urgent reforms are needed to strengthen governance, establish a uniform project appraisal methodology, and develop a single project pipeline. The monitoring of cost and time overruns remains equally important, as does the publication of user-friendly data on capital investment including on projects’ impact. Greater consistency with the public financial management legislation should be ensured by avoiding special legislation that sidelines the established rules and procedures.
At municipal level, following a court ruling, the redirection of capital investment funds to finance recurrent health and education expenditures has affected the pipeline of local infrastructure projects. In an already restrictive fiscal framework, marked by no tax-sharing
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mechanism and high dependence on central transfers, further limiting the spending flexibility of the municipalities erodes municipal operational and fiscal autonomy, and reduces the scope for more efficient public spending and fiscal management.
While Kosovo maintains a certain level of budget transparency, the past year saw no progress. There were delays in publishing the ‘Citizen Budget’, the transparency portal remains non-functional, the public internal financial control report is still not public, and while the publication of budget documents has increased, the lack of open-data formats continues to limit their use for citizens' oversight and analytical purposes. Transparency of public investments also remains an issue of concern, with very limited information available on prioritisation and actual impact. The public consultation process needs to be significantly strengthened to ensure meaningful input from social partners and civil society.
Public service and human-resource management
The public service and human-resource management system needs to be improved. Provisions in the Law on public officials that introduced fixed-term mandates at all managerial levels risk harming the professionalism of the civil service; it does not guarantee a steady career system, as promotion is not possible within the system, while all managerial positions are open to external competition.
Merit-based recruitment and performance assessments are not yet effectively applied. Ministries need to accelerate the roll-out of their institutional plans in order to establish a sound performance management system. The systematisation and classification of positions within the civil service, coupled with the slow adoption of internal organisations, continue to hinder the professionalisation of the administration.
Standard recruitment to the civil service was interrupted until April 2026 when centralised recruitment became operational; however the recruitment system is still not fully functional at all levels, and personnel plans have not been adopted for 2026.
Some progress has been made with the first-time publication of the 2024Human Resources Management annual report, however the 2025 report is delayed. Moreover, data collection should be further improved and made available, especially in areas such as the number of acting appointments at managerial level, the number and procedures for granting temporary and service contracts, as well as the overall number of managerial and non-managerial posts in the public service.
The Human Resources Management Information System (HRMIS) is functional but suffers from delays in data entry; consequently, the accuracy and transparency of the data remain insufficient. The interoperability between the HRMIS and the Treasury’s payroll system has not been established yet.
There is still widespread reliance on acting positions at both senior and medium management level, which circumvents regular recruitment and increases insecurity and politicisation. Furthermore, women and non-majority communities are still under-represented in senior roles, with only 22% of higher management civil service positions based on 2024 government data.
While the remuneration system has been consolidated through the Law on salaries in the public sector, implementation faces persisting challenges in view of the unfinished job classification and systematisation of positions across the administration and the, still unaddressed, Constitutional Court judgment declaring, among others, several articles of the law unconstitutional.
With regard to professional development, the Kosovo Institute for Public Administration has expanded its operational capacity, but needs to further invest in strengthening its governance, internal capacities, as well as its financial resources. A key priority is the digitalisation of its training catalogue through the expansion of e-learning platforms. Kosovo is not yet a member of the Regional School of Public Administration in the Western Balkans.
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Public integrity remains a challenge. Delayed, low-quality institutional integrity plans hinder progress to mitigate corruption risks. Establishing a direct electronic link between the HRMIS and the judicial case management system would further support the processing of corruption cases (see also Chapter 23: Judiciary and fundamental rights).
Accountability of the administration
Despite the existence of a regulatory framework, limited transparency persists regarding government agendas and decision-making processes. Regarding the citizens’ right to access public information, stronger enforcement is still needed to improve the
implementation of the Law on access to public documents.
The Independent Oversight Board on Civil Service has been unable to carry out its mandate and responsibilities efficiently. Staffing shortages, financial constraints, and a considerable backlog of appeals compromise its ability to supervise the legal framework. The board does not have access to the HRMIS, which undermines the quality of its oversight.
While technical work is focussing on six policy sectors, no further progress was made on the rationalisation of independent and executive agencies. The development of a comprehensive rationalisation programme with sector-specific action plans remains essential. Some public institutions were moved in the past outside the remit of the Law on public officials, with sector-specific laws which provide for autonomous rules for recruitment and renumeration, entailing civil service fragmentation.
With the implementation of the Law on administrative disputes, the legal basis and mechanisms for access to administrative justice are in place. In May 2026, a new administrative court was established with responsibility for first instance administrative dispute rulings. This marks an important step towards specialised, more predictable, and more effective administrative justice in Kosovo. It is essential that the court is appropriately resourced to help reduce the persistent long delays in case processing. The framework on the right to seek compensation is still not efficiently applied.
There has been no progress in aligning sector-specific laws with the Law on general administrative procedure, which may entail legal uncertainty and prevent the uniform application of administrative principles across the public sector.
Service delivery to the public and businesses
Some progress was made in service delivery, driven by the implementation of the Digital Agenda and the e-Government Strategy. The expansion of the e-Kosova platform has advanced digital transformation.
Progress has also been made in implementing the agenda on the prevention and reduction of administrative burden. In addition, a service catalogue has been developed, covering a complete inventory of all public services.
Service delivery to socially vulnerable groups, including persons with disabilities, remains inefficient. While digitalisation efforts have advanced, physical and digital accessibility barriers persist.
2.2. RULE OF LAW AND FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS
2.2.1. Chapter 23: Judiciary and fundamental rights
The EU’s founding values include the rule of law and respect for human rights. An effective (independent, high-quality and efficient) judicial system and an effective fight against corruption are of paramount importance, as is the respect for fundamental rights in law and in practice.
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Functioning of the judiciary
Strategic documents
Strategic documents are broadly in place, but implementation and monitoring need to be improved. The overarching framework remains the rule of law strategy 2021-2026 and the updated action plan 2024-2026. However, there was no consistent monitoring of the implementation of the strategy during the reporting period.
The Kosovo Judicial Council has strategic plans in place covering public communication; efficient handling of cases of corruption, abuse of official duty and organised crime; information and communication technology; and access to justice. However, weak implementation, ineffective monitoring and insufficient use of these strategies as policy planning tools remain an issue.
Management bodies
The management bodies and their legal framework are in place, but a lack of transparency and clarity regarding their respective duties and obligations hinders their effectiveness. The exercise of management functions would benefit from more robust oversight and stronger internal accountability mechanisms, enabling timely intervention and remedial action. The Kosovo Judicial Council (KJC), the Kosovo Prosecutorial Council (KPC), the Court Presidents, and Chief Prosecutors use performance evaluation and Case Management Information System (CMIS) data for monitoring and management purposes, but follow-up and corrective measures remain insufficiently systematic. However, delays, unproductive hearings, inconsistent use of the CMIS, weak prioritisation of complex and high-profile cases, and uneven disciplinary practice continue to affect the efficiency and quality of justice.
The implementation of the amendments to the Law on the KPC has encountered significant difficulties, reflecting shortcomings in internal ownership and accountability. Further amendments to the Law on the KPC concerning the composition of the Special Committee responsible for administering the selection process of lay members in line with the Venice Commission recommendations remain necessary in order to ensure a pluralistic selection of lay members. The KPC now has a full complement of members, but concerns remain regarding the effectiveness of its leadership, oversight and decision-making functions. The KJC has generally shown stronger reform orientation and, after several failed attempts, the Chair was finally elected in May 2026. However, the Council has since faced internal divisions and institutional difficulties, impeding its ability to function effectively. Gender balance in managerial positions remains weak, and the limited representation of non- majority communities across the justice system continues to affect access to justice and public trust.
During the reporting period, the Assembly repeatedly struggled to maintain the full composition of the Prosecutorial and Judicial Councils, affecting the required representation of lay members. While this has been resolved for the KPC, the issue remains relevant for the KJC, where one judicial position and one Assembly-elected position remain to be filled. The position of the Chief State Prosecutor was filled in July 2026, following a period of four years during which it had been occupied on an acting basis.
Independence and impartiality
The proposed amendments to the Law on the Kosovo Specialist Chambers (KSC) and Specialist Prosecutor’s Office raise concerns regarding judicial independence and legislative interference in
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Graph 2.1: Kosovo - Requests for protection from undue
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2023 2024 2025 Source: Kosovo Police
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the administration of justice.
The KJC and KPC are both independent from the government and responsible for administration of the justice system. However, the independence and impartiality of the judiciary and prosecution must be improved through consistent enforcement of safeguards preserving their independence against undue influence. The judiciary and prosecution continue to be subject to public criticism, including by legislative and executive powers.
Measures need to be taken to protect judges and prosecutors from internal or external undue influence as well as from threats to their security and professional integrity. Some safeguards are provided regarding recruitment, appointment and transfer of judges or prosecutors without their consent, but additional safeguards are needed, notably by ensuring effective judicial remedies and clear and strict criteria for compulsory transfers. In 2025, five requests for close protection of prosecutors and one request for close protection of judges were filed with the police, representing an increase from previous years, especially for prosecutors.
While the Case Management Information System (CMIS) is operational and monitoring and reporting mechanisms have been strengthened, the manual registration of cases is applied at all court levels as a tool for parallel case registration. Automatic case allocation to judges and prosecutors through CMIS is not applied consistently, leaving scope for discretionary case assignments. Effective and consistent use of the CMIS must be ensured at all levels, following clearly defined management responsibility and proper oversight. Furthermore, the Prosecutorial and Judicial Councils must ensure that there are means to continuously modernise ageing CMIS equipment and ensure upgrades.
The National Centralised Criminal Records System remains an operational online service for criminal record certificates under the KJC, but interoperability should be ensured both with the CMIS and with the integrated database for cases of domestic violence (under the authority of the Ministry of Justice).
Accountability
The Prosecutorial and Judicial Councils continue to pursue disciplinary proceedings against judges and prosecutors. However, concerns remain regarding (i) the extent to which allegations of misconduct are addressed effectively and (ii) the consistency, transparency, and perceived fairness of disciplinary processes and sanctions.
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Graph 2.2: Kosovo - Requests for protection from undue
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Graph 3.1: Kosovo - Disciplinary procedures Judges -
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Accountability shortcomings persist across all levels of the justice system, including within the Prosecutorial and Judicial Councils, the management structures of courts and prosecution offices, and among judges and prosecutors themselves.
Weaknesses in the application and effectiveness of oversight mechanisms continue to be observed. Furthermore, shortcomings remain in the exercise of managerial responsibilities by court presidents and chief prosecutors, particularly with regard to the consistent conduct of performance evaluations and the assessment of individual professional conduct among judges and prosecutors.
The legislative framework for disciplinary proceedings must be amended to ensure accountability at all levels and address the Venice Commission recommendations. While judges and prosecutors declare their assets annually, there are delays in ensuring full control and verification of these assets, due to the limited resources of the Agency for the Prevention of Corruption, which hamper its capacity to carry out timely, systematic and risk-based verification.
Quality of justice
The quality of justice needs to be further improved. Despite an adequate number of judges and prosecutors, there is still a shortage of the professional support staff required by legislation. At the same time, there are persistent systemic weaknesses in the treatment of serious crime and gender-based violence cases, including inefficient prosecution, deficient indictments and judgements, inconsistency in sentencing practices and limited impact in finalised high-profile corruption and organised crime cases, many of which have ended in acquittals or lenient sentences. The lack of consistent application of accessory punishments – such as prohibition on exercising functions in public administration – which are mandatory
in certain types of cases, continues to be an issue. While the legal framework guarantees equal access to justice and legal aid, practical barriers remain for persons with disabilities.
There are some positive developments on the consistency of judgements and quality of reasoning. The Supreme Court continued to take steps towards ensuring a more consistent application of law, including by monitoring
the application of the sentencing guidelines and by publishing selected decisions. Despite this, timely publication of judgements, consistent sentencing practice and consistency in
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Graph 3.2: Kosovo - Disciplinary procedures Prosecutors -
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Initiated Completed Sanctions pronounced n/ a: not available Source: CEPEJ
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Graph 4: Kosovo - Number of justice professionals -
2025
Judges Prosecutors n/ a: not available Source: CEPEJ
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reasoning still need further improvements. Other matters for concern are (i) the quality of indictments (including poor development of prosecutorial evidence, which often falls short of meeting evidentiary thresholds), (ii) poor case preparation, (iii) non-adherence to statutory deadlines, and (iv) insufficient application of Criminal Procedure Code provisions.
The Academy of Justice adopted its annual work and performance plan for 2026 in a timely manner and published the training programme. These key planning documents reflect a structured approach to both initial and continuous training, which should be shielded from any rollback of reforms.
Weak compliance with the Law on languages within the justice system, along with a lack of translations and incomplete multilingual documentation, continue to limit access to justice for non-majority communities. Furthermore, the underrepresentation of these communities throughout the justice system, including in northern Kosovo, the free legal professions, and most notably in the notarial profession, remains a persistent issue that can generate public distrust. The authorities must ensure the selection and recruitment of candidates from non- majority communities, including for notarial positions, and to assign them appropriately to areas where these communities reside.
The justice system in northern Kosovo, with limited Kosovo Serb representation, hampers access to justice and generates public distrust. Efforts to increase the representation of non- majority communities through targeted recruitment have so far produced very limited results.
The situation was further affected by the dismissal of Kosovo Serb prosecutors, judges, and support staff. In July 2026, Kosovo Serb judges, prosecutors and support staff withdrew their resignations from November 2022. However, the KPC and the KJC subsequently accepted their withdrawn resignations, followed by the Acting President's decision decreeing their dismissals. This raises concerns regarding compliance with the applicable legal framework, due process, and overall rule-of-law requirements, and risks further entrenching the underrepresentation of Kosovo Serbs in the justice system. Kosovo authorities need to ensure a viable pathway for the integration of Kosovo Serb judicial and prosecutorial personnel in full respect of Kosovo law and the relevant Dialogue agreements. A subsequent call for recruitment with a quota for Kosovo Serb prosecutors was not successful.
Alternative dispute resolution is legally in place, and mediation awareness and use are increasing.
Efficiency
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Graph 5: Kosovo - Alternative dispute resolution
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The efficiency of the justice system is limited. The practice of unproductive hearings persists, but consecutive hearings are increasingly applied especially in high-level organised crime and corruption cases, reducing delays and thus increasing efficiency. Available 2025 court statistics point to continuing structural inefficiencies, in particular in civil, administrative and commercial matters and at appellate level. While overall clearance rates remained relatively stable, there
was a notable increase in the clearance rate for non-criminal cases at first instance, indicating a positive development. However, disposition times increased for both criminal and non-criminal cases, especially at first instance.
The law entailing the establishment of the Administrative Court entered into force in February 2026. Further efforts are required to complete recruitment, ensure the transfer and training of personnel, and provide the necessary budgetary and administrative support, allowing the Court to become fully operational without further delay.
The Commercial Court continues to face a backlog, and there are concerns on efficiency of processing of cases. A
substantial pending caseload, low judgement-enforcement rates, staffing and case-data constraints continue to affect performance. Commercial dispute resolution remains lengthy in practice. Continued efforts are needed to strengthen timeliness, enforcement, and the overall effectiveness of commercial adjudication.
The accuracy and publication of statistics need to be improved, and data should be used more effectively for management decisions. The use of audio and video recording equipment in courtrooms should be ensured consistently.
Most domestic violence-related cases are handled with priority, in line with the related guidelines of the Kosovo Prosecutorial Council and the Kosovo Judicial Council. However, the overall handling of these cases is inefficient, resulting in weak judgements and lenient sentences. The processing of sexual violence cases is at times prolonged by the time required to collect and examine forensic evidence, while cases involving human trafficking face delays due to the need for cross-border legal cooperation.
Domestic handling of war crime cases
The existing legal framework for handling war crimes is satisfactory, but the limited capacity of the prosecution service continues to hamper its implementation.
The proposed amendments to the Law on the Kosovo Specialist Chambers (KSC) and
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*Civil and commercial cases, administrative cases, non-litigous cases, other cases
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Specialist Prosecutor’s Office risk leaving certain offences outside the KSC’ jurisdiction, thereby creating gaps in accountability and preventing victims from accessing justice. This would undermine Kosovo's international commitments to ensure the effective investigation and prosecution of serious crimes.
The Special Prosecution Office of Kosovo made increased efforts to prosecute war crimes, increasing indictments and pre-trial detentions. Furthermore, the Special Prosecution Office continued to file war crime indictments in absentia, in line with the relevant provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code and international standards set by the Venice Commission.
The adoption of a war crime strategy remains pending. Kosovo has continued to make
progress in investigating and prosecuting sexual violence crimes committed during the war, with an increasing number of reported cases. To date, a total of 2 493 applications for recognition of status as survivors of conflict-related sexual violence have been submitted. Of these, 2 010 persons were granted status, and 370 applications were rejected.
The number of prosecutors assigned to the Special Prosecution Office’s war crimes department has increased. However, concerns persist regarding case backlog and the overall capacity to process cases efficiently. Despite progress in the handling of judicial proceedings, court delays remain problematic. Additionally, there are issues
regarding the courts’ improper handling of evidence and the Special Prosecution Office’s restriction of access to anonymous witness testimonies. The consistent use of pre-trial detention without individualised assessment raises concerns regarding compliance with human rights standards.
The lack of information exchange and of legal assistance between Kosovo and Serbia continue to hamper investigations, prosecution of cases and access to justice. The full use of EU-
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Graph KS: Kosovo Specialist Chambers (KSC) war crime cases
2022 2023 2025
n/a: not applicable Source: Kosovo Specialist Chambers *In 2024 the 26 indictments covered 65 persons.
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Source: Special Prosecution Office of Kosovo
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Graph KS: Kosovo - Processing of war crime cases
Pre-trial investigations Cases with unavailable suspects Trials in absentia Total number of pending cases Percentage of the decrease of pending cases
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facilitated mutual legal assistance arrangements is essential for effective processing of war crime cases.
Fight against corruption
Track record
The track record in prosecution and adjudication deteriorated for high-level cases, with less final court decisions and final convictions compared to last year. Indictments fell substantially to almost one third. Nevertheless, the track record improved for non-high-level cases, as the number of indictments almost doubled, and final court decisions and final convictions significantly increased.
In 2025, there were final court decisions in 8 high- level corruption cases. Problems persist, including
prolonged trial proceedings and inconsistent and lenient sentencing. At the same time, courts need to continue the consistent application of accessory punishments, particularly in high-level corruption cases.
Continuous progress is needed on criminal asset seizure and confiscation. The Asset Recovery Office (ARO), established within the Office of the Chief State Prosecutor, continued to handle requests in 2025, albeit without a budget or permanently assigned staff. The ARO should be given adequate resources and full and direct access to all relevant national databases.
In 2025, the Agency for the Prevention of Corruption (APC) handled several cases under preliminary investigation procedure on suspicion of various corruption-related offences, including 19 criminal reports and 78 other suspected cases submitted to the prosecution. 11 suspected cases were referred directly to the competent courts for minor offences.
A total of 10 344 officials (99% of those legally required to report) submitted regular annual declarations of assets through the
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Graph 7.1: Kosovo - High level corruption cases - Data on number of
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New investigations Indictments Final court decisions
Final convictions Acquittals Plea bargains
Source: National data collected via the organised crime and corruption track record (OCCTR) e-platform
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Graph 7.2: Kosovo - Non-high level corruption cases - Data on
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New investigations Indictments Final court decisions
Final convictions Acquittals Plea bargains
Source: National data collected via the organised crime and corruption track record (OCCTR) e-platform
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electronic platform, whereas 141 officials (1%) did not submit on time, which resulted in fines being imposed for a total amount of EUR 32 426. A total of 17 criminal reports and 61 other suspected cases were referred to prosecution.
In 2025, the APC handled 174 cases of suspected conflicts of interest and 92 cases of external whistleblowing, with 31 referred to the competent authorities for subsequent action. Additionally, the existence of reasonable suspicion of criminal conduct led to the referral of 3 cases to the prosecution service, 4 cases to the competent courts for treatment as minor offences, and 7 cases to the Kosovo Police to determine if investigations had to be conducted. 17 cases were closed as unsubstantiated.
Out of 139 institutions, 127 adopted integrity plans, supporting the identification of corruption risks and measures to prevent corrupt practices in the public sector.
Legal framework
The legal framework on the fight against corruption is in place and is adequate regarding preventive measures and satisfactory regarding law enforcement. However, implementation and oversight remain weak, especially concerning the Law on extended powers on confiscation of assets. The Constitutional Court annulled the previously adopted version of the Law on the State Bureau for verification and confiscation of unjustified assets due to procedural violations, and the law has remained pending. The Kosovo Judicial Council (KJC) has issued a considerable number of regulations to address justice efficiency in the field of anti-corruption, but their implementation is weak and there is still a lack of results in terms of high-level corruption cases.
Although Kosovo is not a party to the main international anti-corruption conventions, its legislation generally aligns with international instruments, the EU acquis, and appropriately criminalises corruption-related offences in its Criminal Code. In practice, the central weakness lies in implementation and sentencing rather than any absence of a legal framework.
Strategic documents
There is no strategic anti-corruption framework in place, and both the national anti-corruption strategy and the action plan remain to be finalised and adopted. This has undermined the establishment of clear objectives, actors, timelines and indicators in the fight against corruption. There has been partial institutional follow-up to last year’s call on the KJC and KPC to prioritise corruption cases, especially through updated strategic planning, monitoring arrangements and ongoing statistical reporting. However, the practical impact is still limited.
Institutional framework
The institutional framework on the fight against corruption is in place, but it is not adequate regarding preventive measures and requires improvement in law enforcement. The APC’s efforts to identify areas vulnerable to corruption and conduct risk mapping should be promoted horizontally across sectors, with focused integration of the findings into the institutions’ internal policies and mitigation of corruption risks. The APC continued to face budgetary, staffing and expertise challenges, which need to be addressed to ensure the fulfilment of its mandate.
As regards law enforcement, specialised anti-corruption institutions are in place, but challenges persist. The Special Investigation Unit of the Kosovo Police remains understaffed, and the lack of rules on its organisation and cooperation with the Special Prosecution Office continue to undermine the effective management of corruption cases, while the efficiency of courts’ special departments dealing with the Special Prosecution Office cases need to be improved.
Fundamental rights
General framework
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The general framework for fundamental rights is established, but considerable enforcement effort is needed. The adoption of the Civil Code is essential to ensure coherence across the legal system, and to improve legal certainty and access to justice for all citizens. The authorities are urged to prioritise its adoption as a key step toward modernising the legal framework and advancing alignment with European standards.
International human rights instruments
Cooperation with international human rights monitoring bodies is satisfactory. Kosovo’s Constitution incorporates the main international human rights instruments and has shown proactive engagement in submitting implementation reports on key human rights instruments. Kosovo’s application for membership in the Council of Europe, submitted in May 2022, remains pending. Furthermore, the incorporation of the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities into the legal framework remains outstanding.
Promotion, protection and enforcement of human rights
The legal and institutional framework for the promotion, protection, and enforcement of human rights is in place and generally adequate. The Office for Good Governance/Off ice of the Prime Minister (OGG/OPM) continues to perform its role in a transparent and inclusive manner, but its human and financial resources remain limited,
with no anticipated increase.
The Ombudsperson Institution (OI) continues to play a central role in the promotion, protection, and enforcement of human rights, and it is vital to safeguard its independence in line with the Paris and Venice Principles. It is accessible to every person and has a mandate to address all violations of their rights. The OI should, however, comply with the Constitution excluding its jurisdiction from the Kosovo Specialist Chambers and the Specialist Prosecutor’s Office.
Cooperation between the OI and the Assembly continues to face shortcomings, with no notable progress in strengthening parliamentary oversight and ensuring timely consideration of its annual reports. The Ombudsperson and Deputy Ombudspersons should be selected swiftly, through a transparent and inclusive process.
While cooperation between executive bodies, particularly between the OGG/OPM and the OI, is overall satisfactory, the implementation of OI recommendations requires significant improvement, including with respect to judicial and prosecutorial authorities.
Human rights mechanisms within both the executive and legislative bodies should continue to strengthen cooperation with the OI and civil society, while institutional capacities in the human rights field need to be further increased.
Prevention of torture and other forms of ill-treatment
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Kosovo provides adequate legal guarantees on the prevention of torture and other forms of ill- treatment, but the follow-up to cases needs to be improved.
Kosovo authorities demonstrate a steadfast commitment to preventing torture and ill- treatment, with the National Preventive Mechanism operating as a specialised body under the auspices of the OI. In 2025, 108 complaints against the police
were received, 26 of which were deemed admissible for investigation. Five ex-officio cases were opened to further investigation.
Execution of criminal sanctions
The legislative system for execution of criminal sanctions (including probation) is adequate. The legislation is generally in line with the EU acquis. A continuous increase in the number of alternative measures and sentences was observed.
The prison system broadly complies with the UN Standard Minimum Rule for the treatment of prisoners. The Law on the execution of criminal sanctions prohibits discrimination on any ground, including disability, and requires all prisoners to be treated humanely and with full respect of dignity. However, further action is needed to safeguard the rights of prisoners, especially women, girls, non-majority community members and persons with mental health issues. Kosovo is encouraged to align with the EU acquis and European standards on the procedural rights of suspects and accused in pre-trial detention and on material detention conditions.
No overcrowding was reported, nevertheless, the OI has recommended that the conditions in some correctional centres be improved. Both the Law on the Kosovo Probation Service and the Law on the Kosovo Correctional Service have been adopted, along with all accompanying bylaws, and are in line with EU legislation.
Protection of personal data
The legal framework for the protection of personal data is broadly aligned with the EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), however, further efforts are needed to align with the EU Law Enforcement Directive. The capacities of the data protection agency are adequate.
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Graph 11.2: Kosovo - Prisons - pre-trial detention
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Police Prisons
Graph 10: Kosovo - Torture / Ill treatments / Excessive use of
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n/ a: not available Source: Kosovo police, Kosvo Correctional Service
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Graph 11.1: Kosovo - Prisons - occupancy rate
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The Information and Privacy Agency has adopted the necessary secondary legislation and expanded its staffing capacity, although the need for additional staffing remains pressing, particularly in light of the continuously increasing challenges in the area of privacy protection. It processes complaints regarding access to public documents and data protection in an independent
and efficient manner. While responsiveness from both public and private institutions has improved, largely due to increased awareness, the Agency should be consulted systematically regarding the drafting of legislation on personal data protection.
Freedom of thought, conscience and religion
While Kosovo provides adequate legal guarantees on freedom of thought, conscience and religion, the 2006 Law on freedom of religion needs to be amended to allow for registering religious communities and granting them legal personality. Moreover, there is a need for a comprehensive legal solution systematising protection mechanisms for the Serbian Orthodox Church, as derived from the Ahtisaari Plan, and reintegrated in the 2023 Ohrid Agreement, in order to avoid selective interpretations based on the available set of laws, including the Law on cultural heritage (2006), Law on freedom of religion (2006) and the Law on Special Protective Zones (2008). Kosovo is invited to make full use of the Implementation and Monitoring Council.
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Freedom of expression and media freedom
Kosovo provides adequate legal guarantees on the freedom of expression, but the enabling environment for media’s free, independent and professional operation needs to be improved.
Intimidation of journalists
During the reporting period, 35 cases of physical and verbal attacks or threats against journalists were registered, a significant decrease compared to the previous year. The attacks included obstruction of their work by security officials, and accusations and harsh language from senior-ranking government officials (including the Prime Minister) directed at journalists and media. Public officials should refrain from rhetoric that targets or discredits journalists, and attacks or intimidation of journalists must be condemned. One cameraman was arrested and briefly detained by the Kosovo Police, whereas at least four persons were detained for threatening journalists. Cases of intimidation also included online harassment and dissemination of personal data. During the same period, no strategic lawsuits against public participation (SLAPP) were recorded.
Legislative environment
Kosovo has still not aligned fully with the EU acquis on freedom of expression and media, particularly the European Media Freedom Act and the EU Anti-SLAPP legal framework, nor with other relevant international and European standards. Moreover, further efforts are needed to establish a comprehensive and coherent regulatory framework for online media, and to ensure its effective implementation. Kosovo should help national authorities fulfil their regulatory function and enable civil society to support implementation of the European Media
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Graph 12: Kosovo - Data protection
2023 2024 2025 Source: Privacy and Information Agency
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Freedom Act and the Digital Services Act. Operational readiness will require institution- building, awareness-raising and stakeholder engagement.
The adoption of the new Law on Radio Television of Kosovo (RTK) and the Law on the protection of journalistic sources remain pending, while the Law on civil defamation still needs to be aligned with case law of the European Court of Human Rights. Following the annulment of the Law on the Independent Media Commission (IMC) by the Constitutional Court, work and consultations on the new draft law must be carried out, in line with European and international standards. It is also important to extend its regulatory scope to online media and further align the framework with the EU Audiovisual Media Services Directive.
Implementation of legislation/institutions
In April 2026, the Assembly appointed six out of eight missing RTK board members and all six missing IMC board members, resulting in both boards being functional. There are four vacant seats in the RTK Board, including one seat reserved for the Kosovo Serb community and one for other non-majority communities. Civil society reported lack of transparency and irregularities in the process and harshly criticised the IMC’s rulings and fines imposed on media when addressing the backlog of cases from 2025 election cycles, also questioning their legality. The IMC Appeals Board has lacked a quorum since November 2023.
The 2026-2028 strategic plan for access to justice adopted by the KJC requires judges at all levels to prioritise SLAPPs and cases involving journalists and civil society, including those related to defamation and safety. Journalists face regular delays or obstructions when requesting access to public documents. Serbian-language media continue to face challenges in accessing information in Serbian due to the failure to properly implement the Law on languages.
Freedom of expression for Kosovo Serbs remained under pressure, with uneven enforcement of rules on incitement to hatred and restrictions on Serbian flags and community symbols in many Kosovo Serb areas.
Public service broadcaster
The functioning of the public broadcaster during the reporting period was marked by a deep financial crisis caused by the institutional deadlock, which was partially alleviated following the constitution of the Assembly in February 2026. However, no progress was made in establishing a long-term, sustainable, and independent financing model for the public service broadcaster. RTK continues to face significant budgetary, property and human resources constraints, with its budget allocation not aligned with the current law or with inflation.
In addition, following the budget allocation for the first half of 2026, RTK was required to pay interest on the EUR 2.7 million government loan that had kept it afloat from July to October 2025. Combined with the request for the enforcement of debts stemming from previous contracts and the court-enforced payment of EUR 0.95 million, RTK’s financial situation remains dire, further exacerbated by internal disputes and leadership instability. In July, the RTK Board appointed a new Director General. However, several key positions – Including those of Deputy Director General, two Directors and Editor-in-Chief – continue to be filled on an acting basis.
Regarding budgetary constraints, 75% of RTK’s total budget continues to be allocated to salaries. The building currently housing RTK is in very poor condition and is not owned by the public broadcaster.
Economic factors
The media sector continues to suffer from a lack of transparency regarding media ownership and financing. The media registry covers only licensed radio and television outlets, while data on media market shares is not publicly available. Combined with limited financial
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sustainability, particularly affecting independent, non-business-affiliated private media, this leaves the sector either dependent on foreign donors or vulnerable to political influence and financial pressure. Independent media, particularly non-majority media, continue to face insufficient funding.
Internet
There continues to be no restriction on the regular and lawful use of the internet and online media, including no restriction that would amount to an unjust interference with the right to information or freedom of expression.
Professional organisations and working conditions
The Press Council, with its 49 members, continues to perform its media self-regulation mandate but faces insufficient financial and human resources. The public broadcaster is the only media outlet with a trade union, while the Association of Journalists of Kosovo continues to represent journalists and media professionals despite limited funding. Working conditions for journalists remain poor, often characterised by low salaries, short-term contracts and an uncertain legal status.
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Freedom of assembly and association
Kosovo provides adequate legal guarantees for freedom of assembly and association, and regulation of assemblies is adequate. Assemblies and demonstrations were regularly held during the reporting period.
The OI received three complaints concerning freedom of peaceful assembly, but found no violations, and received none regarding freedom of association.
Property rights
The legal and institutional framework for enforcing property rights is in place. Despite the persistence of legal challenges in this field, efforts to implement previously issued decisions aimed at ensuring legal certainty have continued.
The implementation of a project for the reconstruction of the cadastre across 115 cadastral zones, initiated in April 2025 by the Kosovo Cadastral Agency, has been ongoing. The Agency for the Comparison and Verification of Property has continued to implement its new mandate for resolving uncontested informal property transaction cases. In January 2026, the legal deadline for the new submission of requests to formalise uncontested property rights was formally closed, with 20 028 claims submitted. Government affirmative measures for the registration of joint property ownership by both spouses in the property rights registry has continued through 2025, releasing spouses from payment of the tariff for joint registration of property. Despite these measures, the ownership of property by women during 2025 only increased to 20.02%, compared to 19.82% in the previous reporting period.
The Law on public property continued to prevent businesses that were operating with public property from signing new contracts or renewing existing ones. It also centralised management of public property, putting in question municipal-level competence to manage municipal property. Conflicting provisions with other applicable sectoral laws that regulate public property need to be reviewed.
Displaced persons from Kosovo holding only Serbian documents continued to face obstacles in securing status and accessing their property. Temporary measures helped some students and workers in Serbia-supported institutions, but permanent solutions are still needed.
In northern Kosovo, a Ministry and publicly-owned companies have issued eviction notices and, in one case, demolished dozens of immovable properties of long-term users, raising concerns over due process and property rights as irreversible measures were implemented
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without adequate procedural safeguards and effective access to legal remedies. The Kosovo Police's assistance to these public companies, in assuming control over and demolishing immovable properties without adequate court or administrative decisions, also raises concerns regarding the scope of the police's jurisdiction. Kosovo needs to ensure full respect for due process, property rights and the right to an effective remedy, including by avoiding irreversible enforcement measures while relevant legal proceedings are pending.
Non-discrimination
The legal and institutional framework on non-discrimination is broadly aligned with the EU acquis, but compliance gaps persist. Implementation and the capacities of the equality body need to be improved. Negative attitudes and rhetoric, particularly targeting members of non- majority communities and women engaged in public life, continue to persist and require a more effective institutional response.
The limited implementation of the Law on protection from discrimination is partly due to unclear institutional responsibilities, limited capacities, as well as the absence of a unified system for recording, monitoring, and reporting discrimination cases. In addition, justice- sector data remain frequently incomplete and are not systematically disaggregated by grounds of discrimination, case classification, or outcome, thus hindering the effective assessment of existing mechanisms.
Anti-racism and hate offences
The legal and institutional framework on anti-racism and hate offences is broadly aligned with the EU acquis but compliance gaps persist. Implementation needs to be improved.
Significant gaps remain in addressing anti-racism and hate offences, due to limited data collection, underreporting, and weak enforcement. The absence of clear legal regulation for social media platforms creates challenges related to freedom of expression, accountability for online content, and the spread of degrading and hate speech. Concerns have also been raised about the use of offensive, denigrating, and discriminatory language during the electoral campaign.
Gender equality
The legal and institutional framework on gender equality and combating gender-based violence is largely in place, but full alignment with EU directives is yet to be achieved and the implementation of laws and policies needs to be improved.Deeply ingrained patriarchal attitudes continue to perpetuate gender stereotypes and hinder progress towards gender equality. Women from non-majority communities or rural areas and women with disabilities continue to suffer multiple and intersecting forms of discrimination.
After a lengthy and inclusive drafting process led by the Agency for Gender Equality, the new programme for gender equality (2026-2036), including the national action plan for Women, Peace and Security, has been finalised and its adoption is expected. Kosovo has no gender equality index, and data disaggregated by sex is lacking across sectors. The implementation of the March 2025 regulation on the new internal organisation of the Agency for Gender Equality is pending due to budget allocations. Challenges persist in appointing Gender Focal Points in different public institutions, both at central and municipal levels, and their roles and reporting lines remain uneven.
Despite some improvements, including the development of a series of gender equality indicators for the implementation of the Reform Agenda, gender mainstreaming in laws and policy documents is still not consistent. The lack of gender analyses, gender
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Graph 13.1: Kosovo - Violence against women (including
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Police reports Final criminal convictions
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responsive policies or measurable gender indicators is to be addressed.
Gender-based violence remains widespread, including cyber violence, which particularly affects women in public life and young women. However, reactions from public officials, institutions and women rights’ organisations continue to play an important role in challenging gender-based discrimination, stereotypes and prejudices.
Domestic violence continues to be the most reported form of gender-based violence, even though Kosovo is making crucial efforts to combat it. According to the Kosovo police, 2509 cases of domestic violence were reported in 2025, slightly fewer than the 2547 cases reported in 2024. Kosovo adopted all the relevant bylaws in accordance with the framework Law on gender-based violence. The Ministry of Justice released a mid-term evaluation of the strategy on gender-based violence, following an inclusive and efficient consultation process. The role of the National Coordinator has been set up in accordance with the provisions of the Istanbul Convention. However, sufficient staff and programming need to be secured to ensure effective implementation of the related functions. While an integrated database of domestic violence cases has been set up, disaggregated by sex, age and ethnic origin, not all forms of gender-based violence are included. Nine institutions provide the relevant data, but these are entered inconsistently.
Despite institutional efforts, the prevention and protection system to combat gender-based violence remains inadequate. While funding for specialist support services for victims has continued increasing, more systematic and multiannual planning should be established to ensure continuity and provide effective and adequate support for victims Rehabilitation programmes for perpetrators are in place.
Women’s rights organisations continued to play a critical role in advancing gender equality. However, their long-term contribution to the legislative process and to the monitoring of policy implementation has been affected by inconsistencies in government consultation processes.
Rights of the child
The legal and institutional framework on the rights of the child, including the Law on child protection, is in place, but implementation remains insufficient. Efforts should be better aligned with the EU acquis and with the European Commission recommendation on integrated child protection systems. Key mechanisms, such as child protection houses, the child helpline, and family support services, require urgent operationalisation, while stronger coordination and results-based planning are needed across governance structures. Finalisation of the strategy for the rights of the child 2026-2030 is pending and is essential to guide priorities and improve implementation.
The best interests of the child are recognised in Kosovo law and are reflected across key policy areas. However, implementation remains uneven. The legal framework prohibits discrimination, yet children in vulnerable groups continue to face barriers in accessing services and effective protection. The child protection system remains weak in institutional coordination and enforcement, with fragmentation and underfunding. Particular attention should be paid to improving mechanisms to strengthening mechanisms to protect child victims of violence and addressing the under-reporting of sexual violence against children.
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Graph 13.2: Kosovo - Violence against women - femicides
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Regarding deinstitutionalisation, progress has been made towards family and community- based approaches, but further efforts are needed to advance the transition from residential care towards quality family- and community-based care, including by addressing shortcomings in the availability of suitable placements, quality, oversight and resources. . More broadly,
The legal framework on child-friendly justice needs to be fully implemented to ensure effective access to justice and that the rights and needs of children are adequately addressed throughout judicial proceedings. Priority should be given to further alignment with EU acquis on procedural safeguards for children who are suspects or accused persons in criminal proceedings and on the rights, support and protection of child victims of crime. The consistent application of diversion and other alternative measures should be strengthened, while fully respecting procedural safeguards and the best interests of the child. Oversight should be strengthened and adequate resources ensured for rehabilitation and reintegration services, including psychosocial support and education. Child-friendly procedures should be systematically applied, including individual assessments, appropriate interviewing techniques and effective access to legal assistance, alongside adequate infrastructure and strengthened preventive measures.
Persons with disabilities
The legal and institutional framework on the rights of persons with disabilities is incomplete, and enforcement is insufficient. Even though discrimination on the grounds of disability is prohibited by law, legislative frameworks need to be strengthened to align with EU acquis and international standards.
The already adopted 2025-2030 strategy on the rights of persons with disabilities, together with the 2025-2027 action plan, require sustained efforts to ensure implementation. Key reforms, such as strengthened anti-discrimination protections, clearer human-rights based recognition of disability status, and the incorporation of the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities into the Constitution, remain pending. No progress has been made on the adoption of the long-delayed draft Law on assessment, recognition of status, benefits, and services for persons with disabilities. Further efforts are needed to ensure accessibility for persons with disabilities and alignment with the EU acquis in this area.
There is a continued lack of progress in policy development for deinstitutionalisation and independent living. Persons with disabilities still face persistent inequality and barriers that limit their full participation in society. Insufficient and unreliable provision of essential services by the competent public authorities is leading to a disproportionate transfer of care responsibilities to families, particularly affecting female family members.
LGBTIQ+ persons
The legal protection of the rights of LGBTIQ+ persons remain insufficient, and LGBTIQ+ persons continue to face discrimination. A strategy and action plan on the rights of LGBTIQ+ persons remain to be adopted since 2024, and no official awareness-raising activities have been conducted.
Kosovo continues to lack a clear administrative procedure for legal gender recognition. Transgender persons therefore face legal uncertainty and may have to pursue lengthy judicial proceedings to change their gender markers in official documents. Same-sex couples continue to lack legal recognition and protection, as the adoption of the Civil Code – which was expected to address this issue – has not progressed.
LGBTIQ+ persons continue to face discrimination in public spaces and workplaces, and in public discourse, including during the election campaign. Online violence persists, while patriarchal and traditional norms contribute to discrimination and rejection within families. Reporting of incidents of violence remained stable, Pride Week and the Pride Parade (June 2026) took place without incidents.
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Public services for LGBTIQ+ persons remain extremely scarce. Civil society organisations remain the sole providers of health, psychosocial and legal services, but shrinking funding is likely to affect sustainability.
Procedural rights of suspects and accused persons and rights of victims of crime
The legal framework on procedural rights requires further improvements to ensure alignment with the EU acquis. The protection of victims’ rights also needs to be improved.
The proposed amendments to the Law on the Kosovo Specialist Chambers (KSC) and Specialist Prosecutor’s Office raise concerns with respect to the rights of victims of crime and the fulfilment of Kosovo’s international obligations. Further concerns relate to the continuity of protection for victims and witnesses, and the effective participation of victims in proceedings.
Systemic issues in practice that affect the effective enjoyment of procedural rights also raise concerns. This concerns, in particular, the length of judicial proceedings, and the excessive use of pre-trial detention as a measure to ensure the presence of the defendant in the procedure. Additionally, courts face trial issues such as availability and quality of interpretation in court proceedings, lack of translation for court judgments and commentaries, high number of postponed court hearings for unjustified reasons, and frequent number of retrials.
Regarding the rights of victims of crime, although redress mechanisms exist, the competent institutions need to increase their capacities, allocate additional resources, and strengthen interinstitutional cooperation so that the representation of crime victims and the compensation for damages caused by crime are as effective as possible. Strengthening and capacity-building are also necessary for free legal aid services.
Protection of minorities
The legal and institutional framework for the protection of persons belonging to non-majority communities is in place and remains broadly in line with European standards, however its implementation requires further strengthening as persons belonging to non-majority communities continue to face discrimination.
The representation of non-majority communities in government and central level institutions remains inadequate. Even though four Kosovo Serb mayors returned to four Serb-majority municipalities in northern Kosovo after the October 2025 elections, Kosovo Serbs remain underrepresented in most institutions in northern Kosovo since the mass resignations in 2022.
In March 2026, the government launched a call for the Language Commissioner (vacant since January 2025) and the Director of the Office for Communities Affairs (vacant since February 2021). In April 2026, the government established the Office for the Language Control and Harmonisation, which remains to become fully operational. The mandate of the Commission for the Verification of Diplomas issued by the Serbian-curriculum University of North Mitrovica was extended three times for three-month periods, until 22 September 2026. The government also made progress towards the verification of Serbian-curriculum high school degrees.
Following a two-year suspension of students’ enrolment, the University of Pristina’s Balkan Studies programme was re-accredited, offering a three-year course to train translators and interpreters in both official languages, addressing a continuing shortage in Kosovo.
The earlier uncoordinated closure of Serbia-supported institutions, without fully effective replacements, continued to leave service gaps for the Kosovo Serb community.
Cultural rights
Relations between the Serbian Orthodox Church (SOC) and Kosovo institutions remain difficult due to the institutions' inconsistent interpretation of the legal protection mechanisms.
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This led to infringements of the Law on Special Protective Zones (SPZ). Kosovo’s prolonged political instability has negatively affected the functioning of the Implementation and Monitoring Council.
The construction of an illegal pathway in the SPZ of the 13th century Heritage of St. Peter in Korishë/Koriša village in Prizren municipality remained halted, but the damage still needs to be addressed.
The EU-facilitated solution to the suspended construction of a parish house within the Gračanica Monastery SPZ demonstrated good cooperation among all relevant stakeholders – the SOC, the Ministry of Culture and the municipality. Moreover, the visit of the Patriarch of the SOC to Kosovo for the Orthodox Easter in April 2026 went unhindered and several inter- faith initiatives took place. The Patriarch of the SOC also visited Kosovo on 5 July together with the religious adviser to the US president, without any incidents. Nonetheless, the government’s continued use of an incomplete name while referring to the SOC and recent developments affecting SOC sites are perceived as denying its identity and questioning its religious and cultural heritage.
Following the expiry of the mandate of the members of the Council for Cultural Heritage in Prizren and of the Council of Velika Hoča/Hoçë e Madhe village, the municipalities of Prizren and Rahovec/Orahovac initiated procedures to elect new members. The Prizren municipal assembly elected the new Council on 30 July 2026, while the election of the Council of Velika Hoča/Hoçë e Madhe is pending.
A renovated Jewish Cultural Centre was opened in Prizren.
Roma2, Ashkali and Egyptians
The legal and institutional framework is in place, but discrimination persists.
The implementation of the strategy for the advancement of the rights of Roma and Ashkali communities 2022-2026 marked limited progress and highlighted the need for stronger coordination between central and local institutions. No more local action plans were adopted, but progress was observed in implementing the existing ones. In 2025, 16 municipalities submitted implementation reports to the OGG/OPM, compared to only seven municipalities during the previous reporting period. Kosovo Roma requested the recognition of Romani as an official language in the municipality of Obiliq/Obilić. No progress has materialised on the request, which remains unaddressed.
Despite the overall positive trend observed during the reporting period, school dropout rates remain a concern, with Roma, Ashkali and Egyptian communities still disproportionately affected. 34 learning centres were operational, managed by 12 NGOs supported by the Ministry of Education and municipal education directorates. Nonetheless, between 2022 and 2025, the number of the centres decreased by 10. The Administrative Instruction regulating learning centres is under revision. While early marriages remain a concern, the OGG/OPM has drafted the 2025 report on the prevention and reporting of early marriages and the framework for the action plan on the prevention and reporting of early marriages 2026-2027.
The implementation of the 2024 national action plan for children in street situations remains limited. Targeted support for Roma, Ashkali and Egyptian communities should be further strengthened, particularly for women and young people with disabilities. Access to basic services remains constrained by socio-economic factors and insufficient targeted measures. Housing conditions remain inadequate for many while employment rates are low, reflecting structural barriers and limited economic opportunities. Women from Roma, Ashkali and Egyptian communities face multiple forms of discrimination, including higher rates of school dropout and non-attendance, early marriage, and exclusion from the labour market.
2 In line with the terminology of the European institutions the umbrella term ‘Roma’ is under here to refer to a
number of different groups, without denying the specificities of these groups.
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Citizenship rights
The new Law on citizenship was adopted in May 2026. The reform introduced substantial changes to the procedures for acquisition and reacquisition of citizenship. It reduced documentation and processing times and made access more inclusive. Additionally, it simplified procedures for persons who had to renounce Kosovo citizenship in their country of residence, notably those residing in EU Member States applying a single-citizenship policy. To improve accessibility, citizenship applications are also set to be made available online through the “e-Kosova” platform.
In the context of the 14 March agreement implementation, Kosovo Serbs were able to register their civil status facts (birth, death, marriage) by using ID cards issued by Serbia- supported structures for a period of three months. The registration process was hindered by insufficient guidance and weak inter-municipal coordination.
2.2.2. Chapter 24: Justice, freedom and security
The EU has common rules for border and migration management, visa policy, and asylum. Schengen cooperation entails the lifting of border controls inside the EU. There is also cooperation in the fight against serious and organised crime and terrorism, and judicial, police and customs cooperation, all with the support of the EU Justice and Home Affairs agencies.
Fight against serious and organised crime
The legal framework on serious and organised crime is partially aligned with the EU acquis. The capacity to fight against serious and organised crime needs to be improved.
General framework
Legal alignment, strategic and institutional frameworks
In October 2026, the Assembly adopted the Law on anti-money laundering and combating the financing of terrorism, aiming to align with the EU acquis. The new national strategy against organised crime 2026-2030 and its action plan remain to be adopted. Following the Constitutional Court verdict of January 2026, the government revised the draft Law on the State Bureau for verification and confiscation of unjustified assets, whose adoption by the Assembly is pending.
The Kosovo Police continued implementing the activities deriving from the 2025 Serious and Organised Crime Threat Assessment (SOCTA).
The Kosovo Police adopted several strategic documents, including a new five-year strategic development plan, the integrated intelligence-led policing and community policing strategy and the human resources strategy. The Kosovo Police updated the standard operating procedure on local public safety committees, strengthening cooperation in community safety issues. In June 2026, the Ministry of Internal Affairs adopted a new organisational structure to improve efficiency, strengthen policymaking, and clearly separate policy from service delivery.
The legal framework on freezing and confiscation is comprehensive; however, challenges persist in its effective implementation across the entire chain of justice institutions. In June 2026, the government established the confiscation fund authorising the Ministry of Finance to open a dedicated confiscation fund account. The confiscation fund will strengthen effectiveness and sustainability of the criminal confiscation regime, ensuring that seized assets are efficiently administered and reinvested in law enforcement and crime prevention efforts.
Kosovo should align with the EU acquis on criminalisation of violation of EU sanctions. It must also adopt a data protection law for law-enforcement, aligned with the EU’s Law Enforcement Directive.
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In 2025, two new generations of police cadets graduated from the Kosovo Academy for Public Safety: 742 police cadets altogether, including 90 Kosovo Serbs. Through multiple rounds of recruitment, the Kosovo Police managed to reduce the average age of its force to 42.7 years.
Efforts to recruit Kosovo Serbs and other non-majority representatives into the police should continue to ensure appropriate community representation across all ranks, particularly in northern Kosovo. The representation of Kosovo Serbs in the Kosovo Police, particularly at senior and command levels in the north, remains insufficient. While Kosovo has continued recruiting new officers from non-majority communities, the current framework does not provide a pathway for the return of experienced Kosovo Serb police officers who resigned in 2022. At the same time, newly recruited Kosovo Serb officers do not yet have the required seniority and experience to fill key command positions. Kosovo needs to appoint the Regional Commander North and the four station commanders in the northern municipalities, in coordination with mayors and in full compliance with the relevant legislation and Dialogue agreements. Equally, the police needs to continue dedicating efforts to recruit women to ensure proper gender representation.
The Kosovo Police launched its e-learning platform on the police intranet, providing access to structured online and self-paced training for the first time. Offering language courses in the two official languages for police officers should be intensified, especially in the Kosovo Serb-majority areas.
Implementation and enforcement capacity
The Kosovo Police has good operational and investigative capacity to fight organised crime but preserving its operational independence remains essential. The number of intelligence structures within the police has doubled, enhancing analytical capacities at both central and regional levels. Nevertheless, the prosecution service and the police need to work more closely to jointly identify, map, and dismantle organised criminal groups and networks.
The Kosovo Police has introduced dedicated neighbourhood officers with electronic files, including in the north of Kosovo, enhancing community involvement in security matters. However, trust in the police in the north remains low, requiring increased community policing efforts to further strengthen and improve inter- community relations.
The Kosovo Police has demonstrated an improved capacity to initiate proactive
96 94
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2023 2024 2025
Graph 14.1: Kosovo - Organised crime cases - Data on number of individuals/legal entities involved
New investigations Indictments Final court decisions
Final convictions Acquittals Plea bargains
Source: National data collected via the organised crime and corruption track record (OCCTR) e-platform
n/a: not available
328
133 156
1148
214 168
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616578
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64 70 107 n/a n/a
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Graph 14.2: Kosovo - Serious crime* cases - Data on number of individuals/legal e ities involved**
New investigations Indictments Final court decisions
Final convictions Acquittals Plea bargains
Source: National data collected via the organised crime and corruption (OCCTR) e-platformn/a: not available
* Serious crime cases stems from the aggregated data of cases of money laundering, cybercrime, production and
trafficking of drugs, firearms related offenses, terrorism, trafficking in human beings, smuggling of persons.
Corruption cases are showcased in Chapter 23.
** Individuals being investigated, prosecuted or convicted for several offences are counted only once.
47
investigations. A Task Force to tackle loan sharking continued its operations, combating a serious criminal activity prevalent across Kosovo. Adding to last year’s results, several groups were dismantled and significant material assets seized, including cash, weapons, and ammunition. The justice sector should further strengthen its effectiveness in prioritising the adjudication of these cases. The track record for both organised and serious crime significantly improved compared to last year, as the number of final court decisions and final convictions increased. Nevertheless, there were fewer new investigations and indictments for organised crime, and while new investigations slightly rose for serious crime, the number of indictments fell.
The Financial Investigations Sector within the Kosovo Police has the operational and technical capacities to conduct financial investigations, although they are still not systematically applied to criminal investigations. Considerable limitations remain in access to modern technological tools, which hamper the ability to conduct effective investigations of organised criminal groups.
On asset confiscation, despite Kosovo’s legislation being aligned with international standards, results remain limited. In 2025, the amount of assets seized reached approximately EUR 64 million, while the amount of confiscated assets was roughly EUR 566 000. The authorities need to further strengthen the practical use of available confiscation tools. Additional efforts are needed to strengthen the cooperation between the police and the prosecution.
During 2025, the Police Inspectorate of Kosovo investigated 232 police officers, which resulted in the arrest of 47 police officers, the suspension of 129 and criminal charges for 110. The Inspectorate's investigations were assessed as high quality, although the case management system should be improved.
Law enforcement cooperation
International police cooperation improved significantly between 2022 and 2025, with operational communications growing by 25% annually. Kosovo has bilateral police cooperation agreements with seven Member States and exchanges data with 12 more via SIENA. Regarding the European Multidisciplinary Platform Against Criminal Threats (EMPACT), in 2025 Kosovo Police took part in 12 operational action plans and 72 operational actions and in the new EMPACT cycle 2026-2027 has taken the role of co-leader in two operational actions under operational action plans on Cyber and Migrant Smuggling and participates in 11 operational action plans and 83 operational actions.
Cooperation also continued through the EU Agency for Law Enforcement Training (CEPOL) and INTERPOL via the UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK). However, the lack of INTERPOL membership undermines Kosovo’s ability to fully engage in international crime prevention, posing challenges in global policing collaboration.
To establish a sustainable professional development, Kosovo is encouraged to adopt the sectoral competencies and integrate knowledge acquired through CEPOL capacity-building actions to its law enforcement training system.
Judicial cooperation in criminal matters
Judicial cooperation in criminal matters is broadly satisfactory, and the legal framework is partially aligned with the EU acquis, to the extent that alignment is possible. Cooperation
between Kosovo and Eurojust remains good. Between September 2025 and March 2026, Kosovo was involved in six new cases at Eurojust, most related to organised crime, fraud and money laundering.
131
301 319295
121 177
426 422
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2023 2024 2025
Graph 15: Kosovo - Requests for mutual assistance in
criminal matters
Incoming requests Outgoing requests Total Source: Ministry of Justice
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Kosovo participated in two joint investigation teams (JITs), including one new. In 2025, the EPPO did not send any mutual legal assistance (MLA) requests to Kosovo, neither did it have any active cases with links to Kosovo at the end of 2025.
The high number of requests and responses in criminal matters exchanged with EU Member States continue to demonstrate Kosovo’s commitment to combating transnational organised crime.
The number of executed extraditions during the reporting period remained high. New bilateral treaties on extradition, MLA in criminal matters, and transfers of sentenced persons have been initiated with the United Kingdom and with the Netherlands, along with a separate initiative on an extradition agreement with the United States. The agreement on MLA in criminal matters with Belgium was also finalised. Most MLA requests submitted to Serbia remain unaddressed, including the ones related to the attacks on Ibër-Lepenc/Ibar-Lepenac and Banjska/Banjskë. Kosovo’s lack of membership in relevant international organisations continues to pose a challenge, as MLA and cross-border cooperation continue to be based on bilateral treaties between Kosovo and respective EU Member States.
Since the Regulation on the establishment and functioning of JITs was adopted in 2025, the Special Prosecution Office has operationalised one JIT at the domestic level and seven under international cooperation frameworks. The use of JITs, particularly at the domestic level, should be further strengthened to effectively combat complex financial crimes.
In 2025, Kosovo received 117 responses from EU Member States in criminal matters. It also provided 205 responses.
Crime areas
Investigation and criminalisation of money laundering
In October 2025, the Supreme Court issued guidance on the adjudication of money laundering cases, with a particular focus on stand-alone money laundering offences. The Joint Money Laundering Intelligence Network of Kosovo, adopted in October 2024, needs to be operationalised.
The anti-money laundering and countering the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT) framework is advancing technically by increased compliance with the Financial Action Task Force and EU standards, but it needs improvement at the operational level. The Financial Intelligence Unit tracks high cash movements, although stand-alone prosecutions for money laundering are very limited.
The number of final convictions for money laundering remains limited, and further efforts are needed to increase investigations, despite a legal framework that recognises money laundering as a stand-alone criminal offence. In 2025, the prosecution initiated investigations against 12 suspects and issued 12 indictments for money laundering. The courts issued one final ruling in money laundering cases. In September 2025, the Kosovo Police conducted an operation resulting in the arrest of 31 individuals suspected of money laundering and drug trafficking. (For anti-money laundering and countering the financing of terrorism, see also Chapter 4 – Free movement of capital.)
To strengthen the oversight and transparency of the crypto-assets sector, all service operators are required to comply with the criteria and obtain a licence as of 1 March 2026. The Central Bank issues licenses regarding crypto-assets, and the Kosovo authorities have developed operational capabilities, including the establishment of a crypto-wallet, to seize or manage virtual assets. Nevertheless, these mechanisms need strengthening and sub-legal acts should be adopted.
Cybercrime
The legal framework to counter and investigate cybercrime is largely aligned with the EU acquis. Capacities to tackle cybercrime, particularly in the areas of digital forensics and
49
electronic evidence, were improved through specialised trainings, but further efforts are required to ensure an effective response to the evolving criminal landscape. Challenges persist in investigating the darknet. However, Kosovo showed an increase in its international cooperation on cybercrime, including with Europol, leading to some results.
Child sexual abuse
Regarding sexual exploitation and abuse of children, the police initiated 14 cases, arrested 13 suspects and submitted 13 criminal reports against 15 individuals. The police adopted a standard operating procedure on the prevention and handling of child abuse. The legal framework should be amended to fully align with the EU acquis.
Trafficking in human beings
On trafficking in human beings, improved interinstitutional coordination was observed, but legislative revision, including alignment with the EU Anti- Trafficking Directive, as amended, and stronger enforcement, particularly in sentencing, remain necessary. In 2025, 13 victims of trafficking were identified, all female, including 11 minors. All these were exploited for sexual purposes, underscoring the need for stronger prevention and awareness efforts, especially in schools. Moreover, mechanisms for reintegrating victims need to be strengthened.
Migrant smuggling
During 2025, Kosovo Police initiated 13 cases on migrant smuggling, compared to 11 in 2024. This resulted in 14 arrests and identification of 57 smuggled migrants. Due to changes in migration routes, new cases of migrant smuggling through Kosovo remained low. Kosovo also participates in the EMPACT operational actions against migrant smuggling, including as action co-leader. Kosovo renewed its engagement in the Global Alliance to Counter Migrant Smuggling at the Global Alliance’s second conference at the end of 2025. Kosovo has endorsed the Global Alliance Joint Declaration and also participated in the second Senior Officials’ Meeting of the Global Alliance in July 2026.
Trafficking in firearms
Kosovo has a high level of alignment with the rules of the UN Firearms Protocol, and the Firearms Focal Point is well-equipped both operationally and in terms of digitalisation. Kosovo continues to successfully implement the roadmap for a sustainable solution to the illegal possession, misuse and trafficking of small arms and light weapons. However, on firearms control, Kosovo still needs to adopt a new Law on weapons and a new Law on the civil use of explosives. Specific focus should also be given to harmonising the national legislation with the EU rules on marking and on alarm and signal weapons.
Kosovo remains active in tracing weapons through international police cooperation. In 2025, the Kosovo Police initiated eight cases on firearm trafficking and arrested 42 suspects. In 2025, Kosovo Police confiscated 1 931 weapons (compared to 1 746 in 2024), and 39 116 rounds of ammunition in 2025, (compared to 33 250 in 2024).
Cooperation in the field of drugs
The legislation on drugs is partially aligned with the EU acquis, and the current Law on narcotic drugs, psychotropic substances and precursors needs to be revised. The capacity
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2023 2024 2025
Graph 16: Kosovo - Victims of trafficking
in human beings*
Children Adults Female
Source: National data collected via the organised crime and corruption track record (OCCTR) e-platformn/a= not available
* Total of victims and potential victims identified by the Office for
Victims Assistance and Advocacy.
50
to fight drug crimes needs to be improved. In 2025, the Special Prosecution Office issued instructions on standard operating procedures for narcotics seizures. Good progress in the implementation of the national drug strategy and its action plan was observed. The Early Warning System needs to be properly operationalised. The National Drug Observatory has prepared an updated report on Kosovo. However, a drug treatment register has not yet been set up pending the establishment of a functional health information system.
Throughout 2025, the Kosovo Police recorded a sustained increase in drug seizures across most substance categories, except for seizures of cannabis plants, amphetamine/methamphetamine , and heroin, which decreased. The number of investigated narcotics trafficking cases also rose. In 2025, the Kosovo Police conducted four large-scale destruction operations, disposing of nearly 1.5 tonnes of narcotics and eliminating significant quantities of seized substances. Increased intelligence capacities continued to improve the results
in drug trafficking investigations.
While international and regional cooperation in drug enforcement remains strong and has shown further progress, Kosovo’s exclusion from key international law enforcement bodies continues to pose a significant obstacle to effective operational and international police cooperation against drug trafficking. Furthermore, domestic inter-agency coordination still requires improvement to increase effectiveness in combating drug-related crime.
Counterfeiting of the euro (criminal law aspects)
The relevant legislation on suppression of counterfeit currency remains partially aligned with the EU acquis. The Criminal Code needs to be further aligned. Kosovo has competent authorities and procedures in place to address counterfeit money, but the structural setup requires further institutional efforts. In 2025, the forensic agency identified 1 745 cases of counterfeited euro notes and 34 007 cases of counterfeited euro coins. Relevant authorities investigated 58 suspects of currency counterfeiting and filed 29 criminal charges.
Counterterrorism, prevention and resilience
Fight against terrorism and prevention of radicalisation
Legal alignment, strategic and institutional frameworks
The legal framework for the fight against terrorism and countering violent extremism is
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Graph 17.1: Kosovo - Cases related to production and trafficking
of drugs- Data on number of individuals/legal entities involved
New investigations Indictments Final court decisions Final convictions Acquittals Plea bargains
Source: National data collected via the organised crime and corruption track record (OCCTR) e-platformn/a: not available
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2023 2024 2025
Graph 17.2: Kosovo - Drugs - volumes seized and
destroyed in kg
Source: National data collected via the organised crime and corruption track record (OCCTR) e-platform n/a: not available
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largely aligned with the EU acquis. However, full compliance with the EU acquis on explosives precursors should still be ensured.
Kosovo adopted the amendments to the Law on anti-money laundering and countering the
financing of terrorism, aiming to align with the EU acquis. Good progress was observed in implementing the national strategy against terrorism and violent extremism 2023-2028. However, the action plan expired in 2025 and should be updated.
Kosovo signed the updated Joint Action Plan on Preventing and Countering of Terrorism and Violent Extremism for the Western Balkans and submitted the national roadmap for its implementation. The Minister of Internal Affairs continues as a National Coordinator for Countering Terrorism. There was no progress in setting up a national centre for countering terrorism and countering and preventing violent extremism and radicalisation. The security institutions conducted bi-annual joint threat assessments.
Implementation and enforcement capacity
The fight against terrorism is broadly satisfactory. The countering of violent extremism needs to be improved. The threat level of terrorism is assessed as moderate. There has been increased concern over the rise of ethno-nationalism. While religiously motivated extremism has not ceased to exist, the authorities have addressed the threats. As part of counter- radicalisation efforts, Kosovo authorities administratively closed 27 informal mosques associated with conservative or radical preaching and required them to register as NGOs, to comply with legal and administrative criteria.
Advanced training for judges, prosecutors and local level frontliners on countering terrorism and the prevention of violent extremism and radicalisation continued. There were 8 persons indicted in terrorism-related offences and 3 convicted.
The indictments for the 2024 Ibër-Lepenc/Ibar-Lepenac canal attack were filed and the trial began in December 2025. The Basic Court delivered its judgement on 24 April 2026 against three defendants for the 2023 attack in Banjska/Banjskë. Two were sentenced to life and the third to 30 years imprisonment. The judgement may be appealed.
13 inmates are serving prison sentences for terrorism-related crimes and 5 are in pre-trial detention. The Correctional and Probation Service continued its work on disengagement and rehabilitation. Kosovo continued to take a leading role in the rehabilitation and reintegration of returnees from foreign conflicts. No repatriations took place in the reporting period. 32 men, 8 women and 37 children still remained in the former conflict area in Syria and Iraq.
The local multidisciplinary referral mechanism is functioning in five municipalities. Hateful rhetoric and disinformation related to inter-ethnic tensions, emanating from foreign actors, continued to increase and were exacerbated by the use of AI.
Kosovo should develop a systematic institutional approach to foreign information manipulation, including clearer coordination, stronger media transparency safeguards, and support for local fact-checking and resilience initiatives to address the challenge. Moreover, Kosovo is encouraged to apply the methodology developed with the support of the Counter Terrorism Support Network (CTSN) to prepare a domestic terrorism trend and situation report.
Critical infrastructure protection
Legal alignment, strategic and institutional frameworks
The legal framework for critical infrastructure protection is partially aligned with the EU acquis. To fully align, Kosovo should amend the Law on critical infrastructure protection. Kosovo should also formally adopt the list of critical entities and assign the sectoral coordinators.
Interinstitutional coordination has improved due to the recruitment of a dedicated team at the
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Ministry of Internal Affairs. The newly created Ministry of Public Administration and Digitalisation is responsible for cybersecurity, requiring closer coordination among all stakeholders. The Ministry of Internal Affairs prepared internal standard operating procedures and working documents in critical infrastructure protection. The security plans of several critical entities are relatively extensive but require further alignment with the updated law once approved.
Implementation and enforcement capacity
The protection of critical infrastructure needs to be improved. Capacity-building efforts of the newly recruited staff on critical infrastructure protection continued. There have been no attacks on critical infrastructure after the Ibër-Lepenc/Ibar-Lepenac canal attack in 2024. The Cybersecurity Agency should be made fully operational by appointing an executive director and recruiting the necessary staff.
Migration and asylum
Legal and irregular migration and returns
The legal framework for management of legal and irregular migration is partially aligned with the EU acquis.
The management of legal and irregular migration is broadly satisfactory.
Legal alignment, strategic and institutional frameworks
Relevant strategic and legal documents are being implemented effectively. The amended Law on foreigners remains to be adopted. The current migration strategy expired in 2025; Kosovo reviewed implementation of the previous strategy and prepared a new migration strategy 2026-2030, which is pending adoption. Kosovo has established its contingency plan, awaiting formal government approval. The institutional framework remains in place and is overall functional, with the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MIA) retaining overall responsibility. Coordination through the Government Authority on Migration and its thematic working groups continued.
Kosovo continued its efforts to modernise migration management systems, including through the development of the Biometric Information System, preparations for a Migration Management Information System, and broader border management upgrades. As there is no readmission agreement with the EU, cooperation on readmission with Kosovo continues bilaterally. The 25 readmission agreementswith EU Member States and Schengen- associated countries continue to be implemented satisfactorily.
Implementation and enforcement capacity
In 2025, migration pressures increased, although overall flows remained manageable. Kosovo Police identified 1 033 migrants who entered Kosovo irregularly during 2025, compared to 690 in 2024. A total of 816 migrants were accommodated in the temporary reception centre for migrants in Vranidoll/Vranidol, a broadly stable number compared to 2024. 181 people applied for international protection and were accommodated at the Asylum Centre in Magurë/Magura. Most migrants transit through mountain passes,
208 177 47
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Graph 18: Kosovo - Number of irregular movements
Source: Government input/Kosovo Police
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entering from Albania and North Macedonia.
A total of 880 people were readmitted to Kosovo. While 32 migrants returned voluntarily to their countries of origin, 32 migrants were returned through assisted voluntary return and reintegration programmes supported by the International Organization for Migration. Return procedures continue to face operational constraints, including challenges in consular cooperation.
Kosovo made some progress in implementing the Law on foreigners. In early 2026, the MIA conducted information campaigns and coordination meetings to support the implementation of the law, including ahead of the enforcement of new foreigner registration requirements. In March 2026, MIA launched an electronic platform for registration of foreigners’ addresses.
Asylum
Legal alignment, strategic and institutional frameworks
While the legal framework on asylum is largely aligned with the EU acquis as it was in force until 12 June 2026, Kosovo should focus on developing its national legal framework and operational capacities on migration and asylum to align with the Pact. The management of asylum is broadly satisfactory.
The new Law on foreigners, which contains provisions relevant to aligning asylum procedures and reception, is still pending adoption. The institutional framework remains in place, with responsibility vested in the MIA. Kosovo continued cooperation with the European Union Asylum Agency, including in the context of contingency planning and capacity-building.
Implementation and enforcement capacity
In 2025, 181 asylum applications were registered. A total of 53 people were granted international protection, and 31 subsidiary protection statuses were renewed. Reception capacity remained adequate for the current scale of arrivals. Kosovo remains primarily a transit country, with most migrants not seeking international protection. Authorities continued to provide support for recognised beneficiaries of protection, including housing and basic integration measures, such as language courses and vocational training.
The system continues to face structural challenges, including limited administrative capacity and understaffing in key functions, insufficient use of country-of-origin information, limited availability of free legal aid and weaknesses in interpretation and referral mechanisms. Procedural gaps persist
11%
38.2%
2%
48.8%
26%
52.9%
15%
51.4%
23%
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Kosovo EU 27 average
Kosovo EU 27 average
Kosovo EU 27 average
Kosovo EU 27 average
Kosovo EU 27 average
2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
Graph 19.2: Kosovo - Asylum recognition rate (%)
n/a: not available
Source: DCAM/ Ministry of Internal Affairs
EU-27 average: ESTAT
*EU averages reflect positive decisions at first instance for refugee status,
humanitarian status and subsidiary protection status
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20 5
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2023 2024 2025
Graph 19.1: Kosovo - Asylum Applications
n/a: not available Source: DCAM/ Ministry of Internal Affairs
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in the early identification of vulnerable people and in the consistency of registration and case management systems. Access to services for applicants for international protection and beneficiaries of protection remains limited, including in healthcare, psychosocial support and integration measures.
Visa policy
Kosovo’s visa policy is not fully aligned with that of the EU, in particular the list of countries whose nationals require a visa to enter the EU. While the government terminated the visa- free regime for nationals of the Republic of Fiji, Kosovo maintains visa-free regimes for 16 countries listed by the EU as visa-required (Bahrain, Belize, Eswatini, Guyana, Jordan, Kuwait, Lesotho, Malawi, Maldives, Oman, Papua New Guinea, Qatar, São Tomé and Príncipe, Saudi Arabia, Türkiye, Vanuatu). The recommendations of the 2025 EU Visa Suspension Mechanism Report were implemented, nevertheless, Kosovo should continue to progressively align its visa policy with that of the EU.
In 2025, asylum applications by Kosovo nationals in EU Member States decreased by 47% compared with 2024 (3 505 applications in 2025; 6 620 in 2024), although cases of irregular stay slightly increased. Kosovo continued its awareness-raising efforts and cooperation with EU Member States to monitor and curb the number of unfounded asylum applications submitted by its citizens in the EU.
Kosovo should maintain and adapt the ongoing communication campaign to inform citizens of their rights and obligations under the visa-free regime with the EU. Furthermore, it should strengthen safeguards against identity and travel document fraud, improve detection of forgeries, ensure cooperation with EU Member States on Schengen Information System alerts, and continue working with INTERPOL while fully implementing its new identity legislation.
Schengen governance and external borders
The legislative and strategic framework for the management of external borders is largely aligned with the EU acquis, andthe management of borders is broadly satisfactory.
Legal alignment, strategic and institutional frameworks
Kosovo needs to adopt the amended Law on border security and surveillance and the updated Integrated Border Management (IBM) strategy to fully align with EU acquis and the European IBM concept. Kosovo has a working arrangement with the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex), with 12 Standing Corps Officers deployed, and has expressed interest in further upgrading this cooperation. The National Centre for Border Management has advanced and is functioning well but needs to integrate the National Coordination Centre functionalities in accordance with the European Border and Coast Guard Regulation. Kosovo has not yet taken any concrete steps to establish a national Schengen governance framework, including by adopting a Schengen action plan or appointing a national Schengen coordinator.
Implementation and enforcement capacity
The Border Police expanded its structure to establish a fourth region in the south. Cooperation with Frontex continued, with its officers deployed in three border crossing points. Regional cooperation and joint patrols continued with neighbouring Albania, North Macedonia and Montenegro. Kosovo is an active participant in the trilateral Police Cooperation Centre based in Montenegro.
Inter-agency cooperation to fight cross-border crime is good. During 2025, the Kosovo Border Police participated in two joint international operations. Some equipment to handle document security advancement was procured, but border infrastructure and equipment remain underdeveloped in several border crossings.
The Interim Common Crossing Points (CCPs) between Kosovo and Serbia continued to be
55
operational. Two permanent CCPs hosted by Kosovo (Merdarë/Merdare and Mutivodë/Mutivode) are operational, while Serbia has not reciprocated. Preparatory work towards the establishment of the third permanent CCP hosted by Kosovo at Tabavije/Bërnjak–Tabalije/Brnjak advanced. The two completed CCPs, Kapi/Kapija Vrapče and Rajetići/Izvor, remain non-operational despite being fully constructed and staffed, as no agreement has been reached to allow traffic. Measures to combat corruption include the use of closed-circuit television (CCTV) monitoring at border crossing points, issuing circulars, and training and rotating the staff.
Judicial cooperation in civil and commercial matters
Judicial cooperation in civil matters is broadly satisfactory, and the legal framework is partially aligned with the EU acquis. The capacities to handle cases are sufficient and no delays in processing incoming cases were observed. There was a high number of requests and responses in civil matters exchanged with Member States, demonstrating Kosovo’s commitment to international cooperation and rule of law. Limited progress was made in the use of the EU-facilitated MLA arrangements between Serbia and Kosovo. Cooperation remains insufficient, with only a very limited number of cases processed by Serbia.
In 2025, Kosovo received 249 responses from EU Member States in civil matters. It also provided 308 responses.
338 377 365
228 265 282
566 642 647
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2023 2024 2025
Graph 20: Kosovo - Requests for mutual assistance in civil
matters
Incoming requests Outgoing requests Total Source: Ministry of Justice
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2.3. ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND COMPETITIVENESS3
2.3.1. The existence of a functioning market economy
Economic governance
Overall, Kosovo remained committed to prudent macroeconomic policies, but the 2026 budget implies a significant fiscal expansion. The headline fiscal balance slightly deteriorated in 2025, as a surge in capital and social spending4 outpaced strong revenue growth. The budget for 2026 foresees a fiscal expansion risking higher inflationary pressures and external imbalances. Previous initiatives taken by the government to improve public investment management resulted in stronger execution rates. Authorities adhered to the fiscal rules, such as the public-sector wage bill, but have not lent support to the establishment of an independent fiscal council. Kosovo has adopted an ambitious Reform Agenda to accelerate economic convergence with the EU, comprising reform commitments in economic governance, public financial management, business environment, and the green and digital transition. Following the delayed ratification of the necessary agreements in February 2026, caused by the political impasse, Kosovo should move forward with implementing these reforms to fully benefit from the Reform and Growth Facility.
The policy guidance set out in the conclusions of the Economic and Financial Dialogue with Regional Partners of 13 May 2025 has been partially implemented.
3 Unless otherwise indicated, the data in this section are taken from the relevant national sources (the statistical office, Ministry of Finance and central bank). 4 Social transfers surged by 20% year-on-year, reflecting government measures in the run-up to
9 February and 28 December 2025 parliamentary elections, including higher maternity and child benefits and non-contributory pensions. Ahead of the 7 June 2026 snap parliamentary elections, on 22 May, the caretaker government approved one-off support of EUR 100 for pensioners, children benefiting from the child allowance scheme, active and regular students enrolled in the 2025-2026 academic year at higher education institutions, as well as private-sector employees with monthly salaries below EUR 1 000.
2023 2024 2025
Kosovo - Key economic figures
GDP per capita (% of EU-27 in PPS) 23 26 28
Real GDP growth 3.8 4.1 4.6 3.6
Activity rate of the population aged 15-64 (%), total 40.1 40.7 43.3 49.2**
female 20.7 24.2 25.9 31.5**
male 59.4 57.8 60.6 66.9**
Unemployment rate of the population aged 15-64 (%), total 24.2 10.9 10.8 10.9**
female 29.7 18.2 18.0 13.6**
male 22.2 7.7 7.7 9.6**
Employment of the population aged 15-64 (annual growth %) 3.5 5.4 -2.6 13.9**
Nominal wages (annual growth %) 3.6 9.4 12.1 11.6
Consumer price index (annual growth %) 3.4 4.9 1.6 3.9
Exchange rate against EUR* 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
Current account balance (% of GDP) -7.3 -7.2 -8.4 -8.2
Net foreign direct investment, FDI (% of GDP) 4.0 6.7 5.5 6.6
General government balance (% of GDP) -2.7 -0.2 -0.3 -0.8
General government debt (% of GDP) 19.2 17.5 16.8 16.4
* The euro is used as a de facto domestic currency
** The average of the first 3 quarters of 2025
Sources: Kosovo Agency of Statistics, Central Bank of Kosovo, Ministry of Finance, World Bank and IMF
2017-22
average
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Despite the increase in capital spending, there was no material change in the spending structure. Financial oversight of publicly-owned enterprises (POEs) has improved, but corporate governance still needs to be strengthened. Tax revenue grew strongly, partly due to some formalisation gains and improved tax compliance while, for the first time data on residential property prices have been published. For 2026-2028, Kosovo’s Economic Reform Programme (ERP) aims to maintain stable public finances and comply with fiscal rules, while supporting economic growth through higher capital spending.
Macroeconomic stability
Economic growth slowed in 2025 but strengthened in 2026. Real GDP growth eased to 3.6% in 2025 from 4.6% in 2024, and slightly below the average growth rate of 3.8% in 2017-2022. The weakening of economic activity was mainly due to a stronger negative contribution of net exports to growth, and a weaker expansion of private consumption, which suffered from a resurgence in inflationary pressures. Nonetheless, private consumption, supported by strong bank lending and rising wages, remained the main growth driver along with gross fixed capital
formation due to higher public capital spending. Further positive contribution came from a notable acceleration in public consumption growth, reflecting higher public-sector wages and expenditure related to parliamentary and municipal elections. Economic activity picked up in the first quarter of 2026, with real GDP growth accelerating to 5.4% year-on-year, from 3.9% in the preceding quarter. Kosovo’s per capita GDP remains the lowest in the Western Balkan region, standing at 28% of the EU average in 2024, but higher than the average of 23% in 2017-2022.
Kosovo’s external deficit remained high but was mainly financed by inflows of foreign direct investment. The current account deficit, as a share of GDP, fell slightly to 8.2% of GDP, down from 8.4% of GDP in 2024. The key driver was a 4.2 percentage points (pps) increase in the services trade surplus, to 21.5% of GDP. This more than offset the 3 pps rise in the merchandise trade deficit (to 50.6% of GDP) and the decreases in the primary and secondary income surpluses by 0.4 pps and 0.7 pps to 2% and 18.8% of GDP, respectively. Workers’ remittances, which usually offset a large part of the trade deficit, slightly fell to 12.8% of GDP. Further unofficial services exports and remittances were reflected in large errors and omissions (2% of GDP) in the balance of payments. In the year to the first quarter of 2026, the current account deficit improved further, decreasing to 7.3% of GDP. In 2025, the current account deficit was mainly financed by net inflows of foreign direct investment (FDI), which increased by 1.1 pps to 6.6% of GDP. The bulk of inflows continued to be concentrated in real estate and financial and insurance services. By the end of 2025, official reserve assets, expressed in months of imports of goods and services, had fallen slightly to 1.8.
Inflationary pressures have been increasing markedly. Annual consumer price inflation
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2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
Graph 21: Kosovo - Real GDP growth and
contributions
Priv. cons. Gov. cons.
GFCF Stocks
Source: WiiW, Kosovo Agency of Statistics
% y-o-y
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Graph 22: Kosovo - Current account selected
components and FDI
Workers' remittances balance
Goods and services trade balance
Current account balance (rhs)
Net FDI (rhs)
% of GDP
Source: IMF, Central Bank of Kosovo
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averaged 3.9% in 2025, well above the 1.6% rate recorded in 2024, while it picked up to an average of 6.4% in the first half of 2026 and further to 7.3% in August. The key drivers of inflation were accelerated prices of energy and services. Core inflation stood at an annual average of 2.5% in 2025, somewhat lower than a year before, but increased markedly in the course of 2026, reaching 7.3% year-on-year in August.
Strong increases in capital and social spending outweighed robust tax revenue growth, resulting in a slight deterioration in the headline fiscal balance in 2025. The headline budget deficit rose to 0.6% of GDP in 2025 (from 0.3% in 2024), which corresponds to a surplus of 0.1% of GDP under the fiscal rule’s definition5. Public revenues increased by an annual 8.3%, partly due to improved tax compliance and some formalisation gains. However, this was outpaced by budget expenditure growth of nearly 10%. Public capital spending rose
strongly by 11.3% year-on-year, but it only reached around 77% of the budget allocation, reflecting overoptimistic targets and remaining weaknesses in implementation capacity. Current expenditure also grew robustly, by 9.4% year-on-year, slightly surpassing the planned increase of 9.1%, mainly on the back of increased spending on transfers and subsidies (10.6%), goods and services (8.8%), and wages (8%). Social transfers – predominantly untargeted – surged by 20%, reflecting government measures in the run-up to the elections in February and December. Government deposits remained unchanged as a share of GDP at 3.8%, which is below the level recommended by the IMF.
A low primary deficit and high nominal GDP growth supported a decrease in the public debt ratio to 16.5% of GDP at end-2025. This is the second-lowest level since 2017, down from16.8% one year earlier. It declined further to 16.1%6 of GDP at end-June 2026. Domestic debt is held by a narrow investor base: at the end of March 2026, the share of domestic debt held by the Kosovo pension fund (KPST) stood at 43%, while the Central Bank of Kosovo and commercial banks held a further 23% and 25%, respectively. Foreign debt is low compared to peers and mostly owed to international donors, such as the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the European Investment Bank. Newly ratified loan agreements, including those concluded with the EU under the Reform and Growth Facility, the World Bank for a Development Policy Loan, and Agence Française de Développement (AFD) and Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau (KfW), will provide external budget financing, subject to the fulfilment of the relevant conditions. In July 2026, Fitch Ratings reaffirmed its ‘BB-’ sovereign credit rating for Kosovo with a stable outlook, which Kosovo had obtained for the first time in April 2024 and which holds out the prospect of Kosovo accessing international financial markets in the future.
5 The fiscal rule places a cap on the fiscal deficit of 2% of forecast GDP, excluding capital projects financed by
privatisation proceeds and donors (‘investment clause’). This exemption for donor-financed investment was valid only until 2025, provided the public debt ratio remained below 30% of GDP. A further rule stipulates that the increase in the public wage bill cannot exceed the nominal GDP growth rate of the latest calendar year available at the time the consolidated budget is being prepared. Government deposits used as fiscal buffers are legally required to stay at 4.5% of GDP as long as the government uses privatisation proceeds. The debt rule requires that public and publicly guaranteed debt cannot exceed 40% of GDP.
6 However, these figures do not include the liability of EUR 120 million arising from COVID-19-related tax-free withdrawals of 10% of pension savings from the Kosovo Pension Saving Trust. While this liability is being amortized through the budget, it is not currently reflected in official debt statistics (IMF, Article IV consultation, April 2026).
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Graph 23: Kosovo - Fiscal developments
Primary balance (lhs) Interest (lhs)
GG balance (lhs) Public debt (rhs)
Source: Ministry of Finance
% of GDP
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The 2026 budget provides a significant fiscal stimulus, which risks increasing inflationary pressures and widening external deficit. The headline deficit is expected to increase markedly by around two percentage points to 2.7% of GDP, mainly on the back of a very ambitious further surge in capital spending and the full‑year impact of current spending measures introduced in 2025. The deficit (according to the fiscal rule’s definition) would not exceed the prescribed ceiling of 2% of GDP, which is appropriate given the need to maintain the credibility of Kosovo’s well-functioning set of fiscal rules. The planned increase in the public wage bill, including the 13th month’s salary, does not exceed nominal GDP growth in 2024, thus the wage bill rule is being respected. The 2026 budget includes lower blanket allocations than the 2025 budget, further improving fiscal transparency. However, the significant fiscal expansion runs counter to lowering inflationary pressures and external imbalances.
Structural fiscal reforms are advancing slowly. The issue of recurring spending overrun on war veterans’ pensions has not been resolved due to the absence of a reclassification of beneficiaries. Despite some progress, weaknesses (particularly in the planning phase of public investment projects) continue to pose a significant challenge as many projects do not undergo proper appraisal and selection procedures. There was no progress in reducing tax loopholes and exemptions or in improving public spending efficiency through better targeting social transfers. In October 2025, a stand-alone annual fiscal risk analysis for POEs was published. However, the analysis is limited to high-risk POEs overseen by the Ministry of Economy as well as the Kosovo Electricity, Transmission, Market and System Operator (KOSTT), which is overseen by the Assembly, excluding other companies. With regard to the social assistance scheme, a pilot phase involving 4 000 households is currently underway to test a new eligibility model. Overall, although public indebtedness remains low, recent substantial increases in untargeted social benefits and wages have weakened the fiscal position and risk crowding out growth-enhancing spending.
Functioning of product markets
Business environment
Some progress was made in improving the business environment. The secondary legislation for the Law on the register of beneficial owners, adopted in 2024 as an important step in combating money laundering and terrorist financing, was completed. The implementation of the Law on sustainable investments, which came into force in 2024, has been slow. The organisational structures of the two new agencies in charge of implementation of a legal framework to protect and promote sustainable investment in Kosovo were approved by the government and the budget for their operationalisation was allocated. The appointment of the chief executive officer of one of the two agencies was finalised in June 2026, but recruitment of core staff has been delayed mainly due to the political stalemate. Since becoming fully operational in August 2022, the Commercial Court has made progress in expediting case resolution. However, disposition times remain above regional benchmarks in both first and second instance commercial cases, at 631 days on average (OECD)7.Overall, unpredictable regulations, a weak rule of law, and a high degree of informality and corruption impede private-sector development.
Efforts to shrink the informal economy are ongoing. During the reporting period, the Tax Administration of Kosovo (TAK) established a specialised team to expand and improve the use of third-party data, aiming to boost tax compliance and increase budget revenues. Three cooperation agreements and standard operating procedures are currently under preparation, in addition to the nine that have already been signed. Although significant progress has been made, limited access to some categories of large datasets and their interinstitutional
7 OECD (2026), SME Policy Index, Kosovo: Creating an enabling environment for SMEs and entrepreneurs.
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exchange remains a challenge. An e-invoicing platform has already been developed with technical expertise, and the relevant Administrative Instruction was signed by the Minister of Finance in April 2026. Work on the business-to-business e-invoicing module continues, and its implementation is expected to help further reduce informality. The informal economy largely affects women’s employment, especially in the service sector.
State influence on product markets
The State aid policy framework is partially aligned with EU rules and principles while the implementation of electricity market liberalisation has started. The existing framework lacks a coherent approach to State aid as well as a comprehensive strategy and systematic cost-benefit assessment of aid and subsidies granted. The Assembly has still not appointed the State Aid Commission, the institution responsible for State aid control and adopting decisions on State aid schemes. The liberalisation of electricity prices for large businesses8, effective from 1 June 2025, is expected to have a positive effect in the longer term on the economy’s competitiveness. Despite the request by Kosovo’s Electricity Supply Company (KESCO) to raise electricity tariffs by 21.3% in 2026, the board of the Energy Regulatory Office (ERO) decided in May to keep them unchanged for all consumer categories. On 23 April 2026, Kosovo’s Assembly adopted a law allowing, in exceptional circumstances, the setting of price caps for basic goods and trade margins for wholesale and retail sales.
Privatisation and restructuring
The establishment of a sovereign fund is delayed. Although the law creating such a fund was approved by the Assembly in mid-December 2023, it remains under review by the Constitutional Court. Upon becoming operational, the fund is anticipated to take over the management of certain publicly-owned enterprises (POEs) currently under the oversight of the Ministry of Economy. It will also assume responsibility for more than 500 socially-owned enterprises9 and assets currently managed by the Privatisation Agency of Kosovo (PAK). During the reporting period, a comprehensive review of PAK’s assets continued, identifying those suitable for transfer to the sovereign fund.
Functioning of the financial market
Kosovo’s banking sector continued to expand steadily while remaining sound. Despite a moderation in the second half of the year, annual bank lending growth remained strong at 14.7% at end-2025, driven mainly by household loans for housing purposes, while growth slowed to 12.5% year-on-year at end-June 2026. Bank deposits’ annual growth picked up to 13% at end-2025, the same level as one year earlier, and accelerated to 16.7% year-on-year at end-June 2026. Financial soundness indicators remained satisfactory. The capital adequacy ratio rose to 17.2% at end-2025 and remained virtually unchanged at 17.1% at end-June 2026, exceeding the regulatory minimum of 12%. The non-performing loans ratio stood at 2.1%, slightly higher compared with the previous year, while it decreased to 2% at end-June 2026. The average return-on-equity ratio remained high, although it fell to 16.7% in June 2026 from 17.4% at end-2025. The release for the first time of the residential property price index by Kosovo Agency of Statistics in December 2025 will assist the CBK in monitoring financial sector risks emanating from the housing market, although data gaps remain.
Functioning of the labour market
Despite some employment gains, the labour market situation remains challenging, while some initiatives are in
8 Businesses with an annual turnover of more than EUR 10 million or with more than 50 employees. 9 Socially-owned enterprises were considered to be shared social property in the former Yugoslavia.
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2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
Graph 24: Kosovo - Labour market trends
(15-64 age group)
Participation rate Unemployment rate
Employment rate Source: Kosovo Agency of Statistics
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place to reduce the very large gender gap. Long delays in publishingthe labour force survey results persist (the latest published data are for Q3-2025). The average employment rate increased to 43.8% in the first three quarters of 2025, from 38.5% one year earlier, while the unemployment rate edged up by 0.1 pps to 10.9%, despite the increase in the labour force participation rate to 49.2% from 43.2% in the same period. The share of young people aged 15-29 not in employment, education or training remained the highest in the Western Balkans, averaging 33.4% in the first three quarters of 2025. Over the same period, the gender gap also remained very large: The female employment rate was only around 27%, while the female labour force participation rate stood at 32%, compared with 67% for men. Weak labour market outcomes contribute to continuously high emigration rates. High inactivity, especially among women and young people, is being addressed primarily through the ‘Super-employment’ scheme, which has brought very strong results, with around 20 000 beneficiaries and a 70% retention rate.
2.3.2. The capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces in the EU
Education and innovation
Poor education quality and a mismatch with labour market needs continue to hinder Kosovo’s development. Outdated learning materials, inadequate initial teacher training, and limited opportunities for professional development have undermined both the quality and relevance of education. Despite recent recruitments, there are not enough inspectors for assessing teachers. Meanwhile, high unemployment rates among university graduates further highlight the system’s weaknesses. These shortcomings were also evident in the 2025 PISA results, where Kosovo ranked among the lowest-performing participating economies. To address these issues, the Ministry of Education and Science launched a curriculum and textbook review in January 2026, targeting grades 1-5 and 6-9. The initiative aims to enhance teaching quality, strengthen student competencies, and improve academic performance. Additionally, 16 dual-education profiles are being implemented to facilitate the transition from school to employment, better aligning education with labour market needs.
Kosovo’s performance lags behind in research and innovation. In 2024, expenditure on research and development stood at about 0.1% of GDP – well below the EU average of 2.2%, the legal requirement of 0.7%, and even the Western Balkans and Türkiye average of 0.5% (OECD)10. Participation in the Horizon Europe programme offers greater potential, yet results remain modest. Since the programme’s launch, Kosovo has submitted 300project applications, of which 275 were eligible and only 19 were successful–securing EUR 2.19 million in EU funding and resulting in a success rate of just 6.33%. The Law on innovation and entrepreneurship, designed to stimulate innovation (including through the establishment of an Innovation Fund), has yet to be adopted by the Assembly.
Physical capital and quality of infrastructure
Kosovo has made limited progress in improving its road and railway infrastructure. Construction on the Pristina–Merdarë motorway, also known as the ‘Peace Highway’, has yet to start. Meanwhile, rehabilitation works on Rail Route 10 continued at a sluggish pace, with tendering for signalling systems and telecommunications still in the preparatory phase. The feasibility study for the Durrës–Pristina railway connection has been completed, though implementation has not yet begun. The transport sector as a whole continues to grapple with major challenges, including safety concerns, insufficient maintenance, and the weak administrative capacity of regulatory bodies.
10 OECD (2025), Economic Convergence Scoreboard for the Western Balkans 2025,
https://www.oecd.org/en/publications/economic-convergence-scoreboard-for-the-western-balkans- 2025_bc0babf3-en.html.
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Despite efforts to diversify energy supply and improve efficiency, Kosovo’s energy sector remains a major bottleneck to economic growth. Over 90% of electricity is still generated by two ageing, unreliable, and heavily-polluting lignite power plants, which pose serious risks to public health and the environment. Kosovo continues to suffer from major technical and commercial losses in the distribution and transmission grids due to poor infrastructure. Frequent power outages11 undermine energy security, imposing high costs on businesses and deterring foreign direct investment (FDI) – one of the biggest obstacles to economic development. Progress in renewable energy deployment has also been slow. The construction of the Kramovik solar park started in July 2026, more than two years after the completion of its auction, while the wind energy auction launched in December 2024 has yet to conclude, highlighting delays in meeting renewable energy targets.
The digital transformation of Kosovo’s economy is progressing steadily. Kosovo remains one of the Western Balkans’ frontrunners in connectivity, with near-universal household internet access and full basic broadband coverage. The substitution of coaxial with fibreoptic cable infrastructure is ongoing to keep up with increasing demand for high- speed broadband infrastructure. Meanwhile, the uptake of e-commerce among SMEs remains limited and concentrated on low-cost and informal channels (OECD)12. The digitalisation of public services has also advanced. The number of services available on the e-Kosova platform has increased and functionality has improved, however, the proportion of fully end-to-end digitalised services remains limited and interoperability between government systems remains weak. During the reporting period, Kosovo also made further progress in deploying its national electronic identification (eID) system, though it has yet to be fully operationalised.
Sectoral and enterprise structure
The services sector continues to dominate the economy, providing 46% of gross value added (GVA). The sectoral structure of GVA shows a gradual decrease in the share of industry in 2025 compared to 2019, by 1.7 pps to around 17%, mainly due to a decline in the shares of electricity, gas, steam and air conditioning supply as well as manufacturing to 2.5% and 12.5% in 2025, from 3.4% and nearly 13%, respectively in 2019. Kosovo’s manufacturing base remains narrow, relying mainly on mineral mining and processed metal products, while the production of food products, beverages and plastics has increased over time. The share of wholesale and retail trade increased to around 14% in 2025, up from less than 13% in 2019, while the shares of financial and insurance services as well as ICT rose by 0.7 and 0.2 pps to 4.6% and 2%, respectively. Agriculture’s share in GVA remained virtually unchanged at around 7% in 2025, compared to 6 years before. At the same time, the share of real estate activities fell by 1.6 pps. to 5.4%, compared to 2019.
The private sector is dominated by small firms with low levels of digital uptake and difficult access to finance. According to the OECD13, SMEs are the backbone of economic activity in Kosovo, accounting for 99.8% of all registered enterprises and 79% of total employment, both above EU levels. Digital adoption among SMEs remains at an early stage, with uptake being lower than in most of the economies in the Western Balkans and Türkiye. About 79% of SMEs in Kosovo use at least one digital tool, compared to the Western Balkans and Türkiye average of 93%, highlighting the economy’s lag in digital maturity (OECD). In 2024, only 20% of businesses indicated that access to finance is not an obstacle to their growth (OECD). Some progress has been made with various financing options
11 Since December 2025, prolonged and often unannounced power cuts began affecting large parts of
Kosovo due to the ongoing renovation of thermal power plant Kosovo B and the consequent exceptional technical and human strain on Kosovo A, the oldest thermal power plant.
12 OECD (2026), SME Policy Index, Kosovo: Supporting the Digital Transformation of SMEs. 13 OECD (2026), SME Policy Index, Kosovo: Creating an enabling environment for SMEs and entrepreneurs.
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available through the Kosovo Credit Guarantee Fund (KCGF). However, the limited availability of non-bank financing, combined with structural obstacles in access to credit, continues to constrain SMEs in Kosovo.
Economic integration with the EU and price competitiveness
Over the last 6 years, the EU has remained Kosovo’s largest trading partner while trade openness increased significantly. The EU’s share in Kosovo’s merchandise exports remained roughly unchanged in 2025 compared to 2019, at 33.6%, while the CEFTA countries’ share increased to 45.8%, up from 43%. In 2025, the EU accounted for 43.1% of Kosovo’s total imports of goods, significantly lower than in 2019 (49.1%), while the CEFTA partners’ share slightly decreased by 0.6 pps. to 13.7%. Trade openness, which is measured as the total value of exports and imports as a share of GDP, rose significantly to 124.4% in 2025, up from 85.8% in 2019, reflecting an expansion in both merchandise and services trade. Exports of services are significantly larger than goods exports. Travel services, in particular, accounted for the largest share (75%) of service exports in 2025, mainly driven by diaspora tourism from Western Europe, and were followed by ICT service exports (9.3%), which have been growing steadily in recent years.
The EU remains the main investor in Kosovo over the past 6 years. Net FDI inflows grew by around 12.7% in 2025 and amounted to 6.6% of GDP. The bulk (nearly 82%) of them continued to be directed to real estate and financial and insurance activities, doing little to improve Kosovo’s export capacity. The EU’s share in Kosovo’s net FDI stock reached 46.6% in 2025, up from 34.6% in 2019. The shares of Germany and Switzerland, which both host large diasporas from Kosovo, increased to around 21% each in 2025, up from 13% each in 2019. A rapid rise in real wages (9.5% in 202514, partly reflecting the implementation of the wage coefficient increase15 in the public sector), together with further rises expected due to strong increases in the monthly gross minimum wage16, risks undermining external competitiveness and fuelling informality. Kosovo’s real effective exchange rate appreciated by 1.3% in 2025.
PUBLIC PROCUREMENT, STATISTICS, FINANCIAL CONTROL
14 IMF (2026), Republic of Kosovo, 2026 Article IV Consultation, No 26/79. 15 On 29 October 2024, the government announced that from January 2025 public sector employees
would receive a EUR 55 increase in their monthly salaries with an additional EUR 55 raise from July. 16 As of January 2026, the monthly gross minimum wage increased from EUR 350 to EUR 425, and further to EUR 500 in July 2026.
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Graph 25a: Kosovo - Exports of goods
EU CEFTA Other
% of GDP
Source: The Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies
(WiiW), Kosovo Agency of Statistics
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Graph 25b: Kosovo - Imports of goods
EU CEFTA Other
% of GDP
Source: The Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies
(WiiW), Kosovo Agency of Statistics
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Chapter 5 – Public procurement
EU rules ensure that the public procurement of goods, services and works in any Member State is transparent and open to all EU companies based on non-discrimination and equal treatment.
Institutional set-up and legal alignment
The legal framework on public procurement remains partially aligned with the EU acquis. The revision of the public-private partnership legislation has started, while the revision of the public procurement legislation has stalled, pending approval by the Ministry of Finance. The drafting of relevant implementing legislation has not started. The established working group in charge of revising the legislative framework excluded relevant public procurement stakeholders and civil society organisations.
Interinstitutional coordination in public procurement was strengthened with regular consultations being held during the reporting period.
Implementation and enforcement capacity
In 2025, the public procurement market accounted for 8.84% of GDP, a slight decrease from 9.3% in 2024. The total value of contracts signed in 2025 amounted to EUR 1 billion, an increase of 6.37% compared to 2024. The dominant use of the open procedure (92.41%, compared with 90.5% in 2024) and the declining use of the negotiated procedure without the publication of a contract notice (6.4% compared with 7.52% in 2024) contributed to transparency in the public procurement processes. Contracts awarded based on the best price-quality ratio criterion remained stable at 13.65% of the total value (13.5% in 2024).
The Public Procurement Regulatory Commission (PPRC) continued to support the use of the best price-quality ratio criterion through training initiatives, yet the lowest price criterion remains predominant, accounting in 2025 for 88.35% of public contracts awarded, compared to 86.9% in 2024. During 2025, cancelled procurement activities amounted to 23%. The average number of bids per tender remained stable at 3.4.
The e-procurement system is now interconnected with the Treasury’s Financial Management Information System. Kosovo needs to finalise the upgrade of its electronic procurement platform.in line with the planned revised legislative framework on public procurement.
The PPRC and the Procurement Review Body (PRB) continued to operate with insufficient administrative capacities. The PPRC continued delivering professional trainings to contracting authorities at both central and local levels.
Public procurement remained vulnerable to irregularities and corruption in Kosovo. The Kosovo National Audit Office continued to identify shortcomings in this area, noting delays, non-compliance, poor planning and frequent bypassing public procurement procedures at both central and municipal levels. Kosovo adopted the Law on Mediterranean Games with provisions going beyond standard derogations from the EU public procurement procedures.
Efficient remedy system
The legislation on the right to legal remedy is partially in line with the EU acquis. Appeals against procurement awards can be submitted through the e-procurement platform. The board of the PRB remains incomplete as the position of President, as one out of the five members, is still vacant. The PRB continued to be inconsistent in its decision-making, while relying on short-term external expertise – otherwise used for the review of complex cases only. Such practice should be replaced with long-term qualified legal review experts to ensure transparent, efficient and quality decisions. The legislative framework does not yet ensure the functional independence of the PRB in line with the EU acquis.
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Chapter 18 – Statistics
European statistics are developed, produced and disseminated by EU Member States, guided by the principles and quality criteria elaborated in the Regulation on European statistics, such as professional independence, impartiality, reliability, accessibility, and statistical confidentiality. Common rules are in place for the methodology, production and dissemination of statistical information, which are further specified in sectoral legislation that constitute the EU acquis on statistics.
On statistical infrastructure, the legal framework is broadly in line with the European statistics Code of Practice, but its implementation needs to improve. Kosovo should empower the Kosovo Agency of Statistics (KAS) to strengthen coordination of the statistical system and ensure access to administrative data sources on the level necessary to produce official statistics. KAS continues to face challenges regarding adequacy of office infrastructure, technological and human capacities, with vacant posts hindering productivity and the quality of its statistical products. Kosovo’s statistical system underwent a peer review in 2025, examining its compliance with the European statistics Code of Practice and providing recommendations for further strengthening the system. In September 2025, the government appointed the National Statistical Council, comprising a total of 15 members, for a five-year term. The appointment was long overdue, as the previous Council’s mandate had expired in 2024. Data transmission to Eurostat continued to improve.
On classifications and registers, Kosovo uses NACE Rev 2 and is working on the transition to NACE Rev 2.1. Existing registers (agriculture, business, households) need to be upgraded. KAS is in the initial stages of building a population register.
On macroeconomic statistics, alignment with the European System of Accounts (ESA) 2010 is ongoing, but further efforts are needed to produce and transmit the remaining data. Kosovo continued to transmit a limited set of annual and quarterly national accounts data, however the extensive application of confidentiality flags, preventing the publication of the transmitted data as well as methodological inconsistencies remain an issue. Data gaps remain in supply, use, and input-output tables, as well as in foreign direct investment statistics.
Monthly trade in goods data and the harmonised index of consumer prices (HICP) is routinely published, the latter now using ECOICOP version 2. In 2025, KAS started publishing a quarterly residential property price index (RPPI), covering 2018-2025. Further work is needed to fully align it with EU House Price Index requirements and advance the owner-occupied housing (OOH) price index. Regarding purchasing power parities (PPP), relevant sectoral surveys were launched, some for the first time, and integrated into the calculations, improving accuracy.
Structural business statistics remain limited and lack distinction between public and private investments or by sectors. Kosovo is not compliant for any of the short-term business statistics datasets and should resume transmitting statistical business register data and metadata to Eurostat. Foreign affiliate statistics are still not available. Progress was made in ICT statistics for households, with households data transmitted to Eurostat in February 2026, while data for enterprises have not been provided.
In the area of social statistics, only demographic statistics are broadly in line with the EU acquis. During the reporting period, KAS published 48 thematic reports based on the 2024 Population Census. Statistics on income and living conditions (EU-SILC survey) are transmitted to Eurostat, but their quality and timeliness needs improvement. Social welfare statistics are produced monthly. Labour force survey (LFS) data have not been transmitted to Eurostat. Kosovo should intensify efforts to ensure the timely transmission of LFS data and quality reports to Eurostat in line with the EU acquis, while continuing to work towards the full implementation of EU-LFS standards. Labour cost indices, earnings structures, and job vacancy statistics are still absent. Public health and crime statistics remain unaligned
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with the EU acquis. As in the past, KAS does not systematically compile gender- disaggregated data.
On agricultural statistics, KAS continued to publish data on annual agricultural crops, livestock production, and orchards. The agricultural holding survey is produced regularly and is aligned with EU standards. Agricultural price indices and economic accounts for agriculture are produced on a regular basis. Meanwhile, supply balance sheets and the agriculture labour index are not yet produced regularly. Preparations for the agricultural census 2027 continue.
Transport and tourism statistics remain unaligned with the EU acquis. KAS initiated, for the first time, a road freight transport survey. Statistics on development and innovation are not produced regularly.
Energy and environment statistics remain partially aligned with the EU acquis. Kosovo should complete the remaining gaps in energy statistics, including energy efficiency indicators, by ensuring the timely submission of missing questionnaires and quality reports. KAS made progress in the field of environment statistics by initiating air emissions accounts, material flow accounts, and environmental taxes by economic activity surveys as per the SEEA 2012-Central Framework and Eurostat requirements. Data are, however, not yet provided to Eurostat. Kosovo regularly transmits data under the waste statistics regulation as well as municipal waste data.
Chapter 32 – Financial control
The EU promotes the reform of national governance systems to improve managerial accountability, sound financial management of income and expenditure, and external audit of public funds. The financial control rules further protect the EU’s financial interests against fraud in the management of EU funds and protect the euro against counterfeiting.
Public internal financial control (PIFC)
Although broadly in place, the PIFC legal and strategic framework requires further strengthening of the internal control environment and establishing a robust system for risk assessment and management and for reporting and addressing irregularities and suspected fraud. Persistent understaffing in the central harmonisation unit hinders its capacity to steer the process, monitor and evaluate the control framework, and offer a consistent system-wide response to challenges. The first-time publication of the summary of the findings of the PIFC report in July 2026 is a positive step. However, regular updates on PIFC system and publication of the full annual PIFC report, remain key to enhancing accountability and incentivising budget users to perform legally, efficiently and effectively.
Managerial accountability remains a challenge as delegation, largely formal, is not supported by effective transfer of operational responsibility within a clear performance framework nor by a consistent link between performance, compliance, and consequences. Kosovo will need to scale up the awareness-raising efforts, introduce a structured set of performance objectives and reporting, and improve internal audit and monitoring systems.
While internal audit is functionally independent and supported by a methodological framework covering all audit types and internal auditors’ certification scheme, the effectiveness and the overall quality of internal audit is affected by persistent staff shortcomings and weak quality assurance. No progress has been made on systemic follow- up of the internal audit findings.
External audit
The National Audit Office (NAO) enjoys a good degree of operational and functional independence but full alignment with international standards requires a new law to strengthen its financial independence, mandate and accountability. The NAO’s independence should be anchored in the Constitution.
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The NAO’s administrative capacity is gradually improving with increased number of auditors and a stronger strategic and methodological framework underpinning its operations, including on quality management. The NAO carries out a full range of audit activities, while expanding the use of performance audits to areas such as gender equality, healthcare and welfare, quality education, industry, innovation and infrastructure. Audit selection has been informed through an evidence-based process and consultations with civil society, professional associations and donor community.
Parliamentary scrutiny was further constrained in the challenging political context, with oversight activity limited to just three meetings with the Committee for Oversight of Public Finance.
The NAO has established a structured system for following up on audit recommendations, complemented by enhanced outreach to auditees and relevant stakeholders. However, the rate of implementation of recommendations dropped from 41% to 36% pointing to persistent gaps in effective enforcement, accountability and parliamentary oversight.
Protection of the EU’s financial interests
Kosovo still needs to align its legislation with the EU acquis, notably the PIF Directive, establish an anti-fraud coordination service (AFCOS) and network, adopt anti-fraud strategy, build capacity to effectively detect, manage, and report fraud and irregularities, including through consistent use of the Commission’s irregularity management system. Kosovo should further strengthen its cooperation with the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) through active engagement in investigations.
Protection of the euro against counterfeiting
Alignment with the EU acquis on the fight against currency counterfeiting still requires adoption of the new legislation and establishment of the institutional framework, involving the Central Bank of Kosovo, the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Forensic Agency. The Central Bank of Kosovo and the European Central Bank signed a cooperation agreement on the protection of euro banknotes in September 2025. Kosovo needs to strengthen coordination among the relevant authorities and ensure timely data exchange through a modern counterfeit monitoring system. The ratification of the 1929 Geneva Convention for the Suppression of Counterfeiting Currency would be beneficial to support international cooperation in the area.
3. GOOD NEIGHBOURLY RELATIONS AND REGIONAL COOPERATION
Kosovo maintained its active engagement in a number of regional cooperation initiatives such as the Central European Free Trade Agreement (CEFTA), the Energy Community, the Transport Community, the South-East European Cooperation Process, and the Regional Cooperation Council.
The EU-Western Balkans Summit took place in Brussels in December 2025 and in Tivat in June 2026 reaffirmed the EU membership perspective of the Western Balkans and explored measures to further advance gradual integration. Kosovo has actively engaged in the regional dimension of the Growth Plan for the Western Balkans, participating in both ministerial and leaders’ meetings.
On the Common Regional Market (CRM), at the Berlin Process summit in London in October 2025, the leaders of the region endorsed a revised and streamlined action plan to implement the Green Agenda for the Western Balkans, adopted a Western Balkans Climate Adaptation Roadmap and committed to make progress in the promotion of regional mobility and implementation of relevant regional agreements and CEFTA decisions. Kosovo adopted the CRM action plan 2025-2028 and is contributing to its implementation. Kosovo still has to ratify the fifth mobility agreement on access to higher education and admission to studies in
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the Western Balkans. The roadmap for roaming between the Western Balkans and the EU entered the first phase of implementation. In February 2026, the Commission proposed launching negotiations with Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Montenegro, North Macedonia, and Serbia to integrate them into the EU’s ‘Roam Like at Home’ regime.
The appointment of a new Director and commitment from the parties gave impetus to the work of CEFTA: substantial advancements have been made on specific areas, including on the Green Lanes, recognition of qualified trust services, recognition of advanced electronic signatures and advanced electronic seals, the establishment of the Advisory Body for Customs Cooperation and the adoption of the Risk Management Strategy 2025-2028.
Kosovo ratified protocols 5 and 6 establishing trade facilitation framework for customs cooperation and liberalisation of trade in services and the additional protocol 7 establishing a regional dispute settlement mechanism.
The unresolved fate and whereabouts of missing persons during the conflicts of the 1990s remain one of the most enduring humanitarian and political issues in the Western Balkans. In Kosovo alone, 1 579 persons remain unaccounted for. In July and August 2026, Kosovo excavated three new mass graves in Zubin Potok and recovered human remains in all three sites. The Institute for Crimes Committed during the War in Kosovo is fully functional. Civil society is actively engaged in truth-seeking, reconciliation and memorialisation initiatives.
The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) plays an important role in addressing the issue of missing persons, as the neutral intermediary chairing the Working Group on Persons Unaccounted for in Connection with the Events in Kosovo and its sub-fora, in an effort to maintain dialogue and promote operational cooperation between the parties. Following a session of the Working Group in June 2025, technical discussions in the framework of the ICRC Sub-Working Group on Forensic Issues and the Analysis Team took place in September and November 2025. In the framework of the Working Group, five joint field assessments/excavations (two under Kosovo and three under Serbia jurisdictions) were conducted. The session of the Sub-Working Group on Forensic Issues, planned for January 2026, was postponed.
Kosovo continued to take part in the work of the Western Balkans Missing Persons Group to address unresolved cases of mutual interest and unidentified persons together with Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, Croatia and Serbia. Kosovo also joined trilateral meetings to foster cooperation and dialogue with the families of the missing, together with Montenegro and Serbia, under the auspices of the ICRC.
Overall, Kosovo-Serbia cooperation within the ICRC-led working group continued to face significant challenges, with progress constrained by difficulties in the parties’ engagement and by the sensitive political context surrounding the file. An inaugural session of the Joint Commission on missing persons, held within the framework of the EU-facilitated Dialogue, took place in January 2026 and was followed by a first technical meeting on 22 April 2026.
Relations with Albania continued to be good, with regular high-level bilateral visits. Building on the joint declaration on defence cooperation signed in March 2025, Kosovo, Albania and Croatia announced further operational coordination, notably through a military exercise to be conducted in 2026. Kosovo-based companies recorded a significant growth of investments in Albania, enabling Kosovo to rank among the leading foreign investors.
Kosovo maintains good neighbourly relations with Montenegro. In July 2026, Montenegro and Kosovo signed a bilateral Agreement on the Mutual Recognition of Qualified Electronic Trust Services and Electronic Identification Schemes.
Bilateral relations with North Macedonia remain positive, although no high-level meetings took place during the reporting period.
Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina have not recognised Kosovo, but they interact in the framework of regional cooperation.
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Kosovo’s relation with Türkiye remainsrobust in the political, defence, economic and cultural sectors. Both countries emphasise their strategic partnership and Kosovo’s leadership has repeatedly expressed gratitude for Türkiye’s political and economic backing. Ankara has supplied advanced military equipment, such as combat drones. The Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency has expended its projects in Kosovo, focusing on cultural infrastructure, education and healthcare.
Georgia, the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine have no formal relations with Kosovo, as they do not recognise Kosovo’s independence.
4. NORMALISATION OF RELATIONS BETWEEN KOSOVO AND SERBIA
The EU-facilitated Dialogue on the normalisation of relations between Kosovo and Serbia, while heavily impacted by domestic political developments, continued during the reporting period with regular meetings at chief negotiator and technical levels in bilateral and trilateral formats. While some progress was achieved, implementation of outstanding Dialogue commitments remained limited, compounded by unilateral actions and rhetoric not conducive to normalisation. In April 2026, Kosovo appointed Ambassador Agron Bajrami as its chief negotiator replacing former Deputy Prime Minister Besnik Bislimi. High Representative/ Vice President Kaja Kallas continues to stand ready to hold a high-level Dialogue meeting once the situation allows.
Both Kosovo and Serbia are expected to implement all of their respective obligations stemming from the Agreement on the path to normalisation and its implementation annex (2023 Ohrid Agreement), as well as all past Dialogue agreements, in line with their official recommitments in September and October 2024, without delays or preconditions. This includes self-management arrangements for the Kosovo Serb community. Kosovo is expected to start the process leading to their establishment, while Serbia is expected in parallel to initiate the recognition of Kosovo’s documents, symbols and institutions. Neither Party has made sufficient progress. The 2023 Ohrid Agreement is valid and legally binding on the Parties, and any formalities, including those related to its adoption or “formalisation”, should not impede implementation. Normalisation and implementation of Dialogue commitments remain essential conditions on the European path of both Parties, and both risk losing important opportunities in the absence of progress.
During the reporting period, the situation in the north of Kosovo remained calm but fragile. Actions and rhetoric not conducive to normalisation increased. Kosovo repeatedly took actions contrary to its Dialogue obligations, or actions undermining the normalisation process. These included police and administrative actions targeting Serbia-supported structures and services, arrests of Kosovo Serbs, and the rejection of the withdrawn resignations of Kosovo Serb judges and prosecutors, undermining their reintegration. The EU expressed deep concern on 21 July and 28 August, including over the recurrent lack of coordination by Kosovo and the negative impact on local communities and their access to basic public and social services. Serbia, for its part, repeatedly acted contrary to its obligations under the 2023 Ohrid Agreement, including by lobbying against Kosovo’s membership in international organisations, notably the Council of Europe and Interpol. These actions and recurrent inflammatory rhetoric by Serbian officials, continue to undermine normalisation. Serbia has not taken any significant step to ensure accountability for the violent attack by armed Kosovo Serb assailants against Kosovo Police on 24 September 2023 in Banjska/Banjskë.
As regards the implementation of Dialogue agreements:
- Justice and reintegration: The withdrawal of Kosovo Serbs from Kosovo institutions in November 2022 violated Serbia’s Dialogue obligations under the April 2013 “First agreement of principles governing the normalisation of relations” (2013 Brussels Agreement) and dismantled core achievements of the 2015 Justice Agreement. Since November 2022, the
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EU has consistently called on Belgrade to support the reintegration of Kosovo Serbs into Kosovo institutions and on Pristina to enable it. The EU therefore welcomed participation of Kosovo Serbs in all 2025/2026 electoral processes in Kosovo, including the taking of office of the newly elected Kosovo Serb mayors in the four northern municipalities in December 2025. In line with the EU’s call for Serbia to take the first step, on 15 July 2026, Kosovo Serb judges, prosecutors and support staff withdrew the resignations they had submitted 3.5 years earlier. This represented an important first step towards reversing the consequences of the 2022 withdrawal and opened a pathway for the reintegration of Kosovo Serb judicial personnel. However, subsequent decisions by the Kosovo Prosecutorial Council (KPC), Kosovo Judicial Council (KJC) and the Acting President to accept the withdrawn resignations prevented it from moving forward. These decisions are inconsistent with the objectives and commitments of the 2015 Justice Agreement by Kosovo. Kosovo has not enabled reintegration of Kosovo Serb judicial personnel. A subsequent call for recruitment with a quota for Kosovo Serb prosecutors was not successful.
- Association/Community of Serb-Majority Municipalities: There has been no further progress towards establishing the Association/Community, as laid down in the 2013 Brussels Agreement and the August 2015 Agreement on the general principles and main elements for establishing the Association/Community. Kosovo is expected to start the process, in line with its Dialogue obligations, including under the 2023 Ohrid Agreement. Both Parties are expected to engage constructively without further delay. The status of Serbia-supported structures and services in Kosovo needs to be addressed fully in line with Dialogue agreements and Kosovo law, not through uncoordinated measures. The EU insists on structured consultations with representatives of the Kosovo Serb community to ensure their meaningful involvement. The process should proceed in close cooperation with the EU Special Representative for the Dialogue.
- Austerlitz Bridge: Works on the Austerlitz Bridge in Mitrovica, including additional assessments and consultations, have been completed. The EU position remains that the bridge should be opened. While the technical conditions have been met, effective coordination and meaningful consultations between the municipalities concerned and central-level institutions need to improve for the bridge to serve all communities. The EU took note of KFOR’s change of posture.
- Energy: Implementation of the 2013 and 2015 Energy Agreements and the 2022 Energy Roadmap continued. The Serbian transmission system operator EMS has yet to determine net transmission capacities at the interconnection with Kosovo, preventing cross-border capacities from being allocated to market participants. This adversely affects security of supply and competition and raises power import prices.Serbia needs to address this longstanding issue, including by fulfilling its obligations under the Energy Community Treaty.
- Technical Dialogue Agreements: Implementation of several technical Dialogue agreements (2011 - 2012) remains incomplete.Both Parties need to continue implementing the Arrangements on regional representation and cooperation, which enable Kosovo’s participation in regional forums. Neither Party should block regional forums over bilateral disputes. Implementation of the agreements on cadastre and acceptance of university diplomas remains pending due to non-implementation by Serbia. Serbia also has yet to address relocated Serbian administrative customs structures with Kosovo denomination operating from within Serbia.
- Integrated Border/Boundary Management (IBM): The Interim Common Crossing-Points (CCPs) between Kosovo and Serbia remain operational, but implementation is incomplete. Only two of six permanent CCPs have been established (Merdarë/Merdare and Mutivodë/Mutivode). Serbia has yet to establish those hosted by its side (Jarinje/Rudnica, Končulj/Dheu i Bardhë and Depce/Muçibabë) and needs to engage constructively to enable construction of the third CCP hosted by Kosovo in the north (Tabavije/Bërnjak- Tabalije/Brnjak). Serbia also needs to close illegal roads and bypasses and allow the
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resumption of EU-facilitated joint IBM meetings at all levels (local, regional and central). Limited progress was made on maintenance deficiencies at the interim CCPs hosted by Serbia, but substantial shortcomings, including health and safety concerns, remain. The full operationalisation of the freight scanner at Merdarë/Merdare during summer 2026 facilitated the movement of Serbian goods and significantly reduced waiting times. However, restrictions on Serbian goods through other CCPs remain. Kosovo needs to ensure free movement of goods through all designated CCPs, in line with its Dialogue commitments.
- Freedom of movement: The EU welcomes the overall satisfactory implementation of the 14 March 2026 agreement on the implementation of the Law on foreigners and the avenues opened to register civil status facts in the Kosovo system using Serbia-issued documents. Kosovo is encouraged to find a long-term solution ensuring an effective registration process for all those living, working or studying in Kosovo to obtain the necessary documentation.
- Telecommunications: There was no progress in resolving outstanding issues under the Telecom Agreements. Both Parties need to fully respect the agreements, resolve cross- border frequency interference between Serbian and Kosovo mobile operators, and ensure adequate postal service quality for all communities.
- Mutual legal assistance: Limited progress was made following the Serbian government’s decision to take steps towards resuming MLA after a prolonged interruption by Belgrade. Serbian courts have resumed using MLA channels in a very limited number of cases. Further efforts are needed to ensure effective, consistent and timely use of MLA, including on outstanding requests from Kosovo.
- Official visits: Both Parties continued to fall short of fully implementing the Arrangements for official visits, with announced visits rejected by both. The EU welcomes that two visits by the Serbian Orthodox Patriarch to Kosovo, including for Orthodox Easter, and a visit by Kosovo's caretaker Minister for Culture and Tourism to Presevo Valley took place without incidents. However, Kosovo and Serbia need to allow visits by their respective chief negotiator, other government officials and religious authorities when announced and conducted in line with the Arrangements. This was not the case for the majority of announced visits. Official visitors are expected to refrain from divisive statements or behaviour.
- Missing Persons: The EU welcomes the first meeting of the Joint Commission on Missing Persons, held in January 2026, to advance the implementation of the political Declaration on Missing Persons adopted in May 2023, followed by a technical meeting on access to archives in April. This constituted progress in operationalising the 2023 Declaration, although further cooperation is required. The Parties are encouraged to refrain from politicisation of this humanitarian issue and improve cooperation.
Overall, Kosovo and Serbia continued to participate in the EU-facilitated Dialogue, but engagement has not translated into sufficient implementation of their respective obligations. Aside from missing persons, neither Party has made noticeable progress on the 2023 Ohrid Agreement. While progress was achieved on missing persons, mutual legal assistance and freedom of movement, implementation of several key agreements remains incomplete and some previous Dialogue achievements have been undermined. Both Parties need to demonstrate greater commitment to their respective obligations, refrain from unilateral actions and rhetoric detrimental to normalisation, and engage constructively to resolve outstanding issues.
5. RESILIENCE, SECURITY AND DEFENCE
Kosovo has a clear strategic alignment with the EU, driven by strong public support. Kosovo has been aligning with the EU’s Common and Foreign Security Policy and is eager to
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become a contributor to European security, resilience and defence readiness. At this stage, it however lacks the necessary institutional and industrial capacities.
The EU Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX) continues to support selected rule of law institutions and to act as second security responder in Kosovo, as part of a three-layer mechanism together with Kosovo Police as the first security responder and NATO’s Kosovo Force KFOR as the third.
Kosovo’s unresolved relations with Serbia represent one of the most serious challenges to regional stability and security, which is the subject of the EU-facilitated Dialogue on the normalisation of relations between Serbia and Kosovo.
Democratic resilience
Kosovo is showing a growing commitment to strengthening democratic resilience, though its capacities are still developing. Elections are peaceful, competitive and generally well managed. At the same time, protracted periods of political stalemate have put a strain on institutional stability. There is susceptibility to disinformation, including false news, AI- generated content, and foreign information manipulation and interference. Weaknesses remain in online media regulation, in interinstitutional coordination and rapid response mechanisms, which leave Kosovo vulnerable to related threats. There is no fully institutionalised mechanism for responding to hybrid threats foreign information manipulation and interference.
Economic security and resilience
Kosovo’s economic security remains constrained by a weak industrial base and high external dependencies. Kosovo lacks export-oriented industries, relying on diaspora remittances that primarily fuel consumption and construction rather than productive foreign direct investment. This results in chronic trade deficits and limited economic resilience.
Energy security is fragile: while domestic lignite provides supply autonomy, ageing and unreliable lignite-fired generation units, lack of energy storage and bottlenecks in the transmission and distribution grids cause recurring winter shortages and a slow transition to renewables. Critical raw materials offer potential, but low administrative capacity, investment strategy and barriers have prevented progress despite political ambitions.
Kosovo’s ICT sector is relatively strong, enabling IT service exports, but artificial intelligence development is hindered by energy-intensive demands and electricity supply issues. Cybersecurity is a priority requiring stronger institutional and financial engagement, while protection of critical infrastructure in energy, telecom, and transport would need enhanced risk management.
Resilience to economic coercion remains moderate. Structural indicators show limited capacity to absorb external shocks due to high import dependence. The EU is Kosovo’s main trading partner, however further market integration is hindered by an export structure concentrated in low value added products, while services linkages benefit from a large diaspora in EU Member States.
Defence and defence industrial dimension
Kosovo is an overall security beneficiary, with continued substantial international military and civilian presence. At present, the defence industrial dimension has become a policy priority. Kosovo is building its first ammunition factory in Gjakovë/Đakovica within a dedicated defence industrial zone. The core project is an ammunition plant currently developed by Türkiye’s MKE corporation, alongside a larger site meant to attract other defence-related investments. The government has linked the industrial push to a broader defence spending increase stating that the factory could become operational by late 2026, with initial production focused on NATO-standard ammunition.
Civil protection and disaster resilience
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Kosovo remains highly exposed to natural and human-induced risks, including floods, droughts, wildfires, landslides and other crises. Significant gaps remain in strengthening Kosovo’s resilience and enhancing its capacity to effectively prevent, prepare for and respond to disasters, both domestically and, where relevant, as part of response efforts beyond Kosovo.
6. EUROPEAN STANDARDS
CLUSTER 2: INTERNAL MARKET
This cluster covers: the free movement of goods (Chapter 1); freedom of movement for workers (Chapter 2); right of establishment and freedom to provide services (Chapter 3); free movement of capital (Chapter 4); company law (Chapter 6); intellectual property law (Chapter 7); competition policy (Chapter 8); financial services (Chapter 9), and consumer and health protection (Chapter 28).
Chapter 1 – Free movement of goods
The free movement of goods ensures that many products can be traded freely across the EU based on common rules and procedures. Where products are governed by national rules, the principle of the free movement of goods prevents these rules from creating unjustified barriers to trade.
General principles
Regarding the general principles, there was no progress on alignment with EU acquis on market surveillance, conformity assessment, mutual recognition of goods or on metrology. The sub-legal acts for the Law on general product safety were adopted.
Non-harmonised areas
The screening of Kosovo’s legislation to eliminate trade barriers and to ensure alignment with the obligations under Articles 34-36 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) continues to progress slowly due to limited capacity and human resources.
Harmonised area: quality infrastructure
The Kosovo Standardisation Agency is still not able to become a full member of the Committee for Standardisation (CEN)/European Committee for Electro-technical Standardisation (CENELEC) due to the status of Kosovo. Its online e-standard system is still partly compatible with that of CEN/CENELEC; alternative solutions are needed to adopt standards more quickly.
The Accreditation Directorate of Kosovo has not yet signed a European Accreditation Multilateral Agreement (EA MLA). A new Regulation on internal organisation and systematisation of jobs has been adopted. The number of conformity assessment bodies in Kosovo has increased to 74, providing testing (52) and inspection (22) services, but no certification services yet, while the number of assessors has increased to 91.
In January 2026, the Constitutional Court upheld the Assembly’s adoption of the Law on the central inspectorate of market surveillance. A new Regulation on internal organisation and systematisation of jobs has also been adopted. Kosovo needs to complete and adopt its new Law on inspection and product conformity to align with the EU acquis on market surveillance, conformity assessment, and mutual recognition. During the reporting period, an estimated number of 6334 market surveillance inspections were carried out, leading to 580 fines, and 100 cases were sent to the court.
The Kosovo Metrology Agency is not yet an associate member of the European Association of National Metrology Institutes (EURAMET). Kosovo needs to complete and adopt its new
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Law on metrology to further align with the EU acquis on measuring instruments, pre- packaged products, measuring containers, and non-automatic weighing instruments.
The standardisation, accreditation, metrology and market surveillance bodies and the Quality Infrastructure Division of the Ministry of Industry, Entrepreneurship, Trade and Innovation still authorities lack the necessary capacity and staffing to implement and enforce the relevant EU acquis.
Harmonised area: sectoral legislation
There was no progress on alignment with the EU ‘new and global approach’ product acquis. There was no progress either on alignment with the EU ‘old approach’ product acquis, including on vehicles, REACH and chemical labelling (CLP), or on procedural measures. Sufficient staffing to implement the EU acquis in these areas needs to be ensured.
Chapter 2 – Freedom of movement for workers
Nationals of one Member State have the right to work in another Member State and must be given the same working and social conditions as other worker nationals of that Member State.
Regarding access to the labour market, work permits are still required for EU nationals and their family members to be eligible to work in Kosovo. In the reporting period, Kosovo’s Employment Agency issued 553 short-term work permits, of which 390 for EU nationals.
On the coordination of social security systems, no progress on bilateral agreements conclusion was reported.
The Kosovo Employment Agency has allocated dedicated resources within its new organisational structure to prepare for participation in the European Network of Employment Services (EURES). A preparatory analysis to support this participation was conducted with the assistance of the Regional Cooperation Council and an activity related to the alignment of the legal framework and strengthening the institutional capacities is included in the Migration Strategy 2026-2030.
There was no progress in implementing legislation to preserve the supplementary pension rights of mobile workers who have worked abroad, including in EU Member States.
There was no progress on the European Health Insurance Card over the reporting period.
Chapter 3 – Right of establishment and freedom to provide services
EU natural and legal persons have the right to establish themselves in any Member State and to provide cross-border services. For certain regulated professions, there are rules on mutual recognition of qualifications. EU rules on postal services focus on improving the quality of universal service, gradual market opening to competition, and the establishment of an independent regulator.
On the right of establishment and freedom to provide services, Kosovo remains partially aligned with the EU acquis on services. The implementation of the 2024-2026 action plan to align with the EU Service Directive is progressing slowly. Delays stem from limited capacities within the inter-ministerial working group and the legal departments of concerned line ministries responsible for assessing the compliance of national legislation with the EU Services Directive. Further efforts are needed to transform the point of single contact (PSC) into a user-friendly online service delivery point.
On postal services, Kosovo’s legislation is aligned with the Postal Services Directive and Kosovo has adopted a Regulation on cross-border parcel delivery services, tariff transparency and reporting to align with the Regulation on cross-border parcel delivery services in July 2026. There is one universal service provider and 37 other operators active
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in the postal market. The institutional capacity of the regulatory authority needs to be strengthened to efficiently monitor and ensure compliance with the postal market rules. Kosovo started implementing a national postal strategy, focusing on a financially sustainable universal service in the context of digitalisation and increasing e-commerce.
Some progress was made in the area of recognition of professional qualifications, notably by drafting a new horizontal Law on the recognition of professional qualifications and related secondary legislation, including minimum training requirements for the seven sectoral professions. Amendments to sectoral laws and the Law on regulated professions were also prepared. The detailed list of 158 regulated professions was published. The national legislative acts for all regulated professions in Kosovo were screened. However, the Division for Regulated Professions within the Ministry of Education and Science remains understaffed to perform its new responsibilities effectively, alongside other competent authorities overseeing regulated professions.
Chapter 4 – Free movement of capital
In the EU, capital and investments must be able to move without restrictions, with common rules for cross-border payments. Banks and other economic operators apply certain rules to support the fight against money laundering and terrorist financing.
The area of capital movements is largely liberalised, although some restrictions remain. In particular, foreign exchange regulations impose maximum limits on banks' net open foreign currency positions, expressed as a percentage of their capital, which constitutes a residual restriction on the free movement of capital.
Kosovo made further progress in the area of payments. Following a Constitutional Court ruling of January 2026 annulling the previous Law on Payment Services on procedural grounds, Kosovo adopted a new Law in April 2026. The Law established the overall framework for payment services and related activities and aims to further align with key EU acquis, including PSD 2, EMD2, rules on payment accounts, interchange fees for card- based transactions, and instant credit transfers.
In the anti-money laundering and terrorist financing (AML/CFT) area, the Constitutional Court annulled amendments to the existing law in January 2026. A new law, aiming to align with the fourth and fifth EU Anti-Money Laundering Directives, was adopted by the Assembly in October 2026. Kosovo should also adopt the secondary legislation stemming from the Law on implementation of targeted international financial sanctions.
Following the entry into force of the new Law on the Register of Beneficial Owners in December 2024, the authorities have prepared five implementing bylaws which are pending adoption. The Law provides the legal basis for enhancing the transparency of ownership and control. However, the central register of beneficial owners has not yet been fully established and operationalised, limiting the effective access of competent authorities to beneficial ownership information. In October 2025, the Financial Intelligence Unit finalised the non- profit organisations sectoral terrorist financing risk assessment, which remains pending government approval. In April 2026, the national risk assessment on AML/CFT was finalised and submitted to the government for adoption. Once adopted, the findings should be reflected in targeted risk mitigating measures.
In 2025, Kosovo received 974 suspicious transaction reports, a 9% increase compared with 2024. Kosovo still needs to strengthen interinstitutional cooperation to address these issues effectively.
Chapter 6 – Company law
The EU has common rules on the formation, registration and disclosure requirements of a company, with complementary rules for accounting and financial reporting, and statutory audit.
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On company law and corporate governance, the draft Law on Business Organisations was finalised but remains to be reviewed and adopted. The law should regulate specific fields required by the EU company law acquis, which are not yet fully reflected in Kosovo’s legislation, such as the minimum capital requirement, shareholders’ rights (including the encouragement of long-term shareholder engagement), company takeovers and the disclosure of information about companies and their branches. Kosovo should also align with the EU Directive on the use of digital tools and the EU Directive on cross-border operations (mergers, divisions, conversions) and complete alignment with the Directive 2024/1760 on corporate sustainability due diligence (CSDDD), as amended by the Directive (EU) 2026/470 (Omnibus I).
The Kosovo Business Registration Agency made some improvements by digitalising entirely the registration process for new businesses. It needs, however, to further improve its technical infrastructure (database) and continue preparations for future interconnection with the Business Registers Interconnection System in line with the EU acquis.
On company reporting and statutory audit, amendments to the Law on Accounting, Financial reporting and Audit remain pending before the Assembly. The existing law is still only partially aligned with the EU acquis and including on country-by-country reporting and on corporate sustainability reporting.
The Kosovo Council for Financial Reporting continues to publish accounting documents. However, the mandates of the Council and its affiliated bodies (Public Oversight Board, Investigation and Disciplinary Committee, Licensing Committee and Accounting and Auditing Standards Committee) had expired in December 2024. While members of the Council have recently been appointed, the oversight bodies have not been renewed. The draft amendments to the Law on Accounting, Financial Reporting and Audit are expected to introduce sustainability reporting requirements. Under the current legal framework, companies are not required to prepare or publish sustainability reports. Significant gaps persist in disclosure requirements, including the publication of companies in certain legal situations including companies subject to insolvency proceedings, and there is no legal obligation to publish financial statements and audit reports of public and private limited liability companies in the business register.
Statutory audits continue to be conducted in line with international auditing standards. However, the public oversight framework requires further strengthening, and reporting requirements for large companies are not yet fully enforced.
Chapter 7 – Intellectual property law
The EU has to a large extent harmonised rules for the legal protection and enforcement of copyright and related rights, as well as of industrial property rights, including trademarks, designs, patents and related supplementary protection certificates (SPCs), geographical indications (GIs), including craft and industrial GIs.
Following the entry into force of the new Law on copyright and related rights in 2023, further key implementing acts were adopted. While legislation is partially aligned with the EU acquis, implementation and enforcement remain weak. The Office for Copyright and Related Rights is still in urgent need of additional resources to ensure effective implementation. In October 2025, the new collective management organisation (CMO) Kosova Music Rights Society was launched. However, a CMO for literary and visual arts right holders has yet to be established.
During the reporting period, enforcement institutions and police forces seized at least 717 pirated books and copyright-infringing materials, during a joint operation in September in Prishtina and Podujevë.
In the field of industrial property rights, the Industrial Property Agency remained understaffed, despite internal structural reforms and progress in the
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digitalisation of services, improving online registers. Although legislation governing patents, trademarks, designs, trade secrets, and topographies of semiconductor products is in place, the Agency still lacks a comprehensive long-term strategy beyond the 2025-2027 Industrial Property Programme.
In 2025, the Agency received 2 216 applications for trademarks, 8 for patents and 73 for industrial designs (compared to 2 171, 11 and 65 last year). Additionally, the Agency issued 7 746 official documents and published 10 Official Bulletins listing 6 082 industrial property objects.
Some enforcement actions were carried out. However, the State Intellectual Property Council and the Task Force against Piracy remain under-resourced and lack effective coordination tools, such as an integrated e-platform. Lengthy procedures and weak sanctions continue to hinder IPR enforcement. Kosovo Customs again reported several large-scale seizures during the reporting period. A Creative Economy Strategy 2026-2035 has been under preparation.
The Commercial Court handled IPR-related cases efficiently. The collaboration with the European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO) was enhanced through a newly launched support programme for the Western Balkans and a first EUIPO mission to Kosovo.
Copyright infringement remains a concern, especially in the publishing and education sectors. The Anti-Piracy Task Force continued implementing its action plan and seized approximately 20 suspected counterfeit branded products, including sportswear, bags and textiles, as well as 717 suspected pirated books, and carried out 49 inspections. The capacities of enforcement bodies remain limited, underscoring the need for stronger policies and institutional support for authors and creators.
Limited progress was made regarding the collective management of copyright and related rights. A new Collective Management Organisation (CMO) in the field of music copyright was licenced in October 2025. Despite additional awareness-raising campaigns of the CMO for the audiovisual sector, effective implementation and enforcement remain challenging, particularly regarding user compliance and the practical functioning of the system.
Chapter 8 – Competition policy
EU rules protect free competition. They include antitrust rules against restrictive agreements between companies and abuse of a dominant position, and rules on concentrations between companies which would significantly impede effective competition. EU rules also set out a system of State aid control. Governments are only allowed to grant State aid if restrictive conditions are met, with a view to preventing distortion of competition.
Antitrust and mergers
The legislative framework on antitrust and mergers is partially aligned with the EU acquis. The amendments to the Law on competition and relevant pieces of secondary legislation which had already been prepared were not yet adopted.
On the institutional framework, the Kosovo Competition Authority is responsible for implementing the legal framework, while the Kosovo Competition Commission acts as the decision-making body.
As regards its capacity to enforce competition law, the Kosovo Competition Commission has been operating with only two members since June 2025 effectively bringing its decision- making ability to a standstill. As a result, it has not adopted any decisions during this period. The Kosovo Competition Authority requested approval for 11 additional staff members to address the growing workload. It continued advocacy at institutional level on bid-rigging in public procurement procedures. The 2025 annual report was submitted to the Assembly at the end of March 2026.
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On implementation, the Kosovo Competition Authority issued two professional opinions during the reporting period.
No progress was made in enforcing competition rules through fines and remedies due to the lack of decision-making capacity within the Competition Commission. No dawn raids were conducted, and the leniency programme has still not been used
State aid
The legislative framework on State aid is broadly aligned with the EU acquis. Recent changes at the EU level were incorporated into the draft Law on state aid, which is under preparation. That law and other important by-laws on horizontal aid, including block exemptions, de minimis aid, services of general economic interest (SGEI), and regional aid, remain to be adopted.
As regards the institutional framework, no progress was made in addressing the mandate of the State Aid Commission expired in 2021. Additionally, the government has not established a new Commission. As a result, State aid control remains on hold. The State Aid Department, within the Ministry of Finance, is responsible for assessing State aid proposals, drafting assessment reports for the State Aid Commission and updating the State aid inventory. All management positions in the Department have been filled, and the recruitment of 10 additional staff is ongoing.
On implementation, no decisions could be adopted during the reporting period without a functional State Aid Commission. The State Aid Department has developed a State aid control information system for online notification and monitoring and re-started training for local and regional State aid providers in spring 2025. The annual reports on State aid have not been submitted to the Assembly for the fourth consecutive year.
Liberalisation
Public undertakings in Kosovo are subject to the Law on competition and the Law on State aid. Kosovo has monopolies of a commercial nature within the meaning of Article 37 TFEU. There is a need to raise awareness of how State aid rules apply to the activities of central institutions and publicly owned enterprises.
Chapter 9 – Financial services
EU rules aim at ensuring fair competition among financial institutions, and the stability and integrity of financial markets, namely in the field of banking, insurance, supplementary pensions, investment services and securities. They include rules on authorisation, operation and supervision of these institutions.
On banks and financial conglomerates, the amended Law on banks entered into force in January 2026 following a Constitutional Court review, further aligning with the EU acquis on capital requirements and the bank recovery and resolution framework. It provides the legal basis to establish a Resolution Fund, designates the Central Bank of Kosovo (CBK) as the resolution authority, and creates a dedicated institutional framework for bank recovery and resolution. The CBK has started operationalising the new framework by establishing a dedicated Recovery and Resolution Department. However, secondary legislation still needs to be adopted, the Resolution Fund needs to be established, and institutional capacity needs further strengthening before the framework becomes fully operational. Some progress has been made in implementing the Supervisory Review and Evaluation Process (SREP) roadmap, aiming to fully transition to risk-based supervision by 2027. Further strengthening of supervisory capacity, data availability and analytical tools is needed to support its implementation. While the Kosovo Deposit Insurance Fund further increased its available financial means, its legal framework remains partially aligned with the EU Deposit Guarantee Scheme Directive.
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Regarding insurance and occupational pensions, no progress was made. The system for setting motor third party liability tariffs remains non risk-based. Kosovo remains outside the Green Card system. There was no progress on occupational pensions or alignment with the Solvency II framework.
Securities markets and investment services are at an early stage, with activity largely limited to government securities. Kosovo’s financial market rules are not in line with the EU acquis and no progress was made in the reporting period.
There was limited progress on sustainable and digital finance. An amended Law on crypto assets is needed to address shortcomings identified during its implementation, and oversight capacities need to be further strengthened. The new Law on payment services, adopted in April 2026, represents a positive step in aligning with the digital finance acquis by incorporating open banking and authentication requirements (see also Chapter 4- Free movement of capital).
Chapter 28 – Consumer and health protection
EU rules protect consumers’ economic interests also ensure product safety, prevent dangerous imitations and establish liability for defective products. The EU also guarantees a high level of protection of public health and in particular also ensures high common standards for tobacco control, blood, tissues, cells and organ, and human and veterinary medicinal products. The EU also has rules for upholding patients’ rights in cross-border healthcare and in preparing for and responding to serious cross-border health threats, including communicable diseases.
Consumer protection
On horizonal aspects, the new Law on consumer protection remains to be adopted. Enforcement of consumer rights remains limited. There are indications of inconsistent implementation of the requirement to provide product labels in Kosovo’s official languages, as regards Serbian-language labelling. At the same time, the Law itself is not fully consistent, as the rules on commodity content data require Albanian while allowing other official languages, creating legal uncertainty as to the applicable language requirements.
Administrative capacities in the area of consumer protection, market surveillance and product safety remain to be further strengthened (see also Chapter 1 on market surveillance). Kosovo is yet to align with the new EU acquis on general product safety. On non-safety issues, the weakness of consumer rights organisations remains a challenge.
Public health
On public health policy, the implementation of the 2025-2030 Health Sector Strategy remains slow. The new law on Mandatory Health Insurance has been adopted by the Parliament. New laws on health, reproductive health, medically assisted fertilisation and mental health remain to be adopted.
In 2025, Kosovo’s health budget was EUR 358.8 million, 3.9% of the GDP, marking an increase compared to 2024. However, the allocated funding was not fully used, and it remains significantly lower than the EU average. Out-of-pocket health expenditure are estimated at around 40%. Strategic purchasing of health products is insufficient, resulting in significant inefficiencies of the health system and weaker health outcomes. Expenditures on pharmaceuticals remain the largest financial burden and impact mostly the poorest households.
Life expectancy at birth in Kosovo remains lower than the EU average, but the UN Inter- Agency Group for Child Mortality Estimation (UN IGME) 2026 Report noted significant progress in child survival rates.
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Kosovo’s e-health system remains fragmented, incomplete, and is not fully functional. Electronic health records are not available, limiting the continuity of care, performance monitoring and strategic purchasing.
Non-communicable diseases are the leading cause of death. In 2025, Kosovo established 49 health resource centres (at primary health care level) to improve access to early diagnosis, continuous treatment, patient education and long-term disease management for hypertension, type 2 diabetes and asthma.
The Law on tobacco control is not enforced comprehensively, and smoking prevalence remains high. Enforcement mechanisms are insufficient, and inspection capacity remains limited.
Mental health services remain integrated. Kosovo is yet to revise the existing Law on mental health.
The legislation on blood, tissues, cells and organs is partly aligned with the EU acquis.
On communicable diseases and serious cross-border threats to health, Kosovo has further strengthened its capacities in the surveillance of communicable diseases by including all 82 diseases as per EU recommendations. Kosovo has approved the ‘One Health’ Action Plan against Antimicrobial Resistance as recommended by the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control. Routine immunisation coverage for 2025 remained at around 89%. Measles, Mumps, and Rubella vaccine coverage declined from 89% to 82% in 2025 vaccinations. Coverage of the Kosovo Roma, Ashkali and Egyptian communities remains a concern, with rates below 40%.
The cancer screeningprogramme is not performed systematically, while the cancer registry is in place. The Ministry of Health has approved its Cervical Cancer Screening Action Plan, however the implementation has yet to begin.
There was no progress on alignment in the areas of patients’ rights in cross-border healthcare, on medical products for human use, on medical devices, or on veterinary medicinal products, which all remain partially aligned with the EU acquis, or on health technology assessment. The list of essential medicines has been updated. However, despite the increasing health budget, some essential medicines remain unavailable on a regular basis. There were also no developments on reducing the harmful alcohol use, on drug abuse and prevention, or on nutrition and physical activity.
Health inequalities remain a serious concern. Persistent issues with health financing and financial protection have hampered progress towards universal healthcare and has exacerbated inequalities. This financial burden is particularly difficult for the vulnerable and poor portion of the society, including women, pensioners, children, and people with disabilities and chronic conditions.
The Kosovo Serb community continues to primarily rely upon Serbia-supported primary and secondary healthcare institutions in Kosovo. The status of Serbia-supported healthcare institutions is expected to be addressed within the EU-facilitated Dialogue.
The Ministry of Health has updated its 2025-2027 Institutional Integrity Plan with a view to preventing corruption, promoting transparency and accountability and ensuring it fulfils its role of protecting and improving public health in Kosovo.
CLUSTER 3: COMPETITIVENESS AND INCLUSIVE GROWTH
This cluster covers: digital transformation and media (Chapter 10); taxation (Chapter 16); economic and monetary policy (Chapter 17); social policy and employment (Chapter 19); industrial policy (Chapter 20), science and research (Chapter 25); education and culture (Chapter 26); and the customs union (Chapter 29).
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Chapter 10 – Digital transformation and media
The EU supports the smooth functioning of the internal market for electronic communications, electronic commerce and audiovisual services. The rules protect consumers and support the universal availability of modern services.
In the area of electronic communications, broadband coverage remains at 100%. However, progress on high-speed broadband infrastructure remains limited. Investment constraints in the private sector and reliance on outdated cable infrastructure continue to hinder improvements in network quality.
Administrative barriers to infrastructure deployment persist due to incomplete harmonisation of legislation governing construction and permitting. Kosovo needs to align with the European Electronic Communications Code, finalise and adopt the new Law on electronic communications, and align with the EU Gigabit Infrastructure Act, the EU Connectivity Toolbox, and the revised Guidelines on State aid for broadband networks. The resources of the Electronic and Postal Communications Regulatory Authority remain limited compared with its mandate, hindering its effectiveness in overseeing an evolving digital market. Alignment with the Digital Services Act and Digital Markets Act needs to be stepped up. The European emergency number is operational, but it still needs to be brought fully in line with European standards.
In the area of digital services, the e-Kosova platform continues to offer online services, with ongoing efforts to improve user access and functionality. The share of fully digitalised public services remains low, and interoperability between government systems remains limited. Alignment with the EU framework on open data, the reuse of public sector information, and the Interoperable Europe Act remain incomplete and further efforts are needed to ensure compliance with accessibility standards to digital public services. Kosovo needs to take steps to build the societal and institutional capacity and to establish the legal basis to effectively support the enforcement of the Digital Services Act and the Digital Markets Act as of EU accession.
Regarding digital trust and cybersecurity, Kosovo needs to accelerate efforts to transpose and implement the EU NIS 2 Directive. The Cybersecurity Agency and the National Cyber Security Council are not yet fully operational. The authorities need to develop comprehensive policies to ensure a safer internet for children. Kosovo should also continue implementing the EU 5G Cybersecurity Toolbox measures. Kosovo should ensure alignment with the new EU Digital Identity Framework. The deployment of the government’s national digital identity and eWallet is progressing.
On artificial intelligence (AI), Kosovo should strengthen institutional readiness and develop AI regulation and the necessary governance and enforcement structures in line with the EU AI Act.
On media, governance issues continued to affect the functioning of the Independent Media Commission. The lack of quorum until April 2026 hampered decision-making, including on key regulatory matters.
Chapter 16 – Taxation
EU rules on taxation cover value added tax, excise duties and aspects of corporate taxation. They also cover cooperation between tax administrations, including the exchange of information to prevent tax evasion.
In the area of indirect taxation, VAT rates are aligned with the EU acquis. The Tax Administration of Kosovo (TAK) reported an 8.4% increase in revenues from indirect taxation in 2025, with growth recorded across all subcategories, including VAT. VAT refund applications were treated within 23.6 days on average, a slight improvement compared to 2024.
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In the area of direct taxation, Kosovo uses a progressive taxation for individuals, with rates ranging from 0% to 10%. The standard corporate income tax and capital gains tax remains relatively low at 10%. Kosovo remains committed to implementing the inclusive framework on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) minimum standards, although it has not yet joined the BEPS inclusive framework.
On administrative cooperation and mutual assistance, a new double taxation agreement between Kosovo and Italy entered into force in January 2026. TAK continues to benefit from the EU FISCALIS programme 2021-2027. TAK should prioritise tackling international tax avoidance and evasion practices, while building technical and human capacities to manage international tax risks. While TAK has continued the implementation of modern Compliance Risk Management methodologies, no formal tax gap assessment has been performed.
On operational capacity and digitalisation, TAK has continued to advance in service digitalisation and service delivery. The replacement of fiscal cash registers with fully functional software is an important step under implementation by TAK and the Ministry of Finance, but it faces delay. TAK needs to further strengthen professional capacities and improve the effectiveness of tax audit functions. Fair, transparent and merit-based recruitment is a prerequisite for efficient TAK. TAK's IT infrastructure remains outdated.
Chapter 17 – Economic and monetary policy
EU rules require the independence of central banks and prohibit them from directly financing the public sector. Member States coordinate their economic policies and are subject to fiscal, economic and financial surveillance.
Fiscal policy remains Kosovo’s principal macroeconomic policy tool, given its lack of an autonomous monetary policy and conventional monetary policy instruments. Kosovo’s use of the euro as its legal tender is fully distinct from euro area membership.
The Law on the Central Bank of Kosovo (CBK) is currently being reviewed to strengthen its governance. The review includes rebalancing responsibilities between the governing board and the executive board and strengthening the governing board’s oversight roles. An action plan to improve CBK’s transparency is being developed.
On economic policy, fiscal rules are well-established in legislation and largely adhered to. Discussions on a new budget framework law are ongoing. One objective of the new law would be to align the fiscal governance framework (in place since 2008) with the revised EU framework, including on fiscal rules.
There was limited progress in aligning the annual budgetary process with the medium-term policy framework. In the absence of an approved medium-term expenditure framework (MTEF) 2026–2028, due to the political deadlock throughout 2025, the 2026 budget was prepared based on projected expenditure ceilings and policy priorities of the MTEF 2025– 2027. No steps were taken towards establishing an independent fiscal review body to enhance budget oversight. The 2026–2028 Economic Reform Programme (ERP) was submitted on time and sets out Kosovo’s key macroeconomic and fiscal policies. To better support multilateral surveillance, however, the ERP could be strengthened by incorporating more realistic macroeconomic forecasts, a long-term fiscal sustainability analysis, and an assessment of the budgetary impact of key fiscal measures. The policy guidance set out in the conclusions of the Economic and Financial Dialogue with Regional Partners of May 2025 has been partially implemented.
Chapter 19 – Social policy and employment
EU rules in the social field include minimum requirements for labour law, equality and non- discrimination, health, and safety at work. They also promote social inclusion, social protection, and social dialogue at EU level.
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The adoption of the amendments to the legislation on labour and on health and safety at work, which would ensure further alignment with the EU acquis, remains pending.
In 2025, the Labour Inspectorate implemented the roll-out of the Electronic Case Management System to improve the efficiency of inspection procedures, replacing paper processes. Sixty additional inspectors were recruited, bringing the total to 120. The Inspectorate also organised an awareness campaign on occupational safety and health. During 2025, the number of reported non-fatal occupational accidents rose to 621, up from 512 in 2024 – an increase that may also reflect improved awareness and reporting practices, given Kosovo’s ongoing challenge with underreporting. The number of occupational fatalities increased to 19 in 2025, up from seven in 2024.
Social dialogue remains limited. The capacity of social partners, in the public and to a larger extent in the private sector, requires strengthening. The mandate of the Social Economic Council (SEC) expired in 2023 given that none of the unions meet the legal representation threshold required for SEC membership. Amendments to the relevant legislation remains pending.
On employment policy, the employment and labour market strategy for 2024-2028 and its action plan are in place, however the adoption of a new regulation on active labour market measures and a new Law on employment are still pending. The overall activity rate stood at 48.9% in Q2 2025, an increase compared to Q4 2024 (43%). The minimum wage increased from EUR 350 in 2024 to EUR 425 in January 2026 and further to EUR 500 from 1 July 2026.
The rate of young people not in employment, not in education, nor in training (NEET) remains high, disproportionately affecting women and young people from rural areas. According to the Labour Force Survey (LFS), in Q3 2025 NEET rates were 33.4% of the total youth population. In response, during the reporting period, women and young people have been the principal beneficiaries of active labour market policies in Kosovo. However, women remain under-represented in the labour market, with only 21% of women active.
The Youth Guarantee (YG) Scheme remains in the pilot stage in two municipalities as a result of significant structural challenges, including under-resourced institutions, limited data collection mechanisms, and insufficient coordination across employment services, education providers and the private sector. The government finalised the restructuring plan for the Employment Agency and a new regulation is planned for adoption this year. The labour market information system, supporting evidence-based policymaking and planning, is outdated and lacks operational capacity in critical areas.
Regarding labour force participation and unemployment rate, see the statistical annex and the section on the functioning of the labour market under 2.3. Economic criteria.
On social protection and inclusion, since May 2024, Kosovo has been piloting a proxy means-tested social assistance system, supported by the World Bank to better target poverty. Under the new Social Assistance Scheme (SAS), the first payments began October 2024, reaching 4 000 families, a number which was reduced to 3 400 during the reporting period after the means testing and field monitoring found that they either were ineligible to benefit from the scheme, or beneficiaries were succesfully employed through job activation measures. The reform seeks to modernise the service delivery systems, including the development of the Social Registry Management System and the integration of the SAS management information system into a comprehensive Social Welfare Information System. It also upgrades the payment processes, promotes online application and enrolment, and strengthens outreach to vulnerable communities, and other discriminated groups, including women. Additionally, the project encompasses labour market activation measures for SAS beneficiaries, including women. Over 800 SAS recipients received training or were placed in jobs through the programme in the reporting period. It remains crucial to address the weak capacities of the Centres for Social Work at the local level. The project partly addressed
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these challenges by recruiting around 200 job counsellors and social workers. Respective departments at the central level (the Department for Social Services and the Department for Child Protection) are understaffed.
The universal child benefit programme was expanded to cover 391 904 children aged 0-16, providing additional monthly financial support. The scheme continues to provide women with the opportunity to open bank accounts to receive the benefits. Families now receive EUR 30 per child, and EUR 45 per child for families with three or more children.
The quality of the social services provided at the municipal level remains limited. The government contracting of NGO services requires a sustained and institutionalised approach to prevent interruptions in services. Combined with a lack of stable multiannual funding, insufficient number of social workers, and low salaries for social workers, capacities to provide quality social services are limited. Municipalities have not hired new social workers specialised in gender-based violence as provided by legislation. The capacity of municipalities concerning service planning and delivery, data collection, gender analysis and integrated care is weak. Around 9% of children are involved in work, of whom 5.6% are working under hazardous conditions. This issue is particularly prevalent among the Kosovo Roma and Ashkali communities.
In the field of non-discrimination in employment and social policy, Kosovo still needs to align its legal framework with the relevant EU acquis, including the Employment Equality Directive and the Racial Equality Directive. More efforts are needed to address challenges in this field, for example with regard to hiring procedures, promotion and pay. Persons with disabilities continue to face persistent inequality in accessing the labour market.
On equality between women and men in employment and social policy, Kosovo needs to align with the relevant gender equality EU acquis, including the application of the principle of equal treatment for men and women in matters of social security, employment and self- employment and improving the gender balance on company boards, maternity leave, work- life balance for parents and carers, and pay transparency. Kosovo’s labour market continues
to face a significant gender participation gap as 67% of those active in the labour market are men and only 32% are women according to the LFS for Q3 2025. The unemployment rate for women is 17.9% compared to 7.8% for men. Enhancing access to child and elderly care and support and community-based
solutions for independent living for persons with disabilities can help boost women’s labour force participation. Sexual harassment and gender discrimination cases in the workplace are common but underreported. Labour inspectors and judges need training to better address the issue of gender-based discrimination. The government continued to allocate funds to compensate young mothers on maternity leave and increased the amount to EUR 500 in line with the changes of the minimum wage.
On the preparation of the European Social Fund, Kosovo has concluded the negotiations with the EU on its participation in the Employment and Social Innovation Strand (EaSI) of the
57.7%
24.2%
60.7%
25.4%
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Men Women Men Women Men Women
2023 2024 2025*
Graph 25: Kosovo - Economic activity rate by sex
Economic activity rate of the population aged 15-64 (%)
Unemployment rate of the population aged 15-64 (%), total
Source: ECFIN*The average of the first 3 quarters of 2025
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European Social Fund + (ESF+). The agreement is pending ratification in the parliament. (see Chapter 22 – Regional policy and coordination of structural instruments).
Chapter 20 – Enterprise and industrial policy
EU industrial policy strengthens competitiveness, facilitates structural change, and encourages a business-friendly environment that stimulates small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs).
As regards industrial policy and competitiveness,Kosovo has a comprehensive Strategy for Industrial Development and Business Support 2023–2030 in place. Only 51% of actions planned for 2023–2025 were implemented, mainly due to a lack of financial resources. In February 2026, the Action Plan for years 2026-2028 was adopted.
Concerning enterprise policy and instruments, theKosovo Investment and Enterprise Support Agency has been transformed into the new Agency for Support to Enterprises and Innovation under the Ministry of Industry, Entrepreneurship, Trade and Innovation, as per the new Law on sustainable investments. The organisational structure of the Agency for Investments and Export within the Prime Minister’s Office was approved in February 2026. These two agencies will play an important role in assisting companies and attracting foreign direct investment, as well as in providing after-care services for investors, thereby addressing long-standing issues and complaints by enterprises. On dispute settlements, the Commercial Court improved efficiency in resolving cases, and online mediation remained a viable tool for dispute resolution. The government continues to invest in industrial parks, while at the same time sponsoring assessments of their operation and functionality to orient its management policies in the future.
SMEs still face obstacles to accessing business support services and obtaining permits and licences, due to a lack of timely and professional responses to their requests and prolonged administrative procedures within Kosovo’s authorities due to limited capacities. Kosovo continued to extend services available on its e-government platform. Self-employed workers face a low tax burden and incorporated SMEs benefit from corporate income tax incentives. The simplification and digitalisation of services reduced tax compliance costs for SMEs. Kosovo needs to continue its efforts and diversify financing alternatives to address the barriers that early-stage businesses, as well as micro and small-sized enterprises, face in accessing finance. Small businesses continued to benefit from robust support in accessing bank finance through diversified e-credit guarantee schemes offered by the Kosovo Credit Guarantee Fund (KCGF). To date, the KCGF has guaranteed over EUR 1 billion to MSMEs in the sectors of production, service agriculture and trade, including start-up firms and women-owned businesses. The KCGF’s donor dependency has declined with increase of government share in the Fund’s capital. A new Law on Late Payments in Commercial Transactions is under preparation aiming to align with Directive 2011/7/EU on Combating Late Payment in Commercial Transactions
Kosovo showed renewed interest in the Single Market Highway initiative, participates in the SME Pillar of the Single Market Programme and is part of the Enterprise Europe Network.
In the area of sectoral initiatives, Kosovo has a tourism strategy for 2024-2030 and an implementing plan for the first two years in place. However, monitoring of implementation has only been carried out for 2024 and published in June 2025.
Chapter 25 – Science and research
The EU provides significant support to research and innovation. All Member States can participate in the EU’s research and innovation programmes and benefit from them, especially where there are scientific excellence and solid investment in research and innovation.
There has been no progress during the reporting period in terms of legislation. The Smart
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Specialisation Strategy remains in draft version. The policy framework for scientific research continues to be primarily set out through the 2013 Law on scientific research activities and the National Research Programme 2023-2028, which set out general objectives and priorities for the sector.
The Law on innovation and entrepreneurship, which includes the establishment of an Innovation Fund, remains to be adopted by the Assembly, while the Innovation Strategy 2030 is awaiting approval by the government.
In April 2026, the government launched an Innovation Grant Scheme for Dual Education, which will support consortia between businesses and educational institutions, including trainers/teachers from vocational schools
Based on the data provided by the Ministry of Education and Science, the budget allocated to scientific research in 2026 increased by 35% compared to 2025, from EUR 1 775 819 in 2025 to EUR 2 404 800 in 2026 (0.16% of GDP). This does not include universities and research institutes, which have separate budgets for scientific research. Comprehensive and reliable data on research and innovation indicators remains limited.
During the reporting period, a total of 160 proposals were submitted to the Horizon Europe programme, resulting in the awarding of 4 projects worth EUR 680 000.
The European Cooperation in Science and Technology (COST) actions have seen a steady increase in participation, particularly through the submission of action proposals. As of August 2026, there were 177 active COST actions with Kosovo’s involvement, representing 65.6% of the running actions.
Chapter 26 – Education and culture
The EU supports cooperation in education and culture through funding programmes and the coordination of Member State policy through the ‘open method of coordination’. The EU and the Member States must also prevent discrimination and ensure quality education for children of migrant workers, including those from disadvantaged backgrounds.
Public funding for education continued to increase in nominal terms, with the 2026 education budget reaching EUR 418.6 million, including higher allocations at both central and municipal levels, representing 5.10% of the national budget and 3.7% of the GDP, below the EU average of 4.7% of GDP (2023).
The Ministry of Education and Science started preparatory works to draft a new Education Strategy 2035+. The mid-term review of the 2022-2026 strategy has not been published, and the new strategy as of 2027 is yet to reach public consultation. The Law on the state matura examination was adopted during the reporting period, the draft Law on VET and adult education remains pending as well as the Law on Texbooks. Higher Education continues to be governed by the 2011 Law on higher education.
Work to implement the legal and regulatory framework for early childhood education (ECE) continued, including by increasing enrolment, structural quality standards, financing models, and cross-sector coordination. Timely adoption of the remaining secondary legislation remains essential for effective implementation. Reforms advanced through the approval of a new curriculum for children aged 0-6 and the establishment of a quality assurance framework for ECE. Systematic capacity-building and roll-out of new curricula remain necessary to achieve sustainable reforms.
Challenges remain in ensuring sufficient and predictable financing of staffing and operational costs, particularly for the implementation of the Law on early childhood education and the delivery of quality, inclusive education and care. Pre-school enrolment increased slightly, while enrolment in primary and lower secondary education continued to decline. Girls represented 48.4% of students at these levels.
Kosovo made some progress in early childhood education. Enrolment of children aged 0-2
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reached 8% in 2024/25 from 3.9% in 2023/24, while gross enrolment for 5-year-olds reached 87.1% in 2024-2025, a 4.3% increase from the previous year, following the introduction of mandatory pre-primary education. Gross enrolment for children aged 3-5 rose by 6.6% compared to 2023-2024, reaching 43.4%. Despite this progress, enrolment remains below EU and OECD benchmarks, and below the 45% target for 2026 set in Kosovo’s own Education Strategy, with further expansion constrained by weaknesses in public financial management capacity.
In 2024-2025, the net enrolment rate in primary school and lower secondary education (grades 1-9) is 95.4%, a decrease of 0.5% from the previous year. The gross enrolment rate in upper secondary education (grades 10-12) for 2024-25 is 86.4%. In January 2026, the Ministry of Education and Science initiated the review of school curricula and textbooks for grades 1-9, to improve the quality of education.
Concerning the results of the Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA) 2025 results showed 21% of students attained at least basic proficiency (Level 2 or higher) in science, 15% in mathematics and 16% in reading. Compared with 2022, results slightly declined in reading, while remaining stable in mathematics and science. Overall, the findings are in line with previous PISA cycles, which have consistently shown very low performance below the OECD average. Significant equity gaps persist, with students from low socio- economic backgrounds, rural areas, and non-majority communities performing worse. The Teaching and Learning International Survey (TALIS 2024) whose results were issued in October 2025, reported a mixed outcome. Teachers reported continued challenges related to motivation, career progression and working conditions, largely linked to the unresolved collective agreement and budget instability. A new strategic framework to transform teacher education by 2030 has been established in April 2026.
On vocational education and training (VET), efforts continued to strengthen the relevance of education and skills development in line with labour market needs through closer cooperation between academia and the private sector, work-based learning opportunities, and targeted non-formal training. In parallel to the dual VET profiles, school-based VET should be maintained and harmonised, especially in smaller municipalities. Dual education has progressed, offering 16 qualifications in dual mode since the academic year of 2025- 2026 (4 more compared to 2024-2025). The draft Law on VET and adult education is pending adoption. Participation in adult learning was slightly above the EU average (11.5% vs 11.2% respectively), but still below the 60% EU target set for 2030.
Regarding inclusiveness, the participation of Kosovo Roma, Ashkali and Egyptian children in education remained significantly below the national average, with only 31% reaching upper secondary education compared to 87% nationally. Kosovo’s legal and policy framework promotes the education of children with disabilities within mainstream educational settings wherever possible, with specialised support provided according to individual needs. Resource centres are intended to function primarily as support institutions for mainstream inclusion rather than segregated educational institutions. According to the 2024-2025 Annual Education Statistics Report, approximately 3 872 children with disabilities attend mainstream preschools and schools in Kosovo. The legislative framework requires schools to provide accessible infrastructure, individualised support, assistants, and pedagogical accommodations to facilitate inclusion.
The Kosovo Serb community continues to use Serbia-supported education institutions at all levels. The status of these institutions is expected to be addressed within the EU-facilitated Dialogue. Challenges persist regarding the recognition of diplomas, professional qualifications and licences issued in Serbia, affecting Kosovo Serbs’ access to employment.
University programmes in other non-majority community languages face accreditation problems due to additional requirements they need to meet in line with the European Qualification Framework.
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In order to strengthen inclusive systems for children and young people with disabilities, more efforts should be made to ensure better access to quality inclusive education, assistive technologies, and tailored support services across youth programmes.
A Digital Competence Framework for teachers was adopted by the Ministry of Education and Science to standardise ICT skills in education. In 2026, the Ministry of Education started the preparation for national use of SELFIE for Teachers (with ETF) to assess the levels of teachers’ digital skills.
Regarding higher education, Kosovo continues to align its higher education system with the European Higer Education Area (EHEA) and the Bologna process. There are five higher education institutions from Kosovo participating in the European Universities Alliances as associated partners.
Kosovo benefits from the international dimension of the 2021-2027 Erasmus+ programme. The positive trend continued, with Kosovo registering the highest number of Erasmus Mundus Joint Master Degree scholarships for students in 2025 (15 participants) and the highest number of higher education projects compared to previous years. Kosovo participates in 3 Jean Monnet projects, while additional 4 project were selected in July 2026. Preparations started for establishing a dedicated Erasmus+ national agency, with a view to participation in the next programme period.
Regarding youth, Kosovo continued implementing the Youth Strategy 2024-2032. Despite challenges with the 2024-2026 Action Plan, the Agency for Youth Development was established, but strengthened operational capacities are needed. The Central Youth Council has been created but is not yet operational and is not currently a member of the European Youth Forum.
Kosovo has a National Sports Strategy 2025-2030, which defines sports development policies and seeks to implement reforms in the sports sector. The Strategy requires sports federations to allocate a minimum share of their funding to promote the participation of women and girls in sports. Kosovo continued participating in the European Week of Sport and is currently developing the infrastructure plan for the 2030 Mediterranean Games where preparations are behind schedule.
Kosovo needs to develop a strategy on culture. Cultural policies in Kosovo are set out in the Law on art and culture. Kosovo is not a party to the 2005 UNESCO Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions. Kosovo takes part in the Culture strand of the Creative Europe 2021-2027 programme, but its participation in the MEDIA strand requires the alignment of the Law on the Independent Media Commission with the EU’s Audiovisual Media Services Directive.
Chapter 29 – Customs union
All Member States are part of the EU customs union and follow the same customs rules and procedures. This requires legislative alignment as well as adequate implementing and enforcement capacity and access to and interoperability with EU electronic customs environment.
In the area of customs legislation, Kosovo’s Customs and Excise Code is in line with the Union Customs Code. Kosovo continued to develop secondary legislation in line with EU requirements. Kosovo has 29 mutual administrative agreements and memoranda of understanding on customs matters in place. Due to statehood issues and despite efforts made by Kosovo, there was no progress on Kosovo’s application to become an observer under the Common Transit Convention (CTC). A total of 12 authorised economic operators are currently licenced and their administrative management needs to be enhanced.
Border controls are performed based on risk approach, in line with the Revised Kyoto Convention and the related EU Customs Blueprints. As of March 2026, Kosovo Customs has
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introduced pre-arrival clearance, allowing for advanced submission and processing of declarations through ASYCUDA World, a significant step towards trade facilitation and risk analysis advancement. Inter-agency coordination was strengthened through the development of an electronic data link via web services with the Food and Veterinary Agency (AUV). On the rules of origin, Kosovo continues to apply the rules of origin of the revised Pan-Euro Mediterranean (PEM) Convention. The legislation on customs measures governing intellectual property rights (IPR) and export controls for cultural goods is aligned with the EU acquis. Kosovo has finalised the transition from private to publicly-owned customs terminals. As of March 2026, customs clearance was performed in publicly-owned customs terminals, abandoning or reducing applicable fees to consignments in line with the SAA between the EU and Kosovo.
Looking forward, Kosovo should ensure that no existing fee in contradiction with the SAA is applied or a new fee is introduced in the future. The Port of Durrës and Porto Palermo remain the main sea hubs used by Kosovo Customs for import of petrol and other oil derivates.
Kosovo Customs has an accredited and operational Customs Laboratory, which continues to participate in the Customs Laboratories European Network as an observer. During the last quarter of 2025, Kosovo obtained a mobile border scanner to support and strengthen its border control. Kosovo Customs updated and confirmed its mutual administrative assistance contract with the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF). Regular cooperation and information exchange with EU counterparts should continue to strengthen the fight against customs fraud, in particular the smuggling of tobacco products. Cooperation with OLAF should intensify.
The IT strategy and Action Plan to enhance the use of artificial intelligence (AI) in risk management is ongoing. Kosovo Customs currently resorts to ASYCUDA World and is undergoing technical preparations with the UN Trade and Development (UNCTAD) to migrate to ASYCUDA 5.
On administrative and operational capacities, Kosovo participates in the EU ‘Customs 2021-2027’ programme and in different fora at the World Customs Organisation. The organisational and administrative structure of Kosovo Customs requires further strengthening. The fight against undue practices and the reinforcement of accountability should remain a priority of the customs administration. In August 2026, Kosovo Customs updated its integrity plan to address integrity-related risks. Investment in infrastructure continued, alongside the development of new border facilities aimed at further strengthening the capacity of publicly managed terminals and improving the efficiency of customs operations. Further progress is needed to meet international infrastructure standards.
CLUSTER 4: THE GREEN AGENDA AND SUSTAINABLE GROWTH
This cluster covers: transport (Chapter 14); energy (Chapter 15); trans-European networks (Chapter 21); and environment and climate change (Chapter 27).
Chapter 14 – Transport
The EU has common rules for technical and safety standards, security, social standards, State aid and market liberalisation in road transport, railways, inland waterways, multimodal transport, aviation and maritime transport.
On transport matters, Kosovo remained actively engaged in the activities of the Transport Community. However, Kosovo still needs to strengthen its administrative and operational capacities to enhance coordination and ensure the timely implementation of infrastructure projects. Efforts must be stepped up to align with and implement the EU acquis across all areas of the transport sector and to ensure the timely execution of the next generation
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Transport Community Action Plans, endorsed in 2025. Kosovo should address transport- related climate resilience, promote the use of alternative fuels, and develop sustainable urban mobility plans that adhere to EU environmental and social standards.
On road transport, further efforts are needed to implement its intelligent transport systems strategy and align with the EU acquis on social and market rules in road transport. Kosovo still needs to set up a road asset management system. The existing crash data system is not compliant with the common accident data set (CADaS) protocol. Kosovo should increase efforts to raise awareness of road safety, establish a road safety agency with clear competencies and dedicated funding, and make further efforts to implement the road safety acquis. With 112 road fatalities reported in 2025, Kosovo is still far from the UN’s target of 56 by 2030. Alignment with the Directive on road infrastructure safety management and the creation of a system to increase the capacity of road safety inspectors and auditors remain priorities. Kosovo made no progress in implementing the rail transport acquis. Kosovo’s railway legislation still needs to be fully aligned with the market and technical pillars of the fourth railway package. The drafting of the Law on railway and a Law on railway safety and interoperability is still ongoing and should be prioritised for finalisation.
Air transport continues to face many challenges arising from Kosovo’s non-membership in several international civil aviation organisations. The NATO-led Kosovo Force (KFOR) still manages and coordinates the Kosovo airspace. Kosovo took measures to address institutional shortcomings of the Air Navigation Service Agency and the Civil Aviation Authority by recruiting and training specialised staff. Kosovo’s airspace saw an increase in passenger traffic during the reporting period. However, the persistent lack of revenue from airspace management remains a long-standing issue. While two outstanding issues remain to complete the first phase of the European Common Aviation Area (ECAA) Agreement requirements, Kosovo has adopted nine additional second-phase aviation safety regulations. In August 2026, Kosovo’s Civil Aviation Authority signed two Working Arrangements with the European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) under the ECAA framework, strengthening cooperation on aviation safety and data exchange.
On multimodal transport, the implementation of the Action Plan of the 2023–2030 multimodal transport strategy remained slow. Kosovo has not aligned with the Combined Transport Directive. Kosovo should also align with the regulation on electronic freight transport information (eFTI).
On passenger rights, Kosovo is aligned with the air passenger rights acquis. However, Kosovo should increase its efforts to implement the EU acquis in this field in all other modes of transport.
Chapter 15 – Energy
EU energy policy covers energy supply, infrastructure, the internal energy market, consumers, renewable energy, energy efficiency, nuclear energy, nuclear safety, and radiation protection.
Kosovo remains heavily reliant on outdated, highly polluting lignite-fired power plants, posing serious health and environmental risks. The start of environmental upgrade works in April 2026 marked progress after years of delay, but further efforts are needed to complete the
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Graph 26 - Road fatalities in Kosovo per 100 000 inhabitants
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Kosovo B thermal power plant upgrade, including investments in SO₂ emission reduction, and to decommission the non-operational units of the Kosovo A thermal power plant.
Kosovo made only limited progress on the security of supply and remains non-compliant with the oil acquis. The adoption of the draft Law on compulsory oil stockholding is pending and there are no procedures in place to release emergency oil stocks. Therefore, Kosovo remains dependent on stocks held for commercial purposes and uninterrupted imports, with Albania’s Adriatic ports serving as key supply route. To date, Kosovo does not plan to develop gas infrastructure. The transposition of the Risk Preparedness Regulation in the electricity sector is still to be completed.
Regarding the internal energy market, alignment with the Electricity Integration Package (EIP) is pending, as a result of the delays in the adoption of the Laws on energy, electricity and the energy regulator. While the Energy Regulatory Office (ERO) is formally financially independent, Ministry of Finance oversight of its budget may limit its operational autonomy. Constraints in staffing, remuneration and capacity affect the ability to effectively enforce market rules. The pending law should address these gaps and ensure its independence. On 5 October 2026, the Assembly elected the new ERO Chair and Board member, restoring the Board’s decision-making capacity and enabling ERO to resume the full exercise of its mandate.
The supply of smart meters for households and commercial consumers in the north of Kosovo was completed in October 2025 but installation of smart meters by the local electricity supply company is expected to be finalised by the end of 2026. The Serbian transmission system operator EMS has yet to determine net transmission capacities at the interconnection with Kosovo, which prevents cross-border capacities from being allocated to market participants. The lack of available interconnection capacity adversely affects security of supply and competition and raises power import prices.
The bulk supply agreement (BSA) between the Kosovo Electricity Supply Company (KESCO) and the Kosovo Electricity Corporation (KEK) remains an obstacle to the development of competition and market liquidity. At present, approximately 1300 large commercial consumers purchase their electricity on the liberalised electricity market from 8 suppliers, while a total of 30 suppliers licensed in Kosovo. In accordance with the EIP, Kosovo should continue opening the retail electricity market by ensuring that all non- household consumers not eligible for public intervention in retail price setting are supplied under market conditions, through predictable rules and in line with the relevant obligations set out in the Law on electricity. In parallel, Kosovo should fully align public interventions in retail price setting by limiting them to household customers and micro-enterprises, in accordance with the requirements set out in the EIP.
Concerning renewable energy sources (RES), no progress was achieved. Kosovo needs to adopt secondary legislation under the Law on renewables to complete alignment with the Renewable Energy Directive (RED II). While the wind auction launched in December 2024 is still ongoing, the previously awarded solar auction has since moved into implementation. Delays in the roll-out of renewable energy projects persist. Kosovo should launch the next round of renewable energy auctions, building on the capacity already awarded under its three-year auction plan, that needs to be updated for the period 2026–2028. During the reporting period, the installed RES capacity marginally increased to 339 MW, while the RES share in gross final energy consumption is stagnating. Following the establishment of the electronic registry for Guarantees of Origin (GOs), Kosovo made some progress with the preparation of a draft rule on GOs. However, disclosure rules and the methodology for calculating the residual energy mix remain to be adopted to make the system fully operational.
On energy efficiency, good progress was achieved with the implementation of energy efficiency measures in the residential and private sectors. However, Kosovo needs to adopt a new Law on energy efficiency, a long-term building renovation strategy, as well as
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secondary legislation to implement the Law on the energy performance of buildings, to align with the Energy Efficiency and Energy Performance of Buildings Directives. To increase energy efficiency, Kosovo needs to mobilise additional financing and strengthen institutional capacity to implement and monitor the associated savings. Kosovo is not aligned with the energy labelling and ecodesign acquis.
Regarding governance, adoption of the National and Energy Climate Plan (NECP) has been delayed for a few years and requires urgent action. Kosovo needs to accelerate the implementation of its Energy Strategy to achieve its objectives and develop robust monitoring frameworks for the overarching strategy for 2022-2031 and its implementation plans.
There has been no progress on nuclear safety, management of radioactive waste and the radiation protection acquis. Kosovo should accelerate its efforts to align with Euratom legislation and to participate in the European Community Urgent Radiological Information Exchange (ECURIE) and the European Radiological Data Exchange Platform (EURDEP).
Chapter 21 – Trans-European networks
The EU promotes trans-European networks (TENs) in the areas of transport, telecommunications and energy to strengthen the internal market and contribute to growth and employment.
Progress on the trans-European transport network (TEN-T) is limited, mainly due to insufficient interinstitutional capacities to ensure realistic cost-benefit analysis, EU standards, public procurement rules, State aid and environmental impact assessments.
Regarding roads, no progress was made on the Pristina–Merdarë/Merdare highway (‘Peace Highway’).
Regarding rail infrastructure, progress on finalising works on the railway on the Western Balkans Eastern Mediterranean Corridor (Rail Route 10) remained limited. As a matter of priority, Kosovo still needs to address technical, administrative, and institutional challenges related to Phase 1, between Hani i Elezit/Elez Han and Fushë Kosovë/Kosovo Polje, and Phase 2, between Fushë Kosovë/Kosovo Polje and Mitrovica. Work on these first two phases continued at a slow pace, mainly focusing on technically demanding structures such as bridges and tunnels. The railway crossing with North Macedonia was completed, but joint operations have not started. The tendering of signalling systems and telecommunications, which is necessary for trains to reach a speed of over 100 km/h, is delayed. On Phase 3, from Mitrovica to Lešak/Leshak, feasibility study and preliminary design activities have started.
On Trans-European Networks for Energy (TEN-E), Kosovo needs to align its legislation with the revised TEN-E Regulation 2022/869. Kosovo still needs to develop its regional electricity connections, in line with the Central and South-Eastern Europe Energy Connectivity (CESEC) Action Plan on Electricity and Renewable Energy and the Projects of Energy Community Interest (PECI), in particular the “Reconfiguration of the 400 kV grid and new 400 kV interconnection Albania–Kosovo”.
Chapter 27 – Environment and climate change
The EU promotes strong climate action, sustainable development and protection of the environment. EU rules contain provisions addressing horizontal environmental issues, climate change, water quality, air quality, waste management, nature protection, industrial pollution, chemicals, noise, and civil protection.
Environment
On horizontal legislation, no progress was made during the reporting period. The quality of the preparation and implementation of investments in compliance with the Environmental
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Impact Assessment (EIA) and the Strategic Environmental Assessment (SEA) Directives remains to be addressed. While Kosovo's engagement in the fight against environmental crime has increased, Kosovo still needs to align its legislation with the EU acquis and step up enforcement. Inadequate funding is a key obstacle for the implementation of the strategic framework in the environment sector. Administrative capacities of the environmental authorities, at central and local levels, to implement the environmental acquis need to be strengthened through adequate budget and staff. Limited capacities and involvement of institutions hamper progress in the sector. Public awareness of environmental protection remains low, increasing the urgency of enhanced awareness-raising efforts.
On air quality, there was no progress. Air pollution continues to present a health risk amid delays in the implementation of appropriate remedial measures to curb it. Emissions of SO2, NOx and dust decreased in 2025 compared with 2024, mainly due to fewer operating days of power plants.
No progress was registered on the implementation of waste management legislation. The Law on waste management has yet to be adopted and align with the waste management strategy for the period 2024–2035. There was no progress in the implementation of the deposit refund system for beverage containers. The number of illegal dumpsites increased by 16.8%, bringing the total to 535 in 2025. The inspection capacity of institutions at central level needs to be urgently increased. Kosovo should accelerate preparation of further inter- municipal waste management plans and adopt plans already developed. As per implementing legislation, a national plan for landfill management (hazardous, non- hazardous, and inert wastes) needs to be adopted.
On water quality, the adoption of a new Law on water is still pending. Except for the Drini i Bardhë/Beli Drim River, river basin management plans remain to be approved. Overall, the capacities of the water management institutions at both central and local levels, remain low and need further strengthening. The lack of identification of agglomerations and of sensitive areas in line with the EU Urban Wastewater Treatment Directive, as well as the absence of a sludge management plan, hamper progress in the area of infrastructure development. Kosovo made no progress in aligning the legislation on water management and floods with the EU acquis. More efforts are necessary for the reduction of water losses and the management of water protection zones.
Kosovo made some progress on nature protection. In October 2025, the government placed Mokra Gora mountain and Lake Gazivode/Ujman under preliminary protection, bringing Kosovo’s share of protected land up to 12.4%, one of the highest levels in the Western Balkans. Protected areas lack appropriate management and continue to be polluted and exploited illegally. Additionally, weak enforcement, understaffing and underfunding undermine conservation efforts.
Kosovo needs to allocate adequate funding and human resources to ensure effective implementation of the management plans for the national parks. Transparent and inclusive consultations with municipal authorities should ensure effective and legitimate environmental protection measures and fully consider local communities’ needs in any transition to permanent protection status. The adoption of a strategy for environmental protection and sustainable development for the period 2024-2033 is still pending, as is progress to align the legislation on nature protection.
Limited progress was made in the implementation of both the strategy and the Law on forestry. Deforestation and illegal logging remain a matter of serious concern, with 40% of the public forests being subject to uncontrolled or illegal harvesting activities. The forestry inventory remains to be completed.
On industrial pollution and risk management, there was no progress in aligning with the EU acquis. The implementation of industrial pollution prevention and control is very slow. Hazardous mining waste, as well as industrial discharge into rivers and industrial dumpsites
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continue to pose serious threats to soil and water, and thus public health. Kosovo needs to intensify efforts to align with the EU Industrial Emissions Directive and to ensure proper implementation and monitoring in this area.
On chemicals, there was no progress in aligning with the EU acquis. The implementation of the relevant legislation remains limited. Kosovo still needs to improve the implementation of the regulatory framework on the export and import of hazardous chemicals.
No progress was registered in aligning with the EU acquis on noise.
Regarding civil protection, Kosovo is not part of the Union Civil Protection Mechanism (UCPM) but remains eligible to a number of UCPM tools. A UCPM peer review of the disaster risk management capabilities of Kosovo was conducted in October 2025. While Kosovo’s Emergency Management Agency demonstrated strong leadership, Kosovo needs to step up efforts, as well as financial and human resources, to address legislative, structural and procedural gaps. The legal, governance and financial framework for disaster prevention, preparedness and response should be revised, and coordination among responsible authorities strengthened to ensure that its civil protection system can deal effectively with large-scale natural and human-induced crises. Capacity building for municipalities on disaster risk management should be further fostered.
Climate change
No significant steps were taken in the area of climate change. Kosovo should step up its efforts to align with the EU climate acquis by prioritising the amendment of the Law on climate change and the adoption of the pending secondary legislation. These measures are essential to establish a robust monitoring, reporting, verification and accreditation framework aligned with the EU acquis, which needs to be swiftly implemented to introduce carbon pricing and align with the EU emissions trading system. One administrative instruction on the methodology for monitoring and reporting on greenhouse gas emissions was adopted in December 2025. The national adaptation plan and the national energy and climate plan should be swiftly adopted.
Kosovo still needs to align with EU acquis on fluorinated greenhouse gases, ozone-depleting substances, on emissions from the Land and Use, Land Use Change and Forestry sector and climate legislation concerning road transport (CO2 performance standards, car labelling and fuel quality).
Kosovo should ensure the implementation of its first voluntary nationally determined contribution. The capacity of the relevant institutions needs to be significantly enhanced by increasing the number of staff. The Ministry of Environment and Spatial Planning has established a unit dedicated to climate change, but additional staff is needed to ensure the unit becomes operational. As public awareness remains low, awareness-raising on climate action needs to be strengthened.
CLUSTER 5: RESOURCES, AGRICULTURE AND COHESION
This cluster covers: agriculture and rural development (Chapter 11); food safety, veterinary and phytosanitary policy (Chapter 12); fisheries and aquaculture (Chapter 13); and regional policy and coordination of structural instruments (Chapter 22).
Chapter 11 – Agriculture and rural development
The EU’s common agricultural policy supports farmers and contributes to ensuring Europe’s food security. It helps tackle climate change and the sustainable management of national resources; maintains rural areas and landscapes across the EU; and keeps the rural economy alive by promoting jobs in farming, agri-food industries and associated sectors. This requires strong management and control systems. There are also common EU rules for marketing standards, quality policy and organic farming.
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On horizontal issues, the national programme for agriculture and rural development was not implemented in 2025. Support measures should be aligned with the EU acquis. Kosovo needs to further strengthen its capacities and take additional steps towards the development of an integrated administration and control system and a farm sustainability data network.
On the agricultural markets - common market organisation (CMO), the adoption of the implementing legislation for the Law on market organisation for agricultural products remains pending.
On quality policy, the registration process and control remain to be strengthened and aligned with the EU acquis.
On organic farming, legislation remains to be aligned with the EU acquis and the National Organic Action Plan 2023-2026 remains to be implemented.
On the fight against corruption, Kosovo has appointed contact persons to coordinate complaints, corruption reports, and related issues, as regulated under the Law on civil servants, which applies to all public institutions.
Kosovo needs to amend the Law on Agricultural Land and the Action Plan to address the loss and degradation of farmland.
Chapter 12 – Food safety, veterinary and phytosanitary policy
The EU food acquis including EU hygiene rules for foodstuff production ensures a high level of food and feed safety and a high-level protection of consumers’ interests. Animal health and welfare and the safety of food of animal origin are safeguarded together with the quality of seeds, plant protection material, the protection against harmful organisms and animal nutrition.
In the area of general food safety, Kosovo still needs to adopt implementing legislation to the Law on food, and the strategy to align with the EU acquis The Food and Veterinary Agency lacks sufficient financial and human resources to implement the EU acquis andimmediate additional resources are needed, particularly for official controls. An epidemiological unit, and the implementation of a risk-based approach to controls should be established.
The Agency continued to implement the national plan for the control and monitoring of food and animal disease and completed the obligatory proficiency testing schemes with EU reference laboratories, as part of the laboratory accreditation. The Kosovo Food and Veterinary Laboratory was re-accredited by the national Directorate for Accreditation of Kosovo and their accreditation scope was expanded.
Kosovo should assess potential risks related to the planned transfer of inspection services from the Food and Veterinary Agency to the central inspectorate under the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Rural Development. Potential changes must ensure that the effectiveness and consistency of official controls across the food safety, veterinary and phytosanitary sectors are not undermined.
In the area of veterinary policy, Kosovo needs to adopt a Law on animal health and repeal the 2004 Law on veterinary. The Food and Veterinary Agency has not yet adopted a five- year disease monitoring and control plan due to a lack of government-allocated resources. Kosovo continued implementing the rabies vaccination campaign for 2025 and 2026 spring and fall. Further work remains necessary to adopt national legislation on animal welfare.
Financial and human resources for the control of animal health and welfare (e.g. at farm level, during transportation, in slaughterhouses and in livestock markets) remain insufficient. Animal movements remained underreported, and controls need to be strengthened. Kosovo is yet to align with the EU animal welfare legislation and ensure adequate resources for its implementation. Kosovo made no progress in identifying basic cross-compliance measures in the areas of food safety, animal health and welfare.
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On the placing of food, feed and animal by-products on the market, Kosovo provisionally approved the economic operator for the existing rendering plant for the processing of animal by-products, however the rendering plan is not yet operating. The establishment and implementation of a system for the collection and safe disposal of animal by-products, and in particular Category 1, remains crucial and still needs to be set up. On food safety rules and its specific rules for feed, no new developments were reported.
In the area of phytosanitary policy, Kosovo needs to advance the alignment with the EU acquis. Strengthening actions regarding surveys, early detection and eradication of pests remains crucial. The legal framework and institutional set-up of the Kosovo Institute for Agriculture (KIA) should be consolidated, especially its mandate, structure and authority in plant protection. No progress on the preparation of the Plant Health law has been noted.
On the marketing of seed and other plant reproductive material, further alignment of the national legislation with the EU acquis on plant reproductive material (PRM) and forest reproductive material (FRM) is needed. This should be accompanied by the development of the necessary institutional framework and administrative capacities to establish and enforce effective certification systems for PRM and FRM.
Kosovo has yet to start working on the development of the legal basis for novel food and genetically modified organisms.
On the fight against corruption, Kosovo has appointed contact persons to coordinate complaints, corruption reports, and related issues, as regulated under the Law on civil servants, which applies to all public institutions.
Chapter 13 – Fisheries and aquaculture
The common fisheries policy lays down rules on fisheries management, protects living resources of the sea and limits the environmental impact of fisheries. This includes setting catch quotas, managing fleet capacity, rules on control and inspection, rules on markets and aquaculture, and support for fisheries and coastal communities. Further, it promotes a sustainable aquaculture.
Kosovo has only inland fishing and aquaculture and therefore part of the EU acquis on fisheries is not applicable. Kosovo needs to adopt a Law on fisheries and aquaculture to align with the relevant EU acquis.
The adoption of a comprehensive national strategy for inland fisheries and aquaculture, incorporating market, environmental and social dimensions as well as the alignment of legislation with the EU acquis, remains pending.
Kosovo should focus on developing a market policy and data collection system including species inventory and production statistics in line with the EU acquis. A significant increase of the administrative capacity for market policy development, legal approximation, policy enforcement, and inter-agency coordination, as well as inspection and control aligned with EU best practices, are needed.
Regarding data collection, an inventory of fish species was created and should be continued.
There was no development concerning resource and fleet management, structural actions, State aid, aquaculture and international agreements.
Chapter 22 – Regional policy and coordination of structural instruments
Regional policy is the EU’s main investment policy aiming at reducing economic, social, and territorial disparities between regions and promoting balanced development across the Union. It is implemented through ‘shared management’ between the Commission and EU Member States. The implementation of cohesion policy programmes requires appropriate administrative structures and capacity on programme and project level, the establishment of
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systems of sound financial management and control, and the fulfilment of other aspects of the EU acquis, such as environmental or public procurement legislation.
There has been no progress on the legislative framework underpinning regional development. The ongoing assessment of the current local self-governance strategy has yet to translate into an ambitious policy agenda to unlock regional potential. Along with stepping up funding to address persisting regional disparities, Kosovo should strengthen its regional development policy by empowering local authorities, actively promoting participatory decision-making, strengthening inter-municipal cooperation, optimising resource sharing, and enhancing service delivery at local level.
The institutional framework for the management of EU funds remains incomplete with key components missing, including managing authorities, intermediate bodies, audit authority, and anti-fraud service. The regional development governance architecture remains fragmented and marked by unclear and overlapping ministerial mandates and weak interinstitutional coordination.
The administrative capacity of the National IPA Coordinator, the Reform and Growth Facility Coordinator and the line ministries involved in programming and managing EU funds is gradually improving, but delays in the public administration reform and the fragmentation of training mechanisms continue to undermine progress on EU reforms and the use of the funding. Kosovo should establish an adequate platform for sector-based policy dialogue with central and local stakeholders, civil society and donor community.
On programming, the last funds under the Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance III were successfully allocated to an ambitious reforms package proposed by Kosovo covering the rule of law, good governance, energy, environment protection and socio-economic development. However, the delays in implementing the Reform and Growth Facility limit the replenishment of the investment envelope and affect the programming and the implementation of the investments. Improving public investment management remains a priority, including through sound, transparent and inclusive methodology for assessing and prioritising projects within a single project pipeline in support of regional development and the achievement of energy, climate, environmental and social objectives. Kosovo continues to participate successfully in three IPA cross-border cooperation programmes with Albania, North Macedonia, and Montenegro for 2021-2027.
Monitoring and evaluation of EU assistance improved through stronger central oversight and enhanced reporting on the use of the EU funds. The monitoring committees under both IPA and RGF held constructive and inclusive meetings in June 2026, marking a step forward in the bilateral dialogue on the use of EU funds. Monitoring and reporting lines needs to be further strengthened and complemented by adequate risk assessment to identify and address problems early.
The financial management, control and audit systems for EU funds remain at an early stage. In the context of RGF, the control environment has improved with the government decision from March 2026 on establishing a system for the RGF implementation and appointing of a RGF Coordinator. However, limited progress was achieved in establishing a fully functioning anti-fraud coordination network.
Verification controls, including checks on double funding, need to be strengthened, applied consistently and evidenced. Moreover, to ensure effective protection of the EU financial interests, Kosovo needs to align its implementing legislation with EU and international standards, notably by setting a formal operational risk assessment and management framework, strengthening the internal controls and audit capabilities, improving irregularity detection and reporting capacities.
On fight against corruption with the EU funds, Kosovo needs to adopt an anti-fraud strategy and put in place a comprehensive fraud control and governance framework including ongoing monitoring of fraud risk indicators, supported by data analytics tools,
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effective mechanisms for whistleblowing and timely escalation of suspected cases to the competent authorities. The introduction of new anti-fraud tools needs to be accompanied by the optimisation and robust implementation of existing instruments to ensure overall effectiveness (see also Chapters 5, 23 and 32).
CLUSTER 6: EXTERNAL RELATIONS
This cluster covers: external relations (Chapter 30); and foreign, security and defence policy (Chapter 31).
Chapter 30 – External relations
The EU has a common commercial policy towards third countries, based on multilateral and bilateral agreements and autonomous measures. There are also EU rules in the field of humanitarian aid and development policy.
On the common commercial policy, Kosovo ratified the CEFTA Additional Protocols (APs) on trade facilitation, trade in services, and dispute settlement. Kosovo ratified the Berlin Process mobility agreements, including those on the mutual recognition of professional qualifications and movement with ID cards.
The authorities continued to participate in regional economic integration through CEFTA, and other initiatives aimed at removing trade barriers, while also actively participating in regional digital initiatives. Under Kosovo’s CEFTA chairmanship in 2025, the Joint Committee adopted 12 decisions and appointed key positions in the Secretariat, ensuring the continuity of its operations. The CEFTA Director was appointed, and key expert positions were filled during the reporting period. Kosovo needs to further strengthen the capacities of the Ministry of Industry, Entrepreneurship, Trade and Innovation to more efficiently fulfil its commitments under the Common Regional Market 2 Action Plan 2025–2028, and to implement the CEFTA additional protocols and related decisions.
Kosovo continued to apply increased controls on imports of goods originating from Serbia, which are currently permitted only through the Merdarë/Merdare crossing point. Combined with disproportionately frequent inspections and regulatory enforcement, this practice continued to impact economic activity in Kosovo Serb-majority areas, disrupting supply chains and local access to certain goods.
As a protective measure against external shocks (notably the instability in the Middle East), Kosovo adopted a new Law on temporary measures for basic products to address market instability and prevent price abuse. The government also temporarily introduced profit margin limits for wholesale and retail petroleum products.
Kosovo’s Law on dual-use goods aims to be aligned with the EU acquis. While Kosovo is not a member of the Australia Group, it applies controls consistent with its principles through its efforts for alignment with the EU dual-use framework and regular updates of the national list. Kosovo has yet to align with the EU acquis on the screening of foreign direct investment.
As regards bilateral agreements with third countries, in April 2026 the Assembly ratified a free trade agreement with the European Free Trade Association. Kosovo also has free trade agreements with Türkiye and the United Kingdom.
There has been limited progress in the areas of development policy and humanitarian aid. As a recipient of aid programmes, Kosovo does not provide humanitarian assistance to third countries in a systematic manner and does not have a dedicated development aid agency.
Kosovo is encouraged to initiate the development of a legal framework covering international cooperation, development policy and humanitarian aid, in line with EU policies and principles. It is also encouraged to establish dedicated administrative structures.
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Chapter 31 – Foreign, security, and defence policy
Member States must be able to conduct political dialogue under the EU foreign, security and defence policy, align with EU statements, take part in EU actions, and apply agreed sanctions and restrictive measures.
Kosovo actively engaged in political dialogue with the EU on foreign and security policy issues. Kosovo participated in the EU-Western Balkans meetings of Political Directors in Sarajevo in October 2025, in Brussels in April 2026 and in Kruje in October 2026, the informal meetings of the Foreign Ministers in Brussels in November 2025 and in May 2026, as well as in the EU-Western Balkans Summit in Brussels in December 2025 and in Tivat in June 2026.
In line with the EU-Kosovo SAA, during the reporting period, Kosovo reached full alignment with the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), including statements by the High Representative on behalf of the EU and Council decisions on EU’s restrictive measures. It also continued to condemn Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine and to implement the EU restrictive measures against Russia and Belarus. Kosovo has provided military assistance to Ukraine. In addition, alaw on targetedsanctions against foreign human rights violators is in place, allowing the government to impose sanctions on individuals responsible for human rights abuses, violations and corruption. Kosovo should align with EU acquis on criminalisation of violation of sanctions.
As regards cooperation with international organisations the lack of universal recognition affects Kosovo’s ability to join many international organisations that require full UN membership or broad recognition. Kosovo’s foreign policy is thus primarily focused on increasing its international visibility and recognition, including through EU and Euro-Atlantic integration. Kosovo is also working towards partnership with NATO and is an associate member to the NATO Parliamentary Assembly.
Kosovo’s Security Force (KSF) participated in NATO-led Defender Europe 2025, with around 1 000 troops. In April 2026, Kosovo’s National Assembly approved the deployment of a KSF contingent to the Gaza Strip, within the framework of the UNSC-mandated International Stabilisation Force.
Internationally, Kosovo is very active in theimplementation of the Women, Peace and Security (WPS) Agenda, but has not adopted a new National Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security. Parts of the WPS Agenda are covered in Kosovo’s overarching framework in the National Strategy on Protection Against Domestic Violence and Violence Against Women (2022-2026), however, a separate national action plan is still to be developed. As Kosovo is currently not in a position to become a party to the Rome Statute, it cannot directly refer cases to the International Criminal Court.
Kosovo is a founding member of the Board of Peace, initiated by the US President in January 2026.
While Kosovo is not a member of the UN and thus not a party to non-proliferation and disarmament treaties and conventions, it supports global non-proliferation norms and aligns itself with the international community’s efforts to prevent the spread of weapons of mass destruction. Kosovo is an EU partner in the outreach project to promote effective arms export control (COARM VII) and is striving to achieve alignment with the EU Common Position 2008/944. The verification of final destination and end-user certificates in the assessment of license applications has yet to be achieved.
As regards the control of small arms and light weapons (SALW), the legislative framework is in place but requires further alignment with the EU acquis. In particular, Kosovo still needs to update the Law on weapons and the Law on the civil use of explosives. The 2024-2028 National Small Arms, Light Weapons and Explosives Control Strategy and Action Plan is aligned with the Western Balkans SALW Roadmap and continues to guide implementation.
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During the reporting period, enforcement efforts by the Kosovo Police and other competent institutions continued, but legislative gaps remain in areas such as traceability, licensing, categorisation, deactivation standards and explosives control.
In terms of security measures, the Law on protection of classified information created the Agency for Protection of Classified Information. It contains two articles regarding the protection of EU classified information, signalling Kosovo’s ambition for concluding such an agreement with the EU.
Kosovo has not yet been invited to conclude a framework agreement on participation in the Common Security and Defence Policy missions and operations, but it has expressed an interest in participating. It participates in training activities of the European Security and Defence College.
While Kosovo is vulnerable to hybrid threats and specifically identifies them as such in its Security Strategy 2022-2027, its legal and institutional framework focuses mostly on cyber security (see under Chapter 10 – Digital transformation and media). Kosovo should establish a cross-sectoral and inclusive mechanism to reduce the space for foreign information manipulation and interference, including disinformation. This mechanism should be part of a broader strategy aimed at building societal resilience against all forms of hybrid threats. Additionally, Kosovo should align its legal framework with EU standards, invest in media literacy programmes, strengthen inter-agency coordination, and engage with civil society to ensure a comprehensive and effective response.
ANNEX I – RELATIONS BETWEEN THE EU AND KOSOVO
The EU-Kosovo Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA), which entered into force in April 2016, provides a framework for political dialogue and cooperation across a wide range of sectors. Since 2016, five Stabilisation and Association Council meetings and seven cycles of subcommittee meetings were held. After the smooth and orderly transfer of local governance in northern Kosovo following the 2025 local elections, the Commission lifted the measures vis-a- vis Kosovo that were in place since May 2023. Accordingly, the delivery of financial assistance (see below) and the meetings of SAA bodies resumed.
The EU is Kosovo’s main trading partner, accounting for 42% of its total trade in goods. EU- Kosovo total trade in goods amounted to EUR 2.7 billion in 2025.
Kosovo formally submitted its application for EU membership on 15 December 2022.
Visa liberalisation for Kosovo entered into force on 1 January 2024, allowing Kosovo biometric passport holders to travel to the EU without a visa for a period of stay of 90 days within any 180- day period. Visa requirements were also lifted for holders of passports issued by the Serbian Coordination Directorate.
In accordance with the Regulation on the establishment of a list of safe countries of origin at Union level, candidate countries and potential candidates are, in principle, designated since 2026 as safe countries of origin at Union level.
On 9 October 2024, Kosovo adopted its Reform Agenda under the Reform and Growth Facility (Growth Plan for the Western Balkans), which allocates up to EUR 882.6 million to Kosovo for the period until end 2027. The Reform Agenda covers reform milestones in the areas of: (i) governance, public administration reform and public financial management; (ii) green and digital transition; (iii) private sector development; (iv) human capital development and retention; and (v) fundamentals and the rule of law. Kosovo ratified the Facility and Loan agreements in February 2026, while in March 2026, the government adopted a decision establishing the system for the implementation of the Reform and Growth Facility and appointing a National Coordinator for the Facility. In April 2026, the European Commission released pre-financing of EUR 61.8 million. Kosovo made its first request for disbursement on 15 July 2026, reporting on Reform Agenda steps originally due in December 2024, June 2025, December 2025 and June 2026.
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The Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance (IPA) III allocations under the bilateral strand reached EUR 414 million for 2021-2027 with the adoption of the last IPA III package for the period 2026-2027 amounting to EUR 180,6 million. 18.5% of the total IPA III funding will support the fundamental reforms in the areas of rule of law and fundamental rights, civil society and border and migration management; 17.6% of the EU funding is dedicated to the reforms related to good governance and alignment with the EU standards; 43.8% focuses on green agenda and sustainable connectivity, while the remaining 20% supports competitiveness of private sector and agriculture along with education and employment.
Kosovo continues to benefit from the implementation of the EU assistance of EUR 602 million under the Instrument for Pre-accession II (2014-2020), 44% of which targets democracy, governance, rule of law and human rights, while 56% has been allocated for competitiveness and growth.
Kosovo is participating in nine EU Programmes for the period 2021-2027: Erasmus+; Horizon Europe; Creative Europe; Customs; Fiscalis; the Single Market Programme; Citizens, Equality, Rights and Values; the Justice Programme and Digital Europe. This participation - supported by EU grant funding of EUR 2,55 million - enables Kosovo to benefit from enhanced exchanges with the EU member states and accession countries in the areas of academic mobility and intercultural cooperation, competitive scientific research, innovation, digitalisation, taxation and customs, fundamental rights and rule of law. Kosovo’s contribution of €805,477 leveraged approximately €6.1 million in EU programme funding in 2025, which represents a substantial return on investment. Kosovo is a beneficiary of the EU’s autonomous trade measures in favour of the Western Balkans.
Kosovo also receives supplementary support under the multi-country and regional programmes and under three cross-border cooperation programmes with Albania, North Macedonia and Montenegro.
Under Western Balkans Investment Framework, since 2009-, Kosovo received grant funding of EUR 253.6 million for an investments portfolio of EUR 743.2 million focused on rail and road transport connectivity (64%), resilient energy systems (28%) and modern water supply and sanitation (7%).
The Kosovo Specialist Chambers (KSC) and the Specialist Prosecutor’s Office (SPO), which were set up to investigate and prosecute allegations stemming from the 2011 Council of Europe Report, continued to advance cases in fulfilment of their mandate. To date, the court has indicted 17 individuals for war crimes, crimes against humanity and offences against the administration of justice, obstructing proceedings in the war crimes and crimes against humanity cases. Proceedings against 16 of them have been opened in six separate cases of which four have concluded. The two remaining cases at trial phase – one concerning war crimes and crimes against humanity the Specialist Prosecutor v. Hashim Thaçi et al., and one concerning the administration of justice case also involving Mr Hashim Thaçi and his co-accused – progressed significantly. Both cases are in their last trial phases: the former is pending an appeal following the first instance conviction on 16 September 2026 and the pronouncement of judgement for the latter expected on 17 November 2026.
Since 2008, the European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX) has been assisting Kosovo authorities in strengthening sustainable and independent rule of law institutions. Under its current mandate (extended until June 2027), EULEX has only limited executive functions. It continues to perform monitoring and advisory activities. EULEX has been supporting selected rule of law institutions in Kosovo on their path towards increased effectiveness, sustainability, multi-ethnicity and accountability, free from political interference and in full compliance with international human rights standards and best European practices, through monitoring, mentoring and advising activities. It also continues to have the role of the second security responder through the EULEX Formed Police Units (the Regular Formed Police Unit and the Reserve Formed Police Unit). EULEX also assists the KSC/SPO with logistical and operational support, in compliance with its mandate and Kosovo legislation.
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Frontex is sending officers to several crossing points in Kosovo based on mutually agreed operational plans. Additionally, it provides other border management-related support such as advice on setting up a national coordination centre.
During the reporting period, the UN Secretary-General continued to provide regular updates on the implementation of the mandate of the UN Mission in Kosovo. In June 2026, NATO announced that it will gradually adjust KFOR's size and posture over the next year. As of 31 August, KFOR is staffed by 4 657 personnel from 31 contributing nations.
To date, according to the government, Kosovo has been recognised by 121 countries, including 22 EU Member States.
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ANNEX II – STATISTICAL DATA
STATISTICAL DATA (as of 14/09/2026)
Kosovo
Basic data Note 2013 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
Population (thousand) 1 816 i 1 798 i 1 774 i : : :
Total area of the country (km²) 10 908 w 10 905 w 10 905 w 10 905 w 10 905 w 10 905 w
National accounts Note 2013 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
Gross domestic product (GDP) (million national currency) 5 071 7 958 8 896 9 680 10 350 11 026 p
Gross domestic product (GDP) (million euro) 5 071 7 958 8 896 9 680 10 350 11 026 p
GDP per capita (euro) 2 793 i 4 426 i 5 015 i : : :
GDP per capita (in purchasing power standards (PPS) : : : : : :
GDP per capita (in PPS), relative to the EU average (EU-27 = 100) : : : : : :
Real GDP growth rate: change on previous year of GDP volume (%) 5.3 10.7 4.3 4.1 4.6 3.6 p
Employment growth (national accounts data), relative to the previous year (%) C : : : : :
Labour productivity growth: growth in GDP (in volume) per person employed, relative to the previous year (%)
C : : : : :
Unit labour cost growth, relative to the previous year (%) C : : : : :
Nominal unit labour cost index based on persons (3 year % change) : : : : : :
Labour productivity per person employed: GDP (in PPS) per person employed relative to EU average (EU-27 = 100)
: : : : : :
Gross value added by main sectors
Agriculture, forestry and fisheries (%) 10.2 8.6 9.2 9.0 9.3 9.4 p
Industry (%) 23.3 23.6 23.3 22.8 22.8 21.9 p
Construction (%) 9.7 10.6 10.7 10.1 10.0 9.9 p
Services (%) 56.8 i 57.2 i 56.9 i 58.2 i 57.9 i 58.8 pi
Final consumption expenditure, as a share of GDP (%) 99.1 95.9 97.5 96.7 96.3 95.7 p
Gross fixed capital formation, as a share of GDP (%) 29.2 32.9 32.5 31.5 31.6 32.4 p
Exports of goods and services, relative to GDP (%) 23.0 33.4 38.6 39.6 41.7 p 44.0 p
Imports of goods and services, relative to GDP (%) 52.1 65.2 71.4 70.3 72.0 74.3 p
Gross fixed capital formation by the general government sector, as a percentage of GDP (%) : : : : : :
Business Note 2013 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
Industrial production volume index (2015 = 100) : : : : : :
Number of active enterprises (number) 30 803 w 45 468 w 46 157 w 48 317 w 50 523 w :
Birth rate: number of enterprise births in the reference period (t) divided by the number of enterprises active in t (%)
8.5 w 22.9 w 22.1 w 21.7 w : :
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Death rate: number of enterprise deaths in the reference period (t) divided by the number of enterprises active in t (%)
8.6 w 2.9 w 2.8 w 2.8 w : :
People employed in SMEs as a share of all persons employed (within the non-financial business economy) (%)
74.8 iw 82.1 iw 67.3 iw 67.3 iw : :
Value added by SMEs (in the non-financial business economy) (EUR million) : : : : : :
Total value added (in the non-financial business economy) (EUR million) : : : : : :
Inflation rate and house prices Note 2013 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
Consumer price index (CPI), change relative to the previous year (%) : 3.4 d 11.6 d 4.9 d 1.6 d 3.9 d
Balance of payments Note 2013 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
Balance of payments: current account total (million euro) - 179.0 - 694.6 - 917.0 - 729.1 - 872.4 - 984.0
Balance of payments current account: trade balance (million euro) - 1 995.6 - 3 567.0 - 4 287.2 - 4 598.3 - 4 926.8 - 5 575.5
Balance of payments current account: net services (million euro) 520.0 1 034.9 1 367.5 1 625.5 1 791.4 2 294.3
Balance of payments current account: net balance for primary income (million euro) 121.5 150.9 119.8 202.8 246.0 222.9
Balance of payments current account: net balance for secondary income (million euro) 1 175.0 1 686.2 1 881.8 2 040.9 2 017.0 2 074.3
Net balance for primary and secondary income: of which government transfers (million euro) 369.7 233.7 295.9 301.8 292.7 :
*3 year backward moving average of the current account balance relative to GDP (%) - 7.7 - 7.1 - 8.7 - 8.9 - 8.8 - 8.3
*Five year change in share of world exports of goods and services (%) : 46.9 33.8 46.8 54.5 114.4
Net balance (inward - outward) of foreign direct investment (FDI) (million euro) 250.2 w 320.4 w 556.9 w 650.1 w 569.2 w 729.2 w
Foreign direct investment (FDI) abroad (million euro) 30.0 w 100.3 w 175.2 w 190.0 w 224.3 w 365.8 w
of which FDI of the reporting economy in the EU-27 countries (million euro) : 26.5 37.8 40.8 56.6 :
Foreign direct investment (FDI) in the reporting economy (million euro) 280.2 w 420.7 w 732.0 w 840.1 w 793.5 w 1 095.0 w
of which FDI of the EU-27 countries in the reporting economy (million euro) : 215.6 388.9 392.8 360.7 :
*Net international investment position, relative to GDP (%) 0.0 - 11.5 - 17.9 - 18.8 - 19.9 - 21.1
Year on year rate of change in gross inflow of remittances (in national currency) from migrant workers (%)
: 14.5 i 13.7 i 13.8 i 0.0 i :
Public finance Note 2013 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
General government deficit / surplus, relative to GDP (%) : : : : : :
General government gross debt relative to GDP (%) : : : : : :
Total government revenues, as a percentage of GDP (%) : : : : : :
Total government expenditure, as a percentage of GDP (%) : : : : : :
Financial indicators Note 2013 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
Gross external debt of the whole economy, relative to GDP (%) 31.7 iw 37.1 iw 38.6 iw 39.6 iw 40.7 iw :
Gross external debt of the whole economy, relative to total exports (%) 137.8 w 111.2 w 100.0 w 100.0 w 97.6 w 91.0 w
Money supply: M1 (banknotes, coins, overnight deposits, million euro) 1 551.2 w 1 877.0 w 1 972.3 w 2 107.5 w 2 070.8 w 2 137.6 w
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Total credit by monetary financial institutions to residents (consolidated) (million euro) : : : : : :
*Annual change in financial sector liabilities (%) : : : : : :
*Private debt, consolidated, relative to GDP (%) : : : : : :
Interest rates: day-to-day money rate, per annum (%) : : : : : :
Euro exchange rates: average of period (1 euro = … national currency) 1 w 1 w 1 w 1 w 1 w 1 w
Trade-weighted effective exchange rate index, 42 countries (2015 = 100) 98.9 w 115.8 w 121.1 w 128.0 w 133.7 w 138.7 w
*3 year change (T/T-3) in the trade-weighted effective exchange rate index, 42 countries (2015 = 100)
0.0 iw 0.1 iw 0.1 iw 0.1 iw 0.2 iw 0.2 iw
Value of reserve assets (including gold) (million euro) - 35.7 168.9 67.6 - 44.0 69.7 49.5
External trade in goods Note 2013 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
Value of imports: all goods, all partners (million euro) 2 421 4 684 5 639 5 918 6 370 7 056
Value of exports: all goods, all partners (million euro) 273 756 998 874 933 942
Trade balance: all goods, all partners (million euro) - 2 148 - 3 929 - 4 642 - 5 044 - 5 437 - 6 114
Terms of trade (export price index / import price index * 100) (number) 96.6 iw 101.4 iw 87.5 iw 81.6 piw : :
Share of exports to EU-27 countries in value of total exports (%) 42.7 iw 31.5 iw 33.9 iw 32.3 iw 33.1 iw :
Share of imports from EU-27 countries in value of total imports (%) 44.2 iw 44.3 iw 42.4 iw 43.0 iw 44.7 iw :
Demography Note 2013 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
Crude rate of natural change of population (natural growth rate): number of births minus deaths (per thousand inhabitants)
12.2 e 5.5 : : : :
Infant mortality rate deaths of children under one year of age (per thousand live births) : : : : : :
Life expectancy at birth: male (years) : : : : : :
Life expectancy at birth: female (years) : : : : : :
Labour market Note 2013 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
Economic activity rate for persons aged 20–64: proportion of the population aged 20–64 that is economically active (%)
46.4 w 43.9 w 43.2 w 45.1 w 47.9 w :
Employment rate for persons aged 20–64: proportion of the population aged 20–64 that are in employment (%)
33.0 w 35.1 w 37.9 w 40.3 w 42.9 w :
Male employment rate for persons aged 20–64 (%) 51.5 w 51.9 w 55.7 w 59.4 w 62.5 w :
Female employment rate for persons aged 20–64 (%) 14.9 w 18.5 w 20.5 w 22.0 w 23.5 w :
Employment rate for persons aged 55–64: proportion of the population aged 55–64 that are in employment (%)
30.8 w 32.1 w 32.1 w 32.8 w 33.1 w :
Employment by main sectors
Agriculture, forestry and fisheries (%) 5.9 w 2.8 w 2.2 w 2.4 w 2.8 w :
Industry (%) 16.8 w 14.8 w 13.3 w 12.9 w 14.4 w :
Construction (%) 11.4 w 10.5 w 11.0 w 11.8 w 12.6 w :
Services (%) 65.9 w 71.9 w 73.4 w 72.9 w 70.2 w :
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People employed in the public sector as a share of total employment, persons aged 20–64 (%)
31.5 w 28.3 w 27.7 w 27.4 w 26.1 w :
People employed in the private sector as a share of total employment, persons aged 20–64 (%)
68.5 w 71.7 w 72.3 w 72.6 w 73.9 w :
Unemployment rate: proportion of the labour force that is unemployed (%) 30.0 w 20.6 w 12.5 w 10.8 w 10.9 w :
Male unemployment rate (%) 26.9 w 18.9 w 11.0 w 7.6 w 7.7 w :
Female unemployment rate (%) 38.8 w 24.9 w 16.5 w 18.2 w 18.5 w :
Youth unemployment rate: proportion of the labour force aged 15–24 that is unemployed (%) 55.9 w 38.0 w 21.4 w 17.3 w 19.5 w :
Long-term unemployment rate: proportion of the labour force that has been unemployed for 12 months or more (%)
20.7 w 14.5 w 8.1 w 7.7 w 8.5 w :
Unemployment rate for persons (aged 25–64) having completed at most lower secondary education (ISCED levels 0-2) (%)
37.3 w 27.6 w 21.8 w 22.6 w 22.0 w :
Unemployment rate for persons (aged 25–64) having completed tertiary education (ISCED levels 5-8) (%)
12.6 w 13.7 w 9.7 w 6.7 w 5.5 w :
Social cohesion Note 2013 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
Average nominal monthly wages and salaries (national currency) 386 w 484 w 521 w 570 w 639 w :
Index of real wages and salaries (index of nominal wages and salaries divided by the inflation index) (2016 = 100)
: : : : : :
Gini coefficient : 57 w : : : :
Poverty gap : 65.0 w : : : :
Standard of living Note 2013 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
Number of passenger cars relative to population size (number per thousand population) : 179.3 iw 191.2 iw : : :
Infrastructure Note 2013 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
Density of railway network (lines in operation per thousand km²) 30.5 iw 30.5 iw 30.5 iw 30.5 iw 30.5 iw 30.5 iw
Length of motorways (kilometres) : : : : : :
Education, Innovation and Research Note 2013 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
Percentage of persons aged 30-34 with a tertiary education level (ISCED 2011 levels 5 to 8) 12.0 w 32.3 w 30.9 w 30.6 w 29.1 w :
Percentage of persons aged 30-34 with a tertiary education level (ISCED 2011 levels 5 to 8), males
14.2 w 30.8 w 26.3 w 23.9 w 23.6 w :
Percentage of persons aged 30-34 with a tertiary education level (ISCED 2011 levels 5 to 8), females
9.9 w 34.0 w 35.9 w 37.4 w 34.8 w :
Participation in early childhood education (children aged 3 and over) : : : : : :
Participation in early childhood education (children aged 3 and over), males : : : : : :
Participation in early childhood education (children aged 3 and over), females : : : : : :
Low achieving 15-year-olds in reading (%) : : : : : :
Low achieving 15-year-olds in mathematics (%) : : : : : :
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Low achieving 15-year-olds in science (%) : : : : : :
Early leavers from education and training: proportion of persons aged 18-24 with at most lower secondary education (at most ISCED 2011 level 2) who are not in further education or training
18.4 w 7.0 w 7.8 w 7.7 w 6.2 w :
Early leavers from education and training: proportion of men aged 18-24 with at most lower secondary education (at most ISCED 2011 level 2) who are not in further education or training
: : : : : :
Early leavers from education and training: proportion of women aged 18-24 with at most lower secondary education (at most ISCED 2011 level 2) who are not in further education or training
: : : : : :
Proportion of persons aged 25-64 having participated in education and training (last 4 weeks)
: : : 4.5 w 2.3 w :
Proportion of persons aged 25-64 having participated in education and training (last 4 weeks), men
: : : 4.3 w 2.0 w :
Proportion of persons aged 25-64 having participated in education and training (last 4 weeks), women
: : : 4.8 w 2.5 w :
Exposure of vocational education and training (VET) graduates to work-based learning (% of population aged 20-34)
: : : : : :
Share of individuals having at least basic digital skills (% of population aged 16-74) : : : : : 75.6
Share of individuals having at least basic digital skills (% of population aged 16-74), males : : : : : 80.1
Share of individuals having at least basic digital skills (% of population aged 16-74), females : : : : : 71.1
Public expenditure on education relative to GDP (%) 4.0 iw 4.3 iw 3.9 iw 4.1 iw 4.3 iw :
Gross domestic expenditure on R&D relative to GDP (%) : : : : : :
Government budget appropriations or outlays on R&D (GBAORD), as a percentage of GDP (%)
: : : : : :
Percentage of households who have internet access at home (%) : : : : 99.1 99.4
Environment Note 2013 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
Index of greenhouse gas emissions, CO2 equivalent (1990 = 100) : : : : : :
Energy intensity of the economy (kg of oil equivalent per 1 000 euro GDP at 2015 constant prices)
446.1 405.0 358.0 : : :
Electricity generated from renewable sources relative to gross electricity consumption (%) 1.6 5.2 6.7 9.0 9.4 :
Road share of inland freight transport (based on tonne-km) (%) : : : : : :
Energy Note 2013 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
Primary production of all energy products (thousand TOE) 1 792 1 937 1 796 1 560 1 756 :
Primary production of crude oil (thousand TOE) 0 0 0 0 0 :
Primary production of solid fuels (thousand TOE) 1 532 1 591 1 543 1 290 1 504 :
Primary production of gas (thousand TOE) 0 0 0 0 0 :
Net imports of all energy products (thousand TOE) 505 i 942 i 858 i 983 i 969 i :
Gross inland energy consumption (thousand TOE) 2 312 2 888 2 662 2 552 2 731 :
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Gross electricity generation (GWh) 6 525 6 892 6 998 6 353 6 750 :
Agriculture Note 2013 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
Agricultural output volume index (at producer prices) (2015 = 100) 106.9 w 95.2 w 93.9 w 93.7 w 94.7 w :
Utilised agricultural area (thousand hectares) 441.6 421.2 421.4 421.6 421.3 :
Livestock numbers: live bovine animals (thousand heads, end of period) : 260.5 250.9 247.5 240.9 :
Livestock numbers: live swine (thousand heads, end of period) : 47.4 45.4 43.7 44.1 :
Livestock numbers: live sheep and live goats (thousand heads, end of period) : 241.4 i 233.5 i 235.0 i 237.2 i :
Raw milk available on farms (thousand tonnes) : : : : : :
Harvested crop production: cereals (including rice) (thousand tonnes) 540.1 504.4 518.7 477.2 544.5 :
Harvested crop production: sugar beet (thousand tonnes) : 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 :
Harvested crop production: vegetables (thousand tonnes) 135.4 165.0 175.6 170.2 164.1 :
Source: Eurostat and/or the statistical authorities in Kosovo**
: = not available C = confidential value d = definition differs e = estimated p = provisional i = Eurostat estimate w= data supplied by and under the responsibility of the national statistical authority and published on an "as is" basis and without any assurance as regards their quality and adherence to EU statistical methodology
* = Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure (MIP) indicator
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EN EN
EUROPEAN COMMISSION
Brussels, 4.11.2026 SWD(2026) 693 final
COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT
North Macedonia 2026 Report
Accompanying the document
COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN
PARLIAMENT, THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL
COMMITTEE AND THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS
2026 Communication on EU enlargement policy
{COM(2026) 690 final} - {SWD(2026) 690 final} - {SWD(2026) 691 final} -
{SWD(2026) 692 final} - {SWD(2026) 694 final} - {SWD(2026) 695 final} - {SWD(2026) 696 final} - {SWD(2026) 697 final} - {SWD(2026) 698 final} -
{SWD(2026) 699 final} - {SWD(2026) 700 final}
1
CONTENTS 1. Introduction ........................................................................................................................................ 3
1.1. Context ......................................................................................................................................... 3
1.2. Main findings of the report .......................................................................................................... 3
1.3 State of play of the accession negotiations ................................................................................ 19
2. CLUSTER 1: THE FUNDAMENTALS OF THE ACCESSION PROCESS ........................ 19
2.1. Functioning of democratic institutions and public administration reform ............................... 19
2.1.1 Democracy ........................................................................................................................... 19
2.1.2. Public administration reform .............................................................................................. 22
2.2. Rule of law and fundamental rights ........................................................................................... 25
2.2.1 Chapter 23 - Judiciary and fundamental rights ............................................................. 25
2.2.2 Chapter 24 - Justice, freedom and security .................................................................. 43
2.3. Economic criteria ....................................................................................................................... 54
2.3.1. The existence of a functioning market economy ................................................................ 54
2.3.2. The capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union ..... 59
2.4. Public procurement, statistics; financial control ....................................................................... 62
Chapter 5 - Public procurement .................................................................................................... 62
Chapter 18 - Statistics ................................................................................................................... 63
Chapter 32 - Financial control ....................................................................................................... 64
3. Good neighbourly relations and regional cooperation ..................................................................... 65
4. Resilience, Security, Defence ............................................................................................................ 67
5. Ability to assume the obligations of membership ............................................................................ 68
Cluster 2: Internal market ................................................................................................................. 68
Chapter 1 - Free movement of goods ........................................................................................... 69
Chapter 2 - Freedom of movement for workers ........................................................................... 69
Chapter 3 - Right of establishment and freedom to provide services .......................................... 70
Chapter 4 - Free movement of capital .......................................................................................... 71
Chapter 6 - Company law .............................................................................................................. 71
Chapter 7 - Intellectual property law ............................................................................................ 72
Chapter 8 - Competition policy ..................................................................................................... 72
Chapter 9 - Financial services ........................................................................................................ 73
Chapter 28 - Consumer and health protection ............................................................................. 74
Cluster 3: Competitiveness and inclusive growth ............................................................................. 75
Chapter 10 - Digital transformation and media ............................................................................ 75
Chapter 16 - Taxation .................................................................................................................... 77
Chapter 17 - Economic and monetary policy ................................................................................ 77
Chapter 19 - Social policy and employment ................................................................................. 78
2
Chapter 20 - Enterprise and industrial policy ............................................................................... 80
Chapter 25 - Science and research................................................................................................ 82
Chapter 26 - Education and culture .............................................................................................. 83
Chapter 29 - Customs union ......................................................................................................... 86
Cluster 4: The Green Agenda and sustainable connectivity ............................................................. 86
Chapter 14 - Transport policy ....................................................................................................... 87
Chapter 15 - Energy ...................................................................................................................... 88
Chapter 21 - Trans-European networks ........................................................................................ 89
Chapter 27 - Environment and climate change ............................................................................ 90
Cluster 5: Resources, agriculture and cohesion ................................................................................ 93
Chapter 11 - Agriculture and rural development.......................................................................... 93
Chapter 12 - Food safety, veterinary and phytosanitary policy .................................................... 94
Chapter 13 - Fisheries and aquaculture ........................................................................................ 95
Chapter 22 - Regional policy and coordination of structural instruments ................................... 96
Chapter 33 - Financial and budgetary provisions ......................................................................... 97
Cluster 6: External relations .............................................................................................................. 98
Chapter 30 - External relations ..................................................................................................... 98
Chapter 31 - Foreign, security and defence policy ....................................................................... 99
Annex I – Relations between the EU and North Macedonia .......................................................... 101
3
1. INTRODUCTION1
1.1. CONTEXT
All screening reports on the six clusters were presented to the Council. North Macedonia has continued work toward completing the necessary documents to fulfil the opening benchmarks for cluster 1 (‘Fundamentals of the accession process’). No progress was made towards adopting relevant constitutional changes as required under the 2022 Council Conclusions. North Macedonia continued to implement the Stabilisation and Association Agreement and several joint bodies under the agreement met. This included the Stabilisation and Association Committee, which met in April 2026, the first time since 2021.
Essential EU-related reforms need to be implemented. North Macedonia has actively engaged on the new Growth Plan for the Western Balkans and has stepped up efforts to deliver on implementing the plan’s four pillars of gradual integration with the EU single market, regional economic integration, fundamental reforms and increased financial support. The Commission’s 2026 rule of law report covered North Macedonia for the third time.
North Macedonia maintained good relations with other enlargement countries and continued its engagement in regional initiatives. Existing bilateral agreements with neighbouring countries need to be implemented in good faith by all parties, including the Prespa Agreement with Greece and the Treaty of Friendship, Good Neighbourliness and Cooperation with Bulgaria. North Macedonia maintained its full alignment with the EU’s common foreign and security policy, including on Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, sending a strong signal of its strategic choice of EU accession and showing itself to be a reliable partner.
1.2. MAIN FINDINGS OF THE REPORT
CLUSTER 1: THE FUNDAMENTALS OF THE ACCESSION PROCESS
Democracy
The legal and institutional framework provides a basis for the democratic conduct of elections. However, no progress was made in aligning with EU standards and implementing outstanding recommendations of the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)/Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) and the Venice Commission with regard to the electoral code. Electoral disinformation and foreign information manipulation remain insufficiently addressed. North Macedonia needs to ensure alignment with all relevant EU acquis, including Regulation (EU) 2024/900 on the transparency and targeting of political advertising, taking into account European and international democratic standards.
Parliament can exercise its powers in a partially effective way. Parliament adopted a new Code of Ethics for Members of Parliament and a new strategic plan. Despite having clear Rules of Procedure, Parliament again failed to adopt its annual agenda. Consensus on legislation requiring qualified majorities remained elusive, delaying key reforms, while the use of shortened legislative procedures increased further.
1 This report covers the period from 1 September 2025 to 1 September 2026. It is based on input from a variety of sources, including contributions from the government of North Macedonia, EU Member States, European Parliament reports and information from various international and non-governmental organisations. It also includes the results of comparative assessments and indices produced by other stakeholders, in particular in the area of rule of law.
The report uses the following assessment scale to describe the state of play: early stage, some level of preparation, moderately prepared, good level of preparation and well advanced. To describe progress made during the reporting period, it uses the following scale: backsliding, no progress, limited progress, some progress, good progress and very good progress. Where appropriate, interim steps have also been used.
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The institutions in charge of the EU integration process are in place. No monitoring reports were produced on the implementation of the National Plan for the Adoption of the EU acquis (NPAA).
The government coalition remained stable. Some progress was made on local government reform, though key legislation is still pending. The inter-ethnic situation remained stable, and the Ohrid Framework Agreement continued to be implemented, though challenges persist.
Civil society, including human rights defenders, operated in an overall enabling environment. The Council for Cooperation between the Government and Civil Society was reactivated. Civil society organisations (CSOs) participate in the National Council for EU Integration and the Council for Open Government Partnership, but their role should be enhanced. Although there is gradual progress towards a more open dialogue and participatory policy environment, civil society engagement in consultations needs to improve, including in the context of the EU accession process. State support remains limited and funding remains a structural vulnerability. There have been instances in which CSOs and human rights defenders have faced intimidation, online harassment and smear campaigns.
Public administration reform
North Macedonia remains moderately prepared in the area of public administration reform. Some progress was made by further expanding the offer of electronic services and upgrading the system for electronic management of documents. Efforts are on-going for amending the Law on administrative servants and the Law on public service employees to address weaknesses identified after their adoption. The country also enacted a Law on top management, with serious shortcomings regarding the composition of the selection boards, the methodologies for the selection and recruitment of top managers and objective criteria for dismissal. The reorganisation of several state institutions in line with the amended Law on state organisation continued. In November 2025, North Macedonia adopted its roadmap on public administration reform.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were partially implemented and remain largely valid. In the coming year, North Macedonia should in particular:
→ adopt and implement the revised Law on administrative servants, the revised Law on public service employees and the rules governing top management;
→ finalise the revision of, and continue implementing, the Law on state organisation and other related laws in line with the recommendations on the new organisation of state administrative bodies, and ensure full implementation of the Law on general administrative procedure;
→ ensure full implementation of the Integrated Financial Management Information System (IFMIS) in line with the revised organic budget law (OBL) requirements, particularly by awarding and rolling out the IFMIS and by being fully on track with putting the core modules into operation.
Chapter 23: Judiciary and fundamental rights
North Macedonia is between having some and a moderate level of preparation in applying the EU acquis and European standards in this area. Overall, there was limited progress.North Macedonia made progress in developing its rule of law roadmap, which sets out commitments for the coming years on further alignment with the EU acquis and strengthening institutional capacity.
Functioning of the judiciary
The judicial system of North Macedonia is between having some and a moderate level of preparation and made some progress. The country continued implementing the Strategy for Judicial Reform (2024-2028). It adopted a new Law on the Judicial Council, largely
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addressing the Venice Commission recommendations. Furthermore, it adopted a new Law on the Council for Public Prosecutors, a Law on salaries of judges, a Law on salaries of prosecutors as well as a new Law on civil procedure. The judiciary’s overall independence and financial autonomy is undermined by persisting interference from other state branches and the drastic lack of financial and human resources.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were partially implemented. In the coming year, North Macedonia should in particular:
→ accelerate implementation of the Strategy for judicial reform;
→ implement the newly adopted laws on the Judicial Council, on the Council for Public Prosecutors, and timely revise the Law on the Public Prosecutor’s Office to strengthen those institutions, addressing the outstanding recommendations of the 2023 peer review mission and the opinions of the Venice Commission and adopting necessary implementing legislation;
→ consistently filling judicial vacancies including by stepping up the implementation of the human resources strategies for the judiciary and the public prosecution service as well as securing sufficient funding and ensure that the Automated Court Case Management Information System is fully functional.
Fight against corruption
North Macedonia is between having some and a moderate level of preparation and made no progress on the prevention of and fight against corruption. Corruption remains prevalent and is an issue of serious concern. The January 2026 amendments to the Criminal Code concerning the offences of abuse of official position and criminal association do not adequately address the adverse effects of the 2023 amendments and have contributed to legal uncertainty. The State Commission for the Prevention of Corruption needs to step up the proactive identification of potential cases of misconduct. High-level corruption cases continue to face delays and often reach the statute of limitations, contributing to the perception of impunity.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were not addressed and therefore remain valid. In the coming year, North Macedonia should in particular:
→ adopt a new Criminal Code and a new Law on criminal procedure in line with the EU acquis and international standards;
→ improve its track record in high-level corruption cases – with timely, professional and transparent proactive investigations, prosecutions, final convictions and recovery, including confiscation of criminal assets, value-based confiscation, extended confiscation and third-party confiscation;
→ allocate sufficient human and financial resources, including financial experts, to: (i) the Public Prosecutor’s Office and the Basic Public Prosecutor’s Office for Prosecuting Organised Crime and Corruption, to ensure effective accountability in high-level corruption cases; and (ii) the State Commission for the Prevention of Corruption, to improve the verification of asset declarations.
Fundamental rights
The legal framework on fundamental rights is overall aligned with the EU acquis and European standards. The country continues to meet its general obligations on fundamental rights. However, the implementation of legislation needs to improve. Parliament elected a new Ombudsperson, but eight new Deputy Ombudspersons still need to be chosen. The Ombudsperson’s Office and the Commission on Prevention and Protection against Discrimination still lack financial autonomy. Gender-based violence remains a serious human rights issue, encompassing domestic violence, psychological, economic and cyber
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violence, and femicide. No steps were taken to align with the EU acquis on non- discrimination and equality, including gender equality. Despite the renovation of some prison facilities, the overall situation in prisons remains appalling.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were addressed to a limited extent and therefore remain valid. In the coming year, the country should in particular:
→ address dire conditions in prisons and continue efforts to promote alternatives to incarceration, and implement relevant recommendations on detention conditions made by national and international institutions, particularly recommendations of the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CPT);
→ appoint the eight Deputy Ombudspersons and ensure that the Ombudsperson’s Office and the Commission on Prevention and Protection against Discrimination receive sufficient financial and human resources, enabling them to function independently and effectively;
→ provide adequate support to women survivors of gender-based violence, vulnerable categories of children, especially child victims of violence, Roma2 children and children with disabilities.
Freedom of expression and media freedom
North Macedonia is between having some and a moderate level of preparation on freedom of expression and has made no progress in this area. The country took some steps to align the legal framework with the European Media Freedom Act. The Agency for Audio and Audio-Visual Media Services and the public service broadcaster continue to face challenges, primarily due to limited financial and administrative autonomy and irregular funding.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were partially implemented and therefore remain valid. In the coming year, the country should in particular:
→ continue to revise the legal framework governing the media to align it with the EU acquis and European standards, particularly by introducing rules on full transparency in media ownership and allocation of public funds for state advertising, competition and State aid, and intellectual property rights;
→ implement the strategy to reform the public broadcaster;
→ continue to promptly address all threats and acts of violence against journalists and ensure perpetrators are brought to justice.
Chapter 24: Justice, freedom and security
North Macedonia is moderately prepared in this area and has made limited progress. A national roadmap map to implement the Joint Action Plan on Countering and Preventing Terrorism for the Western Balkans was adopted. Limited progress was made on EU acquis alignment under this chapter. Cooperation with EU Member States and EU agencies needs to improve.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were only partially implemented and remain largely valid. In the coming year, North Macedonia should in particular:
→ strengthen the capacities and resources of the structures responsible for fighting organised and financial crimes and money laundering, with a focus on increasing
2 In line with the terminology of European institutions, the umbrella term ‘Roma’ is used here to refer to a number
of different groups, without denying the specificities of these groups.
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operational capacity and cooperation and on confiscating property when warranted;
→ ensure effective implementation and monitoring of the national strategies for countering terrorism (2023-2027) and countering violent extremism (2023-2027), and of the Joint Action Plan on Countering and Preventing Terrorism-terrorism;
→ systematically register migrants, improve protection-sensitive profiling and adopt a more systematic approach to fighting migrant smuggling.
Fight against serious and organised crime
North Macedonia is between having some and a moderate level of preparation in the fight against serious and organised crime and has made limited progress in this area. North Macedonia continued to make progress in the fight against organised crime but should increase its capacities to fight all forms of serious and organised crime. Two revised laws on weapons and on testing and marking firearms, aligning with the relevant EU acquis, were adopted. Further alignment with the EU acquis on the fight against serious and organised crime is needed.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were only partially met and therefore remain largely valid. In the coming year, North Macedonia should in particular:
→ continue to improve its track record of investigations, prosecutions and convictions in all fields of serious and organised crime, money laundering cases and financial crimes, with a focus on asset recovery and confiscation of the proceeds of crimes;
→ further strengthen the capacities and resources of law enforcement agencies investigating organised and serious crimes, financial crimes and money laundering, and of the Asset Recovery Office and the Agency for the Management of Confiscated Assets;
→ align its legislation on narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances with the EU acquis.
ECONOMIC CRITERIA
The existence of a functioning market economy
North Macedonia has made limited progress and is at a good level of preparation in developing a functioning market economy. Real GDP growth accelerated in 2025, driven by domestic demand. Inflation rebounded, reflecting both domestic and international price pressures. The 2025 fiscal deficit declined in line with plans, although the spending composition deteriorated. Capital spending execution continues to suffer from weak public investment management. Efforts to formalise the informal economy have slowed down. The central bank maintained a prudent monetary policy and further strengthened the macroprudential framework. The banking sector remained resilient amidst a strong rise in credit growth. The labour market situation improved slightly, but structural problems, including low participation rates, skills mismatches, substantial emigration and a large gender gap, pose obstacles to growth.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were only partially implemented and therefore remain largely valid. In the coming year, North Macedonia should in particular:
→ strengthen fiscal consolidation by reducing tax expenditure and containing the rise in public sector wages and pensions, and by making the Fiscal Council fully independent and improving its access to data;
→ accelerate the implementation of the public investment management action plan and adopt the Law on public-private partnerships;
→ adopt and implement a revised action plan for formalising the informal economy.
The capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the EU
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North Macedonia has made some progress and is moderately prepared to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the EU. The digitalisation of the economy has advanced, and the reform of vocational education and training has seen progress. By contrast, higher education remains characterised by outdated curricula. Significant investment needs in transport and energy infrastructure persist. Integration with the EU in trade and investment, as well as overall trade openness, remained high in 2025.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were partially implemented and therefore remain valid. In the coming year, North Macedonia should in particular:
→ address shortcomings in higher education with a view to reducing the skills mismatch;
→ ensure substantial progress in the implementation of key transport infrastructure projects, such as Road Corridors VIII and X;
→ adopt the new Climate Law with a view to creating the conditions for carbon pricing.
Chapter 5: Public procurement
North Macedonia is moderately prepared in the area of public procurement. No progress was made since the last assessment.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were not implemented and remain valid. In the coming year, North Macedonia should in particular:
→ adopt the Law on public-private partnership (PPP) and the Law on concessions, to further align the legal framework in those areas with the EU acquis;
→ increase competition and the use of most economically advantageous tender (MEAT) criteria for the award of contracts and improve the monitoring and controls of public procurement procedures through reporting on and following up on irregularities, cases of conflict of interest and fraudulent practices;
→ strengthen procurement oversight and improve coordination among key stakeholders to fight corruption, and strengthen their capacities to implement the principles of transparency, free competition, equal treatment and non-discrimination.
Chapter 18: Statistics
The country is between a moderate and a good level of preparation in the area of statistics. Some progress was made, mainly on labour market and social statistics, national accounts, the update of business classification standards and the provision of additional human and financial resources.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were partially implemented and remain largely valid. In the coming year, North Macedonia should in particular:
→ adopt the law for the agricultural census and conduct the agricultural census, drawing on the dedicated budget allocation and the work undertaken to date;
→ continue ensuring adequate staffing and sufficient financial resources for the State Statistical Office;
→ improve compliance with the European System of Accounts 2010 (ESA 2010), remove the flags preventing the publication of government finance statistics (GFS), resolve open issues related to the sectorisation of units, close data gaps in the excessive deficit procedures and government finance statistics, and continue improving the depth of alignment of financial accounts and quarterly national accounts with ESA 2010.
Chapter 32: Financial control
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The country is moderately prepared in the area of financial control. Limited progress was madethrough the adoption of several acts implementing the public internal financial control (PIFC) law and strengthening risk management systems.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were only partially implemented and therefore remain largely valid. In the coming year, North Macedonia should in particular:
→ accelerate implementation of the reforms envisaged in the PIFC law in order to strengthen the institutional capacity of internal audit units, managerial accountability and sound financial management;
→ adopt the state audit law to strengthen the State Audit Office’s (SAO) independence, and improve parliamentary follow-up on individual audit reports and SAO recommendations;
→ strengthen the administrative capacity of the Anti-Fraud Coordination Service Network (AFCOS) to better deliver on the prevention, management and reporting of irregularities related to the EU’s financial interests.
CLUSTER 2: INTERNAL MARKET
Chapter 1: Free movement of goods
North Macedonia is moderately prepared on the free movement of goods. No progress was made in the reporting period.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were not implemented and therefore remain valid. In the coming year, North Macedonia should in particular:
→ adopt the Law on market surveillance and the implementing legislation necessary to complete alignment with the latest EU acquis on general products safety;
→ adopt a new strategy for the free movement of goods, which should include providing for a significant increase in human resources for legal and policy development and implementation of the EU acquis in this chapter;
→ adopt a new action plan to eliminate the non-tariff barriers to trade and ensure compliance with Articles 34-36 of the Treaty on Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), and start implementing the action plan.
Chapter 2: Freedom of movement for workers
North Macedonia is at an early stage of preparation on freedom of movement for workers. Limited progress was made in this area, with the adoption of the Law on seasonal workers.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were only partially implemented and therefore remain largely valid. In the coming year, North Macedonia should in particular:
→ strengthen the capacity of the Employment Service Agency by continuing to organise training, and further align legislation and the exchange of good practices, in line with the European Employment Services (EURES) and European Labour Authority (ELA) Regulations;
→ continue to align the legal framework to the EU acquis on free movement of workers, including access to the labour market and, particularly, rules on non-discrimination on grounds of nationality against EU workers in all sectors;
→ continue to negotiate and conclude bilateral agreements on social security coordination and healthcare insurance with EU Member States and put in place administrative measures to prepare for accession and for the electronic exchange of social security data.
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Chapter 3: Right of establishment and freedom to provide services
On the right of establishment and the freedom to provide services, North Macedonia is moderately prepared. No progress was made in the reporting period.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were not implemented and therefore remain valid. In the coming year, North Macedonia should in particular:
→ intensify implementation of the 2024-2026 action plan to address the non-compliance of listed sectoral laws with the Law on services by adopting cross-sector amendments;
→ finalise alignment with the EU acquis on cross-border parcel delivery;
→ align with the EU acquis on mutual recognition of professional qualifications, in particular Directive on recognition of professional qualifications and Directive on a proportionality test, before adopting the new regulation of professions;
Chapter 4: Free movement of capital
North Macedonia is between a moderate and a good level of preparation in the area of free movement of capital. Some progress in the fight against money laundering and the financing of terrorism, notably through the adoption of the National Strategy for Combating Money Laundering and Financing of Terrorism, but further efforts are needed to address remaining shortcomings as noted by MONEYVAL.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were partially implemented and therefore remain largely valid. In the coming year, North Macedonia should in particular:
→ amend the Law on foreign exchange operations to facilitate the liberalisation of residents’ accounts abroad, and align the restriction on agricultural land acquisition with Articles 63- 66 TFEU;
→ continue to align its payment services legislation with the EU acquis, including the remaining Payment Services Directive 2 requirements beyond those necessary for SEPA participation, and prepare for alignment with the Payment Services Regulation/Payment Services Directive 3 package;
→ continue to strengthen the effectiveness of the AML/CFT framework, including by addressing the remaining MONEYVAL recommendations, in particular as regards asset recovery, non-financial sector supervision, and the operational use of financial intelligence.
Chapter 6: Company law
The country has a good level of preparation in the field of company law. No progress was made in the reporting period.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were not implemented. In the coming year, North Macedonia should in particular:
→ align national legislation with the acquis on shareholder rights, including the rules on encouraging long-term shareholder engagement;
→ align national legislation on cross-border conversions, mergers and divisions;
→ adopt legislation on accounting and auditing aligned with the latest EU acquis, and strengthen the role and capacity of the Council for Advancement and Oversight of Audit.
Chapter 7: Intellectual property law
North Macedonia is moderately prepared in the area of intellectual property law. Limited progress was made over the reporting period with the operationalisation of the online information platform for exchanging data on intellectual property rights.
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The Commission’s recommendations from last year were partially implemented and therefore remain valid. In the coming year, North Macedonia should in particular:
→ adopt the new law on copyright to align with the EU acquis on collective rights management, orphan works and the implementation of the Marrakesh Treaty;
→ further improve the legal framework on industrial property rights by aligning with the Directive on the enforcement of intellectual property rights and with the Directive on trade secrets;
→ implement the national intellectual property strategy.
Chapter 8: Competition policy
The country is moderately prepared in the area of competition. Limited progress was made in the reporting period, notably by strengthening the administrative capacities of the competition authority.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were not fully implemented and therefore remain largely valid. In the coming year, North Macedonia should in particular:
→ further align the legislative framework with the EU acquis, in particular the implementing legislation in the area of State aid and antitrust;
→ ensure full transparency of State aid granted by the authorities;
→ strengthen the administrative and financial capacity of the national competition authority.
Chapter 9: Financial services
The country is moderately prepared as regards financial services. Some progress was made through strenghtened enforcement of motor insurance requirements.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were only partially implemented and therefore remain mostly valid. In the coming year, North Macedonia should in particular:
→ continue to align the banking regulation with the latest versions of the Capital Requirements Regulation and the Capital Requirements Directive;
→ align with the Solvency II Directive, particularly Pillars 1 and 3;
→ step up the adoption of the law on alternative investment funds, and continue efforts to align with the EU acquis on financial market infrastructures.
Chapter 28: Consumer and health protection
North Macedonia is moderately prepared in the area ofconsumer and health protection. No progress was made.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year remain valid. In the coming year, North Macedonia should in particular:
→ adopt and start to implement the next three-year consumer protection strategy and increase capacity for market surveillance;
→ reinforce tobacco control legislation and alignment with the EU acquis on medicinal products for human use and veterinary medicinal products and prepare for alignment with the EU Regulation on substances of human origin;
→ increase funding, awareness and human resources in the area of health, particularly for cancer detection.
CLUSTER 3: COMPETITIVENESS AND INCLUSIVE GROWTH
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Chapter 10: Digital transformation and media
North Macedonia is between a moderate and a good level of preparation in the area of digital transformation and media. Good progress was made, notably through further alignment of the Law on electronic communications with the EU acquis, the expansion of electronic services for citizens and businesses, and steps to strengthen interoperability and the cybersecurity framework.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were partially implemented and therefore remain largely valid. In the coming year, North Macedonia should in particular:
→ further align national legislation with the EU acquis on digital services, cybersecurity and digital trust, and implement the 5G cybersecurity toolbox;
→ strengthen the independence and capacity of the media regulator and of the public service broadcaster;
→ ensure sufficient human resources and necessary system upgrades to improve the 112 emergency number service.
Chapter 16: Taxation
North Macedonia is moderately prepared in the area of taxation. Limited progress was made through the Public Revenue Office improving its audit and compliance risk management capacity for large taxpayers.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were only partially implemented and therefore remain largely valid. In the coming year, North Macedonia should in particular:
→ further align legislation with the EU acquis on VAT, excise duties and direct taxation, and put in place a transparent and effective VAT refund process;
→ provide a commitment and start preparations to put in place a mechanism to effectively implement the automatic exchange of tax information with EU Member States, in line with the OECD Global Standard;
→ develop a new integrated IT tax system, further improve its compliance risk management, continue to streamline the strategic reform of the national authority, and start preparations for interconnection and interoperability with the common EU taxation IT systems.
Chapter 17: Economic and monetary policy
The country is between a moderate and a good level of preparation in the area of economic and monetary policy. Some progress was made, including on a new budget classification, approved in December 2025. However, other legislative procedures that would mark further progress towards the EU acquis on monetary policy, central banks and stability mechanisms are delayed.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were only partially implemented and therefore remain largely valid. In the coming year, North Macedonia should in particular:
→ ensure the timely implementation of the reforms envisaged in the organic budget law, including the roll-out of the Integrated Financial Management Information System, and putting into operation the reforms envisaged in the Public Investment Management Decree;
→ reverse the January 2025 amendment to the Law on the national bank that weakens its financial autonomy by redirecting most of its profits to the state budget;
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→ ensure the legal completeness of the Fiscal Council’s institutional framework to make it fully independent and operationally effective, including employment governance, salary autonomy and accountability architecture.
Chapter 19: Social policy and employment
North Macedonia is moderately prepared in the area of social policy and employment. Some progress was made by further reducing the unemployment rate, increasing social assistance benefits and through continued implementation of the Youth Guarantee Scheme.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were partially implemented and therefore remain valid. In the coming year, North Macedonia should in particular:
→ align national legislation with the EU acquis and standards on equality and non- discrimination in employment, including the EU gender equality acquis as regards provisions of the Work-Life Balance, Pay Transparency, and Women on Boards Directives;
→ continue to implement labour market activation strategies and ensure that those measures are properly evaluated;
→ set up a monitoring and evaluation framework for social services, and a system for monitoring work-related injuries and deaths.
Chapter 20: Enterprise and industrial policy
The country is between a moderate and a good level of preparation in the area of enterprise and industrial policy. Some progress was made, by: (i) streamlining the company support measures into a single public body called the Agency for Innovation, Scientific and Technological Development and Entrepreneurship (INOVA); (ii) implementation of measures against the informal economy, despite persistent delays; and (iii) regular consultation on laws via the ENER electronic platform. North Macedonia takes part in the Single Market Highway Initiative.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were partially implemented and therefore remain largely valid. In the coming year, North Macedonia should:
→ consolidate the institutional structure and mandates of public bodies as regards enterprise and industrial policy principles, and address recommendations by the State Audit Office regarding the work of the Ministry of Economy;
→ simplify the administrative procedures for doing business, and boost export readiness and the integration of companies in supply chains by stepping up efforts to implement the export promotion strategy;
→ improve the process of consulting enterprises during the preparation of measures and inform them with sufficient lead time about implementation conditions;
Chapter 25: Science and research
The country has a good level of preparation in the area of science and research. Good progress was made by rolling out measures from the Action Plan 2024-2025 of the Smart Specialisation Strategy 2024-2027, with the operationalisation of the Agency for Innovation, Scientific and Technological Development and Entrepreneurship (INOVA), the set-up of a co-funding mechanism under the European Innovation Council and EIT and on the European Cooperation in Science and Technology (COST) programme.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were largely implemented. In the coming year, North Macedonia should in particular:
→ continue the implementation of the Smart Specialisation Strategy;
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→ continue to promote and increase participation in Horizon Europe;
→ increase integration into the European Research Area (ERA), especially through increased public investments in research and innovation and improved reporting on the indicators of the European Innovation Scoreboard and participate in the ERA Policy Actions 2025-2027.
Chapter 26: Education and culture
North Macedonia is between a moderate and a good level of preparation in the area of education and culture. Some progress was made, with the adoption of the 2026-2032 Strategy for Education, the adoption of all the implementing legislation for the Law on adult education and of several bylaws for the Law on vocational education and training (VET).
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were largely implemented but challenges persist. In the coming year, North Macedonia should in particular:
→ improve access to quality education for all, in particular for children with special educational needs and children from Roma communities, and increase the number of those children in mainstream schools; further develop teachers’ skills and invest in their continuous professional development;
→ ensure academic freedom and the autonomy of higher education institutions, put in place measures for regular and transparent quality assurance in higher education, complete and apply a funding formula for higher education
→ optimise the school network and continue to apply and adjust the new formulas for financing primary and secondary education and VET.
→ Follow the recommendation of the expert panel monitoring European Capitals of Culture to ensure a successful title-year for Skopje European Capital of Culture 2028.
Chapter 29: Customs union
North Macedonia has a good level of preparation in this area. Some progress was made in the reporting period, through the consolidation and upgrade of the IT systems and the procurement of IT equipment.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were partially implemented and therefore remain largely valid. In the coming year, North Macedonia should in particular:
→ continue consolidating and applying its national customs IT systems in line with the Commission’s Union Customs Code work programme and multiannual strategic plan (MASP) modules, and ensure their upgrade and business continuity;
→ ensure continued alignment of the customs legislation with the EU acquis and upgrade its national component of the New Computerised Transit System (NCTS) to Phase 6, as well as continue the alignment to take account of the progressive application of the new Union Customs Code;
→ strengthen the combat of customs fraud (in particular the smuggling of tobacco products) and through cooperation with the European Anti-Fraud Office.
CLUSTER 4: THE GREEN AGENDA AND SUSTAINABLE CONNECTIVITY
Chapter 14 - Transport policy
The country is moderately prepared in the area of transport. Some progress was made, notably on multimodal transport, with the completion of key studies, the preliminary design and the technical documentation for the Trubarevo multimodal transport node. The sector’s
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inspection bodies were strengthened through external technical expertise, capacity-building support and new equipment.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were partially implemented and remain mostly valid. In the coming year, North Macedonia should in particular:
→ strengthen inspection bodies with qualified operational and administrative capacity to enforce current legislation, in order to reduce crashes and fatalities in road and rail transport;
→ implement connectivity reform measures for road and rail, and finalise pending border- crossing agreements/protocols to facilitate the flow of traffic and goods;
→ adopt and implement legislation on multimodal and intelligent transport systems (ITS) for road and rail and on electronic freight transport information.
Chapter 15: Energy
North Macedonia is moderately prepared in the area of energy. Some progress was made, notably through the adoption of: (i) the Just Transition annual implementation plan for 2026; (ii) amendments to the Law on energy efficiency; (iii) adoption of the law on renewable energy and (iv) a methodology for measuring the level of energy poverty.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were not fully implemented and therefore remain largely valid. In the coming year, North Macedonia should in particular:
→ improve the technical capacities of the Ministry of Energy, Mining and Mineral Resources so that it can meet its responsibilities to develop and implement energy sector policy and legislation;
→ fully align and start implementing the legislation on the Electricity Integration Package (EIP), on renewable energy and energy efficiency;
→ implement the National Energy Action Plan, the National Energy and Climate Plan, the Just Transition Roadmap, and improve reporting on implementation by setting up an adequate data collection system.
Chapter 21: Trans-European networks
North Macedonia has a good level of preparation in the area of trans-European networks (TENs). Limited progress was made during the reporting period, through progress on sections of the Tetovo-Ohrid highway, on the Western Balkans Eastern Mediterranean (WBEM) core network and through the signature of an agreement with Bulgaria to build a rail connection along the WBEM corridor (‘Corridor VIII’). Both corridors VIII and X, part of the WBEM corridor, remain a strategic backbone for North Macedonia’s connectivity to the TEN- T network.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were not implemented and therefore remain valid. In the coming year, North Macedonia should in particular:
→ strengthen the operational and technical capacity of all management and stakeholder institutions dealing with the development of both the trans-European transport (TEN-T) and trans-European energy (TEN-E) networks; harmonise the legal framework; and increase compliance with the Trans-European Network Regulation;
→ mobilise sufficient resources to implement the goals and deadlines in the Transport Community’s five-year rolling work plan for the development of the TEN-T extension;
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→ put the Railway Border-Crossing Protocol signed with Kosovo into operation; finalise the mutual agreement for border-crossing procedures with Greece; accelerate progress on the construction of the rail connection along the WBEM corridor with Bulgaria; ensure the efficient operation and further development of Corridor X and Corridor VIII.
Chapter 27: Environment and climate change
North Macedonia has some level of preparation in this area. Limited progress was made during the reporting period.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were only partially implemented and therefore remain mostly valid. North Macedonia should in particular:
→ strengthen administrative and inspection capacities to implement and enforce the environmental acquis; implement structural reforms in all sectors, including civil protection operational capacity and coordination with the Union Civil Protection Mechanism;
→ Prepare costed plans to ensure adequate financing of environmental investments in priority environmental sectors, ensure the functioning of the regional waste management structures and enable implementation of infrastructure investments to establish a regional waste management system;
→ adopt the Law on climate change, implement the National Energy and Climate Plan (NECP), align with and implement the monitoring, reporting, verification and accreditation (MRVA) acquis, submit a new nationally determined contribution to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), and ensure that the climate change unit within the Ministry of Environment and Physical Planning is operational.
CLUSTER 5: RESOURCES, AGRICULTURE AND COHESION
Chapter 11: Agriculture and rural development
North Macedonia remains moderately prepared in the area of agriculture and rural development. Limited progress was made during the reporting period, notably through the adoption of the new Law on organic production.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were partially implemented and therefore remain mostly valid. In the coming year, North Macedonia should in particular:
→ finalise the new Law on agriculture and rural development to strengthen its policy framework on agriculture support and common market organisation;
→ ensure the interoperability of the various elements of the Integrated Administration and Control System (IACS), verify data accuracy, and transfer the farm register and the Land Parcel Identification System (LPIS) to the paying agency;
→ improve the human resources policy and administrative capacity in the EU Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance for Rural Development (IPARD) operating structures to ensure robust implementation of the IPARD III programme in line with principles of sound financial management.
Chapter 12: Food safety, veterinary and phytosanitary policy
North Macedonia has a good level of preparation in the areas of food safety and veterinary and phytosanitary policy. Limited progress was made over the reporting period, notably
This designation is without prejudice to positions on status, and is in line with UNSCR 1244/1999 and the ICJ
Opinion on the Kosovo declaration of independence.
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through the adoption of the National Plan for the Sustainable Use of Pesticides and the initiation of measures for integrated pest management.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were partially implemented and therefore remain largely valid. In the coming year, North Macedonia should in particular:
→ adopt the law on official controls and the new law on animal health, and put in place an EU-compliant system of collection, storage and processing of animal by-products;
→ continue efforts to strengthen capacity for data analysis and appropriate organisational structures within the Food and Veterinary Agency implementing the General Food Law Regulation;
→ adopt the Law on plant health and the implementing legislation on the sustainable use of pesticides.
Chapter 13: Fisheries and aquaculture
North Macedonia is moderately prepared in the area of fisheries and aquaculture. Some progress was made during the reporting period, notably through the adoption of the National Eel Management Plan.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were not implemented and remain valid. In the coming year, North Macedonia should in particular:
→ adopt the implementing legislation on marketing standards, consumer information, traceability and producer organisations; adopt a national strategic plan on aquaculture;
→ improve the data collection system and reporting, by setting up a data framework to collect data on fisheries and aquaculture, including information on catches of European eel both in recreational and in commercial fishing and providing an analysis of the consequences of such fishing;
→ improve controls on fish stock management and on illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing by introducing a catch certification system.
Chapter 22: Regional policy and coordination of structural instruments
North Macedonia is moderately prepared in the area of regional policy and coordination of structural instruments. Limited progress was made during the reporting period, notably through improved policy dialogue.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were partially implemented and remain largely valid. In the coming year, North Macedonia should in particular:
→ upgrade its institutional, administrative and technical capacity to manage EU funds by adopting the necessary staff retention policy and regulations, strengthening capacities, improving the implementation of EU and audit recommendations, and stepping up interinstitutional cooperation;
→ accelerate the decentralisation process by putting in place a credible financing framework for municipalities and by strengthening policy dialogue on regional development; this includes adopting a plan to implement the Regional Development Strategy for the period 2025-2027.
Chapter 33: Financial and budgetary provisions
North Macedonia is at an early stage of preparation. Limited progress was made over the reporting period through continued implementation of the public internal financial controls law and further alignment of customs legislation and risk management systems.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were partially implemented and therefore remain largely valid. In the coming year, North Macedonia should in particular:
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→ improve the legal basis and methodological tools for the own resources system;
→ strengthen the administrative capacities of, and coordination mechanisms for, key stakeholders.
CLUSTER 6: EXTERNAL RELATIONS
Chapter 30: External relations
The country has a good level of preparation in the area of external relations and made limited progress during the reporting period, in particular in implementing the Central European Free Trade Agreement (CEFTA) protocols.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were partially implemented and therefore remain largely valid. In the coming year, North Macedonia should in particular:
→ put in place a legal framework on international cooperation and development policy and on humanitarian aid for non-EU countries, in line with EU policies and principles;
→ continue to implement commitments under the new Common Regional Market (CRM) action plan for 2025-2028, further implement CEFTA Protocol 6 on trade in services, and take the necessary steps to implement CEFTA Protocol 7 on dispute settlement;
→ align its national legislation on foreign investments with the EU acquis on the screening of foreign direct investments in particular the recently adopted Regulation (EU) 2026/1386 repealing Regulation (EU) 2019/452.
Chapter 31: Foreign, security and defence policy
North Macedonia has a good level of preparation in the field of foreign, security and defence policy. Good progress was made in the reporting period, in particular by maintaining its full alignment with the common foreign and security policy (CFSP), including statements by the High Representative on behalf of the EU and Council decisions on restrictive measures. In April 2026, the second session of the EU–North Macedonia Security and Defence Dialogue was held in Brussels. North Macedonia has increased its defence readiness.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were largely implemented. In the coming year, North Macedonia should in particular:
→ continue to maintain its full alignment with the EU common foreign and security policy; address the challenges related to implementing EU restrictive measures, including the legal time gap between alignment and formal entry into force;
→ align its national small arms and light weapons (SALW) strategy with the revised Roadmap for the control of SALW in the Western Balkans (2025–2030);
→ develop a comprehensive national strategy for addressing hybrid threats to improve its resilience and response capacity.
1.3 STATE OF PLAY OF THE ACCESSION NEGOTIATIONS
No attempts were made to adopt the relevant constitutional changes referred to in the Council Conclusions of 18 July 2022. The country had committed to launching and achieving these changes, with a view to including in the Constitution citizens who live within the state borders and who are part of other peoples, such as Bulgarians.
Progress was made toward completing the preparatory work to the opening benchmarks for the fundamentals cluster. In November 2025, the authorities adopted the roadmap on public administration reform. Work continued towards completing the roadmap on the rule of law,
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including its accompanying action plan on minorities, as well as on the roadmap on the functioning of democratic institutions.
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2. CLUSTER 1: THE FUNDAMENTALS OF THE ACCESSION PROCESS
2.1. FUNCTIONING OF DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS AND PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION REFORM
2.1.1 Democracy
The functioning of democratic institutions is generally stable. However, political polarisation persists, delaying the adoption of important reform legislation and resulting in several overdue appointments.
Elections
Local elections were held on 14 October 2025, with a runoff on 2 November 2025 and a rerun on 11 January 2026 in four municipalities where the minimum required threshold was not reached in October. The elections were competitive and offered voters genuine choice, but took place in a polarised political environment with some procedural shortcomings.
While the legal framework provides a technical basis for conducting democratic elections, it contains numerous gaps and ambiguities, which compromise legal certainty. No progress was made in addressing key outstanding recommendations by ODIHR and the Council of Europe’s Venice Commission. Those recommendations included: (i) conducting a comprehensive open and inclusive review of the Electoral Code well in advance of the next election; (ii) adopting measures to ensure fair and transparent campaign conditions, including equal media access, effective regulation, reporting requirements and oversight of online campaigning, and revised rules for allocating paid political advertising; (iii) eliminating restrictions that impede effective electoral dispute resolution; and (v) strengthening the sanctioning mechanism for electoral violations.
Electoral disinformation, foreign information manipulation, and interference threats remain insufficiently addressed. These are compounded by the unregulated nature of online campaigning and the absence of an oversight authority for social media campaigns.
Meaningful political empowerment of women is limited in practice with only 32 women among 309 mayoral candidates (roughly 10%), resulting in only four women elected mayors. Women candidates remain under-represented, attacked based on their gender, specifically online, and had limited visibility during the electoral campaign, with gender equality issues largely absent. Women’s participation in the electoral process, specifically within the political parties, and political decision-making should be strengthened, including through quotas.
Parliament
Political parties maintained broad consensus on the Rules of Procedure, which have had a positive effect on parliamentary efficiency. Parliament adopted a new Code of Ethics for Members of Parliament and a Strategic Plan 2027-2031. However, Parliament again failed to adopt its annual agenda. The Committee on Monitoring Equitable Representation of Citizens belonging to all Communities remained inactive, despite several emerging inter-ethnic issues.
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Graph 1 : North Macedonia - Women in political life
Women Total % National % EU 27 Source: Assembly of the Republic of North Macedonia, Government of North Macedonia,
State Electoral Commission EU-27- European Institute for gender equalityn/a: not available
Consensus on legislation requiring two-thirds and/or Badinter majorities remained difficult to achieve. This delayed important reforms including the Law on courts and the Law on improving the status of the Ombudsperson’s Office. Some progress was made on high-level appointments: a new Ombudsperson was elected with cross-party support, and opposition votes secured the two-thirds majority needed to elect members of the State Election Commission. Parliament also elected one new judge to the Constitutional Court and five members of the Council for Civilian Oversight. Appointments must be based on clear procedures and merit.
Parliamentary oversight of the executive continued in line with the new Rules of Procedure, with monthly question sessions and two-hour opposition slots at the start of ordinary sessions. The opposition submitted two no-confidence motions against government members, which were unsuccessful.
The use of shortened legislative procedures increased further, particularly for MP-initiated draft laws, but these should not be abused. The ‘EU flag’ procedure was consistently applied for laws aligning national legislation with the EU acquis.
EU integration
The Minister of European Affairs appointed in December 2025 also took over the position of First Deputy Prime Minister. No additional resources have been allocated to the ministry, that coordinates the EU integration process. During the reporting period, there were no changes to the existing cross-cutting EU integration structure in the government and in Parliament. In February 2026, the Stabilisation and Association Committee held a productive meeting, the first in five years.
No monitoring reports were produced on the implementation of the June 2021 National Plan for the Adoption of the EU acquis (NPAA). The NPAA should be fully aligned with the government’s annual and institutional work plans. In 2026, the government of North Macedonia intensified its engagement on the implementation of the Growth Plan/Reform Agenda.
In November 2025, the authorities adopted the roadmap on public administration reform. Progress was achieved on the roadmap on the rule of law, with its accompanying action plan on Advancing the Rights of Persons belonging to Communities. The authorities carried out inclusive public consultations on the action plan, including with representatives of communities and minorities, which need to be finalised in an inclusive process. The authorities continue to work on the roadmap on the functioning of democratic institutions.
Governance
The government coalition remained overall stable, with minor ministerial reshuffles in December 2025 and in June 2026.
Some progress was made on local government reform. The government continued strengthening policy dialogue on regional development and held the Sectoral
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Working Group for Regional and Local Development, where the updates on the adopted action plan 2024-2026 were presented as a roadmap for implementing reforms. Parliament adopted amendments to the Law on inter-municipal cooperation and the Law on local government.
The inter-ethnic situation in the country remained overall stable and the Ohrid Framework Agreement continued to be implemented, though challenges remain. Some inter-ethnic incidents involving sports groups occurred ahead of local elections in a highly polarised political environment. A petition and demonstrations of a group of law students requesting to pass the exam on jurisprudence in the Albanian language gave rise to public debate, opening broader, recurring discussions on the practical implementation of language rights and equitable representation of non-majority communities in state institutions. The government proposed a new Law on adequate and fair representation following the annulment of the ‘Balancer’ tool by the Constitutional Court in 2024. However, its adoption by Parliament remains pending due to a current lack of votes securing the necessary Badinter majority.
Civil society
Civil society, including human rights defenders, continued to operate in an overall enabling environment, although CSOs face structural vulnerabilities, including limited and unpredictable public funding. A new Law on associations and foundations has been prepared through a consultative and inclusive process and is to be submitted to the Venice Commission for an opinion. The legal framework for effective civil society participation is largely in place. There is gradual progress towards more open dialogue and a more participatory policy environment. However, civil society is not yet fully involved in consultations across the board, including in the context of the EU accession process. Further reforms are needed to ensure meaningful civil society participation in policymaking. The participation of CSOs in the National Council for EU Integration and the Council for Open Government Partnership should be strengthened. The National Electronic Register of Regulations supports public consultations, while the reactivated Council for Cooperation between the Government and Civil Society provides a formal platform for dialogue. The Council adopted its 2026 annual work programme, while work is ongoing on transforming the Code of Good Practices for CSO financial support into a legally binding act. However, a communication strategy and action plan to improve outreach and visibility among CSOs are still lacking. Overall, weak publication compliance, limited responsiveness and fragmented engagement continue to undermine meaningful civil society participation and fall short of the Code of Good Practices for stakeholder involvement.
Funding remains a structural vulnerability. State support is limited, while foreign donations have become uncertain, directly weakening the services provided and CSOs’ advocacy capacity. There is a need to diversify funding sources and strengthen transparent public funding standards. Implementation of key measures of the Strategy for Cooperation with and Development of Civil Society is crucial, including legal reforms of social entrepreneurship, donations and sponsorships, standardisation of state funding and establishing a guarantee fund for co-financing EU projects.
CSOs and human rights defenders in North Macedonia continued to face intimidation, online harassment, and smear campaigns. Reported violations primarily included verbal attacks, social media threats, public discrediting campaigns, and pressure targeting journalists, activists and CSO representatives, particularly those working on anti-corruption, human rights, media freedom and right of persons belonging to minorities.
Civilian oversight of the security and intelligence sector
The Parliamentary Committee on Defence and Security held regular sessions. There is no structured arrangement in place for meetings between the Parliamentary Committee for
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Oversight of the National Security Agency, the Intelligence Agency and the Parliamentary Commission for Oversight of the Implementation of Interception Measures.
The Civil Control Mechanism within the Ombudsperson’s Office needs to be provided with adequate financial resources, to ensure autonomy, offices and equipment to function effectively.
In March 2026, Parliament selected a President and four members of the Council for Civilian Oversight, a body provided for in the Law on interception of communication. The body has remained non-operational since the law’s adoption in 2018, as it is not yet fully staffed.
2.1.2. Public administration reform
Strategic framework for public administration reform
The strategic framework for public administration is in place. North Macedonia adopted a revised Public Administration Reform (PAR) Strategy Action Plan (2025–2026) in December 2025, completing the 2023-2030 public administration strategy. In November 2025, the country adopted the PAR roadmap. The overall implementation rate of the PAR strategy in 2025 was 67%, while the public financial management (PFM) reform programme’s implementation rate reached 47%. The budgetary allocations for both remained unchanged, with almost two thirds of all measures funded by donors. Close involvement by the Ministry of Finance remains crucial to the coordination of reforms between PAR and PFM and to ensuring the success of cross-sectoral reforms.
On the institutional framework, the PAR Council continued to provide political support, leadership and supervision of PAR reforms. Further work is required to improve budgeting, strategic planning and reporting mechanisms, thus enabling timely identification of priorities.
Policy development and coordination
Policy development and coordination mechanisms are largely in place, but their efficiency needs to be further improved. During the reporting period, the new framework for sector and cross‑sector strategies was fully implemented in the relevant state institutions, with some progress by ministries on applying uniformly the new standards and methodologies. With this framework in place, the General Secretariat strengthened its quality oversight role by consistently issuing formal opinions on all draft strategies. A single register of strategic planning documents became fully operational in 2025. The register includes data on strategies and action plans and their links to the National Development Strategy and EU negotiation clusters. No reports are being published on the implementation of the annual government work plan.
On evidence-based policymaking, a methodology on regulatory impact assessment (RIA) adopted in June 2025 ensures consistent quality analysis. The parliamentary administration established a dedicated unit on impact assessment, but it is not yet operational.
On public consultations, feedback on published draft laws in the Single Electronic National Register of Regulations needs to improve. However, the government’s annual work plan and reports remain inaccessible to the public. Agendas of government sessions remain unavailable to the public prior to meetings and delays continue in the publication of minutes and decisions of government sessions. Overall, implementation and quality of regulatory policy management tools remain insufficient.
Public financial management
The public financial management system is broadly in place but needs to be further improved. Implementation rates of the activities laid down in the PFM reform programme 2025-2028, the core strategic framework, remain low. The Ministry of Finance continues to be affected by institutional capacity challenges, particularly with regard to attracting and retaining personnel with suitable skills and qualifications.
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On budget management, the entry into force of the reformed organic budget law (OBL) was postponed further to January 2028 following the approval of a new addendum in December 2025. Some progress was made in adopting implementing legislation, but full enforcement of the OBL by 2028 remains a challenge due to delays in implementing the Integrated Financial Management Information System (IFMIS). However, reforms that do not depend on IFMIS implementation could be already moved forward. These include implementation of spending reviews, the strengthening of fiscal risks monitoring and the finalisation of a tax expenditure report. While the OBL incorporates gender-based budgeting as a principle, further efforts are needed to strengthen policy discussions during budget preparation and increase the use of gender-disaggregated indicators.
Progress on public investment management included: (i) putting into operation a database to monitor the implementation of high-value projects; and (ii) efforts to develop a more systematic approach to project appraisal and prioritisation, including better tracking of budget allocations and alignment with strategic priorities.
The Fiscal Council is broadly operational, but its administrative capacity should be increased.
The Ministry of Finance continued to publish quarterly data on the revenue and expenditure of public institutions, local government authorities and state-owned enterprises. However, despite some improvements in budget transparency, North Macedonia continues to rank behind its regional peers according to the latest Open Budget Survey.
Public service and human resources management
Public service and human resources management need to be further improved. The civil service system remained fragmented, as rules governing personnel policy for civil servants under special statutes continued to differ from those for the majority of public servants.
The revised legislation on administrative servants and on public-sector employees, adopted in 2025, is yet to be implemented; the introduction of de-centralised recruitments needs to preserve uniform and standardised selection practices across the administration as well as meritocracy and objectivity in granting permanent and fixed-term contracts in the public service. Under the current legal framework, merit-based recruitment and selection and promotion procedures are applied inconsistently. Politicisation, pay scales with low salaries and limited promotion prospects undermine the public administration’s attractiveness as an employer. Although slight improvements to the collection of performance data, the performance appraisal system continues to be applied inconsistently.
The job classification and remuneration systems still need to be improved to provide for more job security, stability and retention of staff. The salary system is not unified across public bodies, and it is common for state institutions to individually sign collective agreements introducing salary supplements with their employees. Initiatives are ongoing to revise the remuneration system to introduce a unified mechanism. A comprehensive retention policy for the public administration is still lacking, while a partial retention policy for those who work on EU integration and IPA (instrument for pre-accession) matters is applied since February 2026. A law on top management was enacted in June 2026, with serious shortcomings regarding the composition of the selection boards, in the methodologies for selecting and recruiting top managers and objective criteria for dismissals.
The Human Resource Management Information System (HRMIS) is in the process of being upgraded to automatically manage key human resources processes, payroll functions and employee data. The main bottleneck is the current lack of interoperability between systems and the lack of regular updates. The Ministry of Public Administration increased its capacities to coordinate and monitor human resources management across the public administration, although central coordination capacities still need to be further strengthened.
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Gender balance is respected. According to the 2025 register of public sector employees, over 57.5% of all public services employees were women, excluding the army and several law enforcement agencies. Preparations to establish a public administration academy are ongoing. Whistle-blower legislation is in place. In 2025, there were 27 complaints by whistle- blowers for illegal, unpermitted or non-ethical behaviour by managerial staff.
Accountability of administration
The accountability of public administration needs further improvement.
The reorganisation of central government institutions to improve efficiency and accountability continued. Discussion on legislative amendments to the systemic Law on the organisation and operation of state administrative bodies is ongoing. Internal governance still suffers from overlapping responsibilities, and a large number of state bodies are accountable to Parliament, even though their performance is not monitored by it in an effective manner. Delegation of decision-making authority both at central and local levels remains insufficient, limiting managerial accountability. There is a need for more political debate on State Audit Office reports and more systematic follow-up on its findings and recommendations, both by the government and law enforcement agencies.
The number of laws adopted through a shortened procedure dropped to a still high 50.42% in 2025. Procedures for systematic ex post evaluation of laws and policies remain absent in both Parliament and the government.
On the right to access public information, despite modest improvements, the level of information disclosed on state bodies’ websites remains insufficient. Further efforts are needed to improve responses to requests for public information. The Law on general administrative procedures, which regulates the legal and transparency requirements for how state bodies process requests from citizens, businesses and legal entities, still has to be fully implemented. Overall, the legal framework on citizens’ rights to good administration is satisfactory, both as regards administrative justice and judicial review. The Administrative Court and the High Administrative Court handle administrative disputes reasonably, with disposition times of less than one year. However, enforcing rulings remains a concern.
Service delivery to citizens and businesses
Service delivery to citizens and businesses still requires efforts to meet EU standards, although 2025 and early 2026 witnessed significant improvements in digitalisation.
The legislation and IT infrastructure are in place for most administrative services to be offered in three languages, including facilities for people with special needs. The number of electronic services available through the national service portal continued to increase, reaching a total of 338 at end of August 2026, including those partially available. This was accompanied by a growing usage rate, which doubled from the previous year. Preparations to introduce a digital identity wallet are progressing. A central document management system was launched and is currently in use by 44 institutions. Efforts should continue to align with the European Interoperability Framework and the Interoperable Europe Act and to apply eIDAS 2.0 rules. Further action is needed to increase the use of the existing tools for e-identification and e-signature, and to make them more user-friendly and free of charge for
the public.
2.2. RULE OF LAW AND FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS
2.2.1 Chapter 23 - Judiciary and fundamental rights
The EU’s founding values include the rule of law and respect for human rights. An effective (independent, high-quality and efficient) judicial system and an effective fight against corruption are of paramount importance, as is the respect for fundamental rights in law and in practice.
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Functioning of the judiciary
Strategic documents
A Strategy for Judicial Reform (2024-2028) is in place. Implementation of the strategy needs to be improved, including by providing appropriate funding and human resources.
The Council for Monitoring the Implementation of the Strategy for Judicial Reform approved its rulebook, monitoring methodology and the 2025 annual report only in April 2026. This delayed timely follow-up and the introduction of necessary measures to address shortcomings in the judiciary. The implementation rate of activities in 2025 increased to 56.9%. The 2026 state budget and its supplement further decreased resources to the sector. No progress was made in implementing the 2020 strategies for human resources management in the courts and in the public prosecutors’ offices nor with the adoption of the new strategies 2027-2030.
Management bodies
The management bodies are in place but need to step up their capacity and efforts to safeguard the independence, integrity and professionalism of judges and prosecutors.
The new Law on the Judicial Council was adopted in December 2025. The Law largely addressed the recommendations of the Venice Commission and of the 2023 peer review mission, improving the selection process of judges and disciplinary procedures in terms of transparency and clarity. The Law was revised again in June to address pending Venice Commission recommendations, particularly to ensure pluralism in the selection of the Council’s non-judicial members. The Council also amended its Rules of Procedure and several bylaws.
The Judicial Council continued implementing its action plan to address the recommendations of the 2023 peer review mission within its own competencies. In this respect, the Council continued to implement its communication strategy 2024-2028. It maintained efforts to improve its transparency, including the provision of detailed explanations of its decisions on appointments and promotions. However, its sessions to decide on the implementation of a European Court of Human Rights judgment were not made public.
Three new members of the Judicial Council were appointed in the reporting period. The Parliamentary Committee on Elections and Appointments withdrew its proposals for one additional member of the Council.
In December 2025, the members of the Council of Public Prosecutors elected a new President and Deputy President and adopted the Strategy for Communication and Transparency 2025-2028.
The Judicial Council and the Council of Public Prosecutors must continue efforts to provide detailed justifications for their decisions, particularly regarding the selection, appointment and promotion of judges and prosecutors.
Independence and impartiality
The independence and impartiality of the judiciary need to be improved in the higher level courts and in the courts of first instance.
The level of perceived trust in the judiciary remains very low. Persisting external and political interference remain a serious concern. Provocative statements by senior politicians on plans to clean up the judiciary and prosecution, including personal criticism of judges and
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Graph 2.1: North Macedonia - Requests for protection from
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prosecutors, represent undue influence and intimidation, undermining judicial independence. In November 2025, in an unprecedented step, the Supreme Court, the Judicial Council and the Association of Judges issued a joint reaction to persistent, unsubstantiated public criticism from the highest levels of government. In their declaration, they recalled that such statements undermine the democratic principle of separation of powers and stressed the need to respect judicial independence. In April 2026, the Judicial Council also appealed to the media to refrain from ungrounded attacks and sensationalist reporting on judges without a clear and justified public interest, in order to avoid undermining their independence.
In December 2025, the government adopted a new proposal on the dismissal of the Chief Prosecutor, continuing the procedure started in February 2025 and put on hold after the Kochani tragedy. The Council of Public Prosecutors reiterated its negative opinion on the proposal. However, the Chief Public Prosecutor resigned ahead of the Parliamentary vote on his dismissal. The procedure exposed the possibility of politicisation and shortcomings in the dismissal framework. A new Chief Prosecutor was elected by Parliament in March 2026, at the proposal of the government.
The Judicial Council completed several promotions of judges to the higher courts and elections of presidents of several basic courts.
The Law on the Council of Public Prosecutors, adopted in June, broadly addresses the joint opinion of the Venice Commission. The Law on the Public Prosecutor’s Office is still pending revisions to address Venice Commission’s recommendations, including on further clarifying the grounds for dismissing the Chief Prosecutor and the need to revise the dismissal procedure.
Several laws have further reduced the salary coefficients for judges, prosecutors and members of the Judicial Council and Council of Public Prosecutors. The laws were enacted in December 2025 and in February 2026 through shortened procedure, adding to a situation where the overall insufficient budget allocations undermine the independence of the judiciary and the autonomy of the prosecution service. The Constitutional Court annulled the February amendments to the Law on salaries of judges as unconstitutional.
Accountability
The accountability of the judiciary did not improve.
In December 2025, the Judicial Council adopted its anti-corruption strategy 2026-2029 and a linked action plan. In January 2026, the Council lifted the immunity of a judge of the Skopje Court of Appeals, approved him being placed under house arrest and ordered his suspension. In April 2026, the Public Prosecutor’s Office pressed charges against the judge for illegally acquiring and concealing assets and for money laundering.
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Graph 3.1: North Macedonia - Disciplinary procedures
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Graph 2.2: North Macedonia - Requests for protection from
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The investigation is linked to the earlier detention of a lawyer (and former State Attorney) for receiving a bribe for illicit influence of the same judge deciding on a detention measure for his client.
In March 2026, the Council of Public Prosecutors accepted the resignation of a suspended prosecutor over charges of harassment in the performance of duty and of abuse of official position.
Codes of ethics are in place for both prosecutors and judges and are overall in line with the European standards.
Judges and prosecutors, and the members of both Councils, are required to declare their assets and interests to the State Commission for the Prevention of Corruption (SCPC), which keeps a register of elected and appointed officials. No cases of alleged corruption have resulted in specific charges. The SCPC faces overall limitations in verifying asset declarations. Based on the Annual Plan for Monitoring the Property Status and Conflict of Interest for 2025, the declarations of 7 members of the Judicial Council and 3 members of the Council of Public Prosecutors were verified.
Quality of justice
The quality of the justice system needs to be improved.
Staffing shortages in the judiciary have not been addressed and continue to strongly affect its quality and efficiency. In particular, the lack of human resources, including expert associates, remains a concern, with only 38% of the estimated posts in courts filled. The 2025 annual reports of the judicial and prosecutorial councils estimate that 221 new judges and 67 public prosecutors are needed. Although 35 judges and public prosecutors opted to extend their service until the age of 67, thereby partly alleviating the shortage, insufficient staffing continues to negatively affect efficiency and contributes to a growing backlog of cases.
The Managing Board of the Academy for Judges and Prosecutors annulled the largest ever recruitment procedure (130 candidates) due to insufficient allocations in the 2026 state budget, leading to a situation where no new candidates will be available before 2028. In January 2026, a group of dissatisfied candidates challenged the decision before the Administrative Court, which rejected the lawsuit. The Academy needs to remain the sole
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Graph 3.2: North Macedonia - Disciplinary procedures
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Graph 4: North Macedonia - Number of justice
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Judges Prosecutors n/ a: not available Source: CEPEJ
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entry point to the judiciary and prosecution and its initial training should not be shortened. Judicial training should be shielded from any rollback of reforms.
The Supreme Court and the four courts of appeal continued efforts to ensure the consistency of judgments in an effective manner. The Supreme Court issued ten principled legal opinions, stances and conclusions.
Mediation proceedings were conducted, primarily in commercial and labour cases. After the May 2026 amendments to the Law on mediation there are approximately 2,5 mediators per 100 000 inhabitants, well below the regional average of
6,0.
Efficiency
The efficiency of the justice system is limited.
The length of proceedings increased for almost all categories of cases. The clearance rate was below 100% for all first and second instance cases, except for first-instance administrative cases.
The outgoing Minister of Justice suspended the Council for Coordination of Information and Communication Technology in Judicial Bodies (the ‘ICT Council’) until a decision on its new composition is adopted. This delayed the preparation of a new ICT strategy for the judiciary.
Additional funds are needed to: (i) update the Automated Court Case Management Information System (ACCMIS) in line with changes in procedural laws; (ii) introduce new measures for complex cases; and (iii) achieve full integration with external systems. IT infrastructure for the new case management system for the prosecution service
46
144
490
31 59
n/a
45 42
213
0
100
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300
400
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600
Settlement agreements Finalised court-related mediations
Mediators Mediation cases
Graph 5: North Macedonia - Alternative dispute resolution
2023 2024 2025 n/ a: not available Source: CEPEJ
88 99 95
84
104 108 97
83
104 96
89 98
0
20
40
60
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1st instance 2nd instance 1st instance 2nd instance
Criminal cases Non-criminal cases*
Graph 6.1 - North Macedonia - Efficiency of courts (%)
Clearance rate in 2023 Clearance rate in 2024 Clearance rate in 2025
Source: CEPEJ*Civil and commercial cases, administrative cases, non-litigous cases, other cases
223
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208
263
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349 354
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Criminal cases Non-criminal cases*
Graph 6.2 - North Macedonia - Efficiency of courts (days)
Disposition time 2023 Disposition time 2024 Disposition time 2025
Source: CEPEJ*Civil and commercial cases, administrative cases, non-litigous cases, other cases
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has been installed, and the software is under development.
The Administrative Court concluded memoranda of understanding with several judicial and other institutions for the digital submission and exchange of documents via a dedicated e-platform. More efforts are necessary to digitalise the entire justice system, in particular in
relation to communication with courts and the use of videoconferencing for court hearings.
The budget allocated to the courts in 2026 was 0.29% of GDP, well below the legally established level of 0.8% of GDP and a decrease compared to the previous year. Allocations for the Public Prosecutor’s Office amount to 0.24% of the state budget, instead of the legally prescribed 0.4%. Sufficient financial resources are needed to improve the efficiency of the justice system and ensure its financial autonomy.
The Constitutional Court delayed re-examining the rules on bilingualism in judicial proceedings under the Law on the use of languages until it reaches its full composition of nine judges. The implementation of the Venice Commission’s 2019 recommendations and its 2025 amicus curiae opinion is still pending.
Fight against corruption
Track record
The track record for the fight against corruption has remained stable for high-level cases and for non-high-level cases.
Various corruption investigations into the misuse of public funds and other forms of corruption were initiated. Some of the investigations led to indictments, such as in one case involving the Director of the Agency for Financial Support in Agriculture and Rural Development. A former Deputy Prime Minister facing an international arrest warrant returned to the country, was placed under house arrest and stands trial for allegations of corruption, abuse of power and violations of public procurement laws. Nevertheless, significant systemic challenges persist in translating investigative efforts into tangible results, particularly as regards effective judicial proceedings, and the recovery of assets.
Repeated amendments to the Criminal Code, which was revised three times in three years, raise concerns over legal certainty. Insufficient human and financial resources and delays in court proceedings further undermine the establishment of a solid track record of anti-corruption cases, including those
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2023 2024 2025
Graph 7.1: North Macedonia - High level corruption cases -
Data on number of individuals/legal entities involved
New investigations Indictments
Final court decisions Final convictions
Acquittals Plea bargains
Source: National data collected via the organised crime and corruption track record (OCCTR) e-platformn/a: not available
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2023 2024 2025
Graph 7.2: North Macedonia - Non-high level corruption cases
- Data on number of individuals/legal entities involved
New investigations Indictments
Final court decisions Final convictions
Acquittals Plea bargains
Source: National data collected via the organised crime and corruption track record (OCCTR) e-platformn/a: not available
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of the former Special Public Prosecutor’s Office (SPO). The quality of indictments, evidence proceedings and verdict justifications remain weak and inconsistent overall. This weakens the effectiveness and integrity of proceedings in high-level corruption cases and reinforces perceptions of impunity.
Legal framework
The legal framework on the fight against corruption is largely in place but needs improvement for preventive measures and law enforcement.
The January 2026 amendments to the Criminal Code regarding abuse of official position do not remedy the adverse effects of the 2023 changes. A dedicated provision on abuse of official position in public procurement was reintroduced, but with a much narrower scope than in the pre-2023 framework. The offence covers only two grounds, which is too narrow to address other severe procedural manipulations during the tendering process and should be broadened. The amendments also fail to adequately address the impact of the 2023 changes on the statute of limitations.
The Council of Europe’s Group of States against Corruption (GRECO) highlighted that the Law on the prevention of corruption and conflict of interest lacks effective penalties for violations related to conflicts of interest, integrity and anti-corruption rules.
The SCPC’s ability to effectively oversee political campaign financing has continued to be hindered by limited resources, insufficient technical expertise, and gaps and inconsistencies in the legal framework. This includes the lack of clearly defined institutional responsibilities as to which institution should initiate proceedings or impose sanctions, as consistently pointed out by ODIHR.
Implementation of the Law on free access to information has remained insufficient, with some public institutions denying requests or delaying disclosure on arbitrary grounds.
Implementation of the Law on lobbying has remained limited. To date, only one lobbyist and three lobbying organisations have registered, and no further lobbying organisations have been registered. The Law on the protection of whistle-blowers still needs to be aligned with the EU acquis and provide adequate enforcement mechanisms. Individuals who report wrongdoing can encounter retaliation such as harassment and dismissal, which undermines the law’s effectiveness. This is further exacerbated by low trust in institutions and a prevailing sense of impunity.
Strategic documents
The Strategy for the Prevention of Corruption and Conflict of Interest 2026-2030 has been submitted to Parliament but not yet adopted. The drafting process was inclusive but protracted. The strategy identifies two horizontal priority areas, public procurement and monitoring of law implementation, through an anti-corruption lens. The strategy also specifies clear institutional responsibilities and related budgetary implications for each activity. Adequate oversight and accountability mechanisms to ensure its effective implementation need to be ensured.
The previous strategy for 2021-2025 suffered from persistently slow implementation, indicating a continued lack of capacity, resources and ownership of the strategy across institutions. In 2025, only 23% of planned activities were fully implemented, a small increase from 18% the previous year. In the implementation report for the last five years, the SCPC identified delays in necessary legal reforms, weak accountability mechanisms, inadequate interinstitutional coordination and reliance on donor funding as further reasons behind the low implementation across the period.
Institutional framework
The institutional framework on the fight against corruption is in place. It is adequate for preventive measures but needs to be improved for law enforcement.
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In December 2025, Parliament appointed a new President of the State Commission for the Prevention of Corruption (SCPC) in a transparent and timely manner. The appointment followed the resignation of the former President, who is currently on trial for disclosing official secrets and falsifying an exam to obtain security clearance. In February 2026, a Commissioner resigned amid suspicions of a conflict of interest, with the SCPC opening two cases in this regard. Parliament appointed a new Commissioner on 26 June after cancelling the initial selection procedure on questionable grounds.
The SCPC has focused on awareness raising, the implementation of integrity systems, and oversight of election campaign financing and asset declarations. It has been less proactive in detecting and reporting alleged instances of corruption, including in public procurement.
The SCPC needs to increase its capacity to identify potential cases of misconduct. Findings in its reports are often not followed up on by the relevant institutions. The SCPC’s ability to verify asset declarations is constrained by a lack of expertise and insufficient interoperability between relevant databases for effective data exchange. Its oversight of election campaign financing remains insufficient due to shortcomings in the legislative framework, limited resources, reliance on manual data processing and a lack of necessary IT tools.
The Public Prosecutor’s Office for Prosecuting Organised Crime and Corruption (OCCPPO) improved its approach to financial investigations and established clear procedures for parallel investigations, focused on asset identification and recovery. However, further progress depends on ensuring adequate financial and human resources within the prosecution service. The number of financial experts and analysts with digital forensic capacity remains insufficient. Operational capacity is further held back by a lack of adequate equipment, including software licences, and difficulties in retaining qualified personnel, while the absence of strategic planning in managing investigations hampers overall efficiency.
The investigative centres attached to the Public Prosecutor’s Office and the police force lack adequate resources and the necessary equipment. Financial investigations need to be mandated in parallel with criminal investigations for all high-level corruption cases, followed, when justified, by freezing and confiscation mechanisms. Asset confiscation remains one of the weakest links in the fight against corruption.
The State Audit Office continued to identify misuse of public funds, financial irregularities and systemic weaknesses, while detecting and reporting alleged instances of corruption. However, findings in its reports are not sufficiently acted upon by relevant institutions.
The re-established Interinstitutional Body for the Coordination of Anti-corruption Activities has not officially met since its constitutive session in April 2025.
Fundamental rights
General framework
The general framework on fundamental rights is broadly satisfactory. The protection, respect and fulfilment of fundamental rights need to be improved.
International human rights instruments
Cooperation with international human rights monitoring bodies and the follow-up to their recommendations need to be improved.
North Macedonia has ratified most international human rights instruments. However, it is still not a party to the Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance or to the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. In March 2026, the authorities submitted the first baseline report to the Access Info Group. This marked the start of formal monitoring under the Council of Europe Convention on Access to Official Documents for North Macedonia. In May 2026, North Macedonia signed the Council of Europe Framework Convention on Artificial Intelligence and Human Rights, Democracy and the Rule of Law.
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Despite a good reporting record, implementation and follow-up to recommendations from international and regional bodies need to be improved, including GREVIO recommendations on the implementation of the Istanbul Convention. While national capacities have improved, stakeholder knowledge and engagement, evidence-based monitoring, reporting and interinstitutional coordination still need to be strengthened. The authorities prepared an action plan to implement the recommendations from the fourth cycle of the UN Human Rights Council’s Universal Periodic Review, pending adoption by the government. More efforts are necessary for North Macedonia to fully benefit from its observer status in the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights.
European Court of Human Rights
Cooperation with the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) and implementation of its judgments are adequate. The Advisory Panel to the Council of Europe rebutted two proposals for a third candidate for national judge to the ECtHR. The Selection Commission proposed a new candidate.
Promotion, protection and enforcement of human rights
The legal and institutional framework for the promotion, protection and enforcement of human rights is largely in place but needs to be improved.
While the country continues to meet its general obligations on fundamental rights, implementation of legislation needs to improve. Parliament elected a new Ombudsperson but did not elect the Deputy Ombudspersons for the regional offices. Parliament needs to adopt amendments to
the Law on the Ombudsperson’s Office, necessary for upgrading its status to an ‘A’ accreditation under the Paris Principles. Parliament adopted the 2025 annual report of the Ombudsperson’s Office along with the designated measures to enforce its recommendations. The Ombudsperson’s Office and the Commission on Prevention and Protection against Discrimination continue to lack financial and human resources, limiting their capacity to fully implement their legal powers. The country still needs to adopt the Law on gender equality.
2802
2705 2400
523 485 559
2155 1999
1810
59 316 359
737 743 492
23 56 151
73% 74.8%
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2023 2024 2025 2023 2024 2025
Ombudsperson Commission for the prevention and protection
from discrimination
Graph 9: North Macedonia - Promotion, protection and enforcement of human
rights
Complaints
Decisions
Recommendations to the authorities
Implementation of the recommendations by the authorities (% of the total) n/a: not available
Source: Annual Report of the Ombudsperson Office, Annual Report of the Commission for Prevention and Protection against Discrimination
Main themes:
Ombudsperson and Commission for the prevention and protection from discrimination: judiciary, consumer rights, employment,
child protection, penal-correctional and educational-correctional institutions
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725
467
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8 16 12 18 6
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0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800
North Macedonia
EU average North Macedonia
EU average North Macedonia
EU average
16.06.2022 15.06.2023
16.06.2023 01.09.2024
01.09.2024 01.09.2025
Graph 8: North Macedonia - ECtHR judgments
New allocated applications Judgments Breaches Pending applications Source: ECtHR
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Prevention of torture and other forms of ill-treatment
North Macedonia provides adequate legal safeguards for the prevention of torture and other forms of ill-treatment. Follow-up to reported cases is insufficient, in particular regarding serious concerns about detention conditions. The situation in prisons, police stations and in social care and psychiatric institutions remains appalling.
North Macedonia has not advanced on implementing the recommendations of the Committee for the Prevention of Torture, issued in May 2024, and reiterating previous reports. Systemic shortcomings persist in the investigation and prosecution of allegations of
violence, including allegations against law enforcement officials and within penitentiary institutions. Investigations remain inefficient and subject to delays. Further efforts are required to ensure effective, prompt and impartial investigations, including by establishing a fully functional external oversight mechanism for the police.
The National Preventive Mechanism, established within the Ombudsperson’s Office under the Optional Protocol to the UN Convention against Torture, faced capacity and operational constraints, as it has only three staff members, especially in the period when the Office operated without an Ombudsperson. This prevented it from fully exercising its powers.
Execution of criminal sanctions
The system for execution of criminal sanctions (including probation) needs to be improved.
While the Head of the Directorate for the Execution of Sanctions has been appointed, several penitentiary institutions are still managed by acting governors. Corruption in prisons remains a serious concern while measures under the Anti- Corruption Plan (2022-2026), including mandatory searches of premises and individuals by prison police, continued to be implemented.
Prisons remain overcrowded, and no progress was made in improving access to healthcare. The Ministry of
Health should increase its involvement, particularly on the accreditation of healthcare staff. There are delays in establishing the Central Coordination Unit on penitentiary healthcare. The absence of adequate measures to address drug addiction in prisons remains an issue of serious concern. Police officers must respect suspects’ procedural rights as an essential protection against ill-treatment.
In November 2025, in line with Council of Europe Committee of Ministers recommendations on children with imprisoned parents, the authorities refurbished the women’s section and set up a children’s corner in the only detention facility in North Macedonia housing women. This
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Police Prisons
Graph 10: North Macedonia - Torture / Ill treatments /
Excessive use of force
Reported cases Criminal convictions Administrative decisions
n/a: not available
Source: Public Prossecution Office, Ministry of Interior, Ministry of Justice, Prison Administration
105.0%
115.4%
113.2%
98.0% 100.0% 102.0% 104.0% 106.0% 108.0% 110.0% 112.0% 114.0% 116.0% 118.0%
Occupancy rate (%)
Graph 11.1: North Macedonia - Prisons - occupancy
rate
2024 2025 2026 Source: Ministry of Justice, prison administration
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benefits approximately 1 200 prisoners and facilitates contact with around 200 visiting children per month. Despite this, significant structural shortcomings remain, including severely dilapidated facilities.
The probation system continued to evolve. In 2025, a total of 960 new cases were registered, an increase on the 2024 figure of 793 cases, while 663 cases had been recorded by June 2026. The Strategy for the Development of the Probation Service expired in 2025.
Efforts continued to promote the use of alternative measures, including electronic supervision. However, no progress was made in amending the legal framework on alternative to detention. Amendments to the Law on primary education entered into force, establishing a legal basis to provide education in penitentiary institutions. Further steps are required to ensure the effective implementation of educational, cultural and sports activities, including for remand prisoners.
Protection of personal data
The legal framework for the protection of personal data is still insufficient, and the capacities of the data protection agency have not improved. The personal data protection framework is not fully aligned with the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) and the Law Enforcement Directive. Rules in the Law on personal data protection permitting transfer of personal data to NATO member countries remain in force without adequate safeguards to ensure GDPR compliance. The Personal Data Protection Agency (PDPA) is inadequately funded, and its financial autonomy remains restricted. While a new director was appointed in December 2025, the Agency remains critically understaffed, with only seven staff members directly responsible for enforcing the Law on personal data protection. This contributes to systemic underperformance in core functions such as inspections, initiating infringement proceedings and processing complaints. Despite a formal request from the PDPA, the government has not reinstated the obligation for the Agency to be consulted before sectoral laws or implementing legislation is adopted. The PDPA’s opinion on the Law on the security of networks and information systems was disregarded, resulting in misalignment with the NIS2 Directive with regard to personal data protection. The PDPA’s ability to implement the Personal Data Protection Strategy 2025-2030 is severely hampered, and coordination and responsiveness to the Agency’s recommendations remain deficient. Although reported data breach incidents are declining, the Agency estimates there is severe under-reporting due to fear of consequences and a lack of awareness among the broader public. Digital safeguards in state administrative bodies are insufficient, and the Agency cannot effectively police
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Inspections Complaints received
Decisions Administrative sanctions
Declarations of data breaches
Graph 12: North Macedonia - Data protection
2023 2024 2025
Source: Personal Data Protection Agency
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Average duration of pre-trial detention (months)
Graph 11.2: North Macedonia - Prisons - pre-trial
detention
2024 2025 2026 n/a: not available Source: Ministry of Justice, prison administration
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increased use of AI and biometric data requirements, including by private-sector operatives, due to its limited oversight capacity.
Freedom of thought, conscience and religion
North Macedonia provides adequate legal guarantees on freedom of thought, conscience and religion. The rights to freedom of thought, conscience and religion remain guaranteed by the Constitution and are upheld in practice.
Freedom of expression and media freedom
North Macedonia remains moderately prepared in the area of freedom of expression. Limited progress was made in advancing the legislative framework in line with EU standards, and structural challenges affecting the media environment and institutional independence remain.
Intimidation of journalists
Existing legal mechanisms remain insufficient to address all forms of threats, especially those originating online or from unknown perpetrators. While institutional contact points play a role in building trust, effectiveness depends on tangible outcomes in investigations and judicial proceedings. In 2025, five cases of violations of journalists’ rights were reported by the Association of Journalists. These included serious incidents such as arson targeting a journalist’s property, coordinated online harassment of women journalists, and a violent newsroom intrusion. Legal threats are another concern. In 2025, there was one case related to Specific legislation against strategic lawsuits against public participation (SLAPP) lawsuits against journalists and 40 lawsuits for insult and defamation involving journalists, compared to 15 cases in 2024 signalling a negative trend in the protection of journalistic freedom. Women journalists faced rising levels of online abuse, sexualised attacks and discriminatory rhetoric. Judicial transparency remains limited, with courts providing information only upon request and lacking systematic reporting, while existing statistical systems do not enable proper tracking of cases involving journalists. Rules on digital abuses, including AI- generated content, have not yet been introduced to the criminal code.
Legislative environment
The legal framework governing the media is in place and partially in line with the EU acquis. There are ongoing legislative revision efforts, with the support of EU-funded projects, to further align the legislation with the European Media Freedom Act (EMFA). North Macedonia should implement preparatory steps to help national authorities fulfil their regulatory function upon accession and enable civil society to support implementation of the European Media Freedom Act and the Digital Services Act. Operational readiness will require institution- building, awareness-raising and stakeholder engagement. The issue of circumventing the register of online media in the context of paid political advertising remains unresolved, creating space for abuse and non-transparent financing of the media during elections. The reintroduction of state-funded campaigns in private media continues to pose a risk of political influence over editorial policy and endangers the economic dependence of media outlets. The regulatory framework on online media concentration is still not harmonised with the EU acquis or with broader European standards. North Macedonia has yet to establish systemic mechanisms to support media pluralism and public interest journalism. Specific legislation against strategic lawsuits against public participation (SLAPPs) is yet to be adopted to align with the EU Anti-SLAPP legal framework. Limited awareness of this issue persists. As a result, protection against this form of persecution for journalists and other public figures continues to be limited.
Implementation of legislation/institutions
In 2025 and 2026, the state budget funding allocated to the broadcasting sector was temporarily decreased below the legal requirements, before the government subsequently disbursed the full amount in instalments. This has had negative consequences for both the
36
Agency for Audio and Audio-Visual Media Services and the public service broadcaster, undermining the predictability of planning and the implementation of annual programmes, including hiring of the necessary personnel.
The Agency for Audio and Audio-Visual Media Services proactively monitored broadcast media and published a range of analyses that contributed to a more informed policy environment. It also amended several pieces of implementing legislation to further align the national framework with the Audiovisual Media Services Directive, particularly regarding programming obligations, protection of minors, and audiovisual commercial communications. However, the institutional and technical capacities required to fully exercise the Agency’s mandate remain limited, particularly in relation to the oversight and registration of video- sharing platform providers.
Despite delays in managerial appointment, the Agency for Free Access to Public Information resolved its backlog, in a context in which public institutions regularly fail to respect response deadlines for access requests.
Public service broadcaster
In April 2026, the Programme Council of Macedonian Radio Television (MRT) elected a new director. Despite the generally appropriate regulatory framework, the broadcaster remains at risk of political interference, including through the withholding of allocated funds. Delays in appointing governing bodies and reductions in funding can be perceived as structural forms of pressure. MRT has yet to settle its outstanding debts and its strategic plan lacks a multiannual financial projection. Additional funding for technological development is at the government’s discretion, leaving scope for political influence. The broadcaster has limited administrative autonomy and internal self-regulation mechanisms, and procedures are not sufficiently clarified in the Code of Ethics.
Economic factors
The country did not adopt a strategy for the development of media sectors. The media industry is highly fragmented and operates with limited advertising revenues in a financially constrained market, undermining sustainability and investment in quality content. Local and regional media, including non-profit and community media, continue to face significant financial challenges. Transparency surrounding paid political advertising remains an issue, particularly in online and social media. Print, broadcast and digital media are legally obliged to disclose their ownership to the audiovisual media regulatory body. In February 2026, the Agency for Audio and Audio-Visual Media Services established a register of influencers, vloggers and content creators, and adopted a related guidance document following a public consultation. A self-regulatory ownership register for digital national media is also in place.
Internet
Online media sector continues to face challenges and threats, including disinformation, specifically on gender and identity base and hate speech. The Council of Media Ethics received a record 244 complaints, mainly about content on internet portals.
Professional organisations and working conditions
The Council of Media Ethics supports the promotion of ethical journalism but faces long-term funding risks. Self-regulation remains limited in effectiveness due to political and business influence over media content, particularly in online outlets with weak accountability. Journalists and media workers continue to face poor working conditions and wages, with around half of journalists and most media workers earning below the national average, alongside widespread unpaid overtime. In 2025, no general collective agreement was concluded for private media outlets, and protection remains limited, with only one agreement in place with the state-owned media agency. Internal editorial safeguards and ethical codes are largely absent in private media, and especially in local media, while journalists often do not report pressure due to uncertainty and fear of losing their job.
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Freedom of assembly and association
North Macedonia provides adequate legal guarantees to the freedom of assembly and association, and the regulation of assemblies is adequate. The right to freedom of assembly and association was effectively upheld, with protests during the reporting period taking place peacefully and without incidents. No restrictions on assemblies or cases of excessive use of force were reported. Freedom of assembly and association is guaranteed by the Constitution, and the legal framework is broadly aligned with international standards. Further efforts are needed to implement relevant European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) rulings, particularly regarding the registration of associations. Future changes to the legislation regulating the freedom of assembly and association should fully comply with international standards and take into consideration recommendations from the Venice Commission and the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI).
Labour and trade union rights are covered in Chapter 19 – Social policy and employment.
Property rights
The legal and institutional framework for enforcing property rights is broadly in place. However, procedures are lengthy and costly for the public. There has been no progress with the national strategy on property rights. People face most difficulties at municipal level due to outdated, missing or inaccurate bills, as property registers are outdated and kept in analogue format.
The Cadastre Office continued the process of digitalisation and further reduced the bulk of pending cases by additional 40%. Administrative authorities handling property restitutions are facing an excessive caseload due to understaffing and funding constraints. Although the process has been formally closed, there has been no progress on pending denationalisation cases, many of which are pending before the ECtHR.
Non-discrimination
The legal and institutional framework on non-discrimination is incomplete. The capacity of equality bodies needs to be improved.
The anti-discrimination legal framework is not aligned with the Racial Equality Directive, the Directives on standards for equality bodies, EU gender-equality legislation concerning violence against women, work-life balance, pay transparency and women on company boards, and need to be more effectively enforced.
Despite existing legal obligations, the harmonisation of non-discrimination principles across relevant legislation continues to be delayed. The Constitutional Court has received two initiatives challenging the constitutionality of the 2025 amendments to the education laws for removed content on sexual and reproductive health and gender equality.
The Parliamentary selection process for appointments to the Commission on Prevention and Protection against Discrimination needs to be merit-based and transparent. The filling of Commissioner positions has been delayed.
In 2025, the Commission on Prevention and Protection against Discrimination addressed 559 discrimination cases. Most complaints were based on national or ethnic origin, with more than half of discrimination in 2025 related to work and employment. The Commission lacks institutional and financial independence, as well as staff.
The 2021-2026 Strategy for Equality and Non-Discrimination was not comprehensibly implemented. The National coordination body for the promotion and protection against discrimination has been largely inactive.
Anti-racism and hate offences
The legal and institutional framework on anti-racism and hate offences is incomplete. Implementation and enforcement need to be improved.
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The legal framework and institutional capacity to address hate speech and hate crimes need to be further strengthened to ensure alignment with the EU acquis and European standards, in particular the 2008 Council Framework Decision on combating racism and xenophobia. In order to further strenghten its national framework, North Macedonia should implement the Council of Europe’s ECRI General Policy Recommendation No 15 on hate speech and fully follow up on the findings of its September 2023 report, without delay. Systematic data collection by authorities continues to be lacking, while civil society organisations continue to monitor and document cases independently.
In 2025, according to civil society organisations, alleged hate speech incidents registered were most commonly based on ethnicity, sexual orientation and gender identity. The internet and social media have become the primary platform and source of hate speech. North Macedonia still needs to ratify Protocol No 2 to the Convention on Cybercrime, which would enable authorities to more effectively identify individuals behind social media profiles and groups.
Gender equality
The legal and institutional framework on gender equality and combating gender-based violence is incomplete. Implementation and enforcement need to be improved.
There was limited progress in advancing gender equality in North Macedonia. Structural barriers persist, including in the response to gender-based violence, while implementation gaps, insufficient funding and anti-gender narratives continue to hamper progress
The adoption of the National Action Plan for Gender Equality2025-2027 in January 2026 marked progress towards more structured implementation of the related national strategy including through clearer institutional responsibilities and measurable indicators. However, the adoption of the Law on gender equality, is still pending.
Gender-based violence, including domestic violence, psychological, economic and cyber violence and femicides, remains serious concerns. The legislative framework is not fully aligned with the EU Directive on Violence Against Women and Domestic Violence. Amendments to the Criminal Code adopted in January strengthened the criminal-law response to domestic violence and introduced provisions on the non-consensual dissemination of sexually explicit content. However, further alignment is needed including as regards cyberstalking and other forms of technology-facilitated violence.
The availability and quality of specialised services for victims of gender-based and domestic violence remain insufficient. Some existing services are not operational or do not meet the required standards, while understaffing, insufficient funding and unresolved licensing of civil society service providers continue to hamper effective and sustainable service provision. Reintegration support for victims also remains insufficient.
Further efforts are needed to implement the Istanbul Convention and address outstanding GREVIO recommendations. Legislative gaps remain, including as regards the criminalisation of forced marriage and psychological violence. In particular, the Criminal Code is not yet fully aligned. Femicide and the high
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Graph 13.1: North Macedonia - Violence against women
(including domestic and sexual violence)
Police reports Final criminal convictions n/a: not available Source: Ministry of the Interior
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Graph 13.2: North Macedonia - Violence against women -
femicides
Source: Ministry of the Interior
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prevalence of violence against women remain serious concerns, while shortcomings in reporting, investigation and prosecution point to the need for stronger implementation, sustainable funding, enhanced institutional capacity and effective protection measures.
Access to justice and effective support for victims of domestic violence remains limited, including due to the high cost of legal proceedings and insufficient access to free legal aid. Economic insecurity and inadequate access to financial aid and child maintenance support further hamper victims’ recovery and independence.
Growing anti-gender narratives affect policy discussions and public debate, while, women human rights defenders continue to face hate speech and threats, particularly online.
Rights of the child
The legal and institutional framework on rights of the child is in place, but implementation and enforcement need to be improved.
Key challenges persist, including limited accountability mechanisms, insufficient institutional capacity and funding, the absence of systematic monitoring, and weak interinstitutional coordination. Further efforts are needed in particular in the areas of education, healthcare, protection from violence and non-discrimination.
A central body responsible for coordinating policies related to the implementation of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child and its Optional Protocols is yet to be established. The National Action Plan for Children’s Rights provides for an integrated approach to children’s rights, although comprehensive implementation is hampered by inadequate financial and human resources.
Further efforts are needed to develop an integrated child protection system, in line with the Commission Recommendation on developing and strengthening integrated child protection systems in the best interests of the child, particularly as regards coordination, referral mechanisms, multidisciplinary case management, workforce protocols, data monitoring and complaints mechanisms.
The Law on justice for children suspected or accused in criminal proceedings broadly reflects the requirements on procedural safeguards, in line with EU standards. However, regular monitoring and inspection of educational correctional facilities and prisons need to be ensured for effective implementation. Access to justice, including legal aid, remains limited, while the capacity of professionals working with child victims, witnesses and children in conflict with the law needs to be strengthened.
Implementation of the Deinstitutionalisation Strategy (2018-2027) continued, with efforts to progressively transition towards community- or family-based care.
Persons with disabilities
The legal and institutional framework on the rights of persons with disabilities is incomplete. Implementation and enforcement need to be improved.
Persons with disabilities are unable to fully enjoy their rights as the legislation and government policies are not fully aligned with the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (UNCRPD). The capacity of national authorities needs to be strengthened. The Ombudsperson’s Office oversees the implementation of the UNCRPD in close cooperation with CSOs. Implementation of the national strategy on the rights of persons with disabilities is ongoing.
The National Deinstitutionalisation Strategy (2018-2027) is implemented through the activities in the action plan for 2023-2025. The transition from institutional care towards independent living and inclusion in the community is progressing, but further efforts are needed to develop accessible, person-centred community-based support services and prevent institutionalisation.
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Overall, persons with disabilities continue to encounter significant forms of discrimination and barriers to the full enjoyment of their rights, including limited access to information and services, discriminatory attitudes and social marginalisation. Accessibility remains limited, including in the built environment. The legislative framework needs to be further aligned with the EU acquis in the area, including the European Accessibility Act.
LGBTIQ+ persons
The legal protection of the rights of lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, intersex and queer (LGBTIQ+) persons needs to be improved. LGBTIQ+ persons face discrimination.
The legal anti-discrimination framework explicitly recognises sexual orientation and gender identity as protected grounds. No national LGBTIQ+ equality strategy was adopted. National legislation does not provide for legal recognition of same-sex partnerships, as required by relevant ECtHR case-law. No progress was made in implementing the January 2019 European Court of Human Rights judgment on legal gender recognition and a quick, transparent and accessible procedure for legal gender recognition remains lacking. Amendments to the rulebook on reporting violence in schools removed sexual orientation as a possible motive for violence, risking excluding cases of hate-motivated violence against LGBTIQ+ persons from official data and weakening the evidence base for effective prevention.
In June 2026, an LGBTIQ+ pride parade was held in Skopje without incidents. However, hate speech against LGBTIQ+ persons persists, particularly on social media. Increased investigations by the Public Prosecutor’s Office into physical attacks against LGBTIQ+ persons are a positive development, but hate speech cases are often not pursued and no progress was made in long-standing investigations into attacks against LGBTIQ+ persons. Insufficient funding for LGBTIQ+ related programmes risks further weakening efforts to combat LGBTIQ+ phobia and the growing influence of anti-democratic actors.
Procedural rights of suspects and accused persons and rights of victims of crime
The legal framework on procedural rights for suspects and accused persons as well as the rights of victims of crime is partially aligned with the EU acquis and needs to be improved.
The right to a fair trial, and presumption of innocence are formally protected in law. However, full alignment with the EU acquis is not yet ensured. The Law on free legal aid serves as basis for the network providing primary and secondary free legal aid, including for victims of crime. Nonetheless, the system of legal aid in criminal proceedings needs to be reformed to improve access to justice. Eligibility criteria in criminal proceedings for mandatory defence, defence of people unable to afford legal representation and representation of the interests of victims of crime need revision. The country is still not aligned with the European Protection Order Directive. The adoption of an amended Law on criminal procedure to ensure alignment with the Victims’ Rights Directive is still pending. Public awareness about compensation mechanisms and the role of the Commission for the Implementation of the Law on the payment of monetary compensation to victims of violent crimes remains insufficient.
Protection of minorities
The legal and institutional framework for the protection of persons belonging to minorities is in place and persons belonging to minorities are integrated into society.
The government made progress toward finalising an Action Plan on Advancing the Rights of Persons belonging to Communities. The action plan accompanies the rule of law roadmap, required as part of North Macedonia’s opening benchmarks for accession negotiations. The action plan was developed with the assistance of Council of Europe experts in an inclusive process, with two sessions held to consult stakeholders, including representatives of minorities and communities, and relevant institutions. The National Strategy for Inter- culturalism and Social Cohesion 2024-2026 developed by the Agency for the Rights of the
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Non-Majority Communities is being implemented. The strategy serves as the basis for the new strategy for 2026-2032, which is being developed by the Ministry of Inter-Community Relations. The Agency, which focuses its activities on the rights of smaller communities, has limited financial and human resources, hampering its activities. Closer cooperation between the Agency and the Ministry of Inter-Community Relations is needed to ensure a unified approach to upholding the rights of persons belonging to minorities.
North Macedonia has not yet ratified the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages.
Roma
The legal and institutional framework on Roma is incomplete; Roma people continue to face discrimination.
North Macedonia has made limited progress on Roma inclusion, implementing the strategy for 2022-2030. Action plans for 2026 are not yet in place. Interinstitutional cooperation remains at a low level. Outstanding challenges include irregular school attendance, street children and segregation in schools. Implementation of the priorities of the Poznan Declaration is lagging, and no dedicated action plans have been adopted.
Roma women face systemic discrimination in employment, healthcare and education. Most work informally without social protection, and literacy and school dropout rates remain high, with only 2% of Roma children attending early education.
Citizenship rights
North Macedonia still needs align its legislative framework with the EU acquis on EU citizenship rights. This should include carrying out an analysis of the alignment and implementation needs arising from Directive 2004/38/EC on the right of EU citizens and their family members to move and reside freely within the EU, across all affected policy areas and planning timely alignment accordingly.
National legislation allows for citizenship to be granted without prior residence requirements to individuals deemed to represent a ‘special economic interest’. Applicants undergo a security assessment by the National Security Agency and an economic interest assessment by the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Economy. No citizenship on these grounds was granted in the reporting period. The Commission maintains the view that the law’s implementation must not lead to the systematic granting of citizenship in return for investment, as it may be used to bypass the EU short-stay visa procedure and the in-depth assessment of individual migratory and security risks. The absence of the systematic granting of citizenship based on special economic interest is also needed to ensure compliance with EU law.3
2.2.2 Chapter 24 - Justice, freedom and security
The EU has common rules for border and migration management, visa policy, and asylum. Schengen cooperation entails the lifting of border controls inside the EU. There is also cooperation in the fight against serious and organised crime and terrorism, and judicial, police and customs cooperation, all with the support of the EU Justice and Home Affairs agencies.
Fight against serious and organised crime
The legal framework on serious and organised crime is partially aligned with the EU acquis. The capacity to fight against serious and organised crime needs to be improved.
General framework
3 See judgment of 29 April 2025, Commission v Malta (Citoyenneté par investissement), C-181/23,
EU:C:2025:283.
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Legal alignment, strategic and institutional frameworks
The national Serious and Organised Crime Threat Assessment (SOCTA) presented in 2025 remains valid. A national strategy on the fight against organised crime needs to be urgently adopted in line with the priorities of the SOCTA.
In April 2026, the Parliament adopted the Law on the police secondary school.
The Ministry of Interior presented in February 2026 its newly adopted Integrity Plan and the accompanying action plan both covering the period 2026-2028. The integrity plan will be monitored by the Department for Internal Control, Criminal Investigations and Professional Standards of the Ministry of Interior. The Cybercrime Sector within the Ministry was transformed into a Sector for Cybercrime and Digital Forensics, consisting of four departments.
The National Coordination Centre for the Fight against Organised Crime is operational but should serve not only as an information exchange platform but also as a strategic hub for identifying organised crime targets and coordinating investigations. Its resources should be used in a more efficient manner and all contact points from relevant institutions should be appointed. Investigative centres are integrated into some of the public prosecutors’ offices, but they lack human and financial resources and access to necessary databases, professional training and equipment.
The National Security Agency (NSA) and the Operational Technical Agency (OTA) continue to operate as independent entities separate from the Ministry of Interior, in accordance with the recommendations of the Senior Experts’ Group from 2015 and 2017. The housing of the NSA in the same premises as the Ministry of Interior and of the OTA in the same premises as a national telecommunications operator risk impacting their full operational independence. Adequate financial and human resources need to be provided to the OTA to ensure its proper functioning.
The legal framework on asset recovery and asset management needs to be fully harmonised with the EU acquis on asset recovery and confiscation. The Asset Recovery Office (ARO) lacks sufficient human and financial resources to effectively trace and identify criminal assets. Implementing legislation to ensure the Office is made fully operational has not yet been adopted.
The Agency for Management of Confiscated Property (AMCP)filled all the envisaged vacancies in June 2026, as per North Macedonia’s commitment under the Reform Agenda, and now has 62 staff members. However, the Agency still lacks financial resources, storage facilities and equipment, and has to acquire a case management system to facilitate its work.
North Macedonia continued to implement, via the 2025-2026 action plan, its 2025-2028 Strategy for Strengthening the Capacities for Conducting Financial Investigations and Confiscation of Assets. In February 2026, the National Council for Financial Investigations
and Asset Confiscation had its constitutive session.
Implementation and enforcement capacity
North Macedonia continued to develop its track record of investigations, prosecutions and final convictions in organised crime cases. However, further progress is
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Graph 14.1: North Macedonia - Organised crime cases - Data on number of individuals/legal entities involved
New investigations Indictments Final court decisions Final convictions Acquittals Plea bargains
Source: National data collected via the organised crime and corruption track record (OCCTR) e-platform
n/a: not available
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needed from investigations to final convictions in all fields of serious crime, notably, money laundering and trafficking in human beings.
Operational capacity for fighting organised crime needs to be improved. Law enforcement authorities need to develop an intelligence-led policing approach and increase the number of proactive investigations. Access should be ensured to adequate equipment, databases, human and financial resources and training, in parallel with the process of harmonising legislation and procedures with the EU acquis and with European and international standards.
North Macedonia should further strengthen its capacities to effectively seize and confiscate assets. The level of asset seizures drastically increased in 2025 compared with 2024. North Macedonia reported about EUR 32 million worth of seized assets (up from EUR 6 million in
2024). Asset confiscation remains a major area of concern: only EUR 900 000 worth of assets were confiscated in 2025, compared with EUR 5 million in 2024.
In 2025, parallel financial investigations were carried out in 16 cases of serious and organised crime.
Law enforcement cooperation
Cooperation between Europol and North Macedonia remains
overall satisfactory but should be further strengthened, particularly regarding migrant smuggling, cybercrime and counterterrorism.
North Macedonia continued its engagement in the European Multidisciplinary Platform against Criminal Threats (EMPACT): in 2025, the relevant national institutions took part in 76 operational actions (94 in 2024), with North Macedonia co-leader in one of them (6 in 2024). The country is invited to intensify its active involvement in EMPACT. In the EMPACT 2026- 2027 cycle, North Macedonia participates in 77 operational actions and is a co-leader in one operational action under Cannabis, Cocaine and Heroin (CCH) operational action plan.
North Macedonia should make greater use of resources from the EU Agency for Law Enforcement Training (CEPOL) and revise the working arrangement to strengthen its cooperation with the Agency.
To enhance sustainable professional development, North Macedonia is encouraged to adopt the sectoral competencies and integrate knowledge acquired through CEPOL capacity- building actions into its law enforcement training system.
Judicial cooperation in criminal matters
The legal framework for judicial cooperation in criminal matters is partially aligned with the EU acquis to the extent that alignment is already possible. There was limited progress in the area of judicial cooperation in criminal matters. Cooperation with EU Member States, the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO) and Eurojust is broadly satisfactory but needs to be further strengthened and, in the case of cooperation with the EPPO, could be more proactive.
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Graph 14.2: North Macedonia - Serious crime* cases - Data on number of individuals/legal entities
involved**
New investigations Indictments Final court decisions Final convictions Acquittals Plea bargains
Source: National data collected via the organised crime and corruption (OCCTR) e-platformn/a: not available
* Serious crime cases stems from the aggregated data of cases of money laundering, cybercrime, production
and trafficking of drugs, firearms related offenses, terrorism, trafficking in human beings, smuggling of
persons. Corruption cases are showcased in Chapter 23.
** Individuals being investigated, prosecuted or convicted for several offences are counted only once.
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North Macedonia needs to further improve the timeliness and efficiency of its processing of requests for judicial cooperation, in particular as regards mutual legal assistance in criminal matters.
The liaison prosecutor for Eurojust resigned in April 2026 and the position is currently vacant. Between September 2025 and March 2026, North Macedonia was involved in 24 new cases at Eurojust, including 10 as requesting country. Most cases related to fraud, drug trafficking and crimes against life, limb or personal freedom. North Macedonia continued its participation in one ongoing joint investigation team.
North Macedonia maintains a working arrangement with the EPPO. In 2025, the EPPO did not send any mutual legal assistance requests to North Macedonia. It had one active case with links to North Macedonia at the end of the same year.
Crime areas
Investigation and criminalisation of money laundering
North Macedonia’s legal framework on the criminalisation of money laundering is partially aligned with the EU acquis.
The new National Strategy on the Fight against Money Laundering and Terrorism Financing 2026-2029 and its action plan were adopted in March 2026.
Law enforcement agencies, including the Financial Intelligence Unit, need quick access to information on bank and payment accounts and safe deposit boxes.
Cybercrime
No progress was made on alignment with the EU acquis on cybercrime over the reporting period. North Macedonia has not ratified the Second Additional Protocol to the Cybercrime Convention on Enhanced Cooperation and the Disclosure of Electronic Evidence.
Child sexual abuse
In the reporting period, no progress was made on the alignment with the EU acquis on child sexual abuse and exploitation. The Action Plan for the Fight against Trafficking of Children (2021-2025), as an integral part of the National Strategy for Combating Human Trafficking and Illegal Migration (2021-2025), expired along with the strategy. A new national strategy and action plan, aligned with the Lanzarote Convention and the EU legislation on child sexual abuse and exploitation, need to be adopted.
Trafficking in human beings
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2023 2024 2025
Graph 16: North Macedonia - Victims of
trafficking in human beings*
Children Adults Female
Source: National data collected via the organised crime and corruption track record (OCCTR) e-platformn/a= not available
* The total of victims and potential victims identified in the year
equals the number of formally recognised victims during legal
proceedings.
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Graph 15: North Macedonia - Requests for mutual assistance
in criminal matters
Incoming requests Outgoing requests Total Source: Ministry of Justice
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The legal framework on trafficking in human beings is partially aligned with the EU acquis and should be harmonised with the EU Directive on preventing and combating trafficking in human beings and protecting its victims, as amended.
The National Strategy and Action Plan for Combating Human Trafficking and Illegal Migration and the Action Plan for Combating Child Trafficking expired in 2025. A new strategy covering 2026-2030, aligned with the latest EU strategic framework, needs to be urgently adopted.
All identified victims were domestic victims. Five mobile teams identifying victims and presumed victims of trafficking in human beings and vulnerable groups continue to operate.
Migrant smuggling
North Macedonia continue to build up its track record in the fight against migrant smuggling and made progress compared to 2024. 35 new investigations were launched in migrant smuggling cases, leading to 41 new indictments and to 88 final court decisions leading resulting in 86 final convictions for 86 individuals/legal entities in 2025. North Macedonia needs to continue to step up the fight against migrant smuggling, including through international cooperation.
North Macedonia participated in the Second International Conference of the Global Alliance to Counter Migrant Smuggling in December 2025 and signed its joint declaration. North Macedonia has endorsed the Global Alliance Joint Declaration and also participated in the second Senior Officials’ Meeting of the Global Alliance in July 2026.
Trafficking in firearms
The regulatory framework for small arms and light weapons, including on marking and alarm and signal weapons, was aligned with the EU acquis. A revised law on weapons and a revised law on examination and stamping, or marking of firearms and ammunitions were adopted in June 2026, in accordance with commitments under the Reform Agenda. Regular coordination meetings were held by the National Commission on Small Arms and Light Weapons. A National Strategy on Small Arms and Light Weapons (2026-2030) needs to be urgently adopted. The firearms focal point within the Ministry of Interior is not fully operational.
Cooperation in the field of drugs
The legal framework for cooperation in the field of drugs needs to be improved.
The Law on the control of drugs and psychotropic substances is not fully harmonised with the EU acquis and international standards. The country’s national strategy against drugs 2021-2025 expired. A new strategy and action plan, aligned with the new EU strategy on drugs, need to be adopted as soon as possible.
The Interministerial Commission for Narcotic Drugs, responsible for coordinating activities
against illegal production, trafficking and the use of drugs, is not yet fully functional. A lack of
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Graph 17.1: North Macedonia - Cases related to production and
trafficking of drugs- Data on number of individuals/legal entities
involved
New investigations Indictments Final court decisions Final convictions Acquittals Plea bargains
Source: National data collected via the organised crime and corruption track record (OCCTR) e-platform n/a: not available
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sufficient resources hampers the National Drugs Observatory’s operational capacity and daily drug monitoring tasks.
North Macedonia has not established an early warning system for rapid exchange of data on new psychotropic substances. Although a national early warning system coordinator was nominated in 2016, a limited number of activities have been observed.
A new working arrangement with the EU Drugs Agency (EUDA) needs to be signed. The exchange of data with EUDA has deteriorated. The level of cooperation with EUDA needs to be boosted, and the conclusion of the new working arrangement should be prioritised.
The procedure for destroying confiscated drugs is regulated in the Law on the control of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances and in specific implementing legislation.
North Macedonia needs to make tangible progress on the fight against illicit drug production and trafficking. In 2025, about 2390kg of drugs was seized (184 kg in 2024) and a total of 4 000 kg of drugs (solely cannabis) was destroyed. This is the first destruction operation of this kind since 2023. The relevant authorities need to continue to perform regular destructions of confiscated drugs when the prescribed legal requirements are fulfilled.
Counterfeiting of the euro
The relevant legislation is broadly in line with the EU acquis on the suppression of counterfeit currency.
Counterterrorism, prevention and resilience
Fight against terrorism and prevention of radicalisation
Legal alignment, strategic and institutional frameworks
The legal framework for the fight against terrorism and countering violent extremism is partially aligned with the EU acquis. Full compliance with the EU acquis on explosive precursors should still be ensured.
The National Committee for Countering Terrorism and Prevention of Violent Extremism of North Macedonia remains understaffed, which hampers its operational capacity. The Committee does not engage with relevant counterparts at the local level and needs to further strengthen cooperation and coordination with local authorities, particularly with municipalities.
Implementation of the national strategies countering terrorism and violent extremism is under way, covering the period from 2023 to 2027. Regular monitoring and assessment need to be ensured.
North Macedonia became a signatory to the new Joint Action Plan (JAP) on Preventing and Countering of Terrorism and Violent Extremism for the Western Balkans in October 2025. The country adopted a national roadmap to implement the JAP in July 2026.
North Macedonia continues to implement the national plan for reintegration, resocialisation and rehabilitation of foreign terrorist fighters and their family members. Individuals take part
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Graph 17.2: North Macedonia - Drugs - volumes seized and
destroyed in kg
Source: National data collected via the organised crime and corruption track record (OCCTR) e-platform
n/a: not available
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in the plan on a voluntary basis. The country still needs to adopt a legislative framework setting out in detail the division of powers, tasks and responsibilities between central and local-level actors, including community action teams, local multidisciplinary teams and local preventative councils.
2025 saw the expiry of the strategy on the penitentiary system (2021-2025), which envisaged measures against prison radicalisation. A new strategy needs to be adopted, to address the phenomenon of prison radicalisation of regular inmates.
There is no national referral mechanism for preventing and countering violent extremism and radicalisation in the country.
Implementation and enforcement capacity
The fight against terrorism and countering of violent extremism need to be improved.
The threat level for terrorism risk remains low. Competent security services need to continue cautiously monitoring interactions between organised crime groups and foreign terrorist fighters and counteract when necessary. North Macedonia is encouraged to apply the methodology developed with the support of the Counter Terrorism Support Network (CTSN) to prepare a domestic terrorism trend and situation report.
In February 2026, the country’s competent law enforcement agencies and prosecutors’ offices initiated two investigations into terrorism-related offences. Law enforcement agencies need to ensure involvement in the pre- and post-release processes of individuals convicted of terrorism-related offences.
Responsible state institutions are not sufficiently equipped and trained to counteract online radicalisation, which is one of the most prevalent forms of radicalisation.
No repatriation has been planned or performed.
Critical infrastructure protection
Legal alignment, strategic and institutional frameworks
The legal framework for critical infrastructure protection is not fully aligned with the EU acquis.
North Macedonia has not aligned with the EU Directive on the resilience of critical entities. Interinstitutional coordination between counterterrorism, law enforcement, civil protection and cybersecurity authorities is not sufficiently regulated.
Implementation and enforcement capacity
The protection of critical infrastructure needs to be improved.
Institutions with responsibilities in the protection of critical infrastructure need to develop sufficient capacity to carry out their missions, especially given the forthcoming national regulatory framework aligned with the EU acquis.
Migration and asylum
Legal and irregular migration and returns
The legal framework for managing of legal and irregular migration is partially aligned with the EU acquis. The management of legal and irregular migration is broadly satisfactory.
Legal alignment, strategic and institutional frameworks
2025 saw the expiry of the resolution on migration policy (2021-2025) and the national strategy for integrated border management and its accompanying action plan (2022-2025). Follow-up documents have not yet been adopted; these will need to be based on evaluation of how the previous planning documents were implemented.
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North Macedonia continued to actively manage mixed migration flows but still needs to adopt a contingency plan in case of an unforeseen increase in arrivals.
Institutional and administrative capacity for migration management should be strengthened through the provision of adequate material, technical and human resources. The Law on the work and employment of foreigners and the legislation on the right to family reunification is not fully aligned with the EU acquis. North Macedonia needs to ensure that legal pathways developed for third-country nationals prevent irregular secondary movements to the EU.
Implementation and enforcement capacity
For 2025, North Macedonia prevented 6 061 attempted irregular border crossings (down 10.9% on 2024), of which 4 299 attempts were prevented upon entering the country and 1 762 upon exiting the country. Most attempts at irregular border crossing (4 230) were detected at the southern border with Greece. The most prevalent nationalities among the registered migrants in 2025 were Egyptian (1 827), Afghan (1 274), Syrian (447), Moroccan (417) and Sudanese (372). The staffing of the border police should increase.
Systematic migrant registration and protection-sensitive profiling remain a priority. The responsibilities of the institutions involved, mainly the Ministry of Interior and the Ministry of Social Policies and Youth, are not always clearly defined, impacting the effectiveness of migration management.
There is a lack of effective judicial control and of legal counselling and assistance in cases of the detention of migrants.
In 2025, the total number of voluntary returns of foreigners was 970, while the total number of forced returns from the country was 343.
As concerns readmission with the EU, North Macedonia implements readmission agreements with EU countries. In 2025, 269 readmission requests were processed in accordance with agreements
between North Macedonia, the European Union and EU Member States, resulting in the approval of 226 requests and rejection of 43.
Regarding returns to third countries, North Macedonia needs to make progress in establishing practical cooperation with countries of origin on returns of third-country nationals and actively step up engagement with those countries.
The registration of apprehended irregular migrants improved with support from the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex), with which operational cooperation continued smoothly.
The arbitrary detention at the Gazi Baba Detention Centre of irregular migrants who are to be brought before the Criminal Court to make a statement is still a cause for concern.
Asylum
While the legal framework on asylum is partially aligned with the EU acquis as it was in force until 12 June 2026, North Macedonia should focus on developing its national legal framework and operational capacities on migration and asylum to align with the Pact.
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Graph 18: North Macedonia - Number of irregular
movements
Source: Ministry of Interior
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Legal alignment, strategic and institutional frameworks
In June 2026, the Law on International and Temporary Protection was amended allowing temporary protection to be extended beyond the three-year period if the Council of the European Union establishes the existence of a mass influx of persons. Subsequently, the government decision on the extension of temporary protection for persons from Ukraine in the Republic of North Macedonia was endorsed.
The impossibility of acquiring personal identification numbers significantly obstructs the access of applicants for international protection to rights such as employment, opening a bank account and education. ID cards are not issued immediately after an asylum application is submitted and are not machine- readable, in contrast with documents issued to other non-nationals.
The quality of asylum procedures, which are often lengthy, remains a concern: asylum decisions are not always issued in compliance with the legally prescribed procedure and principles, and do not always contain the necessary requisites and assessments. There is a shortage of training opportunities to increase qualifications for administrative personnel.
Efforts are also needed to provide information on access to international protection procedure and counselling, but also access to legal services in detention facilities and at border crossings. Further efforts are needed to address delayed family reunification for people under subsidiary protection, particularly unaccompanied minors.
Implementation and enforcement capacity
North Macedonia remains a transit country. In 2025, 171 third-country nationals submitted an asylum application, with no positive decisions granted since 2024.
The level of cooperation with the European Union Agency for Asylum (EUAA) is satisfactory and facilitated by the third generation of the roadmap for cooperation between the EUAA and North Macedonia for 2025-2027.
Access to asylum procedures remains a challenge. Expulsion decisions should contain a quality assessment and ensure safeguards against possible persecution in the country of origin.
There is no legal framework on the integration of beneficiaries of international protection and no comprehensive approach on integration. Furthermore, there are frequent delaysin the activation of social assistance and health insurance for those granted international protection.
The Law on primary education entitles children who applied for
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Graph 19.1: North Macedonia - Asylum Applications
Source: Ministry of Interior, Asylum Sector
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Graph 19.2: North Macedonia - Asylum recognition rate (%)
n/a: not available
Source:
Ministry of Interior, Aylum Sector
EU-27 average: ESTAT
*EU averages reflect positive decisions at first instance for refugee status, humanitarian status and subsidiary protection status
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international protection to enrol in primary education, although enrolment does not always occur in a timely manner. No equivalent provision exists for secondary education.
Living conditions for applicants for international protection remain unsatisfactory. Reception conditions, including for asylum seekers with special needs, are inadequate. The provision of interpretation services during the asylum procedure is a major challenge.
Visa policy
North Macedonia’s visa policy is largely aligned with the EU’s, in particular the list of countries whose nationals require an entry visa. North Macedonia’s list of visa-free countries only differs from that of the EU by one country: Türkiye.
North Macedonia has taken some steps to address the Commission’s recommendations from the eighth Visa Suspension Mechanism (VSM) report. Recommendations still need to be addressed concerning full visa policy alignment, the effectiveness of additional screening measures, overstays in the Schengen area and the repeal of investor citizen scheme.
Schengen governance and external borders
The legislative and strategic framework for the management of external borders is partially aligned with the EU acquis. The management of borders needs to be improved.
Legal alignment, strategic and institutional frameworks
North Macedonia has no Schengen action plan and no National Schengen Coordinator. The development and adoption of a Schengen action plan need to be prioritised.
The Status Agreement with Frontex continues to be implemented. November 2025 saw the signature of a memorandum of understanding between North Macedonia and Frontex on complaint mechanisms under the scope of the agreement.
The national strategy on integrated border management 2021-2025 expired; a new one has not yet been finalised.
The state of crisis on all borders was extended until December 2026 due to the perceived risk of an increased influx and transit of migrants. Progress towards updating the national contingency plan should be prioritised instead.
Implementation and enforcement capacity
The implementation of the Frontex Status Agreement is progressing well.
Amendments to the Law on border control, abolishing the National Coordination Centre for Border Management, were adopted in April 2026.
In June 2026, in compliance with the reorganisation of the Department for Border Affairs and Migration of the Ministry of Interior, an Integrated Border Management Unit with responsibility over inter-agency cooperation was established.
Human resources in the border police are insufficient; the intention was to compensate for this through the deployment of technical means. Border surveillance is performed in stationary and mobile forms, with the latter conducted by mobile patrols, based on risk assessments and operational risks.
Cooperation with the competent border services of Albania, Bulgaria, Kosovo and Serbia is in line with the Schengen catalogue of recommendations and best practices. For 2025, 716 meetings and contacts occurred, 441 joint border patrols were carried out, and 1 289 pieces of information exchanged with the neighbouring countries. In the absence of an operational agreement with Greece, cooperation is limited, also in the field of training. North Macedonia operates joint (one-stop) border-crossing points with Kosovo and Serbia to simplify and facilitate the movement of people, vehicles and goods.
Judicial cooperation in civil and commercial matters
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Judicial cooperation in civil and commercial matters needs to be improved.
Progress was limited on the legal framework for cooperation in civil and commercial matters.
North Macedonia is yet to initiate the ratification procedure for the Hague Convention on the Protection of Children (1996), and the Child Support Convention and Maintenance Protocol (2007) has not been initiated. The country has not yet ratified the Hague Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Civil or Commercial Matters (2019).
2.3. ECONOMIC CRITERIA4
2.3.1. The existence of a functioning market economy
Economic governance
4 Unless otherwise indicated, the data in this section are taken from the relevant national sources (the statistical
office, Ministry of Finance and central bank).
2023 2024 2025
North Macedonia - Key economic figures
GDP per capita (% of EU-27 in PPS)1) 41 41 42 43
Real GDP growth 1.7 2.6 3.0 3.5
Activity rate of the population aged 15-64 (%), total 65.7 65.4 66.0 66.6
female 53.4 54.7 55.7 56.3
male 77.7 76.0 76.2 76.8
Unemployment rate of the population aged 15-64 (%), total2) 17.9 13.2 12.5 11.7
female 17.4 11.4 11.2 10.7
male 18.4 14.4 13.4 12.4
Employment of the population aged 15-64 (annual growth %)2) 0.6 -0.2 0.6 1.4
Nominal wages (annual growth %) 6.4 15.3 12.9 9.6
Consumer price index (annual growth %) 3.7 9.4 3.5 4.1
Exchange rate against EUR 61.59 61.56 61.53 61.59
Current account balance (% of GDP) -2.6 0.3 -2.2 -4.4
Net foreign direct investment, FDI (% of GDP) 3.4 3.3 6.6 1.5
General government balance (% of GDP) -4.0 -4.6 -4.4 -4.0
General government debt (% of GDP) 45.4 49.5 53.0 51.6
Notes :
1) Eurostat
2) In 2023, the implementation of a new regulation caused changes in the survey affecting
the scope and definition of employment and unemployment.
This caused an interruption of the time series of data, restricting comparability with previous data.
Sources: State Statistical Office, National Bank of North Macedonia, Ministry of Finance and Eurostat
2017-22
average
588 606
n/a
179
311
n/a
767
917
n/a 0
100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 900
1000
2023 2024 2025
Graph 20: North Macedonia - Requests for mutual assistance
in civil matters
Incoming requests Outgoing requests Total Source: Ministry of Justice
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Progress on key reforms remained mixed. The government adopted several bylaws to implement the 2022 Organic Budget Law (OBL) but postponed implementation of the new deficit rule (3% of GDP limit) from 2027 to 2028, and the full implementation of the OBL from 2026 to 20281. The new IT platform underpinning the OBL is seriously delayed, blocking related fiscal governance reforms. The Fiscal Council remains understaffed and underfinanced. The draft law on public-private partnerships is still to be adopted. The 2025 budget was revised, shifting funds from capital to current spending. While the wage bill remained stable as a share of GDP, pension costs rose, with ad hoc increases in September 2025 and March 2026 instead of adjustments through indexation. Monetary policy remained focused on price stability. The Deposit Insurance Fund and Bank Resolution Fund are not yet operational. However, the central bank widened its toolkit for providing liquidity to the financial market and took steps to strengthen the supervisory framework. Under the October 2024 Reform Agenda, the Commission has released EUR 142.1 million as of June 2026, including the pre-financing. The country completed 22 of 136 planned steps to boost the digital transformation, improve financial control, achieve better governance of state-owned enterprises, and improve the quality of education. Implementation of the policy guidance set out in the conclusions of the May 2025 Economic and Financial Dialogue has been limited, with the level of implementation down on the previous year.
Macroeconomic stability
Economic growth accelerated in 2025, driven by domestic demand. Real GDP increased by 3.5% in 2025, boosted by strong investment and private consumption. The increase was above the average growth rate of 3.2% in the period 2021–2024. Performance was particularly strong in construction and in ICT services, partly reflecting the acceleration of public roadworks. Private investment benefited from government- subsidised corporate loans. Household consumption growth picked up, supported by strong pension and wage growth and robust credit expansion. Public consumption also increased, mainly reflecting strong public sector wage hikes. Net exports detracted from GDP growth as muted external demand continued to weigh on exports. In the first half of 2026, annual growth averaged 3.3%. Yet, growth is driven largely by consumption, credit expansion, and government-supported demand, rather than by productivity gains. This raises concerns about the sustainability of growth. Convergence with EU income levels remained very slow, with real GDP per capita in purchasing power standards increasing from 40% of the EU-27 average in 2017 to 43% in 2025.
External imbalances increased. In 2025, the current account deficit widened by 2.1 percentage points (pps) to 4.3% of GDP. This was due to a higher deficit in the merchandise trade balance, and a lower surplus in the services and secondary income balances. In the first half of 2026, a slight improvement in the trade balance was offset by lower private transfers from abroad and the current account deficit
-8
-4
0
4
8
12
2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
Graph 21: North Macedonia -
Real GDP growth and contributions
Priv. cons. Gov. cons. GFCF Stocks Net exports Real GDP growth
Source: WiiW, State Statistical Office
% y-o-y
-12
-9
-6
-3
0
3
6
9
-21 -18 -15 -12
-9 -6 -3 0 3 6 9
2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
Graph 22: North Macedonia - Current account
selected components and FDI
Workers' remittances balance
Goods and services trade balance
Current account balance (rhs)
Net FDI (rhs)
% of GDP
Source: National Bank of North Macedonia, State Statistical Office
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remained unchanged. Net foreign direct investment inflows decreased from an exceptionally high level in 2024 (6.6% of GDP) to 1.5% of GDP in 2025 and only covered roughly half of the current account deficit. This was due to large outflows of intercompany lending rather than a decline in greenfield investments. Foreign reserves covered some 4.5 months of imports of goods and services at the end of August 2026. Despite some progress, the economy remains vulnerable to energy price hikes, given its high energy import dependency. Gross external debt, which poses a low risk due to its high share of long-term and fixed-rate financing, declined by 7.7 pps year-on-year to 72.1% of GDP at end-2025 and further to 71.8% of GDP at the end of the second quarter of 2026.
Disinflation is increasingly hampered by domestic price pressures. Average annual consumer price inflation accelerated from 3.5% in 2024 to 4.1% in 2025. After declining gradually in the second half of 2025, inflationary pressures driven by energy and food prices re-emerged as of March 2026, mainly as a result of the conflict in the Middle East. In response, the government reduced VAT rates and excise duties on petrol and diesel5 in late March. By summer 2026, headline inflation has declined, while core inflation remained elevated, driven mainly by domestic factors, including wage growth and an increasingly expansionary fiscal stance.
The central bank tightened its macroprudential tools to contain credit growth and bolster banks’ buffers. Given the fast rise in house prices and in mortgage lending, amidst ample excess liquidity in the banking system, the central bank tightened borrower-based measures in the real estate market with effect from 1 December 2025. It also raised reserve requirements applicable from November 2025. To bolster banks’ ability to absorb losses, the central bank also raised the countercyclical capital buffer further. In December 2025, it adjusted its monetary policy framework to improve liquidity management and policy transmission, shifting the key policy rate’s focus to shorter-term maturities of central bank bills. In June 2026, against the backdrop of lingering inflationary and geopolitical pressures, the central bank raised the key policy rate by 25 basis points (bps), to 4.25%, after having kept it unchanged throughout 2025.
Fiscal consolidation has been delayed further. The 2025 fiscal deficit stood at 4% of GDP, in line with the government’s plan. Revenue fell short of the target, but this was offset by a significant under-execution of capital expenditure, which reached only 64.6% of the revised target, or 2.7% of GDP6. A mid-year budget revision, followed by a budget rebalancing in December, reduced planned capital expenditure by 6.6% and raised current expenditure by 3%. This reflected further linear increases in pensions, higher public sector wages, and additional municipal projects. Spending on pensions rose to 11.8% of GDP in 2025, up by 0.8 pps. year-on-year, continuing the sharp increase observed in recent years (from 9.8% of GDP in 2021). In its April 2026 Fiscal Strategy, the government postponed compliance with the 3% deficit ceiling required by the 2022 fiscal rules7 from 2027 to 2028. In a July 2026 budget revision, it raised the fiscal deficit target for 2026 from 3.5% of GDP to 4.1%.
Progress in bolstering the fiscal framework has been uneven. The government continued implementing the 2022 Organic Budget Law by adopting several bylaws but postponed the entry into force of the revised budget classifications until January 2028. In the absence of a fully-fledged
5 While the government’s initial VAT reduction has expired, the fuel excise reductions have since been extended until end-October 2026. 6 Including the Public Enterprise for State Roads (PESR), which according to the ESA 2010 rules should be
accounted for under the general government; capital spending was significantly higher (6.6% of GDP in 2024, the latest available figure). 7 The previous government’s plan was to achieve a deficit of 3% in 2026.
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-3
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3
2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
Graph 23: North Macedonia - Fiscal
developments
Primary balance (lhs) Interest (lhs)
CG balance (lhs) Public debt (rhs)
Source: Ministry of Finance
% of GDP
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system, the Ministry of Finance’s Department for Public Investment Management has developed a temporary IT solution to create a project database and monitor financial implementation. The Fiscal Council continues to lack sufficient staff and adequate capacity to conduct independent analysis. Revisions to national accounts data have become more frequent and larger in scale. Moreover, fiscal data remain incomplete, as large parts of the public sector are excluded from the government budget. In addition, the data are not compiled in line with the ESA 2010 standards.
Debt ratios declined slightly but remained well above pre-COVID levels. General government debt fell to 51.6% of GDP at the end of 2025 and remained broadly unchanged at the end of Q2-2026. The public debt ratio dropped by 2 pps year-on-year in 2025, to 59.4% of GDP, implying that the government-guaranteed debt of public enterprises dropped by 0.6 pps in 2025; it declined further to 58.8% of projected GDP in the first quarter of 2026. Still, both debt ratios remained markedly above their 2019 pre-COVID levels. The share of external debt in total public debt has been declining over the past five years, from 65.4% at the end of 2021 to 56% at the end of Q2-2026. Overall, foreign-currency- denominated debt made up 52.4% of total debt in the first quarter of 2026, of which 91% was denominated in euro. Risks stemming from exchange rate depreciation are mitigated by the de facto currency peg to the euro.
The policy mix does not sufficiently address current challenges, notably elevated inflation and fiscal consolidation needs. Monetary policy remained prudent amid strong credit growth and excess liquidity, while fiscal policy added to inflationary pressures through ad hoc increases in wages and pensions and further delays in fiscal consolidation, thereby further eroding fiscal space. As monetary policy is constrained by the peg and weakened by excess liquidity, fiscal policy has a critical role as the main stabiliser. Preserving macroeconomic stability and strengthening competitiveness will require a more credible fiscal adjustment path, faster implementation of reforms, and a stronger focus on productivity-enhancing investment and structural reforms.
Functioning of product markets
Business environment
Long-standing obstacles to doing business persist. Competition is distorted by the large informal economy, which, according to some estimates, accounts for some 38% of GDP8. Informal employment accounted for 14.5% of total employment in the second quarter of 2026, according to the State Statistical Office, up by 0.3 pps year-on-year and by 1 pp. on the same period five years earlier. Implementation of the Strategy and Action Plan for the Formalisation of the Informal Economy is heavily delayed, partly because of a reorganisation of responsibilities in the government. January 2026 saw the entry into force of the new Law on Employment, aimed at bringing informal workers into the formal economy through flexible contracts. Obstacles to lending to small and medium-sized businesses are the focus of several measures in the Reform Agenda, but their implementation is lagging9.
State influence on the product market
Product markets are still distorted by sizeable State aid. State aid schemes are numerous and opaque. The Commission for Protection of Competition still lacks the authority and resources to properly regulate state subsidies. The planned update of the State Aid Registry, which requires procurement of a management information system connecting different institutions, has now been pushed back to 2027. Public procurement competition is weak, with two thirds of tenders awarded to single bidders, raising concerns
8 Kelmanson, Kirabaeva, Medina, Mircheva, and Weiss (2019) ‘Explaining the shadow economy in Europe: size, causes and policy options,’ Working Paper No 19/278, International Monetary Fund. 9 This includes facilitating the use of intangible assets as collateral in lending to SMEs and extending guarantees for SMEs under the State Credit Guarantee Scheme.
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over favouritism and inefficiency. The government has a track record of intervening in market competition through caps on food prices to contain inflation. These measures revealed persistent enforcement failures at the Market Inspectorate and the Commission for Protection of Competition but did not have much impact on inflation.
Privatisation and restructuring
Although limited in size, the public sector has a significant stake in the economy. In 2025, the number of companies in full state ownership remained unchanged at 14. The number of companies in partial ownership remained at 38, most of these with a state ownership share of below 1% of issued capital10. The total value of state ownership in enterprises has declined further in the reporting period, from 7.7% of GDP in 2024 to 5.8% in 2025. Even though relatively limited, state ownership is concentrated in critical network industries with significance for the whole economy, such as energy and transport. Against this background, there are concerns over the generally weak governance and transparency of many state-owned enterprises, which are loss-making and carry large potential fiscal risks. Of particular concern is the domestic electricity generator Elekrani na Severna Makedonija (ESM), whose tariffs in the regulated market are below cost recovery and are subsidised by the government. In line with the Reform Agenda, the government initiated some reforms to address these shortcomings11.
Functioning of the financial market
The banking sector remained resilient, but fast mortgage growth poses a challenge for monetary policy. Although still relatively low, financial intermediation has picked up in recent years, with financial sector assets at some 89.3% of GDP at the end of Q1-2026 (+3.9 pps year-on-year and +10.1 pps compared with the pre-COVID level at the end of Q4- 2019). Non-bank financial institutions increased their share of total financial sector assets, from 18.6% in 2019 to 23.8% in 2024 (latest available figure). Meanwhile, banks’ capital adequacy ratio increased to 19.1% at the end of Q1-2026 (+0.2 pps year-on-year and +2.9 pps compared with end-2019). The sector’s profitability has remained solid, with a return on assets of around 2%. The ratio of non-performing loans in total loans to the non- financial sector dropped to a record low of 1.9% at the end of Q1-2026. Credit growth to the private sector accelerated to 12.8% year-on-year in Q4-2025 and 13.2% on average in the first seven months of 2026. Private-sector deposits also increased robustly, by 11.0% year- on-year in Q4-2025, slowing to 9.7%% on average in the first seven months of 2026. The strong increase in mortgage lending and construction loans contributed to a sharp increase in real estate prices, which, combined with a high exposure of some banks to the real estate market, remains a challenge and requires supervisory vigilance.
Functioning of the labour market
10 The figures are based on information from the government. A harmonised and internationally standardised global database of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) by the World Bank shows that there are 88 SOEs in North Macedonia, with the government holding a 100% stake in 35 of them. 11 On 30 December 2025, the government approved the revised action plans for the Public Enterprise Railway Infrastructure (PERI) and the Railway Transport Operator (PERO). The focus of the plans is on: (i) the segmentation of operations and services; (ii) the introduction of a cost-allocation methodology; (iii) the redesign of track access charges; (iv) the revision and effective implementation of the management and infrastructure contract under a performance-based framework; (v) strengthened governance and oversight arrangements; and (vi) the depreciation and improved management of assets.
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Structural weaknesses in the labour market are constraining growth. Over recent years, key labour market indicators have pointed to continuous, gradual improvements, especially with respect to employment growth and a further reduction in unemployment. The unemployment rate (age group 15-64) dropped to 11.7% in 2025, down from 16.5% five years earlier, and further to 11.5% at the end of Q2-2026. The employment rate also improved (59.3% at the end of Q2, compared with 58.8% at end-2025 and 54.7% in 2020). However, emigration of skilled workers, low participation rates and skills mismatches are leading to labour shortages, impeding economic growth. High emigration continued in 2025, although the labour force declined by less (0.2%) than in 2024 (2%), possibly linked to increased inflows of foreign workers. Labour market participation rose slightly to 67% at the end of the second quarter of 2026 (2020: 65.5%), which is much lower than in the EU and marked by a large gender gap. Youth unemployment (age group 15-24) remained high, at about 25%. Wage growth is fuelled by public sector wage agreements and a rise in minimum wages. Average gross nominal wages rose by 9.6% in 2025, somewhat less than in the preceding year, with annual growth slowing further to an average of 7.7% in the first half of 2026. Real wage growth fell to 5.5% in 2025 (-2.2 pps year-on-year) and declined further to 3.4% in the first half of 2026.
2.3.2. The capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union
Education and innovation
The reform of vocational education and training and the digitalisation of schools are progressing. In 2026, North Macedonia adopted its Education Strategy (2026-2032), marking progress on vocational education and training (VET), with three of eight established regional VET centres now operational. Implementing legislation under the 2024 VET law12 was adopted, strengthening dual education and employer partnerships. Digital transformation in schools advanced, with 160 primary schools equipped with IT infrastructure and digital/green skills integrated into secondary education curricula. However, higher education continues to be based on outdated curricula, exacerbating skills mismatches, while foundational learning outcomes remain weak (as reflected in declining PISA scores). Adult education, which for many unemployed individuals is an important pathway into the labour force, faces a slow take-up. Moreover, systems for validating non-formal learning, which can help in reducing skills mismatches by recognising competencies acquired through work experience, remain underdeveloped. The education budget increased as a share of the overall state budget, from 11.05% in 2024 to 12.2% in 2025, though with inefficient allocation prioritising wages over infrastructure. Research and innovation investment remains critically low (0.38% of GDP in 2024, latest figure), with minimal private-sector engagement.
Physical capital and quality of infrastructure
12 Parliament adopted the new Law on vocational education and training in December 2024. The law introduces several key innovations such as formalising dual education partnerships between vocational institutions and employers, increasing the number of practical training hours in VET, and setting the legal framework for establishing a network of regional VET centres.
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65
70
75
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10
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2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
Graph 24: North Macedonia - Labour market
trends (15-64 age group)
Unemployment rate (lhs) Participation rate (rhs)
Employment rate (rhs) Source: State Statistical Office
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The modernisation of critical transport infrastructure is further delayed due to weaker implementation of public infrastructure projects. Although public construction works on Trans-European Corridors VIII and X have gathered speed, they continue to face delays, with completion now expected in 2029, two years later than originally planned. Railway construction on Corridor VIII, linking Albania and Bulgaria and providing access to ports in both countries, is hindered by unresolved tender revisions and pending cross-border arrangements with Albania. These delays undermine regional connectivity and economic competitiveness. Overall, general government gross fixed capital formation, including municipal projects, amounted to 3.4% of GDP in 2025, down from 3.8% in 202413 and below the EU-27 average of 3.9%, although still above the five-year average. Additional investment in transport infrastructure is needed to support productivity growth.
There is marked progress on the digital transformation. In 2025, several key legislative and infrastructure advancements brought the country closer to EU standards. A new electronic communications law became fully applicable in June 2026. The law strengthens consumer protection and market competition, paving the way for 5G and next-generation network deployment. In December 2025, the government adopted amendments to the Law on construction to ensure harmonisation with several provisions of the EU Gigabit Infrastructure Act. The country also strengthened its cybersecurity framework with the adoption of the Security of Network and Information Systems (NIS2)-aligned Act, effective from January 202614. While the availability of internet connections continued to increase, reaching 92% of households in late 202515 (2021: 83.7%), bottlenecks persist in rural areas and for small businesses.
Measures to improve energy efficiency are delayed. While amendments to the Energy Efficiency Law (aligned with the EU Clean Energy Package) were adopted in October 2025, secondary legislation is still pending, and enforcement of existing rules, such as mandatory energy performance certificates for buildings, remains weak. In October 2025, a 3% annual renovation programme for public buildings was adopted by the government, but only few municipalities are developing the required energy efficiency plans. The Energy Efficiency Fund, first established in 2023, remains non-operational due to bureaucratic delays in finalising operational documents and forming a steering board. The Law on Climate Change, which would introduce carbon pricing mechanisms, has been delayed yet again. This leaves North Macedonia without a clear framework for meeting its EU Green Deal obligations16. Meanwhile, in July 2026, North Macedonia notified the Energy Community Secretariat that the legal alignment of the Electricity Integration package is complete and has entered the verification stage, in which the Secretariat and the Commission confirm alignment before market integration with the EU proceeds.
The government increased renewable energy capacities. The country has made remarkable strides in renewable energy, with green power now accounting for 58.22% of installed capacity, up from 17% in 2021, and 46.37% of total electricity production, up from 22.8% in 2021. This shift is largely driven by solar and wind investments, supported by the government’s 2026 Annual Plan for Energy Facilities, which envisages 67 new plants with a total capacity of 4 416 MW, primarily focused on decentralised, sustainable production. If fully realised, this plan could significantly reduce the country’s historical dependence on coal, which still dominates the energy mix. At the end of June 2026, the government adopted the
13 Eurostat data. This figure does not include investment by the Public Enterprise for State Roads. 14 According to the OECD, about 47% of SMEs in North Macedonia report having no cybersecurity measures in place - the highest share in the entire region. Hence, translating the new legal framework into firm-level resilience will require targeted cybersecurity support for SMEs. OECD (2026), SME Policy Index for Western Balkans and Türkiye 2026 – Economy Profile for North Macedonia. 15 DataReportal, Digital 2026 Report. 16 The adoption of the Law on Climate Change is part of the implementation of the Monitoring, Reporting, Verification and Accreditation, which is a step in the Reform Agenda for North Macedonia. The step was supposed to have been achieved by December 2025 but it is currently in the ‘grace period’ until December 2026.
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Renewable Energy Law, aligning the legal framework for the use of energy from renewables with the relevant EU legislation.
Sectoral and enterprise structure
Changes in the economy’s structure remain slow. Over the past five years, the share of trade and services in gross value added (GVA) increased slightly, from 64.4% in 2020 to 65.4% in 2025. The share of manufacturing also rose, from 15.1% to 16.5%. Among services, information and communication technologies are becoming more important: their share in GVA increased from 4.9% in the first quarter of 2021 to 6.2% in the first quarter of 2026. Construction accounted for 7.5% of GVA, up from 6% in 2020, supported by accelerated public works. By contrast, agriculture’s share fell from 8.3% in 2000 to 6.9% in 2025. Micro, small and medium-sized enterprises accounted for 99.8% of all businesses, 72.9% of employment and 67.5% of value added, all above the EU-27 average.
Economic integration with the EU and price competitiveness
Openness to trade remained at historically high levels. Exports and imports of goods amounted to around 133% of GDP in 2025, broadly unchanged from a year earlier and well above the five-year pre-COVID average of 120%. The share of higher value-added products in exports, notably manufactured goods and machinery, increased from 43.3% in 2019 to 55.7% in 2025. Most of the export value is, however, generated by a limited number of large companies, with only one in four small companies exporting at all17. The EU remained the country’s main trading partner, accounting for 61.5% of total trade in goods in 2025. 76% of the country’s total goods exports went to the EU in 2025, while 47% of its imports derived from there. CEFTA was the second biggest trading partner, accounting for 13.6% of exports and 8.9% of imports. According to the National Bank, EU-27 countries are also the biggest investors in North Macedonia, accounting for some 69,48% of total FDI stock in 2025, down from 60,65% in 2019.
External price competitiveness decreased slightly. The consumer price index-deflated real effective exchange rate (REER), a measure of external competitiveness, appreciated by 1.1% in 2025, following an average appreciation by 0.3% in 2024. Nominal unit labour costs continued to rise strongly in 2025, reflecting higher nominal wages. This was somewhat offset by a pick-up in labour productivity growth in 2025 (3.6% year-on-year in Q3), reflecting strong economic growth and slower employment growth, which helped to moderate the rise in unit labour costs. Inflation differentials with the euro area, rising unit labor costs, and persistent productivity gaps continue to weigh on competitiveness, despite high trade openness and strong integration with the EU. This points to the need for a more coherent policy mix combining fiscal consolidation, structural reforms, and productivity-
17 OECD (2026), SME Policy Index for Western Balkans and Türkiye 2026 – Economy Profile for North
Macedonia.
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2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
Graph 25.a: North Macedonia - Exports of goods
EU CEFTA Other Source: WiiW, State Statistical Office
% of GDP
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2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
Graph 25.b: North Macedonia - Imports of goods
EU CEFTA Other Source: WiiW, State Statistical Office
% of GDP
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enhancing investment.
2.4. PUBLIC PROCUREMENT, STATISTICS; FINANCIAL CONTROL
Chapter 5 - Public procurement
EU rules ensure that the public procurement of goods, services and works in any Member State is transparent and open to all EU companies on the basis of non-discrimination and equal treatment.
Institutional set-up and legal alignment
North Macedonia’s legal framework is largely aligned with the EU acquis. The current exclusion framework in public procurement, based on negative references for companies due to professional misconduct, remains in force: there are concerns about its proportionality and compliance with EU public procurement directives. In 2025, 74 negative references were issued; 56 expired, and 6 were removed. By the end of 2025, 12 negative references remained active. Controls in public procurement should be further strengthened.
The current legal framework for public-private partnerships (PPP) is not aligned with the EU acquis, while related control systems and fiscal risks management remain very weak. The adoption of the law on PPP continues to face delays. In 2025, only one new PPP agreement was recorded in the register of awarded contracts. A comprehensive register needs to be established for PPP and for concessions.
Implementation and enforcement capacity
In 2025, the public procurement market amounted to 9.3% of the country’s GDP, compared with 8.8% in 2024. Competition in public procurement has been limited, and reliance on the lowest-price award criterion has continued to dominate. The percentage of single bid tenders was 33.9% in 2025. The use of negotiated procedures dropped further to only 0.5% of contracts in 2025, while contract cancellations increased to 28.7%. In 2025, 647 contracts were concluded using the e-market for low value procurement, an increase from 325 contracts in 2024. The use of e-auctions decreased to 22% of the published contract notices, well below the 40% target agreed in the Reform and Growth Facility.
The use of the most economically advantageous tender (MEAT) criterion remained limited and was only applied for 6% of procurement contracts, up from 5.4% in 2024. In terms of value, only 4.8% of contracts utilised MEAT criteria.
The electronic for public procurement system operates efficiently, covering all transactions.
Capacity building for managing public procurement processes requires further strengthening, particularly at the local level.
The public procurement strategy includes measures to combat corruption and conflict of interest, risk management systems and reporting on potential corrupt practices or irregularities. However, the framework in this area needs to be strengthened. The Public Procurement Bureau (PPB) regularly publishes red flag reports, although follow-up actions remain insufficient.
Efficient remedy system
The legislation on the remedy system is mostly harmonised with the EU acquis.
In 2025, the State Appeal Commission (SAC) received 1 535 appeals, of which 1 405 cases were solved. Some 119 complaints against SAC decisions were filed before the Administrative Court. The SAC requires additional qualified staff in order to be able to process appeals in a timely manner.
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Chapter 18 - Statistics
European statistics are developed, produced and disseminated by EU Member States, guided by the principles and quality criteria elaborated in the Regulation on European statistics, such as professional independence, impartiality, reliability, accessibility and statistical confidentiality. Common rules are provided for the methodology, production and dissemination of statistical information, which are further specified in sectoral legislation that constitute the EU acquis on statistics.
The statistical infrastructure remains largely aligned with the EU acquis, and the statistical law is aligned with the principles of the European statistics Code of Practice. Despite some progress in addressing the long-standing challenging human resources situation at the State Statistical Office (SSO), the SSO continues to suffer from insufficient human and financial resources. Data transmission to Eurostat has continued to improve, notably in national accounts and social statistics.
On classifications and registers, the national classification standard is aligned with NACE Rev. 2.1.
As regards macroeconomic statistics, annual and quarterly national accounts series have been updated. Gross national income (GNI) is compiled based on ESA 2010 standards, with regular transmission of GNI and GDP data to Eurostat under the ESA 2010 transmission programme. Some progress has been achieved in compiling tax and social contribution data on an accrual basis, and in the experimental development and transmission of table 11 on government expenditure by function (COFOG). However, further improvements are required, particularly regarding the updating of the GNI inventory. The SSO should also resolve the sectorisation of units for the government sector, transmit quarterly GFS data for 2025, as well as data for the ESA tables 27, 28 and 28A, and remove flags that prevent the publication of GFS data, posing broader fiscal transparency challenges. Since December 2025, the National Bank transmits financial accounts data on transactions and balance sheets to Eurostat, but improvements are needed on the completeness of sector accounts and the reconciliation of financial flows with non-financial accounts.
Business and trade statistics continue to be collected regularly, and further work is required to improve data collection and direct reporting on international trade in services and foreign direct investments.
As regards social statistics, accuracy increased following a revision of intercensal population estimates based on the 2021 census results, and important improvements were made in labour market, European Union statistics on income and living conditions (EU-SILC) and European System of integrated Social Protection Statistics (ESSPRO) data transmission.
Regarding agricultural statistics, preparatory work for the agricultural census is advancing but a slow legislative process risks leading to a postponement of the census from 2026 to 2027. The 2026 state budget includes a dedicated allocation for the census, providing a sound financial basis for its execution.
North Macedonia’s energy statistics are highly compliant. Regarding environmental statistics, data are being transmitted to Eurostat for forestry and monetary and physical environmental accounts. Transport statistics are highly compliant, but North Macedonia has not yet transmitted passenger mobility data to Eurostat.
Chapter 32 - Financial control
The EU promotes the reform of national governance systems to improve managerial accountability, sound financial management of income and expenditure, and external audit of public funds. The financial control rules further protect the EU’s financial interests against fraud in the management of EU funds and the euro against counterfeiting.
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Public internal financial control (PIFC)
PIFC reforms are embedded in the 2025-2028 Public Finance Management Reform Programme. The 2025 Annual Report on the functioning of PIFC 2025 was produced and delivered to the Government for approval. As for the legal framework, the implementation of the PIFC law progressed, including through the adoption of two pieces of implementing legislation by the end of 2025, while the remaining ones are still pending. Delays in the operationalisation of the revised budget classifications are slowing down the restructuring of internal audit units and the strengthening of managerial accountability systems. The central harmonisation unit continues to provide methodological guidance and coordinates the PIFC system across the public sector. Despite its limited capacities, systems are robust.
The legal framework on internal control is broadly harmonised with international standards, but implementation is inconsistent, and risk management needs to be further strengthened. A new methodology to identify, report and monitor operational and strategic risks was introduced in September 2025 and 76% of central budget users developed risk management systems in line with it by the end of 2025. Development of implementing legislation for the financial inspection law progressed, while new working procedures and methodological tools are to be established in line with the Law on inspection supervision.
Institutional and managerial accountability remains fragile because of the very high number of first-level budget users and shortcomings in delegation of authority. Amendments to the organisational classification approved the reduction of the number of primary budget users to 35 but it has not been enforced yet.
Fragmentation, inadequate staffing levels and the lack of a national certification system for internal auditors continue to undermine the capacity and quality of internal audit units (IAUs). Indeed, IAUs often operate with just one auditor or none, in a system with only 126 internal auditors across the 116 IAUs established.
External audit
The lack of adoption by the government of the new state audit law prevents the legal framework from strengthening the State Audit Office’s (SAO) independence and increasing Parliament’s oversight role. The 2025 Annual Audit Report was submitted to Parliament and published in June 2026. The SAO fully implemented 2025 work plan, which included 57 regularity audits, 9 performance audits, 6 compliance audits and 4 IT audits. Although the quality of the SAI’s audit work complies with INTOSAI standards and is widely recognised, administrative capacity remains insufficient with a workforce of only 145 out of 245 systematised posts and no additional recruitments are envisaged for 2026. Parliamentary follow-up of individual audit reports should be further strengthened.
Protection of the EU’s financial interests
The Anti-Fraud Coordination Service (AFCOS) Network is formally established, and the government adopted in July 2026 the Anti-Fraud Strategy 2026-2030 for the Protection of the Financial Interests of the European Union. The National legislation is largely aligned with the PIF Directive. Cooperation with the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) is robust. However, sufficient staffing for AFCOS needs to be ensured as the AFCOS unit currently has only 3 employees.
In 2025, national authorities reported 18 cases of irregularities via the Irregularity Management System, of which one classifies as fraudulent, declining from the previous reporting year by about 50%.
Protecting the euro against counterfeiting
National legislation is partially harmonised with the EU acquis. The system for tackling euro counterfeiting is in place, but the capacities of the central bank and Ministry of Interior must
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be strengthened. The central bank conducts regular training for employees at credit institutions and private cash centres to manually verify the authenticity of circulating.
3. GOOD NEIGHBOURLY RELATIONS AND REGIONAL COOPERATION
North Macedonia maintained its active engagement in a number of regional cooperation initiatives such as the Central European Free Trade Agreement (CEFTA), the Energy Community, the Transport Community, the South-East European Cooperation Process (SEECP) and the Regional Cooperation Council (RCC).
North Macedonia participated both in the sixth annual EU-Western Balkans Summit in Brussels in December 2025 and the EU-Western Balkans Summit in Tivat in Montenegro in June 2026, reaffirming the EU membership perspective of the Western Balkans and explored measures to further advance gradual integration.
North Macedonia has actively engaged in the regional dimension of the Growth Plan for the Western Balkans, participating in both ministerial and leaders’ meetings.
On the Common Regional Market (CRM), the Berlin process summit took place in London in October 2025. At the summit, the leaders of the region: (i) endorsed a revised and streamlined action plan to implement the Green Agenda for the Western Balkans; (ii) adopted a Western Balkans Climate Adaptation Roadmap; and (iii) committed to making progress on the promotion of regional mobility and implementation of relevant regional agreements and CEFTA decisions.
North Macedonia adopted the CRM action plan 2025-2028 and is contributing to its implementation.
North Macedonia signed and ratified the fifth mobility agreement on access to higher education and admission to studies in the Western Balkans; it has therefore ratified five regional mobility agreements.
The work of CEFTA gained impetus from the appointment of a new director and the commitment shown by the parties. Substantial advancements have been made in specific areas, including Green Lanes, recognition of qualified trust services, recognition of advanced electronic signatures and advanced electronic seals, the establishment of the Advisory Body for Customs Cooperation and the adoption of the Risk Management Strategy 2025-2028.
North Macedonia ratified Protocols 5 and 6 establishing a trade facilitation framework for customs cooperation and the liberalisation of trade in services. It also ratified Additional Protocol 7 establishing a regional dispute settlement mechanism.
The roadmap for roaming between the Western Balkans and the EUentered the first phase of implementation. In February 2026, the Commission proposed launching negotiations with Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Montenegro, North Macedonia, and Serbia to integrate them into the EU’s ‘Roam Like at Home’ regime.
Relations with Albania remained good.In February 2026, the Albanian President visited Skopje. Several bilateral agreements are in place, including on cooperation in security, defence, infrastructure, energy, education, science and culture. In April 2026, construction began on a high-voltage power line linking North Macedonia and Albania, enabling cross- border electricity trade. Albania is still critical of the treatment of the ethnic-Albanian minority by the authorities of North Macedonia, especially in view of the use of minority languages as stipulated in the Ohrid Agreement. In October 2026, the Ministers of Culture of Greece, Albania and North Macedonia signed a joint statement on cross-border cooperation for the protection of the Prespa region.
Relations with Bosnia and Herzegovina remain good, with occasional high-level bilateral visits. A number of agreements are in place, including on cooperation in EU integration and economic collaboration.
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Cooperation with Kosovo continues to be constructive. In October 2025, both constitutional courts signed a memorandum of understanding on further cooperation.
Relations with Montenegro remained good, with no pending bilateral issues. In March 2026, the President of Montenegro paid an official visit to Skopje, focusing on strengthening bilateral relations, advancing EU integration and promoting regional cooperation.
Relations with Serbia remain good. In October 2025, the Prime Minister of Serbia visited Skopje, and several meetings were held at ministerial level. October 2025 also saw the signature of a five-year memorandum of cooperation to improve communications between institutions and the private sector and coordinate economic policies, including infrastructure projects. A programme on cooperation in culture (2026-2030) was signed in January 2026.
Relations between Türkiye and North Macedonia remain comprehensive and positive. In June 2026, both countries reaffirmed their close and strategic cooperation and the aim of further deepening economic cooperation, increasing trade exchanges, promoting new investments, and cooperating in infrastructure, energy, tourism, education and defence. North Macedonia and Türkiye have in place a political declaration establishing a high-level cooperation council, aimed at boosting economic and trade cooperation, including updating the existing free trade agreement. In September 2025, the countries signed a cooperation agreement to exchange information and scientific publications in formal and informal education. In December 2025, they signed a protocol on rules of origin of products, followed in February 2026 by an agreement on close cooperation in the railway sector. In March 2026, a memorandum of understanding between the Ministry of Culture and Tourism and TURKSOY was signed. A framework agreement on military cooperation is also in place.
Relations with Ukraine remain good. North Macedonia has provided humanitarian and military assistance and is fully aligned with EU restrictive measures against Russia. The two countries have agreements on trade, the protection of investments, culture, education, tourism, transport and military cooperation.
Relations with Georgia are good. An agreement on culture is in place.
Relations with the Republic of Moldova are good. There are agreements in place on transport, trade, customs, finance, medicine and health, police, foreign affairs and consular matters. There is no visa-free arrangement between the two countries.
During the reporting period, relations with Bulgaria focused on the next steps in North Macedonia’s EU accession negotiations process and on railway Corridor VIII. Tangible results and implementing bilateral agreements in good faith, including the Treaty of Friendship, Good Neighbourliness and Cooperation and its Protocol, remains essential. Significant further efforts are needed to promote an atmosphere of dialogue and mutual respect. The Joint Multidisciplinary Expert Commission on Historical and Educational Issues met four times between September 2025 and March 2026 but without tangible outcomes. Cooperation between the two countries on Corridor VIII resulted in the signature in November 2025 of an agreement on the preparation, construction and operation of the tunnel along the corridor at the border between the two countries. Sustained dialogue between the parties supported at the highest political level remains essential for advancing the project’s implementation
Cooperation with Greece continues, particularly on economic matters, infrastructure and energy connectivity, tourism and culture. Implementing bilateral agreements in good faith, including the Prespa Agreement, remains essential. Members of the government and senior officials on occasions disregard the Agreement, including by not using the country’s constitutional name, which risks affecting good neighbourly relations. In December 2025, the 10th meeting of the Joint Interdisciplinary Committee of Experts (JICE) on Archaeological, Historical and Educational Issues was held via videoconference. The most recent meeting of the Joint Interdisciplinary Committee of Experts on Historical, Archaeological and Educational Issues was held in Athens. In October 2026, the Ministers of Culture of Greece,
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Albania and North Macedonia signed a joint statement on cross-border cooperation for the protection of the Prespa region’s unique and exceptionally valuable cultural and natural environment. The three countries commit to cooperate in support of the inscription of the Prespa region on the UNESCO World Heritage List as Mixed World Heritage Property.
4. RESILIENCE, SECURITY, DEFENCE
North Macedonia has a clear strategic orientation anchored in the EU accession process as a candidate country. It continues to align with the EU’s common foreign and security policy, including restrictive measures, and contributes significantly to EU crisis management operations and missions.
Democratic resilience
Hybrid threats remain a challenge to North Macedonia’s democratic institutions, particularly foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI), including disinformation. North Macedonia has initiated, and to a degree put into operation, strategies for countering cyber and hybrid threats. However, there is no clear legal framework on FIMI.
North Macedonia led global efforts against disinformation, being one of WB6 (and the world’s) first countries to include media literacy in primary and secondary school curricula in 2018/19. Skopje hosted the second (2021) and latest (2025) edition of the EEAS-funded EU- WB Media Literacy conference.
Economic security and resilience
North Macedonia provides opportunities for investment, supporting supply chain resilience. Key vulnerabilities include considerable dependence on energy imports and products such as digital and electronic products, exposure to regional economic conditions and the need for continued reforms and infrastructure development. Energy import dependency exceeds 60%, reflecting limited domestic resources and exposure to external supply risks. The country relies on coal for much of its energy needs but is increasingly diversifying its energy mix and increasing renewable energy capacities. The country has made remarkable strides in renewable energy, with green power now accounting for 58.22% of installed capacity. This shift is largely driven by solar and wind investments.
North Macedonia’s critical mineral resources, including iron, nickel, copper, and zinc, are vital for the region’s industrial and manufacturing sectors. The country also produces lead and other essential minerals that support its growing mining industry.
There is marked progress on the digital transformation. In 2025, several key legislative and infrastructure advancements brought the country closer to EU standards. Main challenges include shortages of specialised skills and data infrastructure needs. The country also strengthened its cybersecurity framework with the adoption of the Security of Network and Information Systems (NIS2)-aligned Act, effective from January 2026.
The protection of critical infrastructure needs to be improved. Institutions with responsibilities in the protection of critical infrastructure need to increase capacity. North Macedonia has not aligned with the EU Directive on the resilience of critical entities.
North Macedonia still needs to align with the Critical Raw Materials Regulation (CRM) and draft and adopt the necessary legislation to integrate with the EU’s CRM value chain.
Defence capacity building and defence industrial dimension
North Macedonia’s military expenditure reached 2% of GDP in 2025. The defence industry is relatively small and focused on supporting national security needs, maintenance, and limited defence production.
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The defence industry in North Macedonia is undergoing a significant transformation under its Army Modernisation Plan 2023-2032. The country is focused on boosting its military capabilities, aligning with NATO standards, and improving operational readiness. Key priorities include the procurement of armoured vehicles, tactical communications, air defence systems, and training infrastructure.
In terms of defence capacity building, the Army of North Macedonia has benefitted from EU support via three bilateral assistance measures under the European Peace Facility, an off- budget instrument. The EU committed a total of EUR 38 million to date, with a view to strengthening operational effectiveness and interoperability, and modernising their military equipment. As one of the framework nations of the Balkans Medical Task Force, North Macedonia also benefits from the 2022 regional EPF assistance measure (EUR 6 million) which has strengthened the medical military capabilities of the Task Force.
The country’s defence sector comprises one main dedicated defence manufacturer (ATS Group) and 44 companies registered as economic operators eligible for NATO-related procurement processes.
Civil protection and disaster resilience
North Macedonia is increasingly integrated into European civil protection and disaster preparedness structures, notably through its participation in the Union Civil Protection Mechanism (UCPM). It nevertheless needs to step up efforts to improve its civil protection and disaster preparedness capacities to strengthen its resilience and ensure it can deal effectively with natural and human-induced crises.
5. ABILITY TO ASSUME THE OBLIGATIONS OF MEMBERSHIP
CLUSTER 2: INTERNAL MARKET
This cluster covers: free movement of goods (Chapter 1); freedom of movement for workers (Chapter 2); right of establishment and freedom to provide services (Chapter 3); free movement of capital (Chapter 4); company law (Chapter 6); intellectual property law (Chapter 7); competition policy (Chapter 8); financial services (Chapter 9) and consumer and health protection (Chapter 28). This cluster is key to North Macedonia’s preparations for the requirements of the EU’s internal market and is very relevant for the development of the Common Regional Market.
Chapter 1 - Free movement of goods
The free movement of goods ensures that many products can be traded freely across the EU based on common rules and procedures. Where products are governed by national rules, the principle of the free movement of goods prevents these rules from creating unjustified barriers to trade.
General principles
The country has a functioning institutional framework for the marketing of industrial products. A new Strategy for free movement of goods and a new 2024-2028 Action plan to eliminate non-tariff barriers to trade and ensure compliance with Articles 34-36 TFEU still needs to be adopted. The capacity of the Ministry responsible for the legal alignment with the EU acquis in this area remains insufficient. The country is not yet aligned with the latest EU acquis on general product safety
Harmonised area: quality infrastructure
The necessary institutional and legal structure for technical regulations, standards, conformity assessment, accreditation, metrology and market surveillance are in place. The National Standardisation Institute has now adopted 25 230 European standards, representing over 99% of CEN/CENELEC standards.
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The Institute for Accreditation ensures the accreditation procedures for testing, calibration and medical laboratories, conformity assessment bodies, and inspection bodies, and
successfully completed its fifth peer evaluation by the European co-operation for Accreditation (EA) to maintain its status as an EA MLA signatory. There are 229 active conformity assessment bodies in the country. A new law on market surveillance designed to align with the latest EU acquis is yet to be adopted. The State Market Inspectorate (SMI) performed 1 933 market surveillance inspections in 2025 to mid-2026, resulting in 12 products being withdrawn from the market. The human resource capacities of the SMI have strengthened, with 20 new employees. However, the SMI’s restructuring and digitalisation remains, as well as its operational independence, remains challenging.
Harmonised area: sectoral legislation
The level of alignment with the EU ‘new and global approach’ product acquis remains low, and no progress was made in this area.
No progress was made on aligning with the latest EU ‘old approach’ product acquis, including on vehicles, on chemicals (including on registration, evaluation, authorisation and restriction of chemicals (REACH); chemical classification, labelling and packaging (CLP), and good laboratory practice (GLP)), on detergents or on firearms. There was no progress in aligning with EU procedural measures. The national legislation on returning cultural goods remains partly aligned with the relevant EU acquis.
The recommendations from the national Strategy for the Prevention of Corruption related to market surveillance and product safety have not yet been addressed.
Chapter 2 - Freedom of movement for workers
Nationals of one Member State have the right to work in another Member State and must be given the same working and social conditions as other worker nationals of that Member State.
On access to the labour market, there were no legislative developments in the reporting period. The Law on employment of foreigners does not distinguish between EU citizens and other foreigners. The quota of work permits is set annually (10 000 permits for 2026), and family reunification is allowed.
Except for a short list of positions in healthcare and higher education, EU citizens cannot access public administration posts. Furthermore, some posts in private companies are also exclusively for citizens of North Macedonia. The Law on seasonal workers came into force as on 1 January 2026. The access of EU citizens to this market is allowed but the conditions are yet to be specified within its implementing legislation. In 2025, North Macedonia issued 8119 work permits for foreign workers.
There were no developments on preparations for the European Employment Services (EURES) in the reporting period.
A declaration on coordination and mobility of social security in the Western Balkans was adopted in October 2025. The countries expressed their commitment to strategic activities in coordination of social security systems, transferability of rights and recognition of insurance. The bilateral agreement between Italy and North Macedonia on social insurance, signed in 2014, came into force in December 2025. In June 2026, an Agreement on the regular exchange of Information was signed between the Pension and Disability Insurance Fund of the Republic of North Macedonia and the Austrian pension insurance authority.
There have been no developments on the European Health Insurance Card (EHIC). Nine EU Member States continue to have access to medical servicesin public and some private healthcare institutions in North Macedonia.
The Employment Agency applies the Code of Civil Servants but has not yet adopted an integrity policy to strengthen the efforts to fight corruption.
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Chapter 3 - Right of establishment and freedom to provide services
EU natural and legal persons have the right to establish themselves in any Member State and to provide cross-border services. For certain regulated professions, there are rules on mutual recognition of qualifications. EU rules on postal services focus on improving the quality of universal service, gradually opening the market to competition, and the establishment of an independent regulator.
On the right of establishment and freedom to provide cross-border services, there has been no progress to align legislation with the EU Services Directive. The number of electronic services for citizens and businesses available on the e-services portal reached 336 and 1316 institutions. To serve as ‘Single point of contact’ for services, the portal needs to be further improved to increase the number of e-services and the information available.
In the area of postal services, the national legislation is partially aligned with EU postal acquis. The full postal market opening to competition was postponed until the country’s accession to the EU. There is one universal state-owned service provider and 28 active private postal operators. A plan for restructuring of the state-owned company ‘Post Office’ was drafted but not yet adopted. The Postal Agency is the independent regulatory authority ensuring compliance with the Law on postal services and has sufficient institutional and financial capacity to monitor and enforce the new postal market rules.
On the mutual recognition of professional qualifications, the Ministry of Education and Science fully digitalised the procedure for nostrification of foreign educational diplomas. Since the ratification of the Agreement on the Recognition of Higher Education Qualifications in the Western Balkans and the Agreement on the Recognition of Professional Qualifications of Doctors of Medicine, Doctors of Dental Medicine and Architects, North Macedonia applies direct recognition of university degrees acquired in Serbia, Albania, Kosovo, Montenegro and Bosnia and Herzegovina. However, the country needs to intensify efforts to fully align with the Directive on the recognition of professional qualifications, especially with the minimum training requirements for professions benefiting from automatic recognition, and to set up a transparent electronic register of all regulated professions. The institutional capacity of the Ministry of Education and Science’s unit dealing with the mutual recognition of professional qualifications remains insufficient.
Chapter 4 - Free movement of capital
In the EU, capital and investments must be able to move without restriction, with common rules for cross-border payments. Banks and other economic operators apply certain rules to support the fight against money laundering and terrorist financing.
North Macedonia has achieved partial progress regarding capital movements. Nevertheless, as the National Land Consolidation Strategy 2025-2035 fails to provide for the liberalisation of foreign acquisition rights, the broader capital account liberalisation agenda remains stagnant, leaving the European Commission’s concerns on residents’ accounts abroad and the restriction of foreign acquisition of agricultural land unaddressed.
Concerning payments, North Macedonia became operationally ready for participation in the geographical scope of the SEPA schemes in October 2025, following the European Payments Council’s (EPC) confirmation that the domestic legal and operational framework met the requirements for participation in the SEPA schemes. Further progress was made in the field of instant payments in July 2026, as the National Bank signed the agreement with the EPC on the use of the SEPA Instant Credit Transfer Scheme, establishing the prerequisites for aligning the national instant payment solution with European standards. Nevertheless, North Macedonia is yet to align with more recent EU payment services acquis developments, including the revised Payment Services Regulation/Payment Services Directive 3 (PSR/PSD3) package and full technical alignment of all PSD2 provisions beyond those required for adherence to the EPC scheme.
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Limited progress has been achieved regarding alignment with the EU acquis on the fight against money laundering and terrorist financing (AML/CFT). In July 2026, a multidisciplinary working group was established to align national legislation with the new EU AML/CTF package, in particular Directive (EU) 2024/1640 and Regulation (EU) 2024/1624. Prepared under coordination by the Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU), the National Strategy for Combating Money Laundering and Financing of Terrorism was adopted in March 2026.
On anti-corruption measures, the Law on the prevention of money laundering and financing of terrorism is aligned with the acquis and FATF recommendations are being effectively implemented, although further alignment with the new EU Anti-Money Laundering package is needed. The new National Strategy for Combating Money Laundering and Financing of Terrorism 2026-2029 was adopted in March 2026.
Chapter 6 - Company law
The EU has common rules on the formation, registration and disclosure requirements of a company, with complementary rules for accounting and financial reporting, and statutory audit.
On company law and corporate governance, alignment with the Directive on company law is well advanced on the formation, registration and domestic mergers and divisions of companies. The Central Registry provides a solid and available one-stop shop system where company registration and filing of documents, – including financial documents, – can be carried out fully online. The Agency for Real Estate Cadastre provides a fully digital database easily accessible for users.
A new Law on Public Enterprises and Trade Companies in State Ownership or with the Participation of the Republic of North Macedonia, which regulates the legal framework for more efficient, transparent and accountable management of state-owned enterprises was adopted. This law sets professional criteria are set for members of the supervisory and management bodies, including higher education, and also provides controls of operations and management for internal audits.
The 2021 Corporate Governance Code is mandatory only for listed companies that meet certain criteria. Further alignment with the EU acquis is necessary on cross-border operations (mergers, divisions and conversions), on the use of digital tools and processes in company law, on takeover bids, as well as with the rules on encouraging long-term shareholder engagement (SRD II Directive). North Macedonia should also complete alignment with the Directive 2024/1760 on corporate sustainability due diligence (CSDDD), as amended by the Directive (EU) 2026/470 (Omnibus I). The amendments simplified some of the obligations and postponed the transposition deadline to July 2028 and the application deadline to July 2029.
On company reporting and statutory audit, there was no progress in adopting the long- standing draft law on accounting, aimed at further alignment with the EU acquis, or in adopting the amendments to the Law on audit. Further alignment is also needed on transparency requirements for listed companies and statutory audit. Further alignment with the Corporate Sustainability Reporting Directive is needed.Currently, there is no body with ultimate responsibility for statutory audit oversight, as required by the EU Audit Directive.
Chapter 7 - Intellectual property law
The EU has, to a large extent, harmonised rules for the legal protection and enforcement of copyright and related rights, as well as of industrial property rights, including trademarks, designs, patents and related supplementary protection certificates (SPCs), and geographical indications (GIs), including craft and industrial GIs.
On copyright and related rights, the new law on copyright aimed at aligning with the EU acquis on collective rights management, orphan works and the implementation of the Marrakesh Treaty still needs to be adopted. As regards the Directive on copyright and
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related rights applicable to certain online transmissions of broadcasting organisations and retransmissions of television and radio programmes (SatCab II Directive) and the Copyright in the Digital Single Market Directive (DSM), national legislation is not aligned with the EU acquis. However, partial alignment was achieved through amendments to the law by incorporating the provisions on “journalistic work”, thus aligning with Article 15 of the DSM Directive. The full alignment with Directives remains to be done. The relevant intellectual property rights unit in the Ministry of Culture is left without functional staff and its operations are frozen.
On intellectual property rights, North Macedonia needs to further align its legislation with the EU acquis, in particular in the area of patents and trade secrets. Alignment with the Directive on IPR enforcement is still pending. The State Office for Industrial Property (SOIP) fully digitalised its database for patents and trademarks. SOIP continued cooperating with the EU and international bodies, in particular with the European Union Intellectual Property Office.
In 2025, the Customs Administration in cooperation with the State Market Inspectorate identified and seized more than 145 000 goods suspected of infringing intellectual property rights across 84 cases, involving 34 different trademarks. Most of the counterfeit goods originated from Türkiye, China and the Middle East.
Chapter 8 - Competition policy
EU rules protect free competition. They include antitrust rules against restrictive agreements between companies and the abuse of a dominant position and also include rules on concentrations between companies which would significantly impede effective competition. EU rules also set out a system of State aid control. Governments are only allowed to grant State aid if restrictive conditions are met, with a view to preventing distortion of competition.
The legislative framework on antitrust and mergers is broadly aligned with the EU acquis, although parts of implementing legislation remain to be aligned.
On the institutional framework on antitrust and mergers, some progress was noted with the employment of new case handlers in the Commission for Protection of Competition (CPC). However, more efforts are needed for strengthening its enforcement and technical capacity.
On antitrust and mergers implementation, the number of merger decisions adopted in the reporting period (123) was close to the average recorded in previous years. The number of ex officio and on-site interventions remains low. The leniency instrument to improve enforcement was not used in the reporting period.
The legislative framework on State aid broadly reflects Articles 107 and 108 TFEU. The Law on State aid and its implementing legislation need to be further aligned with the EU acquis. The State aid inventory still lacks transparency.
On the institutional framework on State aid, the CPC is also responsible for implementing the Law on State aid. The CPC has launched training for judges on State aid. The CPC issues non-binding opinions and binding decisions on State aid.
On State aid implementation, the CPC issued 22 decisions and 37 opinions on State aid in the reporting period.
On liberalisation, antitrust and State aid rules also apply to state-owned undertakings and undertakings entrusted with special or exclusive rights, except when application would obstruct the performance of particular tasks assigned to them. There is no evidence of the existence of commercial monopolies within the meaning of Article 37 TFEU.
Chapter 9 - Financial services
EU rules aim at ensuring fair competition among financial institutions, and the stability and integrity of financial markets, namely in the fields of banking, insurance, supplementary
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pensions, investment services and securities. They include rules on authorisation, operation and supervision of these institutions.
There were no developments on banking and financial conglomerates, and the country needs to work further to align with the latest versions of the Capital Requirements Regulation and the Capital Requirements Directive. The Banking Law and the Deposit Insurance Law need to harmonise them with the Bank Resolution Law, which started to be implemented in June 2026. The legal and institutional set-up for establishing the financial Ombudsperson is not yet finalised.
Some progress is noted on insurance and occupational pensions, especially in tackling uninsured driving. The new safe traffic system increased the number of insured vehicles by 15.82% in August 2026. The legislation allowing the Ministry of Finance to set premiums for motor vehicle insurance is still in place, as is the maximum 50% limit on investments in non- domestic securities by pension funds, both of which remain contrary to the EU acquis. National legislation is still not aligned with the Solvency II Directive.
There were no developments as regards financial market infrastructure. Further work is needed to align with the EU Directive on financial collateral, the Regulation on Securities Financing Transactions, the Central Securities Depositories (CSDR) Regulation and the Regulation on over-the-counter derivatives, central counterparties and trade repositories.
On securities markets and investment services, implementation of the Laws on Prospectus and Transparency of Securities Issuers and on Financial Instruments was postponed to October 2026. The country needs to further align with the EU acquis, including amendments regarding undertakings for collective investment in transferable securities and alternative investment fund managers under the ECITS Directive and AIFMD respectively.
On sustainable and digital finance, the central bank continued its activities related to supervisory monitoring primarily of climate-related risks. Efforts are needed to align with the EU acquis on sustainable and digital finance.
Chapter 28 - Consumer and health protection
EU rules protect consumers’ economic interests and also ensure product safety, prevent dangerous imitations and establish liability for defective products. The EU also guarantees a high level of protection of public health and, in particular, also ensures high common standards for tobacco control, blood, tissues, cells and organs, and medicines for human and veterinary use. The EU also has rules for upholding patients’ rights in cross-border healthcare and in preparing for and responding to cross-border health threats.
Consumer protection
While the country’s Law on consumer protection was broadly aligned with most of the EU consumer acquis and clearly set out the responsibilities of physical and legal commercial bodies towards consumers, the EU acquis in this area has evolved, including by the adoption of the EU acquis on the sale of goods, on digital content, and the right to repair, so these also require alignment. National legislation is also still not aligned with the EU acquis on package travel. The consumer protection strategy (2025-2028) is still not adopted. A web platform providing information on consumer protection has not been developed. The national Law on mediation provides mediation process in consumer disputes, however access to the process remains difficult and complicated for consumers.
On general product safety there is ahigh level of alignment with the EU acquis, apart from some definitions. National legislation remains partly aligned with the legal requirements on the EU rapid alert system for dangerous non-food products (Safety Gate).
The State Market Inspectorate (SMI) faced increased workload as a result of government decisions. In the reporting period, the SMI executed a total of 4 340 inspections based on
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the Law on consumer protection and issued a total of 170 decisions based on identified violations. A total of 12 products were withdrawn from the market due to safety issues.
On non-safety related issues, further efforts are needed to develop guidance and procedures on consumer appeals and on compensation.
Public health
Theslight increase in financing of public healthcare in North Macedonia continued in 2025 but remains far below the EU average. Universal health coverage is offered free of charge through primary healthcare, but patients have to pay for some hospital care, specialist outpatient visits and medicines. The scope of health services and their availability, in particular of specialist medical services, and their geographical distribution is inadequate. The ratio of nurses per 100 000 inhabitants still stands below the EU average. Medical staff continue to leave the public health sector to work in the private sector or abroad. The healthcare system is heavily reliant on private funding through out-of-pocket payments (up to 42%) and voluntary insurance. This represents a barrier to equal access to healthcare.
The national e-health system collects data only from the public healthcare, with missing data from private health facilities to complete patients’ files. The e-health application is functional, though improvements in the appointment system are needed.
On tobacco control,North Macedonia should adopt a new law to further align with the EU acquis on Tobacco Products. Its implementation and enforcement will remain a challenge, as smoking continued to be tolerated and unsanctioned in closed areas, including public offices, some medical facilities and restaurants.
North Macedonia needs to update its legislation to align with the acquis on communicable diseases.As regards serious cross-border threats to health, since 2016the country reports gonorrhoea, hepatitis A, West Nile fever, influenza, SARI, COVID-19 (epidemiological and laboratory data, immunization), and HIV/AIDS in ECDC's TESSy system, and has a system for early detection of epidemics. Large-scale use of antibiotics affects antimicrobial resistance (AMR). The National Action Plan on Antimicrobial Resistance (AMR) for the period 2026–2028 is yet to be adopted.There was no progress on blood, cells and tissues, and organs. North Macedonia is not aligned with the EU acquis on patients’ rights in cross-border healthcare.
There were no developments on medicines for human use, veterinary medical products, health technology assessment, cosmeticsandmedical devices.Limitations in budget and medical staff have an adverse effect on the policies related to mental health of children and adolescents. There are ongoing cancerscreening campaigns on colorectal and breast cancer, though HPV testing has still not been introduced for cervical cancer screening. More public awareness and the inclusion of larger part of the respective population groups in the screening process is also needed. The number of registered cancer cases and the mortality rate caused by cancer continued to grow in 2025. The country implements annual programmes for the prevention of cardiovascular diseases (most recently in 2025), which includes early detection based on risk factors, implementation of preventive examinations in primary healthcare, health education and promotion of healthy lifestyles, and improvement of diagnostics and treatment.
The reports on drug abuse prevention and alcohol related harm reduction indicate medium levels of abuse. Alignment with the EU acquis on healthy environments remains incomplete.
The efforts to fight health inequalities, in particular for Roma, and for people living in poverty and those living in remote areas, continued with donor support and limited impact. There has been gradual progress on the integration of gender perspectives in the health sector but the absence of comprehensive gender-disaggregated data continues to constrain evidence-based policymaking. Access to healthcare services is uneven, particularly for
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women in rural and marginalised communities, and women continue to report being unlawful charged by primary gynaecologists for services that should be free of charge under the national Health Insurance Fund Preventive health programmes, such as screenings for cervical and breast cancer, are available but not uniformly accessed. North Macedonia is encouraged to use the new EU guidelines on improving access to healthcare for people with disabilities.
More efforts are needed on prevention of corruption with improved procurement and planning of health-related expenses, strengthened integrity, asset declarations, and digitalisation.
CLUSTER 3: COMPETITIVENESS AND INCLUSIVE GROWTH
Chapter 10 - Digital transformation and media
The EU supports the smooth functioning of the internal market for electronic communications, electronic commerce and audio-visual services. The rules protect consumers and support the universal availability of modern services.
On digital services, North Macedonia is partially aligned with the EU acquis. In line with the long-term ICT Strategy and its Action Plan, the Ministry of Digital Transformation advanced interoperability by expanding institutional participation in data exchange systems and integrating Single Sign-On across service providers to streamline access to digital public services. The national e-services portal was upgraded with new services for citizens and businesses. By the end of June 2026, 44 institutions were using the new electronic archiving and document management system. North Macedonia should continue aligning with the European Interoperability Framework, and the Interoperable Europe Act. Furthermore, North Macedonia needs to strengthen the regulation of online platforms, improve consumer protection, ensure fair competition, and foster a safer and more transparent digital environment, in line with the Digital Services Act (DSA) and the Digital Markets Act (DMA). North Macedonia needs to take steps to build the societal and institutional capacity and to establish the legal basis to effectively support the enforcement of the DSA and the DMA as of EU accession, in line with the considerations and requirements outlined at the 2026 TAIEX workshops. Further efforts are needed to ensure compliance with accessibility standards and barrier-free to digital public services.
In relation to the protection of minors online, a Safer Internet Centre was established in North Macedonia with co-funding received under the Digital Europe Programme.
On electronic communications, the Law on electronic communications was amended in December 2025 and June 2026 to align with the European Electronic Communication Code and the Gigabit Infrastructure Act. North Macedonia has taken steps to align its legislation with the EU roaming acquis. It seeks to align its regulatory framework with the EU Roam Like at Home (RLAH) framework, as a step towards possible participation in the EU RLAH area and accelerated integration into the EU digital market. The 2019-2029 National Broadband Operational Plan remains valid and sets targets for 5G, broadband coverage and take-up of high-speed internet. According to the Broadband Competence Office fixed fast broadband coverage reached 75% in 2025. The public broadcasting enterprise needs to significantly strengthen its institutional capacity to fulfil its responsibilities in developing optical infrastructure for network aggregation, connecting public institutions and free Wi-Fi locations to the national network, and ensuring broadband access in areas with limited commercial investment. The Agency for Electronic Communications should further increase its institutional independence. The 112 European emergency number services should be further expanded. The country is a member of the European Emergency Number Association, maintaining active coordination.
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On digital trust and cybersecurity, the legal and strategic cybersecurity framework contributed to alignment with the NIS2 Directives. The Ministry of Digital Transformation established MKD-GOV-CSIRT, a Computer Incident Response Team for the executive authorities, investing in a cyber incident response platform and strengthening staff capacities to improve technical expertise and operational readiness. However, further strengthening of state institutions’ infrastructure and increase cybersecurity expertise is needed. The national Computer Incident Response Centre still needs a substantial increase in its staffing and operational capacities. The mobile 5G network continued to expand. In January 2026, a new telecom operator was awarded a licence to become North Macedonia’s third mobile network operator. North Macedonia should continue implementing the EU 5G Cybersecurity Toolbox, including by assessing suppliers’ risk profiles and applying appropriate restrictions or exclusions for high-risk suppliers. Preparations for the digital identity wallet are ongoing. In January 2026, North Macedonia applied for inclusion in the EU third countries’ EU List of qualified trust service providers. Further efforts are needed to increase the use of the existing e-identification and e-signature tools by making them more user-friendly and free of charge for the public. North Macedonia should also align with the European Digital Identity Framework (eIDAS 2.0) and create digital wallet for citizens following the EUDIW model. Separately, further efforts are needed to align with the ePrivacy Directive.
On media, a strategy for development of the media sector and its action plan still needs to be adopted. The media regulator published several reports and analyses including on local elections, media ownership, the media market, the structure of employees in broadcasting industry, and support measures for regional and local broadcasters. The regulator needs to strengthen its capacities to effectively carry out its mandate, particularly in overseeing and registering video-sharing platform providers. Efforts to modernise the public service broadcaster and improve professional standards are ongoing. However, limited administrative autonomy and irregular financing continue to affect its effective functioning.
On artificial intelligence, North Macedonia should develop AI regulation, the necessary governance and enforcement structures in line with the EU AI Act. Initial work on alignment with the EU framework has started, including preparatory steps to identify the necessary governance and enforcement structures. The country established a national AI Factory Antenna connected to the European network of AI Factories.
Chapter 16 - Taxation
EU rules on taxation cover value added tax, excise duties and aspects of corporate taxation. They also deal with cooperation between tax administrations, including the exchange of information to prevent tax evasion.
On indirect taxation, the Law on VAT was amended abolishing the threshold of EUR 22 for imports of small parcels free of VAT, effectively introducing a rate of 18% on all imports. Government took several decisions temporarily reducing the VAT rate on fuels from 18% to 10%, as part of the anti-crisis measures to suppress the effects of the fuel crisis. The latest measure expires at the end of September 2026. The excise on diesel and unleaded fuels was reduced, with an effect in the period April - July 2026. Delays in the VAT refund process remain quite prominent, as only 14.3% of the refund was paid within the legal deadline. The Public Revenue Office (PRO) launched an e-invoice pilot phase, enabling all non-cash transactions to be registered in real time.
As regards direct taxation, a new Law on minimum global corporate profit tax is in force since 1 January 2026, introducing a profit tax rate of 15% for domestic companies which are subsidiaries of multinational companies, thus bringing it into line with OECD global minimum tax (GMT) and Directive (EU) 2022/2523. The country still needs to align its legislation with the Merger Directive.
On administrative cooperation and mutual assistance, North Macedonia has signed 49 double taxation agreements, including with 23 EU Member States except Cyprus, Malta,
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Portugal and Greece. The country has not yet committed to a date to start the automatic exchange of financial account information as per the OECD standard, although technical cooperation and exchange of information is ongoing. The country continued to implement the Inclusive Framework on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) minimum standards.
On operational capacity and digitalisation, the Public Revenue Office (PRO) improved its strategic planning, but still needs to improve its business processes, develop compliance risk management and further expand e-services. As regards administrative capacity, 55 employees were hired in 2026 on temporary contracts. However, additional recruitments are necessary in view of the Office’s expanding tasks. The PRO still operates with a fragmented IT system. Progress with procurement of a new integrated e-PRO tax system remains slow.
Chapter 17 - Economic and monetary policy
EU rules require the independence of central banks and prohibit them from directly financing the public sector. EU Member States coordinate their economic policies and are subject to fiscal, economic and financial surveillance.
On monetary policy, North Macedonia is partially aligned with the EU acquis. North Macedonia has a high level of alignment with the EU acquis on the prohibition of monetary financing of the public sector and the prohibition of privileged access of the public sector to financial institutions. The legislation is partly aligned with the EU acquis on central bank independence. As for the NBRNM’s financial independence, the January 2025 amendment to the Law on the national bank concerning profit retention by the government has not been reversed. The National Bank has improved its operational monetary framework to improve liquidity management and the transmission of monetary policy signals. The reserve requirement framework was adjusted to support banks’ access to longer-term external funding amid heightened uncertainty.
Concerning economic policy, North Macedonia is partially aligned with the EU acquis on medium-term budgetary frameworks, budgetary forecasts, statistics, numerical fiscal rules, and the transparency of general government finances. The new Organic Budget Law and the related fiscal rules remain postponed until 2028, while weaknesses persist in fiscal forecasting, fiscal data coverage and ESA 2010 compliance, including the continued exclusion from fiscal documentation of some state-owned enterprises classified within general government sector under ESA 2010. The Fiscal Council continued its work and issued opinions on the Fiscal Strategy 2027-2031 and the Revised Budget 2026, but challenges remain regarding its full independence and operationally effectiveness and the Integrated Financial Management Information System is not yet in place. The authorities adopted the Fiscal Strategy 2027-2031 and a revised 2026 budget. A public debt management strategy for 2027-2029, with projections for 2031, was also adopted, improved transparency.
The Economic Reform Programme (ERP) for 2026-2028 submitted to the European Commission outlines North Macedonia’s medium-term macroeconomic and fiscal framework. According to the Commission’s assessment, implementation of the policy recommendations set out in the conclusions of the Economic and Financial Dialogue of May 2025 was limited and the country’s implementation score has deteriorated steadily in the last two years. Key challenges continue to concern credible fiscal consolidation, stronger revenue planning and collection, better public investment management, and structural reforms linked to labour market mismatches, informality, digitalisation, innovation and the green transition. Regarding acquis-related developments, a major step forward was the entry into force of the Bank Resolution Law in June 2026, aligning with the EU Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive framework, and the adoption in July 2026 of a new methodology for managing interest rate risk in the banking book, further aligning banking regulation with EU standards.
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Chapter 19 - Social policy and employment
EU rules in the social field include minimum requirements for labour law, equality, and non- discrimination, health and safety at work. They also promote social inclusion and social protection, and social dialogue at EU level.
On labour law legislation, the implementation of the Law on the Engagement of Persons for Work started on 1 January 2026. The Ministry of Economy and Labour rolled out the Law as a national reform, introducing an electronic registration system, procedures, monitoring mechanisms, and support services to facilitate lawful and inclusive work engagement. In July 2026, the Law Amending the Law on the Engagement of Persons for Work was adopted, which improves the conditions for work engagement by providing greater flexibility in the engagement of seasonal and occasional workers, responding to labour market needs, and supporting efforts to reduce informal employment.
On health and safety at work, the adoption of a new Law on occupational safety and health, the strategy 2026-2030 and action plan 2026-2027 for safety and health at work remain pending, as does the new law on harassment at work. In 2025, 10 748 inspections in the field of occupational safety and health were carried out. Around 30% of these inspections led to decisions of deficiencies and irregularities in the field of labour relations and another 30% led to decisions in the field of occupational safety and health.
The capacities of the State Labour Inspectorate to tackle issues pertaining to occupational safety and health and establish a system to monitor work-related injuries and deaths remain low.
On social dialogue, collective agreements in the private sector remained limited. North Macedonia should strengthen social dialogue with particular attention to bipartite social dialogue in the private sector. In February 2026, the government and the representative trade unions in the public sector reached an agreement to increase public sector wages through the signing of employer level collective agreements. North Macedonia needs to strengthen the capacities of social partners.
On employment policy, the Employment Service Agency still lacks capacity for improved delivery of active labour market measures and the Youth Guarantee. Nevertheless, North Macedonia’s unemployment rate declined from 12.4% in 2024 to 11.5% in 2025. In January 2026, social and child protection benefits were increased by 4.1% in line with the cost of living, covering guaranteed minimum assistance and other key social support schemes. In 2025, the Youth Guarantee included a total of 23 314 young unemployed individuals, of whom 11 470 were women. A total of 6 856 young individuals were employed, while 1 490 participated in active employment measures to increase employability. The Youth Guarantee supported 1 410 Roma individuals.
In 2025, the Employment Service Agency provided: job search assistance services to 19 725 unemployed persons, of which 10 410 (52%) were women and 5 432 (28%) were under 29 years old; motivational training to 89 unemployed persons; preparation for employment and career counselling to 624 unemployed persons; activated 1 710 unemployed Roma and other persons at risk of social exclusion; and employment services to 5 082 unemployed Roma.
On labour force participation and the unemployment rate (see the statistical annex and the section on the functioning of the labour market under 2.3 Economic criteria).
On social protection and inclusion, several laws were amended by Parliament, including the Law on social security for the elderly, the Law on employment of persons with disabilities, the Law on social protection, the Law on the Registry for Mandatory Social Insurance, the Law on the system of assessment of persons with disabilities and the Law on Contributions from Mandatory Social Insurance.
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There was no adjustment of pensions according to the formula prescribed in the Law on pensions and disability. In line with the amendments to the Law on pensions and disability insurance, all pensioners who acquired their right until 28 February 2026, received a fixed
increase of their pension of 1 000 denars, starting from 1 March 2026. As of July 2026, the minimum pension amounts to 20 228 MKD, while the average pension stands at 28 064 MKD.
Parliament adopted amendments to the Rulebook on guaranteed minimum assistance discontinuing the consideration of compensation received from work engagement as
income, allowing beneficiaries of guaranteed minimum assistance to continue receiving social assistance even when at work.
As of end of August 2026, 31 187 households were receiving guaranteed minimum assistance (GMA). To address energy poverty, households receiving GMA and social security beneficiaries also receive an energy allowance. The number of recipients of this allowance increased over the years and reached 44 771 in the reporting period. The decentralisation of social assistance is still moderate. Progress continued on the implementation of the 2018-2027 National Deinstitutionalisation Strategy. As of August 2026, a total of 189 licensed social service providers have been registered in accordance with the Law on Social Protection. Further actions should take into account the Commission Guidance on independent living and inclusion.
On the European Child Guarantee, a High-Level National Committee was established, which provides strategic leadership and cross-sectoral coordination. A national coordinator was appointed and a Technical Working Group established.
With regard to non-discrimination in employment and social policy, relevant national legislation is still not aligned with the EU acquis, including the Employment Equality Directive and the Racial Equality Directive. The Law on labour relations is still not harmonised with the Law on prevention and protection against discrimination. In 2025, most of the discrimination cases reported to the Ombudsperson’s Office and the Commission on Prevention and Protection against Discrimination concerned labour and employment relations.
On equality between women and men in employment and social policy, gender disparities in the labour market remain a structural challenge. Women’s activity rate in 2025 was 56.3%, compared with 76.8% for men. This gap is driven by unpaid care work, limited childcare, and occupational segregation, with women concentrated in informal and low-paid sectors such as agriculture, textiles and retail. North Macedonia still needs to align with EU gender-equality legislation concerning work-life balance, pay transparency and women on company boards.
The gender pay gap narrowed to 12.3% (from 14.5% in 2024) following enforcement of pay transparency laws for companies with more than 50 employees and EUR 2 million in subsidies disbursed for women-led SMEs. Despite women outnumbering men in tertiary education, these gains are not translated into labour market outcomes, reflecting a persistent education-to-employment gap. While digitalisation in public services has improved access for some women, benefits remain uneven due to digital divides and barriers in social protection, particularly for rural and older women. Women in rural and informal employment
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54.7%
76.2%
55.7%
76.8%
56.3%
11.4% 14.4% 13.4% 11.2% 12.4% 10.7%
0.0%
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Men Women Men Women Men Women
2023 2024 2025
Graph 26: North Macedonia - Economic activity rate by
sex
Economic activity rate of the population aged 15-64 (%)
Unemployment rate of the population aged 15-64 (%), totalSource: ECFIN
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also continue to face limited access to social protection, including unemployment benefits and pensions, while social services are not consistently designed with gender-sensitive approaches.
Chapter 20 - Enterprise and industrial policy
EU industrial policy strengthens competitiveness, facilitates structural change and encourages a business-friendly environment that stimulates small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs).
Enterprise and industrial policy principles continue to be scattered in several strategic documents under the competencies of different national authorities. The new Strategy for SMEs 2025-2030 was adopted and its Action Plan is under implementation.
The overlap in policy measures for financial and non-financial aid to companies managed by different ministries or public bodies persist. Measures are still not assessed against their relevance, the risk to distort market competition, or their effectiveness and impact on overall economic growth. Evidence-based planning and impact assessment seem to be mostly absent and evaluation of the impact from strategies remains limited, despite regular monitoring of policy implementation through input indicators.
The consolidation of the administrative structures in this area was partially fulfilled: only the Agency for Entrepreneurship and the Fund for Technological Development were merged. The Ministry of Economy and Labour took on implementation of measures from the Growth Plan and increased the number of employees for this purpose.
The mandates of the Agency for Entrepreneurship and the Fund for Technological Development were merged and transferred to the newly established Agency for Innovation, Scientific and Technological Development and Entrepreneurship (INOVA). INOVA is envisaged to become the main central public body for implementation of all national policies for private-sector development. A four-year strategy (2026-2029) and a 2026 work plan for INOVA were adopted. While significant budget is allocated for its operation, INOVA needs to establish internal operating procedures and strengthen its human resources.
The EUR 250 million credit line – subordinated loan from Hungary – for private companies with a fixed interest rate of 1.9% has been fully disbursed. The difference with the market interest rate was subsidised by the state budget, which amounted to around EUR 3.8 million. The policy objective remains unclear, as subsidised loans did not target specific industry.
The dialogue with the chambers of commerce and other business associations continues to not be systemic, inclusive nor regular. Besides media communication, the online platform ENER remains the main tool for systematic communication with businesses on legal acts and strategies. The practice to adopt measures, laws and implementing legal acts without previous notification and sufficient adjustment period for companies continued in the reporting period, including using expedited procedures in Parliament. The country needs to set up a regular, inclusive and systematic mechanism for dialogue that is more responsive to business needs. The Strategy for State-owned companies and new Law on Public Enterprises and Trade Companies in State Ownership or with the participation of the Republic of North Macedonia were adopted. They provide policy vision for improvement of operation of these companies as well as the necessary legal framework for universal, efficient, transparent and accountable management.
In its Audit report for the work of the Ministry of Economy for 2025, the State Audit Office (SAO) identified deficiencies that led to loss in revenues in the state budget, irretrievable loss of electronic data, disrespect of deadlines by civil servants, lack of legally binding reports, etc.
In the area of informal economy, the number of inspections for unregistered workers and businesses increased above 20% compared with 2024. The actual impact of the Law on employment on temporary and occasional activities in the informal economy remains to
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show practical results. The progress in simplification and digitalisation of administrative procedures to reduce the burden of companies and tackle informality, especially the business registration and work permits, is progressing as the Government adopted the plan for simplification of 50 administrative procedures and initiated the reduction of 9 parafiscal charges.
Companies continue to report difficulties to recruit qualified workers due to significant emigration and a persisting mismatch between skills demand and supply (See Chapter 19 – Social policy and employment) VAT refunds continued to be delayed significantly, negatively affecting the liquidity of SMEs (See chapter 16 – Taxation).
On enterprise policy and instruments, North Macedonia continues to participate in the SME Pillar of the Single Market Programme and is part of the Enterprise Europe Network.
The Late Payment Directive is transposed in the Law on financial discipline, including a number of amendments for proper harmonisation up to September 2026. Its deadline for settling monetary liabilities for public and private entities is set at 30 days, except for entities in the healthcare sector, where a rule of 60 days applies. An evaluation of its effectiveness is advised.
In 2025, an additional 196 companies benefited from the Law on financial support of investments. As of 2026, the administrative procedure for processing the applications was transferred to the Ministry of Economy and Labour. A lack of objective and transparent award practices distorts the projected effect of the granted State aid. The measures set forth pursuant to the referenced law are subject of compatibility assessment with EU acquis for State aid. The Law on the termination of the Law on out-of-court settlement was adopted in January 2026, leaving a legislative gap in the area of voluntary bankruptcy and liquidation of companies. In terms of sectoral policies, North Macedonia still needs to draft and adopt the necessary legislations to integrate with the EU’s CRM value chain. A Strategy for Geological Research and Sustainable Use and Exploitation of Mineral Resources 2025-2045 underwent public consultation. The Agency for Tourism Support was dissolved and its responsibilities were transferred to the Ministry of Culture and Tourism.
Chapter 25 - Science and research
The EU provides significant support to research and innovation. All Member States can participate in the EU’s research and innovation programmes and benefit from them, especially where there is scientific excellence and a solid investment in research and innovation.
The budget allocation for science and research for 2026 remained unchanged from 2025, totalling approximately EUR 11 million.
The implementation of the Smart Specialisation Strategy (S3) Action Plan 2024-2025 marked a transition from planning to delivery. By the end of 2025, 83.7% of the planned activities had been completed, with most measures implemented in line with the planned timeline. In September 2025, the Joint Research Centre’s evaluation report confirmed that the S3 process was implemented in line with EU methodology, at the same time highlighting the need for further improvement particularly in governance, financial sustainability, private- sector engagement, and monitoring and evaluation systems. In June 2026 the Government adopted the Action Plan 2026–2027, comprising 21 measures and 33 activities covering governance, the Entrepreneurial Discovery Process (EDP), monitoring and evaluation, the innovation ecosystem, the green and digital transition, human capital and skills. Cooperation with the Joint Research Centre (JRC) continued in the areas of S3 governance, EDP and monitoring, as well as preparations for national science, technology and innovation infrastructure and a Science and Technology Parc.
Aiming to increase the integration of North Macedonia into the European Research Area, the Law on Scientific Research Activity was drafted but not yet adopted.
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The European Institute of Innovation and Technology (EIT) Community RIS Hub signed three memoranda of understanding with the Economic Chamber of North Macedonia, held promotional events and supported four start-up applications. A co-funding mechanism to support companies applying to the European Innovation Council (EIC) or EIT instruments was successfully set up by the Agency for Innovation, Scientific and Technological Development and Entrepreneurship (INOVA). The ‘Vezilka’ national artificial intelligence factory antenna positions the country within advanced European digital and research initiatives. ‘Vezilka’ is coordinated by the Faculty of Information Sciences and Computer Engineering at Ss. Cyril and Methodius University in Skopje. This flagship project enables the country’s formal integration into the European AI ecosystem, through a strategic partnership with the Pharos AI Factory in Greece. The grant agreement for its roll-out was signed in April 2026.
In the area of innovation, INOVA started to operate in September 2025. A feasibility study for setting up a technology park was commissioned. Overall investment in research and innovation in the country remains low – only 0.38% of GDP in 2024– while the participation of the private sector in research remains marginal at 0.10% of GDP.
North Macedonia is included in the European Innovation Scoreboard with a performance at 38.5% of the EU average in 2026, and the innovation gap with the EU is widening. Progress should be made on venture capital expenditures, design applications, as well as on direct and indirect government support of business R&D.
Researchers from North Macedonia participated in 94.8% of actions in the European Cooperation in Science and Technology (COST) programme.
North Macedonia is associated to the Research and Innovation Framework Programme Horizon Europe. In the reporting period, 21 grants with participation from North Macedonia were signed with a total EU net contribution for North Macedonia of EUR 6,7 million. The national technology transfer roadmap has not yet been developed. Authorities need to further strengthen integration in the European Research Area and in the European Innovation Ecosystems.
Chapter 26 - Education and culture
The EU supports cooperation in education and culture through funding programmes and the coordination of Member State policy through the ‘open method of coordination’. The EU and the Member States must also prevent discrimination and ensure quality education for children of migrant workers, including those from disadvantaged backgrounds.
The 2026-2032 Strategy for education, adopted in March 2026 is the main document governing the education sector. It is accompanied by an action plan for 2026-2028. Public spending on education and training increased slightly in 2025, remaining far below the EU average. The education budget increased as a share of the overall state budget in 2025 (12.2%) compared to 2024 (11.05%). The Education Management Information System (EMIS) was upgraded to streamline public spending on education data collection for the use of new financing methodologies in primary and secondary education. All 80 municipalities have in place a plan to optimise the school network. Authorities need to ensure sufficient capacity to optimise and restructure the school network, with specific focus on addressing the surplus of teachers, in particular in primary education, and continue efforts in supporting teachers’ career development.
During the reporting period, the capacity of public and private institutions providing early childhood education and care (ECEC) increased by 361 places. The total number of children in ECEC in 2025-2026 was 41 667 showing an increase from 40 530 one year earlier. According to Eurostat, the enrolment rate of children aged 3 to 6 in 2024 was 48.3%, showing a slight increase, but is still considerably short compared with the EU target on ECEC attendance set at 96%. In primary education, the number of pupils dropped by 3.1%, while in secondary education it increased by 0.4% on the previous year.
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In line with the Law on primary education, the concept for primary education is gradually introduced, including green skills as well as new curricula. The removal of content on sexual and reproductive health and gender equality from primary and secondary education remains to be addressed. The new concept for secondary education was adopted in March 2026, and since school year 2025-2026 the new curriculum was introduced for the first year of secondary education. Career guidance provision in both primary and secondary schools is being gradually introduced.
According to the PISA 2025 data, North Macedonia continues to perform well below the OECD average in mathematics, reading, and science, showing no significant progress since the 2022 cycle. According to the results of Teaching and Learning International Survey (TALIS 2024), 94% of teachers in the country report overall job satisfaction while only 28% say that they are satisfied with their salaries.
The new concept for vocational education and training (VET), replying to the quickly changing labour market, introducing practical education in working environment and focusing on inclusivity, was adopted in May 2025. Three new Regional Centres for Vocational Education and Training (RVETCs) started operating in 2025-2026 bringing the total number of centres to eight (one per region). There is a clear trend of an increasing share of students enrolled in VET (71% of all students in secondary education).
One third of students in VET attend dual classes, combining school-based learning with practical learning in a company. Between 2024-2025 and 2025-2026, the number of students enrolled in the first year of dual education has decreased slightly, from 4 171 to 4 070 whereas the number of companies involved in dual education has increased from 650 to 700 North Macedonia has been a member of the European Alliance for Apprenticeships (EAfA) since 2016, demonstrating its commitment to improving dual education and apprenticeships. However, the country should encourage more local stakeholders to join the Alliance through pledges, enabling them to exchange good practices and strengthen quality apprenticeships.
On higher education, in the academic year 2025-2026, a total of 55 036 students were enrolled, which represents an increase of 2.8%. Female students represent 59.9%. The majority of students (77.8%) are enrolled in public higher education institutions, while 22.2% are enrolled in private institutions.
The main challenge remains the improvement of quality of higher education through the development of accreditation and quality assurance processes. North Macedonia needs to work on the full implementation of key commitments from the 2024 Bologna Process Implementation Report, including academic freedom, institutional autonomy, student participation and responsibility of and for higher education. It also needs to provide adequate timeframes and ensure appropriate public consultation with all stakeholders, especially regarding automatic recognition and quality assurance. Five universities from North Macedonia participate in European Universities alliances, amongst them three with fully funded partner status.
With all implementing legislation for the Law for adult education adopted, the new legal framework was completed, enabling the system of validation of non-formal and informal learning to be formalised; this is being gradually implemented. Seven institutions (RVETCs) are authorised to carry out validations. Six new qualification standards were adopted, and one was revised. According to Eurostat, the participation rate in education and training of those aged between 25 and 64 increased from 2.7% in 2022 to 3.7% in 2024 but is still far from the EU average (28.4%).
On inclusive education, despite the progress in enrolling pupils with special educational needs into mainstream primary schools, their share has increased by only 0.2 percentage points in 2025-2026 and represents 1.5%. 33 municipalities have established at least one learning support centre for children with special needs with a mainstream primary school. In
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addition, five resource centres in primary and four in secondary education host exclusively children with special needs whose total number is 459 and 288 respectively. The number of educational assistants in primary education increased from 1018 in the 2024-2025 school year to 1356 in 2025-2026. A newly-launched scheme for inclusive secondary education enabled hiring 148 educational assistants for the 2025-2026 school year.
Over the reporting period, 43 Roma mediators in primary schools were available in 24 municipalities showing a slight decrease compared to 2024-2025. In April 2026, amendments to the Law on secondary education introduced roles for Roma pupil mediators in secondary schools. As a result, 21 mediators were engaged in 16 municipalities. There are no Roma mediators in ECEC. In the 2025-2026 school year, the total number of Roma children in ECEC was 526 showing an increase of 99 children compared to the previous year. In primary and secondary education, their number was 9 515 and 1 504 respectively, showing a decline at both levels. In secondary education, 1 104 Roma pupils were granted scholarships. In higher education, the number of Roma grantees was 115 whereas the total number of Roma students dropped from 250 to 210 compared to the previous academic year.
In April 2026, North Macedonia adopted a Rulebook on the procedure for reporting and protecting pupils who are victims of any form of violence, abuse, and neglect.
The authorities need to further strengthen the development of digital skills throughout primary and secondary education and increase educational institutions’ capacities and teachers’ skills, in line with the EU Digital Education Action Plan 2021-2027. In December 2025, Parliament adopted the Law on textbooks, which promotes digital schoolbooks and innovating educational materials. Since school year 2025-2026, the new Digital Textbook Platform is being applied including for visually impaired children. In the reporting period, 5 771 teachers were trained in the use of generative artificial intelligence. 160 primary schools were equipped with IT and network equipment by December 2025.
North Macedonia continues to participate in the Erasmus+ programme as an associated country. In 2025, organisations participated in more than 700 Erasmus+ projects, of which 400 Youth Mobility Projects. The Erasmus+ National Agency is facing increased scrutiny from the Commission due to a high number of non-compliance issues.
On youth policy, there are still no publicly available reports on the National Youth Strategy for 2023-2027 and its action plan for 2023-2025. The new Action Plan for 2026-2027 and the new Law on Youth Work are pending. The Law on youth participation and youth policies needs to be implemented as well as adjusted in line with the institutional changes that took place in 2024. In 2025, the number of municipalities with a local youth council reduced from 28 to 24 (out of 81 municipalities). The number of municipalities having a local youth strategy is 17 while youth centres and youth offices exist in 13 municipalities. The National Youth Council of North Macedonia is active.
On sports, North Macedonia continued to participate in the European Week of Sport.
As regards culture, the country further delayed the adoption of amendments to national cultural legislation, including national strategies for the development of culture, along with an action plan, as well as for the protection and use of cultural heritage 2026-2030. The Ministry of Culture should further strengthen its institutional capacity and ensure sufficient funding to effectively protect and promote the country’s diverse cultural expressions, in line with its commitments under the 2005 UNESCO Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions. Further efforts to improve institutional response and interinstitutional cooperation on the protection of cultural heritage are needed.The government of North Macedonia signalled its strengthened commitment to cultural heritage protection, including through closer regional cooperation, through the signing of the joint statement on the Prespa region and its nomination for inclusion on the UNESCO World Heritage List together with Greece and Albania.
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North Macedonia continues its full participation in the 2021-2027 Creative Europe Programme. The City of Skopje, designated as the 2028 European Capital of Culture, accelerated preparatory activities. Several issues with the preparation of the title year remain to be addressed such as ensuring transparent governance, stable financing, timely implementation and strong cooperation with cultural partners at all levels.
On anti-corruption in education, North Macedonia’s textbook procurement system for primary and secondary education has been marked by weak transparency, limited competition, strong market concentration, and largely uncompetitive direct negotiations rather than open procedures. At the same time, the Ministry failed to publish the legally required price lists for textbook purchases, despite this being an obligation under public procurement rules, which severely limited public scrutiny. There are also sharp and insufficiently explained price increases of textbooks, raising serious concerns about inefficient use of public funds, weak accountability and heightened risks of abuse and corruption.
Chapter 29 - Customs union
All Member States are part of the EU customs union and follow the same customs rules and procedures. This requires legislative alignment as well as adequate implementing and enforcement capacity and access to the common computerised customs systems.
The customs legislation is highly aligned with the EU acquis. The Customs Tariff for 2026 was adopted, aligned with the EU combined nomenclature.
On administrative and operational capacity, the Development Strategy of the Customs Administration for the period 2025–2027 continued to be implemented. A comprehensive intelligence system in support of investigation and enforcement is in place. Controls are based upon intelligence-led risk analysis, pre-arrival information and selectivity techniques. A new risk management system was introduced, as well as a customs data warehouse. The percentage of physical controls-red channel increased to 13.5% (5.5% in 2024), and documentary controls accounted for 9.5% (17.4% in 2024) of all processed customs declarations in 2025. The Strategy on Integrity and Anti-Corruption for the period 2024–2027 continued to be implemented. The administrative capacities of the controls and investigations sector were significantly strengthened with financial support from EU funds. The support covered the supply of vehicles for customs mobile units and personal protection equipment for customs officers, and a new IT hardware infrastructure for the main server room. This improved the daily operations and IT security of customs operations and ensured business continuity.
Total revenues collected by the Customs Administration in 2025 were 5.2% higher compared with 2024, exceeding EUR 2.1 billion. Maintenance and further development of the Integrated Tariff Environment (ITE) system was secured, and the pilot phase of the Economic Operator Registration and Identification (EORI) and Uniform User Management and Digital Signature (UUM&DS) systems was launched. The Customs Administration has put in place regular data exchange with a number of state institutions through the interoperability platform.
The Customs Administration participated in five international operations in 2025 and continued its cooperation and exchange of intelligence with the customs agencies from the region and with international and regional organisations.
CLUSTER 4: THE GREEN AGENDA AND SUSTAINABLE CONNECTIVITY
This cluster covers: transport (Chapter 14); energy (Chapter 15); trans-European networks (Chapter 21); and environment and climate change (Chapter 27).
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Chapter 14 - Transport policy
The EU has common rules for technical and safety standards, security, social standards, State aid and market liberalisation in road transport, railways, inland waterways, multimodal transport, aviation and maritime transport.
On the general transport acquis, there is no particular progress made. No action plan has been developed to accompany the 2018-2030 national transport strategy. Operational and administrative capacities remain low, and implementation of the Transport Community action plans endorsed in 2025 is still limited.
On road transport, progress remains limited and alignment with the EU acquis is still only partial. Significant gaps persist in road safety, including road infrastructure safety management, tunnels safety, and implementation
capacities. The Law on
dangerous goods is aligned with the EU acquis, but there is still no legal entity appointed to assess equipment conformity. The five-year road maintenance plan is not yet published. In February 2026, Parliament adopted the Law on ratification of the additional protocol to the Convention on the Contract for the International Carriage of Goods by Road concerning the electronic consignment note (eCMR).
On rail transport, the Law on railways, which keeps the market closed to new entrants until EU accession, remains in force, and is not aligned with the relevant objectives of the EU legislation and the commitments made in the Transport Community Treaty. No progress has been made in alignment with railway safety and interoperability legislation. There has also been no progress in establishing an accident and investigation body, and the Railway Safety Directorate has not taken action to strengthen its operational capacity. The mutual agreement on cross-border railway cooperation with Greece is still pending.
On maritime transport, despite being a landlocked country, North Macedonia continues to participate in all basic transport conventions of the International Maritime Organisation. The basic alignment with the legislation has not started yet.
On inland waterway transport, North Macedonia is partially aligned with the EU acquis. The country has requested to participate in the EU strategy for the development of the Danube Region and still remains active in the International Sava River Basin Commission. No progress has been made in aligning the national legislation with common rules applicable to passenger transport by inland waterway.
On aviation, further regulatory alignment following the 2025 European Common Aviation Area assessment visit is still needed. The IT system for certification within the Civil Aviation Agency was upgraded to comply with EU standards, and is expected to be regularly used upon the completion of the testing period. Further action is required to address the European Union Aviation Safety Agency’ s findings on the safety oversight of air navigation services. Independent functioning of the air navigation service provider needs to be maintained on a regular basis.
On multimodal transport, someprogresswas made with the completion of the key technical studies, preliminary design and tendering documentation for the Trubarevo
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Graph 27 - Road fatalities in North Macedonia per 100 000
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multimodal node in November 2025. North Macedonia has not yet fully aligned with the Combined Transport Directive. In 2026, North Macedonia drafted the law transposing the EU regulation on electronic freight transport information.
On the passenger rights acquis, the relevant national legislation in the air transport sector is enacted, the national legislation has not been aligned with the passenger rights rules in rail and waterborne transport, while alignement with bus and coach passenger rights is partial.
On the fight against corruption, authorities are encouraged to strengthen transparency, oversight and integrity safeguards, with particular attention to procurement and contract management of high-value infrastructure projects. Priority should be given to consistent risk monitoring, clear accountability arrangements and the effective implementation of auditing and reporting measures.
Chapter 15 - Energy
EU energy policy covers energy supply, infrastructure, the internal energy market, consumers, renewable energy, energy efficiency, nuclear energy and nuclear safety, radiation protection and nuclear safeguards.
On security of supply, transposition of the Risk-preparedness Regulation and of the Regulation on Emergency and Restoration has been notified to the Energy Community Secretariat and their compliance verification has been initiated,whilea risk-preparedness plan for electricity has not yet been adopted. The adoption by North Macedonia of the Regulation (EU) 2024/1366 establishing a network code on sector-specific rules for cybersecurity aspects of cross-border electricity flows is still pending. The energy law aligns with the amended Regulations on gas security of supply18. In addition, North Macedonia has maintained a fully aligned and EU-compliant implementing framework of Directive 2009/119/EC on oil security of supply. Implementation is progressing under the Government’s newly adopted 2026–2030 Action Plan for the Establishment of Compulsory Oil Reserves, which sets out a gradual build-up to the 90-day requirement by 2030. Existing state reserves, procured and managed by the Compulsory Oil Reserves Agency (MACORA), provide around 45 days of net-import coverage, including 75 days for gasoline and 58 days for diesel. At the same time, the recent reopening of the Thessaloniki–Skopje pipeline has strengthened regional supply security.
On internal energy markets, North Macedonia adopted the laws and by-laws aiming to align with the Electricity Integration Package (EIP) and submitted them for formal verification in June 2026.The intra-day market is operational as of May 2026. Together with the day- ahead market, operational since May 2023, it completes the main organized short-term market segments and provides market participants with greater flexibility to manage renewable variability, reduce imbalance exposure and trade closer to delivery. Regarding regional cooperation, North Macedonia’s transmission system operator made progress by signing a contract with SEleNe, which will act as a regional coordination centre. Lastly, the country has developed a methodology for measuring the level of energy poverty but has not yet adopted a legal definition of energy poverty, neither has a national target to reduce energy poverty.
On renewable energy, in January, the government adopted the 2026 Annual Plan for the Construction of Energy Facilities, providing for the construction of 67 power plants with a total capacity of 4 416 MW – primarily solar and wind. The revised National Energy and Climate Plan (NECP), adopted in April 2026, set a 31.6% target for the share of renewable energy sources in gross final consumption of energy in 2030, which is below the 38% Energy Community target for North Macedonia. Progress on the use of renewable energy is
18 Regulations (EU) 2017/1938 and (EU) 2022/1032.
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taking place in the power sector, but not in the transport, and heating and cooling sectors. A new law on renewable energy was adopted in July 2026 to further align national legislation with the Renewable Energy Directive (RED II), including provisions on biofuels. The electronic registry for guarantees of origin is operational, however the trading with guarantees of origin is not yet taking place. Further efforts are needed to decrease permitting time for renewables, to modernise the grid, to optimise balancing services and ensure hydropower investments comply with the relevant environmental acquis.
Legislation on environmental impact assessment (EIA) is still not aligned with the relevant acquis and continues to pose a significant risk to quality EIAs for strategic energy projects. There have also been no improvements in secondary legislation concerning the screening procedures for small hydropower projects under 2 MW.
On hydrocarbons, the country remains significantly dependent on coal. Both the Bitola and Oslomej/Kichevo thermal power plants continue to operate on coal from limited domestic resources and from imports. The production cost of electricity generated by the state-owned company ESM exceeds the selling price to the universal supplier, leading to persistent financial losses and undermining both the implementation of ESM’s reform plans and the advancement of the green transformation.
Amendments to the Law on energy efficiency have been adopted in October 2025, further aligning national legislation with the EU acquis. Adoption of necessary implementing legislation is still pending. Energy performance certification continues to not be implemented as stipulated in the Construction Law and Energy Efficiency Law. A Rulebook on the Preparation of Municipal Energy Efficiency Programmes has been adopted; however, only a limited number of municipalities are preparing such programmes. A three-year programme for the annual renovation of 3% of public buildings at central level has been adopted and is under implementation. The Energy Efficiency Fund is still yet to be put into operation.
The country is partially aligned with the EU acquis on energy labelling.
On governance, the administrative capacity for dealing with energy policy, strategic planning, and investments in the energy sector has been increased. Nevertheless, there is still lack of technical capacities for policy analysis and implementation. There is no energy data collection system within the Ministry of Energy, Mining and Mineral Resources, neither a proper policy evaluation nor performance assessment in place. Just Transition governance structures are operational and have adopted the plan for 2026. The NECP governance structures are not yet operational, and the full implementation of the National Energy Action Plan (NEAP) is still pending. Concerns about autonomy of the Energy Regulatory Commission (ERC) remain.
In the area of nuclear energy, nuclear safety, radioactive waste management and radiation protection, there have been no changes in the reporting period. On nuclear safeguards, North Macedonia should accelerate its efforts to align with Euratom legislation.
Chapter 21 - Trans-European networks
The EU promotes trans-European networks (TENs) in the areas of transport, telecommunication and energy to strengthen the internal market and contribute to growth and employment.
On transport networks, parts of the road network were upgraded and are compliant with the TEN-T requirements along the Western Balkans-Eastern Mediterranean European Transport Corridor, which integrates parts of former Corridors X and VIII19. The WBEM corridor is a strategic backbone for North Macedonia’s connectivity to the TEN-T network,
19 Older Pan-European transport corridors.
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significantly improving the country’s regional accessibility, trade links and economic cohesion. Corridor X is currently more advanced in terms of infrastructure development and operation. Seven years after the adoption of the National Transport Strategy 2018-2030, an action plan for the implementation of the WBEM is still not prepared. The finances needed for construction of the multimodal node in Trubarevo are yet to be secured. North Macedonia should continue to ensure the efficient operation and further development of Corridors X and VIII.
Increased efforts are also needed to accelerate and reinvigorate work on the WBEM rail corridor on the part of former Corridor VIII and to advance development on other priority sections of the core network for both rail and road. Cooperation between North Macedonia and Bulgaria on the construction of the rail connection along the WBEM corridor has recently improved. In November 2025, North Macedonia and Bulgaria have signed an agreement on the preparation, construction and operation of the tunnel along the rail corridor, at the border between both countries. However, the revised tender documentation for works for the rail project linking Kriva Palanka to the border with Bulgaria is not yet published. More efforts are still needed to urgently finalise the agreement with Greece on the Kremenica-Neos Kafkasos railway border crossing, given that the operational rail infrastructure is already built. There is no progress on the publishing of the five-year road and rail maintenance plans.
On energy networks, the construction of a new 400 kV electricity transmission interconnector line with Albania is ongoing. Preparation of the technical documentation to strengthen the transmission network in the country’s south-eastern region is ongoing, as is the implementation of the technical assistance for greening and digitalisation of the transmission network in the Southwestern and Pelagonia regions. The gas interconnector Greece-North Macedonia, which is a CESEC priority project, is under construction, planned to be completed in 2027. The gas interconnector with Serbia is planned to be completed by end of 2028. The Thessaloniki–Skopje oil pipeline is operational as of March 2026.
National legislation is still not aligned with the revised TEN-E Regulation.
Chapter 27 - Environment and climate change
The EU promotes strong climate action, sustainable development and protection of the environment. EU law contains provisions addressing climate change, water and air quality, waste management, nature protection, industrial pollution, chemicals, noise and civil protection.
Environment
On horizontal legislation, no progress was made in the reporting period. The administration continues to lack capacity and qualified staff working on environment-related matters. No reforms were introduced to improve implementation and enforcement of the environmental acquis. Alignment with the environmental impact assessment (EIA) and strategic environmental assessment (SEA) acquis remains weak, with insufficient coordination and strategic planning for environmental infrastructure investments, and no solid project pipeline or improvements in the EIA procedures. There is no progress in aligning with EU Directives on environmental liability and environmental crime and on spatial data with environmental monitoring not meeting EU standards. No progress has been made on activities and reporting related to Aarhus Convention, making the Aarhus Centre fully operational while civil society’s requests and suggestions are often rejected or ignored.
On air quality, there are no legislative developments to be reported. Air quality management system faces several structural constraints, including weak monitoring design, incomplete pollutant coverage, insufficient background monitoring, limited integration of air quality data into planning and permitting, and institutional weaknesses. North Macedonia’s air monitoring system needs to improve along with the delineation of zones and agglomerations beyond the monitoring of basic pollutants. Plans for the municipalities of Kumanovo, Kavadarci, Gostivar
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and Struga have been updated and were adopted by the respective Municipal Councils in September 2025, while the one for Gevgelija was adopted by the Municipal Council in January 2026. Calibration is in place but not yet fully aligned with EU best practice. Laboratory infrastructure exists, but sample processing is limited and irregular due mainly to the lack of qualified personnel and recruitment constraints. The network has a limited ability to support the new obligations under the Directive on ambient air quality and cleaner air for Europe20. North Macedonia has a partially functioning system for data collection constrained by gaps in coverage and station reliability problems. Data use in decision-making remains limited and needs stronger integration into planning, permitting, enforcement, and urban development to align with EU air quality management. Emission inventories and UNECE reporting are in place, but the system is not yet fully regular.
In the area of waste management, some progress has been made in establishing an integrated regional waste management system across the country. The non-compliant landfills need to be closed and remediated, as frequent fires cause severe pollution. Interinstitutional cooperation and decision-making remain weak, delaying infrastructure investments and efficient operation of the future regional waste management systems. Public awareness campaigns need broader, nationwide, coverage with a sustained approach. Public communal enterprises require urgent reforms due to ongoing operational weakness. The national waste and sludge management strategies are not yet adopted by the government.
Despite a solid legislative and policy framework for the circular economy, implementation remains limited. Insufficient funding inadequate infrastructure, low recycling rates, and fragmented institutional coordination continue to hinder progress. The extended producer responsibility (EPR) scheme still suffers from structural shortcomings and requires urgent improvements in oversight and enforcement to avoid market distortion and support the achievement of national targets. Remediation activities related to the clean-up of Organic Chemical Industry Skopje (OHIS), a former organic chemicals factory, are progressing with additional government funding, but other historical pollution sites remain unaddressed, including contamination threatening Skopje’ s main drinking water source.
On water quality, the framework Law on water to ensure further alignment with the Water Framework, Floods and Groundwater Directives is not yet adopted. The Vardar River Basin management plan is under preparation, and a draft of the Significant Water Management Issues report was completed and is under public consultation. Delineation and classification of surface and groundwater bodies is ongoing. Industrial wastewater discharges significantly affect water quality, with 55% of industrial facilities discharging wastewater without pre- treatment and 46% directly into rivers. Monitoring and information systems were improved during the reporting period. The preparatory work on the alignment with the EU flood-related legislation is advancing, including the development of flood risk management plans for all river basins. Part of the committed EU funding remains unused, hindering sector progress. Reform of public water utilities has not yet started, and a sustainable financing model based on the polluter-pays and full cost-recovery principles is not yet put in place.
On nature protection, the law on Nature Protection is still not adopted. The work on the Natura 2000 network continued. A strategy and programme for education for zoos in Bitola and Skopje was prepared in December 2025, to improve management, animal welfare and ex situ biodiversity conservation in the zoos. No progress has been made in establishing a specialised nature protection institution, despite it being one of the key targets of the National Strategy for Nature Protection.
20 Directive (EU) 2024/2881.
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Administrative capacities at central and local levels for planning, monitoring and enforcement of nature protection remain insufficient. The designation of key protected areas, including Lake Ohrid, Studenchisko Blato and Matka Canyon and the re-proclamation of Mavrovo National Park is still not finalised, leading to continued biodiversity degradation. State financial support for the four national parks continued in 2026, but nature protection financing remains fragmented, donor-dependent and insufficient. The authorities started to prepare a national biodiversity finance plan to establish priorities, mechanisms and institutional responsibilities. As regards transboundary cooperation, although regional and bilateral agreements exist, particularly for lakes Prespa, Ohrid and the Shar Mountains, implementation is limited by constrained resources and capacities. Joint monitoring and data exchange are still at an early stage and need to improve. Implementation of UNESCO recommendations for the Ohrid Region also faces significant challenges, requiring further decisive progress.
In the forestry sector, alignment with the EU acquis remains incomplete. A harmonised Law on forests is needed to comply with the FLEGT and Timber Regulations, while institutional reforms should clarify authorities’ roles, strengthen enforcement, and improve forest data.
On industrial pollution and risk management,inSeptember 2025, a Law on industrial emissions was adopted, but necessary implementing legislation is yet to be adopted. Monitoring data is not properly used in environmental permits for industrial installation and failure to meet air quality standards is not adequately reflected in emission limitsetting.
There were no developments in the area of chemicals, including on the Biocidal Products Regulation,and of noise pollution in the reporting period.
On civil protection, North Macedonia, as a Participating State of the Union Civil Protection Mechanism (UCPM) has benefitted from the UCPM support for disaster prevention and preparedness capacity building. The country has not yet reported on its disaster risk management to the Commission for the 2023 reporting period. North Macedonia is the first country from the region to be part of the rescEU transition response in 2026 with two light airplanes. However, operationalisation of the response needs to be significantly improved.
The necessary reforms for a streamlined, coordinated and efficient disaster risk management system are lagging behind and relevant legislation is not yet in place. The new national protection and rescue strategy is still not finalised and the strengthening of the civil protection institutional set up is overdue. Mandatory training for fire, rescue and civil protection staff is only partially implemented. The national emergency communication system is not yet connected to the European Commission’s Common Emergency Communication and Information System (CECIS), despite having Trans-European Services for Telematics between Administrations (TESTA) in place. In the interim, North Macedonia should establish connection to CECIS LITE to facilitate communication related to civil protection operations.
Governance and the financial framework for disaster prevention, preparedness and response need strengthening, including the capacity to absorb support under the UCPM. Some progress has been made in raising public awareness through information campaigns on preparedness for earthquakes, fires and extreme weather events.
Climate change
Limited progress was made in the area of climate change during the reporting period. North Macedonia needs to accelerate its efforts to align with the EU climate acquis and to significantly strengthen its administrative capacity. Awareness-raising activities should be strengthened.
The climate law consistent with the EU’s 2050 climate neutrality objective is not adopted yet, with consequences for the adoption of implementing legislation necessary to achieve alignment with and implementation of, the monitoring, reporting, verification and
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accreditation (MRVA) acquis. The latter is needed for introducing carbon pricing and aligning with the EU emissions trading system (ETS) in its full scope.
The revised national climate and energy plan (NECP) for the period 2025-2030 was adopted by the government in April 2026. The country still needs to align with EU acquis on fluorinated greenhouse gases, ozone-depleting substances, on emissions from the Land and Use, Land Use Change and Forestry (LULUCF) sector and climate legislation concerning road transport (CO2 performance standards, car labelling and fuel quality).
The first biennial transparency report is not yet finalised. The combined second biennial transparency report and fifth national communication on climate change under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) are due on 30 December 2026. A new and ambitious nationally determined contribution (NDCS) is overdue to be submitted to the UNFCCC, in line with the efforts to limit global warming to 1.5°C.
CLUSTER 5: RESOURCES, AGRICULTURE AND COHESION
This cluster covers: agriculture and rural development (Chapter 11); food safety, veterinary and phytosanitary policy (Chapter 12); fisheries and aquaculture (Chapter 13); regional policy and coordination of structural instruments (Chapter 22); and financial and budgetary provisions (Chapter 33).
Chapter 11 - Agriculture and rural development
The EU’s common agricultural policy supports farmers and contributes to ensuring Europe’s food security. It helps tackle climate change and the sustainable management of national resources; maintains rural areas and landscapes across the EU; and keeps the rural economy alive by promoting jobs in farming, agri-food industries and associated sectors. This requires strong management and control systems. There are also common EU rules for marketing standards, quality policy and organic farming.
On horizontal issues, North Macedonia continues to align its agricultural policy with the EU acquis. Despite substantial national financial support, the share of the agricultural sector in the economy continued to decline (5.98% of GDP in 2025 compared with 7.3% in 2022). The National Strategy for Agriculture and Rural Development 2021-2027 was updated in February 2026. However, the new Law on agriculture and rural development still needs to be adopted.
Certain core components of the Integrated Administration and Control System (IACS) are in place and operational, but the update of the Land Parcel Identification System (LPIS) is delayed. The transfer of the farm register and LPIS to the paying agency remained pending, resulting in unclear mandates for IACS maintenance. Real-time interoperability with the animal identification and registration system has not improved. A geospatial aid application system continued to operate on a voluntary basis, with national roll-out hampered by gaps in digital infrastructure and insufficient human resources. The area monitoring system is not yet fully in place and satellite-based monitoring and controls (‘check by monitoring’) continued as a pilot. The postponement of the agricultural census to 2027 delays the update of the Farm Accountancy Data Network (FADN) sample and the preparations for the transition to the European Union's new Farm Sustainability Data Network (FSDN), which requires an updated statistical farm register.
Implementing legislation for the Law on advisory services is yet to be adopted.
On agricultural markets – common market organisation (CMO), the overall legislation still needs to be aligned, and institutional mandates established. In February 2026, the government adopted a decision to create a separate CMO law in alignment with the EU acquis. Swift adoption of the new law and implementing legislation on school schemes and producer organisations remains a priority.
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On rural development, the implementation of the IPARD III programme continued in the reporting period, after a temporary interruption following certain irregularities. The national authorities took measures to address the situation, with an action plan being implemented to improve the IPARD III programme implementation.
On quality policy, the legislative framework is not yet fully aligned with the EU acquis.
On organic farming, the new Law on organic production entered into force in March 2026. North Macedonia should focus on implementing the law effectively and draw on available IPA III support to develop the sector.
On the fight against corruption, the authorities of North Macedonia are obliged to prevent, detect and report irregularities.
Chapter 12 - Food safety, veterinary and phytosanitary policy
The EU food acquis, including hygiene rules for foodstuff production, ensures a high level of food and feed safety and a high level of protection of consumers’ interests. Animal health and welfare and the safety of food of animal origin are safeguarded together with plant health, the quality of seeds, plant reproductive material, animal nutrition and the use of plant protection products.
On general food safety, the legal framework is advanced in terms of alignment with the General Food Law Regulation. At the same time, North Macedonia has yet to ensure the required distinction between risk assessment and risk management and has yet to improve the application of the risk-based approach and the transparency principle. A new Law on official controls has still not been adopted. The Food Safety and Veterinary Agency (FVA) performed regular audits of laboratories in the veterinary and food safety area and carried out its missions in line with quality management standards in most areas. The systems must be adequately financed to make sure they remain sustainable. The multiannual national control plan for food, veterinary medicine and plant health has not been updated since the 2019-2024 plan expired.
On veterinary policy, North Macedonia has to increase efforts to align its animal health legislation with the EU’s animal health policy and acquis. A new Law on animal health has yet to be adopted. Control measures for animal diseases need to be updated in line with the EU Animal Health Law and other relevant EU legislation. The FVA implemented rabies vaccination campaigns in 2025 and spring 2026; however, efforts on the rabies surveillance programme still need to be strengthened to provide reliable data to support disease freedom.
On animal welfare, North Macedonia is advanced in aligning its national legislation with the EU acquis. However, the FVA lacks sufficient staff for full implementation. The 2026 national monitoring programme on residues of veterinary medicinal products and contaminants was approved by the Commission for bovine, ovine/caprine and porcine meat, poultry, aquaculture, milk, eggs, wild game and honey. Further efforts on alignment and implementing capacity are needed on zootechnical issues.
On the placing on the market of food, feed and animal by-products, the activities to build an animal by-products rendering plant have been cancelled. An EU-compliant system of collection, storage and processing of animal by-products is not in place.
On food safety rules and its specific rules for feed, no significant development was reported.
On phytosanitary policy, a new Law on plant health has yet to be adopted. The Phytosanitary Directorate has regularly updated the list of harmful organisms in line with the EU acquis and the country’s pest status. The phytosanitary monitoring programme for plant health remained in place, and the phytosanitary information system was further developed. In March 2026, the National Plan for the Sustainable Use of Pesticides was adopted and integrated pest management activities have been initiated in two pilot regions. The adoption
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of implementing legislation on the sustainable use of pesticides is still pending. Significant efforts are still needed to collect reliable data on national pesticide use and its effects on human health.
On the marketing of seed and other plant reproductive material, the country should focus on aligning with the EU acquis on the rules plant and forest reproductive material (PRM and FRM), keeping in mind the need to start setting up the necessary institutional frameworks and technical capacities to implement and enforce functioning certification systems for PRM and FRM.
The legislation on genetically modified organisms is yet to be fully aligned with the EU acquis.
On the fight against corruption, North Macedonia should strengthen oversight and integrity mechanisms within the Food and Veterinary Agency and the Phytosanitary Directorate, and ensure that all inspection activities – including controls at border control posts – are conducted on a risk-based basis and subject to independent audit.
Chapter 13 - Fisheries and aquaculture
The common fisheries policy lays down rules on fisheries management, protects living resources of the sea and limits the environmental impact of fisheries. This includes setting catch quotas, managing fleet capacity, rules on control and inspection, rules on markets and aquaculture and support for fisheries and coastal communities. Further, it promotes a sustainable aquaculture.
As a landlocked country, North Macedonia does not apply much of the EU legislation on marine fisheries; nevertheless, it is required to align with the relevant parts of the EU acquis on inland fisheries, aquaculture, control measures, data collection, structural actions, State aid and market policy.
Implementing legislation related to the Law on Fisheries remains delayed. In February 2026, the Constitutional Court annulled a provision on the cancellation of procedures for awarding fishing rights due to insufficient safeguards against arbitrary decisions. The Department for Fisheries and Aquaculture within the Ministry for Agriculture, Forestry and Water Economy remains understaffed.
On resource management, North Macedonia adopted a National Eel Management Plan establishing conservation and management measures for the European eel in the Crn Drim river basin, including Ohrid and Prespa Lakes, with measures to reduce human-induced mortality. Implementation of conservation measures, including restrictions on fishing for vulnerable species and restocking activities for Ohrid trout, continued. Alignment with the EU acquis on fisheries control, including vessel registration and licensing requirements where applicable, remains limited.
Data collection continued, although further alignment with the EU Data Collection Framework and digitalisation of data collection are needed.
In the area of inspection and control, enforcement activities increased during the reporting period. However, administrative capacities remain limited and further efforts are needed to strengthen traceability, environmental monitoring and interinstitutional cooperation in the fight against illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing.
Financial support for national structural actions remains limited. No State aid schemes aligned with EU rules were implemented and no progress was made on market policy during the reporting period.
Aquaculture in North Macedonia, primarily focused on trout and carp production, remains in an early stage of development. Relevant implementing legislation still needs to be adopted, and the Multiannual National Strategic Plan for Aquaculture still needs to be finalised.
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International cooperation with Albania continued under the Ohrid and Prespa Lakes Agreement, although with limited operational follow-up – due to the failure to convene Joint Committee meetings. Cooperation with Greece continued on fisheries management measures for Lake Dojran. North Macedonia remains active in regional dialogue on inland fisheries through the European Inland Fisheries and Aquaculture Advisory Commission (EIFAAC).
On anti-corruption measures, transparency and oversight in the allocation of fishing rights, licensing procedures and the distribution of financial support require further strengthening. Greater use of digital systems, improved transparency of fisheries and aquaculture registers, increased traceability, and stronger control and verification mechanisms would contribute to reducing risks, enable legal certainty and improving accountability in the sector.
Chapter 22 - Regional policy and coordination of structural instruments
Regional policy is the EU’s main tool for reducing regional disparities and investing in sustainable and inclusive socio-economic growth. It is operating through ‘shared management’ between the Commission and EU Member States. The implementation of cohesion policy programmes requires appropriate administrative capacity on programme and project level, the establishment of systems of sound financial management and control and the fulfilment of other EU acquis elements such as environmental or public procurement legislation.
On legislative framework, the amendment to the law on inter-municipal cooperation that could facilitate transnational cooperation between the countries and local authorities within the EU territorial cooperation (EGTC) initiatives are pending adoption by parliament.
The institutional framework for the management of IPA III reflects the specific EU requirements, aligning with the principles of the EU cohesion policy. Nevertheless, operating structures established for the indirect management of IPA programmes continue to function under limited administrative capacity and have resulted in a significant loss of EU funding under IPA II (decommitments). The institutional setting for implementation, coordination, management, audit and control of the Reform Agenda would benefit from reinforcement. Weaknesses in the Ministry of Finance’s role in costing and budgeting reforms continue to constrain the effective implementation of reforms, underscoring the need for stronger institutional capacity and processes. Still, North Macedonia made significant progress in implementing the Reform Agenda during the last three reporting periods. High-level political engagement in the process has improved significantly.
Weaknesses persist in the administrative capacity of key institutions managing EU funds. The absence of a comprehensive staff retention policy, shortcomings in human resources management, and high staff turnover across the IPA structures remain major challenges. Insufficient administrative capacityhas contributed to significant losses of EU funding in the transport and environment sectors. Training capacity remains weak and donor-dependent, while the IPA training centre is understaffed and lacks a functional pool of trainers. The job classification and remuneration system should be strengthened to improve job security, staff retention and long-term stability of personnel working on EU-related matters.
As regards programming, policy dialogue supporting the strategic planning and programming of EU assistance continued through the sector working groups, with improved quality and engagement. The April 2026 meeting of the Sector Working Group on Regional and Local Development marked an important step in advancing sustainable development and decentralisation. North Macedonia further strengthened municipal financing and regional development policies through launching a call for infrastructure, energy efficiency, and renewable energy projects to reduce regional disparities and boost competitiveness. The establishment of the Resource Centre for Municipal Support in November 2025 strengthened municipal capacity by providing expertise and improving access to national
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and EU funding. However, public investment programming remains insufficiently developed in view of future implementation of the cohesion and structural funds. North Macedonia continues to build experience through participation in cross-border, transnational and interregional cooperation programmes, including Interreg, and held the presidency of the EU Strategy for the Adriatic and Ionian Region until June 2026, successfully organising its annual forum. Nonetheless, shortage of qualified and experienced staff, weak coordination at national and bilateral levels, and the absence of a sustainable human resources management system continue to hamper programme implementation, jeopardise key cross- border cooperation projects and contribute to recurring ineligible expenditure under the technical assistance programme.
On monitoring and evaluation, North Macedonia participates in sector monitoring committees, although follow-up on their conclusions remains limited. Reform and Growth Facility and IPA III monitoring committees meet regularly. However, weak coordination, delayed institutional inputs, and inadequate reporting continues to undermine the implementation of EU assistance, underscoring the need for stronger political commitment to improve IPA fund absorption and Reform Agenda delivery.
Financial management and control systems are in place but continue to operate with limited administrative capacity, adversely affecting the implementation of IPA programmes under indirect management. Weak capacity and low absorption rates have led to significant decommitments, with a continued risk of further losses. North Macedonia has reorganised the financial and control systems for IPA III operational programmes, but further efforts are needed on staff retention, procurement and contract planning, internal audit and quality assurance. While internal and external audit functions are in place and the Audit Authority continues to perform effectively, the internal audit function requires strengthening. Audited bodies’ implementation of audit findings remains very limited.
On the fight against corruption, the Anti-Fraud Coordination Service Network is in place and fully operational, but its capacity must be further strengthened.
Chapter 33 - Financial and budgetary provisions
This chapter covers the rules governing the funding of the EU budget (‘own resources’). These resources mainly consist of: (i) contributions based on the gross national income of each Member State; (ii) customs duties; (iii) the non-recycled plastic resource and (iv) a resource based on value added tax. Member States must have the appropriate administrative capacity to adequately coordinate and ensure the correct calculation, collection, payment and control of own resources.
There was some progress on the underlying policy areas that indirectly affect the own resources system (for progress on these areas, see Chapters 16 – Taxation, 17- Economic and monetary policy; 18 – Statistics, 29 – Customs union, and 32 – Financial control).
The administrative infrastructure to ensure the timely and efficient functioning of the process of calculation, collection, payment and control of own resources as well as to improve reporting and coordination mechanisms among all bodies involved remains underdeveloped. Several tasks are still pending, including the development of guidelines for the application of EU Traditional Own Resources, the establishment of an IT system for managing A and B accounts and the enabling of access to the OWNRES electronic system for reporting fraud and irregularities related to traditional own resources.
Customs legislation is well aligned with the EU acquis. The customs tariff for 2026 has been fully harmonised with the EU combined nomenclature. A comprehensive intelligence system has been implemented in support of investigation and enforcement, and a new risk management system was introduced, as well as a customs data warehouse. Additionally, the percentage of physical controls (red channel) was increased. Total revenues collected by
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the Customs Administration in 2025 increased by 5.2% compared with 2024, exceeding EUR 2.1 billion.
On indirect taxation, the Law on VAT was amended abolishing the threshold of EUR 22 for imports of small parcels free of VAT, effectively introducing a rate of 18% on all imports. Persistent delays in the VAT refund process remain a concern, with only 14.3% of the refunds paid within the legal deadline. The Public Revenue Office has maintained its efforts to implement the Integrated Tax Information System (ITIS), aimed at digitalising business processes and improving the monitoring of tax collection. (See Chapter 16 – Taxation for more information.)
Some progress has been achieved in strengthening public internal financial control (PIFC), particularly through the adoption of legislation implementing the PIFC law and the development of a new methodology to strengthen risk management. Nevertheless, internal controls require further improvement to ensure the effective safeguarding of public funds.
CLUSTER 6: EXTERNAL RELATIONS
Chapter 30 - External relations
The EU has a common trade and commercial policy towards third countries, based on multilateral and bilateral agreements, and autonomous measures. There are also EU rules in the field of humanitarian aid and development policy.
On common commercial policy, North Macedonia continued to coordinate its positions and align closely its policies with those of the EU, including within the WTO, and is supporting the WTO reform. The provisions of the Trade Facilitation Agreement are fully applied.
North Macedonia participated actively in CEFTA and has continued to implement the action plan for development of the Common Regional Market (CRM) of the Western Balkan countries and the three agreements related to the CRM, covering freedom of movement with ID cards, recognition of professional qualifications and recognition of academic qualifications.
The system for the export control of dual-use goods and technologies is functional. North Macedonia is regularly aligning with the latest EU acquis, as regards the list of dual-use items including with the latest updated list, which was adopted in May 2026. In 2025, 14 licences for exports of dual-use goods were issued. While the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade regularly publishes and updates restrictive measures related to embargoes of goods and services in line with the UN and EU Decisions, implementation leaves room for improvement. North Macedonia has yet to align with the EU acquis on the screening of foreign direct investments. A new draft Law on foreign direct investments screening was prepared and has passed Government procedure. The Parliament reviewed it and agreed to proceed with its adoption in a regular procedure.
No new bilateral agreements with third countries were concluded in the reporting period. 39 bilateral investment treaties (BITs) are in force, of which 18 are with EU Member States covering 19 EU countries.
The regulatory framework for international cooperation in development policy and humanitarian aid remains to be developed.
Chapter 31 - Foreign, security and defence policy
Member States must be able to conduct political dialogues in the framework of foreign, security and defence policy, align with EU statements, take part in EU action, and apply agreed restrictive measures.
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North Macedonia actively engaged in political dialogue with the EU on foreign and security policy issues. In April 2026, the second session of the Security and Defence Dialogue took place in Brussels. North Macedonia participated in the EU–Western Balkans meetings of Political Directors in Sarajevo in October 2025, in Brussels in April 2026 and in Kruje in October 2026, the informal meetings of the Foreign Ministers in Brussels in November 2025 and in May 2026, as well as in the EU-Western Balkans Summit in Brussels in December 2025 and in Tivat in June 2026.
North Macedonia has an operational institutional framework to participate in the EU common foreign and security policy (CFSP) and in the common security and defence policy (CSDP). The country has maintained its track record of full alignment with EU CFSP (statements by the High Representative on behalf of the EU and Council decisions on restrictive measures). North Macedonia has implemented a law on restrictive measures to regulate the procedure for introduction, amendment and termination of restrictive measures. Following efforts taken to reduce the legal time gap between alignment and formal entry into force during 2026. North Macedonia has delivered substantial humanitarian, defence and other forms of assistance to Ukraine. In July 2026, North Macedonia formally joined the Coalition of the Willing in support of Ukraine.
On cooperation with international organisations, North Macedonia continued to actively contribute to all specialised agencies, programmes and funds within the United Nations system, to the Council of Europe and the OSCE. In June 2026, the country was elected to the UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) for the first time in its history, for a three- year term 2027–2029. North Macedonia is a member of the Human Rights Council for the 2025–2027 term. In addition, the country has continued to regularly align with most EU positions in the UN and other international organisations. In February 2026, North Macedonia co-sponsored the UN General Assembly Resolution ‘Advancing a comprehensive, just and lasting peace in Ukraine’ and in December 2025 the resolution on ‘Return of Ukrainian Children’. It is a member of the International Coalition for the Return of Ukrainian Children and participated in the High-Level Meeting organised in Brussels in May 2026. North Macedonia signed the Convention establishing the International Claims Commission for Ukraine regarding claims for damages, loss, or injury caused by Russia’s invasion in December 2025. In July 2026, North Macedonia joined the Coalition of the Willing.
North Macedonia made progress in implementing its National Action Plan (NAP) on Women, Peace and Security 2020–2025. Women’s representation in the Army increased, and women make up 48% of Ministry of Defence staff. Further efforts are needed for women’s full, meaningful and equal participation in dialogue, peacebuilding and prevention and alignment with EU acquis.
A bilateral immunity agreement between North Macedonia and the United States is still in place, granting US nationals exemption from surrender to the International Criminal Court. This is not in line with Council Decision 2011/168/CFSP of 21 March 2011 or with the related EU guiding principles on bilateral immunity agreements. Alignment with the EU position is needed.
North Macedonia is committed to conflict prevention, aligning with EU values and strategies for peace and stability. During the reporting period, the country has actively contributed to key EU instruments and mechanisms, such as the EU’s Integrated Approach to conflicts and crises, to promote conflict prevention, crisis management and post-conflict stabilisation efforts as well as contributing to EU missions.
On non-proliferation and disarmament, North Macedonia is a party to most international treaties and conventions, including the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). The country has prepared and needs to adopt a new National Strategy for the Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW). It also has a functioning Weapons Registration and Management System. The
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regulatory framework on SALW needs to be harmonised with the EU acquis. North Macedonia continued to align with the EU’s policy on weapons of mass destruction (WMD) through the continued implementation of the 2018 WMD and CBRN National Strategy. In April 2026, the country prepared an action plan 2026-2028 for the implementation of the national strategy, which still requires formal adoption. On arms export control, North Macedonia remains generally aligned with the EU Common Position 2008/944.
On security measures, the country has an agreement with the EU on procedures for the exchange of classified information. Implementation of this agreement continued during the reporting period.
On the common security and defence policy (CSDP), North Macedoniacontinued to contribute significantly to EU military crisis management missions and operations, including the EUFOR ALTHEA operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the European Union Battlegroup HELBROC. During the reporting period, the country took part in the CPX/LIVEX exercise ‘TALOS-25’ as part of the HELBROC BG evaluation process. North Macedonia continues to contribute to regional cooperation in military medicine through the Balkan Medical Task Force. North Macedonia participates in training activities of the European Security and Defence College (ESDC). North Macedonia continues to benefit from EU support through the European Peace Facility (EPF).
On hybrid threats, implementation of the National Cyber Security Strategy 2025–2028 continued to boost cyber resilience, align with EU/NATO standards and facilitate private/public partnerships. Under the strategy, a National Cybersecurity Council has been set up, and the Ministry of Digital Transformation established a new Cybersecurity Department and a Government Computer Security Incident Response Centre. Additionally, the Law on the Security of Network and Information Systems was aligned with EU legislation and adopted. [An operational Team for Cybersecurity and Hybrid Threats within the Ministry of Interior provide guidance to build institutional resilience and strengthen communication with the public. North Macedonia has engaged in the first negotiations of the new UN Global Mechanism on Information and Communications Technologies in the Context of International Security.
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ANNEX I – RELATIONS BETWEEN THE EU AND NORTH MACEDONIA
North Macedonia has been a candidate country since 2005. On 26 March 2020, the European Council endorsed the Council’s decision to open accession negotiations with North Macedonia. The first Intergovernmental Conference took place on 19 July 2022, following the Council’s approval of the negotiating framework. The Commission launched the screening process on the same day. The screening was completed in December 2023 and all screening reports on the six clusters were presented to the Council.
North Macedonia has been participating in the Stabilisation and Association process since 1999. The Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA) with the EU, signed in 2001 and in force since 2004, sets the framework for relations with the EU, including political, economic and technical dialogues. Experts met in seven subcommittees and one special group, according to schedule. The Stabilisation and Association Council took place in March 2023 in Skopje.
The EU is North Macedonia’s main trading partner. In 2025, total EU-North Macedonia trade in goods reached EUR 12.9 billion, with North Macedonia exporting EUR 6.5 billion to the EU and importing EUR 6.4 billion, resulting in a slight trade surplus. The EU accounts for approximately 77% of North Macedonia’s total exports and 49% of its imports. The country’s main export products are catalytic converters, wiring sets for vehicles, car seats, iron and steel and tobacco.
North Macedonia is also a beneficiary of the EU’s autonomous trade measures (ATMs) in favour of the Western Balkans.
Visa liberalisation for citizens of North Macedonia travelling to the Schengen area has been in force since December 2009. A readmission agreement has been in force since 2008. The Commission’s eighth report under the visa suspension mechanism21 concluded that North Macedonia continues to meet the visa liberalisation benchmarks.
North Macedonia has maintained its full alignment with EU common foreign and security policy (CFSP) over the reporting period. Substantial participation in EU crisis management missions and operations continued, notably in the EUFOR ALTHEA operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the EU Battlegroup HELBROC.
A Security and Defence Partnership between North Macedonia and the EU was signed in November 2024 and the EU-North Macedonia Security and Defence Dialogue was launched in Skopje in May 2025, with a second edition held in Brussels in May 2026.
The EU has supported the Army of North Macedonia via three bilateral assistance measures under the European Peace Facility worth a total of EUR 38 million by April 2025, with a view to strengthening their military equipment, operational effectiveness and mobility. The Balkans Medical Task Force, in which North Macedonia participates, benefits from a EUR 6 million 2022 support measure under the European Peace Facility.
Under the Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance 2021-2027 (IPA III), EUR 706.5 million were allocated for the period 2021-2027, supporting key areas such as rule of law, good governance, education and the EU integration facility. This includes annual and multiannual action plans, the IPARD programme for 2021-27, the 2024-27 operational programmes, allocations from the Civil Society Facility and media programmes in the period 2021-27, measures supporting communication, support for participation in Union programmes (including indicative 2025-2027 amounts), and individual measures to strengthen migration management.
Under the Reform and Growth Facility for the Western Balkans, North Macedonia’s indicative maximum allocation amounts to EUR 750.4 million. The allocation covers key
21 COM(2025) 792 final and SWD(2025) 429 final.
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reforms in six policy areas: public administration reform; green (energy); digitalisation; human capital; private-sector development; and fundamental rights and rule of law. Disbursement of EU support is conditional on compliance with the pre-conditions and general conditions, and delivery on reforms as set out in the Reform Agenda. As of June 2026, EUR 142.1 million (including pre-financing) have been released to North Macedonia, under the first three reporting periods; the release of the funding has been based on the achievement of 22 out of 53 reform steps.
As of April 2026, the Western Balkans Investment Framework (WBIF) has supported North Macedonia to the amount of approximately EUR 502 million. On transport, construction of the eastern section of the WBEM corridor (‘Corridor VIII’) railway linking Kriva Palanka to the Bulgarian border is advancing under the Global Gateway initiative with European Investment Bank (EIB) financing. The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) provided EUR 20.9 million for the procurement of five new electric locomotives for North Macedonia’s rail freight operator, reducing emissions and boosting freight capacity. The EBRD also signed a EUR 110 million loan for Road Corridor VIII Phase I – the Kičevo–Bukoičani motorway segment on the western section towards Albania. WBIF also financed projects in the areas of clean energy, the environment and climate. Construction of the Skopje wastewater treatment plant, a Team Europe initiative combining KfW, EIB and EBRD financing, continued during the reporting period.
The EU provides support via IPA and the Foreign Policy Instrument to strengthen the resilience of Western Balkans partners when facing hybrid threats including cyber threats and foreign information manipulation and interference.
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ANNEX II – STATISTICAL ANNEX
STATISTICAL DATA (as of 14/09/2026)
North Macedonia
Basic data Note 2013 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
Population (thousand) 2 062 i 2 069 i 1 837 i 1 830 i 1 826 i 1 823 i
Total area of the country (km²) 25 435 25 435 25 435 25 435 25 437 25 437
National accounts Note 2013 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
Gross domestic product (GDP) (million national currency) 501 891 729 445 816 084 902 905 964 087 p 1 043 881 e
Gross domestic product (GDP) (million euro) 8 150 11 835 13 243 14 667 15 672 p 16 949 e
GDP per capita (euro) 4 240 e 6 440 e 7 230 e 8 020 e 8 590 e 9 310 e
GDP per capita (in purchasing power standards (PPS) 9 862 e 14 125 e 14 947 e 15 837 e 16 932 e 17 843 e
GDP per capita (in PPS), relative to the EU average (EU-27 = 100) 37.6 e 42.5 e 41.4 e 41.3 e 42.3 e 42.8 e
Real GDP growth rate: change on previous year of GDP volume (%) 2.9 4.5 2.8 2.6 3.0 p 3.5 e
Employment growth (national accounts data), relative to the previous year (%) 6 3 - 6 - 1 : :
Labour productivity growth: growth in GDP (in volume) per person employed, relative to the previous year (%)
- 3 2 10 3 : :
Unit labour cost growth, relative to the previous year (%) : : : : : :
Nominal unit labour cost index based on persons (3 year % change) : : : : : :
Labour productivity per person employed: GDP (in PPS) per person employed relative to EU average (EU-27 = 100)
43 47 49 49 : :
Gross value added by main sectors
Agriculture, forestry and fisheries (%) 11.5 8.3 8.4 7.1 7.0 p 6.9 e
Industry (%) 17.3 19.7 19.7 20.6 20.6 p 20.2 e
Construction (%) 8.2 6.4 6.9 7.0 7.2 p 7.5 e
Services (%) 63.1 i 65.5 i 64.9 i 65.4 i 65.1 pi 65.5 i
Final consumption expenditure, as a share of GDP (%) 89.3 83.6 84.6 83.4 82.4 p 82.0 e
Gross fixed capital formation, as a share of GDP (%) 23.7 23.5 24.0 24.7 23.5 p 24.0 e
Exports of goods and services, relative to GDP (%) 43.4 65.4 72.8 67.4 61.7 p 59.6 e
Imports of goods and services, relative to GDP (%) 61.5 81.3 93.4 80.4 74.6 p 73.4 e
Gross fixed capital formation by the general government sector, as a percentage of GDP (%) : : : : : :
Business Note 2013 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
Industrial production volume index (2015 = 100) 87.6 100.0 99.8 100.4 96.8 98.6
Number of active enterprises (number) : 65 735 66 577 67 482 68 934 :
Birth rate: number of enterprise births in the reference period (t) divided by the number of enterprises active in t (%)
: 9.2 i 9.6 i 9.3 i 9.3 i :
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Death rate: number of enterprise deaths in the reference period (t) divided by the number of enterprises active in t (%)
: 7.9 i 6.3 i 6.2 i 15.0 i :
People employed in SMEs as a share of all persons employed (within the non-financial business economy) (%)
: 94.0 96.0 96.0 96.0 :
Value added by SMEs (in the non-financial business economy) (EUR million) : 3 967 4 537 5 132 5 633 :
Total value added (in the non-financial business economy) (EUR million) : 6 253 7 026 8 019 8 967 :
Inflation rate and house prices Note 2013 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
Consumer price index (CPI), change relative to the previous year (%) 2.7 d 3.4 d 14.0 d 9.0 d 4.2 d 4.3 d
Balance of payments Note 2013 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
Balance of payments: current account total (million euro) - 134.2 - 329.0 - 801.3 49.9 - 338.4 - 737.8
Balance of payments current account: trade balance (million euro) - 1 863.3 - 2 336.9 - 3 481.6 - 2 635.0 - 3 088.0 - 3 364.2
Balance of payments current account: net services (million euro) 375.0 497.9 748.5 730.7 1 056.6 1 019.9
Balance of payments current account: net balance for primary income (million euro) - 193.1 - 519.5 - 568.4 - 742.4 - 803.0 - 813.3
Balance of payments current account: net balance for secondary income (million euro) 1 547.3 2 029.4 2 500.2 2 696.6 2 496.0 2 419.8
Net balance for primary and secondary income: of which government transfers (million euro) 74.3 138.5 59.1 131.6 64.5 108.2
*3 year backward moving average of the current account balance relative to GDP (%) - 2.4 - 2.9 - 3.9 - 2.8 - 2.6 - 2.1
*Five year change in share of world exports of goods and services (%) : 25.8 18.3 13.4 2.5 2.9
Net balance (inward - outward) of foreign direct investment (FDI) (million euro) 229.4 w 387.5 w 654.2 w 488.1 w 1 036.8 w 247.3 w
Foreign direct investment (FDI) abroad (million euro) 22.8 w 83.0 w 90.8 w 89.7 w 159.7 w 220.2 w
of which FDI of the reporting economy in the EU-27 countries (million euro) : 59.7 67.3 84.7 106.0 :
Foreign direct investment (FDI) in the reporting economy (million euro) 252.2 w 470.5 w 745.0 w 577.7 w 1 196.5 w 467.5 w
of which FDI of the EU-27 countries in the reporting economy (million euro) : 449.7 519.6 486.9 748.0 :
*Net international investment position, relative to GDP (%) - 55.9 - 61.2 - 61.4 - 56.7 - 55.3 - 51.6
Year on year rate of change in gross inflow of remittances (in national currency) from migrant workers (%)
2.3 iw : : : : :
Public finance Note 2013 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
General government deficit / surplus, relative to GDP (%) : : : : : :
General government gross debt relative to GDP (%) : : : : : :
Total government revenues, as a percentage of GDP (%) : : : : : :
Total government expenditure, as a percentage of GDP (%) : : : : : :
Financial indicators Note 2013 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
Gross external debt of the whole economy, relative to GDP (%) 64.0 i 80.9 i 81.5 i 77.4 i 77.9 i 72.0 i
Gross external debt of the whole economy, relative to total exports (%) 147.9 w 123.0 w 112.0 w 114.9 w 126.4 w 120.8 w
Money supply: M1 (banknotes, coins, overnight deposits, million euro) 1 172.3 w 3 605.5 w 3 830.2 w 4 250.8 w 4 753.1 w 5 391.2 w
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Total credit by monetary financial institutions to residents (consolidated) (million euro) : 8 169.1 8 763.5 9 472.4 : :
*Annual change in financial sector liabilities (%) : 10.5 8.2 5.7 : :
*Private debt, consolidated, relative to GDP (%) : C C C C :
Interest rates: day-to-day money rate, per annum (%) 1.86 w 0.94 w 1.08 w 3.88 w 2.16 w 4.08 w
Euro exchange rates: average of period (1 euro = … national currency) 61.585 61.636 61.623 61.559 61.517 61.589
Trade-weighted effective exchange rate index, 42 countries (2015 = 100) : : : : : :
*3 year change (T/T-3) in the trade-weighted effective exchange rate index, 42 countries (2015 = 100)
: : : : : :
Value of reserve assets (including gold) (million euro) : 304.7 271.6 603.1 318.7 - 368.7
External trade in goods Note 2013 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
Value of imports: all goods, all partners (million euro) 4 983 9 647 12 126 11 149 11 066 11 545
Value of exports: all goods, all partners (million euro) 3 235 6 969 8 300 8 323 7 784 8 008
Trade balance: all goods, all partners (million euro) - 1 748 - 2 678 - 3 826 - 2 826 - 3 282 - 3 537
Terms of trade (export price index / import price index * 100) (number) 1) 98.2 iw 100.0 iw 99.0 iw : : :
Share of exports to EU-27 countries in value of total exports (%) 70.8 iw 77.1 iw 78.3 iw 78.7 iw 76.9 iw :
Share of imports from EU-27 countries in value of total imports (%) 51.7 iw 46.2 iw 46.8 iw 49.2 iw 50.5 iw :
Demography Note 2013 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
Crude rate of natural change of population (natural growth rate): number of births minus deaths (per thousand inhabitants)
1.9 e - 5.1 - 2.4 - 1.9 - 2.3 - 2.4
Infant mortality rate deaths of children under one year of age (per thousand live births) 10.2 4.6 : 1.9 : :
Life expectancy at birth: male (years) 73.4 71.1 b : : : :
Life expectancy at birth: female (years) 77.5 75.5 b : : : :
Labour market Note 2013 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
Economic activity rate for persons aged 20–64: proportion of the population aged 20–64 that is economically active (%)
70.4 72.3 b 72.1 71.0 71.3 71.9
Employment rate for persons aged 20–64: proportion of the population aged 20–64 that are in employment (%)
50.3 61.2 b 61.8 61.7 62.7 63.7
Male employment rate for persons aged 20–64 (%) 59.7 70.8 b 71.8 70.7 71.7 73.1
Female employment rate for persons aged 20–64 (%) 40.7 51.6 b 51.7 52.7 53.7 54.4
Employment rate for persons aged 55–64: proportion of the population aged 55–64 that are in employment (%)
37.9 48.5 b 49.1 50.1 50.6 50.2
Employment by main sectors
Agriculture, forestry and fisheries (%) 18.7 i 11.8 bi 10.0 i 7.8 i 9.0 i 10.0 i
Industry (%) 23.5 i 23.0 bi 23.8 i 23.7 i 23.9 i 22.2 i
Construction (%) 6.9 i 6.5 bi 6.5 i 7.3 i 6.7 i 6.7 i
Services (%) 50.9 i 58.7 bi 59.7 i 61.2 i 60.4 i 61.2 i
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People employed in the public sector as a share of total employment, persons aged 20–64 (%)
: : : : : :
People employed in the private sector as a share of total employment, persons aged 20–64 (%)
: : : : : :
Unemployment rate: proportion of the labour force that is unemployed (%) 29.0 15.5 b 14.4 13.1 12.3 11.5
Male unemployment rate (%) 29.0 16.7 b 15.7 14.3 13.3 12.2
Female unemployment rate (%) 29.0 13.7 b 12.5 11.4 11.0 10.6
Youth unemployment rate: proportion of the labour force aged 15–24 that is unemployed (%) 51.9 36.1 b 32.7 29.4 28.9 29.4
Long-term unemployment rate: proportion of the labour force that has been unemployed for 12 months or more (%)
23.9 13.1 b 12.0 9.4 8.0 7.8
Unemployment rate for persons (aged 25–64) having completed at most lower secondary education (ISCED levels 0-2) (%)
33.2 23.1 b 21.4 18.4 18.1 15.6
Unemployment rate for persons (aged 25–64) having completed tertiary education (ISCED levels 5-8) (%)
20.1 9.8 b 9.0 8.1 6.8 7.3
Social cohesion Note 2013 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
Average nominal monthly wages and salaries (national currency) 21 145 w 28 718 w 31 859 w 36 614 w 41 239 w 45 198 w
Index of real wages and salaries (index of nominal wages and salaries divided by the inflation index) (2016 = 100)
78 w 106 w 117 w 135 w 152 w 166 w
Gini coefficient : 30 b 30 30 29 :
Poverty gap 39.0 35.9 b 31.8 35.0 31.3 :
Standard of living Note 2013 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
Number of passenger cars relative to population size (number per thousand population) 168.0 e 260.0 264.0 303.0 318.0 338.0
Infrastructure Note 2013 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
Density of railway network (lines in operation per thousand km²) 27.5 i 26.9 i 26.9 i 26.9 i 26.9 i :
Length of motorways (kilometres) 259 335 335 335 335 :
Education, Innovation and Research Note 2013 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
Percentage of persons aged 30-34 with a tertiary education level (ISCED 2011 levels 5 to 8) 23.1 35.0 b 35.7 35.5 39.3 38.8
Percentage of persons aged 30-34 with a tertiary education level (ISCED 2011 levels 5 to 8), males
20.7 30.8 b 30.6 31.4 32.5 34.1
Percentage of persons aged 30-34 with a tertiary education level (ISCED 2011 levels 5 to 8), females
25.6 39.4 b 41.0 39.8 46.3 43.6
Participation in early childhood education (children aged 3 and over) 29.7 35.1 42.4 b 46.1 48.3 :
Participation in early childhood education (children aged 3 and over), males 29.4 35.2 41.4 b 46.2 47.3 :
Participation in early childhood education (children aged 3 and over), females 30.0 35.0 43.4 b 46.1 49.4 :
Low achieving 15-year-olds in reading (%) : : 73.6 : : :
Low achieving 15-year-olds in mathematics (%) : : 66.2 : : :
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Low achieving 15-year-olds in science (%) : : 65.3 : : :
Early leavers from education and training: proportion of persons aged 18-24 with at most lower secondary education (at most ISCED 2011 level 2) who are not in further education or training
11.4 6.1 b 6.2 8.4 8.0 9.5
Early leavers from education and training: proportion of men aged 18-24 with at most lower secondary education (at most ISCED 2011 level 2) who are not in further education or training
9.1 5.4 b 5.5 8.6 8.9 10.4
Early leavers from education and training: proportion of women aged 18-24 with at most lower secondary education (at most ISCED 2011 level 2) who are not in further education or training
13.9 6.9 b 6.9 8.2 7.0 8.5
Proportion of persons aged 25-64 having participated in education and training (last 4 weeks)
3.7 2.2 b 2.7 2.5 2.8 2.6
Proportion of persons aged 25-64 having participated in education and training (last 4 weeks), men
3.9 2.2 b 2.5 2.7 2.4 2.3
Proportion of persons aged 25-64 having participated in education and training (last 4 weeks), women
3.6 2.3 b 2.8 2.4 3.1 3.0
Exposure of vocational education and training (VET) graduates to work-based learning (% of population aged 20-34)
: : : 4.4 : :
Share of individuals having at least basic digital skills (% of population aged 16-74) : 34.6 : : : 28.5
Share of individuals having at least basic digital skills (% of population aged 16-74), males : 38.1 : : : 27.6
Share of individuals having at least basic digital skills (% of population aged 16-74), females : 31.1 : : : 29.7
Public expenditure on education relative to GDP (%) : : : : : :
Gross domestic expenditure on R&D relative to GDP (%) : : 0.37 0.37 : :
Government budget appropriations or outlays on R&D (GBAORD), as a percentage of GDP (%)
0.02 : : : : :
Percentage of households who have internet access at home (%) 65.1 83.7 : : 90.8 91.2
Environment Note 2013 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
Index of greenhouse gas emissions, CO2 equivalent (1990 = 100) 90.6 w 81.7 w 87.3 w : : :
Energy intensity of the economy (kg of oil equivalent per 1 000 euro GDP at 2015 constant prices)
330.1 266.5 265.1 257.7 235.7 :
Electricity generated from renewable sources relative to gross electricity consumption (%) 18.2 22.8 25.9 32.3 40.1 :
Road share of inland freight transport (based on tonne-km) (%) 92.4 w 96.8 w 98.1 w 98.8 w 98.8 w :
Energy Note 2013 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
Primary production of all energy products (thousand TOE) 1 425 886 1 040 961 861 :
Primary production of crude oil (thousand TOE) 0 0 0 0 0 :
Primary production of solid fuels (thousand TOE) 1 053 552 710 573 453 :
Primary production of gas (thousand TOE) 0 0 0 0 0 :
Net imports of all energy products (thousand TOE) 1 300 i 1 822 i 1 733 i 1 713 i 1 664 i :
Gross inland energy consumption (thousand TOE) 2 783 2 676 2 736 2 728 2 569 :
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Gross electricity generation (GWh) 6 094 5 532 5 942 6 890 6 305 :
Agriculture Note 2013 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
Agricultural output volume index (at producer prices) (2015 = 100) 92.7 w 92.2 w 101.9 w 87.8 w : :
Utilised agricultural area (thousand hectares) 1 260.3 1 268.8 1 265.1 1 258.6 1 249.2 :
Livestock numbers: live bovine animals (thousand heads, end of period) 238.0 178.0 165.0 149.0 144.0 142.7
Livestock numbers: live swine (thousand heads, end of period) 167.0 186.0 182.0 193.0 180.0 212.8
Livestock numbers: live sheep and live goats (thousand heads, end of period) 807.0 i 709.0 i 726.0 i 673.0 i 615.0 i :
Raw milk available on farms (thousand tonnes) : 389.2 388.0 291.7 : :
Harvested crop production: cereals (including rice) (thousand tonnes) 568.4 568.9 548.4 529.0 538.3 :
Harvested crop production: sugar beet (thousand tonnes) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Harvested crop production: vegetables (thousand tonnes) 686.8 798.0 p 803.1 742.6 790.3 748.7
Source: Eurostat and/or the statistical authorities in North Macedonia
: = not available b = break in time series C = confidential value d = definition differs e = estimated p = provisional i = Eurostat estimate w= data supplied by and under the responsibility of the national statistical authority and published on an "as is" basis and without any assurance as regards their quality and adherence to EU statistical methodology * = Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure (MIP) indicator
Footnotes:
1) Laspeyres unit value index. 2021 = 100.
105
EN EN
EUROPEAN COMMISSION
Brussels, 4.11.2026 SWD(2026) 694 final
COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT
Montenegro 2026 Report
Accompanying the document
COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN
PARLIAMENT, THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL
COMMITTEE AND THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS
2026 Communication on EU enlargement policy
{COM(2026) 690 final} - {SWD(2026) 690 final} - {SWD(2026) 691 final} -
{SWD(2026) 692 final} - {SWD(2026) 693 final} - {SWD(2026) 695 final} - {SWD(2026) 696 final} - {SWD(2026) 697 final} - {SWD(2026) 698 final} -
{SWD(2026) 699 final} - {SWD(2026) 700 final}
1
Contents
1. Introduction ......................................................................................................................................... 3
1.1. Context ......................................................................................................................................... 3
1.2. Main findings of the report ......................................................................................................... 3
1.3 State of play of the accession negotiations ................................................................................ 20
2. Cluster 1: The fundamentals of the accession process ..................................................................... 21
2.1. Functioning of democratic institutions and public administration reform ............................... 21
2.1.1 Democracy ........................................................................................................................... 21
2.1.2. Public administration reform .............................................................................................. 24
2.2. Rule of law and fundamental rights ........................................................................................... 26
2.2.1 Chapter 23: Judiciary and fundamental rights ................................................................ 26
2.2.2 Chapter 24: Justice, freedom and security ..................................................................... 46
2.3 Economic criteria ................................................................................................................... 59
2.3.1. The existence of a functioning market economy ............................................................... 59
2.3.2. The capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the EU .......... 64
2.4. Public procurement, statistics and financial control ................................................................. 66
Chapter 5: Public procurement .................................................................................................... 66
Chapter 18: Statistics .................................................................................................................... 67
Chapter 32: Financial control ........................................................................................................ 68
3. Good neighbourly relations and regional cooperation ................................................................ 69
4. Resilience, security, defence ............................................................................................................ 71
5. Ability to assume the obligations of membership ................................................................. 72
Cluster 2: Internal Market ................................................................................................................. 72
Chapter 1: Free movement of goods ............................................................................................ 73
Chapter 2: Freedom of movement for workers ........................................................................... 75
Chapter 3: Right of establishment and freedom to provide services ........................................... 75
Chapter 4: Free movement of capital ........................................................................................... 76
Chapter 6: Company law .............................................................................................................. 77
Chapter 7: Intellectual property law............................................................................................. 77
Chapter 8: Competition policy ...................................................................................................... 78
Chapter 9: Financial services ........................................................................................................ 79
Chapter 28: Consumer and health protection .............................................................................. 80
Cluster 3: Competitiveness and inclusive growth ............................................................................. 82
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Chapter 10: Digital transformation and media ............................................................................. 82
Chapter 16: Taxation .................................................................................................................... 83
Chapter 17: Economic and monetary policy................................................................................. 84
Chapter 19: Social policy and employment .................................................................................. 85
Chapter 20: Enterprise and industrial policy ................................................................................ 86
Chapter 25: Science and research ................................................................................................ 87
Chapter 26: Education and culture ............................................................................................... 88
Chapter 29: Customs union .......................................................................................................... 90
Cluster 4: The Green agenda and sustainable connectivity .............................................................. 91
Chapter 14: Transport policy ........................................................................................................ 91
Chapter 15: Energy ....................................................................................................................... 93
Chapter 21: Trans-European networks ......................................................................................... 94
Chapter 27: Environment and climate change ............................................................................. 95
Cluster 5: Resources, agriculture and cohesion ................................................................................ 98
Chapter 11: Agriculture and rural development .......................................................................... 98
Chapter 12: Food safety, veterinary and phytosanitary policy .................................................... 98
Chapter 13: Fisheries and aquaculture ....................................................................................... 101
Chapter 22: Regional policy and coordination of structural instruments .................................. 101
Chapter 33: Financial and budgetary provisions ........................................................................ 103
Cluster 6: External relations ............................................................................................................ 103
Chapter 30: External relations .................................................................................................... 103
Chapter 31: Foreign, security and defence policy ...................................................................... 104
Annex I – Relations between the EU and Montenegro .................................................................. 107
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1. INTRODUCTION1
1.1. CONTEXT
Accession negotiations with Montenegro were opened in June 2012. To date, all 33 negotiating chapters have been opened, of which 21 have been provisionally closed. During the reporting period, Montenegro has provisionally closed 14 negotiating chapters. The Council established thead hoc working party on drafting the Accession Treaty with Montenegro in April 2026. In June 2026, the Commission presented a draft financial package, followed by the adoption of conclusions by the Council on 12 October 2026. In the Commission’s assessment, all closing benchmarks have been met and Montenegro has therefore reached the final stage of accession negotiations. These important achievements are the result of the continued political commitment of the Montenegrin authorities to the strategic goal of European integration, which has been consistently stated as the key priority for the country, and to implementing the related reforms. Building on a whole of society approach, it is essential that the current momentum is sustained with focused and cross- party efforts to ensure that preparations for EU membership are completed in time.
Montenegro continued to implement the Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA), and meetings of the joint bodies under the agreement took place at regular intervals.
Montenegro has actively engaged in and continued to deliver on the implementation of the Growth Plan for the Western Balkans across its four pillars of gradual integration with the EU: the single market, regional economic integration, fundamental reforms and increased financial support. Under the Reform and Growth Facility2, a performance-based EU instrument supporting the EU accession process, Montenegro has been implementing its Reform Agenda adopted in September 2024.
The Commission’s 2026 rule of law report3 covered Montenegro for the third time.
1.2. MAIN FINDINGS OF THE REPORT
CLUSTER 1: THE FUNDAMENTALS OF THE ACCESSION PROCESS
Democracy
The legal and institutional framework provides a basis for the democratic conduct of elections. Following the adoption of amendments to the Law on the election of the President, to the Law on the Election of Councillors and Members of Parliament and to the Law on the Financing of Political Entities and Election Campaigns, Montenegro’s legal framework is broadly aligned with European and international democratic standards, as well as the EU acquis. Some efforts are still needed to address key outstanding recommendations by the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe / Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (OSCE/ODIHR) and GRECO. The procedure for appointing the President and the members of the Central Electoral Commission is ongoing.
1 This report covers the period from 1 September 2025 to 1 September 2026. It is based on input from a variety of sources, including contributions from the government of Montenegro, EU Member States, European Parliament reports and information from various international and non-governmental organisations. It also includes the results of comparative assessments and indices produced by other stakeholders, in particular in the area of rule of law.
The report uses the following assessment scale to describe the state of play: early stage, some level of preparation, moderately prepared, good level of preparation and well advanced. To describe progress made during the reporting period, it uses the following scale: backsliding, no progress, limited progress, some progress, good progress and very good progress. Where appropriate, interim steps have also been used. 2 OJ L, 2024/1449, 24.5.2024. 3 2026 Rule of Law Report (17 July 2026), SWD (2026) 929 final, Country Chapter on the rule of law
situation in Montenegro.
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Parliament can exercise its powers, including control of the executive and involvement in the legislative process, in an overall effective way. In the first part of the reporting period, cross- party cooperation facilitated a steady adoption of EU-related legislation. Following a cross- party agreement brokered in July 2026, Parliament adopted by a large majority a first set of constitutional amendements strenghtening the independence of the Judicial and Prosecutorial Council as well as that of the Central Bank. It also successfully delivered on a number of key commitments aimed at advancing the EU accession process. It notably completed the electoral reform, adopted amendments to the Law on Internal Affairs and the Law on the National Security Agency, established cross-party oversight bodies, appointed the pending two Constitutional Court judges and adopted numerous EU accession-related laws in several extra-ordinary sessions. Opposition parties suspended their cooperation with the government and ruling majority in September after Parliament Speaker sent condolences to the son of convicted war criminal Ratko Mladić following his death. A debate and vote for his dismissal were held in October, and the attempt to remove him failed.
The legislative process continued to depend heavily on urgent procedures, particularly for EU accession-related legislation.
The institutions in charge of the EU integration process are in place and coordinate the country’s EU accession negotiations satisfactorily. Montenegro demonstrated its focus on the EU integration agenda.
Despite one party’s withdrawal from the coalition in early 2026, the government delivered its policies in a broadly stable environment, and has prioritised EU accession as its central objective. It took steps to strengthen the legislative framework regulating the executive’s role, including by adopting a Law on Government, which has yet to be approved by Parliament.
Civil society, including human rights defenders, overall operate in an enabling environment. The main legal and institutional framework for civil society is in place.The involvement of civil society in policymaking is formally institutionalised but is sometimes limited to a procedural formality. In December 2025, the Council for cooperation between the government and non- governmental organisations resumed its work for the first time since October 2021. The practice of issuing calls for proposals to finance civil society-led projects is not implemented consistently across ministries.
Public administration reform
Montenegro has a good level of preparation in the area of public administration reform and has made good progress notably by adopting the Law on free access to information, the Law on Local Self Government the Law on Local Civil Servants, the Law on budget and fiscal responsibility as well as related secondary legislation on the Law on civil servants and state employees for the central civil service. Montenegro needs to continue efforts in further strengthening the management and planning of human resources for regular filling of vacancies and the application of a new competency framework.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were broadly implemented. In the coming year, Montenegro should in particular:
→ further strengthen the coordination of public administration reform through effective monitoring, and stronger political steering, implement effectively the Law on free access to information, and establish a functional system of administrative supervision;
→ reinforce a professional, merit-based civil service by consistently applying merit-based recruitment throughout the new competence framework, reducing acting appointments and non-standard employment, improving human resources planning and monitoring, and strengthening performance management and professional development systems;
→ ensure effective implementation of the new legal provisions strengthening the medium- term budgetary framework, including through the adoption and application of the relevant bylaws and methodologies concerning the budget calendar, costing of strategic documents, linkages between strategic planning and budgeting, periodic budget- execution reporting, and preparation of the citizens’ budget.
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Chapter 23 - Judiciary and fundamental rights
Montenegro has a good level of preparation in applying the EU acquis and European standards in this area, and has made good progress overall. Particular focus should now be placed on the effective enforcement of the legislative reforms, further strengthening administrative capacity in the areas of the judiciary, the fight against corruption, media freedom and fundamental rights.
Functioning of the judiciary
Montenegro’s judicial system has a good level of preparation and has made good progress. Montenegro adopted constitutional amendments, strengthening the independence of the Judicial and Prosecutorial Councils, fully in line with EU and Venice Commission recommendations. In addition, Montenegro adopted amendments to the Law on the Judicial Council and Judges, the Law on the State Prosecution Service, and the Law on the Special State Prosecutor’s Office, addressing recommendations from the European Commission, the Venice Commission and GRECO. Montenegro appointed judges to the Constitutional Court, restoring its full composition and strengthening its effective functioning. Furthermore, two lay members to the Judicial Council and three lay members to the Prosecutorial Council were appointed, improving effective functioning. The institutional stability and leadership of the Supreme Court, Supreme State Prosecution Office, and Special Prosecution Officewas further improved through targeted reforms.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were mostly implemented. In the coming year, Montenegro should, in particular:
→ enforce effectively the constitutional amendments by harmonising secondary legislation, namely the Law on the Judicial Council and Judges and the Law on the State Prosecution Service, and appoint members of the Judicial and Prosecutorial Councils;
→ continue to strengthen judicial independence and ensure full and effective implementation of the improved strategic and legal framework, including the Constitution, in line with the EU acquis and European standards on judicial independence and accountability, irremovability, impartiality, integrity, efficiency and professionalism of the judicial system;
→ continue improving the overall efficiency of the justice system, including by strengthening the human, financial, infrastructure and ICT capacity of the justice system and by ensuring the full implementation of the Plan for rationalisation of the court system and the Judicial Digitalisation Strategy.
Fight against corruption
Montenegro has a good level of preparation in the fight against corruption. Good progress was made on the implementation of reforms. The process to adopt two sets of amendments to the Constitution is ongoing. Two out of three votes have taken place in Parliament to adopt a constitutional amendment removing immunity for the Prime Minister and ministers covering all corruption-related offences. In addition, Parliament held a first of three required votes on a constitutional amendment responding to a key recommendation of the Venice Commission, by introducing prior integrity checks for prime ministerial and ministerial nominees. Both amendments have yet to be finally adopted by Parliament. This will be a major achievement, addressing longstanding GRECO and Venice Commission recommendations. Parliament adopted amendments to the legal framework regulating the funding of political parties and electoral campaigns to address key GRECO and OSCE/ODIHR recommendations regarding its scope, clarity and implementation. In addition, Montenegro adopted amendments to the Law on prevention of corruption and the Criminal Procedure Code, as well as a new Law on Whistleblower Protection and a new Law on Confiscation, in line with European standards and best practice, and addressing Venice Commission and GRECO recommendations. A new full-term Director of the Anti-corruption Agency was appointed, ensuring its improved functioning. The institutional framework for preventing and fighting corruption is in place. Human resources and capacities in the fight against corruption have increased but further
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resources are needed for the Special State Prosecution Office. The fight against corruption track record improved with regard to final rulings and convictions in high-level corruption cases, and the complexity of investigations and indictments demonstrates the commitment of the prosecution and law enforcement to tackle the most serious cases. The effectiveness and coordination of prosecutorial and law-enforcement institutions in the area of corruption continued to improve. However, the number of final convictions remains low and needs to increase. Additional efforts are needed to accelerate the implementation of the strategic framework.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were largely implemented. In the coming year, Montenegro should, in particular:
→ continue the full and effective implementation of the improved strategic and legal frameworks (including the final adoption of the constitutional amendments); strengthen prevention, transparency and accountability in high-risk areas, including by ensuring the operational capacity and financial independence of the Agency for the Prevention of Corruption;
→ continue to improve the track record on proactive corruption investigations, prosecutions and convictions, in particular as regards high-level corruption. Montenegro should urgently strengthen the effective enforcement of existing criminal legislation by the State Prosecution Service and courts, ensuring effective and deterrent penalties, addressing delays in criminal proceedings, and urgently improving the human resources and working conditions of the Special State Prosecutor’s Office, the Special Police Department and the Special Department of the High Court in Podgorica;
→ ensure full enforcement of the improved legal framework on the funding of political parties and electoral campaigns, addressing the key recommendations identified by the OSCE/ODIHR and GRECO, and continue its alignment with the EU acquis and European standards.
Fundamental rights
The legislative and institutional framework on fundamental rights is largely in place and Montenegro continues to largely meet its international obligations on human rights. However, more effort is needed to fully implement this framework and to ensure access to justice and enforcement of rights in administrative and judicial proceedings, in particular for groups in vulnerable situation. Montenegro needs to continue aligning the legal framework with the EU acquis and European standards. The groups in most vulnerable situation in society (including Roma4 and Egyptians, people with minority racial or ethnic background, persons with disabilities, LGBTIQ+ persons) continued to be subjected to discrimination, hate speech and hate crime.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were partially implemented and some remain valid. In the coming year Montenegro needs, in particular, to:
→ continue to make substantial progress in implementing all pending recommendations from the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment (CPT), the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI) and the Group of Experts on Action against Violence against Women and Domestic Violence (GREVIO);
→ make additional efforts in implementing the Strategy for the Advancement of the Status of Roma and Egyptians in Montenegro, and meet commitments made under the Poznan Declaration;
→ ensure the full enforcement of the new GDPR-compatible law and a law aligning with the Law Enforcement Directive, including the alignment of the national framework with the
4 In line with the terminology of the European institutions the umbrella term ‘Roma’ is used here to refer to a number of different groups, without denying the specificities of these groups.
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new legislation; fully enforce and further amend the new Law on the Ombudsperson’s Office in line with the EU acquis and European and international standards.
Freedom of expression and media freedom
Montenegro has a good level of preparation in the area of freedom of expression. Good progress was achieved on the implementation of reforms. Montenegro continues to uphold a zero-tolerance policy on violence against journalists and media workers, while dedicated legislation on lawsuits against public participation (SLAPPs) must be adopted. Media ownership transparency improved through the public registry, with gaps for online media. Parliament appointed new members to the Council of the Radio and Television of Montenegro (RTCG) and to the Council of the Agency for Audiovisual Media Services (AMU). A new Law aligning with the EU Digital Services Act Directive was adopted. Access to information must be effectively guaranteed through the full implementation of the improved legal framework. The national media strategy continued to be implemented, and Montenegro continues to enjoy a pluralistic media environment and provides adequate legal guarantees for the freedom of expression and an enabling environment for the media to operate freely, independently and professionally. While media ownership transparency improved, concerns about external strong influence over media in Montenegro have increased.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were fully implemented. In the coming year, Montenegro needs, in particular, to:
→ continue providing prompt and effective law enforcement and judicial protection for journalists against all forms of violence, while prioritising investigations and judicial follow- up in critical cold cases;
→ ensure full implementation of the media legal framework, and ensure that any future legislative amendments preserve the progress achieved, particularly with regard to safeguarding the independence of the two Councils;
→ ensure continued implementation of all media-related legislation and further align national media legislation with the EU acquis, including the European Media Freedom Act.
Chapter 24 - Justice, freedom and security
Montenegro has a good level of preparation in the area of justice, freedom and security. Good progress was made, in particular on visa policy alignment, and in developing border management capacities with the installation of new equipment and the completion of new infrastructure and the recruitment of new personnel in the border police. Montenegro amended its decree on visa policy to bring it fully into line with the EU list of visa required third countries as of 31 October 2026.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were broadly implemented. In the coming year, Montenegro should, in particular:
→ further strengthen border management capacity with the completion of border management infrastructure and procurement of border surveillance equipment;
→ take decisive steps to increase and improve reception capacities for applicants for international protection;
→ mitigate the risks of corruption and the infiltration of organised crime in law-enforcement agencies, including in the border police and the judiciary, by implementing a robust prevention and integrity policy and by providing a stringent judicial response to detected cases;
Fight against serious and organised crime
Montenegro has a good level of preparation in the fight against serious and organised crime. Good progress was made with the appointment with a full mandate of the Director of Police in December 2025 and appointment of four deputy-directors of police in July 2026 as well as with the hiring of additional officers for the Special Police Unit, the Asset Recovery
8
Office, the Financial Intelligence Unit and Assest Managemet Office. Construction was completed in April 2026 of the long-awaited new premises for the Special State Prosecutor’s Office and the Special Police Department.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were largely implemented. In the coming year, Montenegro should, in particular:
→ increase the efficiency of the prosecution/adjudication of cases of serious and organised crime, especially money laundering cases; address the lengthiness of trials and frequent adjournments in organised crime cases; ensure the application by the courts and prosecution of key legal concepts, such as stand-alone money laundering (independent of the predicate crime) and quality of evidence; and ensure the seizure and confiscation of criminal assets by systematically tracking money flows, and by carrying out special investigative measures efficiently and consistently using an extended confiscation procedure;
→ fill the remaining vacancies in the Special Police Unit, the Special State Prosecutor’s Office (SPO), Podgorica High Court, the Asset Management Office (AMO) and Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU) and reorganise the Special Investigative Measure (SIM) division;
→ ensure that all confiscated goods (including narcotics) are systematically inventoried according to a standardised methodology.
ECONOMIC CRITERIA
The existence of a functioning market economy
Montenegro has made good progress and reached a good level of preparation in developing a functioning market economy.
The recently announced ‘Euro Model’ reforms may pose significant risks to the sustainability of public finances and the external balance, which remain nonetheless to be assessed further, notably following on-going consultations with the stakeholders. Economic growth slowed down amid a continued weak export performance in 2025, before picking up in the second quarter of 2026. The budget deficit overshot the 2025 target, and fiscal vulnerabilities remain due to ineffective fiscal rules, a high level of mandatory spending and high debt rollover needs. The fiscal governance framework has been strengthened, notably through the establishment of the Fiscal Council. The large current account deficit persisted with only about a third of it covered by FDI inflows. The labour market situation continued to improve, even though structural problems persist, such as high rates of youth and long-term unemployment. The banking sector remained well capitalised and liquid while credit growth picked up. Good progress was made in improving the business environment and advancing the reform of state-owned enterprises (SOEs).
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were mostly implemented. To improve the functioning of the market economy, Montenegro should in particular:
→ contain public spending, including by anchoring the wage bill in a medium-term framework, and implement measures to raise revenues to ensure compliance with the fiscal rules;
→ task the Fiscal Council to review the 2027 budget proposal;
→ implement the new Laws on SOEs and on budget and fiscal responsibility.
The capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the EU
Montenegro has made good progress and is between a moderate and a good level of preparation to cope with competitive pressure and market forces in the EU. The authorities continued to implement reforms in the education system, which faces numerous challenges. Efforts to advance the green and digital transitions have continued. The diversification of Montenegro’s narrow production base remains a challenge. The economy is driven by
9
services, in particular tourism, which together with the small size of local companies and their low level of exports, constrain productivity growth and the competitiveness of local firms.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were mostly implemented. In the coming year, Montenegro should in particular:
→ continue implementing digital public services for the public and businesses, and align the use of digital tools with the EU legislation;
→ ensure the implementation of the Education Reform Strategy (2025-2035), including the strengthening of work-based learning in higher education and further improvements across education and training systems;
→ implementing the National Energy and Climate Plan, including preparations for coal phase-out.
Chapter 5: Public procurement
Montenegro has a good level of preparation in the area of public procurement. Some progress was achieved.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were partially implemented. In the coming year Montenegro should in particular:
→ continue to improve the administrative and technical capacity of the Directorate for Managing Public Investments and Public Procurement Policy and train and re-certify public procurement officers;
→ introduce and implement a ‘red flag’ system in the electronic procurement system to detect irregularities in public procurement procedures (fraud, collusion, coercion, obstruction, conflict of interest and other corrupt actions);
→ ensure that the implementation of intergovernmental agreements with the United Arab Emirates and other countries does not contravene or circumvent the EU acquis on public procurement.
Chapter 18: Statistics
Montenegro has a good level of preparation in the area of statistics. Overall, good progress was made, including on submissions of data related to government finance statistics and excessive deficit procedure tables, development of methodological aspects, as well as on increasing the production and dissemination of statistics from other domains, in line with the EU acquis. Montenegro adopted a roadmap on 9 July 2026 outlining the timing of producing and transmitting the remaining tables of the European System of Accounts (ESA) Transmission Programme and other relevant data and addressing pending methodological issues.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were mostly implemented. In the coming year Montenegro should in particular:
→ continue to roll-out the roadmap for the implementation of the remaining ESA 2010 transmission programme requirements and the resolution of the remaining methodological issues in the fields of excessive deficit procedure and government finance statistics;
→ continue improving administrative capacities and human resources of the Statistical Office of Montenegro (MONSTAT) in line with the action plan for strengthening the administrative capacities of MONSTAT
Chapter 32: Financial control
Montenegro has a good level of preparation in the area of financial control. Good progress was made, allowing for the chapter to be provisionally closed in January 2026. Montenegro has undertaken efforts to ensure the further improvement and implementation of the regulatory framework on public internal financial control (PIFC). Montenegro also
10
operationalised the budget inspection function at the Ministry of Finance, clarifying roles and responsibilities with respect to internal audit functions, and has strengthened the internal audit of SOEs. Effective delegation of administrative and financial authority is only done to a moderate extent and continues to be streamlined across all line ministries. External audit reforms have continued; Parliament made appointments to fill the vacant seats in the Senate and elected the President of the Senate of the State Audit Institution (SAI), strengthening its functional independence. Montenegro ensured compliance with the EU acquis through a modification of the Criminal Code on the protection of the EU’s financial interests in line with the PIF Directive.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were fully implemented. In the coming year Montenegro should:
→ continue to strengthen the operational framework for PIFC by further developing managerial accountability and implementing the Law on internal governance and financial control, as well as by strengthening the administrative capacity of internal audit units;
→ further improve the implementation of the findings and recommendations of the SAI and continue to strengthen its administrative capacity, notably by filling the vacancies;
→ continue strengthening the network of anti-fraud bodies by improving its administrative capacities and continue implementing the action plan of the current national anti-fraud strategy.
CLUSTER 2: INTERNAL MARKET
Chapter 1: Free movement of goods
Montenegro hasa good level of preparation in the free movement of goods. Very good progress was made on alignment with the EU acquis on medicinal products for human and veterinary use, medical devices, machinery, motor vehicles and several other product sectors, on market accreditation and surveillance, and on improving the capacity of the bodies working on the EU acquis on chemicals.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were largely implemented. In the coming year, Montenegro should in particular:
→ complete its alignment with the legislation on the European Medicines Agency’s reinforced role in crisis preparedness and management, and complete its alignment with the ‘variations framework’ of medicinal products for human use;
→ in the field of falsified medicines, establish the necessary governance, complete alignment and implement a compatible IT system to be able to comply with EU laws concerning the European Medicines Verification Organisation (EMVO) to ensure implementation of all legal provisions as of accession;
→ continue to strengthen the human and financial capacities of its quality infrastructure and complete the requirements for the national standards body to become a full Member of the European Committee for Standardisation and the European Committee for Electrotechnical Standardisation (CENELEC), and address the non-conformities identified in the last European Cooperation for Accreditation peer review.
Chapter 2: Freedom of movement for workers
Montenegro is between a moderate and a good level of preparation in the area of freedom of movement for workers. Good progress was made on alignment with the acquis, on setting up the institutional and technical structures for Montenegro’s future participation in the European Network of Employment Services (EURES) and the Electronic Exchange of Social Security Information (EESSI) systems, and on preparing to implement the European Health Insurance Card (EHIC) by adopting the Action Plan for the Coordination of Social Security Systems as well as the decision on designating the National Access Point for the EESSI system. The chapter was provisionally closed in June 2026.
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The Commission’s recommendations from last year were largely implemented. In the coming year, Montenegro should in particular:
→ strengthen the administrative and technical capacity of the Employment Agency to ensure active labour market policies are relevant and evidence-based,and continue the preparatory work to join EURES upon accession;
→ strengthen the administrative, technical and financial capacities of the competent authorities in view of the correct application of the acquis, and continue to introduce and upgrade IT systems as necessary, training staff, and defining the roles and responsibilities of participating institutions to ensure full operational readiness for the EESSI system by the date of accession;
→ improve the existing Integrated Health Information System and adapt it for the issuance and application of the EHIC, equip the Health Insurance Fund of Montenegro with adequate technical and administrative capacities and resources as well as ensure appropriate budget allocation for future reimbursements by the date of accession.
Chapter 3: Right of establishment and freedom to provide services
Montenegro has a good level of preparation in the area of the right of establishment and freedom to provide services. The chapter was provisionally closed in December 2025. Some progress was made during the reporting period, by updating the Point of Single Contact (PSC) portal through the incorporation of an integrated inventory of services covered by the EU Service Directive. The chapter was provisionally closed in December 2025.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were largely implemented. In the coming year, Montenegro should in particular:
→ step up efforts in strengthening administrative capacities and preparing digital readiness for the use of the Internal Market Information (IMI) system to ensure full operational administrative cooperation with the competent authorities of other Member States upon accession;
→ complete its alignment with Directive 2005/36/EC beyond minimum training requirements; ensure that the country’s existing training programmes for nurses responsible for general care, dental practitioners, medical doctors and pharmacists fully align with the EU’s minimum training requirements; for architects, ensure compliance for those training programmes that would in the future benefit from automatic recognition;
→ intensify efforts to strengthen institutional capacity by establishing the organisational structure and training of the competent authorities that handle the recognition of professional qualifications.
Chapter 4: Free movement of capital
Montenegro has a good level of preparation in this area and made some progress during the reporting period. The chapter was provisionally closed in December 2025.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were partially implemented. In the coming year, Montenegro should in particular:
→ remove restrictions on the acquisition of agricultural land by non-EU or EEA nationals;
→ finalise alignment with the outstanding provisions of the EU acquis on anti-money laundering and countering the financing of terrorism;
→ continue to improve the supervisory capacity and reinforce controls in the area of the fight against money laundering and the financing of terrorism.
Chapter 6: Company law
Montenegro is between having a good level of preparation and being well advanced in the areas of company law and corporate governance of company law. The chapter was
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provisionally closed in December 2025. Montenegro made some progress in the reporting period by adopting amendments to the Law on Companies and the Law on Registration of Business and other entities. The chapter was provisionally closed in December 2025.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were partially implemented. In the coming year, Montenegro should in particular:
→ further align the company law and the Law on registration of business and other entities with Directive (EU) 2025/25, in particular as regards the further expansion and upgrading of the use of digital tools and processes in company law;
→ ensure that all technical specifications and requirements set out in Implementing Regulation (EU) 2021/1042 are fully in place, including those related to the interconnection of the Business Registers Interconnection System (BRIS);
→ strengthen the legal and technical capacity of the Central Register of Business Entities to ensure the smooth implementation of online procedures in line with Directive (EU) 2019/1151, and to guarantee legal certainty in forming companies and registering changes.
Chapter 7: Intellectual property law
Montenegro is well advanced in this area and made very good progress, particularly by addressing the recommendations of the peer review mission conducted in September 2024, and by adopting and implementing the 2025 action plan of the Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) strategy. Montenegro has also reinforced its administrative capacities in this area.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were broadly implemented. In the coming year, Montenegro should in particular:
→ continue to hire additional staff to strengthen the administrative capacity to deal with IPR issues, continue to provide training to enforcement officers, and implement a number of measures to promote understanding of copyright and related rights among the general public and specific target groups;
→ continue to implement the remaining recommendations of the 2024 peer review report;
→ align with the EU’s new design legislation (in particular Directive 2024/2823).
Chapter 8: Competition policy
Montenegro has a good level of preparation in the area of competition policy. Very good progress was made in the reporting period. Within the context of the closing benchmark criteria, legislative alignment with the relevant provisions of the EU acquis was completed. Montenegro demonstrated a credible track record in enforcement and progressively reinforced its administrative and judicial capacity in the areas of antitrust, mergers and State-aid control. The chapter was provisionally closed in July 2026.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were implemented. In the coming year, Montenegro should in particular:
→ focus on sustaining and further enhancing the enforcement track record for all three competition instruments;
→ further align the national legislation with the evolving EU acquis under Chapter 8, as well as finalise preparations to join enforcement of competition instruments, including on specific issues such as cross-border cooperation in antitrust cases, as well as dealing with existing State aid, etc;
→ further strengthen administrative capacities and resources and continue to train personnel and the judicial authorities and other relevant stakeholders for all three instruments.
Chapter 9: Financial services
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Montenegro has a good level of preparation in the area of financial services. Very good progress was made, with comprehensive legal changes aimed at further alignment with EU acquis in all areas covered by the chapter.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were implemented. In the coming year Montenegro should in particular:
→ continue implementing and enforcing the financial services legislation, including the new legal provisions introduced in the last year;
→ continue to boost the administrative and supervisory capacity of regulators in the field of financial services;
→ continue efforts to align with the new and evolving EU legislation in the area of financial services.
Chapter 28: Consumer and health protection
Montenegro has achieved a good level of preparation in the area of consumer and health protection. Good progress was made. The Commission’s recommendations from last year were mostly implemented, including on alignment with the acquis on consumer protection and on organs, and on the adoption of action plans on communicable diseases andsubstances of human origin. The chapter was provisionally closed in June 2026.
In the coming year, Montenegro should in particular:
→ align with the evolving EU acquis on consumer protection and product safety and implement its action plan for strengthening the administrative structures and enforcement and redress capacity in this area;
→ implement its action plan on the prevention of and preparedness for cross-border health threats, including to align with the EU acquis on serious cross-border threats to health;
→ implement its action plan for alignment with the latest EU acquis (Regulation (EU) 2024/1938) on substances of human origin, including by strengthening administrative capacity and oversight.
CLUSTER 3: COMPETITIVENESS AND INCLUSIVE GROWTH
Chapter 10: Digital transformation and media
Montenegro has a good level of preparation in the area of digital transformation and media. Some progress was made, in particular by further aligning with the EU acquis on electronic communications, cybersecurity, open data and media freedom, as well as on continued 5G deployment.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were broadly implemented, while one remains valid. In the coming year, Montenegro should in particular:
→ ensure the effective implementation of the media laws adopted in 2024 and safeguard the independence of the media regulator;
→ further align national legislation with the European Media Freedom Act, the Digital Services Act and the Digital Markets Act, and develop the necessary governance and enforcement structures in line with the EU Artificial Intelligence Act;
→ continue recruiting additional staff to fill the remaining planned posts and further strengthen administrative capacity in the areas of electronic communications, information society services and audiovisual media services.
Chapter 16: Taxation
Montenegrohas a good level of preparation in the area of taxation. Good progress was achieved on further alignment with the EU acquis. Further significant improvements are
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needed to achieve full alignment.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were broadly implemented. In the coming year, Montenegro should in particular:
→ take all necessary steps to fully align with international tax transparency standards, in order to prepare its exit from Annex II of the Non-Cooperative Jurisdiction list. That involves, in particular, addressing the large number of inactive companies still in its company registry and conducting its first automatic exchange of financial account information;
→ further increase staffing in the Tax Administration to the appropriate level for effective and efficient operations, starting with the planned recruitment of 60 officials under the 2026 staffing plan, including fighting corruption, and provide extensive training in the areas of tax inspection and risk assessment;
→ further strengthen IT capacity, interconnectivity and interoperability with EU systems, notably by effective and consistent implementation of the national IT strategy, as well as by setting up and operationalising the VAT Information Exchange System (VIES), the Excise Movement and Control System (EMCS) and other relevant IT tools. Ensure contractual support for the development of VIES.
Chapter 17: Economic and monetary policy
Montenegro has made very good progress and achieved a good level of preparation in the area of economic and monetary policy. Montenegro has aligned its central bank framework with the EU acquis, particularly through a constitutional amendment on 24 August 2026. The country has formally accepted the proposed solution on the adjusted convergence assessment framework for euro adoption. Montenegro also adopted a new Law on budget and fiscal responsibility, improving alignement with the relevant EU acquis.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were implemented. In the coming year, Montenegro should in particular:
→ start implementing the roadmap for assuming the future obligations of the Central Bank of Montenegro within the framework of the European System of Central Banks;
→ fully implement the new Law on budget and fiscal responsibility, in particular by
operationalising the Fiscal Council.
Chapter 19: Social policy and employment
Montenegro achieved a good level of preparation in this area of social policy and employment. Good progress was made, in particular in: (i) aligning the labour law, the Law on anti-discrimination and the Law on occupational health and safety at work with the EU acquis; (ii) adopting strategies in the area of social protection reform; and (iii) advancing the reform of the Employment Agency.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were substantially addressed with further implementation still ongoing. In the coming year, Montenegro should in particular:
→ continue to strengthen the Employment Agency so that it can effectively fulfil its role as a modern public employment service, effectively implement the Youth Guarantee, and use European Social Fund (ESF) -like measures in the future;
→ intensify reform efforts for the improved and timely provision of active labour market measures, with an emphasis on their labour market relevance;
→ continue implementing the transition from a benefit-centred to a service-centred and rights-based social protection system.
Chapter 20: Enterprise and industrial policy
Montenegro is between having a good level of preparation and being well advanced in
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this area. Very good progress was made, particularly on the implementation of enterprise and industrial policies, on addressing business barriers identified by the Competitiveness Council, and by introducing a new management and legal framework for SOEs.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were implemented. In the coming year, Montenegro should in particular:
→ continue to implement the industrial policy for 2024-2028 in cooperation with all stakeholders;
→ continue to address the business barriers identified by the Competitiveness Council;
→ design the SME policy framework for the period 2027-2030, with a focus on improving access to early-stage financing, reducing administrative burdens and supporting the digital and green transitions of SMEs.
Chapter 25: Science and research
Montenegro has a good level of preparation in the field of science and research. Good progress was made, particularly in completing the first cycle of the Smart Specialisation Strategy, adopting the second Smart Specialisation Strategy, strengthening academia- business cooperation and continuing the implementation of the Law on Scientific Research Activities for adoption. The Law on Incentive Measures for the Development of Research and Innovation and the amendments to the Law on Innovation Activity aim at increasing the participation of the private sector in R&I investments.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were largely implemented but remain partially valid. In the coming year, Montenegro should:
→ continue to strengthen the innovation ecosystem and further refine the roles and services of the different actors; including further stimulate private sector investment in research and development
→ strengthen the capacities of the National Contact Points and the Horizon Europe Office to stimulate participation in Horizon Europe
→ Continue efforts to collect statistical data on science, research and development in a systematized way in line with EU practices.
Chapter 26: Education and culture
Montenegro has a good level of preparation in this area. Good progress was made, in particular with the implementation of the 2025/2026 action plan under the Education Reform Strategy (2025-2035), with about 80% of planned activities completed.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were broadly implemented. In the coming year, Montenegro should in particular
→ continue the timely and good-quality implementation of the Education Reform Strategy (2025-2035) and strenghtening adult learning.
→ complete the remaining activities under the current action plan (2025-2026) and launch preparations for the next action plan;
→ ensure the full implementation, funding and monitoring of the Youth Strategy (2023-2027) and continue to update the current legislative framework, including through the amendments to the Law on youth
Chapter 29: Customs policy
Montenegro has a good level of preparation in the area of customs union. Good progress was made, with accession to the Common Transit Convention, the launching of key IT projects, the adoption of EU-aligned legislation, and by combating customs fraud, in particular in tobacco products. The chapter was provisionally closed in July 2026.
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The Commission’s recommendations from last year were implemented. In the coming year, Montenegro should in particular:
→ achieve decisive progress with the development of the new customs IT system and national components for EU systems, in accordance with the timeline and milestones established in the national implementation programme;
→ increase staffing in line with commitments and implement the Commission’s recommendations on administrative capacities, including on scanning capacities;
→ continue aligning its customs legislation to the changes in the Union Customs Code.
CLUSTER 4: THE GREEN AGENDA AND SUSTAINABLE CONNECTIVITY
Chapter 14: Transport policy
Montenegro has reached a good level of preparation in this area. Very good progress was made, particularly by adopting new legislation on air transport, railway safety and interoperability, road transport and passenger rights.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were mostly implemented. In the coming year, Montenegro should in particular:
→ continue to align national legislation with the remaining EU acquis, according to Montenegro’s planning;
→ continue efforts to strengthen the administrative and technical capacity of the Railway Agency, as well as the implementation and enforcement capabilities of the Police Department with regard to road safety, to ensure they can effectively fulfil their mandates;
→ ensure the full and timely implementation of Montenegro’s transition plan for the air navigation service provider, and the implementation of performance and charging
schemes in line with the Single European Sky (SES 2+) Regulation.
Chapter 15: Energy
Montenegro has reached a good level of preparation in this area. Very good progress was achieved, in particular through alignment with the acquis on the internal energy market, the implementation of legislation on mandatory oil stocks, and the deployment of energy- efficiency measures. Montenegro adopted its National Energy and Climate Plan (NECP).
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were mostly implemented. In the coming year, Montenegro should in particular:
→ continue to align national legislation with the remaining EU acquis, according to Montenegro’s planning and continue implementation of the Electricity Integration Package, as well as recommendations, if any, from the verification process, in view of achieving market coupling with the EU, and to adopt its risk-preparedness plan in the electricity sector;
→ implement the NECP, according to its timeline, in particular as regards preparing to phase out the use of coal and decommissioning of the thermal power plant in Pljevlja;
→ ensure full alignment with the 2023 Directive on Energy Efficiency and the 2024 Directive on the Energy Performance of Buildings and adopt its National Building Renovation Plan, as per Montenegro’s 2026 roadmap, while accelerating the deployment of energy- efficiency measures along new targets.
Chapter 21: Trans-European networks
Montenegro achieved a good level of preparation in this area. Good progress was made, particularly on strengthening administrative capacity, aligning legislation with the trans- European networks in energy (TEN-E) and on the agreement between Montenegro and the
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European Commission on a list of priority projects in the transport sector in line with the future trans-European networks in transport (TEN-T). The chapter was provisionally closed in March 2026.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were mostly implemented. In the coming year, Montenegro should in particular:
→ finalise and adopt the updated transport development strategy and ensure its effective implementation and accelerate the preparatory work and maintain focus on investments to ensure the timely completion of the Western Balkans – Eastern Mediterranean European Transport Corridor;
→ fully implement the Roadmap for Participation in the Connecting Europe Facility 2025- 2027, including the recruitment and training of relevant staff and the establishment of appropriate administrative structures;
→ launch and finalise the procurement process for works to modernise Rail Route 4, in particular on the Bar-Golubovci section.
Chapter 27: Environment and climate change
Montenegro is moderately prepared in this area. During the reporting period, good progress was made, particularly through the adoption of legislation in the fields of air quality, nature protection, waste and water management as well as the Law on climate and the related rulebooks on monitoring, reporting, verification and accreditation (MRVA) of greenhouse gas emission for the purpose of EU Emissions Trading System (EU ETS), the biodiversity strategy, the strategy for the protection of the marine environment, the air quality monitoring strategy, the low carbon-development strategy, and the NECP were also adopted. Significant progress was also made in aligning cross-cutting legislation with the EU acquis.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were largely implemented. In the coming year, Montenegro should in particular:
→ continue further strengthening the administrative and investment capacity in the fields of environment and climate change by (i) further hiring staff and ensuring they receive appropriate training and (ii) preparing fully costed financing plans for priority environmental investments;
→ adopt waste management plans at local level and increase capacity to effectively implement them;
→ ensure adequate implementation of MRVA legislation for the full scope of EU ETS and continue to align legislation with the EU climate acquis, according to the planning in the roadmap for implementation of the EU Emissions Trading System by Montenegro upon accession to the EU and the plan for putting arrangements in place to continue aligning, implement and enforce the EU climate acquis by developing the necessary structures,
systems and ensuring enforcement.
CLUSTER 5: RESOURCES, AGRICULTURE AND COHESION
Chapter 11: Agriculture and rural development
Montenegro is between moderately prepared and a good level of preparation in this area. Good progress was achieved through the implementation of the IPARD III pre-accession programme, the adoption of legislation in the area of organic farming and quality policy, and amendments to the law on agriculture which further align with the EU acquis. The chapter was provisionally closed in December 2025.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were substantially addressed with further implementation still ongoing. In the coming year, Montenegro should in particular:
→ continue to intensify the implementation of the IPARD III programme and increase
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resources to do this, in particular the staffing of the paying agency;
→ ensure further progress in the development of an integrated administration and control system by updating the land parcel identification system and advance with the establishment of an area monitoring system, including a pilot project;
→ continue to align with EU acquis, developing structures and systems for the implementation of common market organisation and ensuring adequate staffing in the
administration.
Chapter 12: Food safety, veterinary and phytosanitary policy
Montenegro is between moderately prepared and a good level of preparation. Good progress was made, in particular by further aligning legislation with the EU acquis, expanding laboratory capacities, designating border control posts and securing funds for construction, and by establishing a basic framework to deploy additional staff, improve facilities, and manage animal by-products.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were substantially addressed with further implementation still ongoing. In the coming year, Montenegro should in particular:
→ continue to adopt the remaining implementing legislation and ensure effective enforcement, particularly in the food safety, veterinary and phytosanitary sectors, including by hiring new staff and providing training;
→ accelerate the construction and renovation of border control posts, assess laboratories, and develop a credible plan for designating and supervising official and national reference laboratories;
→ continue work on establishing a phytosanitary information system, improve the veterinary information system, and implement a system for the safe collection storage, use and disposal of animal by-products while preparing for a permanent processing plant.
Chapter 13: Fisheries and aquaculture
Montenegro has a good level of preparation in this area. Good progress was made, in particular in terms of alignment with the EU legislation and administrative preparedness, which resulted in provisionally closing this chapter in December 2025.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were partially implemented and remain mostly valid. In the coming year, Montenegro should in particular:
→ continue to demonstrate its ability to effectively enforce the EU acquis by adopting the remaining secondary legislation;
→ ensure the recruitment of additional administrative and inspection staff and strengthen their capacities through training;
→ continue to strengthen the functionalities of the fisheries information system and continue
to work on establishing a fisheries monitoring centre.
Chapter 22: Regional policy and coordination of structural instruments
Montenegro advanced work on all six closing benchmarks and has a good level of preparation in this area. Good progress was made, notably by adopting a proposal for the future institutional set-up for managing EU cohesion policy, launching the programming framework, and starting to draft the strategic planning document for the next multiannual financial framework.
Montenegro has made progress in implementing the Commission’s recommendations from last year, which require further follow-up. In the coming year, Montenegro should in particular:
→ implement and closely monitor the updated Chapter 22 action plan, strengthen administrative capacity through merit-based recruitments, and sustain interinstitutional
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coordination and structured dialogue with stakeholders in line with the partnership principle and for the next multiannual financial framework programming;
→ continue reinforcing the management verifications and audit for Interreg programmes;
→ roll out the Master Plan for Montenegro’s Infrastructure Development, including a monitoring system for all capital investments regardless of the source of funding, linking closely infrastructure investments to strategic planning, the medium-term budgetary framework and a set of common criteria for prioritisation, while improving project preparation, procurement, implementation and costs verification in line with EU and international standards.
Chapter 33: Financial and budgetary provisions
Montenegro is moderately prepared in this area. Overall, good progress was achieved, particularly in improving the existing coordination structure between relevant institutions and strengthening their capacities to calculate Montenegro’s future own resources contributions to the EU budget.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were largely implemented and remain partially valid. In the coming year, Montenegro should in particular:
→ consolidate work towards a fully operational interinstitutional coordination structure that ensures the correct calculation, forecast, collection, payment and control of own resources;
→ further strengthen the administrative capacities of the relevant institutions by ensuring that qualified staff are employed in line with the recruitment forecasts while enhancing organisational and procedural links between the institutions;
→ finalise improvements to the information system of all relevant institutions, enabling correct data transmissions as well as a full audit trail and reporting.
CLUSTER 6: EXTERNAL RELATIONS
Chapter 30: External relations
Montenegro has a good level of preparation in this area and made some progress, mainly in the field of regional cooperation, development policy and humanitarian aid.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were partially implemented and remain valid. In the coming year, Montenegro should in particular:
→ continue to actively participate in the implementation of measures under the Common Regional Market action plan for 2025-2027;
→ align with the EU acquis on the screening of foreign direct investments (FDI);
→ closely coordinate with the EU on the international agreements to ensure that all commitments are compatible with those of the Union and do not breach the EU law.
Chapter 31: Foreign, security and defence policy
Montenegro is well advanced in this area. Very good progress was made as the country maintained its track record in fully aligning with the EU common foreign and security policy (CFSP), including on statements by the High Representative on behalf of the EU, and Council decisions on restrictive measures. Montenegro continued to participate in EU crisis management missions and operations under the common security and defence policy. A new Security and Defence Dialogue between the EU and Montenegro was launched in December 2025.
The recommendations from last year were implemented. In the coming year, Montenegro should in particular:
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→ continue to maintain its full alignment with the EU common foreign and security policy;
→ make further efforts to counter foreign interference and information manipulation, including disinformation.
→ following the Hybrid Risk Survey, take appropriate action to continue enhancing resilience against all forms of hybrid threats by implementing the strategy on countering hybrid threats and its related action plan.
1.3 STATE OF PLAY OF THE ACCESSION NEGOTIATIONS
CLUSTERS Chapters / areas Date chapter opened / closed
Fundamentals
All chapters open
Chapters 5, 18 and 32 provisionally closed
23 - Judiciary and fundamental rights
24 - Justice, freedom, security
5 - Public procurement
18 - Statistics
32 - Financial control
…Economic criteria
…Functioning of democratic institutions
…Public administration reform
December 2013
December 2013
December 2013 - June 2025
December 2014– October 2026
June 2014 -January 2026
-
-
Internal market
All chapters open
Chapters 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 8 and 28 provisionally closed
1-Free movement of goods
2-Freedom of movement for workers
3-Right of establishment and freedom to establish services
4-Free movement of capital
6-Company law
7-Intellectual property rights
8-Competition
9-Financial services
28-Consumer and health protection
June 2017
December 2017-June 2026
December 2017-December 2025
…
June 2014 - December 2025
December 2013-December 2025
March 2014 - December 2024
June 2020 – July 2026
June 2015
December 2014 – June 2026
Competitiveness and inclusive growth
All chapters open, chapters 10, 17, 19, 20, 25, 26 and 29 provisionally closed
10-Information society and media
16-Taxation
17-Economic and monetary policy
19-Social policy and employment
20-Enterprise and industrial policy
25-Science and research
26-Education and culture
29-Customs union
March 2014 - December 2024
March 2015
June 2018 – October 2026
December 2016– October 2026
December 2013 - December 2024
December 2012 (opened and closed)
April 2013 (opened and closed)
December 2014 – July 2026
Green Agenda and sustainable connectivity
All chapters open, 21 provisionally closed
14-Transport policy
15-Energy
21-Trans-European Networks
27-Environment and climate change
December 2015
December 2015
June 2015 - March 2026
December 2018
Resources, agriculture and cohesion
All chapters open, chapters 11 and 13 are provisionally closed
11-Agriculture and rural development
12-Food safety, veterinary, phytosanitary services
13-Fisheries and aquaculture
22-Regional policy and coordination of structural instruments
33-Financial and budgetary provisions
December 2016-December 2025
June 2016
June 2016-December 2025
June 2017
December 2014
External relations
All chapters open,
30-External relations
31-Foreign, security & defence policy
March 2015 – June 2017
June 2014
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chapter30 provisionally closed
* * *
2. CLUSTER 1: THE FUNDAMENTALS OF THE ACCESSION PROCESS
2.1. FUNCTIONING OF DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS AND PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION REFORM
2.1.1 Democracy
The functioning of Montenegro’s democratic institutions is generally stable. However, they remain vulnerable to political crises and potential institutional blockages. Some efforts are necessary to fully align the legal framework with democratic standards and the EU acquis, includingon inclusive, transparent and resilient electoral processes.
Elections
No national elections took place during the reporting period. The 2022 elections in Savnik have not been completed.The legal framework regulating the funding of political parties and electoral campaigns has been amended in July 2026 to address key GRECO and OSCE/ODIHR recommendations regarding its scope, clarity and implementation. The amendments to the Law on financing of political entities and electoral campaigns increased the transparency and oversight of political parties' spending, including through dissuasive penalties. Amendments to the Law on the Election of Councillors and Members of Parliament further clarified the selection criteria for the chair and members of the Central Election Commission, introduced that a voter can support one or more electoral lists for the election of councillors and further increased the accessibility of persons with disabilities to elections. Furthermore, the amendments build on the 2025 legislative amendments introducing a 40% quota for the less-represented gender by further specifying that a candidate of the less- represented gender will be replaced by the next candidate of the less-represented gender, even if the earlier candidate does not accept the mandate. Amendments to the law on the election of the President addressed a long-standing OSCE/ODHIR recommendation and
introduced the necessary provisions to regulate all procedural aspects of a second-round presidential runoff. Montenegro submitted a Roadmap for the alignment of its legal and institutional framework with Regulation (EU) 2024/900 on the transparency and targeting of political advertising, so that the relevant provisions may apply upon accession.
The Commission will closely monitor its implementation on a continuous basis.
While Montenegro's legal framework protects the right of people with disabilities to participate in political and electoral life on the same basis as other people, there remain significant gaps in the implementation of these legal mandates.
Parliament
Parliament continued to function regularly and constructively for most of the reporting period, with intense legislative activity. During the reporting period, 37 sittings were held, inlcuding 18 regular, nine special and 10 extraordinary sessions. Several constitutional amendments and a total of 315 laws were adopted. To manage this workload, Parliament established a new Department for Legislation to review draft laws and their compliance with the EU acquis.
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However, the legislative process continued to rely on urgent procedures, particularly for EU- related legislation.
The overall constructive relations between the parliamentary majority and the opposition deteriorated in mid-March 2026, following the adoption of the Law on internal affairs and the Law on the National Security Agency, which were not fully aligned with the EU acquis. This delayed decisions that required qualified majorities, most notably constitutional amendments and the two long-delayed appointments to the Constitutional Court. The opposition also repeatedly criticised the ruling majority for allocating insufficient time for debate. In July and August, following a cross-party agreement, Parliament overwhelmingly adopted amendments to the Constitution to enhance the independence of the judiciary and and the Central Bank of Montenegro as well as to advance various key reforms on a cross-party basis. Parliament appointed the two remaining Constitutional Court judges and completed several appointments to independent institutions, but has yet to fill certain long-standing vacancies, such as the chairperson and the members of the Central Electoral Commission and two lay members of the Judicial Council. Opposition parties suspended their cooperation with the government and ruling majority in September after Parliament Speaker sent condolences to the son of convicted war criminal Ratko Mladić following his death. A debate and vote for his dismissal were held in October, and the attempt to remove him failed. Parliamentary committees examined numerous reports submitted by independent bodies. Parliament held eight special sittings dedicated to government question time.
EU integration
The body in charge of EU accession negotiations, headed by the Chief Negotiator, coordinates the country’s EU accession negotiations satisfactorily. Coordination of the Ministry of European Affairs was strengthened with the appointment of a second State Secretary.
The acceleration of EU accession preparations resulted in the provisional closure of eleven additional negotiating chapters during the reporting period. In January 2026, the government adopted the Programme for the Accession of Montenegro to the European Union 2026-2027 and continued to submit quarterly accession reports to Parliament. The digital platform 28by28.eu was launched to communicate on Montenegro's path to EU membership.
Governance
The government functioned within a broadly stable political environment, despite the withdrawal of one coalition party from the ruling majority in January. This withdrawal prompted the resignations of the Deputy Prime Minister for Infrastructure and Regional Development and the Transport Minister. In late 2025, acting on the Prime Minister’s proposal, Parliament dismissed the Minister of Sports and Youth. At the end of July, a government reshuffle took place, resulting in the appointment of a Deputy Prime Minister and three ministers.
The government has prioritised EU accession as its central objective. It remains essential that its established timeline does not impact the quality and sustainability of reforms. Transparency remains a concern, given the government’s frequent use of conference calls to adopt decisions, bypassing formal cabinet sessions. Interministerial coordination and cooperation between the President and the government should be further improved.
In February, the government submitted to Parliament a draft Law on government, which is still pending adoption by Parliament. In its follow-up opinion published in June, the Venice Commission acknowledged Montenegro’s government adopting several key recommendations in the revised draft law but emphasised the need for full alignment with the Constitution. In October, the government addressed the Venice Commission’s recommendation by preparing a constitutional amendment introducing mandatory prior integrity checks for the Prime Minister-designate and members of the government. The first of the three required parliamentary votes for its adoption took place in October 2026.
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In September 2026, Parliament adopted a proposal to amend the Constitution to remove the immunity of the Prime Minister and Ministers in cases of criminal offences in breach of official duties, covering all corruption-related offences. This proposal aims at addressing an existing recommendation from GRECO. Following a second positive vote, the amendment is currently progressing through the relevant constitutional procedures, which include a public consultation process and a third and final vote to adopt the Constitutional Amendments with two-thirds majority of all members of Parliament.
Montenegro’s decentralisation remains limited, largely restricted to utility services, water supply and the maintenance of public spaces. While local authorities formally possess autonomy, in practice they often require central government approval for key decisions. Their financial autonomy is restricted. In September 2026, Parliament adopted the Law on Local Self-Government. The law introduces city status for local self government units that can show strong fiscal discipline, introduces the establishment of units related to EU integration, strengthens inter-municipal and central-local cooperation, enhances the accountability of the local executive and sets up mechanisms to monitor and improve performance at local level. The law will apply from the day following the first nationwide local elections in 2027. Previous sector-specific progress to give more responsibility to local government authorities encountered implementation challenges. These difficulties have exposed structural and capacity deficiencies at the local level, thereby hindering the effective exercise of the newly transferred competencies. As of September 2026, 9 out of 25 municipalities had established the required planning entities, and four had put them into operation.
Civil society
Civil society, including human rights defenders, generally operates in an enabling environment. An overall legal and institutional framework for civil society is in place.
The mandate of the Council for Cooperation with NGOs was renewed and resumed its work in December 2025. While the government formally acknowledges civil society as a partner in policymaking, civil society organisations are not consistently included in consultations on key legislation despite repeated requests for involvement. Furthermore, during the reporting period, high-level public officials repeatedly launched public attacks, smear campaigns and discrediting narratives targeting human rights defenders.
In late 2025, the government established a working group to draft the Law on Representativeness of Organisations of Persons with Disabilities. The first meeting took place in December 2025.
The practical application of the 2022-2026 Strategy for Cooperation remains insufficient in ensuring adequate funding for NGOs and their meaningful participation in public consultations. Authorities have started preparations for the next strategy for 2027-2031. Although the Law on NGOs requires ministries to issue calls for proposals for funding, Montenegro must further enhance ministries’ capacity to strategically plan, monitor and evaluate financial support to civil society organisations as well as the consistency of implementation of the funding rules across ministries.
2.1.2. Public administration reform
Strategic framework for public administration reform
The strategic framework for public administration is in place. Implementation of the public administration reform strategy improved at an accelerated pace in 2026. The strategy is financed from the budgets of the institutions responsible for reform objectives and activities, ensuring the financial and fiscal sustainability of its implementation. The Public Administration Reform Council continued to act as a central political oversight mechanism.
Policy development and coordination
The quality of strategic documents improved and the execution rates of planned activities in internal government documents increased. The methodology for medium-term planning in the government and ministries has been finalised. The recently adopted Law on Budget and
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Fiscal Responsibility strengthens the links between strategic plans and the budget. The rate of implementation of the national plan on the EU acquis has improved, reflecting the accelerated EU accession process. However, the inter-ministerial coordination in policy
making remains to be improved.
The regulatory framework on evidence-based policymaking, includingregulatory impact assessments (RIAs) and public consultations, is in place. A new instruction on conducting RIAs and preparing RIA reports was adopted, ensuring a comprehensive assessment of economic, fiscal and social impacts, including gender and environmental ones. There has been an increased use of public consultations in the preparation of new legislative proposals across line ministries. The e-Participation and e-Petitions portals are still not fully utilised.
Public financial management
Public financial management continued to improve through reforms aligned with EU standards and accession requirements. Implementation of the Public Finance Management Reform Programme 2022-2026 is on track, and a new Public Finance Management Reform Programme has been adopted. On fiscal risk monitoring, the fiscal risks statement is currently prepared on a regular basis, its scope, however, needs to be further widened. The members of the Fiscal Council were appointed but steps need to be taken to make the Fiscal Council fully operational. Public finance management reforms were further advanced through the adoption of the new Law on budget and fiscal responsibility, which strengthens the medium-term budgetary framework, improves fiscal discipline and sustainability, and introduces a mid-year budget review.
Public investment management continued to advance through the development of new
tools and enhanced appraisal and selection procedures for major projects, although
investment planning occurs outside of these procedures. These improvements follow the
adoption of a revised annual procedure in December 2025, which has strengthened
coordination, scrutiny and transparency in project evaluation. In May 2026, the government
of Montenegro adopted the Master Plan for Infrastructure Development 2026-2030, which
represents the first single pipeline of capital investment projects with national and
municipality investments financed from the central budget, on a sectoral basis.
Although a budget inspection function was established, its administrative capacity needs to be further strengthened, in line with regulatory improvements introduced by the recent amendments to the Law on budget inspection, adopted in December 2025.
Budget transparency is largely ensured through the publication of all budget documentation, monthly reporting on the status of the budget execution, timely publication of annual financial statements and the audit report of the State Audit Institution. In 2026 the Ministry of Finance started preparation to issuing a citizen’s budget.
Public service and human resources management
The legal and institutional framework for a professional and merit-based civil service is in place Key secondary legislation to implement the Law on civil servants and state employees was adopted in January 2026, together with the establishment of a new competency-based recruitment model for all job categories. The delayed adoption of staffing plans for 2025, and the adoption in April 2026 of a partial annual recruitment plan for the civil service (which excludes the Ministry of Interior), has delayed recruitments to the civil service and led to an increased number of acting appointments. Regarding the local level, the regulatory framework on local governance is completed, with the adoption of the Law on local civil servants and state employees and the Law on Local Self-government, together with related secondary legislation. Continuous efforts are therefore needed in conducting recruitments most effectively, planning open vacancies more credibly, filling those timely and reducing the number on acting appointments. Professional human resources management is broadly in place. However, the capacity of the Human Resource Management Agency’s needs to be further increased. While the process of job systematisation in the civil service has continued, its link to organisational reforms and the
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new competence framework still needs to be strengthened. The information system for the management of human resources still needs to be improved, as does the reliability of data.
A comprehensive salary reform is needed to ensure a merit-based remuneration system that matches job descriptions with appropriate salary structures across public sector. The government adopted as a first step a roadmap for linking the new competence framework with a clear salary structure for the civil service Performance appraisals although applied, need to be improved to ensure closer links between performance, trainings and career advancement. Regarding gender balance in the civil service, women represent under half of the total workforce, reflecting a gender gap of nearly 6 percentage points. Proactive measures need to be implemented to promote and ensure gender balance in the civil service, including in senior managerial positions.
Accountability of administration
There is a legal framework that sets good standards for the lines of accountability, the legal responsibilities of supervisory and subordinated bodies, performance management and reporting requirements. However, the practice of administrative supervision as per the relevant legislation still needs to be fully ensured. Specific guidelines on managerial accountability have been prepared, and the process needs to continue to be streamlined across all line ministries. [see more Chapter 32]
To close the regulatory gap, Montenegro adopted the Law on free access to information in December 2025 and related amendments in July 2026 and has developed and adopted the relevant secondary legislation. The legal basis is in place to ensure the citizens’ right to good administration in administrative procedures and judicial review. The Administrative Court has been able to significantly reduce its backlog and has reduced the average duration of proceedings from 1 422 days in 2023 to 614 days in 2025, particularly in cases concerning access to information.
Service delivery to citizens and businesses
The Law on administrative procedures and the Law on electronic government provide a sound framework for a user-centric delivery of services. Harmonisation of ongoing amendments to sectoral primary legislation continues to be done in line with the standards of the General Law on Administrative Procedures. Public service delivery has improved through the implementation of the Digital Services Plan 2025-2027, which includes the expansion of digital services on the central e-government portal and continued data exchange through the Government Service Bus. The availability of digital services was further expanded by increasing the number of electronic services on the central e- government portal. While the expansion of connections continues across institutions and electronic registers, meeting the 2026 target of 50 interconnected register pairs will require an increased effort to accelerate delivery (see more in Chapter 10).
The more effective use and promotion of the electronic identification (eID) system still need to be ensured to enable the digital transformation. Citizens’ satisfaction with public services still needs to be measured in a systematic manner, so that user feedback can serve as a basis for improving services.
2.2. RULE OF LAW AND FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS
2.2.1 Chapter 23: Judiciary and fundamental rights
The EU’s founding values include the rule of law and respect for human rights. An effective (independent, high-quality and efficient) judicial system and an effective fight against corruption are of paramount importance, as is the respect for fundamental rights in law and in practice.
Functioning of the judiciary
Strategic documents
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The implementation of the 2024-2027 Judicial Reform Strategy is ongoing. As regards the 2024-2025 Action Plan, all 2024 activities have been completed, while the implementation rate recorded for 2025 activities stands at 81%. The rest of the activities have been carried over into the 2026-2027 Action Plan, which currently has a 68% implementation rate for 2026 activities. The implementation of the 2025–2028 Judicial Digitalisation Strategy and its 2025– 2026 Action Plan needs to be accelerated and completed, even against a reduced budget for activities in 2026.
Despite some progress, the implementation of the 2025–2028 Judicial Digitalisation Strategy and its Action Plan 2025–2026 needs to improve. In August 2026, the activities fully implemented for 2025 are 21 (out of 29) and, for 2026, there are four activities fully implemented (out of 17). The activities which will not be implemented by the end of 2026 will be carried over to the new Action plan 2027-2028.
Management bodies
The composition of and appointment procedures for the Judicial and Prosecutorial Councils are broadly in line with European standards. Montenegro amended its Constitution in July 2026, following an inclusive and transparent consultation process, by reinforcing the safeguards guaranteeing judicial independence, impartiality and democratic legitimacy, namely the composition and appointment procedures of the Judicial Council and the Prosecutorial Council. These safeguards are fully in line with European standards and Venice Commission recommendations. The new provisions must now be enforced by harmonising the implementing legislation.
Montenegro adopted legal amendments to the Law on the Judicial Council and Judges, and the Law on the State Prosecution Service, addressing the outstanding recommendations from the European Commission, the Venice Commission and GRECO. As a result of these amendments, the Judicial and Prosecutorial Councils are reforming their systems of appointment, evaluation of performance and promotion of judges and state prosecutors, aiming to ensure a more consistent, merit-based assessment in line with European standards. In addition, a dedicated Law on the Employment Rights of Judges and Prosecutors has been adopted, addressing Venice Commission and European Commission recommendations.
In June 2026, the Conference of Judges timely appointed four judge-members to the Judicial Council, six weeks ahead of the expiration of the mandates of the previous member judges. Between July and September 2026, Parliament appointed two lay members, whereas the procedure to appoint two lay members to complete its composition is ongoing. Equally, Parliament appointed three lay members to the Prosecutorial Council in November 2025, and the procedure to appoint an NGO representative is ongoing.
Communication to the public and the transparency of both Councils continued to improve in line with their relevant strategic documents. Both Councils continued to ensure public access to their sessions and to systematically publish their decisions, minutes and press statements. Both Councils amended their rules of procedure to allow of all their decisions to be published. Montenegro has to find a lasting solution for the two Councils’ overall inadequate working conditions, equipment and premises. The adopted budget in 2026 for the Judicial Council is EUR 2.7 million (2025: EUR 2.8 million) and EUR 0.98 million for the Prosecutorial Council (2025: EUR 0.9 million).
Independence and impartiality
The constitutional and legal framework guaranteeing judicial independence and the impartiality of the judiciary is in place and respected. Legal changes have been adopted, further reinforcing the legal framework on the judicial and prosecution system in line with European standards. Some implementation challenges remain and must be addressed. These include delays in transparent and merit-based high-level appointments, administrative capacities and undue public comments on ongoing cases.
At the end of 2025, Parliament appointed two new judges to the Constitutional Court,
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strengthening its operational functioning despite delays in the appointment of judges. Furthermore, in July 2026, Parliament appointed two additional new judges, re-establishing the full composition of the Court. In May 2026, Parliament adopted amendments to the Law on the Constitutional Court, addressing Venice Commission recommendations, which is pending constitutional review at the Constitutional Court.
In March, Parliament adopted the legal amendment to reintroduce until 31 December 2026 a temporary 30% salary increase for judges and prosecutors that had previously been adopted in June 2025. Montenegro adopted in September a dedicated law on employment rights for all judges and prosecutors, a systemic reform that provides legal certainty, including on the rules on retirement. This addresses a long-standing recommendation by the European Commission and the Venice Commission.
The independence, autonomy and institutional stability of the justice system continued to be strengthened. The decisive and concrete actions taken by the leadership of the Supreme Court, the Supreme State Prosecutor and the President of the Prosecutorial Council have already yielded concrete positive results and improvements in institutional performance and coordination, reducing procedural inefficiencies and ensuring a more consistent application of legal standards.
In 2025, the Judicial Council carried out 20 evaluations of judges, with 12 judges scoring ‘excellent’, 7 ‘good’ and 1 ‘satisfactory’. In April 2026, the Judicial Council carried out, for the first time, the evaluation of Supreme Court judges. In addition, 33 judges have been evaluated, of whom 27 received an ‘excellent’ rating, five ‘good‘ and one ‘satisfactory’. The Prosecutorial Council appointed members to the Evaluation Commission, which adopted the 2026 evaluation plan for prosecutors. While no evaluations were carried out in 2025, evaluations of state prosecutors and heads of state prosecutor’s offices are underway, with 63 evaluations planned for 2026, covering 51 state prosecutors and 12 heads of state prosecutor’s offices.
Instances of high-level officials and political figures publicly criticising criminal investigations and decisions of prosecutorial authorities continued. In September 2025, Parliament requested a control hearing of the Supreme State Prosecutor and Special State Prosecutor about a concrete high-level corruption case, contravening the legal and constitutional framework. In October 2025, during the parliamentary debate on the 2024 Annual Report of the Prosecutorial Council, Members of Parliament and its speaker criticised the prosecution service, and personally attacked and called on the Supreme State Prosecutor to resign because of the handling of certain cases. Following the arrest of a former Minister in February, Parliament’s leadership openly criticised the work of the State Prosecution Service, prompting a complaint before the Prosecutorial Council. The Council issued a decision that such public statements interfered
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Requests received Outcome of decisions
Graph 2.1: Montenegro - Requests for protection from undue
influence - Judicial Council of Montenegro
2023 2024 2025 n/ a: not available Source: The Judicial Council
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Graph 2.2: Montenegro - Requests for protection from undue
influence - Prosecutorial Council of Montenegro
2023 2024 2025 n/a: not available Source: The Prosecutorial Council
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with the independence of a state prosecutor, to which Parliament reacted with criticism of the Council’s decision. These developments highlight the urgent need for both the executive and legislative branches to refrain from actions which undermine the separation of powers.
Both the Judicial and Prosecutorial Councils have established reporting mechanisms to address instances of undue public influence on the judiciary. No requests for protection from undue influence were received by the Judicial Council in 2025, while the dedicated commission of the Prosecutorial Council received five complaints, of which four were deemed well-founded.
A system for the random allocation of cases is implemented through the judicial information system (PRIS). Operational limitations remain in very small courts due to the lack of judges.
Accountability
Montenegro must continue to strengthen the effective accountability of the judiciary by fully implementing the improved legal framework adopted in 2024 and 2026, including the amendments to the Law on the Judicial Council and the Law on the Prosecution Service. The promotion and enforcement of ethics and professional standards among judges and prosecutors continued to improve and to be implemented, including the ethical and disciplinary frameworks, as well as new codes of ethics for judges and prosecutors. The Anti-corruption Agency (ACA)
continued to improve its verification of the assets and income declarations of judges and prosecutors. The disciplinary practice of the Judicial and Prosecutorial Councils must be further strengthened, in particular to ensure greater consistency in dealing with failure to submit complete declarations of assets and income to the ACA. The Judicial Council adopted amendments to the Rules on the Evaluation of Judges and of Court Presidents in June 2026. The new rules align with European standards on the evaluation of judicial performance by increasing the threshold at which the work of a judge will be considered ‘unsatisfactory’ to 35% of overall decisions annulled on appeal.
In April 2026, the Judicial Council, acting on several complaints, unanimously dismissed the President of the Appellate Court from her managerial position. Subsequently, the Council appointed an acting President pending the election of a new full-term President of the Court.
The Conference of Judges and the Conference of State Prosecutors each adopted a new code of ethics in line with European standards. The Conference of State Prosecutors elected a new Chair and a Deputy to the Ethics Commission of the Prosecutorial Council in December 2025, restoring its full functioning. In addition, the Council appointed a new panel to its Disciplinary Commission. In March 2026, the Bar Association of Montenegro adopted a new Code of Professional Conduct for Lawyers. The codes for notaries and public bailiffs are being enforced.
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Quality of justice
The Judicial and Prosecutorial Councils adopted and have started to implement plans to fill vacant positions through single, nationwide competitions, to improve the timely filling of judicial and prosecutorial positions . By September 2026, Montenegro had 294 full-time judges in place out of 335 planned positions, marking a decrease in vacancies compared with the previous year. In addition, the number of state prosecutors increased to 117 out
of 129 planned positions. The positions of President of the Basic Courts in Bijelo Polje and Cetinje, President of the Appellate Court, and Head of the Basic Prosecutor’s Office in Podgorica, remain vacant.
In 2025, both Councils continued implementing their appointment, promotion and transfer systems for judges and prosecutors through transparent, and merit-based procedures with clearer, more nuanced and objective criteria in line with European standards, to ensure the overall efficiency of the justice system. The Judicial Training Centre continued selecting and providing initial training to judicial and prosecutorial candidates for appointment and new judges and prosecutors, based on an effective and qualitative strategy. Montenegro must continue to improve the capacities of the justice system by ensuring timely recruitment to judicial and prosecutorial positions as a matter of priority.
The justice system still needs more strategic investment in human resources, ICT and infrastructure.The number of courtrooms allocated, the working spaces and equipment, and the working conditions, including for clerks and legal advisors, are still inadequate at the High Court of Podgorica and the Supreme Court. Montenegromust address this urgently and decisively. In October 2025, the government adopted the decision to locate the ‘Judiciary Complex’ in the old airport area, with delays in the tender slowing down the process. The Special State Prosecution Service and the Special Police moved to a new building in July 2026.
The Judicial Training Centre continues to function adequately, however, its financial independence and administrative capacities are not yet guaranteed. Both its 2025 budget (EUR 826 274.90) and 2026 budget (EUR 926 180.22) were below the legally prescribed threshold. Montenegro should join the EU Justice Programme, which provides support for cross-border judicial training.
In March 2026, Montenegro adopted amendments to the Law on Courts, allowing to implement the rationalisation of the judicial network in line with European standards, which is the main objective of the 2024-2027 Rationalisation Plan.
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Montenegro continues to apply its alternative dispute resolution system consistently, with 7 144 cases handled by the Centre for Alternative Dispute Resolution in 2025. By August 2026, it had received 4 078 cases. The Centre is reinforcing its administrative capacities.
Efficiency
The efficiency of the justice system improved in 2025 in a number of areas, in particular in dealing with administrative and criminal cases, while challenges with civil and commercial cases remain.
In 2025, 165 983 cases were pending before Montenegrin courts, of which 91 300 were new. 93 511 cases were resolved, amounting to a positive clearance rate of 102.4%. The clearance rate in administrative cases stood at 156.17%, in commercial cases at 112.75%, while the clearance rate in civil cases before the basic courts was 99.02%. The courts resolved 14 040 cases
that were more than three years old. There has been a slight reduction in the backlog of cases, with 8 279 cases older than three years pending at the end of 2025. In the first half of 2026, 122 022 cases were pending before courts, of which 51 655 were new. During that period, 49 178 cases were resolved (clearance rate 96.95%).There have been improvements in the efficiency of the Administrative Court, which has led to a reduction in its backlog of cases. The clearance rate improved in 2025. During 2025, the Court had a total of 35 302 cases pending, including 26 894 cases from previous years and 8 408 new cases. A total of 13 131 cases were resolved during the year (11 126 in 2024). The clearance rate was 156.17% (2024: 106.69%). At the end of the year, 22 167 cases remained pending.
For the Supreme Court, the clearance rate substantially improved in 2025, with a reduction in the backlog of cases. The Supreme Court of Montenegro had a clearance rate of 107.82%. At the end of 2025, 70 358 cases remained pending.
In 2025, the Constitutional Court continued to reduce its backlog and sustained the trend of dealing with constitutional complaints efficiently. The average duration of proceedings stands at 11 months. In January 2026, the Constitutional Court adopted its work programme
for 2026, aiming to resolve all appeals filed in 2024 and 2025 by the end of 2026. By mid- 2026, the Constitutional Court achieved regular efficiency in handling constitutional complaints, given that there were no unresolved complaint cases dating from before 2025.
The backlog of pending enforcement cases before courts remained small. At the end of 2025, 612 enforcement cases were pending (1 204 in 2024). In 2025, 59 200 cases were filed (59 157 in 2024), with 34 574 cases pending by the end of the year (34 965 in 2024).
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Further efforts are required to implement the upgraded court information system (PRIS 2), to support a more efficient case allocation system, to revise the current random case allocation procedure and to better use judicial statistics. Under the responsibility of the Judicial Council, the system should become the only judicial database.
The 2026 budget for the judiciary is EUR 34.06 million (EUR 34.2 million in 2025), of which, EUR 31.3 million is allocated to the courts. The 2026 budget for the prosecution service is EUR 16.3 million, an increase from 2025 (EUR 15.3 million).
Domestic handling of war crime cases
Montenegro continued to improve the domestic handling of war crimes, consolidating a positive trend established in recent years. This is based on the continued proactive approach by the prosecution authorities, building a credible and sustained track record of effectively investigating, prosecuting and trying war crime cases, including high-level cases, in line with international law and standards. The implementation of the 2024-2027 War Crimes Investigation Strategy is ongoing, with an Action Plan for 2026–2027 adopted in April 2026.
Montenegro maintains positive and intensive cooperation, including in specific cases, with the International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals and its Prosecutors Office, as well as with other countries in the region, namely Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia and Serbia. In November 2025, Montenegro and Croatia signed an Annex to the 2006 Agreement on Cooperation on the Prosecution of Perpetrators of War Crimes, Crimes Against Humanity, and Genocide, thereby strengthening legal and institutional cooperation between the two countries.
One case related to crimes against humanity is currently pending before the High Court of Podgorica.
The Special State Prosecutor’s Office is currently handling 24 cases related to war crimes. Of these, 22 cases are in the preliminary investigation stage, one is under formal investigation, while an indictment has been confirmed in one case. The Office received 11 requests for international legal assistance (three from Bosnia and Herzegovina, one from Croatia, two from Kosovo* and five from Serbia).
In December 2025, the Supreme Court adopted guidelines on the exercise of the right to compensation for victims in criminal proceedings, including war crimes, aiming for a consistent and comprehensive system of reparations for victims.
* This designation is without prejudice to positions on status and is line with UNSCR 1244/1999 and the ICJ Opinion on the Kosovo declaration of independence.
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Montenegro continued to actively participate in the regional Missing Persons Group and is implementing the 2018 framework plan. The list of missing persons compiled by the Commission on Missing Persons of Montenegro comprises 50 active cases of Montenegrin citizens or people whose families reside in Montenegro. In September 2025, the Commission adopted Guidelines on the Search for Missing Persons, setting out clear principles and procedures for conducting searches while upholding the rights of affected families. In July 2026, following a repeated exhumation, Montenegro’s Commission for Missing Persons received DNA analysis results from the International Commission on Missing Persons, preliminary confirming the identity of one person. The remains were transferred to the Missing Persons Institute of Bosnia and Herzegovina for final identification and handover to the family.
Fight against corruption
Track record
In 2025, the fight against corruption track record improved with regard to final rulings and convictions in high-level corruption cases, and the complexity of investigations and indictments demonstrates the commitment of the prosecution and law enforcement to tackle the most serious cases.
The complexity of cases continued to increase, requiring a decisive commitment from the prosecution and law-enforcement authorities, as well as improved specialisation and strategic coordination, including internationally. The quality of indictments continued to improve significantly, particularly in the
alignment between factual descriptions and legal qualifications. In 2025, 99% of indictments were confirmed. This is contributing to develop judicial practice and case law in this area, including by drawing on the standards and jurisprudence developed in Europe.
In March 2026, the Appellate Court overturned the April 2025 acquittal in the so-called ‘Envelope’ high-level corruption case, and returned it to the Podgorica High Court for retrial. The Appellate Court accepted the appeal of the Sprecial Prosecutor’s Office.
The track record on the prevention of corruption continued to improve in quantitative terms, although the overall impact of the work of the ACA remains limited to administrative checks. Following the appointment of a new full term Director, the functioning of the Agency improved, despite insuficient administrative capacities. In 2025, the ACA received and conducted administrative and technical checks on 10 931 asset and income declarations (2024: 11 905). In the first quarter of 2026, the ACA received 8 218 declarations. In September 2026, the Agency adopted improved procedures for the verification of income and assets declarations, in line with European standards.
In 2025, the Agency issued 202 reports on incompatibility of functions and conflicts of interest (2024: 191). As a result of its 17 opinions and 7 decisions, 24 public officials
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resigned. The ACA monitored electoral campaigns in two municipalities and launched 98 misdemeanour proceedings.
In 2025, the ACA received 180 reports concerning threats to the public interest indicating possible corruption, 156 whistleblowers’ reports (163 in 2024) and forwarded 14 reports to the prosecutors’ offices and 40 to other competent institutions. The ACA concluded 82 procedures (116 in 2024) and identified threats to the public interest in 18 cases (25 in 2024). By mid 2026, the ACA received 136 new whistleblower reports, while there were 297 pending from previous years. The ACA concluded 13 proceedings and referred 12 to other competent authorities, establishing a threat to the public interest in 2 cases.
In 2025, the Agency submitted 789 requests for misdemeanour proceedings, a 37.4% decrease compared with 2024, continuing the downward trend of the past four years. This reflects intensified preventive efforts and a more accurate definition of the roles of public officials.
The ACA adopted amendments to its recruitment rules, implementing GRECO recommendations and further strengthening the integrity and transparency of the recruitment process.
Legal framework
The legal framework of the fight against corruption is largely in place. While Montenegro continued to improve the legal framework, further efforts are needed to ensure its full and consistent enforcement. Montenegro has initiated the process to join the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention.
Between September and October, Parliament held two of three votes on amendments to the Constitution removing the immunity of the Prime Minister and ministers in cases of criminal offences against official duty, covering all corruption-related offences. This proposal aims at addressing an existing GRECO recommendation. The next steps of this Constitutional Amendment process is the final adoption of the Constitutional Amendments with two-thirds majority of all members of Parliament.
In addition, Parliament held a first of three required votes on a constitutional amendment to introduce prior integrity checks for prime ministerial and ministerial nominees. The Law on Government, which aims at addressing long-standing recommendations by GRECO and the Venice Commission to increase transparency and accountability in Montenegro’s executive, is pending adoption by Parliament.
The Supreme Court’s adoption of sentencing guidelines for high-level corruption cases in March 2026 provides greater consistency in sentencing and a more coherent judicial response to such cases, with further efforts needed to address undue delays in criminal proceedings.
Montenegro adopted in September 2026 a new Law on confiscation, aiming to further improve the effective confiscation of assets and criminal proceeds in line with European standards and best practice.
Montenegro adopted in August amendments to the Law on the prevention of corruption to address a number of challenges and in line with existing Venice Commission and GRECO recommendations and the EU acquis. The Law must be enforced consistently and effectively.
The legal framework regulating the funding of political parties and electoral campaigns has been amended to address key GRECO and OSCE/ODIHR recommendations in its scope, clarity and implementation.
Montenegro continued to improve and implement its legal framework protecting whistleblowers. In July, a new Law on Whistleblower Protection, fully aligned with the EU acquis and European standards, was adopted.
Strategic documents
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The strategic documents are satisfactory. The implementation of the 2024-2028 strategy on the fight against corruption needs to be accelerated. The implementation of the 2024–2025 Action Plan reached 89.5%. The Government adopted the implementation report and the new Action Plan for 2026–2027 in February, carrying forward activities that had not been fully implemented. During the first half of 2026, 55% of activities planned for 2026 were fully implemented. The new Action Plan aims at addressing challenges with the follow up of implementing indicators.
In April, the government adopted an annex to the strategy identifying persons in top executive positions as a high-risk category for corruption, addressing a GRECO recommendation.
Institutional framework
The institutional framework of the fight against corruption is in place but still needs to be further strengthened. Human resources and capacities in the fight against corruption have increased but further resources are needed for the Special State Prosecution Office.
The concerted efforts by the Supreme Court, the Supreme State Prosecution Office, the Special State Prosecution Office (SPO), the Special Police Department and the Financial Investigations Unit to address systemic challenges in the fight against high-level corruption, continued to deliver positive results. Montenegro must urgently and decisively further increase its administrative capacities and financial resources, and improve the physical and ICT infrastructure.
By July 2026, the Specialised Department of the High Court of Podgorica had made significant progress in addressing its backlog of high-level corruption cases, achieving a clearance rate of 90%. However, persistent understaffing continues to hinder its capacity to manage the growing caseload efficiently.
The SPO has expanded its capacity, increasing the number of special prosecutors to 20, of which 9 are currently in office. Further strenghtening of prosecutorial staffing was planned under the Prosecutorial Council’s 2026-2028 vacancies plan, with recruitement procedures launched in July 2026 for eight Special Prosecutor positions. To further reinforce its operations, the SPO seconded six state prosecutors and recruited 2 additional financial experts, raising the total number of such experts to 12.
The administrative capacities of the Special Police Department (SPU) still need to be improved, in view of its expanded mandate in pre-investigations and investigations in high- level corruption cases. Only 52 out of the 80 positions have been filled, with recruitment procedures ongoing.
The physical conditions of the SPO and SPU offices remain well below the minimum required European standards, preventing these institutions from carrying out their duties effectively, efficiently and independently. The same applies to the the equipment and technological tools that would need further enhancement, limiting their efficiency overall.
In April, the Council of ACA appointed a new full-term Director. This important development ensures the functionality of the Agency.
As of July, 67 out of the 98 posts in the ACA had been filled. The Agency’s financial independence remains to be fully ensured. Its 2026 budget (EUR 2.19 million) remains below the legally prescribed threshold. This is an obstacle to the implementation of its mandate. Montenegro has committed politically to ensure the 2027 budget will observe the legal threshold.
Montenegro advanced with interconnecting the ICT systems of the ACA, the SPO, the Tax Administration and the Police to ensure more efficient access to data and secure data exchanges.
The functions, mandate, transparency and institutional position of the National Council for the Fight against Corruption were clarified, as confirmed by GRECO’s second compliance report.
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The government established a new Integrity Commission for senior executive officials, aimed at strengthening corruption prevention and addressing GRECO recommendations.
Fundamental rights
General framework
The general legal and institutional framework for fundamental rights is largely satisfactory. The implementation and enforcement of fundamental rights need to be improved.
International human rights instruments
Montenegro continues to largely meet its international obligations on human rights. However, more efforts are needed to follow up on the recommendations of international human rights monitoring bodies.
Montenegro has ratified most of the key international human rights instruments; it has yet to ratify the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of their Families and the 2014 Protocol to the ILO 1930 Forced Labour Convention. In October 2025, ECRI noted some progress and made some priority recommendations, which Montenegro must implement effectively. As regards the UN Human Rights Council, in January Montenegro submitted its Mid-Term Report on the Implementation of Recommendations within the Fourth Cycle of the Universal Periodic Review (UPR). Out of 226 recommendations, 24 have been fully implemented, implementation of 199 recommendations is in progress, and the implementation of three recommendations has not yet started yet.
European Court of Human Rights
Cooperation with the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) and the implementation of its judgments is satisfactory. During the reporting period, the ECtHR delivered three judgments against Montenegro. There is one case under enhanced supervision by the Committee of Ministers related to seven ECtHR judgments on non-enforcement of final domestic decisions against state-owned companies. Montenegro must urgently
address systematic and structural issues raised by the Court, in particular those related to the length of proceedings before the Constitutional Court.
In December 2025, Montenegro appointed a new Representative and Deputy before the ECtHR, and reduced its office staff from ten to six, with just one independent legal adviser. The rulebook on the office’s internal organisation should be revised to restore full capacity of legal advisors, ensuring compliance with ECtHR rulings across the judiciary.
Promotion, protection and enforcement of human rights
The legal and institutional framework for the promotion, protection and enforcement of human rights is in place but needs to be further improved.
The Constitutional Court substantially reduced its backlog of cases, closing all cases older than
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18 months. As of September 2026, the backlog from 2025 and 2026 stood at 1 683 cases, with 1 337 constitutional complaints. The average duration of proceedings further decreased from one year and eight months to 11 months.
In December 2025, Parliament appointed the Ombudsperson for a second mandate and adopted amendments to the Law on the Protector of Human Rights and Freedoms (the Ombudsperson’s Office), introducing obligations to safeguard and promote the rights of workers from EU Member States in the Montenegrin labour market. In September 2026, Parliament adopted a new Law on the Protector of Human Rights and Freedoms fully in line with Paris and Venice principles aiming to achieve an upgrade of the office rating to ‘A’ status. The new law strengthened the administrative and financial independence, as well as the autonomy of the institution and effective follow to its recommendations. Montenegro must further align the legislation with the EU acquis, and pursue the upgrading of its national human rights institution’s rating to ‘A’ status. The follow-up to the recommendations of the Ombudsperson’s Office is improving, but is not yet consistent across all public institutions. The Office’s 2026 budget is still adequate and sustainable. The Office is still accessible and is mandated to uphold the rights of persons with disabilities.
Prevention of torture and other forms of ill-treatment
Montenegro made progress on legal guarantees for the prevention of torture and ill- treatment and on the follow-up to cases, though further progress is needed. Parliament adopted amendments to the Criminal Code in September 2026 in line with European and international standards, abolishing the statute of limitations for crimes related to the extortion of testimony and to ill-treatment, and aligning the definition of torture with the recommendations of the UN
Committee Against Torture (CAT). Montenegro must continue improving the legal framework in line with the EU acquis, including with the Commission’s Recommendation on the procedural rights of suspects and accused in pre-trial detention and on material detention conditions.
Montenegro made some progress in addressing recommendations made by the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment and UN Committee Against Torture. The CPT carried out its periodic visit to the country in November 2025. In its preliminary observations, it confirmed the existing deficiencies regarding overcrowding in prisons, especially in detention units where the number of detainees has increased significantly, and regarding long-term detention, sometimes well beyond the legally prescribed limit. In addition, conditions in remand detention remain poor with draconian and antiquated restrictions applied to detainees, the absence of a visiting regime and as regards the length of criminal proceedings. Furthermore, the CPT received complaints of physical ill- treatment by prison staff, including beatings in areas not covered by CCTV (e.g. solitary confinement cells). Standard operating procedures for the police to ensure compliance with CPT standards and to uphold human rights still need to be urgently adopted. The National Prevention Mechanism issued recommendations to administrative authorities in 14 cases, all of which were accepted.
There was some advancement in investigating and prosecuting cases of alleged violence by law-enforcement officers, as well as cases of violence in prisons. In 2025, the Department for
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Internal Control of the Police conducted 158 internal oversight procedures. All cases were referred to the prosecution service to assess the criminal offence of ill-treatment.
Execution of criminal sanctions
There was some improvement in the system for the execution of criminal sanctions, including by strengthening administrative capacities, human rights specialisation and ensuring adequate infrastructure. However, the system needs to be further improved.
Montenegro continues to implement the 2023-2026 strategy for the execution of criminal penalties and its action plan. In May 2026, the Ministry of Justice adopted amendments to the Rulebook on the Detailed Manner of Executing Detention revising provisions regarding
detainees contacts with the outside, the duration of visits, telephone communication, out-of- cell activities, healthcare, transparency of complaint procedures, healthcare for female detainees and juveniles, and the provision of hygiene products to all detainees In July 2026, the Ministry of Justice and the National Prevention Mechanism signed a memorandum of cooperation to enhance the protection of human rights of detained persons and prisonersDuring 2025, the Administration for the Execution of Criminal Sanctions conducted several training sessions on human rights for officers, in cooperation with state institutions, NGOs, international organisations, the Police Academy in Danilovgrad and the Ombudsperson’s Office.
In November 2025, Parliament adopted the new Law on the execution of prison sentences, fines and security measures to increase accountability and protect human rights in line with the EU acquis and European standards. In addition, Parliament adopted amendments to the Law on the execution of suspended sentences and community service aiming at improving the implementation and supervision of alternative sanctions.
Further efforts are needed to use effectively the legal alternatives to detention, as well as to further develop the probation system.
Montenegro undertook several measures to adress the poor physical conditions and the overcrowding in remand prisons. The construction of new prison facilities in Spuz has been delayed and is expected to finish by December 2026. Instead of the previously planned new prison facility in Mojkovac, the government decided to to build a new remand prison in Spuz for 200 persons; works are expected to start at the end of 2026. The relocation of the primary healthcare ambulance in the Spuz remand prison created 80 more places. Parts of the short- term prison in Spuz was repurposed and now serves also as detention facility. The capacity of the prison in Bjelo Polje was enlarged, both for remand and convicted prisoners. Furthermore, some of the poor infrastructure facilities in Bjelo Polje were closed However, poor physical and hygienic conditions in prison institutions, the lack of access to structured activities, education and work - affecting detainees and minors in particular - and the inadequate protection of groups in vulnerable situation remain a problem. Although women
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are housed in facilities completely separate from the adult male prison population, the CPT has raised concerns regarding the conditions in the female remand prison. Additional efforts are needed to ensure children are separated from the adult male population.
In September, 105 detainees in the Spuz Remand Prison went on hunger strike in protest against alleged violations of their fundamental rights, including concerns over prolonged pre- trial detention and calling for greater use of alternative measures to detention.
Protection of personal data
The legal framework for the protection of personal data is adequate but the capacities of the Data Protection Agency need to be improved. Following the adoption in September of a new GDPR-compatible law and a Law transposing the Law Enforcement Directive, the legislation is now fully in line with the EU acquis. Montenegro has yet to ratify the 2018 Council of Europe Protocol amending the Convention for the Protection of Individuals with regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data.
The human and financial capacity and ICT expertise of the Agency for Personal Data Protection and Free Access to Information remains insufficient to carry out its duties effectively.
Freedom of thought, conscience and religion
Montenegro provides adequate legal guarantees for freedom of thought, conscience and religion. The rights to freedom of thought, conscience and religionare broadly respected.
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Freedom of expression and media freedom
Montenegro provides adequate legal guarantees on the freedom of expression and the enabling environment for free, independent, and prefessional operation of media.
Intimidation of journalists
Montenegro continues to uphold a policy of zero tolerance of violence against journalists and media workers, while isolated incidents of attacks occur. In 2025, the authorities maintained a prompt and generally effective institutional and law enforcement response to new cases of violence against journalists, most of which involved harassment and online threats. In 2025, monitoring organisations recorded at least 33 incidents of intimidation, most of which involved online threats, verbal intimidation and harassment related to political reporting, while a smaller number included physical attacks. Women journalists were disproportionately affected. Several cases in 2025 were characterised as alledgely strategic lawsuits against public participation (SLAPPs) by defendants.
In 2025, the prosecution authorities handled 35 cases and resolved 31, including 23 from that year. Indictments were issued in seven cases and misdemeanour proceedings initiated in nine cases, while the remaining cases were dismissed, closed due to lack of grounds, or transferred to another jurisdiction. However, little progress was recorded on old cases of attacks, with a prominent trial for the wounding of a journalist in 2018 prolonged again.
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In March 2026, the government established an interinstitutional Working Group to implement the Mechanism for the Safety of Media Workers. Between March and July 2026, the Mechanism received 22 reports of threats to journalists, mostly concerning online insults and threats, including one death threat. The Mechanism provided legal and psychological support, strengthened direct coordination with the police and prosecution, and established a free SOS hotline for reporting attacks and intimidation. Initial results indicate improved coordination among relevant institutions, access to support for journalists, and systematic monitoring of reported cases and their outcomes.
Although the authorities widely condemned acts of violence against journalists, instances of strong verbal attacks on media representatives by public officials and political parties, including senior figures from the security and defence sector, continued.
Legislative environment
The national media legislation is largely aligned with the EU acquis and European standards.With regard to free access to information, the regulatory framework was upgraded as the Parliament adopted in December 2025 a new Law on Free Access to Information, introducing a mechanism for inspections to monitor compliance with proactive publication obligations and bringing the legal framework into full alignment with the EU acquis. The relevant secondary legislation was also adopted, establishing the legal conditions for its effective implementation. Overall, challenges persist in its enforcement. Currently, the Agency for Personal Data Protection and Free Access is implementing various training programmes to ensure that authorities are adequately prepared to implement the new amendments.
The legal framework is largely aligned with the European Media Freedom Act, and Montenegro must ensure that national authorities fulfil their regulatory function upon accession to the EU, as well as enable civil society to support implementation. Operational readiness will require institution-building, awareness-raising and stakeholder engagement. In October, Montenegro adopted a Law aligning with the EU’s Digital Services Act.
Montenegro does not yet have specific legislation in line with the EU Anti-SLAPP legal framework, which could leave journalists vulnerable to legal intimidation and pressure.
Implementation of legislation, and media institutions
Implementation of the legal framework for media in Montenegro, which is largely aligned with the EU acquis, is being broadly implemented, with continued efforts to achieve full implementation. The reformed media legislation established transparent and merit-based appointment procedures for the governing bodies of the national public broadcaster RTCG and the Agency for Audiovisual Media Services (AMU). Despite certain delays and repeated procedures, new members are being successively appointed to the RTCG and AMU Councils following the expiry of terms or resignations of previous members. Parliament appointed three members to the Council of the AMU, finalising its composition in December 2025. In February 2026, the Council elected its Chair, enabling it to operate at full capacity to enforce the regulatory framework and uphold media freedom and professional standards in audiovisual services. Parliament appointed in October 2026 one AMU Council member and two members of the RTCG Council,. As regards self-regulation of the media, the membership of the Council for Media Self-Regulation continues to increase, with 80 members now registered.
Public service broadcaster
The effective implementation of the new Law on the national public broadcaster, RTCG, provided the public broadcaster with predictable funding, set at 1.34% of the state budget, thereby strengthening its financial independence and sustainability. In June 2026, a new collective agreement was signed, increasing salaries and improving the employment rights of RTCG employees. The legal disputes surrounding the 2024 appointment of the RTCG Director-General continued, with multiple parallel proceedings before national courts. In March, the Podgorica High Court issued two divergent rulings in the legal proceedings
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challenging the appointment of the Director-General: one overturning a first-instance judgment that had found the appointment unlawful, and another ordering a retrial at first instance. Separately, in June 2026, the Podgorica High Court delivered a final and enforceable judgment upholding the Basic Court’s ruling that sentenced the former Chair of the RTCG Council and three former Council members to suspended seven-month prison sentences for abuse of office in connection with the reappointment of the RTCG Director- General in 2023. Overall, the long-lasting and divergent court proceedings have raised concerns regarding procedural consistency of judicial decisions and institutional stability of the RTCG.
Economic factors
The significant increase in state funding for media supports the financial sustainability of commercial media, constrained by the relatively small audience and a restricted advertising market. The local media market, particularly the television sector, is dominated by regionally and internationally owned media companies. Liberal rules on the market entrance of foreign owners have resulted in three out of four national private television channels being majority- owned by foreign capital. Transparency in the allocation of public funding for media improved. Inconsistencies remain between data published by media outlets on their revenues and the data published by public authorities on expenditures.
Media ownership transparency improved through the AMU’s public digital platform covering linear and on-demand audiovisual media services, radio services, cable distributors and video-sharing platforms, as well as the relevant Ministry’s public Media Ownership Registry for print and online media. These initiatives improve access to ownership information and contribute to greater media transparency and pluralism.
Concerns about the strong influence of Serbian media outlets and local media owned by companies established in Serbia have increased, notably due to the pervasive anti-rights narratives and recurrent hate speech. The oversight and enforcement of rules about content remain challenging. In May, the AMU imposed a six-month broadcast ban on the Serbia- based Informer TV for continuous broadcasting of defamatory content against Montenegrin national identity, promoting hatred and discrimination, undermining state institutions and violating human dignity.
Internet
Internet services operate without undue restrictions. The oversight and enforcement of the rules applicable to online content remain challenging.
Professional organisations and working conditions
A nationwide trade union and professional organisations in the media sector are well- established and continue to actively advocate for improvements in socio-economic conditions, professional standards and the safety of media workers.
Membership of the Council for Media Self-Regulation continued to increase, reaching 79 media outlets in June 2026.
However, a sectoral collective agreement has not yet been concluded, which continues to hinder media workers from exercising their employment rights on an equal basis with workers in other sectors. Salaries of journalists also remain below the national average. Union representatives in the RTCG have raised concerns about perceived undue pressure from management, anti-union discrimination, and delayed collective bargaining.
Nearly three quarters of media employees earn below the national average wage. Overtime work is prevalent and is not consistently compensated. Trade union representatives have reported limitations in social dialogue and collective bargaining, as well as instances of pressure related to trade union membership.
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Freedom of assembly and association
Montenegro provides adequate legal guarantees for the freedom of assembly and association, while the regulation of assemblies is satisfactory. Montenegro continued to ensure that the rights to freedom of assembly and association are respected.
Labour and trade union rights are covered in Chapter 19 - Social policy and employment.
Property rights
The legal and institutional framework for enforcing property rights is incomplete. Montenegro
needs to undertake further efforts to ensure restitution proceedings within a reasonable time
and to finalise the mapping of its real estate cadastre to establish clear property ownership.
Outstanding restitution cases need to be addressed.
Non-discrimination
The legal and institutional framework on non-discrimination is in place but implementation and enforcement need to be further improved.
Discrimination remains present in Montenegro mainly due to social polarisation. The people in most vulnerable situations in society (including Roma and Egyptians, people with minority racial or ethnic background, persons with disabilities, LGBTIQ+ persons) continued to be subjected to discrimination, hate speech and hate crimes.
In December 2025, Parliament adopted a new Law on the protection of equality and the prohibition of discrimination, aligning the legal framework with the EU acquis and European standards. The Law now provides a broader list of grounds of discrimination. In September 2026, Parliament adopted further amendments to the Law clarifying the general regime of protection against discrimination and the specific regime of protection of gender equality, particularly with regard to the application of exceptions to the prohibition of discrimination on grounds of sex.
In March 2026, the Ministry of Human and Minority Rights adopted a rulebook on content and the rules for keeping a special register of cases of discrimination, which allows for a systematic collection of data.
Anti-racism and hate offences
The legal and institutional framework on anti-racism and the criminal law framework against hate offences is in place but implementation and enforcement need to be improved.
The Law on the protection of equality and the prohibition of discrimination provides a clearer definition and prohibition of hate speech as a criminal offence in line with the recommendations of ECRI.
The Ombudsperson’s Office processed 18 cases of hate speech and seven cases in the field of public discourse/media, which also predominantly related to hate speech. In 2025, Basic and Higher State Prosecution Offices initiated 67 cases against hate speech, six related to hatred, and nine misdemeanours. This is a drastic increase of 241% compared to the previous year (2024: 24 cases), a consequence of the application of binding guidelines for State Prosecution Offices in cases involving hate offences, and enhanced supervision through the appointment of a coordinator. The State Prosecution Offices issued decisions on all cases from 2024.
Gender equality
The legal and institutional framework on gender equality and combating gender-based violence is largely in place but implementation and enforcement need to be improved. legislative progress was made in 2026, while emerging forms of
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Graph 13.1: Montenegro - Violence against women
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Police reports Final criminal convictions
n/a: not available Source: The Police Directorate, The Supreme Court
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gender-based violence, including cyber violence, require increased attention. In September 2026, Parliament adopted a Law on Gender Equality fully in line with the EU acquis.
Implementation of the 2025–2029 Gender Equality Strategy and its 2025–2026 Action Plan is ongoing, but adequate funding for effective implementation needs to be ensured. In June, Montenegro submitted replies to four urgent 2024 CEDAW recommendations.
Gender equality contact persons have been appointed across a large number of institutions. However, their capacities and inter-institutional coordination remain insufficient. Gender equality considerations are not yet systematically integrated into policymaking and
awareness of and institutional commitment to the gender equality framework remain limited.
In April, further legislative and institutional steps were taken to strengthen the response to gender- based and sexual violence, in particular with the adoption of amendments to the Law on social and child protection. However, Montenegro has yet to fully address a number of outstanding GREVIO
recommendations, including those stemming from the 2018 baseline evaluation and the 2024 thematic evaluation. Data collection by the State Prosecution Service has improved, including through greater disaggregated of data on victims, perpetrators and offences. Further efforts are needed to ensure adequate, accessible and sustainable support services for victims of gender-based violence.
The Supreme Court adopted guidelines on criminal sanctions in cases of gender-based violence, but the implementation and impact need to be closely monitored. Sentencing practices remain a concern, as lenient sentences remain predominant and more severe sanctions are imposed only rarely.
Rights of the child
The legal and institutional framework for the rights of the child is in place, but implementation and enforcement need to be improved.
The child protection system continues to face shortcomings in accountability, institutional capacity, systematic monitoring, sustainable funding, quality assurance and cross-sectoral cooperation. Further efforts are needed to develop a more integrated child protection system, in line with the Commission Recommendation on developing and strengthening integrated child protection systems in the best interests of the child.
A new Council for the Rights of the Child was established in May. However, the adoption of a National Strategy for Exercising the Rights of the Child and Montenegro’s submission of its fourth periodic report to the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child remain pending since 2023.
In May, Parliament adopted amendments to the Law on the treatment of juveniles in criminal proceedings, further aligning the framework with the EU acquis and European standards. However, child-friendly justice safeguards are not yet systematically applied in criminal proceedings involving children. Montenegro continues to implement the 2025-2026 Action Plan of the Strategy for the prevention of and protection from violence against children, but effective implementation of the framework remains a challenge.
Persons with disabilities
The legal and institutional framework on the rights of persons with disabilities is incomplete and implementation and enforcement need to be improved. Persons with disabilities continue to face barriers to the full enjoyment of their rights and multiple forms of discrimination.
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Graph 13.2: Montenegro - Violence against women -
femicides
n/a: not available Source: Ministry of Interior, Supreme Court
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Despite some progress, further alignment with the EU acquis is needed, including the European Accessibility Act.
Parliament adopted a new Law on a unified disability assessment system, marking progress towards a human rights-based approach to disability assessment in line with the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (UN CRPD). The new framework aims to ensure more consisent disability assessment across legislation and policies and facilitate access to rights and services. The institutional framework was also strenghtened through the establishment of the Institute for Disability Assessment as a centralised body. However, further efforts are needed to ensure effective implmenetation of the UN CRPD. The first National Action Plan 2026–2030 for the implementation of the UN CRPD was adopted.
A total of 61% of the activities in the 2025 Action Plan of the Deinstitutionalisation Strategy were implemented and an Action Plan for 2026 was adopted. Further efforts are needed to operationalise the Centre for Foster Care and Family Accommodation, improve the costing of services, further improve standards and develop additional services, and build capacities to ensure the further transition to community-based care supporting independent living.
LGBTIQ+ persons
While the legal framework protecting the rights of LGBTIQ+ persons improved, discrimination persists. Notably, hate speech against LGBTIQ+ persons remains widespread, particularly online. Such cases are often prosecuted under the Law on public order rather than the Anti- discrimination Law, resulting in inconsistent judicial practice that needs to be addressed. Montenegro continues implementing its 2024–2028 Strategy for Improving the Quality of Life of LGBTIQ+ Persons, aiming to improve the effective implementation of the legal framework drawing on recommendations from international bodies. The draft Law on Legal Gender Recognition by Self Declaration underwent preparatory drafting steps and was consulted with the European Commission, but is yet to be adopted.
Considerable progress was made in 2026 in harmonising legislation with the Law on same- sex partnerships, although further amendments remain necessary to ensure full legal consistency, effective implementation and the effective enjoyment of the rights deriving from legal recognition of same-sex couples.
Procedural rights and victims’ rights
The legal framework on procedural rights, as well as on the rights of victims of crime, is overall in place.
In September 2026, Parliament adopted amendments to Criminal Procedure Code, which is now fully in line with the EU acquis and European and international standards on procedural rights, and on procedural safeguards for suspects and accused persons. In December 2025, the government adopted the first National Victims’ Rights Strategy, a comprehensive strategic framework for the protection of victims’ rights in Montenegro. In 2025, the amount spent on free legal aid was EUR 90 353.06 (compared to EUR 79 847.19 in 2024 and EUR 106 476 in 2023).
In July 2026, Parliament adopted amendments to the Law on Compensation to Victims of Criminal Offences of Violence in line with the EU acquis. Montenegro must sustain these efforts and continue improving the legal framework in line with the EU acquis, including with the Commission’s Recommendation on the procedural rights of suspects and accused in pre- trial detention and on material detention conditions.
Protection of minorities
The legal and institutional framework for the protection of persons belonging to minorities is in place and persons belonging to minorities are integrated into society. The Law on minority rights and freedoms ensures the protection and respect of human rights for all people. Its revision is ongoing to improve the institutional and financial framework. The Venice Commission adopted on 9 October 2026 an opinion on the draft amendments to the Law on
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minority rights and freedoms. Montenegro must ensure its recommendations are addressed timely.
Roma
The legal and institutional framework for Roma is mostly in place, but Roma people still face discrimination. The Council of Europe’s three main recommendations for immediate action based on the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities concern the Roma and Egyptian communities. The recommendations concern access to adequate housing; access to secondary and university education; and the setting of an electoral threshold for national minorities to ensure the principle of equal treatment.
In June 2026, the government adopted the Strategy for the improvement of the quality of life of Roma and Egyptians 2026-2030. The assessment of the previous strategy shows that ethnic distance towards Roma was reduced from 0.55% in 2021 to 0.36% in 2025, however, antigypsyism is still present, especially in employment and education.
Citizenship rights
Montenegro will have to align its legislative framework with the EU acquis on EU citizenship rights ahead of accession.
In 2025, the Ministry of Interior issued 38 decisions granting citizenship (ten for applicants and 28 for family members). These applications had been submitted before the expiry of the citizenship by investement scheme on 31 December 2022. It rejected eight requests (eight applicants and nine family members), and seven applicants initiated administrative appeals. Nine applicants withdrew their requests (three applicants and six family members). 21 applications are being processed. As of September 2026, 18 applications are pending.
As ruled in case C-181/23 by the Court of Justice of the European Union, investor citizenship schemes breach EU law on EU citizenship and the principle of sincere cooperation. Such schemes also pose risks related to security, money laundering, tax evasion, terrorist financing, corruption and infiltration by organised crime.
2.2.2 Chapter 24: Justice, freedom and security
The EU has common rules for border and migration management, visa policy, and asylum.
Schengen cooperation entails the lifting of border controls inside the EU. There is also
cooperation in the fight against serious and organised crime and terrorism, and judicial,
police and customs cooperation, all with the support of the EU Justice and Home Affairs
agencies.
Fight against serious and organised crime
The legal framework on serious and organised crime is largely aligned with the EU acquis. The capacity to fight against serious and organised crime is broadly satisfactory.
General framework
Legal alignment, strategic and institutional frameworks
In March 2026, amendments to the Law on internal affairs were adopted by Parliament. Among other things, these amendments revise the integrity procedures covering the recruitment and dismissal of police officers. Montenegro needs to ensure that any dismissal is made on justified grounds and that those concerned have full access to legal remedies. Further amedments to the law were adopted in September 2026 to address recommendation XX from the 5th evaluation round of the second compliance report of the Group of States against Corruption (GRECO) on the internal control system of the police.
Amendments to the Law on seizure and confiscation of material benefit derived from criminal activity were prepared to bring it further into line with the EU acquis and adopted in September 2026.
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In 2026 amendments to the Criminal Code, Criminal Procedure Code and the Law on liability of legal persons for criminal offences were prepared and adopted in September 2026 with the aim of further aligning them with the EU acquis on cybercrime, child sexual abuse and exploitation, financial investigations, investigating and criminalising money laundering and combatting organised.
In February 2026, the Supreme Court adopted guidelines for sentencing in cases of serious and organised crime and for offences related to the illegal production, possession, and trafficking of drugs to ensure more consistent and predictable sentencing while respecting judicial independence.
Montenegro should develop and adopt a comprehensive criminal policy document with clear priorities for fighting organised crime, high-level corruption and money laundering, endorsed by the Police Directorate, the Special State Prosecutor’s Office, and the Ministry of Justice.
All police departments suffer from a serious shortage of personnel, and some are heavily
understaffed. There are 5 921 positions within the Police Directorate and of this number,
3 756 positions are currently filled and 2 165 positions remain vacant. The 2025 recruitment
campaign for police officers took place, and 350 new officers were hired out of the 815 posts
envisaged. Two campaigns for 2026 have been launched to hire 514 officers and 500 junior
police officers respectively. Montenegro needs to ensure that the ongoing recruitment
campaigns are merit-based and that procedural safeguards against undue political
interference in the law-enforcement authorities are in place.
In December 2025, the Director of Police was permanently appointed after a prolonged period during which the position had been filled on an acting basis. Their appointment paved the way for the permanent appointment by government in July 2026 of four deputy-directors of police (whose positions were also filled on a acting basis): the Head of the Criminal Police Sector, the Head of the Border Police Sector, the Head of the Sector for the Protection of Persons and Facilities and the Head of the General Police Sector.
A structured system of integrity testing within the police force has not yet been implemented However, progress has been made in this regard with the adoption in September 2026 of the amendments to the Law on internal affairs which introduced targeted and random integrity testing. Further efforts need to be made to combat corruption in law-enforcement agencies. The Special Investigative Measure (SIM) division of the Police Directorate should be reorganised to improve efficiency and effectiveness and reduce risks of leaking information. The SIM division should also be fully equipped with the necessary technical equipment (such as software for investigative analysis, microphones and cameras) to support its investigative activities.
In April 2026, the construction of the new premises for the Special State Prosecutor’s Office and Special Police Department was completed, following an extensive reconstruction of the former government building. In March 2026, the number of posts in the Special Police Department increased from 60 to 80. The department was further reinforced with 51 posts out of 80 currently occupied, compared to 33 in the previous reporting period. Efforts should continue to fill the remaining vacant positions.
Montenegro needs to continue strengthening all the institutions involved in combating serious and organised crime by ensuring they have adequate office conditions, specialised and sufficient human resources, sufficient financial resources, adequate equipment and access to the necessary databases.
The Asset Recovery Office (ARO) was reinforced with an additional officer, resulting in two officers now assigned to ARO-related duties within the International Police Cooperation Group (in which the ARO is embedded). Montenegro is progressing on filling the remaining vacancies in the Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU) and the Asset Management Office (AMO), in September 2026 two vacancies were filled in the AMO and in October 2026 four vacancies in the FIU.
Implementation and enforcement capacity
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The Special State Prosecution Office and the Supreme State Prosecution demonstrated greater proactivity in investigating and prosecuting high-risk criminal networks, leading to
tangible results. These initial results should be strengthened, through further development of intelligence-led policing and the definition of a clear criminal policy. At the same time, further improvement is needed to secure convictions for the offence of creating as well as participating in a criminal organisation, with a focus on dismantling large, territorially rooted criminal structures. The track record also needs to be further improved in other areas of serious crime,
particularly regarding tobacco smuggling, cybercrime, stand-alone money-laundering offences and trafficking in human beings.
In April 2026, through a landmark operation led by the Special State Prosecutor's Office and the Special Police Department, at least three members of the so-called Skaljari organised crime group, suspected of being involved in at least six assassinations over the past decade, were arrested.
In 2025, the FIU opened 998 cases, representing a 16% increase compared to 2024. The FIU actively participated in the financial investigations conducted by the Special State Prosecutor's Office and, at its request, financial analyses were performed for 168 natural and 61 legal persons subject to financial investigations. The FIU uses international operational police cooperation mechanisms, including INTERPOL’s secure I- 24/7 communication channel and Europol's SIENA secure communication channel.
The number of cases of asset freezing and asset seizures has slightly increased. Thecourts issued 31 temporary security measures in 22 organised-crime cases, 22 measures in 19 money-laundering cases, four measures in three drug-related cases, and one measure concerning 18 individuals in smuggling cases . While progress is evident in the increased application of freezing measures, seizures, and financial investigations, the track record of final confiscations remains insufficient and needs to be improved. Montenegro needs to address the challenges posed by its incomplete land register, which hampers financial investigations and the confiscation of assets, and ensure that all available confiscation instruments are utilised effectively.
Law-enforcement cooperation
Montenegro continued its good cooperation with Europol and participated in 74 separate
operations (three as co-leader) of the European Multidisciplinary Platform Against Criminal
Threats (EMPACT) under the 2024-2025 operational action plans, against 61 for the 2026-
2027 operational action plans (with six in a co-leader position, including one in the framework
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of operational action plan on Migrant Smuggling). Engagement in joint operations,
information exchange, and capacity-building activities meets the expected operational and
strategic standards.
In April 2026, a coordinated action supported by Europol led to the arrest of 12 suspects,
including a high-value target in Montenegro. The Montenegrin authorities played a key role in
the operation, notably by filing charges against several suspects for their involvement in
trafficking 2.7 tonnes of cocaine and 1.5 tonnes of cannabis between October 2024 and April
2026.
Montenegro also continued its good cooperation with the EU Agency for Law Enforcement
Training (CEPOL). To establish a sustainable professional development, Montenegro is
encouraged to adopt the sectoral competencies and integrate knowledge acquired through
CEPOL capacity-building actions to its domestic law enforcement training system.
Montenegro is encouraged to apply the methodology developed with support of the Counter
Terrorism Support Network (CTSN) to prepare a domestic terrorism trend and situation
report.
Judicial cooperation in criminal matters
The legal framework for judicial
cooperation in criminal matters is partially
aligned with the EU acquis to the extent
that alignment is already possible. In
October 2025, Parliament adopted the
Law on the ratification of the Third and
Fourth Additional Protocols to the
European Convention on Extradition and
in December 2025 it adopted the Law on
international legal assistance in criminal
matters. The Law on judicial cooperation
in criminal matters with Member States of the European Union was drafted to further align
with the EU acquis and adopted in September 2026. Further amendments are needed to
bring it fully in line with the EU acquis.
Cooperation between Montenegro and Eurojust continued, with the country involved in 17
new cases between September 2025 and March 2026, including three as a requesting
country. Most cases are related to organised crime, drug trafficking and fraud. To date,
Montenegro has not been part of any joint investigation teams coordinated by Eurojust,
however, it is participating for the first time in a joint investigation team with another partner
in the Western Balkans. Montenegro has working arrangements in place with the European
Public Prosecutor’s Office. In 2025, the EPPO sent two requests for mutual legal assistance
to the authorities of Montenegro. Moreover, the EPPO had four active cases with links to
Montenegro at the end of 2025.
In 2025, the Supreme State Prosecution Office strengthened its bilateral and multilateral
cooperation through the signing of memoranda of understanding with the Ibero-American
Association of Public Prosecutors, the Office of the Prosecutor General of the Kingdom of
Spain, the Office of the Prosecutor General of the Republic of Albania, the Supreme State
Prosecutor’s Office of the Republic of Slovenia. Bilateral memoranda of understanding were
signed with the prosecution services of Brazil, Chile, Colombia, the Dominican Republic,
Paraguay and Uruguay. In December 2025, Montenegro signed a joint declaration of the
prosecution services of the Western Balkans, Latin America and Eurojust to establish a new
structured framework of cooperation to combat the most serious forms of organised and
transnational crime.
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Montenegro should further improve the speed and efficiency of international judicial
cooperation by increasing its use of judicial cooperation instruments, such as joint
investigations teams and direct court-to-court cooperation. Montenegro needs to expedite the
processing of judicial cooperation requests, particularly mutual legal assistance in criminal
matters, through the application of the European Convention on Mutual Legal Assistance and
its additional protocols. Furthermore, Montenegro should focus on ensuring that its
authorities that are competent to deal with matters of judicial cooperation, including in the
field of criminal asset recovery, have the necessary resources to deal with foreign requests
quickly and effectively.
Crime areas
Investigation and criminalisation of money laundering
Amendments to the Law on the prevention of money laundering and the financing of terrorism were adopted in May 2026. Further amendments to the law were adopted in September 2026 to further align with the EU acquis on financial investigations.
The human resources of the unit dealing with the fight against high-level corruption and money laundering in the police was strengthened with the hiring of four additional officers in 2025.
The Special State Prosecutor's Office launched investigations in 14 cases (ten in 2024). Eight indictments were filed against 17 persons. The High Court of Podgorica finalised two cases (three in 2024), the first resulting in a conviction and the second in an acquittal.
An important Supreme Court decision clarified that judicial authorities are not required to establish the specific predicate offence from which laundered funds originate and that it is sufficient to demonstrate that the assets lack a lawful origin. Furthermore, the Court confirmed that the concept of criminal activity may also encompass misdemeanours. This ruling represents a potential milestone for Montenegro, with significant implications for enhancing the effectiveness of investigations, prosecutions and convictions in stand-alone money laundering cases.
The capacity of law enforcement and the judiciary to address cryptocurrency-related cases remains limited, particularly with regard to investigative tracing, seizure and confiscation, evidentiary standards, asset management and the regulatory framework.
Cybercrime
In December 2025, the government adopted the Law on confirmation of the Second
Additional Protocol to the Convention on Cybercrime on Enhanced Cooperation and the
Disclosure of Electronic Evidence. Preparations are underway for the ratfication of this
Protocol. In 2026, amendments to the Criminal Code, Criminal Procedure Code and the Law
on liability of legal persons for criminal offences were prepared with the aim of further
aligning with the EU acquis on cybercrime.
The human resources of the Group for Suppression of High-Tech Crime in the Police
Directorate need strengthening. As of March 2025, seven out of 18 positions were filled.
Montenegro is cooperating with the European Cybercrime Centre within Europol and
participates in EMPACT activities in this area.
Child sexual abuse
In 2026, amendments to the Criminal Code, Criminal Procedure Code and the Law on
liability of legal persons for criminal offences were prepared and adopted in September 2026
with the aim of further aligning with the EU acquis on child sexual abuse and exploitation.On
child sexual abuse online and offline, the legal framework should be amended to align further
with the EU acquis in this area.
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Members of the Group for Suppression of High-Tech Crime continued to carry out a prevention-focused investigative operation to identify victims of child sexual exploitation, and also hosted awareness-raising activties for minors. The members of the group also contribute to the creation of the Help4U platform as part of EMPACT’s activities.
At the end of 2025 Montenegro participated in a joint operation aimed at combating the online sexual abuse and exploitation of children, OCSE 2.0, led by the Ministry of Interior of the United Arab Emirates, following which one individual was deprived of liberty and charged with suspicion of committing the offence of child exploitation for pornography.
Trafficking in human beings
A new Strategy to Combat Trafficking in Human Beings 2025-2028 was adopted. In 2026,
amendments to the Criminal Code, Criminal Procedure Code and the Law on liability of legal
persons for criminal offences were prepared and adopted in September 2026 with the aim of
further aligning with the EU acquis on combating trafficking in human beings.
In December 2025, the Supreme Court developed and presented guidelines on the exercise of the right to compensation for victims in criminal proceedings, which also cover the offence of trafficking in human beings. Montenegro needs to ensure that victims of trafficking in human beings receive fair and appropriate compensation.
Given the increase in seasonal migrant workers, Montenegro should focus on improving the capacities of labour inspectors to detect victims of trafficking.
In 2025, the track record of prosecutions and convictions for trafficking in human beings continued to improve. Progress has been achieved in combating all forms of trafficking in human beings, particularly in the area of forced labour and forced begging.
Montenegro currently has three licensed shelters for victims of trafficking in human
beings: one for women, one for men and one for children. In April 2026, a shelter was licensed to provide accommodation for two male victims of trafficking. Progress is needed particularly on expanding accommodation capacities for all victims of trafficking.
Montenegro is part of the ‘RAPAX’ Operational Task Force, set up within Europol, a multi- state mechanism aimed at combating trafficking in human beings for sexual exploitation, in particular networks recruiting and transporting victims from Latin America.
Migrant smuggling
In 2025, the activities of the Specialised Operational Team for the Dismantling of Migrant Smuggling Networks within the Police Directorate continued. The majority of smuggled migrants originated from Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Egypt, Nepal, Pakistan, Syria and Tunisia.
In December 2025, Montenegro renewed its engagement in the Global Alliance to Counter Migrant Smuggling. Montenegro is a member of DigiNeX, the international Network of Experts for Combating Migrant Smuggling in the Digital Domain, led by Europol. Montenegro is also engaged in the migrant smuggling operational action plan under the new EMPACT cycle, acting as co-leader in one action. Montenegro has endorsed the Global Alliance Joint Declaration and also participated in the second Senior Officials’ Meeting of the Global Alliance in July 2026.
Trafficking in firearms
Following extensive public consultations, a new Law on weapons and ammunition was adopted in July 2026 to further align with the EU acquis. However, further bylaws still need to
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be adopted to implement the EU implementing acts on marking, alarm and signal weapons, and deactivation. In November 2025, the evaluation of the Small Arms and Light Weapons Control Strategy 2019–2025 was completed, and preparation of a new strategy is underway.
In 2025, a total of 1 353 weapons were seized, of which 1 056 were firearms. In 2025, as
part of the campaign ‘Respect Life – Return Your Weapons’, citizens handed in a total of 4
000 firearms, more than 130 000 rounds of ammunition, 500 hand grenades and over 2 000
explosive devices..
Cooperation in the field of drugs
The legal framework for cooperation in the field of drugs is broadly satisfactory.
A new Law on prevention of drug abuse was adopted in July 2026 to further align with the EU acquis. The implemetation of the Drugs Strategy 2024– 2027 continued and a new action plan for 2026-2027 was adopted in July 2026.
The National Drug Observatory is operational, with three full-time staff. Cooperation with the European Union Drugs Agency is good and progress has been made on the quality of data exchanged. Montenegro needs to establish a special registry for drug-related mortalities. The national early warning system is operational and has been linked to the EU early warning system.
In an effort to improve its capacities to store and destroy confiscated goods (including narcotics) several steps were undertaken by Montenegro. Amendments to the Criminal
Procedure Code were adopted in September 2026 to allow for the collection of samples of seized narcotics for criminal proceedings and subsequent destruction of remaining quantities. In view of making progress on the regularisation of destroying narcotics, an operation was carried out in September 2026 in which 3 200 kg of narcotics from finalised criminal cases were destroyed. To improve storage capacities, adaptations were made in September 2026 to an unused
bomb shelter to convert it into a temporary secure storage location for confiscated goods. Efforts need to now continue to oversee the proper and regular destruction of narcotics confiscated under the previous legal framework and preparations need to be made for the implementation of the new legal framework, including the adoption of the necessary bylaws and operational preparations for more regular destructions. Montenegro should also ensure that all confiscated goods (including narcotics) are systematically inventoried according to a
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standardised methodology and a central storage location for all confiscated and seized goods is built in line with security as well as health and safety standards.
Montenegro continued to be a transit country for drugs as a part of the Balkan route.
Montenegro has sufficient operational capacity to actively engage in international police cooperation on drugs-related cases, including via Europol and INTERPOL.
Progress has been made on the funding of ‘Kakaricka Gora’, the public institution for rehabilitation and resocialisation of persons who use drugs, with three municipalities now contributing to the centre and negotiations ongoing with additional municipalities.
Counterfeiting of the euro
The legislation on the suppression of counterfeit currency is fully aligned with the EU acquis.
In 2025, seven persons were reported for the criminal offence of counterfeiting money.
Cooperation with Europol on euro counterfeiting needs to be improved.
Counterterrorism, prevention and resilience
Fight against terrorism and prevention of radicalisation
Legal alignment, and strategic and institutional frameworks
The legal framework for the fight against terrorism is largely aligned with the EU acquis. However, compliance with the EU acquis should be ensured, notably on explosive precursors. In 2026 amendments to the Criminal Code were prepared and adopted in September to further align with the EU acquis. The legal framework for countering violent extremism is largely aligned with the EU acquis.
In 2025, Montenegro continued to implement the measures outlined in the first Joint Action Plan on Counterterrorism for the Western Balkans. The new Joint Action Plan on Preventing and Countering Terrorism and Violent Extremism for the Western Balkans was signed by all Western Balkans partners in October 2025. In July 2026, Montenegro finalised its national roadmap for the implementation of the Joint Action Plan.
Implementation and enforcement capacity
The fight against terrorism is broadly satisfactory
The countering of violent extremism is broadly satisfactory.
In 2026, Montenegro drafted a new Strategy on the Prevention and Suppression of Radicalisation and Violent Extremism for the period 2026-2031 an Action Plan for its implementation 2026-2027. Montenegro should adopt a new Strategy on Prevention of Money Laundering and Terrorism Financing following the expiration of the previous strategy in 2025. A working group has been established to work on the new document and drafting is currently ongoing. (See also chapter 4)
In 2025, no individuals were convicted for terrorism-related offences in Montenegro. The Appellate Court confirmed the acquittal in the 2016 Election Day Coup case, where defendants were charged with terrorism offences, rejecting an appeal from the Special State Prosecution Office and upholding the High Court's ruling of July 2024.
A network of local contact points in municipalities for the prevention of violent extremism is at
an early stage of preparation. Contact points have been appointed in five municipalities, and
standard operating procedures for inter-institutional coordination have been drafted.
Montenegro should continue to strengthen its preventive measures against all forms of
radicalisation and violent extremism, including right-wing extremism and ethno-nationalist
ideologies.
The repatriation of the remaining Montenegrin citizens reported to be in Syria and Iraq (14
Montenegrin nationals, including family members) is currently not envisaged.
Critical infrastructure protection
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Legal alignment, strategic and institutional frameworks
The legal framework for the protection of critical infrastructure is largely aligned with the EU
acquis.
In March 2026, Parliament adopted amendments to the Law on the designation and
protection of critical infrastructure. The amendments create the conditions to ensure that
more data is available and establish a more efficient procedure for identifying critical
infrastructure. A new Law on the resilience of critical infrastructure was drafted to further
align with the EU acquis and adopted in September 2026.
Implementation and enforcement capacity
The Decree on Sectoral Criteria for the Designation of Critical Infrastructure was adopted by
the government in May 2026. The decree establishes criteria for 11 sectors and revises the
existing sectoral criteria that are used to identify critical entities and to recognise additional
sectors in which critical entities and critical infrastructure could be identified. Subsequently, in
July 2026 the Decision on the Designation of Critical Infrastructure was adopted by the
government.
The protection of critical infrastructure needs to be improved.
Migration and asylum
Legal and irregular migration and returns
The legal framework for the management of legal and irregular migration is partially aligned with the EU acquis.
The management of legal and irregular migration is broadly satisfactory.
Legal alignment, and strategic and institutional frameworks
The 2021–2025 Strategy on Migration and Reintegration of Returnees expired in December 2025. Montenegro is currently preparing a new strategic framework in continuation with the previous strategy. Montenegro prepared and adopted in October 2026 amendments to the Law on foreigners to advance its alignment with the EU acquis on migration. In parallel, Montenegro prepared a new Law on Foreigners to further align with the EU acquis on legal migration.
Montenegro is starting to prepare for alignment with the legal instruments under the Pact on Migration and Asylum.
Implementation and enforcement capacity
In 2025, 3 165 migrants were apprehended crossing the borders illegally, which represents an unchanged level compared to 2024 (3 153). The majority of these migrants registered an intention to seek asylum and were provided with accommodation and healthcare at the two reception centres. In addition, 132 migrants were held in detention in the Centre for Foreigners (2024: 141). In 2025, a high number of unaccompanied minors continued to arrive (209 were registered). Montenegro must ensure the satisfactory application of
standard operating procedures for the treatment of unaccompanied minors, particularly in terms of accommodation and individual assessment by social workers. In the first quarter of 2026, Montenegro experienced a significant increase in migrant arrivals, predominantly of Sudanese nationals.
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As concerns readmission with the EU, the readmission agreement continued to be implemented. As of 2025, Montenegro had implementing protocols with 16 EU Member States, which further facilitate its implementation. Montenegro continues to ensure good cooperation in responding to readmission requests. Reintegration assistance is available for Montenegrin returnees.
Regarding returns to third countries, Montenegro has 11 readmission agreements with non- EU countries, including all five Western Balkan countries and Türkiye. In 2025, 250 people were readmitted from Montenegro to neighbouring countries, mainly to Albania (2024: 184). Readmissions of non-EU nationals from neighbouring countries to Montenegro increased, with 67 readmissions in 2025 (2024: 35).
In 2025, 77 voluntary returns from Montenegro to the countries of origin were carried out (2024: 82). The border police carried out 58 returns and the International Organization for Migration carried out 19 returns.
Discussions to conclude formal agreements or administrative arrangements with the main countries of origin of migrants arriving in Montenegro should continue.
Montenegro should ensure that legal pathways developed towards third-country nationals prevent irregular secondary movements to the EU.
Asylum
While the legal framework on asylum in Montenegro is largely aligned with the EU acquis as it was in force until 12 June 2026, Montenegro should focus on developing its national legal framework and operational capacities on migration and asylum to align with the Pact.
The management of asylum is broadly satisfactory.
Legal alignment, strategic and institutional frameworks
The very good cooperation with the EU Agency for Asylum continued within the framework of the Second Joint Roadmap (2024-2027). Following a testing exercise in July 2026, Montenegro is is in the final stages of preparing a contingency plan for responding to situations of mass migrant influx. Montenegro is drafting a new Law on International and Temporary Protection of Foreigners to further align with the EU acquis.
The Directorate for Asylum continued to operate with limited human resource capacity in the reporting period. To strengthen its capacities, in March 2026 the government allocated two additional positions to the Directorate. Furthermore, recrutiment processes were launched for five positions
and in August 2026, two of these position were filled. Currently, three positions out of the 13 are vacant.
Implementation and enforcement capacity
In 2025, 2 724 people registered an intention to request asylum (2024: 2 970), reflecting a similar trend in irregular entries. 146 individuals ended up lodging a formal asylum claim (2024: 132) and 11 were granted refugee status, a 54% decrease compared with 24 individuals in 2024.
In 2025, the Directorate for Asylum continued to reduce the backlog of asylum applications. Decisions are routinely made within six months except in complex cases, where a 21-month deadline applies. In 2025, Montenegro granted asylum in an increased number of complex
54
cases. Few decisions have been overturned at second instance in recent years, reflecting an improvement in the quality of the determination process.
In 2025, the number of applicants for international protection accommodated in Montenegro’s reception centres was 2 029, a slight increase from 1 745 in 2024. Montenegro has two reception centres with a total capacity of 164 beds, and their operating costs are covered by the state budget. The reception capacities of the two centres remain limited; however, efforts are underway to improve them. Following several unsuccessful tender procedures for the improvement of the reception centres, the Ministry of Interior decided in March 2026 to transfer responsibility for the reconstruction of the centre in Bozaj and the expansion of the centre in Spuz to the Ministry of Public Works. In July 2026, construction works started in both centres. Following their completion, the total capacity of beds will increase to 364.
In the region, Montenegro continued to be the country hosting the largest number of Ukrainian nationals under temporary protection, having fled Russia’s war of aggression, in both absolute figures and relative to its population (7 851 temporary protection holders in 2025). The decision on granting temporary protection to them was prolonged and is currently valid until March 2027. In September 2025, Montenegro adopted a contingency plan for Ukrainian refugees. To reduce barriers to accessing healthcare faced by those under temporary protection, several pieces of implementing legislation still need to be adopted and/or amended, including the Law on asylum.
Visa policy
Montenegro’s list of visa-required third countries will be aligned with that of the EU as of 31 October 2026.
In December 2025, the permitted stay for visa-free travel was shortened from 90 to 30 days for all countries. In January 2026, the permanent visa free regime with Azerbaijan was terminated. In April 2026, Montenegro removed Bahrain and Qatar from the list of permanently visa-exempt countries. However, Montenegro adopted a seasonal visa-free regime for Kazakhstan and certain third-country nationals holding a residence permit of the United Arab Emirates for the period 1 May to 1 October 2026. Seasonal visa-waivers are not compatible with the EU acquis. Despite acknowledging the non-compatibility of such waivers with the EU acquis, Montenegro had in the past kept renewing them during the tourist season. In 2026, Montenegro committed to not renewing the current waivers upon their expiry.
In July 2026, Montenegro further amended its decree on the visa regime. This decree abolishes the permanent visa-free regimes for Belarus, China, Russia, Saudi Arabia and Türkiye as of 31 October 2026, and permanently terminates the practice of seasonal visa issuance as of 1 October 2026. This thereby ends the seasonal visa regime for Kazakhstan and certain third-country nationals holding a residence permit of the United Arab Emirates. The changes introduced in the decree prevent the government from amending Montenegro’s visa regime by any means other than the official decree on visas.
The 8th Report under the visa suspension mechanism found that Montenegro had made some progress on previous recommendations, including by, reducing the number of visa-free countries for which the EU requires a visa, and monitoring outstanding applications under the terminated citizenship by investment scheme. The report called on Montenegro to expand its visa issuance capabilities.
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Under the Reform Agenda, Montenegro committed to reforming its national visa information system, ensuring that the system is sustainable and capable of handling an increased volume of applications. To this end, in March 2026 the government adopted a decision to establish a new visa information system, mandating the Ministry of Finance to secure the necessary funding. In July 2026, Montenegro signed an agreement with the United Nations Development Programme to support the modernisation of the VIS, including through relevant procurement processes and capacity building.
By the end of 2026, Montenegrin authorities are to set up the team that will be in charge of developing the new national visa information system. In 2027, Montenegro is expected to carry out data migration and testing. The new national visa information system will also be instrumental to establishing an electronic visa procedure for certain visa-required third- country nationals, including of countries added in 2026 to the visa-required list.
In 2025, 38 individuals were granted Montenegrin citizenship through pending applications under the citizenship by investment scheme, which ended on 31 December 2022. Of these individuals, citizenship was granted to citizens of China (nine), Saudi Arabia (nine), United States (seven), the Russian Federation (five), Pakistan (five) and India (three). Montenegro has committed to performing the necessary security checks while analysing the remaining applications (21 as of May 2026) under the provisions of the scheme and to ensuring that citizenship is not granted under the scheme to persons subject to international restrictive measures.
Schengen governance and external borders
The legislative and strategic framework for the management of external borders is largely aligned with the EU acquis.
The management of borders is broadly satisfactory.
Legal alignment, and strategic and institutional frameworks
Montenegro is taking a proactive approach to meeting Schengen requirements. Implementation of the Schengen acquis is guided by the Schengen Action Plan adopted in 2017, which is currently being updated. To further support effective Schengen governance, a National Schengen Coordinator was appointed in February 2026 and a new Section for Schengen Integration was established within the Ministry of Interior.
Amendments to the Law on border control were prepared to further align with the EU acquis and adopted in September 2026.
Implementation and enforcement capacity
In 2025, Montenegro continued to upgrade its border management equipment in line with
Schengen standards. Progress is underway on the installation of electronic surveillance
systems at Lake Skadar, the Bojana River and Lake Bileca. In June 2026, the adaptation of
the maritime logistics base in Sveti Nikola was completed, providing operational facilities for
up to 20 border police officers. The construction of new National Coordination Centre was
finalised in August 2026. In June 2026, Montenegro signed a government-to-government
agreement with Hungary to procure equipment for the border police. Reliance on support
from donors for border management equipment remained high both in terms of securing
funds for the purchasing of equipment, as well as for support with the acquisition of
equipment. The Border Police does not yet have an adequate IT system to monitor
equipment purchases, set priorities and establish a coherent procurement plan linked to the
Schengen Action Plan.
Operational cooperation with the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex)
continued through the Joint Operation Montenegro 2026. As of September 2026, 88 standing
corps officers have been deployed across the country.
The Border Police Sector remains understaffed, with 975 officers currently employed out of
the 1 507 available positions. As part of its 2025 recruitment campaign for police officers,
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Montenegro recruited 62 new officers for the border police out of the 249 envisaged. Through
the two recruitment campaigns in 2026, Montenegro aims to hire an additional 122 and 233
border police officers, respectively.
In 2025, Montenegro conducted 615 joint border patrols with neighbouring countries,
predominantly with Albania (2024: 719). The border police strengthened its collaboration with
the prosecution and the criminal police, leading to the opening of several new Europol SIENA
cases, including cases of migrant smuggling.
Judicial cooperation in civil and commercial matters
Judicial cooperation in civil and commercial matters is broadly satisfactory.
The legal framework for judicial
cooperation in civil and commercial
matters is largely aligned with the EU
acquis, to the extent that alignment is
already possible. In March 2026, the
2019 Hague Convention on the
Recognition and Enforcement of
Foreign Court Judgments in Civil and
Commercial Matters entered into
force in Montenegro.
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2.3 ECONOMIC CRITERIA5
2.3.1. The existence of a functioning market economy
Economic governance
The government continued with the reforms related to EU accession and the implementation of the Reform Agenda under the EU Growth Plan. Parliament adopted a new law on SOEs, which aims to strengthen corporate governance and assess related fiscal risks through a system of continuous and centralised SOE monitoring. A revised Law on budget and fiscal responsibility was adopted in August. The law covers the main elements required by the EU rules on budgetary frameworks, including fiscal rules, a medium-term budgetary framework, stronger budget planning and execution, fiscal risk monitoring, and an independent Fiscal Council. The recently announced ‘Euro Model’ reform, which includes tiered increases in the minimum wage and the elimination of pension contributions, may pose significant risks to the sustainability of public finances and the external balance which remain to be assessed, following on-going consultations with the stakeholders. In June, Montenegro adopted the Master Plan for Infrastructure Development which aims to accelerate economic growth through improved management of public investments. Under the EU-supported Reform Agenda, Montenegro made progress in strengthening the business environment, the energy sector and the digital economy, as well as the rule of law.
The policy guidance set out in the conclusions of the Economic and Financial Dialogue of May 2025 has been partially implemented. Progress has been made on reviewing tax expenditures and preparing concrete budgetary recommendations to increase budget revenue. Long-pending appointments of central bank vice-governors and external members of the Council of the Central Bank have been finalised. Good progress was made in aligning the Law on the Development Bank with the EU legislation. Montenegro has also aligned its central bank framework with the EU acquis. Public spending and the fiscal deficit in 2025 overshot the target. The Fiscal Council was established with some delay at the end
5 Unless otherwise indicated, the data in this section are taken from the relevant national sources (the statistical office, Ministry of Finance and central bank).
2023 2024 2025
Montenegro - Key economic figures
GDP per capita (% of EU-27 in PPS)1) 46 52 53 54
Real GDP growth 2.6 6.5 3.2 2.7
Activity rate of the population aged 15-64 (%), total 63.8 71.7 72.6 73.0
female 57.0 66.3 66.4 67.6
male 70.6 77.0 78.6 78.3
Unemployment rate of the population aged 15-64 (%), total 16.3 13.4 11.6 10.9
female 16.1 14.3 12.4 12.1
male 16.3 12.6 11.0 9.4
Employment of the population aged 15-64 (annual growth %) 2.1 10.5 2.9 -2.7
Nominal wages (annual growth %) 2.8 11.8 9.7 11.5
Consumer price index (annual growth %) 3.4 8.6 3.3 3.9
Exchange rate against EUR 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
Current account balance (% of GDP) -15.9 -11.2 -17.1 -20.5
Net foreign direct investment, FDI (% of GDP) 10.1 6.1 6.4 6.5
General government balance (% of GDP) -4.7 0.6 -3.3 -4.3
General government debt (% of GDP) 78.3 59.3 61.3 63.5
Notes :
1) Eurostat
2) From Q1-2025, the Labour Force Survey is based on the results of the 2023 population census,
restricting comparability with previous years data.
Sources: MONSTAT, Central Bank of Montenegro, Ministry of Finance and Eurostat
2017-22
average
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of July and further operationalised in September 2026. The 2026 budget projects the general government deficit and debt to breach the limits prescribed by the country’s fiscal rules.
Macroeconomic stability
Economic growth slowed down in 2025 and was driven by domestic demand. GDP growth decelerated to 2.7%, down from 3.2% in 2024. Economic expansion continued to be mainly driven by private consumption and investment. While supported by rising wages and robust credit growth, private consumption decelerated compared to previous years. High public capital spending fostered investment. Exports of goods decreased, mainly due to the temporary shutdown of the Pljevlja power plant, while imports increased. A mixed tourism performance resulted in a
contraction in services’ exports. The contribution of net exports to GDP growth was negative. Following a subdued first quarter, GDP growth accelerated to 3.8% in the second quarter, driven by strong tourism activity and robust investment. Montenegro’s per capita GDP in purchasing power standards stood at 54% of the EU-27 average in 2025 compared with 53% in 2024 and 43% in 2020.
External imbalances widened further in 2025. The current account deficit increased to 20.5% of GDP in 2025, from 17.1% in 2024, due to a deterioration in the merchandise trade balance and a subdued tourism performance. Imports of goods increased by 9.4%. The surplus in the secondary income balance declined to 5.0% of GDP in 2025, on the back of lower transfers to the government sector and a higher outflow of private transfers. By contrast, the primary income surplus increased to 0.8% of GDP due to lower dividend outflows. The current account deficit widened further, to 21.1% of GDP, by Q2 2026.
Net FDI inflows remained practically stable as a share of GDP (6.5%) in 2025, covering less than one third of the current account deficit. Net FDI inflows increased by 8% in 2025, supported by higher total inflows (14%) driven by investment in real estate (around half of all inflows) and intercompany debt. There was a significant rise in outflows (21.8%), resulting mainly from non-residents withdrawing their investments in Montenegro. Net FDI inflows were roughly stable at 6.1% of GDP in the four quarters to June 2026.
A combination of external and domestic factors led to an increase in annual inflation. Average inflation stood at 3.9% in 2025, above the 3.3% registered in 2024. While import prices, in particular of food, had a significant impact on inflation in Montenegro’s small and open economy, domestic inflationary pressures came from high growth of wages and a loose fiscal policy. Core inflation averaged around 5% in 2025. Inflation showed a declining trend from mid-2025, which was, however, reversed in March 2026, partly due to the impact of the Middle East conflict on energy prices. Inflation increased from 2.6% in February to 4.5% in August, driven by transport and alcohol prices.
The 2025 budget deficit exceeded the target due to significantly higher social spending. The general government deficit stood at 4.3% of GDP, an increase of 1% of GDP compared to 2024 and well above the 3.5% target set in the revised budget adopted in September 2025. Budget revenue was above the target (41.1% of GDP instead of 40.6%),
-18 -15 -12
-9 -6 -3 0 3 6 9
12 15 18
2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
Graph 21: Montenegro - Real GDP growth
and contributions
Priv. cons. Gov. cons.
GFCF Stocks
Source: WiiW, MONSTAT
% y-o-y
-30
-20
-10
0
10
20
2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
Graph 22: Montenegro - Current account selected
components and FDI
Workers' remittances balance
Goods and services trade balance
Current account balance
Net FDI
% of GDP
Source: IMF, Central Bank of Montenegro
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on the back of strong tax revenue (4.8% higher than planned) while non-tax revenue was lower than budgeted. Pension contributions were 11.1% below the level planned, and their share of GDP dropped by 2.8 percentage points to 4.3% following a halving in contribution rates. Total public spending increased by 7.8% year-on-year and substantially exceeded the plan (45.4% of GDP instead of 44%), driven by rising social transfers, health-related spending and subsidies. The increase in the wage bill was contained at 1.8% year-on-year while capital spending grew by 14.9%. The general government budget targets a deficit of 3.7% of GDP6 in 2026, which is above the fiscal rule’s 3% limit.
Strong reliance on consumption taxes, a high level of mandatory spending, and large debt repayment needs point to fiscal vulnerabilities. Despite the good performance of labour and corporate taxes in 2025, a marked reliance on revenue from consumption taxes (VAT and excises accounted for 54% of total budget revenue in 2025) results in a high dependency on the business cycle. Montenegro made some progress in strengthening the tax base by introducing VAT on construction land, increasing excises on tobacco, and changing
the personal income tax on income from a second job, but the impact of these measures is rather limited. Public spending is driven by high mandatory expenditure, with the public sector wage bill, social security and health transfers amounting to 68% of total general government spending in 2025. Public debt increased to 63.5% of GDP at the end of 2025 from 61.3% in 2024, reflecting new net borrowing, partly to build fiscal buffers for a large Eurobond repayment due in 2027. The general government debt-to-GDP-ratio declined below 60% in Q2 2026, but the government projects it to increase to 68%7 at the end of 2026. Debt rollover needs, including of Eurobonds, are moderate in 2026 (EUR 383.6 million), but peak in 2027 at EUR 750 million or 8.4% of GDP. The overall financing strategy is to secure sufficient financing for debt repayment by issuing bonds on foreign and domestic markets and using accumulated government deposits in peak repayment years while trying to extend debt maturity, smoothen its repayment profile and avoid peaks every two years8.
There is room to strengthen fiscal policy as the main tool to manage aggregate demand in Montenegro’s ‘euroised’ economy. A loose fiscal stance in 2025 added to price pressures and to external imbalances. High mandatory spending, an ambitious investment programme and increasing interest payments do not leave much room for fiscal support in case of adverse economic shocks and make it challenging to comply with the fiscal rules in the upcoming years.
Functioning of product markets
Business environment
Some progress was made in improving the regulatory business environment. Supported by the permanent secretariat of the Competitiveness Council, the implementation of the Action Plan (aiming to eliminate 11 key barriers to business) continued, with 63% of the plan’s activities completed by mid-2026. The plan focuses on four areas of action: (i) suppressing the grey economy; (ii) improving the business environment; (iii) advancing legislative work; and (iv) making the public administration more efficient.
6 The 2026 budget, adopted in December 2025, targeted a deficit of 3.3% of GDP. Considering the worse-than- expected outcome in 2025 and new developments, the projection was revised to 3.7% of GDP in the Macroeconomic and fiscal policy guidelines for the period 2026-2029, released in July 2026. 7 Macroeconomic and fiscal policy guidelines for the period 2026-2029. 8 Eurobonds (EUR 500 million) will mature in 2029. A further large debt repayment is due in 2031.
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40
60
80
100
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Graph 23: Montenegro - Fiscal developments
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Major challenges remain with respect to timely reimbursement of VAT and addressing seasonal and undeclared work, as the electronic system for processing temporary residence and work permit applications is not yet operational.
The e-government portal, which is expected to serve as a central access point for public administration services, offers around 100 e-services to citizens and businesses, but their operability still needs to be improved. Of these, 57 have been developed during 2025 and hundreds more are expected to be developed and rolled out in the next two years thanks to the EU support through the Reform Agenda. Some technical progress was made by deploying the upgraded Government Service Bus, which is used by 26 institutions in key sectors such as social protection, education, and justice. However, the integration of all public registers into the Unified System of Electronic Data Exchange has yet to be completed. The official deployment plan envisages the expansion of e-services to local government authorities, enabling more effective delivery to citizens.
While the implementation of the ‘Europe Now 2’ programme supported employment growth and some formalisation of wages, Montenegro’s business environment continues to be hampered by the informal economy. The informal economy, accounting to 20.4% of GDP even among registered firms9, poses a significant challenge to legally operating small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and microenterprises, particularly in the services sector. Its prevalence is linked to deficiencies in the institutional and regulatory framework, labour market weaknesses, limited enforcement capacity among public authorities, as well as corruption and tax non-compliance. While indicators under the Action Plan for the Suppression of the Informal Economy 2024-2026 show some progress in formalising economic activities in 2025, e.g. in tourism, and expanding the use of digital tax and customs tools, the structural challenges persist. Further efforts are needed to strengthen institutional coordination and trust between the public and private sectors and enforce capacity of inspections through the use of digital tools.
State influence on product markets
The government continued to intervene in markets to contain price increases, while strengthening the framework for monitoring and enforcing State aid rules. The government reinstated and extended a price cap programme from November 2025 to March 2026 following the suspension of price caps in May 2025. This effort aims to restrict profit margins on 70 essential items, including basic food staples such as flour, sugar, oil and salt, and support domestic producers. In March 2026, the government reduced excise duties on diesel by 50% and on petrol by 25%, with the objective of limiting retail fuel prices. In August the petrol duty reduction was abolished, while the diesel excise reduction was scaled back, leaving the duty still 10% below its original level. The Agency for Protection of Competition (APC) increased the number of investigations processed, conducted dawn raids and assessed the compatibility of State aid measures in 2025. The APC has, in particular, finalised a number of assessments and used all procedural instruments at its disposal in landmark cases of alleged unlawful State aid, including the case of Montenegro Airlines. Further work was carried out to raise awareness of State aid rules among aid grantors and to increase the number of staff in the agency. In 2025, state aid granted by Montenegro (EUR 2.87 million or 0.04% of GDP) was significantly below the amounts provided in 2024 and 2023 (EUR 11.85 and 13.19 million, respectively).
Privatisation and restructuring
Important steps were taken to improve the monitoring and governance of SOEs. The Law on the governance of SOEs was adopted in June 2026. Its aim is to boost SOEs’ financial performance by reforming their management structures and reducing political patronage. In June, the government also adopted the state ownership policy, which serves as the key strategic instrument in implementing the Law on SOEs. Activities to upgrade and update the SOE register are ongoing. The Department for fiscal risk monitoring in the
9 OECD data.
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Ministry of Finance continued to monitor SOEs and prepared an aggregate analysis of their financial performance. The government adopted this analysis, together with an accompanying fiscal risks statement, in December 2025.
Functioning of the financial market
The banking system remained stable and profitable in 2025. Banks continued to fund themselves mainly through domestic deposits, with deposit growth recovering to 6.1% in 2025 from 3.4% in 2024. In the first half of 2026 deposit growth stood at 5% year-on-year. The return on assets declined to 2% in Q4-2025 from 3% one year earlier, while the return on equity fell to 15.3% from 18.5% in the same period. The non-performing loan ratio declined to 2.4% in Q1-2026, compared with 3.5% in the end of 2024. The capital adequacy ratio of the banking sector (regulatory capital to risk-weighted assets) increased to 20.2% in 2025, comfortably exceeding the regulatory minimum.
Montenegro adopted amendments to the Law on the Development Bank that exclude deposit-taking and the provision of payment services from the scope of the Development Bank of Montenegro’s (DBM) activities. Further by-laws were adopted on DBM governing minimum risk-management standards, large exposures, capital adequacy, and reporting requirements.
Credit growth accelerated amid a slight fall in lending rates. Credit growth increased to 15.3% in 2025 from 13.3% in the previous year. Given strong credit expansion and rising real estate prices, the central bank tightened macroprudential measures by raising the countercyclical capital buffer and the capital conservation buffer. Borrowing costs declined slightly, with the nominal weighted average lending rate falling to 6.2% at the end of 2025 from 6.5% one year earlier. The nominal weighted average rate on deposits stood at only 0.29%. The spread between lending and deposit rates supported the profitability of the banking sector. Credit growth remained in double digits in the first half of 2026.
Montenegro’s financial system remains bank dominated. Despite strong banking-sector indicators and rapid credit growth, SMEs continue to face financing constraints. The Montenegro Stock Exchange plays only a limited role, serving mainly as a residual market for some large corporates and SOEs, while SMEs are absent both as issuers and as market participants. Guarantee schemes, equity finance, risk-sharing instruments and investment- readiness remain underdeveloped.
Functioning of the labour market
The labour market continued to improve. According to the labour force survey, the average unemployment rate declined to 10.9% in 2025 and to 9.4% in Q2 2026, down from 11.6% in 2024. The employment rate (aged 15-64) increased to 65.1% in 2025 and to 68.3% in Q2 2026, up from 64.2% in the previous year10. Results of the 2026 Q2 survey once again confirmed large regional disparities, with the unemployment rate standing at 6.7% in the coastal region, 8.4% in the central region, and 19.4% in the poorer northern region. The gender gap narrowed somewhat, but the activity rate for women (aged 15-64) in 2025 (71%) remained significantly below that of men (80%). Youth (age 15-24) unemployment declined to 25% in 2026 Q2 from 26% in 2024 but still remains one of the major structural
challenges alongside the rate of long-term unemployment, with some 70% of all unemployed people looking for a job for more than 12 months. The employment agency adopted a revised catalogue of active labour market policy measures and expanded digital interoperability via the national Government
10 Nominal growth of employment was negative in 2025. From 2025 the Labour Force Survey is based on the results of the 2023 population census, restricting comparability with previous years data.
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Graph 24: Montenegro - Labour market trends
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Service Bus. Following the 2025 pilot phase, the nationwide roll-out of the Youth Guarantee scheme remains contingent on improving interinstitutional coordination and data-sharing between the education, social welfare and employment sectors.
2.3.2. The capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the EU
Education and innovation
Further steps were taken to address long-standing challenges in education quality and skills mismatches. Following the adoption of a comprehensive multiannual education sector strategy (2025-2035) in April 2025, the government integrated the 2025-2026 Action Plan into the national budget and launched a major initiative, ‘Better Schools for All’, in February 2026. In October, Parliament adopted the Law on higher education, which improved the framework for practical training. An external evaluation of practical education in school was carried out to determine the training needs of practical education teachers and instructors. While the 2025 PISA average scores improved compared with the 2022 results, overall student performance remains below the OECD average across all three tested domains.
The national innovation system benefited from a number of new initiatives. The recently established Science and Technology Park of Montenegro enhanced cross-sectoral cooperation, filling 86% of the envisaged positions by the end of 2025. Systemic support for the innovation ecosystem was provided through ten dedicated programmes. The Innovation Fund plays a vital role in implementing the national innovation policy, with funding increasing from EUR 700 000 in 2022 to EUR 3.2 million in 2024. It has introduced two strategic initiatives on artificial intelligence (AI) and a GovTech programme aimed at deploying innovative digital solutions in the public sector. However, spending on research and development (R&D) still amounted to only 0.3% of GDP. To support R&D activities, Montenegro adopted the Law on incentive measures for the development of research and innovation, which grants a corporate income tax credit equivalent to 100% of the tax due on profits reinvested in approved R&D or innovation projects.
Physical capital and quality of infrastructure
Further progress was made in improving the energy infrastructure and implementing the Green Agenda. While the share of renewable energy sources is high, heavy reliance on hydropower, which accounted for approximately 42% of total electricity production in 2025, underscores the continued need for diversification. To capitalise on strong foreign investor interest in new renewable energy projects, Montenegro needs to accelerate its permitting procedures and swiftly upgrade its electricity grid infrastructure. In May 2026 the national electric power company, EPCG, started operating the 55 MW Gvozd wind farm. The National Energy and Climate Plan was adopted in December 2025, providing the necessary strategic framework for long-term decarbonisation and energy transition. The Pljevlja coal power plant is projected to remain in service until 2041. Following a temporary closure in April 2025 for ecological reconstruction, the plant resumed operations in November, with an improved environmental performance, although it is still the main polluter in the country.
Good progress was made in the transport sector, although the lack of administrative capacity remains a bottleneck. Following the adoption of the Law on railways, the Railway Agency was formally established in early 2026. The agency started to set up its structures, which are necessary to carry out its regulatory and safety functions, overseeing the opening- up of the market as a fully independent market regulator and national safety authority. The work on the Bar-Vrbnica railway continued, but the slow pace of progress indicates persistent challenges in the management of large-scale infrastructure projects. A significant milestone was reached for the Mateševo–Andrijevica section of the Bar-Boljare highway as both the construction and supervision contracts were signed in February 2026, following a tender process conducted in accordance with the procurement rules and procedures of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD). In March 2026, the government adopted an ambitious transition plan for the institutional and operational restructuring of the national air navigation service provider. In July 2026, the government
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decided to cancel the public call for the concession of Podgorica and Tivat airports and terminate the procedure, after the first-ranked bidder has withdrawn.
Investment in digital infrastructure accelerated. The Cybersecurity Agency was established in late 2025, significantly enhancing the national institutional framework for cyber resilience. Further efforts are needed, however, to achieve full operational capacity and strengthen its administrative and technical resources. As 5G network coverage expanded to over 95% of the population by early 2026, the focus has shifted towards the uptake of advanced digital technologies by firms and the interoperability of public databases and digital identities. Montenegro’s accession to the Single Euro Payments Area (SEPA) in October 2025 is expected to contribute to the digitalisation of the economy and the modernisation of retail payments. Despite the integration of an increased number of transactional e-services on the centralised e-government portal in 2025, the full interoperability of various institutional databases and the consistent use of digital identities in public administration remain a challenge.
Sectoral and enterprise structure
The structure of the economy remains reliant on services and small enterprises. Micro, small, and medium-sized enterprises (MSMEs) continue to serve as the backbone of the Montenegrin economy, accounting for 54.2% of total employees in 2025. The share of microenterprises within the MSME sector remained unchanged at 95% in 2025, underscoring the continued structural fragmentation of the business landscape. Across sectors, the distribution of employment in 2025 remained the same as in previous years, with the services sector absorbing around three quarters of total employment, while industry and construction (19.3%) and agriculture (4.3%) account for much lower shares. Tourism performance was mixed in 2025, with a higher number of arrivals but fewer overnight stays, resulting in peak- season concentration and environmental pressures. New hotel openings, diversification of tourist origin countries and additional flight destinations served by low-cost airlines, should help to extend the season and shift towards higher value-added services.
Economic integration with the EU and price competitiveness
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Despite falling exports, foreign trade expanded on the back of import growth. Montenegro’s foreign trade increased by 7.2% year-on-year, with exports of goods shrinking by 6.9% and imports growing by 9.3% in 2025. The merchandise export base remained very narrow, relying on mineral fuels and electricity. Bilateral trade in goods11 with the EU grew by 3.7% and the EU remains Montenegro’s main trade partner, accounting for 32.5% of total exports and 43.3% of total imports of goods. CEFTA (Central European Free Trade Agreement) countries also constitute an important market, accounting for 46.8% of
Montenegro’s total exports and 27.3% of total imports of goods. Services exports, relying mainly on tourism, largely outweigh goods exports (amounting to 33% and 7.2% of GDP respectively in 2025). While total tourist arrivals increased by 4.7 per cent in 2025, overnight stays declined by 1.5 per cent, pointing to shorter average stays. The EU remains the main source of FDI inflows for Montenegro, accounting for 32.8% of total FDI inflows in 2025, compared with 28.2% in 2024, followed by Serbia, Türkiye and USA.12
2.4. PUBLIC PROCUREMENT, STATISTICS AND FINANCIAL CONTROL
Chapter 5: Public procurement
EU rules ensure that public procurement of goods, services and works in any Member State is transparent and open to all EU companies on the basis of non-discrimination and equal treatment.
Institutional set-up and legal alignment
The legal framework on public procurement is aligned with the EU acquis, the Law on public procurement includes a specific chapter on defence and security procurement. The Law on public procurement has been amended in July and September 2026, strengthening the oversight of public procurement. The Law on public-private partnership and Law on concessions are aligned with Directive 2014/23/EU.
The Agreement on Cooperation in Tourism and Real Estate Development with the United Arab Emirates (UAE), concluded in March 2025, states that any contracts, programmes and agreements with investors from UAE are exempted from legislation of both countries on public procurement. Montenegro must ensure that the implementation of this and other, similar agreements does not contravene or circumvent the EU acquis on public procurement.
In December 2025, the government adopted a new Strategy for the Improvement of Public Procurement Policy and Public-Private Partnership for 2026-2030. In July 2026, the government decided to cancel the public call for the concession of Podgorica and Tivat airports and terminate the procedure, after the first-ranked bidder has withdrawn. The government decision needs yet to obtain the approval from Parliament. Implementation and enforcement capacity
11 MONSTAT data. 12 Central Bank of Montenegro data.
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Graph 25a: Montenegro - Exports of goods
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Graph 25b: Montenegro - Imports of goods
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The public procurement market represented 12.44% of GDP in 2025 from 11.38% in 2024. The share of centralised procurement continued to increase from 3% in 2023 to 27% in 2025.
The administrative capacity in the area of public procurement is adequate and remains stable. Trainings and courses for procurement officers are organised systematically.
Regarding prevention of corruption in public procurement, amendments to the Law on the prevention of corruption and to the Law on public procurement, which revised the anti- corruption, integrity and conflict of interest framework for public procurements, were adopted by the Parliament in July 2026. The introduction of automatic detection mechanisms of irregularities into the electronic procurement system and establishment of interconnection with the database of the justice system are still awaiting.
Efficient remedy system
The right to legal remedy and appeal procedures are in line with EU standards and practice. There are no significant delays in treating and resolving complaints and the remedy system works efficiently.
Chapter 18: Statistics
European statistics are developed, produced and disseminated by EU Member States, guided by the principles and quality criteria elaborated in the Regulation on European statistics, such as professional independence, impartiality, reliability, accessibility and statistical confidentiality. Common rules are in place for the methodology, production and dissemination of statistical information, which are further specified in sectoral legislation that constitute the EU acquis on statistics.
On statistical infrastructure, the coordination role of the Statistical Office of Montenegro has been strengthened. Amendments to the statistical law brought about alignment with the EU acquis, including enhanced access to administrative data sources and a high level of confidentiality and data protection. They also assigned clear responsibilities for producing government finance statistics (GFS) and excessive deficit procedure statistics (EDP). In the reporting period, cooperation among key institutions involved in the production of macroeconomic statistics – the Ministry of Finance, the Statistical Office of Montenegro (MONSTAT) and the Central Bank of Montenegro – has significantly improved. A Steering Committee for the implementation of the European System of Accounts (ESA) 2010 methodology was established to ensure a more systematic approach to alignment with the EU acquis in this domain. The number of datasets transmitted to Eurostat has significantly increased. Further efforts are needed to ensure full compliance and broader coverage, including for historical datasets.
The lack of adequate office space for MONSTAT and persistent understaffing, with only around 60% of positions filled at the beginning of 2026, remains a serious issue. Insufficient staffing in key areas continues to hinder the production of statistics required under the EU acquis. Plans to significantly increase the administrative capacity by the end of 2028 are underway, but this requires addressing the current limitations of its premises. Montenegro reached a high degree of alignment in the area of classifications and registers.
On business and trade statistics, there is good alignment in statistics on the production of goods and international trade in goods and services. Efforts should continue towards full alignment in short-term and structural business statistics. Energy statistics is fully aligned, and good progress has been achieved in transport statistics.
In the area of macroeconomic statistics, Montenegro completed a benchmark revision of national accounts data for the period 2006-2023, integrated new data sources (including from the recent population and agricultural censuses) and improved the methodology. Key national accounts data are produced in line with the ESA 2010 (Gross Domestic Product, Gross National Income and main aggregates). Regular production of GFS and EDP data started in 2026, marking significant progress in this area. Montenegro provided a roadmap outlining timeline and scope for further improvements in the coverage and quality of these data.
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In social statistics Montenegro regularly provides data on asylum and on enforcement of immigration legislation. Montenegro should produce statistics on residence permits and continue improving completeness and quality of the data across all social statistics areas.
On agriculture statistics, significant progress has been registered, and efforts should continue for full alignment with detailed requirements and deadlines for data transmission.
With regard to price statistics, Montenegro fulfils the mandatory data transmission requirements of the EU acquis for the Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices.
Chapter 32: Financial control
The EU promotes the reform of national governance systems to improve managerial accountability, sound financial management of income and expenditure, and external audit of public funds. The financial control rules further protect the EU’s financial interests against fraud in the management of EU funds and the euro against counterfeiting.
Public internal financial control (PIFC)
The legal, strategic and operational frameworks on PIFC are in place and recent regulatory changes have further strengthened the alignment with international standards. The strategic framework for PIFC is ensured through continuous implementation of related activities under the public finance management and public administration reform strategy. The government continues to adopt a PIFC annual report and corrective measures on improved governance were adopted to improve the uptake of its recommendations across public sector.
Good progress was noted on internal control with the adoption of secondary legislation to the recent Law on governance, internal control and internal audit in the public sector adopted in June 2025 for increased internal audit productivity, better coverage and implementation of audit recommendations. Also, the regulatory gap on a PIFC operational framework for state- owned enterprises (SOEs) was closed through the adoption of the SOEs law in June 2026, and this now needs to be effectively implemented and enforced. Administrative capacity across the PIFC system has improved but remains to be continuously upgraded, particularly at the local level.
On internal control, progress on risk management continued: the majority of budget users identify and assess strategic and operational risks, while integrating them into decision- making processes. Additionally, progress was noted on irregularity management, through upgraded procedures. Central Harmonisation Unit capacities to follow up on better functioning on internal control have been improved. Continuous efforts need to be undertaken to enhance administrative capacities for more effective enforcement of risk and irregularity management, particularly through regular trainings, quality assurance, and establishment of a centralised mechanism for reporting and data collection on irregularities. In December 2025, the Law on budget inspection was revised to better define the organisational and functional division between budget inspection and internal audit, strengthening complementarity while supporting ongoing enhancements to PIFC.
In terms of managerial accountability, progress was in undertaking various steps for better delegation of responsibilities, although the managerial culture in public administration remains highly centralised. In order to ensure that delegation of tasks is accompanied by clear performance indicators and audit trail the government adopted a roadmap for further reform direction. Overall. delegation of decision-making authority has improved in some line ministries, but such needs to be applied across all of them, and the government foresees clear reform ambition under the public administration reform strategy. The Ministry of Finance adopted the guidelines for managerial accountability in March 2026, which were developed with interested line ministries.
Enhanced internal audit is proven by the increased number of audits conducted, consistent planning, reporting, and internal quality assurance processes, including in SOEs, in line with international internal audit standards. Both adopted in October 2025, the rulebook on internal audit methodology clarified obligations, responsibilities, and roles on risk management, while the rulebook on the detailed manner of governance, management and implementation of
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internal control improved the reporting on suspected irregularities and fraud and established an alternative reporting line when regular ones are not functioning. Yet, the internal audit functions need to be further strengthened.
External audit
The legalframework for external audit is in line with international standards and best practices and safeguards the institutional, financial and operational independence of the State Audit Institution (SAI). Such independence needs to be continuously ensured in practice. Parliament appointed the President of the Senate of the SAI in December 2025. As for SAI’s administrative capacity, remaining vacancies are being regularly filled, as per staffing plan. Parliamentary scrutiny supports the uptake of SAI’s recommendations by keeping the government accountable for their implementation. However, the implementation of recommendations needs to be improved.
Protection of the EU’s financial interests
Montenegro adopted amendments to the Criminal Code in order to fully align its criminal legislation with the Directive on the fight against fraud to the Union’s financial interests (PIF Directive).). Additionally, it has adopted a new national anti-fraud strategy 2025-2027 in July. The anti-fraud coordination service continues to strengthen its knowledge and skills through training activities.
In reporting period, national authorities continued to report on cases of irregularities via the Irregularity Management System. In 2025, Montenegro reported 9 irregularities, all classified as non-fraudulent.
Protection of the Euro against counterfeiting
Montenegrin legislation on the protection of the euro against counterfeiting is fully aligned with EU regulations, and the national analysis centre needs to ensure sufficient administrative capacity for technical analysis and to continue international cooperation. Relevant legislation needs also to be further amended to prepare for EU accession.
3. GOOD NEIGHBOURLY RELATIONS AND REGIONAL COOPERATION
Good neighbourly relations and regional cooperation form an essential part of Montenegro’s European integration process. They contribute to stability, reconciliation and a climate conducive to addressing open bilateral issues and the legacies of the past.
Montenegro maintained its engagement in a number of regional cooperation initiatives, such as the Central European Free Trade Agreement (CEFTA), the Energy Community, the Transport Community, the South-East European Cooperation Process (SEECP) and the Regional Cooperation Council. Montenegro also actively participates in initiatives such as the Central European Initiative, the Regional Initiative for Migration, Asylum and Refugees, and the Centre for Security Cooperation. In 2025, Montenegro became an associated participating state of the Three Seas Initiative. In 2026, Montenegro chairs the Berlin Process, the Governing Board of the Regional Youth Cooperation Office and the Western Balkans Fund.
The sixth annual EU-Western Balkans Summit took place in Brussels in December 2025. In June 2026, Montenegro hosted the EU-Western Balkans Summit in Tivat, reaffirming the EU membership perspective of the Western Balkans and exploring measures to further advance gradual integration. Montenegro actively engaged in the regional dimension of the Growth Plan for the Western Balkans, participating in both ministerial and leaders’ meetings, and attended the Growth Plan Summit in Tirana in November 2025. In 2026, Montenegro held the Presidency of the Berlin Process and hosted the Berlin Process Summit in October 2026 as well as several Ministerial meetings throughout the year.
On the Common Regional Market (CRM), at the Berlin process summit in London in October 2025, the leaders of the region endorsed a revised and streamlined action plan to
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implement the Green Agenda for the Western Balkans, adopted a Western Balkans Climate Adaptation Roadmap and committed to making progress in the promotion of regional mobility and in the implementation of relevant regional agreements and CEFTA decisions. Montenegro signed the fifth mobility agreement on access to higher education and admission to studies in the Western Balkans and adopted the CRM action plan for 2025-2028. Montenegro has ratified all of the five regional mobility agreements. The roadmap for roaming between the Western Balkans and the EUentered the first phase of implementation. In February 2026, the Commission proposed launching negotiations with Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Montenegro, North Macedonia, and Serbia to integrate them into the EU’s ‘Roam Like at Home’ regime.
The Commission on Missing Persons of Montenegro continued to cooperate with neighbouring countries under bilateral cooperation protocols. There are 50 active cases of missing persons who are Montenegrin citizens or whose families reside in Montenegro.
Montenegro also continued preparations for assuming the six-month Presidency of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe on 10 November 2026.
Montenegro generally maintains good bilateral relations with other enlargement countries in the region and with neighbouring EU Member States.
Relations with Albania remained good. High-level visits and political contacts continued to improve and strengthen bilateral cooperation in fields of mutual interest.
Relations with Bosnia and Herzegovina remained good overall. Presidential-level discussions were held on strengthening economic ties and regional cooperation. The Zupci– Sitnica joint border crossing on the Trebinje–Herceg Novi route was officially opened. Occasional developments in the Republika Srpska entity have sparked strong reactions from high-level Montenegrin officials.
Relations with Kosovo remained good. In July 2026, Montenegro and Kosovo signed a bilateral Agreement on the Mutual Recognition of Qualified Electronic Trust Services and Electronic Identification Schemes.
Relations with North Macedonia remained good with no pending bilateral issues. High-level meetings between representatives of both countries took place during the reporting period.
Relations with Serbia are generally stable, though tensions occasionally arise, as they did over the 20th anniversary of Montenegro’s independence, following statements by the Serbian President challenging the legitimacy of Montenegro’s independence. Serbia regularly backs pro-Serbian groups in Montenegro, as seen notably during the December 2025 protests in Botun. Debates remain over the status of Serbs, the Serbian language, the role of the Serbian Orthodox Church, and alleged Serbian meddling in domestic affairs, including in Montenegro’s media landscape. Following the death of convicted war criminal Ratko Mladić in August 2026, significant political tensions arose after the Speaker of Parliament offered his condolences to Mladić’s son.
Bilateral relations with Türkiye remained stable and included high-level meetings, including in the margins of the Balkans Peace Platform. In October 2025, Montenegro decided to temporarily suspend the visa-free regime for Turkish citizens, following a stabbing incident in Podgorica. The incident ignited a wave of protests against the Turkish community in Montenegro.The visa-free regime was reintroduced in December 2025.
Montenegro continued to provide unequivocal support to Ukraine in light of Russia’s war of aggression, including humanitarian and military aid. Montenegro participated in regional initiatives and attended the Ukraine–Southeast Europe Summit in Kyiv. The presidents of the two countries met.
Relations with the Republic of Moldova are good. Montenegro and Moldova maintain relations through the SEECP. The two sides are cooperating in the area of European integration, based on a memorandum of cooperation signed in May 2025.
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Relations with Croatia intensified through the ongoing dialogue to find solutions to outstanding bilateral issues. In addition to dialogue at ministerial level, several high-level visits and meetings also took place, including between the Prime Ministers in the margins of the Bled strategic forum and of the Berlin Process Summit. These efforst need to be further sustained. Following the launch of the EU Entry Exit System, in May 2026, Croatia amended its Law on Foreigners and announced the issuing of a national visa in order to facilitate cross-border mobility for professional drivers from third countries, including from Montenegro.
Relations with Italy remained good and included high-level meetings, highlighting key areas for further cooperation.
4. RESILIENCE, SECURITY, DEFENCE
Montenegro has a clear strategic orientation anchored in the EU accession process, continues to be fully aligned with the EU’s common foreign and security policy, including restrictive measures, participates in EU crisis management operations and missions and is a reliable EU partner in multilateral fora.
Montenegro’s advancement in economic security, and democratic resilience serves as additional indicators of its readiness for EU membership. These pillars not only define Montenegro’s capacity to align with EU standards but also its potential to contribute to the Union’s strategic autonomy and collective security.
Democratic resilience
The government increasingly recognised the threat posed by hybrid threats, in particular foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI), including disinformation, which resulted in efforts to strengthen the institutional framework. Montenegro continues close cooperation with the EU on FIMI and strategic communication, leveraging the Hybrid Risk Survey to identify and tailor suitable responses to the increasing hybrid threats, including FIMI and disinformation in the final stages of EU accession negotiations and ahead of the June 2027 elections. Working together with the EU through regional and bilateral programmes efforts continue to reinforce media literacy, independent journalism, and civil society resilience and to counter external hybrid influence, while boosting preparedness to safeguard democratic processes.
Economic security and resilience
Montenegro’s economy remains vulnerable to external shocks due to its reliance on tourism, low diversification of economy and external financing. Tourism accounts directly for around 20–25% of GDP and is a major destination for foreign investment, with annual FDI inflows exceeding 7% of GDP and largely concentrated in tourism, real estate and construction rather than productive sectors.
Economic security faces risks from external dependencies, critical infrastructure gaps, and economic coercion, requiring stronger resilience measures.
Trade dependencies are mainly concentrated in non-strategic consumer and manufactured products, many of which are sourced from China. More relevant vulnerabilities concern foreign-owned activities in ICT & Digital Technologies and Agrifood, where a relatively small number of investors have a significant presence. The energy system remains reliant on hydropower and coal, with lignite accounting for around 40% of electricity generation, exposing the economy to climate and energy-market volatility. Significant grid losses (11.3% in 2023) add to these challenges, while renewable potential offers opportunities for investment, provided grid capacity and system flexibility are strengthened.
Montenegro holds known critical raw material resources. However, the size, value and commercial exploration feasibility for most of these deposits has not been assessed yet.
Montenegro is making considerable efforts at national level on strengthening cybersecurity and has also developed an important role regionally. It hosts the Western Balkans Cyber Capacity Centre (WB3C), which provides the expertise and resources necessary to address
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the region’s growing cybersecurity challenges. Montenegro collaborates with the European Union Agency for Cybersecurity (ENISA) and is in the process of seeking access to the EU Cyber Security Reserve. Montenegro has made significant progress aligning its legislation with the EU legal framework on Cybersecurity. Montenegro has aligned with the NIS 2 Directive, established the Cybersecurity Agency and Computer Incident Response Teams, and adopted the relevant policy frameworks. Montenegro’s emerging technology sector, particularly in AI and cybersecurity, presents an opportunity for deeper EU integration.
Defence capacity building and defence industrial dimension
In terms of defence capacity building, with assistance from the European Peace Facility, an off-budget instrument, Montenegrin armed forces are working towards strengthening capacities. In February 2025, a EUR 6 million assistance measure for Montenegro under the European Peace Facility was adopted to provide the Armed Forces with real life support equipment, equipment for chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear defence operations (CBRN), and equipment for the helicopter-borne search and rescue units. Montenegro also benefits from EPF support at regional level, as a non-EU participating nation in the Balkan Medical Task Force.
Montenegro’s defence industrial base is modest in scale, comprising few SMEs, and focuses on small arms, ammunition and explosives. This presents some opportunities for integration into European defence supply chains. In the framework of the European Defence Fund (EDF) and the European Defence Industry Programme (EDIP), entities established in the EU or in an associated country and subject to control by Montenegro or by a Montenegrin entity could be eligible for funding, provided that guarantees provided by the EU Member State or associated country of establishment are made available to the Commission. So far this has not materialised.
Military mobility is also an area of interest. Montenegro is eligible under the Security Action for Europe (SAFE) instrument and is adapting its defence procurement to align with joint procurement mechanisms and stockpile coordination efforts led by the European Defence Agency (EDA).
Civil protection and disaster resilience
Montenegro increasingly recognises the importance of strengthening civil protection and
disaster resilience, which resulted in closer alignment with European preparedness and
response frameworks. Montenegro continues close cooperation with the EU through the
Union Civil Protection Mechanism (UCPM).
5. ABILITY TO ASSUME THE OBLIGATIONS OF MEMBERSHIP
CLUSTER 2: INTERNAL MARKET
This cluster covers: free movement of goods (Chapter 1); freedom of movement for workers (Chapter 2); right of establishment and freedom to provide services (Chapter 3); free movement of capital (Chapter 4); company law (Chapter 6); intellectual property law (Chapter 7); competition policy (Chapter 8); financial services (Chapter 9) and consumer and health protection (Chapter 28).
Chapter 1: Free movement of goods
The free movement of goods ensures that many products can be traded freely across the EU based on common rules and procedures. Where products are governed by national rules, the principle of the free movement of goods prevents these rules from creating unjustified barriers
General principles
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In January 2026, the government adopted the 2026 EU accession programme, which includes planning for legislative alignment with the acquis on free movement of goods that remain to be aligned with.
Non-harmonised areas
Montenegro continued to implement its action plan for compliance with Articles 34-36 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) on the prohibition of quantitative restrictions. In March 2026, the government adopted a revised action plan which includes the actions taken so far, and what actions remain to be completed and by when.In March 2026, Montenegro adopted the Law on amendments to the Law on technical requirements for products and conformity assessment and related secondary legislation, introducing rules on mutual recognition of goods aiming to remove unjustified barriers to trade. In May 2026, Montenegro adopted implementing legislation specifying the content and procedure for recognising conformity documents and marks, as well as the content and form of the declaration on the mutual recognition of products.
Harmonised area: quality infrastructure
On standardisation, in April 2026, Montenegro amended the Law on standardisation, and the Decision on the establishment of the Institute for Standardisation of Montenegro (ISME); intending to address the recommendations of the European Committee for Standardisation (CEN) and the European Committee for Electrotechnical Standardisation (CENELEC). In April 2026, ISME submitted an application for full membership of CEN and CENELEC: to this end, a peer review by CEN/CENELEC to assess the full membership criteria is expected in Autumn 2026. In the period from 1 September 2025 to 31 August 2026, ISME published a total of 2 088 Montenegrin standards and related documents.
Regarding metrology, Montenegro improved the human and material capacities of their laboratories for temperature and pressure and for testing precious metal articles. In May 2026, Montenegro adopted a number of pieces of national legislation to align with the EU acquis on metrology, particularly the acquis on measuring instruments, measuring units, non- automatic weighing instruments, on bottles used as measuring containers and metrological control. In September 2026 Montenegro adopted amendments to the law on technical specifications, thus aligning with Decision 768/2008/EC on the common framework for the marketing of products. In June 2026, Montenegro adopted national legislation aligning with the acquis on prepacked goods.
In April 2026, Montenegro adopted a Law on amendments to the Law on accreditation. During the reporting period, the Accreditation Body of Montenegro (ATCG) accredited one new conformity assessment body, bringing the total number of accredited bodies to 43. A follow-up peer evaluation was carried out in March 2026 in the context of maintaining ATCG’s status as a signatory of the European Cooperation for Accreditation Multilateral Agreement (MLA), which confirmed that ATCG has made significant progress in organisational structure, assessment planning, and implementation. ATCG is working to address the five non-conformities and six recommendations that the evaluation identified.
In March 2026, Montenegro adopted amendments to the Law on market surveillance aligning with the latest EU acquis on market surveillance. In 2025 2 136 market surveillance inspections were carried out, which identified 861 types of dangerous and non-compliant products (49 196 items). Montenegro has also introduced the use of the European Conformity (CE) marking in national law and in compliance with EU harmonised product rules, providing that the relevant provisions will be applicable upon Montenegro’s accession to the EU.
Furthermore, in May 2026, Montenegro adopted a number of action plans proposing measures to align with some provisions of EU regulations, which become directly applicable upon accession; namely, the Internal Market Emergency and Resilience Act, the net-zero technology manufacturing ecosystem (NZIA), the strawberry regulation, on prohibiting products made with forced labour and on defence products and defence procurement.
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Harmonised area: sectoral legislation
Regarding ‘new and global approach product legislation’, in March, May, June, July and September 2026, Montenegro adopted implementing legislation aligning with cableway installations, gas appliances, lifts and safety components for lifts, pressure equipment, simple pressure vessels, equipment and protective systems intended for use in potentially explosive atmospheres (so called ATEX), low voltage equipment, recreational and personal watercraft, personal protective equipment, cosmetics, electromagnetic compatibility, machinery, radio equipment, drug precursors and explosive substances for civil use, on the safety of toys, detergents, noise emissions from equipment used outdoors and pyrotechnics. In April 2026 Montenegro adopted the Law on plant nutrition products aligning with the EU acquis on fertilising products. In May 2026 Montenegro amended its Law on construction of products to align with the EU regulation on the marketing of construction products.
Under the ‘old approach product legislation,’ legislative work intensified and in February 2026, Montenegro adopted the Law on medicines and a number of pieces of implementing legislation to align with the core EU acquis on medicinal products for human use and for veterinary medicinal products. Further amendments to the Law on Medicines were adopted in June 2026. Montenegro also adopted implementing legislation concerning substances essential for the treatment of equine species, the prohibition of the use of certain substances and veterinary medicinal products in animals, and good laboratory practice. Furthermore, in September 2025, Montenegro adopted implementing legislation to align with the EU Directive relating to the transparency of measures regulating the pricing of medicinal products for human use. In June 2026, Montenegro adopted implementing legislation to align with aerosols dispenser. In June 2026 Montenegro adopted the Law on the homologation of vehicles, vehicle systems, components and separate technical units aligning broadly with the overarching EU regulations in the field of motor vehicles and thereby establishing a vehicle homologation system in Montenegro In July 2026, Montenegro adopted the new Law on chemicals aligning with good laboratory practice and related inspections, and key chemical legislation such as Regulation (EC) 1907/2006 on Registration, Evaluation, Authorisation, and Restriction of Chemicals (better known as REACH). Significant progress is also noted concerning alignment with the legislation on classification, labelling and packaging of substances and mixtures (CLP). Work is ongoing to adopt further secondary legislation concerning CLP implementation particularly Annex VI and Annex VIII.
On procedural measures, Montenegro adopted in March 2026 and May 2026 national legislation aligning with EU acquis on crystal glass products, labelling of footwear and textile products, medical products pricing, on the return of cultural objects unlawfully removed from the territory of a Member State and on firearms.Further amendments to the Law on obligations and the Law on weapons and ammunition were adopted in July 2026.
On anti-corruption measures under this chapter, integrity plans are in place across all key institutions, including the Administration for Inspection Affairs, the Ministry of Economic Development, the Bureau of Metrology, the Institute for Standardisation, the Accreditation Body of Montenegro (ATCG), and the Institute for Medicines and Medical Devices (CInMED).
Chapter 2: Freedom of movement for workers
Nationals of one Member State have the right to work in another Member State and must be given the same working and social conditions as other worker nationals of that Member State.
Regarding access to the labour market, Montenegro aligned its legal framework with the acquis in this area. In December 2025, Parliament adopted amendments to the Law on foreigners, establishing a distinct and autonomous legal regime for the free movement and residence of EU citizens and their family members. To ensure equal treatment between EU citizens and Montenegrin nationals in employment, education, and social benefits, a series of legislative amendments were adopted between October 2025 and March 2026. These acts align the national framework with the principle of non-discrimination, with most provisions entering into force upon accession to the EU. In 2025, a total of 40 567 permits for temporary
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residence and work were issued, representing a 6.7% increase compared to 2024. The utilisation of the allocated quota for 2025 reached 95.52%, with construction and hospitality remaining the predominant sectors. The government set the 2026 annual quota at 28 988 permits for temporary residence and work of foreigners.
On European Network of Employment Services (EURES), Montenegro strengthened its institutional readiness by adopting in January 2026 an updated action plan for Montenegro’s Accession to the EURES Network (2025-2028). A multidisciplinary EURES Working Group and a National Coordination Office were established to coordinate technical interoperability. A dedicated department for EURES and employment mediation abroad were established within the Employment Agency of Montenegro (EAM). The modernisation of the EAM’s IT infrastructure continued, focusing on digital interoperability and integration in the EURES common platform, including the adoption of the European Skills, Competences, Qualifications and Occupations classification.
Regarding the coordination of social security systems, the government adopted in February 2026 the action plan for the coordination of social security systems 2026-2028 defining key activities, deadlines and institutional responsibilities and designated the Pension and Disability Insurance Fund as the national access point for the Electronic Exchange of Social Security Information (EESSI). The Plan targets full operational readiness for the EESSI system by the date of EU accession. On the bilateral coordination of social security systems, Montenegro has 26 social security agreements in place, of which 16 are with EU Member States. No new bilateral agreements with EU Member States were concluded in the reporting period.
The European Health Insurance Card (EHIC) is recognised under the Law on compulsory health insurance, but it will only be introduced after EU accession. The feasibility study on the introduction of EHIC was updated with 2025 statistical data, confirming no significant financial obstacles to its implementation. The assessment determined that Montenegro has a basic legal and administrative framework for the introduction of the EHIC system in place, while further strengthening of technical and information capacities is required. These findings were integrated into the action plan for the Coordination of Social Security Systems which outlines the technical and IT upgrades required prior to accession.
Chapter 3: Right of establishment and freedom to provide services
EU natural and legal persons have the right to establish themselves in any Member State and to provide cross-border services. For certain regulated professions, there are rules on mutual recognition of qualifications. EU rules on postal services focus on improving the quality of universal service, gradual market opening to competition, and the establishment of an independent regulator.
On the right of establishment and freedom to provide cross-border services, Montenegro further aligned its sectoral legislation with the EU Service Directive. In December 2025, updated its Point of Single Contact (PSC) portal by incorporating an integrated inventory of 327 services. Further efforts are needed to enhance the PSC into an interactive tool enabling online submission of applications. Montenegro is yet to develop implementing legislation governing the use of Internal Market Information (IMI) and set up IMI coordination structures. Administrative capacity remains limited, with the Directorate for EU Integration and the PSC having filled only three of its nine planned positions. Montenegro needs to step up efforts to strengthen its administrative capacities and develop IT infrastructure to facilitate cooperation with the competent authorities of other Member States upon accession.
On postal services, national legislation is aligned with the Postal Services Directive and amendments to the Law on postal services were adopted to further align with the Regulation on cross-border parcel delivery services. The Strategy for the Development of Postal Services 2024-2028 continued to be implemented. At the end of the reporting period, the number of active postal operators increased to 44. Montenegro should continue
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strengthening the administrative capacity to efficiently monitor the postal market and ensure compliance with the postal law.
On mutual recognition of professional qualifications, Montenegro continued aligning with the Directive 2005/36/EC by adopting amendments to the rulebook for the recognition of professional qualifications of licensed architects. Work continued for aligning and adopting the study training programmes for five regulated professions (doctors with basic medical training, dental practitioners, architects, general care nurses and pharmacists) with the Minimum Training Requirements of Directive 2005/36/EC. A training model curriculum for veterinarians and midwives is being developed. Work is also ongoing to ensure alignment with all the remaining provisions of the Professional Qualifications Directive beyond minimum training requirements, and with the proportionality test directive. Amendments to the law on the recognition of professional qualifications for the pursuit of regulated professions, together the draft Rulebook on the proportionality assessment were prepared to ensure full alignment with Directive (EU) 2018/958.
Montenegro needs to intensify efforts to strengthen its institutional capacity. This includes establishing the organisational structure and training the competent authorities responsible for the recognition of professional qualifications. Efforts to ensure harmonisation with the minimum training requirements for all professions benefiting from automatic recognition should continue.
Chapter 4: Free movement of capital
In the EU, capital and investments must be able to move without restriction, with common rules for cross-border payments. Banks and other economic operators apply certain rules to support the fight against money laundering and terrorist financing.
In the area of capital movements, Montenegro has ensured that all restrictions for acquisition of real estate and land, including agricultural land by EU citizens would be lifted upon accession. However, the country still needs to make sure that the restrictions are lifted for non-EU EEA nationals. Geographical restrictions in the Law on voluntary pension funds have not been fully lifted. Amendments to the Law on comparability of fees and payment account with basic features were adopted in May 2026.
In the area of payments, amendments to the payment system Law, ensuring alignment with SEPA, cross-border payments and instant payments acquis, were adopted in July 2026. The national instant payments system has been launched in July 2026. The national system mirrors the EU instant payments system (TIPS), and should allow for a smooth technical integration into TIPS depending on the Eurosystem’s decision making process. Following Montenegro’s inclusion in the geographical scope of the Single Euro Payments Area (SEPA), all Montenegrin banks have been operational in the relevant schemes since October 2025, with the central bank reporting substantial savings on transaction costs.
In November 2025, Parliament adopted amendments to the Law on the Development Bank of Montenegro, addressing the concerns on alignment with the EU acquis.
In the area of fight against money laundering and terrorism financing, in May 2026 the Parliament adopted amendments to the Law on the prevention of money laundering and financing of terrorism. Some discrepancies remain between the national legislation in force and the EU acquis (definition of terrorism financing, data protection and record retention periods, sanctions) that need yet to be addressed. In February 2026, the central bank developed guidelines for managing money laundering and terrorist financing risks in the instant payments system.
In the reporting period, the central bank imposed 6 supervisory measures, including 1 fine, upon detecting irregularities in this area. The number of suspicion transaction reports to the Financial Intelligence Unit increased by 16%, to 998.
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Chapter 6: Company law
The EU has common rules on the formation, registration and disclosure requirements of a company, with complementary rules for accounting and financial reporting, and statutory audit.
In the area of company law, Montenegro adopted legislative amendments to the Law on Companies and the Law on Registration of business and other entities and this legislative work is continuing , focusing in particular on the digitalisation of company law procedures, thus further aligning its national legislation with the core EU Company Law acquisIn September 2025, Montenegro finalised and adopted the revised Corporate Governance Code. Further efforts are needed to ensure that all companies, including SOEs, comply with the Company Law as soon as possible, in particular by submitting the required information to the Business Registry without delay. Montenegro should ensure that the national business register is technically ready to interconnect with the Business Registers Interconnection System (BRIS).
Montenegro should also complete alignment with the corporate sustainability due diligence Directive (CSDDD), as amended by the Directive (EU) 2026/470 (Omnibus I). Montenegro has further align with the EU acquis in this area, notably with the CSRD provisions of the Omnibus I Directive.
In the area of company reporting and statutory audit, in February 2026, Montenegro adopted a new Law on the Capital Market, incorporating provisions related to the European Single Access Point (ESAP) framework and multiple-vote share structures, and designating the Capital Market Authority as the competent authority for collecting, managing and submitting information falling within its supervisory remit for the purposes of ESAP. The capacity of both the Department for Audit Oversight, with two quality assurance inspectors, and the Department for Accounting, with two employees, requires further strengthening in the coming period.
Chapter 7: Intellectual property law
The EU has to a large extent harmonised rules for the legal protection and enforcement of copyright and related rights, as well as of industrial property rights, including trademarks, designs, patents and related supplementary protection certificates
(SPCs), geographical indications (GIs), including craft and industrial GIs.
Significant progress was registered in all areas in this chapter, which was provisionally closed in December 2024. In the area of copyright and related rights, legislation is being implemented smoothly. Training and awareness raising in these areas continued.
When it comes to industrial property rights, Montenegro started its work on alignment with the EU Designs Directive. In December 2025 Montenegro opened its new patent information centre (PATLIB Centre) ‘IP4Innovation’,designed to serve as a hub for researchers, entrepreneurs, start-ups and innovators in the field of intellectual property. In May 2026, the government adopted the 2026 action plan for the implementation of the IPR strategy 2023- 2026 and the report on the implementation of the 2025 action plan. Training for officers in the field of intellectual property continued. Data accessibility improved and the functional exchange of data with regional and global databases (European Patent Office, WIPO, EUIPO) is ensured. The website of the Ministry of Economic Development was improved with features including a separate easily accessible and regularly updated intellectual property section which was translated into English for international users.
In December 2025 the working agreement on search cooperation between Montenegro and the European Patent Office entered into force, marking a significant step in Montenegro’s patent protection system. On enforcement, 2025 records show a minimal upward trend in the number of controls executed and the amount of fines imposed through misdemeanour orders compared to 2024. The number of procedures in suspected cases of infringements of intellectual property rights
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at the border undertaken by the Customs Administration increased by 5% in 2025, compared to 2024. When it comes to intellectual property rights procedures undertaken by other responsible authorities, the number of inspections conducted in 2025 was 681, and the number of irregularities detected amounted to 102, while in 2024 the corresponding numbers were 561 and 80 respectively. Three criminal offences were noted in the reporting period. Training sessions on intellectual property including for police officers continued. Joint actions aimed at preventing and suppressing violations of intellectual property rights were conducted in July and August 2026 in Kotor. Two "Intellectual Property Open Days" were held in June at the Chamber of Commerce of Montenegro and in July at the Intellectual Property Directorate.
Efforts should continue in strengthening administrative capacities by hiring additional personnel. One new civil servant was recruited in the Ministry of Economic Development. Four new inspectors and one senior advisor were hired in the Department for Market Inspection. The staffing plan for 2026 was adopted in April 2026 which foresees hiring twelve additional personnel, notably six market inspectors. In the Customs Administration, coordinators for intellectual property issues were appointed for each regional unit - Customs House.
Chapter 8: Competition policy
EU rules protecting free competition include abuses of dominant positions, rules prohibiting concentrations which would significantly impede effective competition and antitrust rules prohibiting restrictive agreements between companies. EU rules also set out a system of State aid control. Governments are only allowed to grant State aid if restrictive conditions are met, with a view to preventing distortion of competition.
Antitrust and mergers
On the legislative framework, in 2026 Montenegro adopted the Law on protection of competition and additional implementing legislation, aligning Montenegro with key EU acquis in the area of antitrust and mergers. The Law on procedures for compensation of damage due to violation of competition in the market was adopted in 2026, aligning with the relevant provisions of Directive 2014/104/EU. Further alignment with the applicable EU acquis for the antitrust and merger instruments was achieved with the adoption of further implementing acts and rulebooks.
As regards the institutional framework, the Law on protection of competition significantly increased the independence of the Agency for Protection of Competition (APC). The 2026 budget for the APC increased nearly 10% as compared with 2025. In March 2026, the government adopted an action plan for strengthening administrative capacities under Chapter 8 until accession, in accordance with which APC recruited four additional case-handlers. Furthermore, salary increases introduced by the new law aim to attract qualified staff. A comprehensive system of professional training was established to reinforce both administrative and judicial capacities in competition and State aid, with a progressive increase of the number of trained staff over the past year. The action plan envisages a continued building of staff expertise through targeted programmes. The effectiveness of this system was demonstrated in the reporting period, as the Agency’s decisions challenged before the courts have been consistently upheld.
As regards enforcement, during the reporting period, the APC launched two sectorial analyses, issued 65 merger approval decisions, most with extraterritorial effect, closed one investigation and issued three opinions on abuse of dominant position. The APC submitted six requests to initiate misdemeanour proceedings following ex officio investigations. With the new Law on the protection of competition, Montenegro abolished the practice of individual exemptions in conformity with EU competition rules.
State aid
Montenegro aligned its legislative framework with the EU acquis by adopting the Law on State aid control in 2025 and its subsequent amendments in 2026, as well as a number of implementing acts and rulebooks.
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On enforcement, in 2025, the APC adopted 32 decisions and issued 16 opinions in ex ante procedures, initiated two investigative procedures ex officio, and concluded one investigative procedure in ex post control.
Overall,enforcement trends remained positive both in competition and State aid sectors.
Regarding the benchmark cases on potential unlawful State aid, the APC has completed the required assessments and exhausted all available procedural means. In the cases concerning the Bar-Boljare Highway and Uniprom KAP, the APC concluded that no incompatible State aid was present. In the Montenegro Airlines case, the APC adopted recovery decisions for incompatible State aid and addressed the related recovery issues in the context of insolvency proceedings, which continue before the Commercial Court.
Liberalisation
There are no significant new developments in this area.
Chapter 9: Financial services
EU rules aim at ensuring fair competition among financial institutions, and the stability and integrity of financial markets, namely in the field of banking, insurance, supplementary pensions, investment services and securities. They include rules on authorisation, operation and supervision of these institutions.
In the area of banks and financial conglomerates, in February 2026, Montenegro amended several key laws, including the Law on credit institutions, the Law on resolution of credit institutions and the Law on financial conglomerates to align rules on capital requirements, bank recovery and resolution, and the supervision of financial conglomerates with the currently applicable EU standards.
In November 2025, Parliament amended the Law on the Development Bank of Montenegro, to address the concerns on alignment with the EU acquis.
In the area of insurances and occupational pensions, in December 2025 and March 2026, Montenegro amended the Law on insurance to further align with the EU acquis. Additionally, the Law on voluntary pension funds was amended in February 2026 and the Law on compulsory traffic insurance in July 2026, further aligning with the EU acquis.
Regarding financial market infrastructure, in February 2026 Montenegro adopted or amended six key laws, including a new Law on the capital market, comprehensively overhauling the national legislation in an effort to further align with EU acquis.
On securities markets and investment services, in February 2026, Parliament adopted or amended four laws, aiming to align with the EU acquis on securities markets, notably on asset management. Consequently, the national legislation has been also comprehensively overhauled in this area to align with the EU acquis.
On sustainable and digital finance, as a part of comprehensive legal changes to financial services of February 2026, Montenegroadopted the Laws on digital operational resilience of the financial sector and on green and sustainable bonds. Both laws aim to align with several EU legal acts in this field.
Chapter 28: Consumer and health protection
EU rules protect consumers’ economic interests and in relation to product safety, dangerous imitations and liability for defective products. The EU also ensures high common standards for tobacco control, blood, tissues, cells and organs. The EU also has rules for upholding patients’ rights in cross-border healthcare and in preparing for and responding to serious cross-border health threats, including communicable diseases.
Consumer protection
In the area of horizontal aspects of consumer protection and product safety, in April 2026 Montenegro adopted an action plan for strengthening capacities in the area of consumer protection 2026-2028 to address the findings of a peer review in this area. This foresees the
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recruitment of additional staff and other measures and a corresponding timeline for strengthening institutional capacity before accession. This includes the establishment of the single liaison office and a European Consumer Centre, strengthening the readiness of the Consumer Protection Council and Consumer Protection Cooperation (CPC) and engaging local authorities. Montenegro also designated the Agency for Protection of Competition as the host institution for the future European Consumer Centre.
In February 2026, Montenegro adopted a new Law on consumer protection, ensuring alignment with EU acquis on consumer rights, on unfair commercial practices, on unfair contract terms, on digital content, and on the sale of goods. The Law also introduces measures facilitating the implementation of the EU acquis on CPC, including the designation of a single liaison office and strengthened enforcement powers and alternative dispute resolution. Additional progress was made with the adoption of the Law on collective actions for the protection of consumers’ interests, which aligns with the EU acquis on representative actions for the protection of the collective interests of consumers. In June 2026, Montenegro adopted amendments to the Law on prohibited advertising, further aligning national legislation with the EU acquis on misleading and comparative advertising. The government also adopted the 2026 action plan for implementing the 2025 - 2027 National Consumer Protection Programme, focusing on stronger market surveillance, interinstitutional cooperation and product safety.
Concerning enforcement and redress, the composition of the Committee for out-of-court settlement of consumer disputes was improved. A total of 579 complaints were registered in the central consumer information system in 2025. As regards complaints, more than 92.97% were resolved; of these, 35.97% were resolved fully or partially in favour of consumers, while more than 17.26% were found to be unfounded, and the requests could not be granted, with consumers being referred to seek protection of their rights through judicial/out-of-court proceedings. In more than 46% of cases, consumers withdrew their complaints.
Regarding product safety, Montenegro aligned with the latest EU acquis on general product safety. The consumer protection action plan foresees the establishment of a coordination body and a national contact point, as well as budget for upgrading IT systems and operational resources to carry out inspections and product testing.
Public health
In the area of public health, on e-Health, Montenegro adopted at Law on data management in the field of health and digital health and amendments to the Law on healthcare, providing for the establishment of a Digital Health Agency. On cardiovascular health, Montenegro is encouraged to use as reference the Safe Hearts Plan to develop its national cardiovascular health strategy.
There were no developments on tobacco control. On communicable diseases and cross- border health threats, in January 2026 Montenegro adopted an action plan for the prevention and preparedness for cross-border health threats and a Law on the protection of the population from infectious diseases, leading to training activities, and the development of operational procedures and preparedness documents. Further efforts are needed to complete alignment with directive 2011/24/EU on the application of patient's rights in cross- border healthcare. The national immunisation strategy needs to be finalised and adopted. Initiatives were launched to increase the immunisation rate of children against measles, mumps, and rubella. On antimicrobial resistance (AMR), three workshops were held aimed at rationalising antibiotic use in hospitals.
On blood, tissues, cells and organs the Law on transplantation of human organs was amended in March 2026 along with implementing legislation, ensuring alignment with the EU acquis on the quality and safety of human organs intended for transplantation. In March 2026, the government adopted an action plan for substances of human origin to strengthen capacities in this area.
On mental health, in 2025, a national psychological support helpline was introduced, which operates within the Psychiatric Clinic of the Clinical Centre of Montenegro. The helpline
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remained operational and recorded 2,690 calls in 2025, of which 1,010 required professional psychological intervention. Montenegro also established its first child and adolescent psychiatry department within the Clinical Centre of Montenegro and continued implementing the 2025–2026 Mental Health Improvement Programme, with a focus on community-based services and support for young people. Montenegro should use as reference the Commission Communication on a comprehensive approach on mental health of 2023. Montenegro is yet to align with the recent EU acquis on health technology assessment.
Regarding cancer, in December 2025, the government adopted a 2026-2028 programme for the prevention and control of malignant diseases with an action plan. On cancer screening programmes implementation continued through the organised breast, cervical and colorectal cancer screening programmes. Activities included invitations to the target population, monitoring of programme quality indicators, efforts to increase screening coverage and the application of standard operating procedures. On drug abuse and harm prevention in September 2026 the Government adopted the implementation report for the 2024 - 2025 action plan under the 2024–2027 Drugs Strategy, together with a new action plan for 2026 - 2027. On nutrition, a number of awareness-raising activities were organised regarding breastfeeding as well as proper nutrition and physical activity for children. There were no developments to report on harmful use of alcohol.
On health inequalities, measures were introduced to improve access to services for vulnerable groups, including the development of an information system for voluntary counselling and testing and the systematisation of positions for Roma and Egyptian health mediators in primary healthcare institutions. On disabilities Montenegro is encouraged to use the new EU guidelines on improving access to healthcare for people with disabilities.
On anti-corruption, in November 2025, the Ministry of Health adopted a new integrity plan and carried out awareness-raising activities on corruption in healthcare, alongside measures to increase transparency.
CLUSTER 3: COMPETITIVENESS AND INCLUSIVE GROWTH
This cluster covers: digital transformation and media (Chapter 10); taxation (Chapter 16); economic and monetary policy (Chapter 17); social policy and employment (Chapter 19); industrial policy (Chapter 20); science and research (Chapter 25); education and culture (Chapter 26); and customs union (Chapter 29).
Chapter 10: Digital transformation and media
The EU supports the smooth functioning of the internal market for electronic communications, electronic commerce and audiovisual services. The rules protect consumers and support the universal availability of modern services.
In the field of electronic communications, Montenegro adopted relevant implementing legislation under the Law on electronic communications, further aligned national legislation with the Gigabit Infrastructure Act and established a secure information system. Furthermore, Montenegro has taken steps to align its legislation with the EU roaming acquis. Montenegro seeks to align its regulatory framework with the EU Roam Like at Home (RLAH) framework, as a step towards possible participation in the EU RLAH area and accelerated integration into the EU digital market. By December 2025, 5G population coverage, calculated as a composite for all three mobile networks, reached 96%, while territorial coverage amounted to 60.36%. Concerning digital services, Montenegro held a public consultation on national laws for the implementation of the Digital Services Act (DSA) and the Digital Markets Act (DMA) upon EU accession. Montenegro needs to take steps to build the societal and institutional capacity and to establish the legal basis to effectively support the enforcement of the DSA and the DMA as of EU accession, in line with the considerations and requirements outlined at the 2026 TAIEX workshops. Montenegro needs to accelerate alignment with the Interoperable Europe Act and to continue its work on the DSA and the DMA. This includes ensuring compliance with accessibility standards and cross-border access to digital public
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services. Preparatory work is ongoing, with alignment and operationalisation planned by the end of 2026.
On AI, Montenegro should develop the necessary AI regulation, governance and enforcement structures in line with the EU AI Act. Montenegro established the working group on AI, and it should accelerate its work on alignment with the EU framework.
As regards semiconductions, Montenegro currently does not participate in the Chips Joint Undertaking under Horizon Europe and still has to implement the European Chips Act.
Regarding digital trust and cybersecurity, in April 2026, Parliament adopted the Law on electronic communication to align with the NIS 2 Directive. Montenegro established the Cybersecurity Agency and Computer Incident Response Teams and adopted relevant cybersecurity frameworks. Montenegro needs to step up its efforts so that the cybersecurity agency is fully staffed and operational. Montenegro should start implementing the EU 5G Cybersecurity Toolbox, including by assessing suppliers’ risk profiles and putting in place appropriate restrictions and/or exclusions for high-risk suppliers. Regarding electronic identification and trust services, in July 2026 Montenegro adopted national legislation with the eIDAS 2 Regulation and is progressing towards joining the EU third countries list for advanced electronic signatures by the end of the year.
Montenegro updated the Law on free access to information to align with the Open Data Directive. Montenegro is not yet aligned with the General Data Protection Regulation, the e- Privacy Directive.
On media, the effective implementation of the media laws adopted in 2024 remains essential, including safeguarding the independence of the media regulator. Montenegro is encouraged to appoint the last member of the Council of the Agency for Audiovisual Media Services. Montenegro needs to align national media legislation with the European Media Freedom Act.
In March 2026, the government established a coordination body for the protection against foreign information influence, and efforts on this domain should be accelerated. Montenegro should strengthen its institutional response to disinformation, in line with the National Media Strategy 2023-2027.
Montenegro continued to implement its legal framework for protecting whistleblowers by adopting the Law on whistleblower protection, aligning with the EU acquis and European standards.
Chapter 16: Taxation
EU rules on taxation cover value-added tax, excise duties and aspects of corporate taxation. They also cover cooperation between tax administrations, including the exchange of information to prevent tax evasion.
In the area of indirect taxation, in December 2025, Parliament amended the Law on VAT, as well the Law on excise duties. Further amendments to the Laws on VAT and on excises duties were adopted in July 2026. The Excise Liaison Office was established through the rulebook on internal organisation and job classification in the Customs Administration. The Law on Implementation of Regulation (EU) No 904/2010 on administrative cooperation and combating fraud in the field of Value Added Tax and Law on Tax exemption for certain means of transport temporarily imported from one member state into another was adopted in July 2026.
Regarding direct taxation, in December 2025, Parliament amended the Law on ratification of the Multilateral Convention to Implement Tax Treaty Related Measures to Prevent Base Erosion and Profit Shifting. In 2026, Parliament amended the Law on Tax Administration for alignment with Directive (EU) 2021/514 (DAC 7) and Directive (EU) 2023/2226 (DAC 8), thereby introducing the obligation to report on users of digital platforms and users of services related to crypto-assets for the purpose of exchange of information with EU Member States, as well as with Directive 2010/24 on mutual assistance for the recovery of claims. In order to
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comply with requirements from the OECD - Global Forum, instructions were issued by the Tax Administration in the rulebook on the detailed manner of reporting and reporting forms based on the Common Reporting Standard and Manual for Exchange of Information Upon Request.
On administrative cooperation and mutual assistance, the Tax Administration adopted in March 2026 an employment action plan for the period 2026-2028. Under the 2025 staffing plan, recruitment procedures have been launched for 60 positions, while the 2026 staffing plan foresees the filling of an additional 60 positions. The Strategy for Professional Development, Training and Capacity Building of Tax Administration officials for the period 2026-2028, as well as the training plan for 2026, were adopted. In July 2026, the Law on mechanisms for resolving tax disputes in the European Union was adopted.
As concerns operational capacity and digitalisation, the Integrated Revenue Management System (IRMS) was implemented and operationalised in January 2026, establishing a unified information system for managing tax processes. In parallel with the implementation of the IRMS system, pending the outcome of the OECD indepth review, the Tax Administration worked to establish a system for Automatic Exchange of Information in line with international standards (FATCA, CRS) and EU Directives on administrative cooperation (DAC). The Tax Administration is also working on establishing a connection to the European Commission’s communication network CCN/CSI (Common Communication Network/Common System Interface), as well as connecting to the CCN2 channel through which data exchange with OECD jurisdictions will be carried out from the date of accession. Lastly, Montenegro is preparing for the implementation of its Excise Movement Control System.
On anti-corruption measures, in accordance with Anti-Corruption Strategy 2024-2028 and the accompanying action plan 2024-2025, integrity tests in the Tax Administration were conducted with 202 officials. New training plans were devised on the basis of these tests.
Chapter 17: Economic and monetary policy
EU rules require the independence of central banks and prohibit them from directly financing the public sector. Member States coordinate their economic policies and are subject to fiscal, economic and financial surveillance.
Monetary policy
Montenegro does not have standard monetary policy tools at its disposal, as it uses the euro as legal tender, leaving fiscal policy as the main macroeconomic policy instrument. Montenegro’s use of the euro is fully distinct from membership of the euro area. In the framework of the accession negotiations, in May 2026, Montenegro accepted the solution developed by the EU on how to apply the EU’s framework for the adoption of the euro after EU accession.
Montenegro has aligned its central bank framework with the EU acquis, particularly through amendments to the Law on the Central Bank of Montenegro and by adopting, on 24 August 2026, a constitutional amendment ensuring the objective of price stability in the primary law. These changes ensure compliance with central bank independence, as outlined in the TFEU and the European System of Central Banks (ESCB)/European Central Bank Statute. Montenegro’s legal framework also prohibits monetary financing of the public sector and complies with the prohibition of privileged access of public authorities to financial institutions. In addition, Montenegro has showed significant progress on the integration of its central bank into the ESCB and, at a later stage, into the Eurosystem.
After long delays, vacancies at the top of the Central Bank of Montenegro were filled, with the parliamentary appointments of vice-governors and external members of the Central Bank of Montenegro Council. In April 2026, the government and the CBCG signed an agreement to ensure stable financing to the Central Bank of Montenegro in the period before the country formally joins the euro area and the CBM becomes a member of the ESCB/Eurosystem. To prepare for future integration into the ESCB, in June 2026 the Central Bank of Montenegro completed a comprehensive needs assessment analysis, coordinated by several central
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banks of the Eurosystem. On its basis, it developed a roadmap to assume future obligations within the ESCB/Eurosystem framework.
Economic policy
In the area of economic policy, Parliament adopted a new Law on budget and fiscal responsibility on 24 August. The law covers the main elements required by the EU rules on budgetary frameworks, including fiscal rules, a medium-term budgetary framework, stronger budget planning and execution, fiscal risk monitoring, and an independent Fiscal Council. Montenegro appointed all members of the Fiscal Council on 31 July 2026.
A new cooperation agreement between the Ministry of Finance, the CBM, and the Statistical Office entered into force in November 2025. The agreement defines clear responsibilities for producing tables and datasets in the context of the government finance statistics and the excessive deficit procedure statistics (see Chapter 18). However, further efforts are needed to develop the appropriate capacity to produce these data and fiscal notifications in line with the EU acquis.
In January 2026, the government adopted and submitted its 2026-2028 Economic Reform Programme (ERP), setting out a macroeconomic and fiscal framework for 2026-28 and supporting reforms. The annual submission of the ERP has become an important tool for economic policy making. The implementation of the policy guidance jointly agreed in the Economic and Financial Dialogue with regional partners of May 2025 has been partial.
Chapter 19: Social policy and employment
EU rules in the social field include minimum standards for labour law, equality and non- discrimination and health and safety at work. They also promote social inclusion and social protection, and social dialogue at EU level.
On labour law, Montenegro aligned with EU legislation on transparent and predictable working conditions, pay transparency and equal pay, adequate minimum wages, employee information and consultation, and incorporated the EU Framework Agreement on Telework. Montenegro adopted a national Law on platform work with the purpose of transposing the Platform Work Directive further aligned its national legislation under this area with EU acquis regarding sector-specific working time rules and platform work. The government adopted the action plan for strengthening the capacity of the Labour Inspectorate for 2025-2027.
On health and safety at work, the Law on occupational health and safety (OSH) was aligned with the framework Directive on safety and health at work, and Directives on construction sites, and protection of temporary workers, and is supported by extensive implementing legislation aligning with the EU acquis.
The government adopted the action plan for building capacities of occupational safety and health inspection 2026-2028 to establish a strategic reporting framework, implement professional development programmes and digitalise inspection processes. The government further adopted the action plan for OSH systems in Montenegro 2025-2028 to improve coordination among responsible bodies, apply the legal framework and strengthen enforcement capacities.
On social dialogue, the Law on the Social Council, adopted in April 2026, further strengthens the Social Council’s role, particularly in monitoring and promoting pay transparency and equal pay. In the reporting period three sessions of the Social Council and six sessions of the Presidency of the Social Council were held. Opinions of the Social Council are often not considered and remain without formal feedback from the government. Social partners are involved in relevant policymaking processes on labour, but their involvement in other areas is weak and needs to be strengthened. Collective bargaining is primarily conducted at the sector and national level, with agreements predominantly regulating employees’ salaries and working hours. Important sectors remain without collective agreements, such as banking, media and retail. Capacity building of social partners needs to continue.
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On employment policy, the effectiveness and coverage of active labour market measures are insufficient, especially among young people and marginalised groups. The incapacity to ensure multiannual budgeting is limiting the implementation of active labour market policy measures. The Employment Agency continued its modernisation efforts through the preparation of a new catalogue of active labour market policy measures specifically targeting women, groups in vulnerable situations and long-term unemployed and the extension of its digital services and increased data interoperability. The implementation of the Youth Guarantee lacks overall coordination among the relevant sectors and institutions. A Strategy for the Development of the Social and Solidarity Economy 2025-2029 and its action plan 2026-2027 was adopted in December 2025. A Law on the social economy is pending adoption. Unemployment and the number of persons registered with the Employment Agency further decreased, while revenues continued to increase, boosted by the implementation of the ‘Europe Now 2’ reform and increased minimum wage levels, which continues to point toward further formalisation of the labour market. Nevertheless, undeclared work and the informal economy remain persistent challenges that require continued structural and regulatory attention.
Regarding labour force participation and unemployment rate see the statistical annex and the section on the functioning of the labour market under 2.3 Economic criteria.
Concerning social protection and inclusion, the Law on social and child protection was amended to advance the progressive transition from a benefit-centred to a service-centred and rights-based model, with particular emphasis on deinstitutionalisation, family-based care and community services, and the reform of disability assessment. In this respect, the Commission Notice – Guidance on independent living for persons with disabilities aiming at facilitating de-institutionalisation and independent living is to be taken into account. The risk of poverty rate in Montenegro is 29.2% with children being the most exposed. Income inequality persists, with the northern region at a higher risk of poverty. According to MONSTAT, 35.0% of children under 18 years were ‘at the risk of poverty or social exclusion’ as per the at-risk of poverty or social exclusion (AROPE) indicator in 2025 (34.6% in 2024 and 38.2% in 2023). An analysis of existing and missing community-based services at national and local level has been completed. The national action plan for the European Child Guarantee is in the final state of drafting.
On non-discrimination in employment and social policy, Montenegro adopted a new Law on protection of equality and the prohibition of discrimination, completing the alignment of the legal framework with the EU acquis and European standards, including the Employment Equality Directive and the Racial Equality Directive. Most complaints submitted to the Protector of Human
Rights and Freedoms continue to concern the field of employment and labour.
With regard to equality between women and men in employment and social policy, Montenegro adopted the new Law on gender equality and is broadly aligned with the EU acquis on gender equality in the area of employment and social policy, notably through legislative alignment with the principle of equal treatment for women and men in matters of social security, on employment and self-employment, on improving gender balance on company boards, on maternity leave and on work-life balance for parents and carers. The gender equality index has increased over the last years. However, the latest estimate of the gender pay gap in Montenegro is around 20% (2021). The biggest share of women is in wholesale and retail, education and health, and social work. Although the majority of
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employees in these areas are women, only a fraction of them reach decision-making positions.
Preparations for the participation in the European Social Fund are progressing. Montenegro regularly participates in meetings of the Employment and Social Innovation technical working group. (See also Chapter 22 - Regional policy and coordination of structural instruments).
Chapter 20: Enterprise and industrial policy
EU industrial policy strengthens competitiveness, facilitates structural change and encourages a business-friendly environment that stimulates small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs).
In the area of enterprise and industrial policy, the implementation of the 2024-2028 industrial policy, aligned with the current EU industrial policy, is ongoing. The report on the implementation of the industrial policy for 2025 (action plan 2025-2026) shows that 75% of planned activities were fully implemented and 22.06% partially implemented. Montenegro continued to implement the Programme for the suppression of the informal economy 2024- 2026. The annual implementation report for 2026 considers that 56% of the assessed activities have been fully implemented and 39% partially implemented.
In the area of enterprise policy and instruments, the action plan on barriers for doing business is continuously monitored through quarterly reporting. The level of implementation increased from 42% in Q3 2025 to 63% in Q2 2026. However, challenges remain in dealing with business barriers that ensure timely VAT refunds and address seasonal and undeclared work. The Law on the Credit Guarantee Fund was adopted on 13 August 2025, with EUR 10 million in initial capital, and the appointment of the Board was confirmed in February 2026. The SME definition still diverges from the EU recommendation.
Montenegro is participating in the EU Single Market Programme and member of the Enterprise Europe Network. Montenegro also takes part in the Single Market Highway initiative, which represents a new framework for bilateral industrial cooperation between the EU and the Western Balkan countries.
Regarding sectoral policies, in June 2026, Parliament adopted the Law on the management of companies in state ownership, introducing a new framework for governance, oversight and accountability of SOEs. Given the importance of tourism for Montenegro’s economy, further efforts are needed to support a more sustainable and resilient development of the sector and reduce its vulnerability to external shocks.
Chapter 25: Science and research
The EU provides significant support for research and innovation. All EU Member States, associated countries and third countries participate in the EU’s research and innovation programmes, and can benefit from them, especially where there is a scientific excellence and solid investment in research and innovation.
Concerning research and innovation policy, Montenegro adopted key accompanying implementing legislation of the Law on scientific research activity. The new Smart Specialisation Strategy 2026-2031 and its first Action Plan for 2026–2027 as well as the Action Plan for the Implementation of the Scientific Research Activity Strategy 2024–2028 for the period 2026–2027 were adopted in May 2026. The government adopted the Programme for Science and Innovation 2026-2030 in December 2025. In September 2025, the government adopted the Decision on the establishment of a new Council for Scientific Research Activity.
In December 2025, Montenegro also established the PATLIB centre providing local access to patent information and related issues.
The Innovation Fund continues to provide grants and support to innovative start-ups and companies.
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In October 2025, the House of Digital Revolution was opened at the Innovation Entrepreneurship Centre Technopolis, TechLab and Maker Space with advanced 3D equipment for industrial design. In 2025, the Science and Technology Park recorded further growth and diversification of project activities by participating in eight international projects, including Horizon Europe and Interreg programmes. It also prepared 14 project applications for funding from EU and other international sources.
Budget allocations for science in Montenegro show continuous growth and almost tripled for the period 2021-2026. However, data show that growth in funding has not yet been fully accompanied by a proportional strengthening of the private sector as a driver of innovation. Even if the summary innovation index under the European Innovation Scoreboard has changed positively compared to 2025, Montenegro performs at only 44,7% of the EU average.
Regarding the EU Framework Programme for research and innovation, Montenegro continues to promote the Horizon Europe programme and opened its Horizon Office in the Science and Technology Park. In March 2026 Montenegro acquired the observer status in the Extreme Light Infrastructure European Research Infrastructure Consortium (ELI ERIC) and in June 2026 the observer status in the Biobanking and BioMolecular Resources Research Infrastructure (BBMRI) ERIC. Since the beginning of Horizon Europe Montenegro signed 39 grants worth EUR 19.1 million. In the reporting period 10 grants were signed in the value of EUR 14.5 million. Montenegro was awarded a Teaming for Excellence grant to establish a Centre of Excellence for advanced environmental monitoring and nature-based solutions in protected areas (CENNA), under Horizon Europe.
Researchers from Montenegro participated in 52.6% of actions of the European Cooperation in Science and Technology (COST). For the first time, a proposal led by a researcher from Montenegro as the Main Proposer was approved for funding as a COST Action.
After the successful assessment of its Climate City Contract, Podgorica was awarded the EU
Mission Label under the Climate-neutral & Smart Cities mission.
Chapter 26: Education and culture
The EU supports cooperation in education and culture through funding programmes and the
coordination of Member State policies through the ‘open method of coordination’. The EU
and the Member States must also prevent discrimination and ensure quality education for
children of migrant workers, including those from disadvantaged backgrounds
In education and training, the government continued the implementation of the Education Reform Strategy 2025-2035 and accelerated the implementation of its action plan 2025-26, completing 81% of planned activities. In October 2025, Parliament adopted the Law on higher education and the Law on education of children with special educational needs, updating the 2010 legislation. Parliament also adopted the Law on preschool education and care, replacing the 2002 law, to ensure high-quality preschool education while supporting family well-being and child development.
In the 2026 state budget, the total allocation for education amounts to EUR 368,2 million or ca. 4.3% of GDP (2026 estimate), slighly below the EU average of 4.7% of GDP (2023), out of which 46.05% is allocated to preschool and primary education, 15.86% to secondary education, and 13.91% to higher education.
The total number of children enrolled in preschool and school education in 2025/2026 was 26 786 in preschool education, 69 295 pupils in primary education and 27 004 pupils in secondary education. Montenegro launched a new programme for qualifications as assistant for early childhood development.
Concerning international assessments for school education, Montenegro participated in the Progress in International Reading Literacy Study 2026. The test provides evidence-based data on children’s literacy achievement and identify trends. Montenegro also participated in the PISA 2025 assessment. Results published in September 2026 showed that 60% of
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students attained at least basic proficiency (Level 2 or higher) in science, 45% in mathematics and 55% in reading. While results remain below the OECD average, they have improved when compared to PISA 2022. Montenegro took part in the Teaching and Learning International Survey 2024 whose results were issued in October 2025. The survery revealed a stark trend: one in four teachers in Montenegro intend to leave the profession within the next five years.
Regarding vocational education and training (VET), as a continuation of the Osnabruck Declaration, Montenegro endorsed the Herning Declaration in September 2025, reaffirming its commitment to modernising VET provision, improving skills and to delivering reforms to address skills mismatches. The 2025 amendments to the VET Law introduced measures to further strengthen dual and practical education. To this end, the Ministry of Education established a Dual Education Support Fund, accompanied by a dedicated rulebook published in December 2025.
Montenegro is a member of the European Alliance for Apprenticeships (EAfA) since 2015, demonstrating its commitment to improving youth and adult employment and has hosted the last EAfA-ETF event in October 2025. However, the country should encourage more local stakeholders to join the Alliance through pledges, enabling them to exchange good practices and strengthen quality apprenticeships. It could also consider to renew its national commitment.
Montenegro continued the implementation of the higher education strategy with the aim to improve the quality, accessibility, and financial stability of the education system. Montenegro has been a member of the Bologna Process since 2003 and is actively implementing its commitments set out in the strategy. As part of this reform, Montenegro adopted the new Law on higher education in October 2025, strengthening Montenegro’s alignment with European Higher Education Area (EHEA) standards.
In the academic year 2025/2026, 4 071 students enrolled in postgraduate and doctoral studies at higher education institutions in Montenegro.
Regarding adult education, Montenegro has developed a solid strategic and legal basis for adult learning, including reforms on micro-qualifications, flexible pathways and free access to first qualifications, but participation remains very low at 5.47% in 2024, far below the EU target of 60% by 2030. Progress is constrained by weak implementation of the Adult Education Strategy, insufficient funding and coordination, scarce and incomplete data, and uneven educator quality — although a dedicated budget line was introduced in 2026.Adult learning provision in Montenegro is broad, covering remedial education, non-for mal learning and micro-qualifications, but it only partly responds to the needs of diverse adult groups and often lacks recognised outcomes or clear labour market relevance. Participation is further limited by weak outreach and underdeveloped career guidance for groups beyond the unemployed.
As for inclusive education, enrolment of Roma and Egyptian children remained a challenge. In 2025, enrolment of Roma and Egyptian children in early childhood education increased by 14.43%, totalling 333 children. However, enrolment declined by 1% in primary and by 8% in secondary education. In 2025, the number of children with special educational needs in regular schools across all education levels was 1 794. While the number of enrolments in preschools and secondary education saw a decrease of 3% and 0.3%, respectively, a significant increase of 7% in primary school enrolment was recorded in 2025 in comparison to 2024. Continuous capacity building for education professionals is needed. Montenegro launched a new training programme, including examinations, for teaching assistants for children with special educational needs.
In terms of gender balance, participation in education was relatively even between boys and girls in primary and secondary schools in the 2025/2026 period. However, there was a substantial difference at higher education level in the 2025/2026 [period, with 59% female and 41% male students enrolled. At the postgraduate level females constituted 63% of all students in master’s studies and 58% in PhD programmes.
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Digital skills have been recognised in the 2025-2035 Education Reform Strategy, and Montenegro made some progress in the area of digitalisation of education. With the support of the EU, more than 100 EdTech laboratories were established, particularly in northern municipalities. To help young female students develop their digital skills, Montenegro ran the CyberHER programme, benefiting more than 130 young female secondary students.
Montenegro benefits from the international dimension of the 2021-2027 Erasmus+ Programme. Under the guidance of the European Commission, as of 2025 Montenegro started the preparations of national structures for the association to the Erasmus+ programme. Montenegro has committed to establishing a National Agency for EU Programmes by the end October 2026. The Agency will be tasked, among others, to manage the Erasmus+ programme’s implementation in the country once it will become fully associated. The University of Montenegro is full partner in a European University Alliance.
Montenegro is largely aligned with the European Youth Strategy. However, further efforts are needed to strengthen youth participation in decision-making and to ensure explicit legal recognition of youth-led organisations. Montenegro continued the implementation of the 2023-2027 Youth Strategy. Funding is limited for youth centres and clubs, while collaboration with municipalities is minimal. In November 2025, Podgorica became the country’s first city named 2028 European Youth Capital. In April 2026, the city adopted its local action plan for Youth.
In the field of sports, the government continued the implementation of the 2024-2028 Strategy for Development of Sports. The Ministry of Sports and Youth initiated amendments to the Law on youth to improve the existing legal framework. The authorities conducted relevant public consultations and submitted the draft for further procedural deliberations. Montenegro continued taking part in the European Week of Sport.
Montenegro continues its full participation in the Creative Europe Programme 2021-2027. Nikšić was designated 2030 European Capital of Culture in October 2025. In the first half of 2026, Montenegro progressed towards the adoption of the amendments of the principal laws in the field of culture, including the Law on Culture, the Law on Protection of Cultural Properties and the Law on Archive field, with their finalization planned by the end of 2026. A public consultation on the draft new Law on Culture is ongoing.
On the fight against corruption, Montenegrin authorities are requested to prevent, detect and report irregularities. In April 2026 Montenegro prepared a report on corruption in the field of education
Chapter 29: Customs union
All Member States are part of the EU customs union and follow the same customs rules and procedures. This requires legislative alignment as well as adequate implementing and enforcement capacity, and access to and interoperability with the EU electronic customs environment.
On customs legislation, in December 2025, Parliament amended the Law on customs and adopted the Law on drug precursors and psychotropic substances to further align with EU acquis.It also amended the Law on the restriction of the use of tobacco products, making an important step towards establishing a ‘Track & Trace’ system that prevents smuggling and reduces illegal trade in tobacco products.Also in December 2025,the government adopted the Customs Tariff for 2026, aligned with the Combined Nomenclature of the EU for 2026.
In February 2026, Parliament adopted the new Law on free zones, aimed at enhancing control mechanisms within free zones, reinforcing supervision, transparency and compliance with international standards. Amendments to the Law on prevention of money laundering and terrorist financing, adopted by Parliament in May 2026, brought about alignment with the EU acquis on cash controls at the borders, including on cargo and postal packages. In June 2026, Parliament adopted amendments to the Law on the protection of cultural goods.
In November 2025, Montenegro joined the Common Transit Convention and the Convention on the Simplification of Formalities in Trade in Goods.
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As regards administrative and operational capacity, Montenegro concluded an international agreement with Slovenia in February 2026 on the donation of 11 IT systems that, once implemented in the country, should enable interoperability with the EU digital customs environment. A contract for the integration of these systems into the Montenegrin customs IT environment was signed in April 2026. In July 2026, Montenegro started the implementation of IT systems for the automated export system and the import control system.
National Customs Decision System has become fully operational as of 1 April 2026. The upgrade of the Customs Information System, allowing, among others, for the electronic submission and storing of declarations and accompanying documents (e-documents), became fully operational in September 2026.
In October 2025 the government adopted implementing legislation on the internal organisation and job classification of the Customs Administration. The plan foresees a total of 606 job positions, while the current number of employees is 476. The budget for hiring 28 additional staff is secured for 2026, with further 79 posts planned for 2027 and 2028. In February 2026, the ethics committee was established in the Customs Administration.
Montenegro Customs has granted Authorised Economic Opertor status to 19 operators.
CLUSTER 4: THE GREEN AGENDA AND SUSTAINABLE CONNECTIVITY
This cluster covers: transport (Chapter 14); energy (Chapter 15); trans-European networks (Chapter 21); and environment and climate change (Chapter 27).
Chapter 14: Transport policy
The EU has common rules on technical and safety standards, security, social standards, State aid and market liberalisation in road transport, railways, inland waterways, multimodal transport, aviation and maritime transport.
As regards general transport, the national transport development strategy is being updated and due for adoption by the end of 2026. Montenegro advanced in implementing the Transport Community next generation action plans and other transport-related reforms. In June 2026, Montenegro adopted new legislation on electronic freight transport information, and in May 2026 it ratified the additional protocol to the Convention on the Contract for the International Carriage of Goods by Road (CMR) on electronic consignment note. The strengthening of inter-ministerial coordination and implementation and enforcement capacities in the road, maritime and rail sectors should continue as a matter of priority. The national accident investigation body lacks working and financial arrangements for major air
crash investigations. The development of sustainable urban mobility plans has not advanced.
In the area of road transport, key national legislation on road transport was adopted, including a new Law on working hours, mandatory break periods of transport workers and recording equipment in road transport, last amended in April 2026. The law ensures
alignment with the EU acquis on social rules in road transport and tachographs. In April 2026, amendments to the Law on road transport and the Law on roads were adopted ensuring further alignment with the acquis on access to the road transport market, road
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charging and intelligent transport systems (ITS). In November 2025, the government established a national coordination body to implement the new road safety strategy. However, more effort is needed to achieve targets set for reducing the high number of road deaths and serious road traffic injuries. Full implementation of the ITS investment plan for national roads is still pending subject to the provision of a loan of up to EUR 30 million by the EBRD.
On rail transport, in December 2025, Montenegro adopted a new law on railway safety and interoperability, subsequently amended in March 2026. Along with the previously adopted law on railways, Montenegro has ensured alignment with the technical and market pillar of the EU railway acquis. It has also ensured that the legal framework is in place for the setting up the new Railway Agency, which was formally established in January 2026, and has been operational since May 2026. Adequate administrative capacity of the new agency is yet to be ensured with a view to effectively carry out inspection and regulatory functions in the sector. In addition, the methodology for calculation of direct costs for setting of infrastructure charges for railway undertakings remains to be fully aligned with the EU acquis. In March 2026, by the judgement of the administrative court, the ban on providing freight operations was lifted for the only private sector rail operator. In February 2026, the government adopted a modernised long-term public service contract for passenger transport services by rail. The adoption of the strategic and policy frameworks for implementation of the European Rail Traffic Management System has been delayed.
In the area of maritime transport, in December 2025, Montenegro adopted a number of sectorial laws and related implementing legislation. This included the law on maritime safety, which ensures alignment with the acquis on port state control, flag state requirements, inspection of vessels, investigation of accidents and vessels traffic monitoring system, the law on ports and the law on prevention of sea pollution from the ships. Work is ongoing to fully implement a corrective action plan in response to the European Maritime Safety Agency findings on compliance with the International Convention on Standards of Training, Certification, and Watchkeeping for Seafarers (STCW).
In the area of inland waterway transport, in April 2026 Montenegro adopted a new law on working time and rest periods of mobile workers on inland waterway vessels aiming alignment with the EU acquis. However, there were no relevant developments of the legislative framework in other areas of inland waterway transport.
As regards aviation, Montenegro has made considerable progress with regard to the implementation of the first transitional phase of the European Common Aviation Area Agreement. In April 2026, Montenegro adopted a new law on air transport followed by implementing legislation in May 2026 to align with the technical aspects of air traffic management and the Single European Sky (SES 2+) Regulation. When it comes to the issue of the joint air navigation services provider with Serbia, in March 2026, the government adopted a transition plan for 2026-2030 with the aim of reaching full compliance with the SES2+ and performance and charging schemes. Montenegro is required to establish a fully operational national air navigation service provider in compliance with the EU’s rules on ownership and control. The transition plan requires significant financial resources and a sufficient number of highly trained human resources for its full implementation.
There were no relevant developments on multimodal transport. The Law on combined transport from 2014 aimed to align with the EU acquis, but the implementation and enforcement of incentives for road users and establishing the intermodal terminal(s) remain challenging.
On passenger rights, Montenegro successfully aligned with the EU acquis by adopting new legislation in the area of bus and coach transport as well as laws on contracts on transport of passengers by sea and rail, including concerning persons with disabilities and persons with reduced mobility. The effective implementation and enforcement of passenger rights regulations regarding air, rail, maritime, and bus and coach passenger rights should continue to be monitored by designated national enforcement bodies.
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With regard to anti-corruption measures, following the restructuring of the transport administration, the Ministry of Maritime Affairs adopted an integrity plan in December 2025.
Chapter 15: Energy
EU energy policy covers energy supply, infrastructure, the internal energy market, consumers, renewable energy, energy efficiency, nuclear energy and nuclear safety, radiation protection, and nuclear safeguards.
In the area of security of supply, Montenegro has continued to make significant progress in establishing its emergency oil stockholding system. Stocks equivalent to around 35 days of supply have been secured, largely through industry-held volumes, while the development of public inventories by the Hydrocarbons Administration remains the main area requiring further effort. Stockholding fees aim to provide a functioning financing mechanism for the build-up. The refurbishment of state-owned storage tanks at the Port of Bar is in progress. The Crisis Plan for Resolving Disruptions in the Supply of Petroleum Products was adopted in May 2026, further strengthening the emergency response framework. In the electricity sector, alignment with the Risk-Preparedness Regulation was achieved by the adoption of the Law on cross-border exchanges in electricity and natural gas in January 2026, but a risk- preparedness plan has still not been drafted. Alignment by Montenegro with the 2024 Regulation establishing a network code on sector-specific rules for cybersecurity aspects of cross-border electricity flows is still pending.
Montenegro has no functional gas market. The country has partially aligned its gas legislation with the Third Energy Package, but there is no transmission or distribution infrastructure, nor gas consumption on a commercial scale.
With regard to the internal energy market, following the adoption of the 2026 Law on cross-
border exchanges in electricity and natural gas, and related implementing legislation,
together with the previously adopted Law on energy, Montenegro introduced a new legal
framework aiming at the full alignment with the Electricity Integration Package. The day-
ahead electricity market is operational, while the intraday market has not yet been launched.
Regarding regional cooperation, Montenegro’s transmission system operation made
progress by signing a contract with the regional coordination centre. The cooperation
between the transmission system operators of Italy and Montenegro within the capacity
calculation region is progressing, which is important towards optimised electricity trading in
the region. The retail market in Montenegro is fully liberalised, and electricity prices are set
freely by suppliers. However, although there are seven licensed suppliers, EPCG, the former
vertically integrated company, continues to supply the entire retail market.
In the area of hydrocarbons, following the previous adoption of the Law on safety measures in offshore exploration and production of hydrocarbons, related implementing legislation was adopted to further align with the EU acquis.
Montenegro has completed its legislative alignment with the Renewable Energy Directive (RED II) by adoption of amendments to the Law on the use of energy from renewable sources and related implementing legislation between March and August 2026, including provisions on biofuels. The country has also started alignment with RED III Directive by adopting implementing legislation in May 2026, aligning with provisions related to the mapping of its territory for the deployment of renewable energy and to the simplified permit- granting procedure. Montenegro continues to develop documentation for hydropower plants to increase the energy baseload while taking steps on the gradual phasing out of the thermal power plant in Pljevlja. In May 2026, the Gvozd wind farm was commissioned while plans exist to increase its capacity from 54.6 MW to 75.6 MW. The first solar power auction had to be cancelled and was not relaunched.
In the area of energy efficiency, Montenegro has achieved a high level of alignment with the EU legal framework. In September 2025, Montenegro amended its Law on energy efficiency to align with EU standards. Montenegro started alignment with the 2023 Energy Efficiency Directive and the 2024 Energy Performance of Buildings Directive. In April 2026, Montenegro
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adopted a detailed roadmap committing to fully align with the remaining provisions by March 2027 and to adopt the National Building Renovation Plan by end of 2027. Institutional capacity of relevant institutions has been further strengthened through training on energy audits and certification.
On energy labelling and eco-design, Montenegro’s legal framework has a high level of alignment with the EU acquis, but continued efforts are necessary to fully implement and enforce these standards.
In the area of governance, the National Energy and Climate Plan (NECP), setting Montenegro’s climate and energy targets until 2030, was adopted in December 2025.
Regarding nuclear energy, nuclear safety, radioactive waste management and radiation protection, in December 2025, Montenegro adopted implementing legislation related to the Law on ionising radiation protection, radiation and nuclear safety and security, to further align with the EU acquis. Montenegro should accelerate its efforts to participate in the European Radiological Data Exchange Platform by strengthening its technical and operational capacity to operate early warning systems and auxiliary tools, inter alia by recruiting specialised personnel. It should also continue its efforts to increase its administrative capacity in the areas of nuclear safety and radiation protection and to develop its Radioactive Waste Management Programme covering disposal of all the radioactive waste.
On nuclear safeguards, upon EU accession, the existing systems of accountancy and control of nuclear materials in Montenegro would need to be adapted to accommodate for the safeguard provisions of the Euratom Treaty.
With regard to anti-corruption measures, the Ministry of Energy and Mining adopted an integrity plan for the period 2026-2028 in February 2026.
Chapter 21: Trans-European networks
The EU promotes trans-European networks in transport, telecommunications and energy to strengthen the internal market and contribute to growth and employment.
On transport networks, the Commission agreed with Montenegro on the list of priority transport projects in the country in line with the trans-European networks in transport (TEN- T) objectives. Montenegro continued preparation for participation in the Connecting Europe Facility (CEF), possible only upon EU accession. In this context, in December 2025, the government adopted a multi-year strategic plan (2025-2027) for participation in CEF, aimed at strengthening the administrative capacities of relevant institutions through the provision of an adequate number of employees and financial resources.
In the area of rail transport networks, the development of the TEN-T rail corridor 4 Bar- Vrbnica continued with a significant delay. Limited progress was observed on the implementation of two major Western Balkans Investment Framework investments focused on renewal, interoperability and digitalisation of approximately 60 km of the railway line. Procurement of contractors for the section Bar-Golubovci of the rail corridor 4 is still to be launched. Scoping for the modernisation of several sub-sections north from Golubovci should be carried out to facilitate budgeting and final project preparation activities. Ongoing main design activities related to rail corridor 2 towards Albania should be accelerated.
On road networks, in February 2026, the government signed a contract for the construction of a 23 km long section of the Bar-Boljare highway with financing from the state budget and co-financing from the EBRD (EUR 200 million loan) and the EU (EUR 150 million grant). The preparation of detailed design documentation for one of the remaining Bar-Boljare sections, for which EU funds have also been secured, has been pending for an extended period.
In October 2025, Parliament ratified two intergovernmental agreements on cooperation in the field of infrastructure with Hungary and France respectively, which enables involvement of their economic entities without conducting a public procurement. In July 2026, a similar agreement was ratified by Parliament with the United States of America for award of strategic infrastructure projects, including Adriatic-Ionian TEN-T road corridor, with exemptions from
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the public procurement, taxes and customs. The implementation of the agreement formally started in August 2026 when the U.S. Embassy in Podgorica published a call inviting U.S. companies to express interest in participating in the development of the Adriatic–Ionian motorway and gas connection.
In the area of energy networks, in February 2026, the Law on cross-border energy
infrastructure projects was adopted, aligning with the Trans-European Energy Network (TEN-
E) Regulation. On electricity interconnection with neighbouring countries, the Montenegrin
section of the Trans-Balkan electricity corridor, connecting the thermal power plant in Pljevlja
to the substation Lastva via a 400 kV transmission line, entered in trial operation in July
2026. There was further progress in developing Montenegro’s regional electricity connections
in line with the Central and South-Eastern Europe Energy Connectivity (CESEC) action plan
on electricity and renewable energy and the Projects of Energy Community Interest in
respect to section 4 of the Trans-Balkan corridor (in Montenegro from Pljevlja to the border
with Serbia) and increasing the capacity of the existing 220 kV transmission line Trebinje –
Perućica (Bosnia and Herzegovina). A project for the second interconnection between
Villanova (Italy) and Lastva (Montenegro), which consists of another 600 MW high-voltage
direct current cable, doubling the existing interconnection capacity between two countries,
received a status of Project of Mutual Interest in April 2026.
Chapter 27: Environment and climate change
The EU promotes strong climate action, sustainable development and protection of the environment. EU rules contain provisions addressing environmental issues, climate change, water and air quality, waste management, nature protection, industrial pollution, chemicals, noise and civil protection.
In the fields of environment and climate change, Montenegro has made progress in strengthening its administrative capacities at central and local level by hiring additional personnel and addressing insufficient inspection services at both levels. In June 2026, the government adopted an action plan to this effect which includes an assessment of current and projected administrative capabilities and indicates future recruitments and timelines by sector up to 2030 with a key milestone for 2028. In June 2026 Montenegro recruited one environmental inspector. As of September 2026, the Ministry of Ecology, Sustainable Development and Northern Region Development had recruited nine permanent staff members. Three of them were recruited under the Employment Plan and assigned to the organisational units responsible for international cooperation, inspection supervision and nature protection. Montenegro should ensure continued implementation of this action plan, and the set-up of an institutional structure to deliver coordinated, strategic planning for sustainable environmental and climate investments and their implementation. Montenegro also needs to ensure adequate public consultations and awareness-raising campaigns on nature protection, Natura 2000 networks, climate change, waste recycling and noise pollution.
Environment
Onhorizontal legislation, in the reporting period, Montenegro completed alignment with a number of important pieces of EU legislation, namely the strategic environmental assessment (SEA), environmental impact assessment (EIA) and the INSPIRE Directive. Montenegro is encouraged to continue increasing synergies and coordination between SEA and EIA to make better use of such documents for planning and implementation purposes. In August 2026, amendments were adopted to the Criminal Code and the Law on environmental liability for environmental damage and in September 2026 the Law on the liability of legal entities for criminal offences was also amended to ensure alignment with the environmental crime Directive. Institutional capacity has been strengthened through the establishment of a specialised police unit and an operational team within the prosecution. A digital platform for reporting environmental offences was introduced to enhance enforcement and compliance.
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On air quality, in July 2026,Montenegro adopted the air quality management strategy 2026- 2029 aligning it with the country’s national energy and climate plans adopted in December 2025. The Strategy includes emission reduction projections, a national air pollution control programme, as well as air quality plans for all zones in Montenegro. In August 2026, Montenegro also adopted the Law on air quality and the Air Protection Act and related implementing legislation in October 2026, further aligning with the National Emission Ceilings Directive.
On waste management, in August 2026, Montenegro adopted amendments to the Law on waste management, together with implementing legislation in October 2026, to further align with the EU Waste Framework Directive, the landfill, the single use plastic and the batteries Regulation. Media awareness-raising campaigns and proper enforcement rules, targeting citizens and local authorities, about prevention, separation of waste and recycling, are ongoing. Local government units still need to adopt local waste management plans and implement them.
On water quality, in December 2025, the government adopted the 2026 programme for monitoring surface and ground water as well as the flood risk-management plans in the water areas of the Danube and Adriatic basins. In August 2026, Montenegro adopted the Law on water for human use to align with EU Drinking Water Directive and in May 2026 the strategy for the protection of the marine environment until 2036.
On nature protection, in August 2026, Montenegro adopted the Law on nature protection further aligning with the Habitats and the Birds Directives. The national strategy for biodiversity 2026-2031 and its action plan for the years 2026-2028 were also adopted in June 2026. The work on establishing the Natura 2000 network continued and, in June 2026, Montenegro submitted its proposed List of NATURA 2000 sites together with a proposed governance structure, which are under assessment by the European Commission. Montenegro still needs to address the recommendation of the Bern Convention related to Skadar Lake and to find adequate solution for the military training polygon at Sinjajevina. In January 2026 an agreement was reached between the government and the municipality of Ulcinj on the management of the site; a new management company is in the process of being established and should be in place by end of 2026. To this end, in October 2026 the government of Montenegro adopted a roadmap on the future management of the site and conservation measures. The municipality of Ulcinj adopted the Management Plan of the site in July 2026, which focuses, among other things, on the conservation measures of the site. The government allocated EUR 510 000 from the State Budget for restoration works.
On industrial pollution and risk management, the ecological reconstruction for Pljevlja coal power plant is ongoing but concerns remain regarding core issues for its long-term viability. Montenegro should step up efforts to permanently close the plant to meet EU emission standards and to create more sustainable economic opportunities in the region. A strategic approach is needed for a just transition that provides economic alternatives to the communities who will be most affected by the coal phase-out. Work is ongoing to align with the limitation of emissions of certain pollutants into the air from medium combustion plants Directive and the industrial emissions Directive.
In July 2026 Montenegro adopted amendments to the Law on chemicals to ensure alignment with REACH, the asbestos Directive, prior informed consent Regulation and the persistent organic pollutants regulation, and the volatile organic compounds regulation. Further action is needed to complete alignment with the biocidal products Regulation. A national Helpdesk, Chemicals Register and biocidal product records are in place, though further digitalisation, data quality and security improvements are needed for interoperability with European Chemicals Agency (ECHA) systems.
On noise, In July 2026, Montenegro adopted the Law on environmental noise protection to
align with the EU acquis. While considerable progress has been achieved in preparing the
strategic noise maps and noise action plans for 13 major roads, these should be submitted to
the Commission via the digital platform Reportnet3, along the information on the presence of
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all the major noise sources, including all the agglomerations, in its territory. Further efforts
are needed on noise management and public awareness raising campaigns to reduce
exposure to environmental noise. During the reporting period, a guide to environmental noise
management was also developed and published on the Ministry’s website.
Regarding civil protection, Montenegro is a member of the Union Civil Protection
Mechanism and, since 2024, is connected to the common emergency communication and
information system (CECIS). The country has been consistently and actively involved in
UCPM activities, including disaster risk management reporting to the Commission and
disaster prevention and preparedness capacity building. Montenegro made progress in Host
Nation Support after hosting aerial firefighting response assets. Nevertheless, the country
should continue to improve Host Nation Support, with a focus on ensuring aerial coordination
structures operate effectively to facilitate response during wildfires. In December 2025, the
government adopted the National Plan for Rescue and Protection from Extreme Weather and
Climate Events, and the Strategy for Disaster Risk Reduction for 2025-2030 with an action
plan for 2025-2026. In January 2026, Montenegro adopted the Law on post-disaster
recovery.
Climate change
On climate change, Montenegro has made good progress in increasing its legislative alignment with EU acquis, however there is still a need to significantly strengthen administrative capacity and ensuring adequate implementation and enforcement.
In December 2025, Montenegro adopted the Law on climate change with a legally binding commitment to achieve climate neutrality by 2050. The law further sets the legal basis for the monitoring, reporting, verification and accreditation (MRVA) system covering the EU emissions trading system (ETS1) sectors (power generation, industry, aviation and maritime transport) and ETS2 sectors (buildings, road transport and small industry). The Law was further amended in May 2026, and further secondary legislation (eight Rulebooks) was adopted in July 2026, that would facilitate the implementation of MRVA in all EU ETS sectors by the end of 2026). The two regulated entities submitted their monitoring plans, and one greenhouse gas emission (GHG) permit was issued in June 2026. Montenegro must ensure that all regulated entities receive their GHG permits by the end of 2026 and are ready to commence monitoring on 1 January 2027, at the latest. Decisive steps are needed to improve the country’s current domestic carbon pricing mechanisms, to facilitate the transition into the EU ETS upon accession.
Montenegro adopted the national energy and climate plan in December 2025, and the low carbon-development strategy (2026-2050) in February 2026. This strategy provides a long- term decarbonisation pathway to 2050 in line with the Paris Agreement and Montenegro’s climate neutrality commitment. Montenegro adopted further secondary legislation increasing alignment with the EU Governance Regulation and EU acquis concerning emissions from the land and use, land use change and forestry (LULUCF) sector and has increased its timelines and completeness of reports required by the adapted Governance Regulation adopted under the Energy Community Treaty. Montenegro still needs to align with EU acquis on ozone depleting substances, fluorinated gases, carbon removals certification framework and climate legislation concerning road transport (CO2 performance standards, car labelling and fuel quality). To this end, Montenegro adopted in June 2026, a Plan for putting arrangements in place to transpose, implement and enforce the EU climate acquis that should enable to achieve full alignment with EU acquis and prepare Montenegro for its full implementation.
CLUSTER 5: RESOURCES, AGRICULTURE AND COHESION
This cluster covers: agriculture and rural development (Chapter 11); food safety, veterinary and phytosanitary policy (Chapter 12); fisheries and aquaculture (Chapter 13); regional policy and coordination of structural instruments (Chapter 22); and financial and budgetary provisions (Chapter 33).
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Chapter 11: Agriculture and rural development
The EU’s common agricultural policy supports farmers and contributes to ensuring Europe’s food security. It helps tackle climate change and the sustainable management of national resources; maintains rural areas and landscapes across the EU; and keeps the rural economy alive by promoting jobs in farming, agri-food industries and associated sectors. This requires strong management and control systems. There are also common EU rules for marketing standards, quality policy and organic farming.
On horizontal issues, staffing of the paying agency remains a critical issue. Recruitment of 48 personnel is envisaged in 2026, and it is essential that this proceeds without delay to facilitate progress with the setting up of the paying agency and the establishment of an integrated administration and control system. For the land parcel identification system, new ortophoto maps are being delivered. Its update needs to proceed speedily, ensuring adequate staff resources are available for the task. Detailed steps for developing the area monitoring system must be elaborated and a pilot project launched without delay. There was no progress in the development of the farm sustainability data network. Farm advisory services remain to be strengthened.
As regards agricultural markets - common market organisation, Montenegro advanced its alignment by amending the Law on the organisation of the market of agricultural products as well by adopting secondary legislation regarding the quality of olive oil, and honey. Efforts for its implementation must continue. Work on the electronic vineyard register remains to be completed.
In the area of rural development, implementation of the IPARD III programme is progressing with ongoing contracting and implementation of projects. Montenegro is encouraged to ensure full absorption of the available EU funding, by obtaining entrustment to implement further measures under IPARD III.
On quality policy, the law on quality schemes for agricultural and food products was amended, further aligning with the acquis. Activities to strengthen control and enforcement continued.
On organic farming, alignment with the acquis continued with the adoption of legislation on plant and livestock organic production, on processing, collection, packaging, transport and storage of products, on labelling of organic production and of the List of products and substances allowed in organic production. Activities to strengthen control and enforcement continued.
On the fight against corruption, the Montenegrin authorities are obliged to prevent, detect and report irregularities
Chapter 12: Food safety, veterinary and phytosanitary policy
The EU food acquis, including hygiene rules for foodstuff production, ensures a high level of food and feed safety and a high level of protection of consumers’ interests. Animal health and welfare and the safety of food of animal origin are safeguarded, together with plant health, quality of seeds, plant reproductive material, pro, animal nutrition and the use of plant protection products.
In the area of general food safety, inApril 2026, Parliament adopted the Food Safety Law that is aligned with the EU acquis. The Administration for Food Safety, Veterinary and Phytosanitary (AFSVPA) implemented the 2025 programme for food and feed safety quality measures and adopted the 2026 programme. The 2025 national residue monitoring plan was implemented and the 2026 plan was approved. In July 2026, the governmentadopted a revised programme for improving the quality of raw milk with an action plan and a plan for dealing with non-compliant raw milk. Montenegro has yet to complete the harmonisation of its national framework with EU requirements relating to secondary legislation. Regarding the horizontal framework of administrative capacity and official controls, some progress has been made in strengthening administrative and inspection capacities. In July2026 the government adopted the revised action plan for strengthening the administrative capacities of the
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AFSVPA, which in the period up to 2030 envisages the recruitment of 147 additional employees. The announcement of 26 vacant positions for 2026 was published.
Parliament adopted the Official Controls Law in May 2026. Thematic trainings on official control for competent inspections in the field of food safety were provided, along with the development of guidance materials and tools, including a guide for official controls in facilities for slaughtering, cutting and processing meat, a handbook on official control of milk processing facilities, a manual for the primary production of food of animal origin. Checklists were also prepared for the implementation of official controls on farms for the production and distribution of raw milk. The development of control procedures is ongoing and includes measures to prevent conflicts of interest in the production of products of animal origin. Notable progress was made on the required border control posts (BCPs). In February 2026 the government adopted the roadmap for the construction and improvement of border control posts and instructed the Ministry of Finance to allocate the required funds. It envisages the construction or reconstruction of six BCPs ahead of EU accession. The revised Roadmap, which includes a contingency plan, was adopted by the government in July 2026.
An action plan for strengthening the administrative capacity which provides the successive recruitment and training of 147 officials until 2030 has been presented and linked to areas falling in EU Official Controls Regulation (OCR)
In July 2026, the Government adopted a roadmap for the designation and supervision of official laboratories and national reference laboratories for official controls.) Some progress was made when it comes to the requirement for a detailed and evidence-based assessment to determine which reference functions are feasible in the territory of Montenegro and which functions should be designated to laboratories of EU Member States.
On veterinary policy, Parliament adopted the Law on Animal Health in June 2026. Montenegro has established competent authorities and a system of official controls. Control activities are carried out in practice, laboratories support surveillance programmes, and awareness campaigns and simulation exercises are organised for relevant animal diseases. Certain structural weaknesses still affect the effectiveness and consistency of the system, therefore further efforts by Montenegro are needed addressing the organisation of official controls (which is not sufficiently supported by documented procedures, risk-based planning and central oversight), safeguards to prevent conflicts of interest for authorised veterinarians, staffing constraints, the efficient use of resources and the absence of systematic performance assessment (which limits effective supervision), the animal identification and registration database (which remains inaccurate and incomplete and which weakens traceability and disease control), surveillance systems (which are in place but do not consistently ensure early detection and targeted monitoring). In June 2026, Montenegro adopted a new Animal Health Law, which will enter into force in 2027, and which sets a basis for further alignment with the EU acquis in this area. Further efforts are needed from Montenegro to continue with legislative alignment and implementation of relevant animal health legislation under Animal Helath Law and other frameworks while ensuring full compliance with theEU acquis in this animal health field upon accession.
The AFSVPA implemented the 2025 programme of mandatory animal health protection measures and adopted the 2026 programme with a strengthened measures for supervision, including the introduction of incentive measures for reporting dead wild birds. The rabies vaccination of wild animals continued, and an aerial vaccination campaign was carried out in spring 2026. In June 2026, Montenegro was included in the list of third countries which can derogate from the rabies antibody titration test requirement when moving dogs, cats or ferrets to the EU. Montenegro also advanced on the development of border control point procedures, including biosecurity guidelines and instructions for documentary, identity and physical checks, sampling and handling.
The country advanced ontraining on animal welfare during slaughter, the preparation of key procedures and manuals (covering slaughterhouse checklists, certification of slaughter competence, and on-farm welfare assessments). The consistent implementation of animal welfare standards during transport, at farm and at the time of slaughter, remains a significant
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area for improvement in many establishments and small operators. Greater efforts are also needed on enforcement and efficient risk based official controls related to animal welfare at farm, during transport and at time of slaughter and killing animals, including ensuring sufficient and trained staff in charge of animal welfare within the competent authorities. Secondary legislation was adopted to further align the national legal framework with the acquis in the field of farmed animal welfare and animal protection during killing.
With regard to placing on the market of food, feed and animal by-products, the Parliament adopted the law on management and handling of animal by-products in April 2026. The Government adopted in April the updated Revised Plan for the Management of Animal by- Products not intended for human Consumption defining a phased approach to establishing a compliant system
in February 2026, the government adopted the innovative plan for the improvement of facilities for food of animal origin after consultation with the Commission. Montenegro committed to submit an updated list of facilities for food of animal origin to the Commission every three months, starting from the end of March 2026. The authorities still need to demonstrate that the planned national rules will not weaken EU food safety standards, allow unjustified exemptions, or be used to compensate for structural shortcomings or delay necessary investments. Any flexibility should be strictly limited to specific cases, while remaining proportionate and ensuring the same level of food safety. Otherwise, no national derogations could be applied, approvals would be granted only to fully compliant establishments, and authorities would have to refuse or withdraw authorisation where full compliance is not ensured. In the area of food safety rules and its specific rules for feed, AFSVPA implemented the 2025 programme of food and feed safety measures and adopted the 2026 programme.
With regard to animal by-products, the plan for the management of animal by-products togehter with the action plan were adopted by the government in 2018 and further updated in April 2026. Montenegro demonstrated further progress in implementing that plan in the recent years. In particular, on 27 April 2026, Montenegro adopted the Law on management and handling of animal by-products, aligning with Regulation (EC) No 1069/2009 and certain provisions of Commission Regulation (EU) No 142/2011. Montenegro has also committed to establish a system for safe collection and disposal of animal by-products, compliant with EU rules by the date of accession, and eventually to construct a processing plant for certain animal by-products in the country by 1 January 2031.
In the area of phytosanitary policy, in March2026, Parliament adopted the Plant Health Law and in April 2026, it adopted the Plant Protection Products Law that is aligned with the acquis. The AFSVPA implemented the 2025 programme of phytosanitary measures, including the programme of plant health protection, the programme of plant protection products (including pesticide residue monitoring) and the programme for the control of the production of seeds, planting material and plant genetic resources. The programme of phytosanitary measures for 2026 was adopted. Additionally, the plan of official controls in phytosanitary area for 2025 was implemented, and the plan for 2026 was adopted. Since December 2025, activities have begun on the design, development and implementation of the phytosanitary information system within the framework of an EU-financed project.
On the marketing of seed and other plant reproductive material, the country should first align its national legislation with the EU acquis on the rules plant (PRM) and forest reproductive material (FRM). Considering the ambitious timeframes, Montenegro should focus both on establishing the necessary institutional frameworks and technical capacities to implement and enforce the acquis effectively, and also setting up functioning seed certification systems, including as regards the evaluation and registration of varieties for PRM, the approval and registration of basic material for FRM, official inspection and controls, testing and laboratory infrastructures, and the registration and supervision of operators.
In the area of genetically modified organisms, no progress was reported and further work remains necessary.
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On the fight against corruption, Montenegrin authorities should prevent, detect and report irregularities
Chapter 13: Fisheries and aquaculture
The common fisheries policy lays down rules on fisheries management, protects living resources of the sea and limits the environmental impact of fisheries. This includes setting catch quotas, managing fleet capacity, rules on control and inspection, rules on markets and aquaculture and support for fisheries and coastal communities. Further, it promotes a sustainable aquaculture.
As regards resource and fleet management, work is ongoing to further update and upgrade the fisheries information system. Management plans have been developed for bottom nets, longlines, coastal nets and European eel. In February 2026, the Parliament adopted the Law on freshwater fisheries, which is harmonised with the EU acquis in the area of traceability of fish products and management of eel stocks.
Regarding inspections and control, guidelines were developed for at-sea inspections and during landings, however the adminsitrative capacity for inspection would still need to be increased. Procedures for at-sea inspections, traceability and vessel monitoring and surveillance systems were prepared for the fisheries monitoring centre. Annual work plan for inspection was prepared.
As regards international agreements, Montenegro became the 55th member of International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas. The implementation of the European Strategy for the Adriatic-Ionian Region and collaboration with the General Fisheries Commission for the Mediterranean continued.
Regarding data collection, the annual implementation of the data collection programme (DCF-DCRF) continued, covering both commercial catch data and biological data. The new data collection plan is under preparation.
There were no developments during the reporting period with regard to maritime spatial planning, structural actions and State aid.
Chapter 22: Regional policy and coordination of structural instruments
Regional policy is the EU’s main tool for reducing regional disparities and investing in sustainable and inclusive socio-economic growth. It is operating through ‘shared management’ between the Commission and EU Member States. The implementation of cohesion policy programmes requires appropriate administrative capacity on programme and project level, the establishment of systems of sound financial management and control and also the fulfilment of other EU acquis elements such as environmental or public procurement legislation.
Regarding the legislative framework, the government adopted the new law on regional development in July 2026 that lays down the legal, institutional, and strategic framework for regional development. A coordination body and six thematic working groups were established to develop a draft strategic planning document which will constitute the basis for programming future cohesion policy related EU funding.
Concerning the institutional framework, the government adopted, in February 2026, a proposal for the institutional and programming framework for EU funds after accession, with coordinating authority, managing authorities, and audit authority. Montenegro received the European Commission’s entrustment for budget implementation under indirect management for the IPA 2025-2027 multi-annual action programme and the sector operational programme on employment and social policy and conditional entrustment for the sector operational programme on environment and climate change.
Administrative capacity remains a key priority, given high staff turnover and persistent vacancies. Recruitments have been launched in line with adopted systematisation but still need to be completed. Management verifications for Interreg programmes require reinforcement. Montenegro prepared individual organisational development strategies and
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developed a comprehensive capacity-building framework through competency mapping, training needs analyses and the preparation of an Administrative Capacity Building Roadmap.
On programming, Montenegro prepared a Strategic Planning Document providing the basis for the cohesion elements of the future National and Regional Partnership Plan (NRPP). The Council for Public Investments developed an Infrastructure Public Investment Marster Plan to monitor all capital investments, regardless of funding source. Programming and contract preparations under the IPA III operational programmes progressed but should be accelerated to ensure timely and effective absorption of EU funds. Montenegro continued to participate in Interreg cooperation programmes and macro-regional strategies, further strengthening its experience with shared management and contributing to preparation for the future Interreg programming period. The Council for Public Investments developed a Master Plan for Infrastructure Development to monitor all capital investments, regardless of funding source, and improve alignment with strategic priorities.
In the area of monitoring and evaluation, a monitoring and evaluation plan and a Management Information System implementation plan were prepared. Monitoring committees have been established for both IPA III operational programmes and for the Reform and Growth Facility, in line with the European Code of Conduct on Partnership principles. Montenegro is also a member of the monitoring committees of all seven Interreg programmes it participates in. Inter-ministerial coordination as well as regular dialogue with local municipalities and civil society need to be strengthened and turned into a structured process allowing further engagement, tracking and regular monitoring. Under indirect and shared management, the coordination and implementation capacities of beneficiary institutions remain to be strengthened.
On financial management, control and audit, systems are established under the IPA programmes, but problems with management verifications persist under Interreg programmes. In April 2026, a decree was adopted to confirm Montenegro’s coordination and fund management set-up under the Reform and Growth Facility, defining responsible bodies, financial management procedures, coordination, monitoring and reporting systems, and measures to prevent and address irregularities and fraud.
On fight against corruption,in the reporting period six cases were registered on the Irregularity Management System operated under the Anti-Fraud Information System. Four of these cases have been closed and two remain open.
Chapter 33: Financial and budgetary provisions
This chapter covers the rules governing the funding of the EU budget (‘own resources’). These resources mainly consist of: (i) contributions based on the gross national income of each Member State; (ii) customs duties; (iii) the non-recycled plastic resource; and (iv) a resource based on value-added tax. Member States must have the appropriate administrative capacity to adequately coordinate and ensure the correct calculation, collection, payment and control of own resources.
Montenegro accelerated accession preparation and advanced in underlying policy areasaffecting the own resources system (for progress in these areas, see chapters 16: Taxation, 18: Statistics, 27: Environment and climate change; 29: Customs union, and 32: Financial control).
On traditional own resources, in October 2025, the Customs Administration adopted a new rulebook on the internal organisation and systematisation of the Customs Administration. It established a Department of the Management of Traditional Own Resources and foresaw recruitment of three additional officials in this department for 2026. In December 2025, the government introduced amendments to the Customs Law, providing the legal basis to undertake enforced collection of customs debt, including collection from movable and immovable property. The authorities continued preparations to ensure full operationalisation of A/B accounts, including upgrading its relevant information system.
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As regards VAT-based resources, the tax administration continued improving its administrative capacities, standardising procedures and improving its information system to enable accurate data calculation and reporting. The Statistical Office continued preparatory work for correct calculation of the average weighted VAT rate.
In the area of gross national income-based (GNI) resources, Montenegro prepared and submitted to the EC its GNI Inventory and a roadmap for outstanding methodological issues for statistics in line with the European System of Accounts (ESA) 2010 methodology, while the informal economy is calculated in accordance with the OECD and Eurostat manuals.
On non-recycled plastic packaging waste own resource, Montenegro continued improving its regulatory and operational framework in the area of waste management and extended producer responsibility, providing for a normative basis for collection, processing, and control of data related to non-recyclable plastic packaging waste own resource.
As regards administrative infrastructure, in March 2026, with government-adopted amendments an interinstitutional working group to coordinate work for the provisional closure of Chapter 33 was established. To ensure administrative capacity for own resources management, procedures for recruitment of 30 additional qualified staff have started, including 9 positions in 2026. As of June 2026, only five positions were filled, thus the recruitment process needs to be accelerated.
CLUSTER 6: EXTERNAL RELATIONS
There are two chapters in this cluster: external relations (Chapter 30) and foreign, security and defence policy (Chapter 31).
Chapter 30: External relations
The EU has a common commercial policy towards non-EU countries, based on multilateral and bilateral agreements and autonomous measures. There are also EU rules in the field of humanitarian aid and development policy.
On the common commercial policy, Montenegro continued to align its positions with those of the EU, including within the World Trade Organisation (WTO). The country continued to implement obligations arising from WTO multilateral and plurilateral agreements.
Montenegro remained an active participant in the Central European Free Trade Agreement (CEFTA) working groups and the Joint CommitteeIn May 2026, Parliament adopted the Law on the Ratification of Decision No 5/2024 of the Joint Committee of the Central European Free Trade Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, adopted on 9 October 2024, which establishes a unified regional framework designed to modernize and harmonize intellectual property rights protection across CEFTA parties in alignment with European Union (EU) and TRIPS standards. . Additional Protocol 7 (Trade in Services) was ratified in July 2026.
The country remains committed to the Common Regional Market action plan 2025-2027 to strengthen regional economic cooperation.
In June 2026 the government adopted secondary legislation on credit insurance against non- market risks. The Development Bank of Montenegro is mandated to perform export credit insurance operations. In the area of dual-use goods, Montenegro has yet to join the Australia Group and the Wassenaar Arrangement. Montenegro decided to adhere unilaterally to the Australia Group in September 2025. A visit from the Wassenaar Arrangement rapporteurs took place in April 2026. Montenegro is yet to align with the EU’s 2025 dual-use export control list and the EU framework for the FDI screening.
In July 2026, Montenegro’s Parliament ratified an intergovernmental agreement with the US. As foreseen under the Stabilisation and Association Agreement with Montenegro and the EU law, Montenegro is required to bring its legislation, including all incompatible provisions
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under the existing, and particularly recently signed intergovernmental agreements, fully in line with the EU acquis at the latest by the date of accession
On bilateral trade agreements, in December 2025 Montenegro agreed to implement the revised rules of the Pan-Euro-Mediterranean (PEM) Convention with Türkiye and Ukraine. The revised PEM are in application across all relevant agreements (Stabilisation and Association Agreement with the EU, CEFTA, EFTA, and Türkiye) since January 2026. Montenegro has 25 bilateral investment treaties in force, including 15 with EU Member States. In the field of development policy and humanitarian aid, Montenegro adopted the 2026-202gramme of International Development Cooperation and Humanitarian Aid in December 2025. Official Development Assistance stood at 0.019% of GNI in 2024, with a similar level reported for 2025. To strengthen the legislative framework on humanitarian aid, the Law on post-disaster recovery and a National Plan for Rescue and Protection against Extreme Weather were adopted in December 2025.
Chapter 31: Foreign, security and defence policy
Member States must be able to conduct political dialogue under the EU foreign, security and defence policy (CFSP), align with EU statements, take part in EU actions, and apply agreed restrictive measures.
Montenegro remained actively engaged in political dialogue with the EU on foreign and security policy issues. In December 2025, the first EU–Montenegro Security and Defence Dialogue was held. Montenegro participated in the EU–Western Balkans meetings of Political Directors in October 2025, in Brussels in April 2026 and in Kruje in October 2026, the informal meetings of the Foreign Ministers in November 2025 and May 2026, as well as in the EU-Western Balkans Summit in December 2025 and hosted the EU-Western Balkans Summit in June 2026.
The institutional framework enabling Montenegro’s participation in the EU common foreign and security policy is in place and operational. Montenegro sustained full alignment with EU CFSP: including with statements by the High Representative on behalf of the EU and Council Decisions on restrictive measures.
During the reporting period, seven regular and one extraordinary sessions of the Permanent Coordination Body for Restrictive Measures took place, and steps were taken to strengthen capacities on implementation, including training for public and private sector representatives. Montenegro should continue strengthening its capacity to implement and enforce EU sanctions.
Montenegro maintained active cooperation in international organisations (UN, OSCE and Council of Europe). Montenegro aligned fully with all EU statements and positions at the United Nations General Assembly and many other multilateral fora. In February 2026, Montenegro co-sponsored the United Nations General Assembly resolution on ‘Support for lasting peace in Ukraine’ and in December 2025, the resolution on ‘Return of Ukrainian Children’. Montenegro was the only Western Balkan partner to join 35 other states and the EU to create the Special Tribunal for the Crime of Aggression against Ukraine under the Council of Europe in May 2026. Montenegro is a member of the International Coalition for the Return of Ukrainian Children, and it participated in the High-Level Meeting organised in May 2026. In December 2025 Montenegro signed the Convention for establishing and International Claims Commission for Ukraine regarding claims for damages, loss, or injury caused by Russia's invasion. In November 2025, Montenegro became co-chair of the Group of Friends on Cultural Rights of Persons with Disabilities in the Human Rights Council. Since September 2025, Montenegro participates in the ‘Prove It Matters’ initiative on children in armed conflict. Implementation of the second National Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security is ongoing, with a need for accompanying funding, civil society inclusion and localised accountability. In September 2025, the Ministry of Defence organised a regional conference marking the 25th anniversary UNSC Resolution 1325 and in November 2025 a Working Group on Networking Women in the Security Sector was established.
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Montenegro is party to the Rome Statue of the International Criminal Court. Montenegro remained aligned with the Council Decision 2011/168/CFSP of 21 March 2011 and the related EU guiding principles on bilateral immunity agreements, following its decision to terminate the bilateral immunity agreement with the United States on the International Criminal Court in September 2025.
Concerning conflict prevention, Montenegro continued to align with EU and UN initiatives, including through the contribution to EU missions as well as to UN and NATO missions. Montenegro continued to participate in the implementation of the Agreement on Sub-Regional Arms Control under Article IV of Annex 1B of the Dayton Peace Accords and will assume its Chairpersonship from July to December 2026.
Regarding non-proliferation and disarmament, Montenegro is a party to most international treaties and conventions. It remains actively engaged in the implementation of the Western Balkans roadmap on small arms and light weapons (SALW). Preparations for a new strategy on combating illegal possession, misuse and trafficking of SALW for 2026-2030 are underway. Implementation of the 2023-2028 plan for the prevention, detection, response and protection against chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear threats and risks (CBRN), and for preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery, continued Montenegro also continued efforts to join the Wassenaar Arrangement and the Australia Group. On arms export control, Montenegro remains fully aligned with the EU Common Position 2008/944.
In terms of security measures, Montenegro continued to implement the agreement with the EU on procedures for the exchange and protection of classified information.
As regards common security and defence policy (CSDP), Montenegro has expressed strong interest in concluding a Security and Defence Partnership with the EU. It continues to participate in EU crisis management missions and operations, currently in the EU NAVFOR ATALANTA. Montenegro also prepared its participation in the EU Military Assistance Mission in support of Ukraine (EUMAM Ukraine). Montenegro also continues to contribute to UN peacekeeping operations in the Western Sahara (MINURSO) and in Cyprus (UNFICYP). Montenegro continues to contribute to regional cooperation in military medicine through the Balkan Medical Task Force. It participates in training activities of the European Security and Defence College (ESDC).
As regards hybrid threats, Montenegro continued to strengthen its institutional framework and cooperation with the EU. The implementation of the National Strategy for Countering Hybrid Threats 2025-2029, adopted in 2025, continues. During the first EU–Montenegro Security and Defence Dialogue in December 2025, foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI) and cyber security issues were discussed. Montenegro requested additional EU support in these areas in March 2026, including a new tailored Hybrid Risk Survey. In March 2026 the Prime Minister joined the high-level panel with HRVP in the EEAS annual counter-FIMI conference in Brussels. In March 2026, Montenegro signed the host country agreement for the Western Balkans Cyber Capacity Centre, the first international organisation headquartered in Podgorica. Additionally, Montenegro has actively engaged in the first negotiations of the new UN Global Mechanism on Information and Communications Technologies in the Context of International Security. In March 2026, the Coordinating Body for Protection against FIMI was established, further efforts are needed in building a coordinated institutional response and enhancing societal resilience to FIMI and other forms of hybrid threats.
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ANNEX I – RELATIONS BETWEEN THE EU AND MONTENEGRO
Within the framework of the accession negotiations, by June 2025 all 33 screened chapters had been opened, 21of which have been provisionally closed.
Montenegro is participating in the Stabilisation and Association Process. Montenegro continued to broadly implement its obligations under the Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA). Regular political and economic dialogue between the EU and Montenegro has continued through the SAA's structures. Regular subcommittee meetings were held throughout the period. The Stabilisation and Association Committee met in March 2026 and the Stabilisation and Association Council in July 2022. The Stabilisation and Association Parliamentary Committee met regularly.
Montenegro participates in the ministerial dialogue between the economic and finance ministers of the EU and the candidate countries, which aims at helping the latter to gradually meet the economic accession criteria and be better prepared in terms of economic reforms, competitiveness and job creation.
Montenegro is also a beneficiary of the EU’s autonomous trade measures (ATMs) in favour of the Western Balkans.
The EU is Montenegro’s main trading partner. In 2025, total EU-Montenegro trade in goods reached EUR 2.63 billion, with Montenegro exporting EUR 432 million to the EU and importing EUR 2.2 billion.
The EU Montenegro has maintained its full alignment with the EU common foreign and security policy and hascontinued to contribute to EU crisis-management missions and operations under the CSDP. In February 2025 a EUR 6 million assistance measure for Montenegro under the European Peace Facility was adopted to provide the Armed Forces with real life support equipment, equipment for chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear defence operations (CBRN), and equipment for the helicopter-borne search and rescue units.
Visa liberalisation for citizens of Montenegro travelling to the Schengen area has been in force since December 2009. As part of the visa liberalisation monitoring mechanism, the Commission has been regularly assessing the progress made by the country in implementing reforms introduced under the visa roadmap. The Commission’s eighth report under the Visa Suspension Mechanism adopted in December 2025 concluded that Montenegro addressed some of the Commission’s previous recommendations, in particular by reducing the list of visa-free countries for which the EU requires a visa, and by continuing to monitor the processing of the remaining applications from the terminated investment citizenship scheme. Montenegro amended its visa policy decree to fully align with the EU list of visa-required third countries as of 31 October 2026. A readmission agreement between the European Union and Montenegro has been in force since 2008. In accordance with Regulation (EU)2026/46413, candidate countries and potential candidates are, in principle, designated since 2026 as safe countries of origin at Union level.
Under the Reform and Growth Facility (RGF), Montenegro's indicative maximum allocation amounts to EUR 383.5 million. Release of EU funds under the RGF is conditional on compliance with the preconditions, general conditions and on delivery of reforms set out in the Reform Agenda, which the Commission approved in October 2024. As of May 2026, EUR 89 million have been released to Montenegro (including pre-financing) covering the first three reporting periods.
13 REGULATION (EU) 2026/464 OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL of 24 February 2026 amending Regulation (EU) 2024/1348 as regards the establishment of a list of safe countries of origin at Union level
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The Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance 2021-2027 (IPA III) continues to provide financial support to the region and finances the Economic and Investment Plan for the Western Balkans. While programming of IPA III remaining funds was completed in 2024, implementation of the programmes continues. This includes significant support for further alignment with the EU action plan and institutional capacity building. For IPA 2021, Montenegro contracted EUR 9.1 million (i.e. 73.5% of the available amounts) under indirect management by the December 2025 contracting deadline. The entrustment of IPA III Operational Programmes for employment and social policy as well as for the environment was completed and procurement procedures have been launched.
The bilateral annual programmes are complemented by a package of multi-country and regional programmes, supporting the environmental sector, and dealing with migration and social housing, as well as TAIEX and competitiveness programmes together with International Financial Institutions and International Organisations. Montenegro also benefits from the rural development programme IPARD III (in continuation of the IPARD II support), providing a significant contribution to the implementation of the Economic and Investment Plan for the Western Balkans and the Green Agenda. Montenegro continues to participate actively in cross-border cooperation programmes with neighbouring countries and EU Member States (Adriatic and Danube – macro-regional strategies), as well as transnational cooperation programmes and Union Programmes.
The EU provides support via IPA and the Foreign Policy Instrument to strengthen the resilience of the Western Balkans partners to face hybrid threats including cyber threats and foreign information manipulation and interference.
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ANNEX II – STATISTICAL ANNEX
STATISTICAL DATA (as of 14/09/2026)
Montenegro
Basic data Note 2013 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
Population (thousand) 621 i 621 i 618 i 617 i 624 i 623 i
Total area of the country (km²) 13 882 13 882 13 882 13 882 13 882 13 882
National accounts Note 2013 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
Gross domestic product (GDP) (million national currency) 3 330 4 923 5 944 7 069 7 645 8 171 p
Gross domestic product (GDP) (million euro) 3 330 4 923 5 944 7 069 7 645 8 171 p
GDP per capita (euro) 5 350 7 880 9 530 11 340 12 260 13 110 p
GDP per capita (in purchasing power standards (PPS) 10 605 15 111 17 316 19 903 21 365 22 545 p
GDP per capita (in PPS), relative to the EU average (EU-27 = 100) 40.4 45.4 47.9 51.9 53.4 54.1 p
Real GDP growth rate: change on previous year of GDP volume (%) 3.4 13.0 7.7 6.5 3.2 2.7 p
Employment growth (national accounts data), relative to the previous year (%) 0 2 18 9 4 3 p
Labour productivity growth: growth in GDP (in volume) per person employed, relative to the
previous year (%)
3 10 - 9 - 2 - 1 - 1 p
Unit labour cost growth, relative to the previous year (%) - 12 - 11 9 14 10 6 p
Nominal unit labour cost index based on persons (3 year % change) - 10.5 1.8 11.3 11.6 36.8 33.0 p
Labour productivity per person employed: GDP (in PPS) per person employed relative to EU
average (EU-27 = 100)
55 60 54 54 54 53 p
Gross value added by main sectors
Agriculture, forestry and fisheries (%) 6.4 4.7 5.0 4.7 4.4 4.3 p
Industry (%) 13.8 12.3 11.1 11.1 10.5 9.6 p
Construction (%) 5.2 6.0 5.6 4.8 4.9 4.8 p
Services (%) 74.5 i 77.0 i 78.3 i 79.4 i 80.3 i 81.2 pi
Final consumption expenditure, as a share of GDP (%) 101.4 94.0 95.2 92.9 96.6 98.7 p
Gross fixed capital formation, as a share of GDP (%) 20.4 22.2 21.7 20.4 21.1 22.3 p
Exports of goods and services, relative to GDP (%) 41.8 43.1 51.3 49.2 43.7 40.1 p
Imports of goods and services, relative to GDP (%) 62.0 62.6 74.1 67.6 66.2 65.7 p
Gross fixed capital formation by the general government sector, as a percentage of GDP (%) : : : : : :
Business Note 2013 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
Industrial production volume index (2015 = 100) 94.0 99.7 96.8 103.0 102.9 93.5
Number of active enterprises (number) : : 43 313 51 266 55 931 :
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Birth rate: number of enterprise births in the reference period (t) divided by the number of
enterprises active in t (%)
16.2 w 11.4 w 21.6 w 16.3 w 12.3 w 10.6 w
Death rate: number of enterprise deaths in the reference period (t) divided by the number of
enterprises active in t (%)
4.3 w 4.9 w 5.6 w 4.9 w 4.8 w 3.2 w
People employed in SMEs as a share of all persons employed (within the non-financial
business economy) (%)
: : : : : :
Value added by SMEs (in the non-financial business economy) (EUR million) : : : : : :
Total value added (in the non-financial business economy) (EUR million) : : 2 862 3 503 3 630 :
Inflation rate and house prices Note 2013 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
Consumer price index (CPI), change relative to the previous year (%) : 2.5 d 11.9 d 8.7 d 3.6 d 4.1 d
Balance of payments Note 2013 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
Balance of payments: current account total (million euro) - 383.0 - 457.0 - 766.0 - 791.0 - 1 306.0 - 1 679.0
Balance of payments current account: trade balance (million euro) - 1 328.0 - 1 914.0 - 2 671.0 - 2 986.0 - 3 299.0 - 3 735.0
Balance of payments current account: net services (million euro) 653.0 956.0 1 317.0 1 688.0 1 583.0 1 592.0
Balance of payments current account: net balance for primary income (million euro) 66.0 103.0 119.0 67.0 - 21.0 64.0
Balance of payments current account: net balance for secondary income (million euro) 227.0 401.0 469.0 438.0 430.0 408.0
Net balance for primary and secondary income: of which government transfers (million euro) 21.0 66.0 41.0 60.0 34.0 21.0
*3 year backward moving average of the current account balance relative to GDP (%) : - 16.7 - 16.2 - 11.1 - 13.7 - 16.3
*Five year change in share of world exports of goods and services (%) : 5.0 17.0 29.1 14.0 92.1
Net balance (inward - outward) of foreign direct investment (FDI) (million euro) 323.8 i 582.0 i 783.0 i 434.0 i 491.0 i :
Foreign direct investment (FDI) abroad (million euro) 13.1 9.0 50.0 53.0 63.0 :
of which FDI of the reporting economy in the EU-27 countries (million euro) : - 8.0 8.0 13.0 20.0 :
Foreign direct investment (FDI) in the reporting economy (million euro) 336.9 591.0 833.0 487.0 554.0 :
of which FDI of the EU-27 countries in the reporting economy (million euro) : 175.0 226.0 108.0 99.0 :
*Net international investment position, relative to GDP (%) : - 158.6 - 123.7 - 104.4 - 104.3 - 111.5
Year on year rate of change in gross inflow of remittances (in national currency) from migrant
workers (%)
6.4 i 6.9 i 7.3 i 5.5 i 5.4 i :
Public finance Note 2013 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
General government deficit / surplus, relative to GDP (%) : : : : : :
General government gross debt relative to GDP (%) : : : : : :
Total government revenues, as a percentage of GDP (%) : : : : : :
Total government expenditure, as a percentage of GDP (%) : : : : : :
Financial indicators Note 2013 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
Gross external debt of the whole economy, relative to GDP (%) : 193.5 i 158.1 i 128.2 i 126.6 i 126.3 i
107
Gross external debt of the whole economy, relative to total exports (%) 379.2 w 448.8 w 307.9 w 260.4 w 289.4 w 315.0 w
Money supply: M1 (banknotes, coins, overnight deposits, million euro) : : : : : :
Total credit by monetary financial institutions to residents (consolidated) (million euro) : : : : : :
*Annual change in financial sector liabilities (%) : : : : : :
*Private debt, consolidated, relative to GDP (%) : : : : : :
Interest rates: day-to-day money rate, per annum (%) : : : : : :
Euro exchange rates: average of period (1 euro = … national currency) 1 w 1 w 1 w 1 w 1 w 1 w
Trade-weighted effective exchange rate index, 42 countries (2015 = 100) : : : : : :
*3 year change (T/T-3) in the trade-weighted effective exchange rate index, 42 countries
(2015 = 100)
: : : : : :
Value of reserve assets (including gold) (million euro) 77.0 8.0 164.0 - 482.0 242.0 208.0
External trade in goods Note 2013 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
Value of imports: all goods, all partners (million euro) 1 773 2 504 3 540 3 810 4 068 4 458
Value of exports: all goods, all partners (million euro) 376 437 700 674 615 572
Trade balance: all goods, all partners (million euro) - 1 398 - 2 067 - 2 840 - 3 136 - 3 453 - 3 886
Terms of trade (export price index / import price index * 100) (number) 98.9 iw 99.8 iw 110.6 iw 102.2 iw : :
Share of exports to EU-27 countries in value of total exports (%) 40.6 iw 31.1 iw 30.3 iw 36.1 iw 29.1 iw :
Share of imports from EU-27 countries in value of total imports (%) 43.6 iw 45.7 iw 44.3 iw 45.8 iw 45.7 iw :
Demography Note 2013 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
Crude rate of natural change of population (natural growth rate): number of births minus
deaths (per thousand inhabitants)
2.5 - 3.4 - 0.1 1.1 1.0 0.8
Infant mortality rate deaths of children under one year of age (per thousand live births) 4.4 1.4 : 2.1 1.6 :
Life expectancy at birth: male (years) 74.1 70.8 : 75.1 75.2 b :
Life expectancy at birth: female (years) 79.0 77.0 : 80.2 80.1 b :
Labour market Note 2013 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
Economic activity rate for persons aged 20–64: proportion of the population aged 20–64 that
is economically active (%)
65.1 w 64.7 w 73.3 w 76.3 w 78.2 w 78.0 w
Employment rate for persons aged 20–64: proportion of the population aged 20–64 that are
in employment (%)
52.6 w 54.2 w 62.5 w 66.5 w 69.7 w 69.8 w
Male employment rate for persons aged 20–64 (%) 57.8 w 59.8 w 66.9 w 72.0 w 76.1 w 73.7 w
Female employment rate for persons aged 20–64 (%) 47.5 w 48.7 w 58.2 w 61.0 w 63.3 w 65.7 w
Employment rate for persons aged 55–64: proportion of the population aged 55–64 that are
in employment (%)
38.7 w 41.1 w 59.0 w 60.2 w 63.4 w 53.9 w
Employment by main sectors
Agriculture, forestry and fisheries (%) 4.5 w 6.4 w 4.3 w 4.5 w 4.3 w 4.3 w
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Industry (%) 11.9 w 10.2 w 10.0 w 9.8 w 10.4 w 10.1 w
Construction (%) 5.9 w 6.7 w 9.1 w 8.6 w 8.7 w 9.2 w
Services (%) 77.7 w 76.7 w 76.7 w 77.1 w 76.6 w 76.4 w
People employed in the public sector as a share of total employment, persons aged 20–64
(%)
36.0 w 32.7 w 28.8 w 28.3 w 29.8 w 33.2 w
People employed in the private sector as a share of total employment, persons aged 20–64
(%)
48.1 w 63.7 w 67.0 w 68.4 w 66.7 w 64.5 w
Unemployment rate: proportion of the labour force that is unemployed (%) 19.5 w 16.6 w 14.7 w 13.1 w 11.4 w 10.7 w
Male unemployment rate (%) 20.1 w 17.1 w 16.2 w 12.2 w 10.8 w 11.9 w
Female unemployment rate (%) 18.8 w 15.9 w 12.8 w 14.0 w 12.2 w 9.3 w
Youth unemployment rate: proportion of the labour force aged 15–24 that is unemployed (%) 41.6 w 37.1 w 29.4 w 23.3 w 26.0 w 23.9 w
Long-term unemployment rate: proportion of the labour force that has been unemployed for
12 months or more (%)
16.0 w 11.0 w 10.2 w 9.4 w 8.5 w 6.6 w
Unemployment rate for persons (aged 25–64) having completed at most lower secondary
education (ISCED levels 0-2) (%)
39.7 w 31.0 w 23.5 w 21.2 w 23.1 w 18.5 w
Unemployment rate for persons (aged 25–64) having completed tertiary education (ISCED
levels 5-8) (%)
9.0 w 11.5 w 10.3 w 7.9 w 6.6 w 7.6 w
Social cohesion Note 2013 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
Average nominal monthly wages and salaries (national currency) 726 w 793 w 883 w 987 w 1 083 w 1 206 w
Index of real wages and salaries (index of nominal wages and salaries divided by the
inflation index) (2016 = 100)
: : : : : :
Gini coefficient : 33 32 : : :
Poverty gap 39.7 29.5 29.5 28.0 33.8 :
Standard of living Note 2013 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
Number of passenger cars relative to population size (number per thousand population) : 358.0 369.0 389.0 417.0 442.0
Infrastructure Note 2013 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
Density of railway network (lines in operation per thousand km²) 17.9 i 18.0 i 18.0 i 18.0 i 18.0 i :
Length of motorways (kilometres) 0 0 0 0 0 :
Education, Innovation and Research Note 2013 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
Percentage of persons aged 30-34 with a tertiary education level (ISCED 2011 levels 5 to 8) 28.0 w 39.0 w 39.3 w 40.9 w 41.3 w 52.2 w
Percentage of persons aged 30-34 with a tertiary education level (ISCED 2011 levels 5 to 8),
males
24.7 w 34.9 w 33.2 w 37.7 w 41.4 w 45.5 w
Percentage of persons aged 30-34 with a tertiary education level (ISCED 2011 levels 5 to 8),
females
31.5 w 43.0 w 45.4 w 44.1 w 41.3 w 58.4 w
Participation in early childhood education (children aged 3 and over) : 71.6 w 76.0 w 81.5 w 82.3 w 85.4 w
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Participation in early childhood education (children aged 3 and over), males : 72.6 w 76.7 w 82.5 w 83.4 w 86.7 w
Participation in early childhood education (children aged 3 and over), females : 70.5 w 75.2 w 80.4 w 81.1 w 84.1 w
Low achieving 15-year-olds in reading (%) : : 52.9 : : :
Low achieving 15-year-olds in mathematics (%) : : 59.5 : : :
Low achieving 15-year-olds in science (%) : : 54.9 : : :
Early leavers from education and training: proportion of persons aged 18-24 with at most
lower secondary education (at most ISCED 2011 level 2) who are not in further education or
training
5.8 w 6.7 w 5.2 w 6.8 w 4.9 w 3.8 w
Early leavers from education and training: proportion of men aged 18-24 with at most lower
secondary education (at most ISCED 2011 level 2) who are not in further education or
training
: : : : : :
Early leavers from education and training: proportion of women aged 18-24 with at most
lower secondary education (at most ISCED 2011 level 2) who are not in further education or
training
: : : : : :
Proportion of persons aged 25-64 having participated in education and training (last 4
weeks)
3.1 w 5.2 w 3.2 w 2.8 w 3.6 w 2.7 w
Proportion of persons aged 25-64 having participated in education and training (last 4
weeks), men
3.0 w 5.0 w 3.0 w 2.2 w 2.6 w 1.9 w
Proportion of persons aged 25-64 having participated in education and training (last 4
weeks), women
3.3 w 5.4 w 3.4 w 3.5 w 4.6 w 3.4 w
Exposure of vocational education and training (VET) graduates to work-based learning (% of
population aged 20-34)
: : : : : :
Share of individuals having at least basic digital skills (% of population aged 16-74) : 47.2 : 52.0 : 44.2
Share of individuals having at least basic digital skills (% of population aged 16-74), males : 48.5 : 53.5 : 44.0
Share of individuals having at least basic digital skills (% of population aged 16-74), females : 45.7 : 50.0 : 44.4
Public expenditure on education relative to GDP (%) : : : : : :
Gross domestic expenditure on R&D relative to GDP (%) 0.38 0.51 p 0.32 p 0.34 p 0.29 p :
Government budget appropriations or outlays on R&D (GBAORD), as a percentage of GDP
(%)
: 0.02 p 0.01 p 0.02 p 0.02 p :
Percentage of households who have internet access at home (%) : 80.8 81.0 81.3 84.5 88.1
Environment Note 2013 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
Index of greenhouse gas emissions, CO2 equivalent (1990 = 100) 66.0 w 71.6 w 72.1 w 74.2 w 71.7 w :
Energy intensity of the economy (kg of oil equivalent per 1 000 euro GDP at 2015 constant
prices)
288.9 269.5 243.0 236.1 238.7 :
Electricity generated from renewable sources relative to gross electricity consumption (%) 49.1 60.5 68.5 67.5 66.6 63.1 p
Road share of inland freight transport (based on tonne-km) (%) 100.0 bw 65.1 w 47.4 w 61.2 w 50.9 w 67.8 w
Energy Note 2013 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
Primary production of all energy products (thousand TOE) 761 749 743 829 779 :
110
Primary production of crude oil (thousand TOE) 0 0 0 0 0 :
Primary production of solid fuels (thousand TOE) 372 371 416 430 389 :
Primary production of gas (thousand TOE) 0 0 0 0 0 :
Net imports of all energy products (thousand TOE) 234 i 340 i 309 i 261 i 374 i :
Gross inland energy consumption (thousand TOE) 995 1 093 1 062 1 099 1 146 :
Gross electricity generation (GWh) 3 945 3 777 3 322 4 187 3 552 :
Agriculture Note 2013 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
Agricultural output volume index (at producer prices) (2015 = 100) : : : : : :
Utilised agricultural area (thousand hectares) 223.1 255.6 p 253.7 p 263.5 p 248.3 :
Livestock numbers: live bovine animals (thousand heads, end of period) 89.0 71.2 70.8 68.8 67.5 p 68.5
Livestock numbers: live swine (thousand heads, end of period) 21.0 24.3 24.5 24.2 29.3 p 33.2
Livestock numbers: live sheep and live goats (thousand heads, end of period) 221.0 i 195.0 i 190.5 i 184.1 i 171.8 pi 183.6 i
Raw milk available on farms (thousand tonnes) 186.4 : : : : :
Harvested crop production: cereals (including rice) (thousand tonnes) 8.1 7.1 p 7.2 p 7.7 p 7.7 :
Harvested crop production: sugar beet (thousand tonnes) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 :
Harvested crop production: vegetables (thousand tonnes) 31.2 40.9 p 40.9 p 42.1 p 63.4 :
Source: Eurostat and/or the statistical authorities in Montenegro
: = not available b = break in time series d = definition differs p = provisional i = Eurostat estimate w= data supplied by and under the responsibility of the national statistical authority and published on an "as is" basis and
without any assurance as regards their quality and adherence to EU statistical methodology * = Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure (MIP) indicator
EN EN
EUROPEAN COMMISSION
Brussels, 4.11.2026 SWD(2026) 695 final
COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT
Serbia 2026 Report
Accompanying the document
COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN
PARLIAMENT, THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL
COMMITTEE AND THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS
2026 Communication on EU enlargement policy
{COM(2026) 690 final} - {SWD(2026) 690 final} - {SWD(2026) 691 final} -
{SWD(2026) 692 final} - {SWD(2026) 693 final} - {SWD(2026) 694 final} - {SWD(2026) 696 final} - {SWD(2026) 697 final} - {SWD(2026) 698 final} -
{SWD(2026) 699 final} - {SWD(2026) 700 final}
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Table of Contents
1. INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................................... 3
1.1. Context ............................................................................................................................. 3
1.2. Main findings of the report ................................................................................................ 4
1.3. State of play of the accession negotiations .................................................................... 23
2. CLUSTER 1: THE FUNDAMENTALS OF THE ACCESSION PROCESS ................................ 24
2.1. Functioning of democratic institutions and public administration ................................... 24
2.1.1. Democracy........................................................................................................ 24
2.1.2. Public administration reform ............................................................................. 28
2.2. Rule of law and fundamental rights ................................................................................ 31
2.2.1 Chapter 23: Judiciary and fundamental rights ............................................. 31
2.2.2 Chapter 24: Justice, freedom and security .................................................. 52
2.3. Economic criteria ............................................................................................................ 64
2.3.1. The existence of a functioning market economy .............................................. 64
2.3.2. The capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the EU .......................................................................................................... 69
2.4. Public procurement, statistics and financial control ....................................................... 71
Chapter 5 - Public procurement .................................................................................. 71
Chapter 18 - Statistics ................................................................................................ 72
Chapter 32 - Financial control ..................................................................................... 74
3. GOOD NEIGHBOURLY RELATIONS AND REGIONAL COOPERATION ............................... 75
4. NORMALISATION OF RELATIONS BETWEEN SERBIA AND KOSOVO........................... 79
5. RESILIENCE, SECURITY, DEFENCE ...................................................................................... 81
6. ABILITY TO ASSUME THE OBLIGATIONS OF MEMBERSHIP .............................................. 83
Cluster 2: Internal market ...................................................................................................... 83
Chapter 1 - Free movement of goods......................................................................... 83
Chapter 2 - Freedom of movement for workers ......................................................... 84
Chapter 3 - Right of establishment and freedom to provide services ........................ 84
Chapter 4 - Free movement of capital ........................................................................ 85
Chapter 6 - Company law ........................................................................................... 86
Chapter 7 - Intellectual property law ........................................................................... 86
Chapter 8 - Competition policy ................................................................................... 87
Chapter 28 - Consumer and health protection ........................................................... 89
Cluster 3: Competitiveness and inclusive growth .................................................................. 90
Chapter 10 - Digital transformation and media ........................................................... 90
Chapter 16 - Taxation ................................................................................................. 91
Chapter 17 - Economic and monetary policy ............................................................. 92
Chapter 19 - Social policy and employment ............................................................... 93
Chapter 20 - Enterprise and industrial policy ............................................................. 95
Chapter 25 - Science and research ............................................................................ 96
Chapter 26 - Education and culture ............................................................................ 97
Chapter 29 - Customs union ..................................................................................... 100
Cluster 4: The Green Agenda and sustainable connectivity ............................................... 101
Chapter 14 - Transport policy ................................................................................... 101
Chapter 15 - Energy ................................................................................................. 102
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Chapter 21 - Trans-European networks ................................................................... 104
Chapter 27 - Environment and climate change ........................................................ 105
Cluster 5: Resources, agriculture and cohesion ................................................................. 107
Chapter 11 - Agriculture and rural development ...................................................... 107
Chapter 12 - Food safety, veterinary and phytosanitary policy ................................ 108
Chapter 13 - Fisheries and aquaculture ................................................................... 109
Chapter 22 - Regional policy and coordination of structural instruments ................. 110
Chapter 33 - Financial and budgetary provisions ..................................................... 111
Cluster 6: External relations ................................................................................................ 112
Chapter 30 - External relations ................................................................................. 112
Chapter 31 - Foreign, security and defence policy ................................................... 113
Annex I - Relations between the EU and Serbia ................................................................. 117
Annex II – Statistical annex ................................................................................................. 119
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1. INTRODUCTION1
1.1. CONTEXT
Since Serbia’s accession negotiations opened in January 2014, 22 out of the 35 negotiating chapters have been opened, including all chapters under cluster 1 (fundamentals) and cluster 4 (green agenda and sustainable connectivity). Two chapters have provisionally been closed. The Commission’s assessment from previous years, i.e. that Serbia has fulfilled the opening benchmarks for cluster 3 (competitiveness and inclusive growth) and that this cluster is technically ready to be opened, remains valid. The overall pace of the negotiations will continue to depend on progress on the rule of law and on the normalisation of Serbia’s relations with Kosovo*.
EU membership remains the strategic goal of the Serbian government, which has set up a new operational team led by a Chief Negotiator to speed up progress on the technical criteria for membership. Meeting Serbia’s objectives for EU accession negotiations requires strong political will, the implementation of necessary reforms, a whole-of-society approach, effective policy planning and coordination, along with sufficient human and financial resources for EU accession across all institutions involved. The anti-EU narrative evident not only in Serbian media outlets but also used by political office holders, including at highest levels, remains. As a matter of priority, the Serbian authorities should take much more responsibility for proactively and objectively communicating on Serbia’s EU accession process and on the EU, and for countering disinformation and information manipulation.
The funeral of convicted war criminal Ratko Mladić that took place in September 2026 with official support and in presence of senior officials and military contributed to glorification of a convicted war criminal in a manner contradicting the values underpinning Serbia’s path towards the European Union.
Mass student and public protests continued across the country over allegations of government corruption and the perceived lack of accountability and transparency, particularly in relation to the 2024 Novi Sad station canopy collapse. The incident and the aftermath have further deepened the polarisation of Serbian society.
Early parliamentary elections were held on 25 October 2026. According to preliminary results, the “Student List” which grew out of the mass students and citizens movement, obtained an absolute majority of mandates.
The EU-facilitated Dialogue on normalisation of relations between Kosovo and Serbia continued during the reporting period. Domestic political preoccupations on both sides hindered decisive steps towards implementing the 2023 Agreement on the Path to Normalisation and its implementation annex and thereby progressing on normalising their relations. Constructive engagement in the normalisation process is also a requirement under the Reform and Growth Facility for the Western Balkans. An EU-facilitated agreement on the
1 This report covers the period from 1 September 2025 to 1 September 2026. It is based on input from a variety of sources, including contributions from the government of Serbia, EU Member States, European Parliament reports and information from various international and non-governmental organisations. It also includes the results of comparative assessments and indices produced by other stakeholders, in particular in the area of rule of law.
The report uses the following assessment scale to describe the state of play: early stage, some level of preparation, moderately prepared, good level of preparation and well advanced. To describe progress made during the reporting period, it uses the following scale: backsliding, no progress, limited progress, some progress, good progress and very good progress. Where appropriate, interim steps have also been used.
* This designation is without prejudice to positions on status, and is line with UNSCR 1244/1999 and the ICJ Opinion on the Kosovo declaration of independence.
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Law on foreigners allowing workers and students in the Serbia-supported health and education services to apply for work and residence permits was agreed on 14 March 2026 within the short window between two elections.
Serbia has continued to engage in the Growth Plan for the Western Balkans. Under the Reform and Growth Facility, a performance-based EU instrument that supports the EU accession process, the country has submitted four payment requests.
The Commission’s 2026 rule of law report2 covered Serbia for the third time.
1.2. MAIN FINDINGS OF THE REPORT
CLUSTER 1: THE FUNDAMENTALS OF THE ACCESSION PROCESS
Democracy
Tangible improvements are needed in the way elections are conducted. It remains vital that outstanding recommendations by the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) / Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) and the Council of Europe bodies are fully implemented in a transparent and inclusive manner and well ahead of new elections. The adoption of six electoral laws in May, July, and August 2026 marked a step forward in this regard, however not all of ODIHR’s key recommendations were implemented. The full implementation of those laws as well as further reforms are needed, in particular to prevent misuse of office, misuse of state resources, intimidation and pressure on voters, and to ensure the safety of media professionals. Serbia also needs to ensure alignment with all relevant EU acquis in this area, including Regulation (EU) 2024/900 on the transparency and targeting of political advertising, and taking into account European and international standards.
Parliament’s effectiveness and oversight functions remain hampered by the low frequency of parliamentary sessions, the lack of genuine political debate, and the absence of an annual work plan for Parliament. Public scrutiny and involvement in the legislative process are limited while parliamentary debates continue to be marked by tensions between the ruling coalition and the opposition. Parliamentary rules of procedure and the Parliament’s code of conduct for punishing offences by parliamentarians need to be applied consistently.
As regards governance, Serbia’s political debate and decision-making continued to be de facto steered by the President in a manner not intended by the Constitution. Local government reform continues to advance slowly.
The institutions in charge of the EU integration process are in place. An operational team for EU accession was established in January 2026, replacing the previous coordination structure. A new chief negotiator was appointed in March 2026. The current deep societal polarisation and persistent anti-EU rhetoric run counter to the authorities’ stated objective of EU accession. The authorities are not yet managing to communicate more proactively and objectively about the EU and Serbia’s accession process.
Civil society, including human rights defenders, continued to operate in a restricted environment and have faced increasing pressure, smear campaigns and attacks, including from high-level officials. A police search of four civil society organisation (CSO) offices in February 2025 has so far resulted in no indictments and was widely perceived as an act of intimidation against civil society. There have been new reports of spyware attacks targeting human rights defenders, student activists and opposition politicians, and little judicial follow-
2 2026 Rule of Law Report (17 July 2026), SWD (2026) 929 final, Country Chapter on the rule of law
situation in Serbia
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up so far. Strategic lawsuits against public participation (SLAPPs) increasingly hindered the work of civil society actors. In this context, formal cooperation between CSOs and governmental working groups has not resumed, affecting the inclusiveness of the EU integration process.
Public administration reform
Serbia is moderately prepared in the area of public administration reform. However, there was backsliding during the reporting period. While reforms on public investment management are ongoing, this was overshadowed by amendments to the government rules of procedure which lowered the standards for public consultations, while government decrees exempted European integration-related draft regulations and public policy documents from mandatory impact assessments. The excessive number of senior civil servant positions occupied in an acting capacity further increased. In April 2026, the Director of the Public Policy Secretariat was dismissed, without sound justification.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were mostly not implemented and remain valid. In the coming year, Serbia should in particular:
→ reduce the excessive and increasing number of senior civil servant positions occupied in an acting capacity and allocate sufficient resources to ensure effective, transparent and merit-based recruitment processes;
→ strengthen the mechanism for systematically integrating opinions issued by the Public Policy Secretariat into draft laws and policy documents, in line with the Law on the planning system, and reconsider the exemption from impact assessments for European integration-related draft regulations and public policy documents;
→ continue public investment management reforms and put in place a unified, comprehensive and transparent system for capital investment planning and management, in line with the Reform Agenda.
Chapter 23: Judiciary and fundamental rights
Serbia has reached some level of preparation and has made no progress.
Functioning of the judiciary
Serbia is between having some and a moderate level of preparation in the area of judiciary. No progress took place during the reporting period. While in August 2026, Serbia adopted amendments to the Law on Judicial Academy, implementing the recommendations of the Venice Commission, undue political pressure on the judiciary and the prosecution increased significantly with little to no follow-up from the relevant institutions. Concerns about prosecutorial autonomy persist. Although a case management system has been finalised for the prosecutors’ offices, Serbia does not have a comprehensive court case management system. Moreover, while new judges have been appointed, overall, a considerable number of vacancies of judges and prosecutors remain to be filled, including the remaining pending appointments to the Constitutional Court. Serbia has yet to show genuine commitment to investigating and adjudicating war crimes cases, including by appointing a Chief Public Prosecutor for War Crimes.
In addition, in January 2026, the Parliament adopted legislative amendments on several laws governing the judiciary and prosecution by urgent procedure without a transparent and inclusive consultation process. According to an ex-post assessment in April 2026 by the Venice Commission this constituted the removal of some of the safeguards designed to protect prosecutorial autonomy and judicial independence introduced through constitutional amendments in 2023. In May and June 2026, Serbia adopted subsequent legislative amendments and took other non-legislative measures, which the Venice Commission assessed as addressing a considerable part of its recommendations. Additional prosecutors were also seconded to the Prosecutor’s Office for Organised Crime (POOC). Two Venice
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Commission recommendations remain partially implemented: the need for a structural reform to enhance the operational autonomy of the Special Department for Cybercrime and the need to carry out an analysis about the judicial and prosecutorial re-mapping.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were not implemented and remain valid. In the coming year, Serbia should in particular:
→ fully implement the two outstanding Venice Commission recommendations on amendments to the laws governing the judiciary and the prosecution and appoint judges and prosecutors in line with the legal framework, in particular to fill the remaining vacant positions in the Constitutional Court;
→ reduce political interference in the judiciary and prosecution services and ensure that the High Judicial Council and the High Prosecutorial Council, the government and Parliament defend judicial independence and prosecutorial autonomy effectively and proactively in cases of undue influence;
→ make the uniform and centralised case management systems operational; improve the efficiency of the justice system, in particular by reducing the backlogs and disposition times for the Administrative and Constitutional Courts and fully implement the human resources and ICT strategies.
Fight against corruption
Serbia is between having some and a moderate level of preparation in the fight against corruption. Overall, it has made limited progress. In its Second Compliance Report of 18 August 2026, GRECO reported that Serbia had satisfactorily addressed only three of 24 recommendations under its fifth evaluation round. Implementing some of the GRECO and/or ODIHR recommendations, Serbia amended the laws on lobbying, corruption prevention, and political financing. However, the latter two did not address all ODIHR recommendations. Implementation of these laws will need to be closely monitored to assess their effectiveness. Overall, corruption is prevalent in many areas and remains an issue of concern. The widespread public protests prompted by the canopy collapse at Novi Sad railway station in 2024 continued, with demonstrators expressing concerns about corruption as well as the perceived lack of accountability and transparency in public infrastructure and construction projects. The corruption investigations launched following the canopy collapse at the Novi Sad railway station have yet to be completed. In June 2026, Serbia adopted a new 2026- 2028 action plan for implementing the national anti-corruption strategy. Nevertheless, there is a need for stronger political will to tackle corruption effectively, establish a robust track record and put in place a strong criminal justice response, including action on high-level corruption. The role and mandate of the Prosecutor’s Office for Organised Crime (POOC) is insufficiently regulated. Operational obstacles as well as attempts to unduly influence the POOC increased further during the reporting period. A majority of the activities of the previous anti-corruption action plan 2024-2026 have not been achieved, with most of them carried over to the new action plan. Also the specific anti-corruption measures from the action plan related to the most vulnerable sectors are still to be implemented to tackle corruption more effectively.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were implemented only to a limited
extent and remain largely valid. In the coming year, Serbia should in particular:
→ improve its track record on investigations, prosecutions and final convictions in high-level corruption cases, in particular the seizure and confiscation of criminal assets and systematic use of parallel financial investigations; strengthen the mandate of the Prosecutor’s Office for Organised Crime to increase its effectiveness;
→ address all remaining GRECO recommendations, in particular from the fifth evaluation round; build a constructive relationship with the Anti-Corruption Council and systematically consult the Council on draft legislation;
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→ start and ensure timely implementation of the 2026-2028 action plan, including by establishing an effective monitoring, evaluation and coordination mechanism to track progress and impact focusing on all relevant interim benchmarks and GRECO recommendations.
Fundamental rights
Although Serbia’s institutional framework for upholding fundamental rights is broadly in place, the implementation of this framework needs to be improved as a matter of priority. Independent bodies have issued only little, or late, public reaction to human rights violations in the context of protests and other sensitive cases. While protests have been allowed to take place, the safety of participants has not always been guaranteed. Moreover, several violent incidents against demonstrators and journalists have been recorded. To date, only a few perpetrators have been prosecuted. As regards reports of excessive use of force by the police during protests, cases are ongoing although none of the police officers charged have been convicted so far. In relation to the European Court of Human Rights’ interim measure regarding the alleged use of a sonic weapon for crowd control at demonstrations in Belgrade in March 2025, the Belgrade Higher Public Prosecutor’s Office stated in September 2026 that no sound cannon or LRAD device had been used. The announcement that individuals would be prosecuted for engaging in public debate on the alleged use of sonic weapons has had a chilling effect on freedom of expression and open debate in a democratic society.
While new action plans have been adopted in the areas of anti-discrimination, Roma inclusion, de-institutionalisation and national minorities, other Commission recommendations from last year have not been implemented and remain valid. In the coming year, Serbia should in particular:
→ amend the legal framework related to freedom of assembly and ensure its enforcement in line with European standards and case law, including interim measures;
→ demonstrate progress in addressing the recommendations of the Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishments (CPT) and ensure effective investigations of cases of police ill-treatment;
→ allocate sufficient resources and effectively implement action plans in the area of fundamental rights, notably personal data protection, anti-discrimination including rights of LGBTIQ+ persons and of people with minority racial or ethnic background, gender equality, violence against women, violence against children, rights of persons with disabilities, victims of crime, Roma3 and other national minorities; actively counter hate offences and build up a track record of investigations and convictions.
Freedom of expression and media freedom
Serbia is between an early stage of preparation and having some level of preparation in the area of freedom of expression. There was further backsliding during the reporting period, with the environment for journalists, media professionals and outlets continuing to deteriorate, media legislation remaining inconsistently implemented, and the media market becoming more concentrated. Concerns also grew about political and economic influence over media’s editorial policy. Personnel changes in a media group following the announced change of ownership, and at the time of the electoral campaign, raise questions about pressure on the editorial independence of its media outlets. Cases of strategic lawsuits against public participation (SLAPP) persist, increasingly hindering the work of investigative media and CSOs. Since November 2024, there had been no Council of the Regulatory body
3 In line with the terminology of European institutions, the umbrella term ‘Roma’ is used here to refer to a number of different groups, without denying the particular features of these groups.
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for electronic media (REM). However, in July 2026, the process of electing a new REM Council was unblocked and the Council was established. The Council’s chair and vice-chair were elected in September 2026. The new Council was unable to reach a decision on expanding the list of media outlets to be subject to more comprehensive and systematic monitoring of the electoral campaign, nor to rule on complaints regarding violations of media regulation during the campaign. In its statement of preliminary findings, the international election observation mission (IEOM) found that “overall, the REM failed to provide effective oversight and timely remedies for election-related violations, which contributed to the advantage of incumbency and was at odds with international standards and good practice.” IEOM also found that “all monitored broadcasters failed to provide voters with the balanced and substantive information necessary to make an informed choice. The systematic imbalance in exposure and treatment undermined legally prescribed equal campaign opportunities.”
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were not implemented and remain valid. In the coming year, Serbia should in particular:
→ implement media legislation in a way that respects both its letter and spirit, including on the independence of the media regulator, and amend it, through a transparent and inclusive process, to align with the European Media Freedom Act and related European standards;
→ strengthen the protection and safety of journalists, notably by ensuring that: (i) high-level officials stop verbal attacks on journalists and civil society representatives involving intimidation, stigmatisation and de-legitimisation; and (ii) swiftly follow up any threats, cases of physical and verbal violence or spyware attacks and publicly condemn, investigate or prosecute any such cases, as appropriate;
→ ensure transparent and equitable co-funding for media content serving the public interest, and full transparency in media ownership and advertising.
Chapter 24: Justice, freedom and security
Serbia is between having some and a moderate level of preparation in the field of justice, freedom and security and has made limited progress in this area. Serbia continued to contribute to the management of mixed migration flows to the EU by playing an active and constructive role and by cooperating effectively with its neighbours, EU Member States and EU agencies. The Law on internal affairs remains to be amended to strengthen the operational autonomy of the police from the Ministry of the Interior during the pre- investigation and investigation phases. Serbia adopted a Law on weapons and ammunition, as well as a new strategy and action plan for the control of small arms and light weapons. There was no progress on visa alignment in 2025 and Serbia has visa-free arrangements with 12 countries on the EU’s list of non-EU countries whose nationals require a visa to enter the EU. Serbia’s granting of citizenship and, by extension, EU visa-free travel, to Russian nationals, continue to pose potential security risks to the EU.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were partially implemented and remain largely valid. In the coming year, Serbia should in particular:
→ amend the Law on internal affairs to make the police fully autonomous from the Ministry of the Interior and fully accountable only to the Prosecutor’s Office during pre- investigation and investigation phases;
→ further align with the EU’s visa policy and ensure rigorous screening of visa-free arrivals of third-country nationals, particularly from countries presenting security or irregular migration risks; apply rigorous security screening when granting Serbian citizenship to third-country nationals due to Serbian passport holders benefiting from visa free travel to the EU; in particular refrain from granting citizenship under accelerated or simplified procedures to nationals of countries that pose illegal migration or security risks to the EU
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; take measures to systematically register and identify migrants, develop swift asylum procedures and increase the capacity to manage effective return operations; ensure that legal pathways developed for third-country nationals to enter Serbia prevent secondary movements to the EU;
→ adopt new strategies and action plans to combat cybercrime and drugs and effectively implement the programme for the fight against trafficking in human beings in order to ensure support and protection for victims of trafficking, including by strengthening coordination between national and local-level institutions.
Fight against serious and organised crime
Serbia has some level of preparation and has made limited progress in the fight against serious and organised crime. Serbia notably adopted a new Law on preventing and combating trafficking in human beings and on protecting victims, in April 2026, as well as a Law on weapons and ammunition and amendments to the Criminal Code to effectively criminalise the trafficking of weapons, in July 2026. The authorities also continued to cooperate actively with the European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Training, Eurojust, Europol and Interpol, notably on drugs trafficking and the fight against organised crime groups. However, no steps were taken to phase out the role of the security services in investigations of serious and organised crime cases. Deterioration of cooperation between the Prosecutor’s Office for Organised Crime and the police and the large-scale personnel changes within the police hindered investigations. The Law on the organisation and jurisdiction of state authorities in the suppression of organised crime, terrorism and corruption has not yet been amended, and the draft operational plan for financial investigations and for the seizure and confiscation of proceeds of criminal offences, as well as the Law on seizure and confiscation of the proceeds of crime remain to be adopted. Serbia has also not finalised the signature of the Memorandum of Cooperation with the European Public Prosecutor’s Office and cooperation with Eurojust was disrupted by delays in renewing the secondment of a Serbian liaison prosecutor to Eurojust and in signing joint investigation team agreements.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were partially implemented and remain largely valid. In the coming year, Serbia should in particular:
→ further improve the efficiency of prosecuting serious and organised crime cases, including money laundering cases and the seizure and confiscation of criminal assets by the systematic tracking of money flows, effective use of financial investigations and special investigative measures, and systematic use of extended confiscation, while ensuring sufficient investigative and prosecutorial capacity and resources;
→ implement the amendments to the Criminal Code to effectively criminalise the trafficking of weapons, implement the new Law on weapons and ammunition, and step up the fight against the storage, sale and ownership of illegal firearms;
→ take specific steps to ensure a clear separation between mandates and regulations concerning criminal investigations carried out by law enforcement institutions and security measures executed by the Security Information Agency (BIA).
ECONOMIC CRITERIA
The existence of a functioning market economy
Serbia has a good level of preparation but has made limited progress in developing a functioning market economy. Economic growth slowed considerably in 2025 due to domestic political instability and global uncertainties affecting economic confidence, investment and exports, before rebounding in the first half of 2026. The current account deficit increased slightly in 2025 and was no longer covered by foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows, which
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halved compared to 2024. The 2025 budget deficit turned out lower than planned and monetary policy remained relatively tight, which helped inflation stay in the target band. The banking sector remained stable amid increased lending. Serbia continued to postpone the full application of certain fiscal rules and the reform of the public sector wage system faced further delays. Limited progress was made in improving budget transparency. State aid rules are not always applied to financial support for state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and large foreign investors. SOEs continue to have a disproportionately large influence on the economy. The business environment is burdened by excessive red tape, rule of law weaknesses, and public administration inefficiency and lack of transparency. The government interfered significantly in the retail market by introducing a margin cap for a wide variety of goods from 1 September 2025 until February 2026. While intended to benefit consumers by lowering inflation, the measure risked causing market distortions and harming the business environment.
Last year’s recommendations were addressed to some extent but remain mostly valid. To improve the functioning of the market economy, Serbia should in particular:
→ keep an appropriately tight policy stance to maintain price stability amid the global energy price shock, including by containing current spending;
→ move forward with reforming of the public sector wage system;
→ strengthen SOE governance to reduce the associated fiscal risks, notably in the energy sector.
The capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union
Serbia is between having a moderate and a good level of preparation and has made limited progress in coping with competitive pressure and market forces in the EU. The manufacturing and service sectors are well established, bolstered by close economic links with the EU. However, educational outcomes remain below the OECD average as highlighted in the 2025 Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA) and public funding for education and research is insufficient compared to the EU average. Infrastructure gaps are pronounced in certain areas, despite increased public investment. Digital transformation is progressing well. SMEs continue to encounter challenges, including an unfair competitive environment, when compared to large enterprises and foreign investors. Wage growth outperformed productivity growth, and the real exchange rate continued to appreciate, putting pressure on Serbia’s cost competitiveness.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year have been partially implemented. Over the coming year, Serbia should in particular:
→ improve educational outcomes and skills, including by increasing enrolment rates, modernising vocational education and training, improving private sector consultation, and stepping up lifelong learning;
→ harmonise public investment management, including by putting in place a single, comprehensive and transparent system for prioritising and selecting all public investments, regardless of the type and source of financing and in line with the best international standards;
→ further advance green transition reforms and connectivity and continue diversifying sources of energy imports.
Chapter 5: Public procurement
Serbia is moderately prepared in the area of public procurement. It made no progress in the reporting period.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were not implemented so remain valid. In the coming year, Serbia should in particular:
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→ further align its legislation with the 2014 EU directives on public procurement, in particular by amending the Law on public-private partnerships and concessions, and by ensuring that projects are subject to public procurement procedures;
→ ensure that procurement rules under intergovernmental agreements with third countries comply with the public procurement principles, in line with the EU acquis;
→ further strengthen the institutional capacity of the Public Procurement Office, the Commission for Public-Private Partnerships and Concessions, the Republic Commission for the Protection of Rights in Public Procedures and the Administrative Court.
Chapter 18 - Statistics
Serbia has a good level of preparation in the area of statistics. Good progress was made during the reporting period, with the adoption of the new Law on official statistics, and improvements in the compilation of macroeconomic statistics, in line with the European System of Accounts (ESA 2010).
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were largely implemented. In the coming year, Serbia should in particular:
→ continue to improve the compilation of macroeconomic statistics in line with the European System of Accounts (ESA 2010);
→ continue efforts to strengthen the administrative capacity of the Statistical Office of the Republic of Serbia (SORS) to produce statistics in accordance with the EU acquis and to meet other national needs.
Chapter 32: Financial control
Serbia is moderately prepared in the area of financial control. Limited progress was made in the reporting period, notably by keeping up the implementation of the managerial accountability roadmap and by directing efforts on improving the consistency of the Public Internal Financial Control (PIFC)’s legal basis with the general legal framework.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were partially implemented but remain largely valid. In the coming year, Serbia should in particular:
→ strengthen risk management and the reporting of irregularities, notably by expanding the use of risk registers;
→ continue implementing the managerial accountability roadmap swiftly and effectively, especially by improving the delegation of decision-making authority;
→ establish an effective internal audit function in all central budget institutions.
CLUSTER 2: INTERNAL MARKET
Chapter 1: Free movement of goods
Serbia is moderately prepared in the area of free movement of goods. Some progress was made during the reporting period with the adoption of revised strategic documents under this chapter, and the adoption of implementing legislation that aims to align with the latest EU acquis on machinery.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were partially implemented. In the coming year, Serbia should in particular:
→ continue implementing the revised strategic documents to ensure compliance with Articles 34-36 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) and all the EU acquis in this chapter;
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→ align with the latest EU acquis on market surveillance, machinery and accreditation.
Chapter 2 - Freedom of movement for workers
Serbia is moderately prepared in the area of freedom of movement for workers. Serbia made limited progress by continuing preparations to join the European Employment Services (EURES) upon accession.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were implemented to a limited extent so remain largely valid. In the coming year, Serbia should in particular:
→ continue to work on concluding additional agreements on social security coordination with EU Member States and develop the IT infrastructure for the European Health Insurance Card (EHIC) and Electronic Exchange of Social Security Information (EESSI), as well as administrative capacities in view of joining the future EESSI Network;
→ continue preparations to join EURES upon accession;
→ start preparations for aligning national legislation with the EU acquis on free movement of workers, including access for EU citizens to the labour market and equal treatment of EU workers.
Chapter 3: Right of establishment and freedom to provide services
Serbia is moderately prepared in these areas. Limited progress was made, notably with the adoption of implementing legislation regulating the Point of Single Contact, in line with the Law on services, and adoption of implementing legislation on net cost calculation and accounting separation applied by the universal service provider, in line with the Postal Services Directive.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were implemented to a limited extent so remain largely valid. In the coming year, Serbia should in particular:
→ further align its horizontal Law on services with the EU Services Directive, continue harmonising sectoral laws with the horizontal law and EU acquis, and operationalise the Point of Single Contact online portal by providing information to service providers, including on all relevant administrative procedures;
→ continue aligning with the EU acquis on postal services and make progress on gradual postal market opening;
→ continue aligning with the EU acquis on the mutual recognition of professional qualifications, including the directives on the recognition of professional qualifications and on a proportionality test.
Chapter 4: Free movement of capital
Serbia has between a moderate and a good level of preparation in the area of free movement of capital. Limited progress was made during the reporting period, following the assessment of Serbia’s anti-money laundering (AML) and countering financing terrorism (CFT) system in its latest Mutual Evaluation Report adopted by Moneyval in December 2025.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were partially implemented but remain largely valid. In the coming year, Serbia should in particular:
→ intensify efforts to further liberalise capital movements in line with the EU acquis and its obligations under the Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA), including by removing the remaining restrictions on capital movements and the acquisition of agricultural land by EU nationals and by adopting amendments to the Law on the elements of property law relations to ensure equal treatment on the acquisition of property rights;
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→ further align with the EU acquis on payments;
→ continue legislative alignment with the latest EU acquis and enhance effectiveness in monitoring, supervision, financial intelligence, investigation and reporting by building a track record in the field of AML/CFT.
Chapter 6: Company law
Serbia has a good level of preparation in company law. No progress was made during the reporting period.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were not implemented so remain valid. In the coming year, Serbia should in particular:
→ further align its legislation with the EU acquis on company law and corporate governance, particularly by finalising and adopting the Law on takeover bids;
→ align its legislation with the EU acquis on cross-border conversions, mergers and divisions and on the use of digital tools and processes in company law;
→ further align its legislation with the EU acquis on company reporting, transparency and statutory audit.
Chapter 7: Intellectual property law
Serbia has a good level of preparation in intellectual property rights (IPR). Limited progress was made in the reporting period, notably by the adoption of the Law on ratification of the Geneva Act of the Lisbon Agreement on appellations of origin and geographical indications.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were implemented to a limited extent so remain largely valid. In the coming year, Serbia should in particular:
→ align the copyright and related rights legislation with the EU directive on collective rights management, the EU directive on orphan works, and the EU directive on certain permitted uses of certain works and other subject matter protected by copyright and related rights for the benefit of persons who are blind, visually impaired, or otherwise print-disabled;
→ strengthen enforcement by improving capacities to handle IPR cases and improving coordination among different stakeholders.
Chapter 8: Competition policy
Serbia is moderately prepared in competition policy. In the reporting period, Serbia made some progress, notably with the adoption of a timebound action plan for the alignment of incompatible State aid schemes. Amendments to a number of State aid schemes, adopted in August 2026, aim at aligning with the EU acquis.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were partially implemented but remain largely valid. In the coming year, Serbia should in particular:
→ continue work on aligning the existing fiscal State aid schemes, where required, and on aligning the Law on multilateral interchange fees and special operating rules for card- based payment transactions with the EU acquis and with obligations under the Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA);
→ ensure that the notification and standstill obligations are systematically respected for all State aid measures and build a solid track record in implementing the laws on protection of competition and State aid control;
→ in line with the Reform Agenda, continue implementing the action plan to align all
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existing schemes identified as being incompatible with SAA obligations.
Chapter 9: Financial services
Serbia is moderately prepared in the area of financial services. Limited progress was made, notably by adopting amendments to the Law on alternative investment funds, intended to further align with the Alternative Investment Fund Managers Directive (AIFMD) and the European Long-term Investment Funds Regulation (ELTIF) and by bringing into operation the Bank Resolution Fund.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were partially implemented. In the coming year, Serbia should in particular:
→ continue to align the banking regulation with the latest versions of the Capital Requirements Regulation (CRR), Capital Requirements Directive (CRD) and the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD);
→ continue to align with the EU acquis on insurance, including the Solvency II Directive;
→ continue to align with the EU acquis on financial markets infrastructure and capital markets, including the Markets in Financial Instruments Regulation Directive and Regulation (MIFID II/MiFIR) and the Directive relating to undertakings for collective investment in transferable securities (UCITSD).
Chapter 28: Consumer and health protection
Serbia is moderately prepared in consumer and health protection. Limited progress was made in aligning with the EU acquis on consumer protection, by adopting the Law on consumer protection and the Law on trade.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were implemented to a limited extent and remain largely valid. In the coming year, Serbia should in particular:
→ continue to further align with the EU acquis on consumer protection and on general product safety;
→ further align its legislation with the EU acquis on substances of human origin, on patients’ rights in cross-border healthcare, on tobacco control, and on medicines for human use and on veterinary medicinal products;
→ amend the Law on health records and documentation to ensure full compliance with EU data protection requirements and with the EU acquis.
CLUSTER 3: COMPETITIVENESS AND INCLUSIVE GROWTH
Chapter 10: Digital transformation and media
Serbia is moderately prepared in the field of digital transformation and media. Some progress was made during the reporting period, notably through the conclusion of the 5G spectrum auction, further digitalisation of public services, the adoption of legislation aiming to further align with the NIS2 Directive, the Gigabit Infrastructure Act, and the Open Data Directive and continued investment in AI infrastructure. However, serious concerns remain regarding the media sector. The election of the new Council of the Regulatory Authority for Electronic Media (REM) was unblocked in July 2026, after Serbia had remained without a functioning Council since November 2024, while the media market further concentrated.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were partially implemented and remain largely valid. In the coming year, Serbia should, in particular:
→ fully align its electronic communications, digital trust and cybersecurity legislation with the EU regulatory framework, including the Gigabit Infrastructure Act, the European
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Digital Identity Framework (eIDAS 2.0), the NIS2 Directive, the Cyber Resilience Act and the EU AI Act;
→ ensure the full financial and operational independence of the Regulatory Authority for Electronic Communication and Postal Services (RATEL) in line with the EU acquis, including the European Electronic Communications Code;
→ fully implement the adopted media legislation, including with respect to the financial and functional independence of the Public Broadcasting Services and the Council of the Regulatory Authority for Electronic Media (REM), and further amend the media legislation to align with the European Media Freedom Act, through an inclusive and transparent process.
Chapter 16: Taxation
Serbia has between a moderate and a good level of preparation in the area of taxation. It made limited progress, in particular following the entry into force of excise duties on natural gas used as propellant, the creation of a register of non-tax levies and the procurement of a commercial off-the-shelf solution for the tax administration. A follow-up strategy to the Tax Administration transformation programme has yet to be adopted.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were partially implemented. In the coming year, Serbia should in particular:
→ adopt and implement a follow-up programme to the Tax Administration transformation programme, continue to implement the new integrated information system to support the tax administration’s new business model, and urgently hire additional staff;
→ further align its legislation with the EU acquis in the areas of VAT, excise duties, and direct taxation;
→ sign the Multilateral Competent Authority Agreement on the automatic exchange of financial account information and commit to a date when the first exchanges will take place.
Chapter 17: Economic and monetary policy
Serbia has between a moderate and a good level of preparation and made limited progress in economic and monetary policy. Serbia has started to expand fiscal risk reporting and work is ongoing on amending the legislation on the National Bank of Serbia and the budget system law.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were not implemented and remain valid. In the coming year, Serbia should in particular:
→ fully align the legislation on the National Bank of Serbia with the EU acquis to ensure its full independence
→ further align the Budget System Law with Directive 2011/85/EU.
Chapter 19 - Social policy and employment
Serbia is moderately prepared in the area of social policy and employment. Serbia made no progress during the reporting period.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were not implemented so remain valid. In the coming period, Serbia should in particular:
→ address the recommendations made in the previous functional reviews of the national employment service to ensure sufficient financial and institutional resources for employment and social policies, to systematically focus on supporting youth, women and the long-term unemployed, and start rolling out the Youth Guarantee nationwide;
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→ launch consultations on the new labour law, including rules on foreign seconded workers in line with the EU acquis, and a new law on strike, and avoid further delays in implementing the action plan for Chapter 19, including further alignment with the EU acquis in the area of non-discrimination and equality in employment and social policy;
→ adopt the increasingly delayed social protection strategy and amendments to the social welfare law to improve the coverage and adequacy of social benefits for people below the poverty threshold, including financial social assistance and child allowances, tackle the high caseload of social welfare centres, and address the recommendations made by the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI) on the decision-making process of the Social Card and its impact on Roma and other people at heightened risk of poverty, social exclusion or discrimination.
Chapter 20: Enterprise and industrial policy
Serbia is moderately prepared on enterprise and industrial policy. Limited progress was made during the reporting period, notably by adopting seven pieces of secondary legislation to implement the Law on the governance of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and by adopting – later than planned – the action plan 2026-2027 on the implementation of the industrial policy strategy.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were implemented to a limited extent so remain largely valid. In the coming year, Serbia should in particular:
→ further improve the predictability of the business environment, in particular by substantially increasing the proportion of legislative acts opened for public consultation;
→ in line with the Reform Agenda, adopt the remaining implementing legislation to ensure proper implementation of the SOE Law;
→ conduct a mid-term impact evaluation of the industrial strategy and further increase resources for financial and technical support to small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs).
Chapter 25: Science and research
Serbia has a good level of preparation in science and research. No progress was made during the reporting period. Although alignment was achieved with the European Research Infrastructure Consortium Regulation, this was overshadowed by negative developments regarding the autonomy of research institutes and universities, including through the Decrees restricting the amount of time the academic staff can spend on research, which remained into force for most of the reporting period, changes in the management of research institutes, and irregularities regarding national funding of research and innovation schemes. These developments negatively affected the stability of the research and innovation ecosystems.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were implemented to a limited extent so remain largely valid. In the coming year, Serbia should in particular:
→ ensure the autonomy of research institutes and universities and guarantee respect for academic freedom and freedom of scientific research, in line with the principles of the European Research Area (ERA);
→ increase and guarantee the predictability of national funding schemes for research and innovation and ensure the autonomy of national science and innovation schemes and support mechanisms;
→ actively participate in the ERA Policy Agenda 2025-2027 and commit to ERA priorities
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and actions.
Chapter 26: Education and culture
Serbia has between a moderate and a good level of preparation in education and culture. There was backsliding during the reporting period. While the policy and institutional framework remains in place and work continued in some areas, in particular on quality assurance in higher education, the governance of the sector further deteriorated, which adversely affected the delivery of quality education and the functioning of educational institutions. This included dismissals of staff, cases of disciplinary action and legal proceedings against teaching staff across all levels of education, as well as cases of restructuring educational institutions without inclusive consultations. International cooperation was also impacted, resulting in delays in the implementation of EU programmes. These measures extended to other levels of education and to the cultural sector, where dismissals, postponements or withdrawals of funding and concerns over the transparency of public grants affected freedom of artistic expression and the independence of cultural institutions. Taken together, this marked a further deterioration in respect for the fundamental academic values of the European Higher Education Area (EHEA) – academic freedom, institutional autonomy and the participation of students and staff in governance.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were implemented to a limited extent
and remain valid. In the coming year, Serbia should in particular:
→ ensure respect for fundamental academic values, such as academicfreedom and institutional autonomy, in line with the principles of the EHEA; in particular address concerns related to undue interference in the governance of the education sector and pressure on the education community, such as dismissals without sound justification, legal proceedings against teaching staff and measures that could impact the financial autonomy of education institutions;
→ increase the number of children enrolled in early childhood education and care, and ensure inclusion in particular of children from disadvantaged backgrounds;
→ ensure respect for freedom of artistic expression, and sufficient and transparent funding for cultural organisations on the basis of predictable and non-discriminatory criteria.
Chapter 29: Customs union
Serbia has a good level of preparation in the area of the customs union. It made some progress, in particular by upgrading its national component of the New Computerised Transit System (NCTS) to Phase 6 and adopting amendments to existing implementing legislation with the aim of further aligning with the EU acquis, as well as further bringing into operation its new risk analysis IT system RMSa.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were partially implemented but remain largely valid. In the coming year, Serbia should in particular:
→ further upgrade the customs processing system by integrating risk management in all customs procedures;
→ further develop the national customs IT system to enable interconnection and interoperability with the EU electronic customs environment;
→ continue work in aligning legislation, with respect to the revised Union Customs Code.
CLUSTER 4: THE GREEN AGENDA AND SUSTAINABLE CONNECTIVITY
Chapter 14: Transport policy
Serbia has a good level of preparation in this field. Limited progress was made in the
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reporting period, in particular by simplifying border crossing procedures with electronic data exchange, and by adopting road and rail sector legislation. In March 2026, Serbia’s Civil Aviation Directorate introduced regulatory changes which, once enforced, will negatively affect the traffic rights for EU carriers flying to and from Serbia.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were partially implemented. In the coming year, Serbia should in particular:
→ adopt the National Transport Strategy in line with the requirements of the new Trans- European Transport Network (TEN-T) Regulation; continue to systemically improve the maintenance system for road and rail infrastructure; continue to ensure implementation of the EU-Western Balkans Green Lanes; and continue to implement the measures in the action plan for the national road safety strategy;
→ ensure that procurement procedures for transport infrastructure projects follow the principles of transparency, equal treatment and open competition; strengthen the legal, technical, administrative and institutional frameworks for preparing, implementing and operating transport infrastructure investment projects, including engaging fully independent supervision services in a timely manner;
→ on aviation ensure that any regulatory change regarding the traffic rights for EU carriers operating at Serbian airports is in line with the European Common Aviation Area (ECAA) agreement; on rail reform, continue aligning legislation with the fourth railway package and adopt the new Law on railways; address bottlenecks hindering the efficiency and quality of railway services.
Chapter 15: Energy
Serbia is moderately prepared in the area of energy. Some progress was made during the reporting period, including the full unbundling and final certification of Transportgas Srbija as Serbia’s national gas Transmission System Operator, the establishment of the company Gas Infrastruktura Novi Sad as the new independent owner of Serbia’s gas network,and progress in the transposition of the Electricity Integration Package.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were partially implemented. In the coming year, Serbia should, in particular:
→ Fully transpose the Electricity Integration Package, notably by implementing the recommendations from the verification process, and begin implementation, including determining net transmission capacities and allocating capacity on all cross-border interconnections, including on the bidding zone border between the Transmission System Operators (TSOs) EMS and KOSTT;
→ ensure effective, non-discriminatory and transparent third-party access to the entire gas network of the country, and certify the Banatski Dvor underground gas storage facility in accordance with the Gas Storage Regulation;
→ finalise and adopt the implementing legislation on the energy performance of buildings and establish a sustainable Just Transition funding mechanism to support the efficient implementation of the Just Transition Plan.
Chapter 21: Trans-European networks
Serbia has between a moderate and a good level of preparation in the area of trans- European networks (TEN). Limited progress was made, notably by advancing the Trans- Balkan electricity corridor and by further developing railway infrastructure.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were only partially implemented but remain largely valid. In the coming year, Serbia should in particular:
→ Finalise the procurement process and sign contracts for works and supervision for
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Section 3 of Rail Corridor X in a transparent and competitive process; prepare tender documents for Sections 1 and 2; accelerate the implementation of the Niš-Dimitrovgrad railway line, including the Niš railway bypass; complete and put the Niš-Brestovac railway section into operation;
→ transpose the revised TEN-E Regulation;
→ continue project preparations for section IV of the Trans-Balkan Electricity Corridor between Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Montenegro; continue project preparations for the Projects of Mutual Interest with EU Member States.
Chapter 27 - Environment and climate change
Serbia is between having some and a moderate level of preparation in the area of environment and climate change. Some progress was made by adopting the Environmental Protection Strategy, the adoption of the Law on Integrated Pollution Prevention and Control, two laws establishing a carbon tax for major industrial emitters and a border levy on carbon- intensive imported goods. Progress was also made by adopting implementing legislation, in particular in the area of horizontal legislation, air, chemicals, climate taxation, and by completing the first monitoring, reporting, verification and accreditation (MRVA) cycle for stationary installations.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were partially implemented but remain mostly valid. In the coming year, Serbia should in particular:
→ continue implementing measures set out in (i) the action plan for administrative capacity development, (ii) the low-carbon development strategy, (iii) the National Energy and Climate Plan; (iv) the programme on air protection; and implement the extended producer responsibility (EPR) system for specific waste streams, in accordance with the polluter pays principle;
→ adopt legislation in line with the Environmental Crime Directive and the Environmental Liability Directive; amend the law on climate change and expand alignment with, and implementation of, the EU acquis on monitoring, reporting, verification and accreditation (MRVA) to the full scope of the EU Emissions Trading System (ETS); adopt new legislation on nature protection, water and drinking water, further aligning with the EU acquis;
→ improve the policy dialogue with civil society organisations and ensure transparent and meaningful public participation; ensure that infrastructure investments comply with the EU environmental and climate acquis and with national and international nature and water obligations.
CLUSTER 5: RESOURCES, AGRICULTURE AND COHESION
Chapter 11: Agriculture and rural development
Serbia has some level of preparation in agriculture and rural development. Limited progress was made towards alignment with the EU acquis, notably by adopting laws on organic production and unfair trading practices.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were implemented to a limited extent so remain largely valid. In the coming year, Serbia should in particular:
→ take measures to accelerate the implementation of IPARD III and avoid further losses of EU funds, notably by increasing capacity building, ensuring more efficient contracting and project implementation, and proposing new measures for entrustment as soon as possible;
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→ speed up the implementation of the action plan to align with the EU acquis in agriculture and rural development, and adopt legislation relevant to agricultural markets, quality policy as well as wine and spirit drinks;
→ Establish the land parcel identification system (LPIS) on the entire territory of Serbia.
Chapter 12 - Food safety, veterinary and phytosanitary policy
Serbia is moderately prepared in the area of food safety, veterinary and phytosanitary policy. Limited progress was made during the reporting period, with the adoption of two framework laws, namely the Law on official controls, which is only partially aligned with the EU acquis and the Law on seeds and planting material of agricultural and ornamental plants, which aims to further align with the EU acquis.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were implemented to a limited extent and remain largely valid. In the coming year, Serbia should in particular:
→ continue adopting framework legislation on food safety, animal health, animal welfare, plant health and genetically modified organisms, aligned with the EU acquis; strengthen administrative capacity to ensure correct implementation;
→ adopt and start implementing the national plan to align legislation with EU quality standards for raw milk;
→ upgrade establishments producing food, feed and animal by-products to meet EU structural standards.
Chapter 13 - Fisheries and aquaculture
Serbia is moderately prepared in the area of fisheries and aquaculture. Limited progress was made during the reporting period with the adoption of the Laws on organic production and official controls, which aim to further align with the EU acquis as part of the action plan under this chapter.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were implemented to a limited extent and remain largely valid:
→ continue and speed up implementation of the action plan for alignment with the EU acquis, in particular on the organisation of markets, aquaculture, data collection, control measures and illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing;
→ address the severe capacity issues of the authorities responsible for developing policy and anti-fraud controls for fisheries (including border controls).
Chapter 22 - Regional policy and coordination of structural instruments
Serbia is moderately prepared in the area of regional policy and the coordination of structural instruments. It made some progress, notably by adopting the Law on cohesion policy.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were only partially implemented but remain largely valid. In the coming year, Serbia should in particular:
→ put in place a national plan to promote regional development, address regional disparities, and build a resilient ecosystem involving all levels of government and relevant non-state bodies, in line with the partnership principle;
→ move forward with public administration reforms in a coordinated manner, implementing effectively the local-self-government component through the necessary financial and fiscal decentralisation;
→ address administrative capacity as a matter of urgency, strengthen capacity monitoring
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for the Reform and Growth Facility, and further strengthen the financial management and control systems for EU funds.
Chapter 33: Financial and budgetary provisions
Serbia has some level of preparation in the area of financial and budgetary provisions. Limited progress was made over the reporting period, notably by drafting an action plan for meeting specific administrative conditions.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were partially implemented but remain largely valid. In the coming year, Serbia should in particular:
→ further develop organisational and procedural links between the institutions involved in the own resources system;
→ continue preparations to meet the specific administrative conditions for own resources, as laid down in the EU own resources regulations, including by finalising and adopting an action plan with a timeline to meet the administrative conditions.
CLUSTER 6: EXTERNAL RELATIONS
Chapter 30: External relations
Serbia is moderately prepared in the area of external relations. There was backsliding as Serbia temporarily introduced new trade restrictions that were not in line with the Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA), disengaged from regional cooperation activities, blocking progress on Common Regional Market for the entire region, and continued its ongoing import license regime, which appears inconsistent with the SAA.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were not fully implemented so remain largely valid. In the coming year, Serbia should in particular:
→ lift any existing trade restrictions and refrain from adopting new ones;
→ adopt a WTO-compliant law on genetically modified organisms to move forward in the remaining negotiations on bilateral market access and finalise its accession to the WTO
→ implement the actions set out in the new common regional market action plan for 2025- 2028 and all decisions adopted in the context of the Central European Free Trade Agreement (CEFTA) and avoid hindering the adoption of decisions and recommendations and delaying further progress on regional economic integration.
Chapter 31 - Foreign, security and defence policy
Serbia is moderately prepared in the field of foreign, security and defence policy.Overall, it made no progress over the reporting period, aligning only partially with the common foreign and security policy (CFSP). Serbia continued to resort to retroactive alignment. Serbia retroactively aligned with some Council decisions related to Russian individuals, Iran, and some EU Statements on Ukraine, which represents a positive change in terms of patterns of alignment. Nevertheless, some of Serbia’s actions and statements went against key EU positions, especially on Russia and China. It is currently not aligning with the EU’s restrictive measures against Russia, Belarus and Iran taken in the context of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine. Combined with recurrent anti-EU narratives, this raised questions about Serbia’s strategic orientation.
High-level and frequent bilateral contacts with Russia continued, including in the context of Serbia’s continued dependence on Russian energy. Notwithstanding the fact that Serbia has not yet aligned with EU sanctions against Russia related to its war of aggression against Ukraine, Serbia is cooperating with the EU on countering sanctions circumvention and has provided substantial support to and intensified its cooperation with Ukraine, including
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through high-level exchanges. Serbia continues to contribute substantially to EU crisis management missions and operations under the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP).
During the reporting period, Serbia deepened its comprehensive strategic partnership with China. The procurement of supersonic air-to-surface precision strike missiles from China, which are mounted to Russian-produced fighter jets, deepened Serbia’s strategic dependencies further and in a manner inconsistent with its commitment to the EU path.
The recommendations issued in 2025 were not implemented and remain valid. In the coming year, Serbia should in particular:
→ improve, as a matter of priority, its alignment with the EU common foreign and security policy (CFSP), including restrictive measures, and avoid actions and statements that go against EU positions;
→ make credible efforts to close the space for foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI), including disinformation, and take action to build societal resilience against it and other forms of hybrid threats. In particular, it should prevent Serbian territory and/or citizens being used by third countries to conduct hybrid operations, and ensure effective judicial follow-up;
→ continue to take action to prevent any attempt to use the territory of Serbia or legal bodies registered in Serbia to circumvent EU restrictive measures, including through the acquisition of visa-free travel rights to the EU for nationals of Russia by granting them Serbian citizenship.
1.3. STATE OF PLAY OF THE ACCESSION NEGOTIATIONS
Clusters Chapters/areas State of play
1. Fundamentals All chapters open
23 – Judiciary and fundamental rights
Opened July 2016
24 – Justice, freedom and security Opened July 2016
5 – Public procurement Opened December 2016
18 – Statistics Opened December 2018
32 – Financial control Opened December 2015
…Economic criteria …Functioning of democratic institutions …Public administration reform
2. Internal market 4 chapters open
1 – Free movement of goods Serbia working on fulfilment of opening benchmarks
2 – Freedom of movement for workers
Draft EU Common Position in Council
3 – Right of establishment and freedom to establish services
Draft EU Common Position in Council
4 – Free movement of capital Opened December 2019
6 – Company law Opened December 2017
7 – Intellectual property rights Opened June 2017
8 – Competition Serbia working on fulfilment of opening benchmarks
9 – Financial services Opened June 2019
28 – Consumer and health protection
Draft EU Common Position in Council
3.Competitiveness and inclusive growth
10 – Digital transformation and media
Draft EU Common Position in Council
23
5 chapters open
16 – Taxation Draft EU Common Position in Council
17 – Economic and monetary policy Opened December 2018
19 – Social policy and employment Draft EU Common Position in Council
20 – Enterprise and industrial policy Opened February 2017
25 – Science and research
Opened December 2016 and provisionally closed
26 – Education and culture
Opened February 2017 and provisionally closed
29 – Customs union Opened June 2017
4. Green agenda and sustainable connectivity All chapters open
14 – Transport policy 15 – Energy 21 – Trans-European networks 27 – Environment and climate Change
Opened December 2021 Opened December 2021 Opened December 2021 Opened December 2021
5. Resources, agriculture and cohesion 2 chapters open
11 – Agriculture and rural development
Opening Benchmarks Assessment Report in Council
12 – Food safety, veterinary and phytosanitary policy
Serbia working on fulfilment of opening benchmarks
13 – Fisheries and aquaculture Opened June 2018
22 – Regional policy and coordination of structural instruments
Opening Benchmarks Assessment Report in Council
33 – Financial and budgetary provisions
Opened June 2018
6. External relations 1 chapter open
30 – External relations 31 – Foreign, security and defence policy
Opened December 2017 Screening report in Council
Not part of a cluster:
Chapter 34 – Institutions, currently not applicable for Serbia
Chapter 35 – Other issues (including ‘normalisation of relations between Serbia and Kosovo’) opened in December 2015
* * *
2. CLUSTER 1: THE FUNDAMENTALS OF THE ACCESSION PROCESS
2.1. FUNCTIONING OF DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS AND PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION
2.1.1. Democracy
Sustained political polarisation at both national and local level continues to pose a challenge to the functioning of democratic institutions. Less frequent mass student and citizen protests continued across the country during the reporting period. There were cases of violent incidents and attacks against students, activists and peaceful protesters, with institutions such as the police failing to take follow-up action in most cases. There were also some violent incidents against pro-government gatherings. The police entered the Rectorate of the University of Novi Sad in September 2025 and remained on site for several weeks. In March 2026 following the death of a student, the police raided the premises of Belgrade University, including its Rectorate. In March 2026, on the day of partial local elections, the main office of an opposition party in Belgrade was raided. In several cases where activists, media workers and domestic election observers were attacked, the police were present but, according to local NGO observers, failed to react. There have been very few public reports of measures being taken against officers allegedly involved in cases of excessive use of force by the police. State officials continue to frame protests as being part of a foreign backed ‘colour revolution’, allegedly aimed at overthrowing the constitutional order of Serbia, without substantiating evidence. The announced interrogation and prosecution of individuals engaging in public debate on the alleged use of sonic weapons at the 15 March 2025
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protest, despite an interim measure issued by the European Court of Human Rights in April 2025 in this respect, has had a chilling effect on freedom of expression and open debate.
Elections
The general framework regarding elections still requires further comprehensive reform and more efforts are needed to ensure alignment with all relevant EU acquis in this area, including Regulation (EU) 2024/900 on the transparency and targeting of political advertising, taking into account European and international democratic standards.
Several laws aiming to implement some of OSCE/ODIHR’s recommendations were adopted throughout the reporting period. Following an amendment to the Law on the unified voter register which was adopted in November 2025, a Commission for auditing the voter register was set up in February 2026. This Commission includes representatives of the ruling majority, parliamentary opposition and CSOs. The audit of the voters’ register is still ongoing and was not fully performed before the October parliamentary elections. In addition, Serbia has taken forward work on the electoral framework. The Law on the election of the President, the Law on the election of members of parliament, the Law on local elections and the Law on the Constitutional Court were amended in May 2026 to implement OSCE/ODIHR
recommendations, in particular those on mandatory training for members of the election administration, the deadline for the Constitutional Court to act in election-related disputes, and criteria for lists representing national minorities. Amendments to the Law on financing of political activities and to the Law on the fight against corruption were adopted in July and August 2026 respectively. Despite progress, several priority
OSCE/ODIHR recommendations remain to be implemented, including on the separation of state and political parties, inclusive and comprehensive electoral reform, the completion of a meaningful audit of the voter register, greater oversight of election campaigns and their financing, measures to enable media freedom and independence especially in the context of electoral campaigns, and measures to prevent voter intimidation.
On 7 September 2026, upon proposal of the government, the President of Serbia dissolved the Parliament and called for early parliamentary elections which were held on 25 October 2026. The President resigned as president on 27 September. The former President Vučić then ran as the first candidate on the list of the ruling SNS party and for the post of Prime Minister. The elections were observed by an international election observation mission (IEOM), which included a full-scale OSCE/ODIHR Election Observation Mission deployed in September, the European Parliament, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe and the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly. As per its preliminary findings and conclusions, “the 25 October early parliamentary elections saw active citizen engagement with high voter turnout and vigorous competition between two main contenders, but unfolded in an atmosphere of profound polarization, with the equality of campaign opportunities seriously compromised.” The management of the election preparations was deemed as “overall efficient” and the assessment of all stages of the election day process in the vast majority of polling stations as “positive”. However, according to IEOM elements, such as entrenched advantages enjoyed by the ruling party, including misuse of state resources, “pronounced bias in monitored media coverage in favour of the incumbent party, intimidation and pressure on voters, candidates, and civil society, as well as disruptions of campaign activities marred the electoral environment. Reported incidents of physical violence also raised serious concerns and some procedural shortcomings were noted.” Widespread mistrust in the integrity of the voter register persisted.
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Regular local elections in several municipalities also took place in November 2025 and March 2026. They were marked by irregularities, an uneven playing field, reports of violence, attacks on observers, journalists and representatives of political parties, and a failure by police to act. Pressure on female activists, including gender-based digital violence, increased in the run-up to local elections in some municipalities in March 2026. The CoE Congress of regional and local authorities’ observers of the March elections noted that while procedures inside polling stations were largely in line with legal provisions, acts of violence and the threatening presence of unidentified and sometimes masked groups were witnessed across municipalities. They also noted a deterioration in the campaigning environment, allegations of pressure on voters, misuse of public resources and an increased blurring of the line between the State, local authorities and the ruling party. The Constitutional Court has still not issued a decision on the opposition motions challenging the December 2023 early parliamentary and local elections.
Despite the introduction of measures to achieve a more balanced representation, including a gender quota of 40% for electoral lists, women remain underrepresented in political life. The largest disparities remain at local level.
Parliament
Parliament’s effectiveness, autonomy and transparency still need to be strengthened. The effective exercise of parliamentary powers is constrained by parliamentary sessions often being called as late as legally possible, the absence of an annual work plan, and an agenda almost entirely driven by the government and the ruling party. The 2026 regular spring sitting started with a 45-day delay. Plenary and committee sessions continued to be marked by tensions and offensive behaviour, including from some ministers. Furthermore, the Code of Conduct was not applied consistently, with fines being mostly imposed on opposition MPs. At times, the Speaker has engaged in direct exchanges with the opposition and failed to provide impartial rulings in line with the procedural rules of the parliament.
Most laws adopted by Parliament originated from the government. Still, a number of problematic judicial laws was adopted on the motion of one ruling MP without prior public consultation or consultation of the European Commission. Furthermore, some important electoral laws were tabled by a ruling party MP, which had an impact on the transparency and inclusiveness of the legislative process. The practice of calling sessions at short notice and of amalgamating unrelated agenda items continued. The State budget was debated alongside 57 other items in December 2025 while the pre-election budget revision was considered alongside 58 separate items in August 2026. A no-confidence motion from February 2026 was placed on the agenda in July 2026, despite rules stipulating that it should have been debated at the next parliamentary session after it was tabled. Only one session for MP questions to the government was held in the course of 2026, despite clear rules for such sessions to be regularly held. The use of urgent procedure increased to 18% between September 2025 and September 2026.
EU integration
In January 2026, Serbia established an operational team for EU accession, replacing the previous broader coordination structures. In March 2026, the Head of Mission of the Republic of Serbia to the EU was appointed as chief negotiator and head of the operational team. While this served to consolidate the operational leadership, it blurred the division of responsibilities between the Minister for European Integration and the chief negotiator.
Under the new set up, technical work on legislative alignment and on planning accelerated although it is yet to be matched by genuine political commitment to meet all criteria for EU membership. The national programme for the adoption of the EU acquis (NPAA), last amended in August 2025, remains the central planning instrument, supported by quarterly and annual monitoring reports. However, implementation challenges persist and recent monitoring cycles show only a partial fulfilment of planned legislative measures. The new
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operational team has developed its own parallel planning for meeting the outstanding opening and interim benchmarks and for prioritising the legislative agenda.
The bodies set up by Serbia to support EU accession negotiations also oversee the implementation of the Reform and Growth Facility, with the Minister for European Integration assuming the role of the national coordinator of the Reform and Growth Facility (RGF).
The Ministry of European Integration still is the formal focal point for consultations and engagement with civil society, the business community, local self-government and other stakeholders. However, the practical allocation of responsibilities has yet to be clarified following the establishment of the operational team. The National Convention on the EU (NCEU), an umbrella platform engaging CSOs in the accession process, continues to act as a public watchdog for the accession negotiations.
However, since the NCEU decided to suspend its participation in processes involving cooperation with political decision-makers in February 2025, engagement with civil society has been limited and inconsistent. While cooperation continues at a technical level, notably within the negotiation groups and in relation to the RGF Monitoring Committee and biannual trilateral RGF policy dialogue meetings, civil society continues to report a deteriorating environment, insufficient transparency and access to information, and limited influence on decision-making, with consultations perceived as procedural rather than meaningful.
As the Serbian government continues to declare EU membership a strategic goal, the national authorities must prioritise unambiguous, proactive communication about EU accession and implement EU-related reforms consistently and effectively.
Governance
Concerns persist that political debate and decision-making are de facto steered by the President in a way not intended under the Constitution. Following previous pardons granted in 2025, the announcement of the President in September 2026 of new pardons granted to 49 individuals raised further concerns in terms of lack of transparency and whether the applicable legal procedure was correctly followed. There were no changes in the composition of the government during the reporting period. In July 2026 the Parliament debated on and voted down a motion of no confidence that had been tabled by the opposition in February 2026.
Legal requirements for public debate were scaled back by way of an amendment to the government’s rules of procedure in November 2025, while adequate conditions for genuine public participation were not always ensured. Some members of the government made inflammatory, insulting and potentially threatening statements against students and the student protest movement. Independent bodies must be allowed to act entirely without outside influence, and their recommendations must be followed up more thoroughly.
The Prosecutor for Organised Crime initiated a criminal case against the Minister for Culture on the grounds of ‘irregularities during the process of removing cultural heritage status from the army's general staff building. The case is ongoing; the Minister did not invoke immunity from proceedings as a member of government.
In the area of local self-government, the Law on financing the autonomous province of Vojvodina has still not been adopted despite a constitutional requirement to do so. Local administrative capacity is limited, with significant disparities between municipalities. The programme to reform the local government system (2021-2025) was implemented to a moderate extent. The Commission for Financing Local Self-Governments has not met since 2022, in breach of its legal obligations.
Civil society
Civil society, including human rights defenders, has been subject to increased pressure and attacks, including from high-level officials, further impacting what already was a restricted
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civic space. Smear campaigns have been orchestrated by the tabloids and government- organised non-governmental organisations (GONGOs). The police search of four CSO offices in February 2025 has resulted in no indictments so far and was widely perceived as an act of intimidation against civil society. CSOs have not been informed of the outcome of a request made in January 2025 by the Administration for the Prevention of Money Laundering for the confidential bank data of five CSO employees. There have been new reports of spyware attacks targeting human rights defenders, student activists and opposition politicians, but little judicial follow-up so far. Strategic lawsuits against public participation (SLAPPs) persist, increasingly hindering the work of civil society actors. In this overall context of civil society environment, formal cooperation with the authorities has not resumed, except for their participation as members of the RGF Monitoring Committee in a tripartite format with the European Commission. There was no notable progress in the implementation of Serbia’s strategy and action plan for civil society. There have been no specific improvements in the transparency and fairness of public funding for CSOs. According to public data collected by investigative journalists, some public funds have been allocated to ghost organisations or GONGOs. For example, a case filed by CSOs back in 2023 on alleged corruption in public calls implemented by the Ministry of Demography and Family Care is still in the pre-investigative stage.
Civilian oversight of the security and intelligence sector
The Parliamentary Committee for the Oversight of Security Services remains responsible for civilian oversight of the security sector. The Committee reviews periodic activity reports by the civilian and military security agencies and by the Inspector-General of the Ministry of Defence. There have been reports that the civilian security agency (BIA) summoned students, activists and prosecutors for informative talks. The Law on access to state security files is still to be adopted.
2.1.2. Public administration reform
Strategic framework for public administration reform (PAR)
A comprehensive PAR strategy (2021-2030) is in place, however implementation remains inconsistent and needs to be improved. The new PAR action plan 2026-2030 was adopted in September 2026. Underlying reform programmes for 2026-2030 have not yet been adopted, with the exception of the Public Finance Management Reform Programme, which was adopted in May 2026. The 2025 PAR implementation report shows slow progress overall with 49% of measures and 51% of activities implemented. Monitoring reports are still being adopted too late to provide timely information to decision makers. PAR coordination mechanisms at political and administrative levels are formally in place, but their impact is limited due to the lack of clear ownership and political commitment. Financial sustainability remains an issue of concern due to reliance on donor funding.
Policy development and coordination
The regulatory framework for policy development and coordination has been weakened by the fact that quality assurance checks were further reduced, undermining evidence-based policymaking. In March 2026, implementing legislation was amended, exempting all European integration-related draft regulations and public policy documents from mandatory impact assessments – which is against EU standards on better regulation – and from the opinion of the Public Policy Secretariat. The streamlining of sectoral strategic frameworks remains slow, with only six out of 23 sectors optimised so far. The national development plan, due for adoption in 2020, is still not in place. The adoption rate of mid-term plans remains low (65% for the period 2026 – 2028 – as of September 2026), continuing to lag far behind the 2020 deadline set for central level institutions. Government decision-making transparency remains limited, with no publication of meeting agenda or minutes, only press releases providing partial information. Moreover, the strategic framework does not envisage any improvements. The share of published annual reports on the implementation of sectoral
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planning documents is still limited (around 60%, despite this being a legislative requirement).
The legal framework for public consultations has deteriorated. In November 2025, the government adopted amendments to its rules of procedure, lowering the standards applicable to public debate by introducing several exemptions which are not in line with primary legislation. Public consultations were carried out in 2025 on 51% of draft laws (down from 58% in 2024) and on 30% of draft regulations, with no systematic follow-up. There is still no central body in charge of oversight and quality control of public consultations. Use of the e-consultations platform, although mandatory, is insufficient. Only 32% of public consultations on legislation adopted by the government were performed using the platform while no more than 15% had their mandatory reports published on the platform (see civil society under 2.1.1 Democracy).
Public financial management
Public financial management (PFM) is broadly in place but needs to be improved. As per the strategic framework, 72.7% of the activities of the 2021-2025 PFM reform programme were completed. The new PFM reform programme 2026-2030, adopted by the government in May 2026, is less dependent on donor funding but continues to lack ambition, notably with regard to budget planning, execution and public investment management. Despite a well-defined methodological framework, the link between strategic priorities and budget programmes remains inconsistent. Programme budgeting needs to be better integrated and implemented, in particular for central government. Gender-responsive budgeting and the green tagging methodology are continuing to find greater application.
A new public expenditure and financial accountability assessment (PEFA) and a Fiscal Transparency Evaluation were conducted in 2025. The latter assessed Serbia as advanced in fiscal reporting, forecasting and budgeting, while weaknesses were recorded in fiscal risk management. Macroeconomic and fiscal forecasting remain adequate. On budget management, budget revenue and expenditure are realistically forecast. Fiscal risks monitoring continues to improve, with risks identified in the medium-term fiscal strategy. However, the Ministry of Finance still does not publish a stand-alone and comprehensive fiscal risk statement. With full implementation of the general fiscal rules having been postponed, fiscal policy credibility may be undermined. The relatively large contingency budgetary reserve lacks sufficient accountability, as it continues to be used without a clear purpose and transparent reporting.
The financial autonomy of local self-government units remains highly dependent on intergovernmental transfers and has been affected by a decrease in the share of non- earmarked transfers and the lack of a standardised methodology for assessing their financial needs.
While the country has yet to develop a genuine single pipeline for capital investment management, reforms of public investment management are ongoing. Existing exemptions are being addressed with the gradual inclusion of projects of special importance in the standard procedure. However, public-private partnerships continue to be managed separately without transparent data on their total costs and obligations. While a Serbia 2030 strategy has been announced, there is no public development plan and no investment plan.
Limited progress was made in improving budget transparency.Both the 2025 and 2026 budgets were adopted in line with the budget calendar, but the qualitative assessment and debate among stakeholders should be substantially improved.A public hearing on the draft budget law was held a day before the start of the parliamentary debate and with limited public participation. A citizen’s budget portal was introduced in October 2025, with a mechanism for the public to submit proposals and comments. Budget oversight by the legislature needs to improve. As noted in the Open Budget Survey 2025, a mid-year report has still to be produced and published. Budget execution reports contain basic information and do not analyse divergence from set targets. Inconsistencies in the accounting and
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reporting framework need to be resolved (See Chapter 17 – Economic and monetary policy).
Public service and human resources management
The regulatory framework of public service and human resources management (HRM) is satisfactory, but its effectiveness continues to be undermined by a lack of consistent enforcement. The horizontal and vertical scope of the civil service is adequate, except for several (regulatory) public agencies with a higher degree of autonomy that are excluded from the civil service system with no justified reason. Serbia’s public service and HRM legislation provides for merit-based recruitment and dismissal procedures but leaves too much discretion to the heads of institutions in setting up selection committees. In May 2026, the Director of the Public Policy Secretariat was dismissed without sound justification. Amendments to the Law on civil servants adopted in 2025 and early 2026 introduced positive regulatory changes with the potential to make public sector employment more attractive and recruitment procedures more efficient. A requirement to assess at least one functional competence was incorporated into the hiring procedure for fixed-term staff. Around 10% of all civil servants continue to be hired on a fixed-term basis without passing a competition as the adoption of a legal provision to that effect has been postponed once again until January 2027. Administrative bodies have limited autonomy to launch new recruitment procedures based on their staffing plans, due to recruitment restrictions under the Law on the budget system. The new HRM information system is not yet operational. HRM units continue to have limited capacity and do not play a strategic role. No progress was made on salary reform aimed at ensuring equal pay for equal work in the public administration. Serbia maintained an effective gender balance in the public administration, including in top managerial positions, with 49% women and 51% men.
The percentage of senior civil servant posts occupied in an acting capacity is excessively high and increased during the reporting period (72% as of September 2026 compared with 62% in September 2025), undermining merit-based and legally compliant appointment procedures and contributing to prolonged instability in senior management. Transparency in the appointment of candidates – as recommended by the High Civil Service Council – continues to be lacking, which is cause for serious concern. Moreover, most acting managers are not civil servants despite there being a legal provision to prevent such appointments. No credible steps have yet been taken or planned to address these issues.
The National Academy for Public Administration continued to improve the scope and quality of training at central and local levels. Almost all (99.8%) institutions that have the obligation to adopt integrity plans have done so. Further efforts are needed to fully implement the current integrity plans for the judiciary and public administration, including at local level.
Accountability of the administration
The accountability of the administration still needs to be improved. No progress was made in addressing long-standing shortcomings in the organisation of the central state administration, oversight of subordinate bodies, or delegation of decision-making powers to lower management levels. The managerial accountability roadmap is being implemented slowly and with no formal mechanism to report on its implementation. According to the Ombudsman’s report for 2025, 61% of complaints were related to violations of economic, property and social rights (see Chapter 23 - Fundamental rights). On citizens’ right to access public information, the Commissioner for Information of Public Importance and Personal Data Protection resolved 16 602 complaints in 2025 (up from 15 282 in 2024) while 17 401 cases remained pending. The issue of legal professionals potentially abusing legal remedies remains to be addressed while not jeopardising the right to access information. The execution rate of Commissioner decisions was 79.8% (2024: 77.98%). On citizens’ right to administrative justice, the establishment of a two-instance administrative justice system continues to be delayed. The Administrative Court received fewer cases and increased its clearance rate in 2025, although the backlog and disposition time (the time a judicial system takes to resolve a case) remain high. The jurisdiction of the Court was
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extended again, meaning judges face high workload. Citizens’ rights to seek compensationis regulated, but there is a lack of statistical data to monitor implementation.
Service delivery to citizens and businesses
Service delivery to citizens and businesses, in particular e-services, continued to improve. Further developments continued to be hampered by the fragmentation of responsibilities and mandates among institutions and the lack of a dedicated coordination system. Amendments to the Law on e-government were adopted in August 2026. Progress on key enablers continued to lead to improved e-services. The interoperability framework is in place. More databases were connected to the improved government service bus (an information system linking major databases). The number of municipal one-stop shops continued to increase, with improvements in physical accessibility, but there are still no quality standards for service provision. The legal framework for simplifying administrative procedures is in place. Work to simplify and digitalise administrative procedures continued with the roll-out of the e-paper programme. Serbia continued to improve the portal of the register of administrative procedures, which now includes more than 7 500 procedures.
2.2. RULE OF LAW AND FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS
2.2.1 Chapter 23: Judiciary and fundamental rights
The EU’s founding values include the rule of law and respect for human rights. An effective (independent, high-quality and efficient) judicial system and an effective fight against corruption are of paramount importance, as is respect of fundamental rights in law and in practice.
Functioning of the judiciary
Strategic documents
Some strategic documents are in place, but their implementation needs to be improved. The main strategic documents, namely the action plan for Chapter 23 and the 2020-2025 judicial development strategy, have expired. A new Judicial Development Strategy is under preparation but has not been adopted yet. No new action plan for Chapter 23 has been developed. Instead, an operational plan, only covering the adoption of legislation and strategic documents linked to Chapter 23 interim benchmarks, was adopted in June 2026. Once drawn up in line with EU standards and adopted, full implementation of these laws and strategies will be key, also to establish a strong track record in this field. Implementation of the human resources strategy and the information and communications technology (ICT) strategy – which were both evaluated alongside the now expired judicial development strategy – remains weak, in part due to a lack of coordination and adequate monitoring mechanisms.
Management bodies
Management bodies are in place although their independence and capacity need to be improved.
As with magistrates, members of the High Judicial Council (HJC) and High Prosecutorial Council (HPC) are required under the Law on the prevention of corruption to declare their assets and interests when taking office and must update these declarations regularly under the oversight of the Agency for the Prevention of Corruption.
The blockade of the HPC exposed persistent weaknesses in its independence. Elections were held in December 2025 to appoint magistrates to the HPC which were contested, delayed and subject to procedural challenges. Objections by unsuccessful candidates were upheld by the Constitutional Court which partially annulled the results. A re-run of the elections was held in February 2026, during which there were allegations of political interference. The new magistrates (five judges and five prosecutors) took up their positions
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on the HJC and HPC in April 2026. The HPC has still to elect a new President and Commissioner for Autonomy, which has so far not succeeded due to the lack of quorum required for the appointments (8 out of 11 HPC members).
The capacity of the HJC and HPC needs to be improved. Specifically, the issue of undue influence, to which the HJC and HPC both remain exposed, needs to be addressed.
Independence and impartiality
The independence and impartiality of the judiciary need to be improved, both in the higher- level courts and in the courts of first instance.
In January 2026, Parliament amended five laws – based on a proposal by a Member of Parliament – under urgent procedure and without a transparent and inclusive consultation process, citing efficiency gains. In its ex-post opinion of April 2026, the Venice Commission identified several shortcomings which removed safeguards designed to protect
prosecutorial autonomy and judicial independence introduced through the constitutional amendments in 2023. For instance, the 2026 legislative amendments transferred authority to verify the legality of prosecutorial instructions and workload from the HPC back to the prosecutorial hierarchy, thereby reducing prosecutorial autonomy, which the Venice Commission recommended reversing. The amendments also introduced renewable mandates for court presidents and chief public prosecutors instead of the previous single five-year mandate, established hierarchical subordination of the Special Department for Cybercrime to the Higher Public Prosecutor’s Office in Belgrade and the replacement of some of the existing courts and prosecution offices by the creation of new ones. Furthermore, the amendments terminated at short notice the temporary assignments of all seconded prosecutors and shifted responsibility for secondments from the Supreme Public Prosecutor to the HPC. While the Venice Commission accepted the latter, it considered that the early termination of secondments without any compelling justification failed to respect the security of tenure of the affected prosecutors and recommended reinstating them. Subsequently, Serbia fully implemented the Venice Commission’s recommendations that required immediate follow-up through adopting new legislative amendments and taking other non-legislative measures. Among the non-legislative measures, between March and June 2026, the High Prosecutorial Council (HPC) re-appointed all prosecutors seconded to the Prosecutors Office for Organised Crime (POOC) whose secondments had been terminated on 11 March 2026, fulfilling an additional Venice Commission recommendation. Moreover, in
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total, the HPC increased the capacity of the POOC by increasing the number of prosecutors in the POOC from 20 (before the legislative amendments) to 24 (of which 15 are seconded and 9 are permanent). In its follow up opinion in June 2026, the Venice Commission welcomed the measures taken by the authorities to strengthen the capacity of the POOC by assigning additional prosecutorial staff. The Venice Commission also acknowledged Serbia’s efforts to address the outstanding aspects of the two recommendations which remain partially implemented at the present time (related to the need to increase the autonomy of the Special Department for Cybercrime and judicial and prosecution remapping, both of which require further work to be carried out in the coming months) and welcomed Serbia’s commitment to implement them swiftly.
During the reporting period, political pressure on the judiciary and the prosecution service increased significantly, including in relation to the prosecution of high-profile cases, but was subject to little or no follow-up by relevant institutions. Government and public officials at the highest level, including the Members of Parliament and the President continued to make undue public comments on ongoing investigations and court proceedings, including on the work of individual prosecutors and judges. These comments included criticism of judicial decisions and threats to remove judges and prosecutors. Other comments made by officials containing information outside the public domain raised concerns about leakage of information by institutions involved in criminal proceedings. Despite the rules of procedure of the HJC and HPC laying the foundation for reacting more effectively to cases of undue influence, the HJC and HPC both remained largely passive. Neither Parliament nor the government have so far acted on cases of undue influence. The Serbian institutions have yet to demonstrate a more active role.
As regards case management, cases are allocated electronically and at random to judges by means of specialised software. Software enabling cases to be automatically allocated to prosecutors has yet to be developed.
While there are legal safeguards regarding appointments and promotions of judges and prosectors as well as transfers without consent, the legislative amendments from January 2026 and subsequent termination of the mandates of seconded prosecutors have sparked debate over their effectiveness. The system of recruiting, transferring and promoting judges and prosecutors should be further revised to ensure that career progression is entirely merit- based.
Accountability
The accountability and transparency of the judiciary need to be improved.
The Law on the prevention of corruption requires judges and prosecutors to declare their assets and interests when taking office and to update these declarations regularly under the oversight of the Agency for the Prevention of Corruption. Weaknesses persist in law and in practice regarding the verification and enforcement of asset declarations and conflicts of interest (see: Anti-Corruption).
Codes of ethics are in place, as adopted by the ethics boards of the HJC and HPC. No independent inspection authority exists, while disciplinary commission rulings can be appealed by either the disciplinary
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prosecutor or the judge/prosecutor concerned, and can be further appealed to the HJC and the HPC, respectively.
In 2025, 156 disciplinary complaints were filed with the HPC, and one disciplinary measure was issued. In 2025, 448 disciplinary complaints were filed with the HJC at first instance and 8 proposals were forwarded to the disciplinary commission at second instance. The HJC issued 1 disciplinary measure.
Quality of justice
The quality of justice needs to be improved.
On 31 August 2026, Serbia amended the Law on the Judicial Academy as part of efforts to fully implement the 2023 constitutional amendments, while relevant implementing legislation has yet to be adopted. In its follow-up opinions of 15 June and 16 July 2026 on the Law on the Judicial Academy, the Venice Commission found that Serbia had implemented its recommendations of 9 December 2024. The amendments include designating the Judicial Academy the sole entry point into the judicial and prosecutorial professions and the replacement of the ex officio participation of the Minister for Justice in the Management Board of Academy with another member appointed by the government from among academia. The new law will be in force from 1 March 2027. The adoption of the final implementing legislation on the Court Rulebook, which is required in order to fully implement the 2023 constitutional amendments, remains pending.
In 2025, the Judicial Academy held 221 continuous training events. In 2026, the Academy updated its infrastructure by moving to new premises with updated IT and communication tools. Training programmes should be financially sustainable and aimed at increasing capacity, access and focus on practical skills and EU law training, drawing on support from the European Judicial Training Network.
Appellate courts continued their efforts to harmonise case law by signing a new joint- sessions agreement in February 2026, by holding trainings, a cross-department session with the Supreme Court and by expanding the case law database which, as of July 2026, contained 576 708 integral decisions and 75 830 anonymised decisions, now also expanded to decisions of the Anti-Corruption Departments of Higher Courts. The Supreme Court should contribute to ensuring the law is uniformly applied in practice. The Judicial Academy improved the functionality of the eCASE database and its access to ECtHR decisions.
Serbia does not have a comprehensive court case and document management system in place connecting court cases across courts and prosecutors’ offices. A new case management system for prosecutors’ offices has been finalised and is implemented in 10 offices, but its full operationalisation has been delayed since 2025 due to issues related to staffing, infrastructure and legislative framework, and is now expected by the end of 2027. Work on the comprehensive case management system for courts remains stalled and the Ministry of Justice should explore alternative solutions. Further work is required to digitalise the justice system. This includes making legislative changes to the Criminal Procedure Code and the Civil Procedure Code so that digital documentation is admissible as envisaged
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under the new systems. It also includes ensuring adequate staffing and financial resources and upgrading IT infrastructure including videoconferencing equipment for court hearings.
The HJC appointed 146 judges in 2025 (compared with 241 in 2024) and 211 judges in 2026, including the appointment of five judges to the Supreme Court in June 2026. As of September 2026, 2 775 judicial posts had been filled
(compared with 2 719 in 2025) while 352 posts were vacant (down from 383 in 2025). A lack of judges, expert assistants and administrative staff has hindered the efficiency of the courts, especially those with the highest caseload.
No public prosecutors have been elected since February 2025, with several public calls for application cancelled and appointments postponed or not completed. The primary reason for this was the lack of a quorum within the HPC and the occasional absence of the Minister for Justice or other members of the HPC, as well as appeals before the Constitutional Court regarding election decisions. 51 prosecutors have taken office following the rejection of these appeals by the Court). As of August 2026, 166 out of 899 public prosecutor posts were vacant (compared with 139 in May 2025) and 733 were filled. In addition, 62 out of 90 positions for chief public prosecutors were filled, of which 26 were acting.
The Constitutional Court continued to work with a partial bench despite the election of 10 new judges in December 2025, bringing the total number of judges to 12 out of the required 15. The Supreme Court failed to elect the remaining three judges despite candidates being jointly proposed by the HJC and HPC. No progress was made with reforming the Constitutional Court following the Venice Commission’s recommendation to introduce qualified majority voting with a deadlock mechanism for the election of some judges by Parliament. In January 2026, a new president of the Constitutional Court was appointed, while also drawing criticism for public remarks suggesting that judges opposed to the current government should be dismissed.
Efficiency
The efficiency of the justice system is limited.
Problems of unequal workload distribution among judges and prosecutors, negatively affecting their performance and access to justice, still need to be addressed. Efficiency in civil and commercial cases remained stable overall, but in criminal cases it deteriorated, with disposition times increasing in first and second instances. Efficiency remains a concern in administrative cases, where despite a reduction in incoming cases and improvements in the
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clearance rate and disposition times, the average disposition time nevertheless exceeds three years. The Supreme Court adopted a new Uniform Backlog Reduction Program 2026– 2030, including measures to analyse 2021–2025 performance data, resolve past systemic failures, and implement efficient new case management strategies. The backlog of cases in the Constitutional Court decreased slightly (42 460 cases as of April 2026, down from 43 666 cases in 2024) but remained high overall. Of these cases, 99% are constitutional complaints related to human rights protection. Budget execution per inhabitant increased further but remained stable at 0.53% of GDP. The information system of the Constitutional Court is operational, but access to decisions should be simplified.
Domestic handling of war crime cases
Serbia has yet to show genuine
commitment to investigating and
adjudicating war crime cases. In 2025, the
War Crimes Prosecutor’s Office filed five
indictments against five individuals, none
concerning high-profile cases, while a
further indictment has not yet been
confirmed. One indictment stemmed from
an investigation conducted more than 15
years ago; another was issued in absentia,
and a further indictment resulted in a plea
agreement. No cases were transferred from
the regional judicial authorities or from the
International Residual Mechanism for
Criminal Tribunals (IRMCT). Five final decisions and eight first instance judgements were
rendered against seventeen defendants. At the end of 2025, trials were ongoing in 24 cases.
Serbia continued to avoid prosecuting high-ranking war crime suspects. Cases continue to be processed slowly and there is a backlog of over 1 800 cases, which remains a very serious concern. Serbia has yet to adopt a case categorisation plan. The High Prosecutorial Council has yet to appoint a successor to the acting Chief War Crimes Prosecutor, whose mandate ended in May 2025, with the decision- making process in deadlock. Several prosecutors dealing with war crimes reported to have been targeted by a smear campaign led by government media. Cooperation with the IRMCT and the War Crimes Prosecutor’s Office has deteriorated. Cooperation with Bosnia and Herzegovina and with Croatia has not progressed. Moreover, the case of Vojislav Seselj, who was handed over to Serbia by the IRMCT in February 2024, has not moved forward. Serbia has yet to enforce the judgments of Bosnia and Herzegovina in the case of Novak Djukić, who resides in Serbia. The lack of information exchange and legal assistance between Kosovo and Serbia continue to hamper investigations, prosecution of cases and access to justice. The full use of EU-facilitated mutual legal assistance arrangements is essential for effective processing of war crime cases.
A number of Serbian political parties, politicians and media outlets continued to openly support and to provide public space for convicted war criminals and deny war crimes,
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including the Srebrenica genocide, without any repercussions. The funeral of convicted war criminal Ratko Mladić in Serbia with official support and in presence of senior officials and
military have further intensified the public narratives of revisionism, genocide denial and glorification of war criminals, in contradiction with the values underpinning Serbia’s path towards the European Union.
The sentencing policy in war crime cases continued to be inconsistent and not systematically aligned with criminal sanctions applicable to the gravity of the crimes. Serbia’s judiciary has failed to provide financial compensation to the victims of war crimes, a matter which remains unresolved.
The undetermined status of missing persons who disappeared during the conflicts in the 1990s remains a key issue to be solved in the Western Balkans. Despite steady progress in the identification process, 9 540 persons (compared with 9 624 in 2025) are still missing since the conflicts. Further efforts are needed at bilateral and regional level through the missing persons group, established in 2018 under the Berlin Process to strengthen cooperation.
Fight against corruption
Track record
Serbia’s track record in the fight against corruption deteriorated both in high-level cases and non-high-level cases.
Significant challenges persist, particularly in addressing high-level cases. The number of final convictions in high-level corruption cases in 2025 was again lower than in previous years. In 2025, the Prosecutor’s Office for Organised Crime ordered more investigations against individuals than in 2024 but fewer than in 2023. Meanwhile, fewer indictments were issued than in previous years. Weaknesses in the investigation and prosecution of high-level corruption cases were not adequately addressed, in particular regarding the quality of evidence collection and presentation of evidence as well as the risk of politically motivated interference.
The corruption investigations launched following the canopy collapse at Novi Sad railway station are yet to be completed. The collapse and subsequent failure to make progress in the investigations continue to fuel the public’s perceptions of a lack of accountability and transparency in government infrastructure and construction projects. The Prosecutor’s Office for Organised Crime (POOC) reported a lack of cooperation from the police in presenting all evidence collected. The Task Force set up by the POOC for this investigation ceased its activities in September 2025 following the removal of 17 experienced members by the Ministry of the Interior on the grounds that a new job classification system had been adopted. This has delayed investigative activities and the filing of indictments. During this period, the Belgrade Higher Court lifted detention measures on some of the defendants as the applicable detention periods had expired. Another reason for the slow pace of the investigations was the initiation of parallel proceedings for the same case.
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Regarding non-high-level corruption, the special departments for combating corruption in the offices of higher prosecutors and the prosecutors’ offices of general jurisdiction launched fewer investigations in 2025 than in 2024. While the number of indictments rose slightly, the number of final court decisions and convictions was lower than in 2024 and 2023. This continuing downward trend raises concerns about the capacity to address mid and lower-level corruption effectively.
No significant judicial outcomes were reached in 2025 or 2026 following the anti-corruption campaign that took place in February-April 2025. Over 153 individuals were arrested during that period, although many were subsequently released. The campaign ultimately delivered limited results, having led to no systemic investigation, prosecutorial follow-up or final judicial outcomes.
In December 2025, Serbia submitted its compliance report on the implementation of the GRECO recommendations of the fifth evaluation round. In its second Compliance Report published on 18 August 2026, GRECO concluded that Serbia has satisfactorily implemented 3 of the 24 recommendations of GRECO’s Fifth Round Evaluation Report. Of the outstanding 21 recommendations, 10 have been partly implemented and 11 have not been implemented. While this constitutes a step in the right direction, continued follow-up will be necessary to achieve progress on the remaining recommendations and their effective implementation in practice. Serbia should provide a report on the progress in implementing the outstanding recommendations to GRECO by 30 June 2027.
The perception among the public, experts and businesses is that the level of corruption in the public sector is high and has increased in the past year.
Legal framework
The legal framework governing the fight against corruption is in place, but needs improvement in terms of preventive measures and law enforcement.
In July 2026, Serbia adopted amendments to the Law on Financing of Political Activities, taking into account some ODIHR recommendations. In August 2026, Serbia adopted amendments to the Law on Prevention of Corruption, taking into account a number of recommendations by GRECO and ODIHR, while several key recommendations remained unaddressed. Serbia also amended the Law on Lobbying in August 2026, taking into account the recommendations of GRECO. Their effective implementation will need to be closely monitored, including with a view to assessing the extent to which the recommendations have been effectively addressed in practice and whether further measures may be required. Implementation of the Law on free access to information of public importance needs to be improved. As part of these efforts, Serbia has prepared draft legal amendments to the Law, which, however, do not address all OECD/SIGMA and GRECO recommendations. The legal framework governing whistleblower protection has yet to be aligned with the EU acquis.
Regarding sectors highly vulnerable to corruption, there remains a high risk of corruption in the area of public procurement procedures. No further measures have been taken since the 2024 amendment to the Law on public procurement. Many contracts continue to be awarded outside the scope of standard public procurement legislation through project-specific special
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laws and intergovernmental agreements for large infrastructure projects containing provisions for exclusive access to particular bidding procedures. These are not in line with the EU acquis, and their wide use should be phased out (see Chapter 5 – public procurement). Although the Criminal Code includes a specific offence for public procurement abuses, convictions are rare. It is important that all entities, in particular those with significant public expenditure, comply with the State Audit Institution’s (SAI) recommendations. The authorities should encourage the proactive disclosure of contracts, procurement processes and oversight reports, and ensure the protection of whistleblowers to build public trust. Serbia should further reinforce the SAI’s staffing, financial and technical resources for overseeing public spending.
The Law on the organisation and jurisdiction of state authorities in suppression of organised crime, terrorism and corruption does not regulate in sufficient detail the role and mandate of the POOC. The POOC’s coordination role in relation to the special departments of offices of higher public prosecutors for the eradication of corruption should be clarified and strengthened to avoid cases of different specialised bodies leading uncoordinated proceedings in corruption investigations.
Strategic documents
An adequate national anti-corruption strategy for 2024-2028 and an accompanying action plan 2026-2028 are in place. However, the strategic framework is still only being implemented to a limited degree. The Agency for the Prevention of Corruption has analysed the implementation of the previous action plan for 2024-2025 and concluded that 56% of activities from that action plan were not fully implemented. According to the implementation report, 80% of activities were carried over to the new action plan for 2026-2028 adopted in June 2026. A working body for coordinating monitoring activities related to the implementation of the strategy and action plan was established by way of a government decision in July 2026 but has yet to organise any meetings. To ensure the strategy and action plan are effectively implemented and monitored, adequate coordination will be needed from the newly established body to guarantee that the mechanism for tracking progress and impact is functioning and that the necessary budgetary resources are being used. The implementation of the previous action plan was hindered by a lack of such measures.
Institutional framework
The institutional framework governing the fight against corruption is largely in place but needs improvement in terms of preventive measures and law enforcement.
The number of proceedings conducted by the Agency for the Prevention of Corruption for identifying violations of the Law on the prevention of corruption in the area of conflicts of interest has been falling consistently. In 2025, the Agency completed 176 such proceedings (compared with 202 in 2024, 264 in 2023 and 483 in 2022) and submitted 153 requests to start misdemeanour proceedings for failure to promptly submit asset declarations (compared with 131 in 2024, 143 in 2023 and 201 in 2022). Overall, these activities to prevent corruption have yielded limited results. The Agency needs more human and technical resources to be able to work in a comprehensive manner. In addition, steps still need to be taken to increase the independence, impartiality and accountability of the Agency and the system for verifying declarations.
The fact that the Government neither systematically consults the Anti-Corruption Council on draft legislation nor implements its recommendations, remains a serious concern. No steps have been taken to increase the Anti-Corruption Council’s budgetary resources or staffing.
The Prosecutor’s Office for Organised Crime (POOC) continued to experience operational obstacles in processing and investigating complex organised crime and high-level corruption cases, as well as attempts of undue influence, which increased further during the reporting period. Following legislative amendments in January 2026, the secondments of 11 of its
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prosecutors ended on 11 March. Between March and June 2026, in line with the recommendation of the Venice Commission, the HPC reinstated all 11 prosecutors of the POOC whose secondments had previously been terminated and seconded an additional 4 prosecutors to the POOC. In total, the HPC increased the number of prosecutors from 20 (before the legislative amendments) to 24 (of which 15 are seconded and 9 are permanent), considerably enhancing the capacity of the POOC which now operates with 24 out of the required 25 prosecutors and a Chief Public Prosecutor for Organised Crime. In its follow up opinion of 16 June 2026, the Venice Commission welcomed the measures taken by the authorities to strengthen the capacity of the POOC by assigning additional prosecutorial staff. In May 2026, the government approved the workplace restructuring of the Ministry of the Interior, converting the former Anti-Corruption Department into the Anti-Corruption Service. This change should lead to an increase in the number of police officers specialised in combating corruption and financial crime, as well as an additional improvement in operational capabilities in this area. Despite this, cooperation between the POOC and the police has been deteriorating. The POOC also lacks adequate premises to accommodate new staff as plans to construct a new building to house the POOC are on hold as financing has not been secured.
The special departments in the higher prosecution offices have insufficient resources and should each have a financial forensic expert. No permanent forensic financial experts have yet been hired.
Fundamental rights
General framework
Although Serbia’s institutional framework for upholding fundamental rights is broadly in place, the implementation of the framework needs to be improved as a matter of priority.
International human rights instruments
Cooperation with international human rights monitoring bodies and the follow-up to their recommendations need to be improved. Serbia has ratified the main international human rights instruments and continues to benefit from its observer status at the Fundamental Rights Agency.
European Court of Human Rights
Cooperation with the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) and implementation of its judgments need to be improved. The Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe ended
its supervision of certain cases due to progress in addressing the excessive length of judicial proceedings. Currently, there are 17 cases under enhanced supervision by the Committee of Ministers (compared with 12 cases last year). During the reporting period, the ECtHR found breaches of the European Convention on Human Rights relating mainly to the right to liberty and security, protection of property, freedom of expression, the
right to a fair trial and prohibition of torture. No action was taken to further regulate the role of Serbia’s government agent before the ECtHR. The government agent needs to be entrusted with a coordinating role and given the authority to fulfil it.
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Promotion, protection and enforcement of human rights
The institutional framework for the promotion, protection and enforcement of human rights needs to be improved. Public reaction by the Ombudsperson continues to be limited or slow in response to human rights violations, particularly in sensitive cases such as those related to protests and attacks on human rights defenders. Despite new recruitment, the Ombudsperson’s Office continues to operate with fewer staff (72 at August 2026) than the target set in the action plan for Chapter
23, i.e. 106. The Ombudsperson currently does not have any deputies as required by law. In the Ombudsperson’s report for 2025, a more formalised mechanism was presented for measuring the authorities’ follow-up. While follow-up to individual recommendations was reported to be at 86.7%, follow-up to general (systemic) recommendations – which require more time to address – was found to be fully implemented in 6% of cases, partially implemented in 54% of cases, not implemented in 36% of cases and could not be determined in 3.5% of cases. Parliament has yet to adopt conclusions on the 2025 Ombudsperson’s report.
Prevention of torture and other forms of ill-treatment
Serbia needs to further improve legal guarantees on the prevention of torture and other forms of ill-treatment. Investigations into allegations of ill-treatment remained largely ineffective, particularly regarding reports of excessive use of force by the police in the
context of protests. Cooperation between the Ombudsperson and CSOs that are part of the National Preventive Mechanism against Torture needs to be improved. There has been no deputy Ombudsperson for this area since December 2024. Several recommendations of the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishments (CPT) have yet to be addressed, especially on eradicating police ill-treatment and ensuring effective
investigations of such cases, an area which remains under enhanced supervision by the Council of Europe’s Committee of Ministers. Implementing legislation and adequate conditions are lacking to ensure accurate recording of police interviews using audio and video equipment and to protect the rights of individuals in remand detention and their right of access to a lawyer without undue delay. In April 2026, the CPT published a report on two ad hoc visits to Serbia in 2024 which highlighted serious and long-standing concerns regarding the treatment, safety, and detention conditions of children and psychiatric patients held in
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juvenile-correctional or psychiatric facilities. Serbia has still not revised the Criminal Code amendments of 2019, which brought in life imprisonment without the possibility of conditional release for a number of crimes, contrary to the European Convention on Human Rights and the case law of the ECtHR.
Execution of criminal sanctions
The system for the execution of criminal sanctions (including probation) needs to be further improved, in line with the EU acquis and European standards. Improvements were made
specifically in terms of infrastructure, treatment programmes and staff capacity building. Two pilot programmes on suicide prevention and women’s empowerment were launched, as well as new treatment programmes for individual and group work with juvenile offenders. However, the uneven distribution between facilities means that many closed-type penitentiary institutions are still overcrowded. Probation, social and employment services lack sufficient resources. Moreover, the probation service is focused on control-oriented measures while rehabilitation measures remain marginal. Post-penal care is rarely provided.
Protection of personal data
The legal framework governing the protection of personal data (PDP) needs to be further aligned with the EU acquis – including the new European Artificial Intelligence Act – and to be coordinated with the drafting of the Law on data secrecy. It must also be adapted to address issues identified during enforcement such as low penalties and practical difficulties in implementation. The process of harmonising all other laws with the PDP Law continues to be plagued by delays. The Office of the Commissioner for Information of Public Importance and Personal Data Protection now has 129 employees (at July 2026), thereby fulfilling the target set in the action plan for Chapter 23. The mandate of the Commissioner expired on 26 July 2026, and the deputy Commissioner has been acting since then. The Parliament published the call for candidates on 13 July 2026 with delay as the law required it to do so by 27 January 2026 at the latest. A list of eligible candidates had not yet been established by the time Parliament was dissolved in September 2026. As regards biometric video surveillance in public spaces, an appropriate legal basis would need to be adopted and an assessment of proportionality and necessity carried out before deploying such technology. Investigative journalists however reported, based on public procurement
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data, that an increasing number of public institutions are procuring and using biometric cameras without such a legal basis. Regarding reports of spyware and mobile phone forensic products being used to unlawfully target journalists, human rights defenders, student activists and opposition politicians, new cases have been reported with little judicial follow-up so far. One case initiated in 2025 is still at the pre-investigation stage, meanwhile the Commissioner for Personal Data Protection and the Ombudsman have closed their cases. Surveillance of this kind produces a chilling effect and may lead to self-censorship. The personal data of CSOs, participants in student protests, judges and prosecutors continued to be disclosed to the tabloids without eliciting an appropriate reaction.
Freedom of thought, conscience and religion
Serbia provides adequate legal guarantees on freedom of thought, conscience and religion. Serbia continued to implement the Law on the restitution of heirless Jewish property. However, the registration process for religious communities remained non-transparent and inconsistent. The Law on Churches and Religious Communities is not yet aligned with European standards. In addition, amendments to that Law adopted in August 2026 enable churches and religious communities to establish higher education institutions and also introduced a specific legal framework for a university of the Serbian Orthodox Church providing for possible state co-ownership and public funding. Although the law formally upholds the equal legal status of all churches and religious communities, the specific arrangements for the Serbian Orthodox Church would need to be clarified as regards questions of equal treatment and non-discrimination among religious communities.
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Freedom of expression and media freedom
The environment for media and its free, independent and professional operation remains constrained.
Intimidation of journalists
Cases of physical attacks, threats, intimidation and hate speech against journalists have continued to rise, with the authorities failing to consistently condemn them. Local journalists and female journalists were among the worst affected by threats and attacks, in particular in the online space. Recurrent verbal attacks by high-level officials against journalists continued to have a chilling effect on freedom of expression, with 674 verbal attacks by officials reported by civil society in the last five months of 2025. One of the main media associations reported that attacks, threats and pressure against journalists had more than doubled in 2025 (427 cases compared with 168 in 2024), including 117 physical attacks and 174 threats. Several journalists have been relocated out of Serbia due to security reasons resulting from targeting campaigns. In 2025, the prosecution recorded the highest number of attacks against journalists since recording of media-related cases began. Only a few of the reported cases resulted in final convictions (four out of 140). Several serious attacks against journalists were reported in the context of the local elections in March 2026, but there was no adequate response by police or follow-up, despite video reports from the sites. A series of documentary-style videos broadcast on a number of media services, including TV channels broadcast on national frequencies, contributed to a smear campaign against journalists without being publicly condemned by the authorities. Strategic lawsuits against public participation (SLAPPs) persist, increasingly hindering the work of investigative media, with 15 complaints filed in 2025 against journalists, activists and other individuals in the database of the National Anti-SLAPP Working Group (a group comprising CSOs), compared with 7 complaints in 2024. Serbia will need to align with the EU Anti-SLAPP legal framework. No progress was made in prosecuting those implicated in the murders of three journalists in 1994, 1999 and 2001, one of which has already been barred by the statute of limitations. In the case of the murder of Slavko Ćuruvija, the Supreme Court ruled that the 2024 decision of
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the Belgrade Court of Appeal was reached despite significant violations of the provisions of criminal procedure. However, the final acquittal remains in force and no further steps have been taken by the Court of Appeal to establish the potential accountability of those involved. In a first-instance verdict, the Slavko Ćuruvija Foundation was found guilty in a defamation lawsuit and ordered to pay compensation to the three persons acquitted of Slavko Ćuruvija’s murder.
Legislative environment
The appointment of a new Council of the Regulatory Authority for Electronic Media (REM), which had been pending since the previous Council’s mandate expired in November 2024, was unblocked in July 2026. The overall delay and shortcomings with the former procedure had cast doubt over Serbia’s commitment to safeguard the nomination process against political influence and to increase REM’s independence. In June 2026, the Culture and Information Committee of the Parliament endorsed the proposal of an opposition MP to invite the 4 candidates who had resigned in late 2025 to return to the Council. The Committee also returned the REM statute and invited the new Council to draft a new statute. Finally, the Committee suspended the procedure for nominating a candidate to the REM Council on behalf of the national minority councils until after the elections for the new national minority councils in November 2026. Before the four elected candidates returned to the Council, they demanded additional legal clarity. This resulted in the National Assembly adopting an authentic interpretation of the Law on electronic media in early July 2026 addressing their legal concerns, which in turn paved the way for their return to the Council and the first constitutive session of the new Council was held in July. The Council’s chair and vice-chair were elected in September 2026. Although some members requested the inclusion of Informer TV due to the reach and previous track record of this cable channel, the new Council was unable to reach a decision on expanding the list of media outlets to be subject to more comprehensive and systematic monitoring of the electoral campaign. In addition, Telekom Srbija started broadcasting some cable channels through its terrestrial network without the required licences to do so, further increasing the audience of channels not covered by the REM’s election campaign monitoring. The REM Council did also not succeed in reaching a decision on complaints regarding violations of media regulation during the electoral campaign. In its statement of preliminary findings, the international election observation mission found that “divisions within the Regulatory Authority for Electronic Media (REM) prevented effective oversight and timely remedies, leaving the overwhelming majority of complaints unresolved before election day, at odds with international standards and good practice.” Prior to that, in the absence of a functioning REM Council, the audiovisual market had not had a regulatory authority to react to breaches of media legislation. The procedure for allocating a fifth frequency for national broadcasting, which was launched already in 2022, has yet to be completed. Several TV channels started broadcasting without a licence to do so, including on Telekom Srbija cable. Moreover, public officials appeared on some of those channels, and one of their publishers received public funding. A new media strategy has yet to be adopted following the expiry of the previous strategy in 2025.
Implementation of legislation/institutions
Serbia’s media legislation, which was last amended in June 2025, is not being sufficiently enforced, including in relation to fairness of public funding and transparency of ownership structures. Media outlets in violation of the Serbian Journalists’ Code of Ethics continued to receive public co-financing, although the Law on public information and media establishes media outlets’ compliance with ethical standards as one of the criteria for receiving co- funding. Grants were allocated at national and local levels even where evaluation committee members did not adhere to the scoring grids set out in secondary legislation. Media associations continued to report irregularities, resulting in the largest allocations of funding going to media close to the authorities, and filed criminal charges against a local mayor for breaching legal criteria in allocation of public co-funding. Measures laid down in the previous media strategy to ensure fair and transparent allocation of state advertising have yet to be
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implemented. Partially or fully state-owned companies continue to advertise predominantly in media outlets which frequently breach the Code of Ethics. The media register does not reveal beneficial ownership for every media service since many owners are listed as subsidiary companies. Inspections conducted by the Ministry of Information and Telecommunications do not include monitoring of enforcement activities relating to the new provision on the adoption of internal ethical codes. In 2025, 43% of complaints made by journalists to the Commissioner for Information of Public Importance concerned the ‘institutional silence’ of public bodies, including on sensitive cases concerning environmental damage, capital projects, the use of public resources, legalisation of illegally constructed buildings and the co-financing of media projects. During the reporting period, Serbia did not take meaningful action to counter foreign information manipulation and interference. RT Balkan (Russia Today-Balkan) is still broadcasting in the Serbian language via the Telekom Srbija cable operator and under a licence previously issued by the REM Council in 2024.
Public service broadcaster
In the absence of a functioning REM Council, no new secondary legislation concerning the operation of public broadcasters was adopted despite a legal requirement to do so by December 2025. The competent parliament committees have not yet launched the procedure to elect the new Programming Council of Radio Television Serbia (RTS) despite the legal deadline of December 2025 and launched it late for Radio Television Vojvodina (RTV). Subsequently the new position of Commissioner for the Protection of the Rights of Listeners, Viewers and Readers has not yet been filled. The mandates of most of the members of RTS Management Board have expired and, without a functioning REM Council in place, no new members could be appointed. The amendment to the Law on public broadcasting services of June 2025 has not ensured full financial independence of public broadcasters as State funding for RTV was again needed in 2026 to compensate for the low level of the licence fee. Concerns over issues of limited pluralism and biased reporting in favour of the government persisted. Data aggregated by a CSO showed that from March to September 2026, 96% of airtime during central news broadcasts by RTS was dedicated to the ruling majority, compared with 4% to opposition parties. In its statement of preliminary findings, the international election observation mission found that during electoral campaign period “contrary to its legal obligations and public-service mandate, RTS favoured “United Serbia” and singled out the “Student List” for negative treatment”. In February 2026, a new Director-General of RTS was appointed on the basis of the previous Law on public broadcasting services, following a process criticised by some media associations as well as other candidates of the call citing irregularities and legal breaches; a court case is ongoing.
Economic factors
Political and economic influence on the media, including on editorial policy, is a source of increasing concern. Following the 2023 amendment to the Law on public information and media that allowed state-owned companies to be media owners, the media market has become more concentrated. Since a leaked phone conversation in August 2025 between the CEOs of a private media group and the majority state-owned Telekom Srbija regarding personnel changes at the former, concerns have increased about the exertion of political pressure on media outlets perceived as critical towards the authorities. In February 2026, new governance and editorial boards of the aforementioned private media group were announced, and the CEO of a subsidiary company and the director of its news channel were dismissed. In May, an agreement on the sale of this media group was announced and, in August, the announced new commercial owner appointed a new director of the publisher of these media in Serbia while required approvals were still pending. This was followed by further personnel changes among this company's media, criticised by part of their staff and by media associations as going against the editorial independence of these media, and raising questions of compliance with ‘Commission Recommendation 2022/1634 on internal safeguards for editorial independence and ownership transparency in the media sector’, notably safeguards to promote the participation of journalists in decision-making of media
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companies. Also in August, another commercial cable provider launched a pilot customer offer, which involved the removal of two cable channels perceived as critical towards the authorities. Several local media services, owned by the same few economic entities, were launched or acquired in municipalities, including some prior to partial local elections held in March 2026. The election observation mission of the Council of Europe Congress of Local and Regional Authorities reported that the state of local media has been adversely affected by concentration of ownership and self-censorship.
Internet
Internet provision functions without undue restrictions. However, social media accounts of independent media outlets and CSOs were targeted by coordinated bot attacks.
Freedom of artistic expression
The deep polarisation in the country has spilled over into the cultural and creative sectors, with individuals being dismissed and funding withdrawn (see also Chapter 26 – Education and culture).
Professional organisations and working conditions
Journalists and other media professionals continue to work in difficult conditions, often without suitable work contracts and with unstable financing. Nearly a quarter of journalists were reported to be working on a freelance/contract basis, often without sick leave, paid holiday or social insurance. Journalists have been made redundant or faced disciplinary measures reportedly in retaliation for their personal social or political views.
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Freedom of assembly and association
While Serbia provides adequate legal guarantees with respect to freedom of association, the legal framework governing freedom of assembly needs to be further aligned with European standards. Serbia has yet to align further with the joint Venice Commission and OSCE/ODIHR Guidelines on Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and with the Conclusions of the UN Human Rights Committee concerning the notification requirements in the Law on public assembly. Serbia also needs to comply with the case law of the ECtHR, notably Serbian-Chinese Friendship Society FDH v. Serbia of 2 June 2026, including the obligation to carry out a specific security assessment before deciding on a potential assembly ban, the obligation to ensure an effective domestic remedy, as well as the positive obligation to try to ensure the safety of all persons concerned.
Student and civic protests demanding accountability and more effective action against corruption are continuing, albeit less frequently. The Security Information Agency continued to hold ‘informative talks’ with protesters, which were perceived as a form of intimidation, and plainclothes police officers continued to arrest protesters, which sometimes made it difficult for protesters to identify who had arrested them. Overall, several hundred individuals were arrested, some of whom were detained or placed under house arrest on grounds including ‘invoking a violent change to the constitutional order’, though few of those cases have resulted in indictments. Violent incidents were recorded against demonstrators and journalists reporting on the protests, although only some of the perpetrators have been prosecuted so far and several others were previously pardoned from criminal prosecution by the President. In September 2026, the President announced further pardons of protesters and activists facing criminal charges as well as individuals convicted for violence against protesters. Those raised further concerns including in terms of a lack of transparency, and as to whether the applicable legal procedure was followed. Excessive use of force by the police during the protests, including against journalists and minors, has been reported, with prosecution cases either ongoing or dismissed. There have been reports of the police protecting pro-government groups while failing to respond to violence committed by the
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latter, allegedly involving individuals with a criminal background. In relation to the European Court of Human Rights’ interim measure concerning the alleged use of a sonic weapon for crowd control at the demonstrations in Belgrade in March 2025, the Belgrade Higher Public Prosecutor’s Office stated in September 2026 that no sound cannon or LRAD device had been used. The announcement that individuals would be prosecuted for engaging in public debate on the alleged use of sonic weapons has had a chilling effect on freedom of expression and open debate in a democratic society.
Labour and trade union rightsare covered in Chapter 19 – Social policy and employment.
Property rights
The legal and institutional framework for enforcing property rights is in place. Enforcement through the judicial and restitution system has been slow and complex in some cases. The Agency for Restitution has continued with restitutions in kind of confiscated properties. The government has been issuing bonds where restitution in kind is not possible. Sufficient resources, including allocation of land, need to be secured to enable the process to be finalised.
Non-discrimination
The legal framework governing non-discrimination needs to be further aligned with the EU acquis and European standards, including the Directives on standards for equality bodies. In February 2026, Serbia adopted a new action plan against discrimination for 2026-2027. A new Commissioner for the Protection of Equality was elected in December 2025, although several CSOs expressed concern over his political neutrality and independence. As of August 2026, the Office of the Commissioner had 45 employees out of 60 systematised posts. According to the Equality Commissioner’s report for 2025, a large number of complaints had been made concerning discrimination on the grounds of age, health status, income level, disability, gender and nationality. In 2025, the Commissioner issued a total of 20 opinions on draft laws and other acts, including the Criminal Code, and submitted two special reports to Parliament related to discrimination against persons with disabilities and against women. The recommendation to adopt regulations enabling registration of same-sex partnerships was also reiterated.
Anti-racism and hate offences
The legal frameworks governing anti-racism and hate offences need to be aligned with the EU acquis and European standards, in particular with the provisions relating to the definition and punishment of hate offences based on racist and xenophobic motives. In May 2026, the UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination expressed concern that incidents of racial discrimination, hate crimes and hate speech were being underreported in Serbia because of a lack of trust in law enforcement agencies among victims. Cases of incitement to violence or hatred continued to be reported specifically targeting human rights defenders, Roma, LGBTIQ+ persons and migrants. Serbia still does not compile centralised official data on hate crimes broken down by motive and traceable for the purposes of legal proceedings.
Gender equality
The legal framework governing gender equality and combating gender-based violence needs to be further aligned with the EU acquis and European standards, while implementation and enforcement remain insufficient in a context of gender backlash and of the suspension of related legislation due to a constitutional review since 2024. In August 2026, Serbia published the
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fourth Gender Equality Index based on data from 2022 and which amounted to 60.0 points (EU average, 63.4), compared with 58.0 in the third Index based on 2018 data. The Index showed the greatest progress in the domain of ‘power’, a slight increase in ‘money’, ‘knowledge’ and ‘health’, a negative change in ‘work’, while the domain of ‘time’ could not be tracked due to a lack of more recent data. A new action plan on gender equality needs to be adopted. More efforts are needed to strengthen gender mainstreaming, address gender stereotypes in textbooks and discriminatory narratives in public discourse and improve sex- disaggregated data. Women in vulnerable situations continued to experience multiple and intersecting forms of discrimination.
Violence against women and domestic violence remain widespread. Women continue to play a prominent role in protests and are disproportionately exposed to violence, intimidation and targeted attacks. Serbia needs to align with the Directive on combating violence against women and domestic violence and address GREVIO recommendations. The definitions of rape and sexual harassment in the Criminal Code need to be amended to comply with the Istanbul Convention.
The government adopted a decision extending until 2027 the implementation period for the strategy for preventing and combating gender-based violence against women and domestic violence. It also decided, without a public debate, to delete or modify some of the strategy’s indicators. The accompanying action plan, legally due since 2021, has not yet been adopted. Reliable and sufficiently disaggregated data on all forms of gender-based violence and femicide remain lacking. Data collected by CSOs indicates an increase in the number of murdered women who had previously reported violence.
Specialist support services for victims of gender-based violence and domestic violence remain insufficient, underfunded and unevenly available, and are predominantly run by CSOs. The transparency and fairness of public funding need to be significantly improved to address allegations of bias in allocating funding to ‘governmental non-governmental organisations’ (GONGOs). Shelters lack staffing and adequate funding and the strict licensing requirements imposed on shelters place additional burdens on these services. Sexual violence referral centres are concentrated in Vojvodina, with none established in the rest of the country. Cooperation and systematic referral between the police and specialised support services remain insufficient, and women-led CSOs are not systematically involved in individual protection plans, as recommended by GREVIO. Victims’ participation in drawing up such plans needs to be enforced. Equal access to protection and support services also needs to be ensured for women from marginalised groups, including women with disabilities, refugee and migrant women, and transgender women.
Rights of the child
The legal framework governing the rights of the child needs to be further aligned with the EU acquis,European and international standards, and enforcement needs to improve. Further efforts are needed to develop an effective integrated child protection system, in line with the European Commission Recommendation, including as regards referral mechanisms, multidisciplinary case management, workforce protocols, data, monitoring and complaints mechanisms. In July 2026, Serbia ratified the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child’s (UNCRC) third optional protocol on a communication procedure. Serbia has yet to align its legislation on child-friendly justice with the EU acquis and international standards. Legislative
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amendments are also needed to strengthen the inclusion of child victims or witnesses of domestic violence in courts’ individual protection plans, explicitly prohibit corporal punishment in the family and ban child marriage. No strategic document for the rights of the child is in place, while the adoption of a new strategy on violence against children has been pending since 2023. The Council on the rights of the child was re-established in April 2026 but needs to be supported by a technical body and a cross-sectoral group ensuring coordination, governance across the different levels of competence and equal access to child protection services.
Many children joined protests, which the authorities criticised despite the UNCRC provisions guaranteeing children the rights to freedom of assembly and expression. Some arrested children reported not having timely access to lawyers or their family, raising concerns as regards compliance with EU rules on procedural safeguards for children who are suspects or accused persons in criminal proceedings.
Disaggregated data collection on children at increased risk, including Roma children and children with disabilities, needs to be improved. Although relatively few children are currently in institutional care (under 100 children per 100 000 children), violations of children’s rights in large-scale institutions remain a serious concern. Children with disabilities, who are vulnerable to multiple forms of exclusion and abuse, constitute the largest group of children in institutions. Serbia is not fully enforcing the legal ban on placing children under three years of age in residential care.
Persons with disabilities
The legal framework governing the rights of persons with disabilities needs to be further aligned with the EU acquis and European standards, including the European Accessibility Act and the Commission Guidance on independent living and inclusion in the community of persons with disabilities as well as sectoral EU law laying down accessibility requirements. Further efforts are needed to improve and ensure accessibility for persons with disabilities.
In November 2025, after several years of delay, Serbia adopted an action plan regarding the
implementation of the strategy for deinstitutionalisation for 2025-2026. Further efforts are
needed to accelerate the transition from institutional care towards independent living and
inclusion in the community, including through accessible, person-centred community-based
support services. Women with disabilities in residential institutions continue to face gender-
specific forms of violence.
Serbia has yet to adopt implementing legislation for the Law on temporary social care
residents. There is still no legal basis ensuring that placement decisions in care homes are
subject to regular court reviews. Deprivation of legal capacity procedures need to be
changed to strengthen the position of the individuals concerned. Amendments to the Family
Law to abolish the existing system of complete deprivation of legal capacity have yet to be
adopted. Despite improvements introduced by the August 2026 amendments to the Law on
the protection of persons with mental disorders, further revisions are needed to align with
European and international standards on the rights of the child and of persons with
disabilities, including previous CPT recommendations to Serbia.
LGBTIQ+ persons
The legal protection of the rights of LGBTIQ+ persons needs to be improved. LGBTIQ+ persons, in particular transgender persons and persons experiencing multiple and intersecting forms of discrimination, continue to face high levels of discrimination, hate speech, violence and abuse. Implementation of strategic measures to combat discrimination and protect the rights of LGBTIQ+ persons remains insufficient. Serbia does not provide for legal recognition and protection of same-sex couples, as required by relevant ECtHR case- law. The anti-discrimination action plan does not provide for the adoption of a law on same- sex partnerships or for regulating legal gender recognition, contrary to the previous strategy.
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Difficulties remain, especially in smaller municipalities, in enforcing the Law on birth registry which enables data on gender changes to be entered into the registry. Difficulties in obtaining diplomas reflecting the new names of persons who have undergone legal gender recognition also persist. The new Law on civil registry simplifies the procedure for recording legal gender changes but its relevant provisions will only apply three years after its entry into force.
The implementation of legislation combating hate crime, including on grounds of sexual orientation, remains inadequate. Violence and discrimination against LGBTIQ+ persons remain unreported due to lack of trust in institutions and fear of secondary victimisation. There is no official data on intersex persons who continue to lack adequate legal protection. Serbia has yet to address the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI)’s recommendation to prohibit medically unnecessary interventions until intersex children are able to participate in decisions concerning their bodies on the basis of free and informed consent.
The pride event in Belgrade in September 2026 took place largely peacefully despite verbal confrontation by individuals opposing the march. This event was preceded by the pride caravan which was cancelled by police in some municipalities due to security concerns.
Procedural rights of suspects and accused persons and rights of victims of crime
Serbia has yet to align the Criminal Code and Criminal Procedure Code with the EU acquis on procedural rights of suspects and accused persons in criminal proceedings and the rights of victims of crime. Efforts are also needed to ensure full alignment with the Directive on compensation to crime victims. A new strategy and action plan for the rights of victims and witnesses of crime for 2026-2029 have yet to be adopted. A nationwide victim support service has yet to be established. Moreover, specific human and financial resources are needed to set up victim and witness support services in 10 high courts. Further investments are also needed to equip high courts with separate rooms and special equipment so that victims do not have to face perpetrators during proceedings. In addition, an effective referral mechanism has yet to be established. CSOs continue to provide the bulk of specialised victim support although they still lack sufficient and stable financing.
Regarding access to justice, there is a need for stronger financial support to be provided at state level, for local self-governments to have greater capacity to handle legal aid requests and for further attention to be paid to ensure women have access to justice in all cases of gender-based violence and discrimination. Although the analysis of the necessary amendments to the Law on free legal aid has been finalised, its adoption continues to be delayed.
Protection of minorities
Serbia’s policy framework for the protection of persons belonging to minorities is now in place following the adoption of a new action plan in May 2026 which partially addresses the recommendations of the most recent Council of Europe report of February 2025 (Fifth Opinion). The Coordination Body for monitoring the implementation of the action plan was established in July 2026. Persons belonging to minorities continue to face discrimination. It remains vital to ensure that national minority councils are functioning properly and independently. These councils need increased administrative capacity, including in terms of human resources. The action plan for improvements in the representation of Albanians in institutionshas not yet delivered measurable outcomes. Further efforts by both the Ministry of Human and Minority Rights and Social Dialogue and the Albanian National Minority Council are needed to re-establish dialogue and cooperation. The authorities need to address the concerns expressed in the Fifth Opinion regarding the procedure for the ‘passivisation’ of addresses. Trust and understanding of passivisation would benefit from reducing the potential for inconsistent application at local level, by improving methods of communication with affected individuals, and by increasing the clarity and effectiveness of
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the redress mechanisms. National minorities remain underrepresented in public administration and the judiciary. Work needs to continue to improve their representation in the police. The Ministry of Education allocated funding for the printing of new textbooks in minority languages; this work needs to be further intensified. Access to religious worship in minority languages has yet to be guaranteed throughout Serbia. There are still insufficient public broadcasting services in minority languages, except among some local broadcasters in Vojvodina. Cases of hate speech against national minorities in the media and by some politicians have been reported.
Roma
Overall, the situation of Roma needs to be substantially improved and the gap with the rest of the population reduced in all relevant areas. Moreover, Roma people continue to face discrimination. An action plan for Roma inclusion was adopted in December 2025. Robust monitoring and data collection are needed to meet the commitments made in the Poznan Declaration. Job descriptions for local Roma coordinators, pedagogical assistants and health mediators have not been aligned, and contracts have been signed with limited duration. Most Roma people in Serbia have civil documentation. The procedure for registering all births, regardless of the parents’ status, needs to be implemented effectively and monitored. Roma pupils continue to receive scholarships through affirmative measures. However, school dropout rates remain high, especially among Roma girls. Roma pupils are still over- represented in special-needs schools and classes. The transition from education to the labour market is particularly challenging. Roma people are still underrepresented in the public administration. Forced evictions are still taking place, in breach of the law and international standards. The Council of Europe’s Fifth Opinion stressed that no evictions should take place without adequate notice and without providing effective opportunities for rehousing in decent, affordable accommodation. Early and child marriage remains an issue of concern among Roma girls living in settlements. Domestic violence also often goes unreported.
Citizenship rights
Serbia will need to ensure that the EU acquis on EU citizenship rights, notably the right to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States, can be applied upon accession. In this context, Serbia will need to carry out an analysis of the alignment and implementation needs arising from the EU acquis, which will need to cover all policy areas affected, with alignment timely planned accordingly.
2.2.2 Chapter 24: Justice, freedom and security
The EU has common rules for borderand migration management, visa policy, and asylum. . Schengen cooperation entails the lifting of border controls inside the EU. There is also cooperation in the fight against serious and organised crime and terrorism, and judicial, police and customs cooperation, all with the support of the EU Justice and Home Affairs agencies.
Fight against serious and organised crime
The legal framework on serious and organised crime is partially aligned with the EU acquis.
However, capacity to fight serious and organised crime needs to be improved.
General framework
Legal alignment, strategic and institutional frameworks
An operational plan, only covering the adoption of legislation and strategic documents linked to Chapter 24 interim benchmarks, was adopted in June 2026. Once drawn up in line with EU standards and adopted, full implementation of these laws and strategies will be key, also to establish a strong track record in this field. Serbia is yet to amend the Law on internal affairs to give the police greater operational autonomy with respect to the Ministry of the
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Interior during the pre-investigation and investigation phases and to address the recommendations of the Committee for the Prevention of Torture. The Law on seizure and confiscation of the proceeds of crime remains to be adopted to align the asset recovery legal framework with the EU acquis. Serbia still has to formally establish the Asset Recovery Office. Serbia is a party to the Second Additional Protocol to the Convention on Cybercrime on Enhanced Cooperation and the Disclosure of Electronic Evidence. In 2026 Serbia adopted a High-Tech Crime Strategy and action plan, thus enhancing its capacity to fight cybercrime.
The Prosecutor’s Office for Organised Crime (POOC) and the Special Department for Cybercrime still lack sufficient human, material and technical resources to carry out their tasks. Staffing of the Special Department for Cybercrime has been reduced to five prosecutors in addition to the head prosecutor, and seven prosecutorial assistants. As a result of amendments in January 2026 to the legislation governing the judiciary and the prosecution, including the Law on the organisation and competences of state authorities for the suppression of high-tech crime, the Special Prosecutor’s Office for Cybercrime has become a department within the Higher Public Prosecution Office in Belgrade (now called the Special Department for Cybercrime). Since June 2026, the POOC has been operating with 24 out of the required 25 prosecutors. However, the January 2026 amendments, which terminated at short notice the temporary assignments of all seconded prosecutors as from March 2026, undermined the functioning of the POOC for several months, with a direct impact on ongoing investigations. The lack of appropriate premises to carry out POOC functions remains a concern.
Cooperation between the POOC and the police has deteriorated, with reports by the POOC of collected evidence not being shared and delays in following up requests, thereby hindering investigations. Large-scale personnel changes within the police resulted in experienced investigators being replaced, which slowed down several investigations, notably related to organised crime, money laundering and corruption. Serbia should adopt amendments to the Law on the organisation and jurisdiction of state authorities in suppression of organised crime, terrorism and corruption to improve the institutional set-up in the fight against organised crime, and revise its legislative framework to ensure that investigators are accountable solely to the prosecution during pre-investigations and investigations.
The POOC and the police lack the technical resources to carry out special investigative measures without the help of the Security Information Agency (BIA). The police services require a shared case/workflow management system, connecting all institutions and giving them access to a common database. Serbia should continue to work towards achieving a fully operational national criminal intelligence system.
Serbia should phase out the role of the security services in investigations of serious and organised crime cases. Legislative changes should be made so that the activities of the BIA and the Military Security Agency are limited to national security threats only and no longer include involvement in criminal proceedings. The remits and regulations for criminal investigations and for security operations need to be clearly separated.
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The 2026-2028 operational plan for financial investigations and for the seizure and confiscation of proceeds of criminal offences remains to be adopted. After adoption, its implementation, together with improved cooperation between the POOC and law enforcement agencies, should improve financial investigations and the identification, seizure and confiscation of proceeds of crime.
Implementation and enforcement capacity
Between 2024 and 2025, the total value of seized assets decreased by nearly 30% (although it was still significantly higher than between 2020-2023), while the total value of confiscated assets increased.
The POOC is consistently carrying out financial investigations, however its resources need to be increased to enable it to conduct investigations more proactively, including systematic tracking of money flows, as well as to identify more criminal assets, uncover illegal financial schemes, increase confiscation and gather circumstantial evidence of unexplained wealth. In 2025, the POOC initiated parallel financial investigations in relation to 147 defendants in cases of serious and organised crime.
The legal framework and the practice of using plea agreements needs to be balanced against the need to avoid any perception of impunity in serious and organised crime cases. Serbia should continue to increase the number of proactive investigations, based on intelligence-led policing, focusing on high-profile cases to dismantle high risk international criminal organisations.
Law enforcement cooperation
Cooperation with CEPOL, Eurojust, Europol and Interpol continued, leading to arrests in serious and organised crime cases and to the disruption of organised criminal groups. Serbia continued to actively participate in the European Multidisciplinary Platform Against Criminal Threats (EMPACT), taking part in 76 operational actions (up from 64 in 2023), including four as action co-leader in the 2024-2025 cycle. In the EMPACT 2026-2027 cycle, Serbia participates in 74 operational actions and has taken on for the first time the role of an action leader in one operational action under Online Fraud Schemes operational action plan. Serbia is also a co-leader in four operational actions: one under Cocaine, Cannabis and Heroin operational action plan, and three under Migrant Smuggling Migration operational action plan.
Serbia is encouraged to make full use of its access to CEPOL capacity-building activities. To establish a sustainable professional development, Serbia should adopt the sectoral competencies and integrate knowledge acquired through CEPOL capacity-building actions to its law enforcement training system.
Serbia needs to step up its efforts to implement the Directive on the obligation of carriers to communicate passenger data, and the Directive on the use of passenger name record data for the prevention, detection, investigation and prosecution of terrorist offences and serious crime.
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Judicial cooperation in criminal matters
Judicial cooperation in criminal matters remained broadly satisfactory in 2025. The legal framework governing judicial cooperation in criminal matters is partially aligned with the EU acquis, to the extent that alignment is already possible. Alignment of the Criminal Code and Criminal Procedure Code with the EU acquis is pending. Serbia is a party to the relevant Council of Europe conventions and protocols on cooperation in criminal matters.
Administrative capacity needs to be increased to enable requests for mutual legal assistance to be executed more efficiently and to reduce processing times. In 2025, 3 091 requests were processed, with an average processing time of 470 days. In 2026, 1 598 requests were processed with an average processing time of 480 days. In October 2026, the absolute limitation period for enforcing the final prison sentence of former President of the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro expired, while repeated Montenegrin extradition request to Serbia remained unanswered.
Good cooperation between Eurojust and Serbia, through the Serbian Liaison Prosecutor, continued until March 2026, at which point the mandate of the Liaison Prosecutor expired, thus disrupting mutual legal assistance and participation in coordination meetings and joint investigative teams. However, in May 2026, the previous Liaison Prosecutor was appointed for a further six-year mandate. Between September 2025 and March 2026, Serbia was involved in 59 new cases at Eurojust, including 20 as the requesting country. Most cases were related to drug trafficking, organised crime and fraud. In 2025, Serbia participated in seven active joint investigation teams, while another five have been prepared, out of which four are pending sign-off by the Ministry of Justice. Serbia needs to address the delays in signing joint investigation teams’ agreements. The Supreme Public Prosecution Office and the Ministry of Justice continued to actively cooperate with the European Judicial Network. A draft Memorandum of Cooperation between the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO) and the Ministry of Justice remains to be signed. In 2025, the EPPO sent five requests for mutual legal assistance to the authorities of Serbia, and it had five active cases with links to Serbia at the end of the same year.
Limited progress was made in the use of the EU-facilitated Mutual Legal Assistance arrangements in civil matters with Kosovo. Cooperation remains insufficient, with only a very limited number of cases processed by Serbia.
Crime areas
Investigation and criminalisation of money laundering
Serbia was assessed under the sixth round of Moneyval mutual evaluations in 2025, and achieved substantial effectiveness in relation to money laundering investigations and prosecutions (immediate outcome 7) and asset recovery (immediate outcome 8). However, weaknesses were identified in relation to asset confiscation and provisional measures. Capacity to investigate and prosecute money laundering has increased, including for standalone money-laundering cases. However, the POOC and the prosecutors’ offices of the Anti-Corruption Departments do not have an integrated approach in place, thus
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preventing money laundering offences being addressed efficiently. The permanent task force within the POOC for detecting and prosecuting members of organised crime groups who commit money laundering offences is no longer in operation and should be reinstated by appointing law enforcement investigators. Cooperation between the Agency for the Prevention of Money Laundering and the POOC needs to be improved.
Efforts to fight money laundering and indictments by the POOC led to 11 individuals being convicted in 2025 (compared with eight in 2024). In 2025, 92 individuals were convicted (final decision) for money laundering in courts of general jurisdiction (for anti-money laundering and countering the financing of terrorism, see also Chapter 4 – Free movement of capital).
Cybercrime
Further work is needed to align Serbian legislation with the Second Additional Protocol to the Council of Europe Budapest Convention on Cybercrime. The 2026-2030 Programme for Combating High-Tech Crime and the 2026-2028 Action Plan remains to be adopted.
The Service for Combating High-Tech Crime in the police requires additional human resources, including to address the growing prevalence of cybercrime, while it is equipped to monitor and investigate darknet activities. Serbia has been participating actively in operations with Europol’s Cybercrime Centre and Interpol’s Global Complex for Innovation. Serbia’s platform for reporting cyber-enabled criminal offences was launched in June 2026.
Child sexual abuse
Serbia still needs to address the Lanzarote Committee’s recommendations on the Convention on the Protection of Children against Sexual Exploitation and Sexual Abuse. The legal framework governing child sexual abuse needs to be aligned with the Directive on combating the sexual abuse and sexual exploitation of children and child pornography. Amendments to the Criminal Code remain to be adopted to align with the EU acquis. Additional human resources are needed to effectively combat child sexual abuse.
Trafficking in human beings
In April 2026, Serbia adopted a new Law on preventing and combating trafficking in human beings and on protecting victims in order to align with the EU acquis. Serbia’s legislative
framework needs to be further aligned with the EU acquis in the field of trafficking in human beings, through amendments to the Criminal Code and the Criminal Procedure Code. Their implementation, along with the adoption of implementing legislation and the provision of adequate funding and operational resources to the relevant institutions, should improve the protection of victims of trafficking though a victim-centred approach. CSOs remain the primary providers of support in such cases but still lack sufficient and stable financing. Serbia is continuing to implement the 2024-2029 programme for the fight against human trafficking and its 2024-2026 action plan although neither has yet had any tangible
impact. Coordination between national and local-level institutions should be strengthened to ensure that victims are properly identified, adequately protected, supported and not re- victimised.
Serbia should continue to improve its support for and protection of victims of trafficking in human beings, including by providing proper protection during trials. Moreover, it should
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continue to improve the investigation, prosecution and adjudication of trafficking cases, in particular those involving labour exploitation and third-country victims.
Migrant smuggling
Serbia has the capacity to investigate, prosecute and convict migrant smugglers but should continue strengthening this capacity, in particular to pursue organised criminal groups. Serbia continues to participate in the Global Alliance to Counter Migrant Smuggling and endorsed the Global Alliance Joint Declaration in December 2025. Serbia also participated in the second Senior Officials’ Meeting of the Global Alliance in July 2026. Under the EMPACT framework, Serbia has engaged in operational actions against migrant smuggling, including data exchange, police training and collaboration with international organisations. In particular, Serbia is co-leader of 3 operational actions under the 2026-2027 operational action plan on migrant smuggling.
In 2025, Serbia launched new investigations into 136 migrant smuggling cases and filed indictments against 189 defendants, i.e. over 50% fewer than in 2024.
Trafficking in firearms
In December 2025, Serbia adopted the 2025-2030 programme for the control of small arms and light weapons, ammunition and explosives and the accompanying action plan for the period 2025-2027.
In July 2026, Serbia adopted a new Law on weapons and ammunition in order to align with the EU acquis. However, further efforts should be directed towards harmonising with the EU rules on deactivation. The Criminal Code was amended in July 2026 to effectively criminalise the trafficking of weapons, in line with the provisions of the UN Convention against Transnational Organised Crime and its Firearms Protocol, which should be applied to convictions for such crimes.
Positive steps have been taken to improve firearms stockpile management; however, Serbia must continue increasing the destruction of weapons. Similarly to 2024, Serbia seized 1 091 pieces of firearms, 35 796 pieces of ammunition and 8.1 kilograms of explosives in 2025. The Firearms Focal Point remains fully operational. However, the fact that it still lacks sufficient personnel to tackle firearms offences, crime and trafficking remains a cause for concern.
Cooperation in the field of drugs
The legal framework for cooperation in the field of drugs needs to be improved.
Serbia’s legal framework for psychoactive substances has been in force since 2021. Legislative measures should be taken so that only samples of drugs are kept as
material evidence for court proceedings.
The national drug strategy expired in 2021, and a new strategy is yet to be adopted. In July 2026, a new Operational plan on drug abuse prevention for the period 2026-2027 was adopted, as a transitional operational
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framework pending the preparation of the new strategic document on drug policy for the period 2028–2030, together with its accompanying Action Plan. This new strategic document should address the drug phenomenon in a balanced approach between health and security and be aligned with the relevant EU strategic framework on drugs. Serbia has a well- established national early warning system that continues to interface with the EU Drugs Agency (EUDA) with regard to psychoactive substances and related trends. The list of psychoactive controlled substances continues to be updated, and Serbia’s National Drugs Observatory remains operational.
International cooperation remained strong throughout the reporting period, with two notable joint operations carried out with Germany and North Macedonia, respectively.
The Office for Combating Drugs of the Government of the Republic of Serbia collects data from its partners, including civil society organisations, which it regularly submits to the EUDA.
Counterfeiting of the euro
Serbia’s legislation on the suppression of counterfeit currency is largely aligned with the EU acquis.
Serbia’s central bank has formal cooperation agreements in place with the European Commission on coins and with the European Central Bank on banknotes. The National Bank of Serbia has been conducting technical analyses and providing specialised training for licensed entities that authenticate euro coins and process euro banknotes. Procedures are in place to deal with counterfeit money (see Chapter 32 – financial control).
Counter-terrorism, prevention and resilience
Fight against terrorism and prevention of radicalisation
Legal alignment, strategic and institutional frameworks
The legal framework for the fight against terrorism is largely aligned with the EU acquis. The legal framework for the countering of violent extremism is partially aligned with the EU acquis. Full compliance with the EU acquis on explosives precursors still needs be ensured.
Serbia did not make any further amendments to its legal framework governing the fight against terrorism and the prevention of radicalisation and violent extremism.
After its previous strategy expired in 2021, Serbia adopted the programme for countering terrorism and all forms of radicalisation and violent extremism for the period 2026-2030 together with its accompanying action plan for the period 2026-2027 in June 2026. The National Coordination Body for the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism has been in place, with a national coordinator, since July 2023.
Implementation and enforcement capacity
The fight against terrorism is broadly satisfactory.
The countering of violent extremism, in particular ethno-nationalism and violent right-wing extremism, needs to be improved.
In October 2025, Serbia signed the new Joint Action Plan (JAP) on Preventing and Countering of Terrorism and Violent Extremism for the Western Balkans. The roadmap for its implementation remains to be adopted.
The increasing presence of right-wing extremist content online, along with hateful content, disinformation, and new forms of online extremism, such as nihilistic extremism, remains a concern.
Serbia remains actively engaged in international counterterrorism cooperation through Europol and the Council of Europe, including as part of analysis projects by the European Counter Terrorism Centre, and data exchanges through the counter-terrorism SIENA.
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Moneyval’s December 2025 evaluation indicated the need to further improve the investigation, prosecution and punishment of terrorist financing cases and to protect non- profit organisations from terrorist financing abuse.
In 2025, there were two convictions for terrorism related offences and the Prosecutors’ Office for Organised Crime filed two indictments. There were no indictment or final conviction for financing of terrorism.
Serbia is encouraged to apply the methodology developed with the support of the Counter Terrorism Support Network (CTSN) to prepare a domestic terrorism trend and situation report.
Critical infrastructure protection
Legal alignment, strategic and institutional frameworks
The legal framework for critical infrastructure protection and the resilience of critical entities is not aligned with the EU acquis and Serbia should take steps to align its legislation with the Directive on the resilience of critical entities.
Implementation and enforcement capacity
The protection of critical infrastructure and the resilience of critical entities need to be improved. Serbia should speed up the process of critical infrastructure identification. Furthermore, the identification of critical entities has yet to be completed for all relevant sectors, creating difficulties in terms of risk management and the planning of protective measures.
Migration and asylum
Legal and irregular migration and returns
The legal framework for the management of legal and irregular migration is partially aligned with the EU acquis. Management of legal and irregular migration is broadly satisfactory.
Legal alignment, strategic and institutional frameworks
The legislative framework for the management of external borders is largely aligned with the EU acquis. Further alignment and better implementation are needed to identify cases of illegal border crossing and people smuggling, ensure irregular migrants are registered efficiently, and to provide effective human rights monitoring mechanisms and access to free legal aid.
Serbia contributed to the management of mixed migration flows to the EU and actively cooperated with the EU, EU Member States and with its neighbours to implement the EU Action Plan on the Western Balkans. Progress has been made on several pillars of the EU Action Plan on the Western Balkans, particularly on border management, fighting migrant smuggling and returns. However, further efforts are needed, notably on processing asylum claims.
In 2025, Serbia continued to provide temporary protection to all people fleeing Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, in line with the decision adopted in March 2024 to extend such temporary protection for as long as the reasons for granting it persist.
In terms of combating irregular migration, Serbia continued to prevent a large number of illegal border crossings. Serbia further improved its capacities for border management through the implementation of the integrated border management strategy (2022-2027). The corresponding action plan for the period 2025-2027 was adopted in December 2025, and the coordination body was established in August 2026.
As an observer in the European Migration Network (EMN), Serbia continued to be covered by the asylum and migration overview of EMN member and observer countries.
Implementation and enforcement capacity
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Serbia continues to host a substantial number of third-country nationals with EU support.
Overall, Serbia’s reception capacity is adequate. A total of 9 757 irregular migrants were housed in reception centres and asylum centres. Due to a significant decline in occupancy following reduced migration flows (50% fewer migrants compared with the previous year), only three reception centres (out of twelve) remain in operation, mainly in the south of the country. A considerable number of people transited undetected through the country aided
by violent smuggling groups. These groups continue to operate. The number of unaccompanied and separated children remained high, which is of particular concern (1 575 in 2025). On several occasions, apprehended migrants, including minors, had to be temporarily housed in police stations.
Serbia continued to step up police controls targeting migrants illegally present in the country. In 2025, there were 9 480 detected cases of individuals either residing illegally or attempting to illegally enter the country.
As concerns readmission with the EU, the EU-Serbia readmission agreement continued to be implemented. Cooperation on the readmission of third-country nationals who transit through Serbia remained limited. In February 2026, Serbia signed a Standard Operating Procedure with Belgium as part of the implementation of the EU-Serbia readmission agreement.
As concerns return of third country nationals to their countries of origin, in March 2026, Serbia ratified a readmission agreement with Kazakhstan as part of the implementation of the EU Action Plan on the Western Balkans. Efforts to establish cooperation on legal migration and readmission are ongoing with Bangladesh and Uzbekistan.
Serbia should take further measures to prevent secondary movements to the EU by third- country nationals legally residing in Serbia, including foreign workers. In total, 75 foreign nationals, the majority of whom were referred from detention centres for foreigners, were assisted in voluntarily returning to their countries of origin. Regarding forced returns conducted by land, in 2025, four third-country nationals were returned to border crossing points with neighbouring non-EU countries.
In October 2025, the government adopted a Regulation establishing the Programme for Support to the Voluntary Return of Foreigners for the period 2026–2029, which provides a legal basis for continuing and sustaining activities in the field of returns.
Asylum
While the legal framework on asylum is largely aligned with the EU acquis as it was in force until 12 June 2026, Serbia should focus on developing its national legal framework and operational capacities on migration and asylum to align with the Pact.
Legal alignment, strategic and institutional frameworks
Serbia’s legal framework is largely aligned with the EU acquis, although its implementation needs to be improved, including in relation to the quality of decision-making bodies, in order to ensure asylum claims are processed in a fair and timely manner. In July 2026, Serbia started reviewing the legal framework on asylum and temporary protection to further align it
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with the EU acquis, notably as regards effective access to the asylum procedure and the rights and obligations of applicants/people under international protection.
Serbia has the necessary institutions to manage asylum applications. The third roadmap for cooperation (2024-2026) with the European Union Agency for Asylum (EUAA) was endorsed together with its implementation plan in November 2025.
Serbia has an annual contingency plan (response plan) to respond to large influxes of migrants. In November 2025, with EU support, Serbia further enhanced its monitoring and response capacity, including by developing early warning indicators for migration crises and a standardised four-level escalation model.
Implementation and enforcement capacity
In 2025, the number of applicants for international protection was lower than in previous years. Of the 626 individuals who expressed an intention to seek international protection (compared with 850 in 2024), only 132 filed an asylum application (compared with 219 in 2024).
The Asylum Office was fully staffed in 2025 and conducted 42% more interviews compared with the previous year (152 in 2025 compared with 107 in 2024). In turn, it was able to reduce the backlog and ensure a monthly presence at asylum centres.
The asylum recognition rate was very low. The absconding rate remained high, exceeding 50%. In 2025, only two applicants received refugee status, five received subsidiary protection while 122 had their asylum claims denied.
Further improvements are needed to ensure high-quality, merit-based asylum decisions, compliance with legal deadlines, and consistent access to interpretation, translation, and free legal aid. Although support is available to help with the integration of refugees, including healthcare and social protection, effective integration remains hindered by a lack of opportunities for skills development and insufficient access to cultural mediation, translation, and interpretation services. Integration of persons with disabilities needs to be prioritised with targeted support and access to social housing.
Serbia’s cooperation with the EUAA remains strong. Although the third roadmap for cooperation (2024-2026) was only adopted by the government in November 2025, the EUAA continued to assist the Serbian authorities, mainly the Asylum Office and the Commissariat for Refugees and Migration, throughout the year.
Due to reduced migration flows, only six asylum and reception centres remain in operation, while the other six centres have been temporarily closed. The occupancy rate of the reception centre for unaccompanied and separated children (UASC) run by the
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Commissariat for Refugees and Migration was very low. Crucial services at reception and asylum centres, such as psycho-social support, legal assistance, interpretation and cultural mediation, which are entirely dependent on civil society organisations, have been discontinued due to a lack of funding.
Visa policy
Serbia’s visa policy is not fully aligned with EU policy, in particular the list of third countries whose nationals require a visa to enter the EU. No progress on visa alignment was made in 2025. Moreover, Serbia’s still has visa-free arrangements with 12 countries on the EU’s list of non-EU countries whose nationals require a visa to enter the EU: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Belarus, China, Indonesia, Jamaica, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Russia, Suriname and Türkiye. In July 2026, a three-year plan was developed to align Serbia’s overall visa policy with the EU acquis and remains to be adopted by the Government.
Serbia took steps to enhance screening measures for third-country nationals who do not require a visa, including more detailed verification of travel documents and a risk assessment. However, further improvement is needed particularly for arrivals from countries presenting heightened security or irregular migration risks.
According to Eurostat, 1 870 Serbian nationals applied for asylum in the EU-27 in 2025, a 42% decrease compared with 3 225 in 2024.
The acquisition of visa-free travel rights within the EU by Russian nationals who are granted Serbian citizenship continues to pose potential security risks to the EU. Serbia should put an end to the practice of granting citizenship under accelerated or simplified procedures to nationals of countries that pose illegal migration or security risks to the EU.
The Commission’s Eighth Report under the Visa Suspension Mechanism concluded that Serbia had taken steps to address previous recommendations.
Schengen governance and external borders
The legislative and strategic framework for the management of external borders is largely aligned with the EU acquis. Management of borders is broadly satisfactory.
Legal alignment, strategic and institutional frameworks
Further efforts are needed to align with and implement the EU acquis.
Implementation of the Integrated Border Management Strategy (2022-2027) is underway, the corresponding new action plan 2025-2027 was approved in December 2025, and the coordination body was established in August 2026. Serbia has continued to align further with the Schengen acquis by implementing the Action Plan for the Accession of the Republic of Serbia to the Schengen Area 2023-2028.
Implementation and enforcement capacity
The implementation of the Integrated Border Management Strategy has been delayed and will require continued investment in technical and human resources, including infrastructure, to enable border controls to be carried out in line with Schengen requirements. Implementation of the strategy and action plan for Serbia’s accession to the Schengen area is underway.
Based on the Police Cooperation Convention for Southeast Europe (PCC SEE), the Ministry of the Interior has cooperation arrangements in place with all neighbouring countries. Joint patrols are being carried out with neighbouring countries, including Hungary, North Macedonia, Romania and Bosnia and Herzegovina.
The Serbian authorities enjoy well-established cooperation with the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex). As of September 2026, 167 standing corps officers are deployed at Serbia’s borders with North Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Hungary and Bulgaria and at Belgrade international airport, under the status agreement between the
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European Union and Serbia.
The Interim Common Crossing-Points (CCPs) between Kosovo and Serbia remain operational. Only two of the six permanent CCPs have been established (Merdarë/Merdare and Mutivodë/Mutivode), hosted by Kosovo. Serbia still needs to establish permanent CCPs to be hosted by their side (Jarinje/Rudnica, Končulj/Dheu i Bardhë and Depce/Muçibabë), which led to a suspension of EU funds for a project in 2018. In addition, Serbia needs to engage constructively to enable the construction of the CCP hosted by Kosovo in the north of Kosovo at Tabavije/Bërnjak-Tabalije/Brnjak. Urgent efforts are still required from Serbia to close illegal roads and bypasses to ensure exclusive use of official crossing points for goods and people entering or leaving Kosovo. The conditions of several CCPs remain a serious concern, with inadequate maintenance resulting in deteriorating infrastructure and potential health and safety risks for staff and travellers. Serbia needs to urgently ensure the proper maintenance and safe functioning of the CCP facilities for which it is responsible.
In 2025, Serbia implemented its anti-corruption preventive mechanism as part of the Integrated Border Management System through inspections carried out by the Border Police Directorate. As a result, 10 criminal charges were brought against officers of the border police for incidents involving corruption and four disciplinary proceedings were initiated.
Several investments are underway to establish and bring into operation the EUROSUR national coordination centre, including investments in advanced surveillance systems. Inter- agency cooperation is satisfactory, notably between border police and customs at border crossing points. Further improvements are needed as regards information exchange, included enhanced access to databases and a secure information exchange system.
In June 2025, the Ministry of Internal Affairs and border management agencies developed a roadmap for achieving IT systems’ interoperability with the European Union, including the Entry/Exit System (EES). The roadmap set out all legal, technical and procedural steps and conditions regarding the design, connection and implementation of the EES.
Judicial cooperation in civil and commercial matters
Judicial cooperation in civil and commercial matters is broadly satisfactory.
Serbia continued reporting on its implementation of the 2007 Hague Convention on Child Support, in force since February 2021. No progress was made on acceding to core instruments under the Hague Conference on Private International Law, namely the 2000 Hague Convention on the International Protection of Adults, the 2005 Hague Convention on Choice of Court and the 2019 Hague Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Civil or Commercial Matters.
In 2025, 2 256 requests for mutual legal assistance were processed, with an average processing time of 460 days.
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2.3. ECONOMIC CRITERIA4
2.3.1. The existence of a functioning market economy
Economic governance
Serbia remained committed to maintaining macroeconomic stability, but its implementation of reforms has been inconsistent. In December 2024, Serbia agreed a 36-month policy coordination instrument (PCI) with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) under which Serbia is committed to continuing to implement important reforms in the area of SOE governance, the public sector wage system, fiscal transparency, public investment management and energy sector reforms. The government’s current fiscal strategy (2026-2028) sets a deficit target of 3.0% of GDP until 2027, falling to 2.5% in 2028, in agreement with the IMF. However, in August 2026, the government effectively raised the 2026 deficit target to 3.0-3.5% of GDP, including through granting immediate cash transfers to a wide range of population groups, in the run-up to national elections in October.
Serbia has partially implemented the policy guidance set out in the conclusions of the
4 Unless otherwise indicated, the data in this section are taken from the relevant national sources (the statistical
office, Ministry of Finance and central bank).
Table: 2023 2024 2025
Serbia - Key economic figures
GDP per capita (% of EU-27 in PPS)1) 43 48 52 52
Real GDP growth 3.6 3.7 3.9 2.0
Activity rate of the population aged 15-64 (%), total1)2) 68.5 71.7 72.7 73.0
female 61.5 65.6 66.9 67.3
male 75.5 77.8 78.6 78.7
Unemployment rate of the population aged 15-64 (%), total1)2) 11.5 9.7 8.9 9.0
female 12.2 10.2 9.1 9.2
male 11.0 9.3 8.8 8.7
Employment of the population aged 15-64 (annual growth %) 0.8 0.2 1.4 -0.7
Nominal wages (annual growth %) 8.6 14.7 14.4 11.6
Consumer price index (annual growth %) 4.1 12.1 4.6 3.8
Exchange rate against EUR 118.3 117.3 117.1 117.2
Current account balance (% of GDP) -5.2 -2.4 -4.5 -4.9
Net foreign direct investment, FDI (% of GDP) 6.6 5.7 5.5 2.6
General government balance (% of GDP) -2.2 -2.1 -2.0 -2.4
General government debt (% of GDP) 53.2 48.0 46.7 44.4
Notes :
1) Eurostat
2) From Q1-2022, the Labour Force Survey is based on the results of the 2022 population census,
restricting comparability with previous years data.
Sources: Statistical office of Serbia, National Bank of Serbia, Ministry of Finance of Serbia and Eurostat
2017-22
average
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May 2025 Economic and Financial Dialogue. Serbia’s budget deficit was lower than forecasted, while the central bank maintained an appropriate monetary policy stance. Progress was made in assessing the long-term sustainability of the pension system and in preparing a comprehensive tax expenditure review. Likewise, work continued on enhancing fiscal risk monitoring (especially related to SOEs, court decisions and potential natural disasters) and promoting greater use of the dinar. The central bank is implementing a credit registry to harmonise bank lending information. Ongoing reforms on public investment management aim at addressing the existing exemptions which allow major projects to bypass standard selection and screening procedures. The public sector wage system reform remains incomplete, while the total wage bill is in line with the fiscal rules.
Macroeconomic stability
GDP growth slowed markedly from 3.9% in 2024 to 2% in 2025, but recovered in the first half of 2026 to 3.5%. Growth in 2025 was well below the average of 3.4% between 2020 and 2024. The slowdown was driven by domestic political instability, sanctions against Serbia’s only oil refinery, and global uncertainties concerning tariffs and trade, all of which affected consumer and business confidence, investment and exports. Nevertheless, consumer spending was still supported by fast wage growth and hikes in pensions and minimum wages, while inflation slowed. In the first half of 2026 GDP reboundedby 3.2% in Q1 and 3.8% in Q2, driven by private consumption and construction. The income gap with the EU average continued to narrow slightly in 2025, with GDP per capita, in purchasing power standards, 52% of the EU average, up from 48% in 2023.
The current account deficit remained elevated, rising from 4.7% of GDP in 2024 to 4.9% in 2025. The higher deficit was caused mainly by a smaller surplus in services trade and a higher primary income deficit. However, in the first half of 2026, up until June, the current account deficit declined by 30%, compared to the same period one year earlier, amounting to 3.1% of GDP. This was notably due to strong exports of goods and services outpacing imports. Amidst domestic political turmoil and global trade uncertainties, investor sentiment weakened and net FDI inflows halved in 2025 compared to 2024, amounting to 2.4% of GDP, and staying at a similar level in the first half of 2026. At the end of 2025, the central bank’s foreign exchange reserves were still relatively high at EUR 29 billion (32.7% of GDP), corresponding to 6.8 months’ worth of imports. They were boosted partly by a surge in gold prices, bearing in mind that gold makes up 21.4% of Serbia’s total foreign exchange reserves. At the end of Q2 2026, reserves edged down to 32.2% of GDP. External debt continued a decreasing trend to 57.7% of GDP in 2025, compared to an average of 62% between 2020 and 2024.
Monetary policy remained relatively tight in 2025, which helped inflation remain within the central bank’s target band (3±1.5%) in 2025, but price rises were temporarily suppressed by ad hoc government intervention in retail trade margins. The central bank remained cautious, keeping the key policy rate stable at 5.75% since September 2024. Between September 2025 and February 2026, the government introduced a 20% margin cap on most food items, household cleaning products and personal hygiene goods. While at odds with free market principles, this significant market intervention led to a marked reduction in inflation (from 4.7% in August 2025 to 2.9% in September 2025). Overall, average annual inflation was 3.8% in 2025, down from 4.7% in 2024. Inflation has remained relatively steady despite the global energy price shock. It rose only gradually from 2.6% in Q1 to 3.3% and 3.5% respectively in April and May, and was down to only 1.9% in July, helped by a good agricultural season and cuts to energy taxation. Amid a deteriorating
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external position, the stability of the dinar was maintained by the central bank taking regular action on the foreign exchange market, with net sales of EUR 580 million in 2025.
General government deficit was lower than planned in 2025, at 2.4% of GDP, albeit up 0.4 pps on the previous year. Even with weaker-than-expected GDP growth, the budget deficit was lower than the 3% target after revenue was sustained by solid growth in labour taxes, compensating for weaker consumption-related taxes. At the same time, expenditure was lower than planned, notably due to slower investment execution. The public debt-to-GDP ratio fell to 44.4% from 46.7% in 2024. In response to the global energy crisis stemming from the conflict in the Middle East, Serbia repeatedly lowered excise duties on fuel in a non-targeted manner, with implications for tax revenue. In addition, in August 2026, the government raised its projections for both revenues and expenditure, adding 0.5% of GDP to the deficit. This is estimated to push the overall 2026 deficit to 3.0-3.5% of GDP. Expenditure measures in the supplementary budget for 2026, include one-off transfers of nearly EUR 1 billion (1% of GDP) to households, as well as higher investment and defence spending, while some infrastructure projects have been scaled back.
While the fiscal governance framework is generally well-designed, weaknesses remain in the transparency of public finances and implementation of the medium-term budget framework. Serbia hasrecently expanded fiscal reporting. However, the budget still lacks detailed information on risks associated with public-private partnerships and public spending on state-owned enterprises. Fiscal reports are gradually incorporating the remaining extrabudgetary funds. The relatively large budgetary contingency reserve lacks sufficient accountability. The planned expansion of ‘green’ tagging to local government is a positive step. Efforts to strengthen the medium-term budget framework are continuing, however some technical features are still missing from the medium-term budget, including the indexing of medium-term projections to make them more realistic. Ultimately, medium- term planning needs to be fully implemented to allow for a more strategic approach to budget decisions. The Fiscal Council continued to monitor fiscal policies by producing independent reports and issuing recommendations, while the government’s assessment and implementation of the Fiscal Council’s recommendations was not systematic.
The macroeconomic policy mix was generally appropriate in 2025, although Serbia’s loosening of its fiscal stance in 2026 may compromise efforts to bring down inflation in the face of the ongoing energy price shock. The decision to weaken fiscal targets seems pro-cyclical, given that relatively strong economic growth is anticipated in 2026-2027. To manage inflationary risks effectively, it is crucial to maintain fiscal discipline. Meanwhile, monetary policy has been appropriately tight, taking into account persistent domestic inflationary pressures.
Functioning of product markets
Business environment
Despite progress in reducing regulatory and administrative burden on businesses, the business environment still has weaknesses affecting small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in particular, while shortcomings related to the rule of law and corruption remain a concern. The business environment is hampered by red tape, political interference, weaknesses in the rule of law and limited efficiency and transparency in public administration. SMEs are among the worst affected by this, while large companies, with
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significant transactional capacity, are less impacted. Businesses continue to be affected by a lack of transparency and predictability regarding the adoption of business-related legislation, including unexpected and non-transparent amendments to the legal framework, often with limited or no consultation, and reports of the burden of regulatory compliance being unevenly distributed. Despite the implementation of Single Euro Payments Area (SEPA) transactions and improvements to foreign transaction processing which have reduced processing times significantly, the Law on foreign exchange transactions continues to impose excessive administrative requirements on entities engaging in foreign exchange operations. Serbia ranked 116th out of 182 countries in the 2025 corruption perception index by Transparency International, registering its lowest score and ranking in two decades, behind all other Western Balkan countries. Efforts to reduce the size of the informal economy continued, although several factors contribute to its persistence: high taxes and social security contributions on low wages (which have been recently pushed up by rapid minimum wage increases), red tape, and shortcomings in addressing corruption. In addition, there is insufficient capacity in key inspection departments. A legal basis has been established for the creation of a register of non-tax levies; public bodies are currently in the process of entering these in the register. Further efforts are needed to improve the quality, independence and efficiency of the justice system.
State influence on product markets
The state systematically intervened in product markets. The margin cap, applied between September 2025 and February 2026, impinged on the ability of retailers and supply chains to operate freely, negatively influencing the business environment while failing to address underlying longer-term price pressures. In addition, weekly price caps continue to restrict market-based pricing in the fuel retail segment. Efforts to further align the legal framework for competition and State aid with the EU acquis continue, while the implementation of the framework still needs to be further aligned. The Commission for Protection of Competition (CPC) and the Commission for State Aid Control (CSAC) are legally independent bodies. However, the CSAC needs to prove its operational independence by building a credible track record of enforcement. State aid rules are not always implemented consistently due to strong political pressure to provide financial assistance to SOEs, large foreign investors and companies with state connections. Transparency over State aid schemes is often lacking, including in the 2026 budget. In addition, temporary and ad hoc trade restrictions continue to be introduced at very short notice and without clear justification, with negative impacts on both local and foreign companies. Public investment management and public procurement procedures still use exemptions from standard procedures, undermining transparency and fair competition.
Privatisation and restructuring
The significant economic presence of state-owned enterprises continues to hinder competition and private sector growth. In Serbia,SOEs operate in key sectors such as energy, transport, manufacturing, telecommunications and finance, employing a large share of the workforce. Their dominant presence affects resource allocation, competitiveness and public finances, and is also attributed to the country’s poor record on investment, innovation, productivity, profitability and payment discipline, including instances of unpaid bills amongst SOEs. According to a recent OECD estimate5, the net budgetary cost of SOEs was approximately 0.8% of GDP in 2023, primarily due to the largest energy-related SOEs. Efforts to improve SOE governance are ongoing, supported by the adoption of the 2021- 2027 strategy on state ownership and management of SOEs and the introduction of the Law on SOE governance in September 2024, which was followed up by a number of related secondary laws intended to enhance the efficiency and transparency of SOEs. To mitigate
5 Public Finance Review: Fiscal Policy for High-Income Serbia, World Bank, 2025
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SOE-linked fiscal risks, the government has somewhat reduced the number of new guarantees issued for SOE operations. While the legal basis is now largely in place, ongoing challenges include strengthening government oversight in practice, including as regards establishing independent internal audit bodies to enhance the transparency and quality of SOE governance, restructuring SOEs where necessary, addressing public procurement irregularities, and systematic disclosure and analysis of financial data.
Functioning of the financial market
The banking sector remains stable. The sector’s capital adequacy was 19.5% as of Q1- 2026, well above the 8% minimum set by the central bank. Sector-wide liquidity remains high. Profitability increased, with the return on assets remaining relatively high, easing from the historic peak of 3.1% in Q1-2025 to 2.5% in Q1-2026. The non-performing loan ratio fell to a record low of 2.1% in Q1-2026, down from 2.5% at the end of 2024. Bank lending growth has been on an upward trend since 2023, accelerating to 16.6% year-on-year in June 2026 (20% for households, 11.7% for businesses) amid eased credit standards. Bank financing remained the dominant form of lending, with non-banking financial institutions still underdeveloped. A legal framework for microfinance institutions is yet to be drawn up. Backed by the capital market development strategy, Serbia is working to further develop the domestic corporate bond capital market. The availability of venture capital in Serbia is very limited. During the reporting period, the central bank intervened in the consumer and mortgage loan market. Under the new Law on the protection of financial service consumers, which was enacted in 2025, differentiated interest rate caps may be applied on various loan types. The central bank also directed commercial banks, citing supervisory expectations, to offer reduced-interest loan options for low-income households, young people and pensioners. The authorities’ goal is to increase access to finance, alleviate the burden of excessive interest rates on households, and encourage the uptake of fixed-rate loans given the relatively high loan margins in Serbia compared to neighbouring countries. However, these measures may interfere with market forces, thereby affecting mortgage and consumer credit rates while potentially creating moral hazard and exacerbating risks related to a rapid growth in loans.
Functioning of the labour market
The labour market remained stable in 2025 and in the first half of 2026. The employment rate remained unchanged at 66.8% of the working age population in Q2 2026 compared to a year earlierWhile the overall unemployment rate decreased notably by 1.3 pps. to 7.4% in Q2 2026, this was due to a drop in the activity rate of the population aged 15- 64 by 1.1 pps. (to 72.1% by Q2 2026). The activity rate of women (66.8%) remains significantly behind that of men (77.5%). Wage growth remained relatively high in 2025 and in the first half of 2026. Net salaries increased by 11.3% in nominal terms in January-May 2026, exceeding productivity growth. Salaries were also driven upwards by significant hikes in the monthly minimum wage (+13.7% in January 2025, +9.4% in October 2025 and +10.1% in January 2026, reaching around EUR 750 in gross terms). In August 2026 the government adopted a decision raising the minimum hourly wage by 9.2%, effective 1 January 2027. In September 2026, increases of 8% for public sector wages (12% in social protection) and 7.5% for pensions were announced, to take effect from 1 December 2026.The youth unemployment rate (15-24) has declined to 22% in Q2 2026, down from about 50% a decade ago and 22.8% a year ago. Emigration and brain drain is a long-standing problem which has a negative impact on the growth and
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skills level of the labour force. Access to skills corresponding to labour market needs remains a significant issue for companies in various sectors, with a third of businesses facing difficulties finding appropriate candidates and citing lack of skills, knowledge and experience as the main problem6. Labour shortages are a common obstacle to larger investments, partly eased by foreign labour inflows. Unemployment benefits and employment support programmes are underfunded compared with the EU average. The budget allocated to active labour market measures was reduced further in 2026, to below 0.1% of GDP. Undeclared work is a long-standing issue that has yet to be fully addressed. However, legislation on temporary agency employment (staff leasing) and seasonal work has gradually lowered the rate of people working in the informal economy, with informal employment down 0.6 pps in 2025.
2.3.2. The capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the EU
Education and innovation
Education and training are not of sufficient quality to meet labour market needs. Public spending on education remained below the EU average at 3.46% of GDP in 2025 and the results of the 2025 Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA) show lower educational attainments than in the OECD and the 2022 PISA. The school-to-work transition in Serbia needs to be improved, as confirmed by a reduction in the employment rate of recent graduates (70.1% in 2025 compared with 73.1% in 2024). By contrast, the ‘not in education, employment or training’ (NEET) rate among people aged 15-29 is relatively low, at 15.1% in 2025. Efforts to modernise vocational education and training (VET) are ongoing but VET students continue to face uneven opportunities for practical workplace training. The government has taken action to diversify VET programmes and promote reskilling/upskilling. Participation rates in lifelong learning remain low, partly linked to insufficient funding and a limited offer. Investment in research remained low at 0.93% of GDP in 2024 (compared with an EU average of 2.24%). The share of private sector investment in R&D stagnated at 45% of total financing. Implementation of Serbia’s Smart Specialisation Strategy and the Law on innovation activity is ongoing. New calls for start-up funding were launched in 2025 but the capacity of enterprises to engage in public innovation programmes remains limited.
Physical capital and quality of infrastructure
Government investment is concentrated in road and rail infrastructure, while infrastructure gaps remain in particular in energy. In 2025, Serbia’s gross fixed capital formation remained relatively high at 22.8% of GDP. The economy attracted net FDI inflows of 2.6% of GDP in 2025, down considerably on the previous year’s record levels. FDI inflows were highest in manufacturing (24.5%), construction (17.5%) and professional, scientific, and technical activities (17.0%). Government investment remained robust at 7.0% of GDP in 2025. In autumn 2025, the government adopted a law aiming to address the high number of unregistered buildings and making all illegal buildings erected on public land state property ex lege. Following the start of its implementation, around 270 000 properties have been registered. Continuous monitoring of transport investment compliance with European standards remains a challenge. Energy infrastructure is largely outdated, and coal remains the main source of electricity. Regulatory and green transition reforms are progressing at a slow pace. Serbia remains highly dependent on Russia for gas, routinely agreeing short-term extensions to gas supply contracts, although steps have been taken to diversify import sources, notably by importing from Azerbaijan and the EU. Work is progressing on transport connectivity with neighbouring countries, albeit at a slower pace than initially planned. The authorities are committed to extending the ‘green lanes’ to neighbouring Member States, in line with the Growth Plan for the Western Balkans. Serbia’s digital transformation has
6 GIZ (2025). ‘Employer Survey 2025: Results of the Employer Survey and Forecasts of Employment Needs for the Period
2025 - 2027’, Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit GmbH (GIZ), Belgrade.
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advanced at the government level, although progress has been less widespread among corporates and disparities remain. Cross-border and domestic digital connectivity remain solid in urban areas while rural connectivity has seen limited but tangible progress. The first 5G auction has been completed, with full roll-out pending. Digital government services are underpinned by a robust public digital backbone and a state data centre, helping to attract increased investment in AI and high-performance computing. Nevertheless, data ecosystems are still being developed and regulatory alignment with the EU still needs to be achieved.
Sectoral and enterprise structure
Services dominate the economy while the contributions from industry and agriculture continue to decrease. The services sector provides more than two thirds of economic value added. The industrial sector’s contribution to GDP declined to 20.3% in 2025 (from 21.5% in 2024), continuing the sector’s long-term downward trend. The agricultural sector’s contribution to the economy fell further, to 3.5% of GDP (down from 3.7% in 2024), while the construction sector’s contribution increased to 6.1% in 2025, driven by large-scale infrastructure projects (EXPO 2027 preparations, railway modernisation and energy investments). In 2024, 99.4% of all businesses were SMEs, employing 64.4% of the workforce outside of the financial sector and generating 58.9% of total turnover in the economy. They remain particularly active in construction, retail, housing and food services. However, two thirds of exports remain concentrated in larger foreign-owned companies. Serbia is continuing to implement programmes to support SMEs, including digitalisation initiatives, export promotion and access-to-finance schemes, although budget allocations remain modest and subject to ad hoc adjustments. Efforts should continue to improve the quality and frequency of consultations with SMEs in policymaking and programme design processes. Loans to SMEs represented around 67% of total corporate loans in 2025, although SME borrowing costs remained significantly higher than for large firms. Public credit guarantee schemes are underdeveloped, exacerbating collateral constraints. Large companies and foreign investors often benefit from direct government engagement and state subsidies, creating an uneven playing field.
Economic integration with the EU and price competitiveness
Economic integration with the EU remains deep and structurally anchored. The EU continues to be Serbia’s largest trade and investment partner, accounting for 58.2% of total trade in goods and 72.2% of FDI inflows in 2025. Serbia’s other main trading partners in 2025 included China (11%), CEFTA countries (9%) and Türkiye (4.5%). Russia accounted for 2.7% of total trade flows in 2025. China continues to consolidate its position as Serbia’s second-largest trading partner, driven primarily by Serbian imports of industrial goods and exports of copper ore. Despite continued efforts to facilitate trade, including through the digitalisation of customs procedures and initiatives such as the EU-Western Balkan Green Lanes, persistent bottlenecks at border crossing points with EU Member States and non- tariff barriers continue to affect trade flows.
The real effective exchange rate (REER) has steadily appreciated in recent years, pointing to a decline in Serbia’s cost competitiveness. The nominal dinar-euro exchange rate remained relatively stable in 2025, depreciating by 0.2% against the euro. The Consumer Price Index (CPI)-based REER appreciated by 2.4% in 2025, driven by persistent inflation differentials between Serbia and its main trading partners. However, the pace of appreciation was slower than in previous years. Meanwhile, the unit labour cost (ULC)- based REER, a key indicator of Serbia’s external cost competitiveness, appreciated by 5.8% in 2025, after a 13.4% surge in 2024. Successive minimum wage hikes, which amounted to a cumulative increase of 37% over the course of 2025 and early 2026, with additional wage increases foreseen in December 2026, have compounded already strong wage growth, and are a cause of considerable concern in the Serbian business community with regard to the country’s external competitiveness.
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2.4. PUBLIC PROCUREMENT, STATISTICS AND FINANCIAL CONTROL
Chapter 5 - Public procurement
EU rules ensure that the public procurement of goods, services, and works in any Member State is transparent and open to all EU companies on the basis of non-discrimination and equal treatment.
Institutional set-up and legal alignment
The legal framework of Serbia is broadly aligned with the EU acquis. The Law on public- private partnerships and concessions still needs to be amended to align with Directive 2014/23/EU on the award of concession contracts. In March 2026, Serbia adopted the 2026 action plan related to the 2024-2028Programme for the development of the public procurement.
Serbia continued to circumvent its public procurement legislation through intergovernmental agreements and special laws, including for the implementation of the international specialised exhibition EXPO Belgrade 2027. The Law on special procedures for the implementation of EXPO Belgrade 2027 and its accompanying decree continue to exempt projects from the application of the Public Procurement Law (PPL) and persistently raise concerns over their compliance with the EU acquis. Serbia continued to introduce project- specific exemptions from the public procurement legislative framework, by expanding the scope of the Special law on Morava corridor to another highway section and by restricting competition for the pre-selection of suppliers involved in the Djerdap 3 pumped storage hydropower plant. Other special laws and decrees exempting projects from the PPL remain in place. Transparency of projects contracted under intergovernmental agreements improved but remains insufficient.
Implementation and enforcement capacity
In 2025, the public procurement market represented8.98% of GDP (10.87% in 2024) and decreased by 11% in terms of total value of contracts. The total procurement market amounted to EUR 15 billion in 2025, with public procurement contracts following the PPL valued at EUR 7.95 billion. The total value of contracts exempted from the application of the PPL increased significantly from EUR 5.7 billion in 2024 to EUR 7.05 billion in 2025 (47% of the total value). A large part of the exempted procurement concerns transport projects, for which contracts are awarded directly without competitive procedures on the basis of intergovernmental agreements or lex specialis. Intergovernmental agreements were the most frequently used legal basis for the exemptions in terms of value (EUR 1.7 billion) and represented 24.57% of the exemptions reported in 2025 (EUR 1.2 billion and 21% in 2024).
The average number of bids per tender remained at 2.5. The share of tenders with only one submitted bid decreased to 47.05% in 2025 (50.75% in 2024).The share of contracts awarded on the basis of the price and quality criterion slightly increased to 10.38% in 2025 (9.78% in 2024). In 2025, 32 contracts for public-private partnerships were signed. Since
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1 January 2026, the legal requirement to include mandatory environmental aspects has been extended to further goods and services.
The Public Procurement Portal has been updated twice with new functionalities, while a module on EXPO 2027 is also available.
Concerning the capacity to manage public procurement processes, the Public Procurement Office (PPO) remained slightly understaffed. The Commission for Public- Private Partnerships and Concessions has no permanent staff, while its administrative capacity needs to be strengthened. Trainings by the PPO for contracting authorities, economic operators and the judiciary continued.
Regarding prevention of corruption, the number of public procurement procedures monitored by the PPO remained stable at 835 in 2025 out of 46 792 procedures. The PPO referred 288 misdemeanours to relevant courts in 2025 (223 in 2024). In 2025, budget inspections inspected the execution of 150 public procurement contracts. In 2025, the SAI found 13.5% of audited procurement value showing irregularities, which raises concerns. The PPL needs to be applied more consistently to enhance competition, transparency and prevent conflicts of interest in public procurement, which remains prone to corruption.
Efficient remedy system
Legislation on the right to legal remedy isbroadly in line with the EU acquis. The Republic Commission for Protection of Rights in Public Procurement Procedures solved 953 cases out of 974 requests in 2025 (812 received in 2024). The Administrative Court’s implementation capacity needs to be increased, due to limited specialisation. Better coordination is needed between the PPO, the Commission and the Administrative Court.
Chapter 18 - Statistics
European statistics are developed, produced, and disseminated by EU Member States, guided by the principles and quality criteria elaborated in the Regulation on European statistics, such as professional independence, impartiality, reliability, accessibility, transparency, and statistical confidentiality. Common rules are in place for the methodology, production, and dissemination of statistical information, which are further specified in sectoral legislation that constitute the EU acquis on statistics.
Serbia’s statistical infrastructure is largely in line with European standards, and the statistical law is aligned with the principles of the European Statistics Code of Practice. A new law on official statistics was adopted during the reporting period, which enhanced the professional independence of the Statistical Office of the Republic of Serbia (SORS) and improved alignment with the amended Regulation (EC) No 223/2009 on European statistics. The National Coordination Board for statistics has been established. Access to administrative data sources has improved. The institutional framework is functional, but the administrative capacity of SORS needs to be further strengthened.
Concerning classifications and registers, the main classifications are aligned with the EU acquis and registers are updated regularly. SORS continues to increase its data submissions to Eurostat, but the coverage of data needs to be further expanded.
Regarding macroeconomic statistics, Serbia improved the completeness of the submitted ESA tables in the reporting period, but data gaps remain. Data for table 29 accurate-to-date pension entitlements (covering the year 2024) and data for table 11 general government expenditure by function (covering the period 2021-2024) were submitted to Eurostat for the first time, although consistency and plausibility require improvement. Serbia achieved a relatively good coverage of the excessive deficit procedure (EDP) notification tables, but further improvements in quality, coverage and timeliness are needed. Efforts should continue to ensure that government finance statistics (GFS) and excessive deficit procedure (EDP) statistics fully comply with ESA 2010 and that ESA tables and EDP notifications are aligned.
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Serbia is largely aligned with the EU acquis onbusiness statistics. Structural business statistics (SBS) data and metadata transmitted to Eurostat are of good quality. SORS also submits business demography (BD) data to Eurostat. However, full coverage and timeliness of both SBS and BD data submissions has yet to be achieved. In the area of short-term business statistics (STS), Serbia transmits fully compliant data, with the exception of service producer prices and the service production volume, where the initial data compilation has been established. Serbia should compile and submit to Eurostat of outward foreign affiliates statistics (outward FATS).
Serbia broadly complies with the EU acquis on social statistics. Further progress is needed to complete statistics on job vacancies. Demographic and international migration statistics are partly aligned with EU requirements. To reach full compliance, Serbia should increase efforts to regularly provide data on population by country of birth, by country of citizenship, on immigrants, emigrants and acquisition of citizenship by all requested breakdowns. SORS is in the phase of establishing asylum and managed migration statistics and started to transmit data on residence permits to Eurostat (from 2024 reference year) while statistics on asylum and enforcement of immigration legislation (EIL) are not yet transmitted to Eurostat.
Regarding agricultural statistics, Serbia is largely aligned with the EU acquis for crop production statistics, animal production statistics and fishery statistics. Serbia submits economic accounts for agriculture since 2025 with 2024 as the reference year but should still complete the transmission of mandatory elements and extend the time series. Data on pesticide statistics, fertiliser consumption, and gross nutrient balances are not yet transmitted to Eurostat.
In the area of transport statistics, Serbia is fully compliant with air transport statistics requirements. For inland waterway and rail transport statistics, Serbia transmits data to Eurostat; however, certain data gaps remain to be addressed. Further efforts are needed to implement the road freight transport survey. Serbia is highly compliant with the Eurostat/ITF/UNECE Common Questionnaire and with regional transport statistics requirements. Serbia is encouraged to conduct a passenger mobility survey.
Energy statistics are compiled and submitted to Eurostat on both an annual and monthly basis, covering all relevant energy sources. In the area of environmental statistics, Serbia is fully compliant for physical environmental accounts. However, monetary environmental accounts are still in the phase of development and further effort is needed to achieve full completeness. Serbia should start to submit Ecosystem accounts to Eurostat.
Chapter 32 - Financial control
The EU promotes the reform of national governance systems to improve managerial accountability, sound financial management of income and expenditure, and external audit of public funds. The financial control rules further protect the EU’s financial interests against fraud in the management of EU funds and protect the euro against counterfeiting.
Public internal financial control (PIFC)
The legal, strategic and institutional framework is in place. The are currently no major contradictions between the PIFC legislation and the general legal framework. Efforts to ensure the coherence of these frameworks should continue. Weaknesses in performance management and lines of accountability between independent bodies and their parent institutions persist. The central harmonisation unit continued to focus on PIFC monitoring and development, provided trainings and disseminated methodological guidance.
Internal control standards, including risk management, must be integrated in the administrative culture and capacities to implement them have to increase at both central and local government level. 75% of public funds beneficiaries have adopted risk management strategies but only 64% have a risk register, although both practices are increasing. The framework for irregularity reporting for budget beneficiaries is in place but needs to be
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properly implemented. The work, scope and capacities of the centralised budget inspections have been strengthened.
The optimal number of key spending units needs to be reviewed to enhance policy-based budgeting, spending efficiency and institutional accountability. After earlier delays, the implementation of managerial accountability roadmap has intensified but needs to be closely monitored. Amendments to the Budget System Law adopted in August 2026 strengthen the link between internal financial control and managerial accountability. While analytical units are yet to be set up in all ministries and government agencies, the government adopted guidelines for their establishment in January 2026, and their piloting has started in three ministries.
The internal audit practice is broadly in line with international standards but quality assurance mechanisms should be improved. During the reporting period, 12 quality assessments were conducted, of which two used the peer-review method. Despite an increase of internal audit units across public institutions and in the number of internal auditors and of those certified, not all institutions required to establish an internal audit unit have done so. While 79% of ministries have a functional internal audit, only 56% of public enterprises have one. Many internal audit units do not have a sufficient number of auditors.
Despite an existing legal framework and mandate for relevant institutions, a public track record of financial control on public funds used for the organisation of EXPO 2027 has been very limited and fragmented. An effective and transparent financial oversight on the use of public funds for EXPO 2027 needs to be ensured and carefully monitored.
External audit
The constitutional and legalframework provides for the independence of the State Audit Institution (SAI) in line with international standards. Its Strategic Plan for the period 2024- 2028 continues to be duly implemented. Its audit procedures are in line with international standards. Although SAI demonstrates sufficient administrative capacity, shortcomings in filling all systematised job positions remain a concern. The lack of appropriate premises and the continued focus on the detection of errors and filing of misdemeanour and economic offences against individuals adversely affects SAI’s capacity to carry out its core audit tasks. SAI’s financial independence has continued to be respected during the 2026 budget approval procedure. The quality of audit work and relation with stakeholders is constantly improving and SAI has continuously focused on performance related audits along a positive trend. Parliamentary scrutiny should be improved. While the National Assembly adopts conclusions on SAI’s annual report, the report is not discussed in plenary or in other committees, beyond the Committee on Finance. SAI’s well-established post-audit process keeps ensuring a high rate of implementation of recommendations. 89% of its first priority and 74% of second and third-priority recommendations were implemented in 2025.
Protection of the EU’s financial interests
Full alignment with the Directive on the fight against fraud to the EU’s financial interests by means of criminal law still needs to be ensured. Regarding the anti-fraud strategy, the 2024-2026 strategic plan for combating fraud and managing irregularities in handling financial resources of the EU in Serbia is being implemented. The administrative capacities of anti-fraud coordination service (AFCOS) should be strengthened.
Good cooperation with the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) on investigations and with other departments of the European Commission on the follow-up to recommendations and reporting of irregularities should continue to further develop a solid track record. In 2025, 24 cases of irregularities were reported via the Irregularity Management System.
Protection of the euro against counterfeiting
A high degree of EU acquis alignment has been maintained. The National Bank of Serbia has formal cooperation agreements with the European Commission on coins and with the
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European Central Bank on banknotes. The National Bank of Serbia continued to develop its administrative capacities and actively cooperated with central banks in the region and Member States.
3. GOOD NEIGHBOURLY RELATIONS AND REGIONAL COOPERATION
Good neighbourly relations and regional cooperation form an essential part of Serbia’s European integration process. They contribute to stability, reconciliation and a climate conducive to addressing open bilateral issues and the legacy of the past.
Serbia maintained its engagement in a number of regional cooperation initiatives such as the Central European Free Trade Agreement (CEFTA), the Energy Community, the Transport Community, the South-East European Cooperation Process (SEECP) and the Regional Cooperation Council.
Serbia did not participate in the sixth EU-Western Balkans Summit held in December 2025 in Brussels but attended the EU-Western Balkans Summit held in June 2026 in Tivat as well as the European Political Community Summit in May 2026 in Yerevan.
Serbia has actively engaged in the regional dimension of the Growth Plan for the Western Balkans, participating in both ministerial and leaders’ meetings.
On the Common Regional Market (CRM) at the Berlin process summit in London in October 2025, the leaders of the region endorsed a revised and streamlined action plan to implement the Green Agenda for the Western Balkans, adopted a Western Balkans Climate Adaptation Roadmap and committed to make progress in the promotion of regional mobility and implementation of relevant regional agreements and CEFTA decisions. Serbia adopted the CRM action plan 2025 -2028 and is contributing to its implementation.
Serbia has so far ratified four of the five regional mobility agreements. The fifth mobility agreement on access to higher education and admission to studies in the Western Balkans is still to be ratified.
The appointment of a new Director and commitment from the parties gave impetus to the work of CEFTA: substantial advancements have made on specific areas, including on the Green Lanes, recognition of qualified trust services, recognition of advanced electronic signatures and advances electronic seals, the establishment of the Advisory Body for Customs Cooperation and the adoption of the Risk Management Strategy 2025–2028.
Following the death of the convicted war criminal Ratko Mladić who served a life sentence for the Srebrenica genocide and other international crimes, his funeral involved presence of senior officials and elements of state support in terms of logistics and security as well as military honours. The President of the European Council, the President of the European Commission and the EU High Representative for Foreign and Security Policy issued statements highlighting that glorification of war criminals contradicts the values underpinning Serbia’s path towards the European Union.
As a signatory to the Dayton/Paris Peace Agreement, Serbia respects Bosnia and Herzegovina’s sovereignty and territorial integrity and is developing and publicly promoting special relations with the Republika Srpska entity. In March 2026, the fourth parliamentary forum between Serbia and the Republika Srpska was held in Belgrade and in September 2026 the Serbian Speaker addressed the ceremonial session of the parliament of the Republika Srpska entity which debated the perspectives of the forum. In April 2026, the Serbian President hosted a meeting of the defence and army leadership, together with the leadership of the Republika Srpska, including politician Milorad Dodik, who was convicted by the Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina, a decision that Serbia does not recognise.
Serbia continued to cooperate closely with Croatia, Montenegro and Bosnia and Herzegovina under the Sarajevo Declaration Process to find sustainable solutions for
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refugees and persons displaced by conflicts in the 1990s.
Regarding missing persons, preparations to draw up a Law on missing persons resumed after several delays, but the law has not been finalised. Serbia continued to cooperate with the International Commission on Missing Persons (ICMP) and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). Serbia took part in the work of the Western Balkans Missing Persons Group to address unresolved cases of mutual interest and unidentified persons together with Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, Croatia and Kosovo. Serbia also joined trilateral meetings to foster cooperation and dialogue with the families of the missing, together with Montenegro and Kosovo, under the auspices of the ICMP. No formal meetings of the bilateral working groups with Croatia and Montenegro have taken place since January 2023 and April 2025, respectively. The remains of several victims were handed over by the Bosnia and Herzegovina authorities to the Serbian authorities in October 2025 and July 2026.
The ICRC plays an important role in addressing the issue of missing persons, as a neutral intermediary chairing the Working Group on Persons Unaccounted for in Connection with the Events in Kosovo and its sub-fora, in an effort to maintain dialogue and promote operational cooperation between the parties. Following a session of the Working Group in June 2025, technical discussions in the framework of the ICRC Sub-Working Group on Forensic Issues and the Analysis Team took place in September and November 2025. In the framework of the Working Group, five joint field assessments/excavations (two under Kosovan jurisdiction and three under Serbian jurisdiction) were conducted in 2025 with ICRC facilitation. While preparations for excavations in Kozlje (Novi Pazar) have been suspended since November 2025, the Belgrade delegation took preliminary steps to prepare field assessments of a potential gravesite location near the Perucac lake in August 2026. The session of the Sub- Working Group on Forensic Issues planned for January 2026 was postponed.
Overall, Kosovo-Serbia cooperation within the ICRC-facilitated Working Group continued to face significant challenges, with progress constrained by difficulties in the parties’ engagement and by the sensitive political context surrounding the file. An inaugural session of the Joint Commission on missing persons, held within the framework of the EU-facilitated Dialogue, took place in January 2026, with its first technical meeting taking place on 22 April 2026.
Overall, Serbia has remained committed to maintaining good bilateral relations with other EU candidate countries and neighbouring EU Member States.
Relations with Albania remained good overall. In February 2026, the Serbian President and
the Albanian Prime Minister co-signed an op-ed calling for accelerated integration into the EU, focusing on the common market and the Schengen area without a right of veto on decision-making. Serbia and Albania agreed on the opening of a General Consulate of Albania in Bujanovac and a General Consulate of Serbia in Shkodër. In April 2026, the Serbian and Albanian Foreign Ministers held a bilateral meeting. Albania requested the opening of a General Consulate in Bujanovac. At the same time, Serbian representatives continued to publicly voice their very strong opposition to the signing of a joint declaration on cooperation in security and defence matters between Albania, Albania and Kosovo. The Serbian President’s statements mentioning the potential future change of the course of the Ibar river in August 2026 led to sharp exchanges with the Albanian Prime Minister.
Developments around the death of Ratko Mladić put the overall good bilateral relations with Bosnia and Herzegovina under strain. In February 2026, bilateral political consultations between the two Ministries of Foreign Affairs took place in Belgrade. Senior Serbian officials attended the unconstitutional celebrations of the Republika Srpska entity on 9 January. Milorad Dodik continued to be received frequently and at a high level in Serbia, where the authorities publicly declare not to recognise Dodik’s criminal conviction by the Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina, leading to mutual accusations. In August 2026, the Serbian President visited the Republika Srpska entity and communities with a majority Serb population in the Federation entity. As a signatory to the Dayton/Paris Peace Agreement,
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Serbia is obliged to respect Bosnia and Herzegovina’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. The two countries need to reach an agreement on state borders, including on two dams on the Drina River and a part of the Belgrade-Bar railway line.
Relations with Montenegro have been generally stable, despite regular mutual accusations, especially around the time of the 20th anniversary of Montenegro’s independence in May 2026, when the Serbian President delivered several statements which questioned the legitimacy of the country’s independence. Serbia regularly expressed support for Serb politicians in Montenegro, including during the protests in Botun in December 2025. Debates remain over the status of Serbs and the Serbian language, the role the Serbian Orthodox Church and alleged Serbian meddling in Montenegro’s affairs, including in the media landscape. In June 2026, the Serbian President attended the EU-Western Balkans Summit hosted by Montenegro in Tivat. The day before the summit, the Montenegrin authorities denied entry to a group of 87 male Serbians who had arrived in Montenegro on a charter flight, citing security concerns. Serbia introduced temporary restrictions at bilateral border crossings as a response, although those were quickly lifted.
Relations with North Macedonia are good. In October 2025, the Prime Minister of Serbia visited Skopje and several meetings were held at Ministerial level. A five-year memorandum of cooperation to improve communications between institutions and the private sector and coordinate economic policies, including infrastructure projects were signed. The Prime Minister of Serbia visited met with the Prime Minister of North Macedonia again in July 2026. In December 2025, the Minister for Energy, Mining and Mineral Resources of North Macedonia visited Belgrade and discussed the gas interconnector with her Serbian counterpart. A programme on Cooperation in Culture (2026-2030) was signed in January 2026.
Relations with Türkiye are good. In February 2026, the Serbian President visited Türkiye where he was received by the Minister for Foreign Affairs, and in April 2026, the Serbian Prime Minister and Foreign Minister met with the Turkish President on the sidelines of the Antalya Diplomacy Forum.
Relations with Ukraine have continued to improve, although Serbia has not signed up to EU sanctions against Russia. Serbia continued to provide financial, energy-related and humanitarian assistance to Ukraine. In November 2025, the Speaker of the Serbian Parliament made an official visit to Kyiv, and the same month represented Serbia at the 4th Parliamentary Summit of the Crimea International Platform in Stockholm, attending in person for the first time. In April 2026 a delegation from the Ukrainian Parliament visited Serbia and met with representatives of the Serbian Parliament. In November 2025, the Speaker of the Serbian Parliament In May 2026, the Serbian and Ukrainian Presidents held a phone call, the Ukrainian Deputy Prime Minister visited Belgrade and a Memorandum of Understanding on cooperation in the field of European integration was signed the same month by the two countries. The Serbian President participated in the Ukraine–Southeast Europe Summit in Kyiv in July 2026 and the Speaker of the Serbian Parliament co-hosted with the Ukrainian Speaker the inaugural conference of the Speakers of Parliaments of candidate countries for membership of the EU in Belgrade. The Ukrainian President visited Serbia in August 2026, it was the first visit of the Ukrainian President to Serbia since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022. The Serbian President participated in the Carpathian Initiative Summit in Ukraine in September 2026.
Relations with the Republic of Moldova are good overall. In June 2026, the Serbian Prime Minister meet his Moldovan counterpart on the sidelines of the South-East European Cooperation Process Summit in Sofia. In October 2025, Serbia confirmed that three Russian nationals had been at a camp near the western town of Loznica, where the Serbian authorities had previously detained two persons for allegedly training between 150 and 170 Moldovan and Romanian nationals to interfere in Moldovan elections and incite unrest.
Relations with Georgia are good. In December 2025, the President of Georgia visited
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Belgrade with a delegation of ministers. Trade relations remain underdeveloped, although Georgia and Serbia have announced the start of negotiations on a free trade agreement. President Vučić made his first official visit to Georgia in June 2026.
Relations with Romania, Bulgaria and Hungary are good overall.
Relations with Croatia continued to be marked by ad hoc antagonistic public exchanges. Serbian officials continued to publicly voice their very strong opposition to the declaration on cooperation in security and defence matters signed by Croatia, Albania and Kosovo and the signing of a bilateral agreement on expanding military cooperation between Croatia and Slovenia. Following comments by the Serbian President alluding to interference by another country in the March 2026 local elections in Serbia, the Croatian President cancelled a summit under the Brdo-Brijuni Process planned for May 2026. In June 2026, the two Ministers for Foreign Affairs met on the sidelines of an event marking the Day of the Croatian Community in Serbia. Following the launch of the EU Entry Exit System, in May 2026, Croatia amended its Law on Foreigners and announced the issuing of a national visa in order to facilitate cross-border mobility for professional drivers from third countries, including from Serbia.
4. NORMALISATION OF RELATIONS BETWEEN SERBIA AND KOSOVO
The EU-facilitated Dialogue on the normalisation of relations between Serbia and Kosovo, while heavily impacted by domestic political developments, continued during the reporting period with regular meetings at chief negotiator and technical levels in bilateral and trilateral formats. While some progress was achieved, implementation of outstanding Dialogue commitments remained limited, compounded by unilateral actions and rhetoric not conducive to normalisation. In April 2026, Kosovo appointed Ambassador Agron Bajrami as its chief negotiator replacing former Deputy Prime Minister Besnik Bislimi. High Representative/ Vice President Kaja Kallas continues to stand ready to hold a high-level Dialogue meeting once the situation allows.
Both Serbia and Kosovo are expected to implement all of their respective obligations stemming from the Agreement on the path to normalisation and its implementation annex (2023 Ohrid Agreement), as well as all past Dialogue agreements, in line with their official recommitments in September and October 2024, without delays or preconditions. This includes self-management arrangements for the Kosovo Serb community. Kosovo is expected to start the process leading to their establishment, while Serbia is expected in parallel to initiate the recognition of Kosovo’s documents, symbols and institutions. Neither Party has made sufficient progress. The 2023 Ohrid Agreement is valid and legally binding on the Parties, and any formalities, including those related to its adoption or “formalisation”, should not impede implementation. Normalisation and implementation of Dialogue commitments remain essential conditions on the European path of both Parties, and both risk losing important opportunities in the absence of progress.
During the reporting period, the situation in the north of Kosovo remained calm but fragile. Actions and rhetoric not conducive to normalisation increased. Kosovo repeatedly took actions contrary to its Dialogue obligations, or actions undermining the normalisation process. These included police and administrative actions targeting Serbia-supported structures and services, arrests of Kosovo Serbs, and the rejection of the withdrawn resignations of Kosovo Serb judges and prosecutors, undermining their reintegration. The EU expressed deep concern on 21 July and 28 August, including over the recurrent lack of coordination by Kosovo and the negative impact on local communities and their access to basic public and social services. Serbia, for its part, repeatedly acted contrary to its obligations under the 2023 Ohrid Agreement, including by lobbying against Kosovo’s membership in international organisations, notably the Council of Europe and Interpol.
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These actions and recurrent inflammatory rhetoric by Serbian officials, continue to undermine normalisation. Serbia has not taken any significant step to ensure accountability for the violent attack by armed Kosovo Serb assailants against Kosovo Police on 24 September 2023 in Banjska/Banjskë.
As regards the implementation of Dialogue agreements:
- Justice and reintegration: The withdrawal of Kosovo Serbs from Kosovo institutions in November 2022 violated Serbia’s Dialogue obligations under the April 2013 “First agreement of principles governing the normalisation of relations” (2013 Brussels Agreement) and dismantled core achievements of the 2015 Justice Agreement. Since November 2022, the EU has consistently called on Belgrade to support the reintegration of Kosovo Serbs into Kosovo institutions and on Pristina to enable it. The EU therefore welcomed participation of Kosovo Serbs in all 2025/2026 electoral processes in Kosovo, including the taking of office of the newly elected Kosovo Serb mayors in the four northern municipalities in December 2025. In line with the EU’s call for Serbia to take the first step, on 15 July 2026, Kosovo Serb judges, prosecutors and support staff withdrew the resignations they had submitted 3.5 years earlier. This represented an important first step towards reversing the consequences of the 2022 withdrawal and opened a pathway for the reintegration of Kosovo Serb judicial personnel. However, subsequent decisions by the Kosovo Prosecutorial Council (KPC), Kosovo Judicial Council (KJC) and the Acting President to accept the withdrawn resignations prevented it from moving forward. These decisions are inconsistent with the objectives and commitments of the 2015 Justice AgreementKosovo has not enabled reintegration of Kosovo Serb judicial personnel.
- Association/Community of Serb-Majority Municipalities: There has been no further progress towards establishing the Association/Community, as laid down in the 2013 Brussels Agreement and the August 2015 Agreement on the general principles and main elements for establishing the Association/Community. Kosovo is expected to start the process, in line with its Dialogue obligations, including under the 2023 Ohrid Agreement. Both Parties are expected to engage constructively without further delay. The status of Serbia-supported structures and services in Kosovo needs to be addressed fully in line with Dialogue agreements and Kosovo law, not through uncoordinated measures. The EU insists on structured consultations with representatives of the Kosovo Serb community to ensure their meaningful involvement. The process should proceed in close cooperation with the EU Special Representative for the Dialogue.
- Austerlitz Bridge: Works on the Austerlitz Bridge in Mitrovica, including additional assessments and consultations, have been completed. The EU position remains that the bridge should be opened. While the technical conditions have been met, effective coordination and meaningful consultations between the municipalities concerned and central-level institutions need to improve for the bridge to serve all communities. The EU took note of KFOR’s change of posture.
- Energy: Implementation of the 2013 and 2015 Energy Agreements and the 2022 Energy Roadmap continued. The Serbian transmission system operator EMS has yet to determine net transmission capacities at the interconnection with Kosovo, preventing cross-border capacities from being allocated to market participants. This adversely affects security of supply and competition and raises power import prices.Serbia needs to address this longstanding issue, including by fulfilling its obligations under the Energy Community Treaty.
- Technical Dialogue Agreements: Implementation of several technical Dialogue agreements (2011 - 2012) remains incomplete.Both Parties need to continue implementing the Arrangements on regional representation and cooperation, which enable Kosovo’s participation in regional forums. Neither Party should block regional forums over bilateral disputes. Implementation of the agreements on cadastre and acceptance of university diplomas remains pending due to non-implementation by Serbia. Serbia also has yet to
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address relocated Serbian administrative customs structures with Kosovo denomination operating from within Serbia.
- Integrated Border/Boundary Management (IBM): The Interim Common Crossing-Points (CCPs) between Kosovo and Serbia remain operational, but implementation is incomplete. Only two of six permanent CCPs have been established (Merdarë/Merdare and Mutivodë/Mutivode). Serbia has yet to establish those hosted by its side (Jarinje/Rudnica, Končulj/Dheu i Bardhë and Depce/Muçibabë) and needs to engage constructively to enable construction of the third CCP hosted by Kosovo in the north (Tabavije/Bërnjak- Tabalije/Brnjak). Serbia also needs to close illegal roads and bypasses and allow the resumption of EU-facilitated joint IBM meetings at all levels (local, regional and central). Limited progress was made on maintenance deficiencies at the interim CCPs hosted by Serbia, but substantial shortcomings, including health and safety concerns, remain. The full operationalisation of the freight scanner at Merdarë/Merdare during summer 2026 facilitated the movement of Serbian goods and significantly reduced waiting times. However, restrictions on Serbian goods through other CCPs remain. Kosovo needs to ensure free movement of goods through all designated CCPs, in line with its Dialogue commitments.
- Freedom of movement: The EU welcomes the overall satisfactory implementation of the 14 March 2026 agreement on the implementation of the Law on foreigners and the avenues opened to register civil status facts in the Kosovo system using Serbia-issued documents. Kosovo is encouraged to find a long-term solution ensuring an effective registration process for all those living, working or studying in Kosovo to obtain the necessary documentation.
- Telecommunications: There was no progress in resolving outstanding issues under the Telecom Agreements. Both Parties need to fully respect the agreements, resolve cross- border frequency interference between Serbian and Kosovo mobile operators, and ensure adequate postal service quality for all communities.
- Mutual legal assistance: Limited progress was made following the Serbian government’s decision to take steps towards resuming MLA after a prolonged interruption by Belgrade. Serbian courts have resumed using MLA channels in a very limited number of cases. Further efforts are needed to ensure effective, consistent and timely use of MLA, including on outstanding requests from Kosovo.
- Official visits: Both Parties continued to fall short of fully implementing the Arrangements for official visits, with announced visits rejected by both. The EU welcomes that two visits by the Serbian Orthodox Patriarch to Kosovo, including for Orthodox Easter, and a visit by Kosovo's caretaker Minister for Culture and Tourism to Presevo Valley took place without incidents. However, Kosovo and Serbia need to allow visits by their respective chief negotiator, other government officials and religious authorities when announced and conducted in line with the Arrangements. This was not the case for the majority of announced visits. Official visitors are expected to refrain from divisive statements or behaviour.
- Missing Persons: The EU welcomes the first meeting of the Joint Commission on Missing Persons, held in January 2026, to advance the implementation of the political Declaration on Missing Persons adopted in May 2023, followed by a technical meeting on access to archives in April. This constituted progress in operationalising the 2023 Declaration, although further cooperation is required. The Parties are encouraged to refrain from politicisation of this humanitarian issue and improve cooperation.
Overall, Kosovo and Serbia continued to participate in the EU-facilitated Dialogue, but engagement has not translated into sufficient implementation of their respective obligations. Aside from missing persons, neither Party has made noticeable progress on the 2023 Ohrid Agreement. While progress was achieved on missing persons, mutual legal assistance and freedom of movement, implementation of several key agreements remains incomplete and some previous Dialogue achievements have been undermined. Both Parties need to
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demonstrate greater commitment to their respective obligations, refrain from unilateral actions and rhetoric detrimental to normalisation, and engage constructively to resolve outstanding issues.
5. RESILIENCE, SECURITY, DEFENCE
Serbia remains central to the stability and security of the Western Balkans. Serbia’s cooperation with the EU continued in several areas, including through contributions to EU CSDP missions and operations. However, important challenges remain, notably as regards Serbia’s strategic orientation as an EU candidate country.
Serbia’s unresolved relations with Kosovo represent one of the most serious challenges to regional stability and security, which is the subject of the EU-facilitated Dialogue on the normalisation of relations between Serbia and Kosovo.
Democratic resilience
Serbia has been facing a deep political and societal polarisation and low level of trust in the conduct of elections. While the mass student and civic protests were largely permitted, some actions by the authorities in relation to the protests, including instance of excessive use of force, lack of follow-up to cases of violence, as well as targeting of activists by state representatives and tabloids, the framing of protests as a foreign-backed coloured revolution, measures eroding academic freedom and a difficult environment in which the civil society operates, exposed weaknesses with regard to the country’s democratic culture, and its system of checks and balances.
There are persistent challenges as regards establishing an enabling environment for free and independent media, countering foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI), including disinformation and lack of political will to address those issues. TV stations holding national broadcasting frequencies remain the primary sources of information manipulation and disinformation, also targeting the EU. The same media outlets are also the primary recipients of public co-funding of media content, and their ownership structures are closely intertwined with State-owned companies. The Serbian territory and/or citizens continued being used by third countries, such as Russian Federation, to conduct hybrid operations and there continue to be reports of cooperation between Serbian security and intelligence service and the Russian security and intelligence apparatus. Russia’s state-owned RT Balkans operates on state operator Telekom Srbija, but its reach has so far been limited compared to domestically produced pro-Kremlin media. Its presence, as well as that of Sputnik Serbia nonetheless reflect a permissive environment for Kremlin-aligned narratives. The concentration of editorial and financial power in the hands of a few media actors hostile to democratic norms, combined with an absence of effective FIMI countermeasures, undermines both the integrity of the information space and Serbia’s EU accession process.
Economic security and resilience
From the perspective of the EU’s economic security framework, Serbia is a key partner interconnected with several European value chains. The EU has remained Serbia’s largest trading partner, and investor. Serbia has a key role to play in the diversification of regional supply chains, particularly in sectors like industrial production, transport infrastructure and energy. The presence of significant investments from third countries, including China, in key sectors such as mining, steel production, infrastructure and high tech, expose Serbia’s dependency on imported technology and on foreign capital. Serbia’s continued dependence on Russian energy imports, particularly of natural gas, and Russian ownership stakes in Serbia’s critical infrastructure further expose critical energy dependency and makes the country prone to Russian leverage and impact of international sanctions against Russia. Such dependencies underline the importance of diversification of energy sources and routes, enhanced energy efficiency, and strengthened governance of critical infrastructure to reduce
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vulnerability to external shocks and potential economic coercion.
Defence and defence industrial dimension
Serbia inherited a substantial defence industry from former Yugoslavia, regaining a prominent position in the region and on the world market. The predominantly state-owned defence industry counts around 200 companies with 20 000 employees and is the largest in the Western Balkans. The state-owned Yugoimport – SDPR specialised in manufacturing and trading of defence equipment (armoured vehicles, artillery systems, drones) and ammunition represents the core of Serbia’s defence industry. Development of new defence capabilities is supported by domestic sources. At the same time, Serbia is entering in defence industry partnerships with other non-EU countries, such as China and Israel.
Due to its insufficient level of alignment with the EU’s CFSP, Serbia does not receive assistance under the European Peace Facility. Following allegations in June 2025 by the Russian foreign intelligence agency that Serbia was selling artillery ammunition to Ukraine through intermediaries, a moratorium on all exports of arms and ammunition was declared by the Serbian National Security Council, citing national security and economic interests. Serbia’s military spending has increased in the past years to USD 2.7 billion in 2025. While significant military procurement has been agreed with suppliers from EU Member States, Serbia’s military cooperation with China has increased over the past year. China is Serbia’s largest defence equipment supplier, accounting for 61% of Serbia’s total arms imports between 2021 and 2025, followed by France (12%) and Russia (7%).
In the framework of the European Defence Fund (EDF) and the European Defence Industrial Programme (EDIP), entities established in the EU or in an associated country and subject to control by Serbia or by a Serbian entity could only be eligible for funding if guarantees provided by the EU Member State or associated country of establishment are made available to the Commission. So far this has not materialised.
Civil protection and disaster resilience
Serbia has continued improving its resilience through enhancing its civil protection system and has capacity to provide important cross-border assistance. Serbia continues close cooperation with the EU through the Union Civil Protection Mechanism (UCPM), it has both provided and received assistance under the mechanism during the reporting period.
6. ABILITY TO ASSUME THE OBLIGATIONS OF MEMBERSHIP
CLUSTER 2: INTERNAL MARKET
Chapter 1 - Free movement of goods
The free movement of goods ensures that many products can be traded freely across the EU based on common rules and procedures. Where products are governed by national rules, the principle of the free movement of goods prevents these rules from creating unjustified barriers to trade.
General principles
Serbia has adopted its revised strategic documents to implement EU acquis in this chapter. Serbia should speed up implementation of these strategic documents. Serbia has applied for an Agreement on Conformity Assessment and Acceptance (ACAA) with the EU, covering low voltage equipment, electromagnetic compatibility, machinery, and personal protective equipment and the relevant assessment processes are ongoing.
Non-harmonised area
Serbia should continue to implement its action plan to ensure compliance with Articles 34- 36 of the TFEU. Serbia remains partly aligned with the EU acquis on mutual recognition.
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Harmonised area: quality infrastructure
Serbia has a developed quality infrastructure system, overseen by the Ministry of Economy and supported by various key entities and market surveillance bodies. The quality infrastructure institutions still require additional budget and human resources. On standardisation, the national legislation is highly aligned with the relevant EU acquis, and Serbia has aligned with 99% of European harmonised standards (EN). Serbian legislation remains partly aligned with the EU acquis on accreditation.
The number of conformity assessment bodies in Serbia decreased to 787 during the reporting period, down from 918 during the prior reporting period. Serbia accepts the CE marking as a conformity mark and repealed most of the required obligations regarding Serbian certificates of conformity for EU products. However, Serbian certificates of conformity are still required for drones and construction products, including cement, steel for the reinforcement of concrete, and specific types of screws. Serbian legislation remains partly aligned with the EU acquis on metrology. Serbia needs to align with the latest EU acquis onmarket surveillance, adopt an adequate market surveillance strategy, and increase the number of market surveillance staff and IT resources. During the reporting period, 4003 market surveillance inspections were carried out, leading to 444corrective fines and two restrictive measures, and 208 cases were sent to court.
Harmonised area: sectoral legislation
Serbia adopted implementing legislation on machinery, which aims to align with the latest EU acquis on machinery. Serbia needs to further align with the EU new and global approach product acquis, including with the EU acquis on radio equipment.
There was no progress on the EU old approach product acquis.The alignment and capacity to implement the EU acquis on vehicle homologation remains insufficient and requires strengthening.
On procedural matters, in 2026 Serbia adopted and published an updated national control list of weapons partly aligned with the EU.
Chapter 2 - Freedom of movement for workers
Nationals of one Member State have the right to work in another Member State and must be given the same working and social conditions as other worker nationals of that Member State.
Regarding access to the labour market, the legislative framework is partially aligned with the EU acquis as EU citizens are currently covered by rules for third-country nationals. In 2025, a total of 1 190 work permits were issued to EU citizens. The working permit procedure has been simplified by the new system of single permit for residence and work.
Serbia’s National Employment Service has continued with the preparations for joining the European Employment Services Network (EURES) upon accession, including on IT infrastructure, roadmap and legislative alignment.
Regarding the coordination of social security systems, no new bilateral agreements were concluded over the reporting period but there are ongoing negotiations with the Netherlands and Portugal.Although specific activities in the area of Electronic Data Exchange are being developed and continued, overall, legislative and technical conditions for social security institutions to cooperate with their counterparts in EU Member States need to be further improved.
There were no developments on the European Health Insurance Card (EHIC). Serbia currently applies agreements on the use of EHIC with nine EU Member States.
Chapter 3 - Right of establishment and freedom to provide services
EU natural and legal persons have the right to establish themselves in any Member State
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and to provide cross-border services. For certain regulated professions, there are rules on mutual recognition of qualifications. EU rules on postal services focus on improving the quality of universal service, gradual market opening to competition, and the establishment of an independent regulator.
In the areas of the right of establishment and freedom to provide cross-border services, the legal framework remains to be aligned with the EU acquis, notably the Law on services needs to be aligned with the EU Services Directive. The implementing legislation regulating the Point of Single Contact (PSC) has been adopted in April 2026 and preparatory works to operationalise the PSC portal are ongoing, in line with the Law on services. Sectoral legislation remains to be aligned with the EU Services Directive and the institutional framework needs to be further strengthened.
In the area of postal services, the legal framework is aligned with the First and Second Postal Services Directives, and partly with the Third Postal Services Directive and the Regulation on cross-border parcel delivery services. A reserved area to the universal service provider is maintained. The national regulatory authority is legally separate and operationally independent from postal operators and remains sufficiently staffed to monitor and ensure compliance with the postal sector rules. In April 2026, the regulatory body adopted secondary legislation on the financing of the universal service net cost calculation and compensation and cost accounting system. A new Strategy for the Development of Postal Services and an action plan for its implementation in 2026-2030 have been adopted in February 2026.
In the field of mutual recognition of professional qualifications, national legislation is broadly aligned with the EU acquis. Serbia is yet to fully align with the Professional Qualifications Directive, and the Proportionality Test Directive as well as to further harmonise relevant sectoral legislation. Certain regulated professions still have nationality requirement for access. A list of 50 regulated professions is pending adoption but does not contain all seven sectoral professions which benefit from automatic recognition under the EU Directive.
Chapter 4 - Free movement of capital
In the EU, capital and investments must be able to move without restrictions, with common rules for cross-border payments. Banks and other economic operators apply certain rules to support the fight against money laundering and terrorist financing.
In the field of capital movements, there were no substantial changes in terms of liberalisation of capital movements during the reporting period. Certain restrictions on capital movements remain, notably on short-term foreign credit and deposit operations, on transactions with financial derivatives, as well as with regard to the Insurance Law and the Law on voluntary pension funds. Preparations are ongoing to align with Solvency II and with the Occupational Pension Funds Directives. Administrative burden for entities engaging in foreign exchange operations remain significant.EU citizens do not have equal treatment regarding the acquisition of real estate and agricultural land, which is not compliant with the EU acquis and Serbia’s obligations under the SAA.
On payments, Serbia should continue its efforts to align with the EU acquis in the area of payment services, including with the Cross-Border Payments Regulation and with the Payment Services Directive. The Law on multilateral interchange fees and special operating rules for card-based payment transactions remains to be aligned with the EU acquis and the SAA obligations (see Chapter 8 – Competition policy). Following Serbia’s entry into the geographical scope of the Single Euro Payments Area (SEPA) in 2025, 18 payment service providers started processing SEPA credit transfers in May 2026, offering faster cross- border Euro transactions and reducing fees for companies and citizens.
On the fight against money laundering and terrorism financing (AML/CFT), the legal framework is broadly aligned with the current EU acquis but there were no legislative developments in the reporting period. Serbia should continue efforts to align with and
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implement the latest EU acquis, including in the area of beneficial ownership.
MONEYVAL’s 6th round of mutual evaluation report on Serbia, adopted in December 2025, indicated that Serbia has improved its understanding of risks, supported by regular national risk assessments and coordinated policy planning. However, shortcomings were reported in the overall effectiveness of the system, including on beneficial ownership, implementation of preventive measures in the non-financial sector, addressing corruption and proactive measures on asset tracing and recovery (also see Chapter 24 – justice, freedom and security). Serbia is revising its strategic operational plan 2025-2029 in light of MONEYVAL’s recommendations.
The capacity and operational independence of competent authorities, including the Administration for Prevention of Money Laundering (APML), need to be further strengthened. In 2025, 2 572 suspicious transactions were reported to the APML and by mid-August 2026, 1 676 suspicious transactions had been reported. In 2025, the APML recorded a large number of suspicious activity reports filed by public notaries related to the authentication of loan agreements.
Chapter 6 - Company law
The EU has common rules on the formation, registration and disclosure requirements of a company, with complementary rules for accounting and financial reporting, and statutory audit.
As regards company law and corporate governance, Serbia’s legislation has a good level of alignment with the EU acquis. A new Law on the takeover of joint-stock companies, along with the implementing legislation, and amendments to the Law on companies are under preparation, aiming to achieve full alignment with the EU acquis. Serbia needs to align further with the directives on the use of digital tools and process, and on cross-border conversions, mergers and divisions. Serbia’s Corporate Governance Code is based on EU best practice and OECD principles. Company information in the business register is stored electronically in a database and is technically ready to interconnect with the business registers interconnection system (BRIS) upon EU accession. Serbia should also complete alignment with the corporate sustainability due diligence Directive, as amended by the Omnibus I Directive.
Regarding company reporting and statutory audit, Serbia has yet to align with the EU acquis on corporate sustainability reporting, on the disclosure of income tax information by certain undertakings and branches, and regarding the adjustments of the size criteria for micro, small, medium-sized and large undertakings or groups, bearing in mind the ongoing developments of the EU acquis. Drafting of a new draft Law on accounting and a new draft Law on auditing- has progressed but these are yet to be adopted. Serbia should continue efforts to fully align with the EU acquis on accounting, auditing and transparency.
Chapter 7 - Intellectual property law
The EU has to a large extent harmonised rules for the legal protection and enforcement of copyright and related rights, as well as of industrial property rights, including trademarks, designs, patents and related supplementary protection certificates (SPCs), geographical indications (GIs), including craft and industrial GIs.
The Law on copyright and related rights remains to be further aligned with the EU acquis, in particularwith Directive 2014/26/EU on collective rights management, Directive 2012/28/EU on orphan works and Directive (EU) 2017/1564 on certain permitted uses of certain works and other subject matter protected by copyright and related rights for the benefit of persons who are blind, visually impaired or otherwise print-disabled. Work on the alignment of Serbia’s legal framework with Directive 2019/789 on the exercise of copyright and related rights applicable to certain online transmissions of broadcasting organisations and retransmissions of television and radio programmes, and Directive 2019/790 on
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copyrights and related rights in the Digital Single Market is ongoing.
On industrial property rights, the legislative framework is generally in line with the relevant EU acquis. Serbia acceded to the Geneva Act of the Lisbon Agreement on Appellations of Origin and Geographical Indications in June 2026, with its entry into force starting in October 2026. The Intellectual Property Office is relatively well staffed and efficient in registering trademarks. In 2025, it received 2 648 applications for trademark protection and 92 for industrial designs (respectively 2 600 and 273 in 2024). Registration of trademarks increased from 1 935 in 2024 to 2 246 trademarks in 2025, while registration of industrial designs decreased from 273 to 68. In 2025, there were 1 222 validated European patents, compared with 1 304 in 2025, while 29 national patents were granted (21 in 2024).
On enforcement, the amount of counterfeit and pirated goods confiscated and destroyed by the Market Inspectorate dropped from 1 215 425 in 2024 to 366 368 in 2025, while the number of items detained by the customs administration increased from 103 894 in 2024 to 798 071 in 2025. The Coordination Body for the Protection of IPR convened seven times during the reporting period. A new programme on the development of intellectual property remains to be adopted. Work to further align with the Directive on the enforcement of IPR is ongoing. The electronic platform for information exchange among IPR enforcement institutions was finalised but still needs to become fully operational. Due to inadequate specialisation and the increasing number of new cases, the capacity of the judiciary to handle IPR cases remains limited.
Chapter 8 - Competition policy
EU rules protect free competition. They include antitrust rules against restrictive agreements between companies and abuse of a dominant position, and rules on concentrations between companies which would significantly impede effective competition. EU rules also set out a system of State aid control. Governments are only allowed to grant State aid if restrictive conditions are met, with a view to preventing distortion of competition.
Antitrust and mergers
The legislative framework is broadly in line with Articles 101 and 102 in the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) and related provisions of the Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA) but needs to be fully aligned with EU guidelines and communications. Progress was made on three block exemption regulations, which were adopted in March 2026. Work is ongoing with respect to amending and aligning Article 9 of the Law on multilateral interchange fees and special operating rules for card-based payment transactions with the EU acquis and the SAA.
Regarding the institutional framework, the Commission for Protection of Competition (CPC) has a reputation as an operationally independent institution. However, it remains to be seen how the CPC’s financial independence, resources and ability to conduct its competition enforcement responsibilities will be impacted by the introduction of new responsibilities under the Law on Unfair Trading Practices, adopted in April 2026. The level of fines decreased to around EUR 0.18 million in 2025, from over EUR 0.5 million in 2024. Work should focus on sustaining a credible enforcement record, decisions should be systematically published, and the transparency of the CPC’s work should increase.
The enforcement capacity of the CPC is adequate. Consulting the CPC on all relevant legislation should continue and its opinions should be systematically taken into account. The CPC should continue to step up its advocacy activities. The capacity and specialisation of the judiciary for complex competition cases needs to be improved significantly.
State aid
Regarding the legislative framework on State aid, the Law on State aid control is broadly in line with the EU acquis and the relevant provisions of the SAA. To further align
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implementing legislation with the EU acquis, two new decrees were adopted in September 2025, and April 2026, one decree was amended in October 2025, one new rulebook was adopted in February 2026, and four sets of guidelines were adopted in May and June. Six State aid schemes, including four fiscal aid schemes established by the laws on corporate income tax, personal income tax, compulsory social insurance and free zones, were amended and adopted in August with the aim of aligning with the EU acquis. Additional implementing legislation needs to be further aligned. A timebound action plan for alignment of incompatible schemes, based on the finalised inventory submitted in 2025, was adopted in June 2026. Furthermore, the regional aid map in line with the obligations of the SAA still has to be drafted.
On the institutional framework, the operational independence of the Commission for State Aid Control (CSAC) must be demonstrated by a transparent track record that shows consistent and satisfactory implementation of the law.
CSAC’s enforcement capacity should be further strengthened, with particular focus on staffing.
The implementation of the Law on State aid control needs to be improved. In particular, the notification and the standstill obligations need to be respected systematically. State aid is occasionally provided to economic operators, particularly foreign investors, without prior approval by the CSAC. All State aid grantors, including municipalities, must notify State aid ex ante. CSAC’s annual reports on State aid granted should be adopted by the government in a timely manner. Advocacy activities among aid-granting authorities should continue, as there is a systemic lack of awareness on State aid rules.
On liberalisation, the decree on public service compensation granted to certain undertakings entrusted with the operation of services of general economic interest was amended in October 2025. Enforcement of competition rules for public companies needs to be intensified. There is no evidence of the existence of commercial monopolies within the meaning of Article 37 TFEU.
Chapter 9 - Financial services
EU rules aim at ensuring fair competition among financial institutions and the stability and integrity of financial markets, namely in the field of banking, insurance, supplementary pensions, investment services, and securities. They include rules on authorisation, operation, and supervision of these institutions.
In the area of banking and financial conglomerates, Serbia has a good level of alignment with the previous versions of the Capital Requirements Regulation and the Capital Requirements Directive (CRR II /CRD V). Work needs to continue to align with the latest versions (CRR III/CRD VI). The regulatory package for the interest rate risk in the banking book is applied fully as of January 2026. Regarding bank resolution, the resolution reporting framework was established, and the Bank Resolution Fund operationalised in line with the amended Law on banks adopted in March 2025. However, full alignment with the revised version of the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD) is yet to be achieved. As regards protection of deposits, Serbia needs to further align its national legislation with the EU Deposit Guarantee Scheme Directive.
Regarding insurance and occupational pensions, Serbia should continue efforts to align with the EU acquis. Preparations for alignment with the Solvency II Directive are ongoing, while a new law on compulsory traffic insurance is yet to be adopted. Serbia has yet to align with the Directive on the activities and supervision of institutions for occupational retirement provision.
In the area of financial market infrastructure, Serbia remains partially aligned with the EU acquis and should continue alignment efforts.
On securities markets and investment services, amendments to the Law on alternative
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investment funds adopted in December 2025, aiming to further align with the Alternative Investment Fund Managers Directive (AIFMD) and the European Long-term Investment Funds Regulation (ELTIF). Further work is needed to fully align with the EU acquis in relation to the Directive and the Regulation on markets in financial instruments (MIFID II/MIFIR) and the Directive on undertakings for collective investment in transferable securities (UCITS).
On sustainable and digital finance, starting from 1 January 2026, financial institutions are required to report ICT related incidents to the National Bank of Serbia. There were no developments on sustainable financein the reporting period.
Chapter 28 - Consumer and health protection
EU rules protect consumers’ economic interests and in relation to product safety, dangerous imitations and liability for defective products. The EU also ensures high common standards for tobacco control, blood, tissues, cells and organs, as well as human and veterinary medicinal products. The EU also has rules for upholding patients’ rights in cross- border healthcare and in preparing for and responding to serious cross-border health threats, including communicable diseases.
Consumer protection
On horizontal aspects, Serbia’s legislation was further aligned with the EU consumer protection framework with the adoption of the Law on consumer protection and the Law on trade. While Serbia is largely aligned with the EU consumer protection framework, full alignment remains to be ensured. The financing model of Consumer Protection Organisations remains to be addressed, as organisations have not yet received their financial allocations. On product safety related issues,Serbia needs to further align its legislation with the EU acquis, notably through the adoption of a Law on general product safety. In addition, market surveillance capacities need to be strengthened (see also Chapter 1).
On non-safety related issues,the number of alternative dispute resolution (ADR) bodies decreased to 39, and the number of solved cases in ADRs proceedings amounted to 3551in 2025. The issue of financial stability of ADRs remains unresolved.In its capacity as an ADR body in charge of financial institutions, during the reporting period the National Bank of Serbia (NBS) resolved 3296 complaints related to banks, as well as 4629 complaints related to relevant financial and payment service providers, including insurance companies.
Public health
On public health, Serbia needs to ensure the sustainability of the public health insurance fund, full compliance with EU health indicators, implement the national plan for human resources in the health sector, and adopt implementing legislation to improve the organisation of emergency services. Serbia joined the EU4Health programme in January 2026. Appropriate funding is needed to ensure implementation of the national programme on sexual and reproductive health. On eHealth, the Law on health records and documentation needs to be aligned with the EU data protection acquis, standards, and principles.
There was no progress on alignment with the EU acquis on tobacco control. The deadline for combined health warnings on packaging was postponed. Serbia needs to intensify controls to ensure effective implementation of tobacco control measures. Surveillance and response capacities for serious cross-border health threats, including communicable diseases, remain limited and in need of modernisation. Serbia needs to increase awareness of the necessity of childhood vaccination. There was no progress on alignment with the EU acquis on blood, tissues, cells and organs, patients' rights in cross-border healthcare, on medicines for human use or veterinary medicinal products, or on health technology assessment. There was no further progress on medical devices. Serbia needs to implement stricter controls on prescriptions of antimicrobials for human and veterinary use to bolster its efforts on antimicrobial resistance.
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Community-based mental healthservices remain underdeveloped with low accessibility, and the 2019-2026 mental health protection programme remains to be implemented. In August 2026, Serbia adopted amendments to the Law on the protection of persons with mental disorders (see also fundamental rights under Chapter 23). On cancerscreenings, over 100 000 mammography examinations have been completed since September 2025 as part of efforts to increase breast cancer screening coverage to 70%.
On health inequalities and disabilities, an eHealth digital platform providing online access to healthcare services is operational. However, the registration process involves in-person steps that limit accessibility for persons with disabilities, older persons and those in remote areas.
On anti-corruption, the Law on medicinal products and medical devices and its by-laws contain anti-corruption provisions, though aspects on the promotion or advertising of medicinal products need to be improved. The Law on healthcare also needs to be amended to address gaps in provisions on conflict of interest and gift regulation in publicly owned healthcare institutions.
CLUSTER 3: COMPETITIVENESS AND INCLUSIVE GROWTH
Chapter 10 - Digital transformation and media
The EU supports the proper functioning of the internal market for electronic communications, electronic commerce, and audiovisual services. The rules protect consumers and support the universal availability of modern services.
On the overall strategy, Serbia took steps to advance its digital transformation through public investment in digital infrastructure, digital government services, and information security. Serbia continued to participate in the European Digital Innovation Hubs network, the Digital Europe Programme and the EuroHPC Joint Undertaking, as well as regional initiatives such as the EU Digital Agenda for the Western Balkans and EU4Digital.
Regarding electronic communications, the Law on electronic communication needs to be further aligned with the European Electronic Communications Code. The full operational and financial independence of the Regulatory Agency for Electronic Communications and Postal Services also remains to be ensured through stronger legal safeguards, while its administrative capacity also remains to be improved. The 112 European emergency number calling systemremains to be fully implemented according to EU standards. Serbia aims to align with the Gigabit Infrastructure Act through the adoption of the Law on measures to reduce the cost of deploying very high-capacity electronic communications networks. Serbia concluded the 5G spectrum auction and issued licences to the three operators to begin commercial roll-out. While current coverage remains concentrated in urban areas, the licence conditions include obligations to accelerate network deployment to reach national coverage. Serbia needs to fully implement the EU 5G Cybersecurity Toolbox, including by assessing suppliers’ risk profiles and putting in place appropriate restrictions and/or exclusions for high-risk suppliers. There were no developments regarding competitive safeguards, while concentration in the cable operators’ market further increased. Serbia has taken steps to align its legislation with the EU roaming acquis, including with the EU Roam Like at Home (RLAH) framework, as a step towards possible participation in the EU Roam Like at Home area and accelerated integration into the EU digital market.
Regarding digital services, Serbia introduced additional e-government services on the government service information portal. Serbia still needs to align with the Digital Services Act and Digital Markets Act. Serbia aims to further align with the EU’s Open Data Directive on the reuse of public sector information with the adoption of the Law on e-government. However, full alignment remains pending. In relation to the protection of minors online, a Safer Internet Centre was established in Serbia.
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On digital trust and cybersecurity, Serbia adopted the Law on information security, which further aligned with the NIS2 Directive. Serbia should further align with the European Digital Identity Framework, while preparations are ongoing for the roll-out of an interoperable national digital wallet and cross-border validation of trust services. Serbia has advanced work for the inclusion in the EU third country trusted list scheme for the validation of electronic signatures with the adoption of secondary legislation. Serbia also needs to align with the Cyber Resilience Act. Technical and institutional capacities were strengthened through the establishment of a dedicated information security department.
On media, in July 2026, the process of election of the new REM Council was unblocked with the return of the four REM Council members who had previously resigned, while the election of the ninth member was suspended until after the elections for the new national minority councils in November 2026. (See also on freedom of expression and media freedom in chapter 23) Prior to that, electronic media had been without a functioning regulatory body since November 2024. Several electronic media launched channels without a licence, some of which are transmitted by state-owned Telekom Serbia. In addition, the media market concentration further increased. A major private media group was impacted by the announcement of new governance and editorial boards, followed by the dismissals of the CEO of a subsidiary company, the director of its news channel, and an announced change in ownership. Serbia has yet to adopt a new Law on advertising to further align with the EU acquis. The procedure for allocating the fifth national broadcasting frequency, launched in 2022, remains pending.
On artificial intelligence (AI), Serbia should align with the EU AI Act and develop the necessary governance and enforcement structures.Serbia continued upgrading its national AI supercomputing platform as part of its 2025-2030 AI Strategy and was selected to host an AI Factory Antenna under the EuroHPC Joint Undertaking.
Chapter 16 - Taxation
EU rules on taxation cover value-added tax, excise duties and aspects of corporate taxation. They also cover cooperation between tax administrations, including the exchange of information to prevent tax evasion.
In the area of taxation, the institutional framework is in place. Serbia has committed to greater transparency by preparing a first tax expenditure report, which initial findings show that value added tax (VAT) represents the largest fiscal cost.
Regarding indirect taxation, the legislative framework remains partially aligned with the EU acquis. The Law on VAT was amended in December 2025 and introduced periodic invoices for water, electricity, natural gas, heating and cooling supplied to final consumers. The start of the implementation of preliminary tax returns for VAT was postponed to January 2027. The Law on excise duties has yet to be fully aligned with the EU acquis. In the context of the escalation in the Middle East and the related increase of global oil prices, Serbia initially reduced excise duties on oil by 25% in April 2026, then increased it, while always keeping the duties above the EU minima. However, amendments to the Law on Excise adopted in August 2026 now allow the government to reduce excise duties on petroleum products by more than 20%. Natural gas is taxed when used as propellant since 1 January 2026, while it remains untaxed when used for heating purposes. An effective system to control and monitor the movement of excisable products is not yet fully in place, although improvements were made to the e-excise system for cigarettes and non-burning tobacco.
Regarding direct taxation, the legislative framework is partially aligned with the EU acquis.
Some progress was achieved on non-tax levies through the creation of a unified register, established through the amendments to the Law on register of administrative procedures, adopted in December 2025. All relevant public bodies are in the process of registering all non-tax levies. The Law on Republic Administrative Fees was amended to introduce e- payments for public fees and charges as of 1 January 2026.
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Serbia cooperates with the EU through an enhanced dialogue on tax good governance, on the basis of the EU list of non-cooperative jurisdictions for tax purposes. The country remains committed to implement the Inclusive Framework on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting minimum standards.
Regarding administrative cooperation and mutual assistance, the institutional and legislative framework is largely in place. Efforts are ongoing to align with the minimum global corporate income tax. Serbia is yet to implement automatic exchange of financial account information and no commitment for first exchanges was provided.
Regarding operational capacity and digitalisation,the institutional framework requires strengthening, as well as the capacities of the tax administration, particularly on enforcement. While competitions have been organised, the tax administration’s capacities continue to decrease with 3 320 permanent employees and 665 temporary in mid-2026 down from 3 305 permanent and 863 temporary in mid-2025. A follow-up programme to the Tax Administration Transformation Programme, which ended in 2025, has yet to be adopted. The tax administration has adopted an integrity plan, an internal anti-corruption act, as well as an operational plan for preventing corruption. The tax administration’s commercial-off-the- shelf IT solution was procured in December 2025 and the implementation of a first phase has started for VAT, excise and non-life insurance. Further efforts are needed to meet the requirement for the exchange of information on VAT (VIES system) and Excise Movement and Control System (EMCS).
Chapter 17 - Economic and monetary policy
EU rules require the independence of central banks and prohibit them from directly financing the public sector. Member States coordinate their economic policies and are subject to fiscal, economic and financial surveillance.
On monetary policy, the institutional framework is in place, and the legal framework is largely aligned with the EU acquis. Work is ongoing to ensure the full functional, institutional, personal, and financial independence of theNational Bank of Serbia (NBS), including through preparation of amendments to the Law on the NBS and the Law on public property.
Regarding economic policy, the legal framework is partially aligned with the EU acquis. Numerical fiscal rules are in place, and an independent Fiscal Council is operational, providing relevant assessments. Improvements to budgetary transparency need to continue, including in relation to fiscal risks and tax expenditures and public participation. Budget oversight by the legislature needs to be improved. Strengthening the analysis of the long- term sustainability of public finances and private-public partnerships (PPPs) should continue. Alignment with the Directive on requirements for budgetary frameworks is needed through amendments to the Law on the budget system regarding macroeconomic and fiscal projections, a three-year expenditure perspective, transparency, and accounting and statistical reporting. The sizeable contingency reserve, which has in recent years been used to facilitate ad hoc spending measures, lacks clearly defined restrictions for its usage and would benefit from improved and regular reporting (see public financial management).
The government submitted its 2026-2028 Economic Reform Programme (ERP) on 9 January 2026. As in previous years, its analytical diagnostics were solid. Core reforms under the ERP continue from the previous programme and are in line with the Reform Agenda. Implementation of policy guidance set out in the conclusions of the Economic and Financial Dialogue of May 2025 has been partial.
Chapter 19 - Social policy and employment
EU rules in the social field include minimum requirements for labour law, equality and non- discrimination, health, and safety at work. They also promote social inclusion, social protection, and social dialogue at EU level.
In the field of labour law, the 2014 law remains only partially aligned with the EU acquis.
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The number of labour inspectors remained well below the target of the Chapter 19 action plan, despite a slight increase in the reporting period. Serbia has not yet addressed the recommendations of the Council of Europe Group of Experts on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings (GRETA), which called for proactive and thorough investigation of allegations of trafficking for labour exploitation involving migrant workers. Although the US Customs imposed in December 2025 a withhold release order on tyre manufacturer Linglong due to allegations of forced labour, Serbia’s labour inspections on the production side had not detected forced labour. Another withhold release order was imposed in June 2026. The Law on inspection oversight still does not fully comply with the International Labour Organisation (ILO)’s Convention.
In the area of health and safety at work, the legislation of 2023 remains partially aligned with the EU acquis. The implementation of provisions related to storing occupational and health records, testing electrical protection installations and safe work at height were postponed to January 2027. Serbia continued to align its secondary legislation with the EU acquis. In 2025, labour inspectors carried out 1 021 inspections regarding fatal, serious with fatal outcome, serious, collective and minor injuries at work. The number of reported workplace fatalities decreased slightly in 2025 (49 cases, from 59 in 2024) while the number of recorded serious injuries remained stable (910).
Social dialogue, and the involvement of social partners in policy developments relevant to them, remain weak. The Law on Strike needs to be amended without further delay as the current law of 1996 is outdated and not in line with ILO standards. No new sectoral collective bargaining agreements were signed. Some complaints brought up to ILO about infringements to the freedom of association remain open. The capacity of social partners will need to be strengthened, and full use should be made of the findings of the project carried out by the ILO.
On employment policy, budget allocations for active labour market policies decreased by 10% in 2026 and remain well below 0.1% of GDP. The 2024-2026 employment action plan’s target of 0.2% of GDP by 2026 was not achieved. The job seekers to public employment advisers ratio remains very high (570). A Youth Guarantee pilot scheme has been implemented in three employment offices since January 2024. At the pilot stage, the scheme has not yet contributed significantly to reducing youth unemployment (23.4% in 2025 for the 15-24 population) and NEET rate (15.1% in 2025 among youth aged 15-29) (see also Chapter 26 – Education and culture).
Regarding labour force participation and unemployment rate, see the statistical annex and the section on the functioning of the labour market under 2.3 Economic criteria.
In the area of social protection and inclusion, in 2025, according to the latest survey on income and living conditions (SILC), the at-risk-of-poverty or social exclusion rate amounted to 23.2%, compared to 24.3% in 2024. Public expenditure on social protection and budget transfers as a share of GDP remain low. Serbia still needs to address the ECRI’s recommendations of June 2024 on the decision-making process of the Social Card and its impact on Roma and other people at heightened risk of poverty, social exclusion or discrimination, as well as the recommendations of the Commissioner for the Protection of Equality to issue instructions to centres for social work to eliminate ambiguities in the application of the Social Card Register. There is a need for legislative adjustments and improvement of the coverage and adequacy of financial social assistance. A new strategy for social protection and amendments to the Law on social welfare are increasingly delayed. The recommendation of 2022 of the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights to remove discriminatory conditions in the Law on financial support to family with children have yet to be addressed. Means-tested social assistance programmes do not sufficiently reach people living in poverty, a large share of children living in poverty are not covered by any benefit, and the social protection system remains understaffed. The system of earmarked transfers to the local level is still not implemented systematically or transparently.
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With regard to the de-institutionalisation process for children and adults with disabilities, the Commission’s Guidance on independent living for persons with disabilities aiming at facilitating de-institutionalisation and independent living needs to be taken into account. Under the new Law on Parents-Caregivers and Caregivers adopted in July 2026, a parent- caregiver of children with developmental disabilities is entitled to a monthly allowance, with the payment of applicable taxes and contributions, thereby securing rights related to pension, disability and health insurance. Preparatory activities are ongoing as regards the European Child Guarantee; a working group to develop an Action Plan needs to be established by the Government.
In the field of non-discrimination in employment and social policy, Serbia still needs to proceed with alignment with the relevant EU acquis, including the Employment Equality Directive, the Racial Equality Directive, the Directive and Council Directive on standards for equality bodies. Most complaints received by Serbia’s Commissioner for the Protection of Equality are related to the area of employment (see also Chapter 23 – Judiciary and fundamental rights).
In the area of equality between women and men in employment and social policy, Serbia still needs to fully align with the EU acquis, including the Directive on Work-Life Balance, the Pay Transparency Directive and the Women on Boards Directive. The position of women on the labour market in Serbia remains unfavourable compared with the position of men. The employment rate for men (20-64-year-olds) is 11.5 percentage points higher and their activity rate is 12.1 percentage
points higher than those for women. The gender pay gap is 14.5%. The gender equality law remained suspended by the Constitutional Court, which means that the legal obligation for employers to report on gender equality in the workplace, including on the principle of equal pay for equal work, also remained suspended. The gender pension gap was 4 % in 2025, down from 7.9 % in 2024, among persons aged 65-74. Although the legislation grants access to parental leave to both parents, gender-based stereotypical preconceptions persist about childcare and household work being a woman’s responsibility. The lack of State services for childcare in rural areas also increases the amount of unpaid household work for women. Maternity, paternity and parental leave rights in the legislation are not aligned with the EU acquis. Sustained efforts are needed to ensure that anti-discrimination commitments translate into consistent practice, particularly in under-resourced municipalities with limited administrative and financial capacity.
As regards preparations for the European Social Fund, Serbia adopted the law on cohesion policy in April 2026, creating the legal and institutional framework for managing EU cohesion funds after accession (see also Chapter 22 - Regional policy and coordination of structural instruments).
Chapter 20 - Enterprise and industrial policy
EU industrial policy strengthens competitiveness, facilitates structural change, and encourages a business-friendly environment that stimulates small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs).
The institutional and policy framework with regard to industrial policy and competitiveness, is largely in place. Serbia’s strategy for industrial development 2021-2030
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continues to be implemented. The publication of the implementation report for 2025 was delayed. Serbia adopted the 2026-2027 action plan in June 2026, delaying implementation. Stakeholder consultation in drafting this action plan was limited. Serbia should conduct a mid-term impact evaluation of the industrial strategy, with reference to relevant indicators.
Serbia’s approach of using budgetary subsidies for newly created jobs, as an incentive for foreign direct investments (FDI) is inconsistent with its industrial policy goal of prioritising value added over labour cost, and with the continued need to better integrate SMEs into domestic and international supply chains.
Regarding enterprise policy, reforms concerning the ownership and management of state- owned enterprises (SOEs) are advancing primarily through the implementation of the SOE strategy and related action plans and the 2024 SOE Law. Full implementation of the Law is dependent on 13 pieces of implementing legislation, of which one remains to be adopted. During the reporting period, Serbia made little progress on its privatisation and restructuring process of over 500 SOEs, given 41 companies remain to be privatised, as in the previous reporting period.
Serbia’s SME development strategy for 2023-2027 is being implemented. Serbia has yet to adopt an action plan covering 2026-2027, and has yet to provide an implementation report for 2025.
To improve the business environment, Serbia should continue efforts to ensure all relevant legislation is subject to timely, inclusive and comprehensive public consultations, including through effective communication of the e-consultation portal. Serbia should continue its efforts to address the mismatch between workforce skill and labour-market demand, including through systematic public-private consultation.
Serbia draws on a range of enterprise and industrial policy instruments, including grants, subsidies, tax exemptions and guarantee schemes. The budget for measures supporting SMEs and entrepreneurship continues to grow, but remains modest. Serbia participates in the SME Pillar of the Single Market Programme and is a member of the Enterprise Europe Network. Serbia takes part in the Single Market Highway initiative, which represents a new framework for bilateral industrial cooperation between the EU and the Western Balkan countries. The first EU–Serbia Single Market Highway workshop, focusing on the machinery sector, took place in April 2026. On combating late payments in commercial transactions, Serbia’s legislation is largely aligned with the EU acquis. However, Serbia is still not aligned with the rules on payments, indemnity interest rates, expedited recovery procedures, and compensation.
On sectoral policies, Serbia has a number of sector-specific strategies including in the areas of energy, transport, education, media, artificial intelligence and tourism (see also Chapters 10 on Digital transformation and media, 14 on Transport, 15 on Energy and 26 on Education and culture). In April 2026, Serbia adopted its Strategy for the Management of Mineral and Other Geological Resources until 2040. Serbia is implementing its Smart Specialisation Strategy (see also Chapter 25 on Science and research).
Chapter 25 - Science and research
The EU provides significant support to research and innovation. All Member States can participate in the EU’s research and innovation programmes and benefit from them, especially where there are scientific excellence and solid investment in research and innovation.
On research and innovation policy, Serbia adopted a new Strategy of Science, Technological Development and Innovation 2026-2030 and its action plan for 2026-2028. The Law on science and research was amended in December 2025 to align with the European Research Infrastructure Consortium Regulation.
The Decrees restricting the amount of time the academic staff can spend on research
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activities amended in March 2025 remained in place until end of July 2026 and undermined the institutional autonomy of academic institutions, freedom of scientific research, and eligibility of Serbian researchers to apply to certain European Research Council grants for most of the reporting period. Pressure on higher education institutions and academic staff also intensified (see Chapter 26 – education and culture).
The national level of investment in research remains low at 0.93% of GDP in 2024. Private sector research and innovation expenditure was stable at 45% in 2025. Serbia is in the sixth year of implementing its Smart Specialisation Strategy but has yet to adopt a second action plan for the period 2026-2027.
The main government financial instruments for support to research and innovation are in place, with the yearly budget allocated to the Science Fund of EUR 11 million and to the Innovation Fund of EUR 15.4 million. The Innovation Fund’s Katapult programme has been recognised as the 48th leading European start-up hub in February by the Financial Times. However, some of the public calls for grants of both funds were either not finalised for more than a year (2024 IDEAS programme of the Science Fund) or cancelled after evaluation (Katalitik programme of the Innovation Fund), which affect the credibility of these institutions and funding security for researchers.
The decisions of central and local authorities to dismiss board members of two major research institutions in the summer of 2025 were legally challenged. In one case, a dismissed director of a research institute which is a major recipient of Horizon Europe grants, was reinstated by the court in October 2025, only to resign in May 2026, due to pressures from the research institute’s Management Board. Subsequently, a new acting director was appointed but also dismissed at the end of August 2026.
The number of validated European patents remain modest. Further integration into the new European Innovation Ecosystems and activities of the European Innovation Council is strongly encouraged.
Serbia is an Emerging Innovator in the European innovation scoreboard, with performance of 60.4% of the EU average in 2026 which is above the average of the emerging innovators group. The performance gap with the EU is nonetheless increasing. Relative weaknesses are design applications, labour productivity and venture capital expenditures.
Researchers from Serbia participated in all the actions of the European Cooperation in Science and Technology (COST). Serbia is also successfully participating in Eureka.
Serbia is associated to the Research and Innovation Framework Programme Horizon Europe. In the reporting period, 72 grants with Serbian participation were signed with a total EU contribution for Serbia of EUR 24.45 million.
The Serbian Artificial Intelligence Factory Antenna was launched in May 2026 and aims to become a national hub for AI development, supporting the full lifecycle of AI innovation.
Chapter 26 - Education and culture
The EU supports cooperation in education and culture through funding programmes and the coordination of Member State policies through the ‘open method of coordination’. The EU and the Member States must also prevent discrimination and ensure quality education for children of migrant workers, including those from disadvantaged backgrounds.
In the area of education and training, the policy framework and the institutional framework are in place, but their implementation deteriorated during the reporting period. The level of public spending on education was modest in 2025, around 3.46% of GDP, which is below the EU average of 4.7% of GDP (2023). Underinvestment in certain sectors constrains the administrative and delivery capacity of the system. The implementation of the 2030 education strategy and its action plan is delayed. There is vulnerability to undue interference and corruption in the sector, particularly in higher education, which materialised during the
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reporting period through untransparent decisions on appointments, dismissals and restructuring of institutions. Serbia’s National Education Council and the National Council for Higher Education have not been operational since February 2026, due to the authorities not reappointing new members. The student population continues to decrease due to negative demographic trends and emigration.
The coverage of children with early childhood education and care (ECEC) for age 6 months to 6.5 years and mandatory ECEC for children aged between 5.5 and 6.5 years old is stable at 62.5% in 2025 (62.8% in 2024) and 96.2% in 2025 (same in 2024) respectively. Continued efforts are needed to increase participation and equitable access for the most disadvantaged children, including Roma children and children with disabilities.
The rate of early school leavers dropped to 5.1% in 2025 (6.2% in 2024). Revised curricula for the first grades of all three cycles of pre-university education were adopted but will only apply as of the 2027/2028 school year.
In December 2025, Serbia adopted amendments to the Law on textbooks which give exclusive rights to a public publisher for producing textbooks for subjects of geography and history in primary and secondary education as of 2027/2028 school year. This reduces pluralism, may impact the quality of education and politicise the curriculum.
At the beginning of the 2025/2026 school year, a significant number of principals were dismissed and temporary contracts of some teachers in primary and secondary education were not renewed. Additional dismissals across all levels of education occurred during the reporting period, including at the beginning of the 2026/2027 school year, deepening the trend previously reported. The Commissioner for the Protection of Equality issued opinions on dismissals and suspensions of teachers found to be made on the basis of discrimination and recommended their reinstatement. A significant number of disciplinary proceedings were initiated against teachers in primary and secondary education in connection with the suspension of education delivery the previous year in relation to students protests and blockades.
Concerning international assessments, Serbia took part in the Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA) 2025 and the Progress in International Reading Literacy Study (PIRLS) 2026. According to PISA 2025 results, 57% of Serbian students attained at least basic proficiency (Level 2 or higher) in science, 47% in mathematics and 52% in reading. These results remain below the OECD average and lower than in PISA 2022 in all fields. Serbia also piloted studies of TIMMS 2027 and ICCS 2027 testing. Serbia should commit sufficient funding and human resources for sustained participation in international assessments. The OECD Teaching and Learning International Survey (TALIS) 2024 survey indicated that teachers in Serbia report the lowest satisfaction with their profession in the region. These findings come in a context of teacher shortages and a significant number of teachers with temporary contracts.
Serbia should continue to modernise the curricula to improve vocational education and training (VET) relevance and further develop the national work-based learning model for VET. A framework for monitoring and evaluation of dual education is yet to be fully integrated in quality assurance processes. A decree establishing training centres for lifelong learning was adopted in September 2026. The employment rate of VET graduates (aged 20- 34) has slightly decreased to 65.5% in 2025 (67.3% in 2024). Serbia is a member of the European Alliance for Apprenticeships since 2017. Preparations for the introduction of final examinations in secondary education, which has been postponed three times and should apply as of the 2028/2029 school year, are significantly delayed due to persistent constraints in administrative capacities and in financial planning.
Serbia is a member of the European Higher Education Area (Bologna process). In June 2026, Serbia ratified the fifth mobility Agreement on Access to Higher Education and Admission to Higher Studies in the Western Balkans. The delivery of higher education,
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discontinued last year, resumed gradually in late 2025 according to a new calendar to mitigate the impact of missed classes. The previously reduced salaries of teaching staff and material costs for higher education were gradually compensated. As of 1 January 2026, higher education institutions have been included in the SPIRI public accounting system, which has prompted concerns that this reduces their financial autonomy.
Academic freedom and institutional autonomy of higher education institutions have further eroded during the reporting period. Pressure intensified on academic staff especially those involved in the protests and blockades, including through dismissals, disciplinary and criminal proceedings and smear campaigns. Two high-level state officials made threatening comments about students in April 2026, which were not followed by corrective actions. In March 2026, following the death of a student, the criminal police raided the University of Belgrade. Concerns were raised about the proportionality and politicisation of the search on campus, which led to seizure of documentation related to the students’ movement.
Furthermore, several changes in the governance and structure of universities have taken place between November 2025 and May 2026. In November 2025, at the University of Niš, authorities dismantled three departments of the Faculty of Philosophy to establish the Faculty of Serbian Studies, without the prior opinion of the management bodies of relevant higher education institutions as mandatory per the Law on higher education. This raises questions as to the legality of the decision and creates legal uncertainty on its accreditation. This case has resulted in ongoing legal proceedings. In April 2026, Serbia and Russia signed a memorandum of understanding in the field of higher education, despite Russia’s suspension of participation in EHEA. In May 2026, a memorandum of understanding was signed with the Serbian Orthodox Church to establish the Saint Sava University. Amendments to the Law on Churches and Religious Communities were adopted in August 2026, authorising the Serbian Orthodox Church to establish a higher education institution of special social relevance under more favourable conditions. Announced reforms of higher education needs to be transparent, discussed inclusively with all relevant stakeholders and to comply with the Law on Higher Education.
On quality assurance in higher education, the National Accreditation Body has yet to submit an application for renewed membership in the European Association for Quality Assurance in Higher Education (ENQA) after its suspension in 2020. In January 2026, five by-laws were adopted, linking qualification standards with quality assurance procedures, and further regulating accreditation of higher education institutions, short study programmes and micro- credentials. The attainment of tertiary level qualifications for people aged 25-34 remained stable at 37.1% in 2025 (37.2% in 2024), still significantly below the 2030 EU target of 45%.
Although Serbia has a comprehensive adult learning framework and would benefit from having a stand-alone strategy, lifelong learning participation remains low at 5.2% in 2025 (5.5% in 2024). The lack of opportunities for reskilling and upskilling remains a structural barrier to employment and should be addressed. Work on the recognition of informal and non-formal training is progressing slowly.
Measures to reduce drop-out rates and improve inclusion of minorities need to continue. Quota for the enrolment of Roma students and students with disabilities in higher education increased from 1% to 1.5% in the 2026/2027 school year, however their enrolment remains limited. The number of students supported by individual education plans continued to increase. Children with intellectual disabilities still do not have access to teaching assistants. The issue of children in residential institutions who are not in education needs to be addressed. Thirteen resource centres for students with disabilities were set up and four schools were given the status of model schools for inclusive education. Mechanisms for prevention of, and protection against violence and discrimination need to be fully implemented, and their monitoring strengthened.
Serbia’s digital education transformation is ongoing through the development of infrastructure, curricula and teacher digital pedagogical competencies. However, such efforts
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are still not yielding the expected learning outcomes. The education management information system is still not fully developed and utilised. Persistent data discrepancies limit evidence-based policymaking and reform monitoring.
Serbia has been participating in the Erasmus+ programme as an associated country since 2019. In 2025, Serbian organisations took part in 866 Erasmus+ projects worth EUR 22.5 million, of which 302 projects as project coordinators. Due to challenges in the governance and national administrative constraints linked to the opening of bank accounts for individual projects, delays in the implementation of some of the Erasmus+ programmes were recorded.
Regarding youth, Serbia is implementing the youth strategy and the Youth Guarantee action plan. The 2026-2028 youth strategy action plan was adopted in July 2026. The revised legislation on youth, volunteering and traineeship has yet to be adopted. The National Youth Council has not been re-constituted since April 2025. Despite increased efforts, youth policy and support mechanisms remain unevenly developed at local level. Operational and governance standards should be set and adequate budgetary allocations should be committed to ensure quality and sustainable local youth spaces and services.
On sports, the Strategy for the Development of Sports by 2035 was adopted. Serbia is participating in the fourth call for proposals for mobility projects in the area of sport and continued to participate in the European Week of Sport.
On culture, Serbia has yet to adopt an overarching cultural development strategy. Serbia fully participates in the 2021-2027 Creative Europe Programme and cultural operators achieved significant results in all three strands of the Creative Europe programme. Serbia continues to implement the 2005 UNESCO Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions.
The operating environment of the cultural and creative sectors deteriorated during the reporting period. The widespread polarisation in the country has also affected the cultural and creative sectors, including through dismissals, financial inspections and lawsuits against cultural institutions and their staff. Many traditional cultural operators have faced funding withdrawals. Concerns have been raised on the transparency and predictability of public grants and undue interference affecting freedom of artistic expression and independence of cultural institutions, also creating a risk of self-censorship. Following a government decision in November 2024 revoking the protected cultural heritage status of the General Staff Building, Serbia adopted a special law facilitating the redevelopment of the site in November 2025 and removing its regime of heritage protection. While the project has stalled, the Minister of Culture and other officials were indicted on grounds of abuse of office and document forgery, in the context of the removal of the protected statute. Such developments point to serious shortcomings in the administration of heritage protection.
Chapter 29 - Customs union
All Member States are part of the EU customs union and follow the same customs rules and procedures. This requires legislative alignment as well as adequate implementing and enforcement capacity, and access to and interoperability with the EU electronic customs environment.
Serbia’s customs legislation is largely aligned with the EU acquis. In November 2025, Serbia further amended its Regulation on customs relief, while in February 2026, Regulation on customs procedures and customs formalities was amended with a view to further aligning with the acquis. Serbia is a party to the Common Transit Convention and to the Pan-Euro- Mediterranean Convention on rules of origin and applies the revised rules in trade with the EU since end of 2021. Serbia regularly harmonises its customs tariff nomenclature with the EU combined nomenclature, including for 2026. Serbia has an authorised economic operator programme and has issued a total of 72 certificates for authorised economic operators. Full alignment with the EU acquis is still needed concerning free zones. Fees are still charged to allow lorries to enter certain customs terminals to discharge customs obligations, which is
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not in line with Serbia’s obligations under the Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA).
In terms of the administrative and operational capacity, during the reporting period, the customs administration adopted a new action plan (2025-2027) for implementing the integrated border management strategy (2022-2027), a new business strategy (2025-2029) and a new IT strategy and implementation plan (2025-2029). For 236 announced vacancies, 214 new staff members were hired. Work is ongoing to fill the remaining vacant positions. Development of the Integrated Tariff Management System (ITMS) software has begun. The customs administration successfully launched the New Computerised Transit System (NCTS – Phase 6) with an opt-in approach, in May 2026. The customs laboratory remains underequipped, and the risk management system must be further strengthened. To fully align on security aspects, Serbia should consistently carry out pre-arrival/pre-departure risk- based analysis, in line with the Union Customs Code. In 2025, total revenues collected by the customs administration increased by 5.5% year-on-year. The administrative capacity for the control of illicit tobacco trade is insufficient. Serbia should continue to strengthen combating customs fraud, in particular smuggling of tobacco products, by cooperating with the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF).
Serbia is a party to the Protocol to Eliminate Illicit Trade in Tobacco Products of the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control but has yet to fully comply with its provisions, including by establishing a track and trace system of tobacco products.
Serbia continued to cooperate with EU Member States and OLAF under Protocol 6 of the SAA on mutual administrative assistance in customs matters, particularly in order to investigate suspected cases of circumvention via its territory and/or by legal entities registered in Serbia of EU sanctions adopted in the context of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine.
CLUSTER 4: THE GREEN AGENDA AND SUSTAINABLE CONNECTIVITY
This cluster covers: transport (Chapter 14); energy (Chapter 15); trans-European networks (Chapter 21); and environment and climate change (Chapter 27).
Chapter 14 - Transport policy
The EU has common rules for technical and safety standards, security, social standards, State aid and market liberalisation in road transport, railways, inland waterways, multimodal transport, aviation and maritime transport.
For the general transport acquis, Serbia must finalise and adopt its National Transport Strategy, while ensuring a transparent and inclusive consultation process. The strategy is now significantly overdue (previous one expired in 2015). Subsequently, Serbia needs to update the general transport master plan and integrate it with capital budgeting. The improvement of administrative capacity in the road and rail sectors should continue. Serbia actively engages in the work of the Transport Community (TCT), focusing on the implementation of the next generation action plans 2025-2027. For larger transport agglomerations, sustainable urban mobility plans that adhere to environmental and social standards should be developed in accordance with EU practice.
On road transport, alignment with the EU acquis is at a good level and remains a priority. The institutional framework is in place, but the independence of agencies responsible for road maintenance and construction needs to be ensured. Road
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maintenance and its financing should ensure the sustainability of investments in road infrastructure, performance-based maintenance practices to be systematically applied on road priority sections, and adherence to the ‘user pays’ principle. In March 2026, the customs authorities of Bulgaria and Serbia signed a memorandum of understanding on the electronic exchange of customs data, taking the implementation of the EU-Western Balkans Green Lanes initiative forward. The Road Safety Strategy for 2023-2030 and its three-year action plan should continue to be implemented, including through a more systemic use of tools supporting road safety improvements. The exchange of data with the European Commission, in accordance with the EU CARE protocol, should also be maintained. There should be full alignment with social and market rules in the field of road transport. The issuance of second-generation SMART cards (G2V2) began in March 2026.
On rail transport, there is a high level of alignment with the EU acquis. The Railway Directorate, which acts as the regulatory body, licensing authority, and safety authority, should be further strengthened. Serbia should improve maintenance practices of railway infrastructure to provide an adequate balance between infrastructure capacity and safety standards, as well as to ensure sustainability of investments in infrastructure modernisation. Alignment with the fourth railway package should continue, including through the adoption of a new Law on railways. Formal adoption of EU technical specifications for interoperability remains pending, as does full alignment with the rail safety and interoperability acquis. The European Rail Traffic Management System should be fully and transparently implemented. In April 2026, the Assembly adopted the Law on amendments to the law on transport of dangerous goods, as well as the Law on investigation of accidents in air, rail and water transport.
On maritime transport, Serbia is at a high level of alignment with the EU acquis. Serbia should continue aligning with international conventions.
Regarding inland waterway transport, there is a high level of alignment with the EU acquis. The institutional framework is in place, but vessel traffic services need to be further strengthened. Serbia’s operational river information services system is highly interoperable with those of EU Member States. Serbia continued efforts in recognising certificates in inland waterways, including the connection to the European Crew Data Base, by adopting the Rulebook on Titles of Crew Members of Inland Navigation Vessels. Investments in the improvement of inland waterway navigation should provide tangible results, including the EU funded sunken vessels removal project from the Danube in the Prahovo area.
On aviation, Serbia maintains a good level of alignment with the EU acquis. No progress was made in lifting the suspension of articles on the licensing of air carriers or in normalising the lower airspace regime over Kosovo. In March 2026, Serbia’s Civil Aviation Directorate introduced regulatory changes which would negatively impact the traffic rights for EU air carriers flying to and from Serbia and, in the Commission's view, be incompatible with Serbia’s obligations under the European Common Aviation Area (ECAA) Agreement. In September 2026, the implementation of the changes was postponed to March 2027. Montenegro’s reform to establish a national air navigation service provider (ANSP), in accordance with Regulation (EU) 2024/2803, is expected to have implications for the current joint Serbia and Montenegro Air Traffic Services (SMATSA) arrangement.
Multimodal transport policy should focus on improving the operational connectivity of various transport modes. Administrative capacity for multimodal transport needs to be further strengthened. Serbia has not yet aligned with the Combined Transport Directive.
No progress was made on EU passenger rights reforms.
Chapter 15 - Energy
EU energy policy covers energy supply, infrastructure, the internal energy market, consumers, renewable energy, energy efficiency, nuclear energy, nuclear safety, radiation protection, and nuclear safeguards.
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On security of supply, Serbia maintained a high level of alignment with the EU acquis on emergency oil stocks and continued to strengthen its mandatory stockholding system (51 days of average daily net imports).
Serbia should further align with Regulation (EU) 2019/941 on risk-preparedness in the electricity sector and align with Regulation (EU) 2024/1366 establishing a network code on sector-specific rules for cybersecurity aspects of cross-border electricity flows. Adoption of the Electricity Risk Preparedness Plan is still pending.
Implementation of the Gas Storage Regulation is pending. In September 2026, the current gas supply contract with Russia was extended by three months until 31 December 2026. Serbia should reduce its gas dependence on Russia and address the issue of Russian majority control over its gas and oil industry. NIS, Serbia’s main oil company and sole refinery operator, remains subject to US sanctions related to its Russian majority ownership and continues to operate under a temporary US licence, currently valid until 30 October 2026, adding uncertainty to domestic markets.
Regarding internal energy markets, Serbia successfully finalised the unbundling of the national gas Transmission System Operator in line with the EU acquis. The Law on gas was adopted in December 2025 and a new gas transmission infrastructure owner, Gas Infrastruktura, was established. The Energy Regulatory Authority (AERS) granted the final certificate to the TSO Transportgas Srbija in March 2026. It is important to ensure the TSO is operationally and financially independent, and that Gas Infrastruktura has the administrative capacity to carry out its activity. Transportgas Srbija joined the Regional Booking Platform (RBP) in March 2026 and offered capacities on 7 July 2026 for five gas years in advance at the relevant interconnection points. The certification of the Banatski Dvor underground gas storage facility is still pending.
Serbia made progress towards electricity market integration by adopting laws aiming at transposing the Electricity Integration Package, which should be fully transposed and implemented, a requirement for market coupling. Regarding regional cooperation, Serbia’s Transmission System Operator EMS has still not allocated capacity for electricity trading on all cross-border interconnections, including on the bidding zone border with Kosovo.
The regulatory framework for the market-based purchase of reserves, that includes aggregators, has been implemented in January 2026. The retail market is largely liberalised, however public intervention in price setting is still prevalent. Furthermore, the guaranteed supplier is appointed by law, rather than through a market-based process.
Regarding renewable energy (RE),Serbia made progress in integrating RE capacities into its electricity grid, with approximately 1 300 MW connected by mid-2026. The country still needs to conduct the third auction for solar and wind power plants, as set out in the 2023– 2025 Auction Plan. The uptake of renewable energy in sectors such as district heating, industry, and transport remains limited.
Serbia needs to improve its regulatory framework and permitting process, establish a fully operational single contact point for renewable energy projects, define renewable acceleration areas, and introduce a national traceability system for renewable fuels. Additionally, Serbia should prioritize the introduction of advanced biofuels and Renewable Fuels of Non-Biological Origin to support the transition to a low-carbon economy. Moreover, Serbia needs to revise its legislation for Renewable Energy Communities (RECs) addressing unclear definitions, inconsistencies in legal framework, and lack of practical implementation.
On energy efficiency, Serbia should introduce a calculation methodology for the energy performance of buildings, a national nearly zero-energy buildings standard, and effective financing mechanisms for energy efficiency projects.
Regarding energy labelling and ecodesign, Serbia has continued to align with the EU acquis by adopting relevant rulebooks for energy-related products. However, effective enforcement of eco-design and energy labelling requirements remains limited.
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In terms of governance, Serbia has adopted the Program for the implementation of the Energy Strategy for the period 2026-2028 and initiated the next National Energy and Climate Plan (NECP) cycle covering the period from 2030-2040. Following the adoption of the Just Transition plan in June 2025, Serbia should now focus on establishing a sustainable funding mechanism to support its implementation and ensure acceleration of coal phase-out.
As regards nuclear energy, nuclear safety, radioactive waste management and
radiation protection, Serbia’s legislation is only partially in line with the Euratom acquis. In
February 2026, an Interministerial Working Group was established to coordinate activities
related to the possible development of the nuclear program. In March 2026, Serbia adopted
the Preliminary technical study on nuclear energy application in the Republic of Serbia.
‘Nuclear Facilities of Serbia’ submitted a request for a licence for decommissioning two old
storage facilities and for obtaining an operational licence for the Waste Processing Facility.
In June 2026, the Serbian Parliament ratified the European Community Urgent Radiological
Information Exchange (ECURIE) Agreement. The capacity of the Serbian Radiation and
Nuclear Safety and Security Directorate (SRBATOM) needs further strengthening to fulfil its
future obligations, also considering ongoing activities for the possible use of nuclear energy.
On nuclear safeguards, upon EU accession, the existing systems of accountancy and control of nuclear materials in Serbia would need to be adapted to accommodate for the safeguards provisions of the Euratom Treaty.
Chapter 21 - Trans-European networks
The EU promotes trans-European networks (TENs) in the areas of transport, telecommunications, and energy to strengthen the internal market and contribute to growth and employment.
On transport networks, the legislative framework is partially aligned with the EU acquis.
Serbia continues to develop transport projects within the trans-European networks. The preparation of technical and tender documentation for the implementation of TEN-T projects in road and rail sectors needs to be accelerated. Feasibility studies and Environmental and Social Impact Assessments with active stakeholders’ engagement should remain central to ensuring the quality of technical project documentation. Serbia needs to take into account the new TEN-T Regulation requirements and standards.
Regarding roads, for the works on the Niš-Merdare highway, to date, only around 10% of approved EU grant funds have been utilised, and the tendering of the remaining sections has been further delayed and additionally postponed until the end of 2026. The preparation of missing project documentation for the Pločnik-Merdare section, for which EU funds have also been secured, has been pending for an extended period.
Regarding rail infrastructure, the investment pipeline continues to grow, albeit at a slow pace. The legal, technical, administrative, and institutional frameworks relevant for the preparation and implementation of investment projects need to be thoroughly reassessed to tackle ineffective use of resources. Specifically, works related to the modernisation of the Niš–Dimitrovgrad railway and the Niš railway bypass are progressing at a very slow pace, due to insufficiently thorough project planning. Tenders for the selection of contractors (both works and corresponding supervision services) on Sections 3 of Rail Corridor X have been launched. Preparatory activities related to Sections 1 and 2 should be accelerated and completed. A multisectoral working group was established to accelerate preparatory works on Rail Corridor X. Scoping for the modernisation of the Belgrade and Niš railway junctions should be carried out to facilitate budgeting and project preparation activities. The works on the Stalać–Djunis sub-section have not yet started, despite the signing of the contract. The timely availability of qualified, independent supervising engineers is recognised as a critical issue, as it has often not been adequately planned in previous projects.
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Serbia is part of the new Western Balkans–Eastern Mediterranean European Transport Corridor and is therefore expected to be constructive in EU-funded projects implemented across the region, enhancing regional connectivity, in coordination with neighbouring countries.
Alignment with the revised TEN-E Regulation is delayed. Serbia should transpose it into its national legislation, with the aim of accelerating permitting procedures and enable development of key infrastructure projects with the neighbouring countries.
Serbia continues to develop energy projects within the trans-European energy networks. During the reporting period, there was some progress in developing Serbia’s regional electricity connections in line with the Central and South-Eastern Europe Energy Connectivity (CESEC) action plan on electricity and renewable energy, and the Projects of Energy Community Interest. The construction of Section 3 of the Trans-Balkan 400 kV electricity corridor (Obrenovac - Bajina Basta) continued, while the tender documentation for Section 4 from Bajina Bašta to Montenegro and Bosnia and Herzegovina has been prepared and evaluation is ongoing. The interconnection between Subotica (RS) and Sándorfalva (HU) (“Pannonian Corridor”) and between Bobov Dol (BG) and Leskovac 2 (RS) (“Central Balkan Corridor”) received the status of Project of Mutual Interest (PMI).
Chapter 27 - Environment and climate change
The EU promotes strong climate action, sustainable development and protection of the environment. EU rules contain provisions addressing horizontal legislation, climate change, water quality, air quality, waste management, nature protection, industrial pollution, chemicals, noise, and civil protection.
Environment
The Environmental Protection Strategy was successfully adopted in August 2026, establishing the strategic framework for environmental protection until 2033. However, coordination should be improved as the environmental sector competencies are scattered across several Ministries and local self-governments. Better enforcement of the environmental legislation is needed, as well as enhanced environmental inspections and effective sanctions for polluters.
On horizontal legislation, the alignment of the legislative framework with the EU acquisis highbut further adoption of implementing legislation is necessary for its completion. Three by-laws linked to legislation on environmental impact assessment (EIA) and two rulebooks linked to the legislation on strategic environmental assessment (SEA) were adopted. Serbia should work towards better implementation of horizontal legislation, improving the public consultation process, judicial efficiency, building capacities to strengthen environmental inspections and ensuring more effective sanctions for polluters. The implementation of the principles of the Aarhus Convention, namely the right of citizens to information, participation, and access to justice in environmental matters, remains a concern (see also Public Administration Reform).
Alignment with the Environmental Liability Directive and the Environmental Crime Directive and their implementation need to be improved.
On air quality, there is a high level of alignment with the EU acquis. Some implementing legislation was adopted, including a Regulation on the list of air quality categories by zones and agglomerations and a Regulation on the air quality control programme within the State network. Serbia has also begun implementing the new European air quality index. Three new air quality plans were approved in the reporting period. Progress was made on requirements and standards in reducing emissions of volatile organic compounds through the adoption of a new rulebook. However, the reporting on the annual air quality is delayed, affecting the necessary timely actions to respond to the reported pollution.
On waste management, Serbia has a good level of alignment with the EU acquis, however
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some gaps in enforcement of waste legislation, investment and awareness-raising remain. The waste management report of the Republic of Serbia is published with delays. Despite a municipal solid waste collection rate of almost 90%, landfilling remains the dominant disposal method. Serbia recycles only about 17% of its collected municipal waste, while energy recovery efforts have recently begun. Amendments to the Law on waste management were adopted in December 2025. However, further changes are needed to address outstanding legal gaps including the introduction of revised municipal waste recycling targets and provisions and targets for specific waste streams. Further measures are needed to ensure the implementation of extended producer responsibility (EPR) in accordance with the polluters pays principle. Uncertainty over fees for recyclers of specific waste streams threaten their effective management and put at risk the entire system for managing certain types of recycling waste. Landfilling remains the dominant waste disposal in Serbia, with many non-compliant landfills and dumpsites. In 2025 there were 2 217 landfill fires, representing a new record. Serbia should intensify efforts to close them and further align legislation with the Landfill Directive to address regulatory gaps, particularly in landfill operation rules, waste acceptance criteria, reporting requirements and calculation methodologies. Good progress was made with the adoption of the programme for the development of the circular economy for the period 2026-2030. A new Rulebook on medical waste management and a new Regulation on lists of waste for transboundary movement were also adopted.
On water quality, alignment with the EU acquis remains partial. Losses in the water supply system, as well the low uptake of wastewater treatment remain a concern. Serbia should further improve its infrastructure, strengthen its administrative capacity in monitoring, enforcement, and interinstitutional coordination, and proceed with the adoption of the new Water Law and the Law on drinking water, in line with the EU acquis.
On nature protection, alignment with the EU acquis remains partial, with the adoption of the new Law on nature protection still pending. In the reporting period, a new Programme for Nature Protection for 2026–2031 was adopted and five new protected areas were designated. The Law on placing timber and timber products on the market was adopted. There are concerns that amendments to the Law on Planning and Construction could allow the repurposing of fire-damaged forest land for public-interest projects. Serbia should adopt a new Law on nature protection, a comprehensive action plan for illegal killing of birds and intensify efforts to identify and pre-designate sites for inclusion in the Natura 2000 network. Institutional and administrative capacity at the national and local levels remains weak.
On industrial pollution and risk management, alignment with the EU acquis remains partial. Good progress was made with the adoption of the new Law on Integrated Pollution Prevention and Control, and in the area of industrial safety. Serbia adopted four new rulebooks to further align with the SEVESO III Directive, as well as the Industrial Safety Programme for the period 2026-2035. Serbia should urgently expand enforcement capacity, increase the issuance of integrated permits for major industrial installations and penalise installations operating without or with an outdated integrated environmental permit.
On chemicals, Serbia has a high level of alignment with the EU acquis. During the reporting period, nine pieces of implementing legislation were adopted.
On noise, Serbia is partially aligned with the EU acquis and should adopt the three prepared implementing laws under the Law on environmental noise protection.
On civil protection, Serbia actively contributes to and participates in the Union Civil Protection Mechanism (UCPM). During the reporting period, Serbia provided important energy equipment and medical supplies to Ukraine and contributed to wildfire response operations in France and Spain by deploying firefighting response teams. Additionally, Serbia activated the UCPM in August 2026 in response to deteriorating wildfires and received civil protection assistance by four EU Member States. Serbia is encouraged to adopt a new disaster risk reduction strategy and the new Law on disaster risk reduction and
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emergency management. The Disaster Risk Register, in line with the EU INSPIRE Directive and the EU initiative to enhance data interoperability, continues to be regularly updated. Serbia should put in place the trans-European Services for Telematics between Administrations (TESTA) as a prerequisite for connecting to the full version of the Common Emergency Communication and Information System (CECIS).
Climate change
Serbia has between some and moderate preparedness in the area of climate change. Good progress was made during the reporting period, however last year’s recommendations were only partially implemented.Serbia continues to advance its work on carbon pricing, in particular on implementation of monitoring, reporting, verification and accreditation (MRVA) acquis concerning stationary installations. It has successfully completed a first cycle of monitoring, reporting and verification of installation level emissions in 2026, in alignment with the EU requirements and timelines. In 2026, out of 97 operators with GHG permit, 70 submitted their verified annual emission reports (AERs), while 19 submitted unverified AERs and are expected to submit their verification reports. The greenhouse gas (GHG) registry is operational and four new permits were issued in 2025.
In December 2025, Serbia adopted two climate taxation laws, establishing a carbon tax for major industrial emitters and a border levy on carbon-intensive imported goods. In July 2026, Serbia adopted further implementing legislation enabling the collection of tax revenue in 2027 for the calendar year 2026. While progress on carbon pricing marks an important step forward, Serbia should expand its legislative alignment and implementation to cover the full EU Emission Trading System (ETS) scope, including aviation, shipping and ETS2 sectors (buildings, road transport and small industry). Serbia should continue working towards closer alignment with the EU carbon pricing by progressively aligning the sectoral coverage and carbon price of its domestic measures with that of the EU. Moreover, Serbia should establish a dedicated fund or effective mechanism to ensure that revenues directly support further decarbonisation.
Serbia should also set a coal phase-out date in line with its Green Agenda commitments for climate neutrality by 2050 and update its climate Law and low-carbon development strategy to align with the EU’s 2050 climate neutrality target. Serbia still needs to fully align with EU acquis on fluorinated greenhouse gases, ozone-depleting substances, vehicles and road transport, carbon capture and storage, and emissions from the Land Use, Land-Use Change, and Forestry (LULUCF) sector.
CLUSTER 5: RESOURCES, AGRICULTURE AND COHESION
Chapter 11 - Agriculture and rural development
The EU’s common agricultural policy supports farmers and contributes to ensuring Europe’s food security. It helps tackling climate change and the sustainable management of national resources; maintains rural areas and landscapes across the EU; and keeps the rural economy alive by promoting jobs in farming, agri-food industries, and associated sectors. This requires strong management and control systems. There are also common EU rules for marketing standards, quality policy, and organic farming.
Regarding horizontal issues, Serbia needs to speed up implementation of the revised action plan for the transposition, implementation, and enforcement of the acquis in this area. Policy design in the area of direct payments needs to align with the acquis. Serbia adopted a new strategy for agriculture and rural development covering the period 2026-2034.
Work to establish an integrated administration and control system (IACS) has started with the delivery of equipment and trainings, proceeding with the work on rolling out the land parcel identification system (LPIS) all over the country Serbia needs to ensure sufficient human resources to implement the LPIS and further develop other elements of IACS. The
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farm sustainability data network (FSDN) needs to be developed, sample size must be increased, and the collection of data must be extended to include environmental and social indicators.
In the area of agricultural markets - common market organisation, Serbia adopted legislation aligning with the EU acquis on unfair trading practices. The Law on wine remains to be adopted.
On rural development, the delayed ex-post evaluation of the IPARD II programme still needs to be completed. The implementation of the IPARD III programme has been very slow, leading already to a loss of 8.5% of the funds. Serbia should urgently make all efforts to contract and disburse IPARD III funds and significantly accelerate the entrustment of new measures. The IPARD agency’s capacity needs to be further strengthened.
As regards quality policy, there was no progress. The Law on quality schemes still needs to be adopted.
Progress regarding alignment with the EU acquis was recorded in the sector of organic farming, with the adoption of the Law on organic production.
On the fight against corruption, the national authorities are obliged to prevent, detect and report irregularities.
Chapter 12 - Food safety, veterinary and phytosanitary policy
The EU food acquis, including hygiene rules for foodstuff production, ensure a high level of food and feed safety, and a high level of protection of consumers’ interests. Animal health and welfare, and the safety of food of animal origin, are safeguarded together with the quality of seeds, plant reproductive material, the protection against harmful organisms, animal nutrition and the use of plant protection products.
The legal and institutional framework for this chapter is in place. However, the legal framework remains to be aligned with the EU acquis, while the institutional framework and capacities still remain to be considerably strengthened in order to effectively implement the aligned legislation.
In the area of general food safety, Serbia has yet to adopt a strategy and action plan for alignment with the EU acquis. Serbia adopted the Law on official controls, which is only partially aligned with the acquis, and the Law on seeds and planting material of agricultural and ornamental plants which aims to further align with the EU acquis.
Although work on preparation of the framework legislation has advanced, substantial further efforts are needed in order to complete the alignment of all sixteen framework laws regulating this chapter.
Serbia has yet to align with the EU legislation with regard to limiting import bans only to the regions affected by animal disease outbreaks and avoid imposing undue trade restrictions affecting EU Member States. Further efforts remain necessary to improve the digital exchange of documents with food operators to reduce import costs ultimately borne by consumers.
On veterinary policy, severe capacity issues at the Veterinary Directorate continued affecting its daily operations, which remains a major challenge. In June 2026, Serbia was added to the list of third countries which can derogate from the rabies antibody titration test requirement when moving dogs, cats or ferrets to the EU Legislation on animal welfare is not yet aligned with the EU acquis.
The procedure for the issuance of import certificates for meat and dairy products by the Veterinary Directorate remains a challenge and continues to represent a potential trade barrier as it reportedly lacks transparency and/or is based on discretionary practices. Serbia still needs to meet some requirements for the start of exports of fresh eggs and fresh poultry, as well as pork meat to the EU.
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Regarding placing on the market of food, feed, and animal by-products, no visible progress could be verified when it comes to the process of upgrading food establishments to EU standards. With regards to animal by-products, further work is still needed to reach an overall alignment with the EU acquis.
On food safety rules and specific rules for feed, Serbia has to urgently address structural problems in relation to the competitiveness of its dairy sector, including by adopting and implementing a plan to align its milk quality standards with the EU acquis.
In the area of phytosanitary policy, Serbia has yet to implement the system for control and calibration of application devices for plant protection products. Serious capacity issues remain at the Plant Health Directorate, notably in its policy and inspection departments.
On the marketing of seed and other plant reproductive material, further alignment of the national legislation with the EU acquis on plant reproductive material (PRM) and forest reproductive material (FRM) is needed. This should be accompanied by the development of the necessary institutional framework and administrative capacities to establish and enforce effective certification systems for PRM and FRM.
On genetically modified organisms, no progress was achieved. Alignment in this area remains essential to advance negotiations on World Trade Organisation membership and remains a prerequisite for opening this chapter.
On anti-corruption, Serbia should ensure that the procedures on audit within the Ministry will be aligned with the EU acquis as soon as possible.
Chapter 13 - Fisheries and aquaculture
The common fisheries policy lays down rules on fisheries management, protects living resources of the sea and limits the environmental impact of fisheries. This includes setting catch quotas, managing fleet capacity, rules on control and inspection, rules on markets and aquaculture and support for fisheries and coastal communities. Further, it promotes a sustainable aquaculture.
Serbia still needs to fully develop its institutional framework to address the relevant parts of the EU acquis under this chapter. The legal framework remains to be fully aligned with the EU acquis. Serbia should speed up the implementation of the action plan to achieve full compliance with the EU acquis by the time of accession and ensure the recruitment of additional staff.
On resource and fleet management, the EU acquis applicable to Serbia includes provisions on the European eel. While the system for inspection and controls is generally in place, further improvements remain necessary, including for the coordination between relevant state bodies. Serbia adopted the law on official controls, which aims to also align with the acquis under this chapter. Serbia should improve controls in the area of fisheries, including by recruiting and training more staff for market measures, enhancing inspection capabilities, and advancing data collection and aquaculture management. The rulebook on catch certification and full alignment of the legal framework on illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing should be implemented as a matter of priority, and relevant systems and capacities should be developed.
In the area of structural actions, the sector is eligible for support under IPARD. However, those opportunities are not adequately used as only a limited number of contracts have been awarded so far. Legislation on market policy remains to be aligned with the EU acquis.
In the area of aquaculture, Serbia should prioritise the adoption of a strategic plan to facilitate the development of this economic activity and further align with the EU acquis. Serbia adopted the law on organic production, which aims to align also with the EU acquis under this chapter.
There were no significant developments concerning State aid and international
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agreements.
Chapter 22 - Regional policy and coordination of structural instruments
Regional policy is the EU’s main investment policy aiming at reducing economic, social, and territorial disparities between regions and promoting balanced development across the Union. It is implemented through ‘shared management’ between the Commission and EU Member States. The implementation of cohesion policy programmes requires appropriate administrative structures and capacity on programme and project level, the establishment of systems of sound financial management and control, and the fulfilment of other EU acquis elements such as environmental or public procurement legislation.
On legislative framework, Serbia adopted in April 2026 the Law on cohesion policy, establishing a stable formal basis for transitioning towards the structural instruments. The implementing legislation remains to be adopted. The adoption of a national development plan for reducing regional and local disparities remains outstanding, with limited progress since 2023. Decisions affecting regional development, including major growth-enhancing investments, are taken centrally in fragmented and opportunistic manner lacking coherent, systemic and partner-inclusive approach (see also Chapters 5, 8, 15, 17, 19 and 27). Serbia still needs to enhance fiscal decentralisation, the political and organisational autonomy and the competencies of the local authorities to enable local actors plan and implement policies closely aligned with the territorial needs and development priorities. No further progress has been made as regards the adoption of local development plans based on the partnership principle. Compliance with enabling conditions is monitored on regular basis.
The institutional framework for cohesion policy is functional, with regular meetings, mostly at central level, to coordinate activities related to regional policy, including the Chapter 22 action plan. By contrast, the system for regional development planning remains fragmented with responsibilities scattered among several ministries and insufficient integration of the regional development agencies and local development offices into policymaking.
The administrative capacity is marked by a stable administrative framework but is increasingly affected by the absence of a staff retention policy, delays in recruitment and an inconsistent approach to skills development. These challenges require urgent attention to avoid significant decommitment of EU funds.
Serbia needs to enhance the implementation of the Reform Agenda under the Reform and Growth Facility and strengthen the programming under the two IPA III operational programmes, where persistent shortfall in project identification and preparation remains a concern. Unless additional projects are identified and implementation is accelerated, there is a significant risk of losing substantial EU funds. Serbia would benefit from a single investment planning approach that aligns the operational programmes, the Western Balkans Investment Framework and other sources of public investment into a coherent and transparent framework. The ownership and accountability of the managing authorities should be strengthened along with the partnership principle. Systemic signing of agreements with end beneficiaries is needed to ensure an effective management and use of EU funds.
Serbia should build more systemically on its participation in Interreg programmes, including six cross-border programmes and two transnational programmes, as well as in the EU Strategy for the Adriatic and Ionian Region and the EU Strategy for the Danube Region - by translating successful regional experiences into national regional development policies and investments. The potential of using the European Groupings of Territorial Cooperation remains untapped. As tools for integrated territorial governance, they could support a shift from project-based cooperation to more strategic territorial development, particularly in regions bordering the EU.
The monitoring and evaluation system for cost-based IPA funds is well established and effective, supported by an operational monitoring framework and management information system. However, the monitoring of the performance-based instruments, such as the Reform
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and Growth Facility, requires further improvements in the process and documentation management, definition of responsibilities and management controls. Serbia has established effective monitoring committees under all EU funding instruments.
Although the financial management, control, and audit systems are well established, their effectiveness is significantly constrained by low staffing levels across all bodies. With the launch of the two operational programmes significantly increasing the workload, the risks of delays in contracting, significant errors and operational weaknesses have increased. The Audit Authority performs effectively, in line with the international audit standards, and covers both Instrument for Pre-Accession (including operational programmes) and the Reform and Growth Facility. However, the internal audit function remains weak due to limited institutional coverage (40% of the institutions managing EU funds have not yet established internal audit units), and shortages of certified and qualified internal auditors, with potentially negative implications for the protection of the EU’s financial interests.
As regards the fight against corruption and fraud with EU funds, Serbia still has to adopt provisions to enable full access to information by the European Commission, the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF), and the European Court ofAuditors and the European Public Prosecutor’s Office as well as to ensure an appropriate irregularity management framework for the Reform and Growth Facility. The competencies and capacities of the Department for combating irregularities andfraud with European Union funds (AFCOS) needs to be strengthened as a matter of urgency (see also Chapter 32).
Chapter 33 - Financial and budgetary provisions
This chapter covers the rules governing the funding of the EU budget (‘own resources’). These resources mainly consist of: (i) contributions based on the gross national income of each Member State; (ii) customs duties; (iii) non-recycled plastic; and (iv) a resource based on value-added tax. Member States must have the appropriate administrative capacity to adequately coordinate and ensure the correct calculation, collection, payment, and control of own resources.
There was between limited to good progress in the underlying policy areas indirectly affecting the own resources system (for progress in these areas, see Chapters 16 – Taxation, 18 – Statistics, 29 – Customs union, and 32 – Financial control).
Regarding traditional own resources, the customs legislation is largely aligned with the EU acquis.Reporting remains manual, and Serbia does not use OWNRES, or any other similar national electronic database, to report on fraud and irregularities for amounts over EUR 10 000.The current accounting system does not distinguish between the two different accounts for collected or secured debts (A account) and for uncollected/unsecured debts or secured but appealed debts (B account). Serbia should continue its efforts in implementing a new accounting system, which will enable reporting in accordance with the EU methodology.
As regards the VAT-based resource, sufficient data sources are available for the calculation of the weighted average rate, deriving from the supply and use tables (SUT), published for the first time in 2019. Serbia should reflect the EU simplification for calculating VAT Own Resources in its finalised action plan.
On gross national income (GNI) resource, progress is ongoing under Chapter 18.
Regarding administrative infrastructure, the capacity of the institutions in the relevant policy areas needs to be further strengthened. Serbia should continue its efforts to further develop the organisational and procedural links between the institutions involved in own resources.
The measures for reporting laid down in Articles 3, 6a and 12 of the European Parliament and Council Directive 94/62/EC (Packaging and Packaging Waste Directive), and Articles 3 and 11a of Directive 2008/98/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council (Waste Framework Directive) (see Chapter 27 (Environment)) should continue to apply. The
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administrative capacities for the own resource based on non-recycled plastic packaging waste should be improved.
CLUSTER 6: EXTERNAL RELATIONS
Chapter 30 - External relations
The EU has a common commercial policy towards third countries, based on multilateral and bilateral agreements and autonomous measures. There are also EU rules on humanitarian aid and development policy.
As regards the common commercial policy, Serbia has yet to accede to the World Trade Organisation (WTO). The process is stalled primarily due to the lack of progress on the adoption of an amended law on trade in genetically modified organisms, and on the completion of market access negotiations with a limited number of WTO members. Serbia has yet to achieve full alignment with the EU acquis in line with its action plan on remaining preparations for EU accession under Chapter 30.
Serbia should play a constructive role in CEFTA and within the common regional market (CRM), in line with commitments taken in the context of the Berlin Process. Serbia should also implement the CRM action plan for 2025-2028 and decisions adopted in the context of CEFTA.
Serbia has a tendency to introduce ad hoc trade restrictive measures against the spirit of the Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA). Serbia introduced temporary tariff quotas on imports of certain types of cement and steel products effective as of 1 January 2026, for a period of six months, and in April 2026, extended the measure by an additional six months until December 2026. In March 2026, Serbia introduced an export ban on oil and oil derivatives that was repeatedly extended, with current validity until the end of October 2026. The export ban on arms and military equipment introduced in June 2025 remains in place. Conditions for imports are systematically deteriorating, specifically for different types of products primarily of animal origin, related to the practices of sanitary, phytosanitary and veterinary border inspections in terms of frequency, duration, volume and costs of sampling, as well as delays in the issuance of import licences for dairy and meat products by the veterinary inspection. Serbia’s import license regime was registered as a trade barrier on the Access2Markets database. Serbia should abstain from introducing unilateral trade restrictive measures, in line with its SAA obligations under Article 36. In addition, concerning the management of its wine quotas, Serbia is encouraged to revert to the open and transparent First Come First Served System, which is the system applied to all wine imports into the EU.
Serbia continues to prevent circumvention of the EU’s restrictive measures adopted in the context of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine via Serbian territory and/or by legal entities registered in Serbia. Serbia should continue to step up its efforts to fight sanctions circumvention including concerning the risk of trade triangulation.
Serbia regularly adopts a national control list of dual-use goods aimed at full alignment with the latest Commission delegated acts. The latest list was adopted in July 2026 with the aim of aligning with the latest Commission Delegated Regulation 2025/2003. Serbia’s applications to join the Wassenaar Arrangement and the Australia Group from 2009 and 2017 respectively, are still under consideration. Serbia has yet to align with the EU acquis on the screening of FDI.
Serbia continues to negotiate bilateral agreements with third countries. Negotiations on a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with South Korea were completed, pending signature of the agreement. Serbia has announced plans for a FTA with Israel, Georgia, Ukraine and Uzbekistan. All the FTAs that Serbia negotiates must ensure compatibility with the EU acquis and include a sunset clause, guaranteeing that Serbia will terminate the agreements upon accession to the EU. Serbia should also ensure that proper cost-benefit analyses are
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conducted before concluding any negotiations to minimise the risk of negative effects on specific sectors. Serbia has 52 Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) in force, of which 21 are with EU Member States. Two new BITs with Uzbekistan and with Japan entered into force in June and July 2026, respectively. Serbia signed a BIT with Angola in June 2026, that has not yet entered into force. Serbia is encouraged to develop a strategy for amending or terminating BITs that fall short of EU standards and expose the country to risks.
Serbia’s institutional framework for effective management of trade policy is in place. However, the administrative capacity should be strengthened concerning trade with the EU, related to completing the WTO accession and to effectively collecting and analysing market statistics.
The regulatory framework for international cooperation in development policy and humanitarian aid remains to be developed. Development assistance and humanitarian aid are granted on an ad hocbasis.
Chapter 31 - Foreign, security and defence policy
Member States must be able to conduct political dialogue under the EU foreign, security and defence policy, align with EU statements, take part in EU actions, and apply agreed sanctions and restrictive measures.
The political dialogue between the EU and Serbia on foreign and security policy issues continued. Serbia participated in the EU-Western Balkans meetings of Political Directors in Sarajevo in October 2025, in Brussels in April 2026 and in Kruje in October 2026, as well as in the informal meetings of the Foreign Ministers in Brussels in November 2025 and in May 2026. Serbia’s President chose not to take part in the EU-Western Balkans Summit in Brussels in December 2025 but did attend the Summit in Tivat in June 2026.
In the area of the common foreign and security policy, Serbia needs, as a matter of priority, to make additional efforts to further align its foreign policy with the EU’s CFSP. Serbia’s alignment with Council decisions on sanctions remains low. As of 1 September 2026, Serbia’s CFSP alignment rate was at 63% (compared to 67% in 2025). Serbia continues to resort to retroactive alignment.
Serbia has not aligned with the EU’s restrictive measures against Russia and Belarus taken in the context of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine. It continues to operate flights to Russia – Saint Petersburg and Moscow, as well as Kazan and Nizhny Novgorod since mid-May this year – and host pro-Kremlin news channels. Close cooperation and exchange of information between the EU and national authorities is ongoing at technical level against sanctions circumvention and Serbia should maintain the existing good level of cooperation. The practice of granting visa-free travel rights to the EU to some nationals of Russia by granting them Serbian citizenship, in many cases under special fast track procedure, remains a matter of high concern.
Serbia continued to engage actively in the UN and other international organisations. Serbia’s alignment with EU positions has decreased from 44% to 36% at the United Nations’ General Assembly. It has applied for formal membership in the UN Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS). Serbia, which is a party to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, does not have a bilateral immunity agreement granting exemptions from the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court and it complies with the EU positions on the integrity of the Rome Statute together with related EU guiding principles on bilateral immunity agreements. Serbia implemented its third action plan for the Implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security for the period 2024-2026; however without explicitly referring to women CSOs or to women facing multiple and intersecting forms of discrimination. Serbia also contributed to four UN peacekeeping missions and maintained its cooperation with NATO, including holding the first-ever Serbia-NATO joint military exercise in May 2026.
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Serbia continued to develop intense relations and strategic partnerships with a vast number of countries worldwide. High-level and frequent bilateral contacts with Russia continued, coupled with anti-Western and anti-EU narratives on an alleged ‘colour revolution’, often amplified in pro-Kremlin and local media, raising questions about Serbia’s strategic direction. The Serbian President had telephone conversations with the Russian President, the Russian Ambassador was regularly received at the most senior levels and frequent close contacts and ministerial visits took place from and to Moscow and Saint-Petersburg. In April 2026, Serbia and Russia signed several cooperation documents on the margins of the meeting of the intergovernmental trade and economic commission. In June 2026, ministerial-level talks in Saint Petersburg reaffirmed Belgrade’s readiness to strengthen its bilateral cooperation with Russia on energy and other areas of mutual interest. In August 2026, Russian-Serbian consultations on arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation, but also on security cooperation and fight against international terrorism took place at the level of Deputy Foreign Ministers in Moscow. During the wildfires in summer 2026, Serbia sought and obtained Russian assistance before activating the EU Civil Protection Mechanism.
At the same time, Serbia intensified its relations with Ukraine, as reflected in high-level contacts between the Serbian President and the President of Ukraine, including President Vučić’s visit to Kyiv in July 2026 and President Zelenskyy’s visit to Belgrade in August 2026, as well as the visit of the Serbian Parliament Speaker to Ukraine in November 2025, and a visit of Ukraine’s Deputy Prime Minister to Belgrade in May 2026. A Memorandum of Understanding on cooperation in the field of European integration between Serbia and Ukraine was signed in May 2026. President Vucic participated in the summit of the Carpathian Initiative in September 2026. While Serbia supports the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine; its actions and voting patterns in international fora have not reflected this commitment. In December 2025, Serbia was absent from the UN General Assembly vote demanding Russia to ensure the safe return of forcibly transferred or deported Ukrainian children and leaves the room when Ukraine-related matters are put to vote by Russia’s proxies at UNESCO. Serbia is also absent from several Human Rights Council items, carefully balancing its alignment with also supporting Russian initiatives at the same time. In February 2026, Serbia abstained, for the second year in a row, on the EU- supported UN General Assembly Resolution ‘Support for a lasting peace in Ukraine’. Serbia also indicated it would not support the establishment of a Special Tribunal for the Crime of Aggression against Ukraine. Serbia continued providing humanitarian and financial assistance to Ukraine, including significant amounts of energy equipment and medical supplies. In April 2026, the two countries signed a protocol of intentions on provision of training on demining.
Serbia maintained frequent high-level contacts with China, strengthening its comprehensive strategic partnership, including in the military domain. TheSerbian Presidentmet the Chinese President as part of his four-day state visit in May 2026 during which two joint statements, 23 cooperation agreements and a memorandum of understanding between the ruling Serbian Progressive Party (SNS) and the Chinese Communist Party were signed. During the visit, which was overall tainted with anti-Western narratives and occasional criticism of the EU stance on China, Serbia reiterated its support to Beijing on several issues, such as human rights, the situation in Hong Kong, Tibet, Xinjiang and the status of Taiwan, a stance that goes against EU positions. Serbia is the first and only European country to procure supersonic air-to-surface precision strike missiles from China, integrated into Russia-produced fighter aircrafts and creating strategic dependencies which are inconsistent with Serbia’s EU path.
Serbia continued supporting EU measures on conflict prevention and contributed to four UN peacekeeping missions (often joining the contingent of one EU Member State) and maintained its cooperation with NATO and its members.
As regards non-proliferation and disarmament, Serbia is a party to most international treaties and conventions. It has beenimplementing its 2023-2025 strategy and action plan
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for the fight against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. As regards conventional weapons, Serbia continued to implement and engage positively on the new Western Balkans Regional Roadmap for a sustainable solution to illegal possession, misuse and trafficking of small arms and light weapons and their ammunition. The Programme (2025-2030) and action plan (2025-2027) for the control of small arms and light weapons were adopted in December 2025. Serbia should consider ratifying Protocol V on Explosive Remnants of War to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons.
Serbia participates in the Nuclear Suppliers Group, but not yet in other multilateral export control regimes. Serbia last updated its National Control List of Arms and Military Equipment in July 2026, alongside its National Control List of Dual-Purpose Goods. After Serbia suspended the export of arms and military equipment produced in Serbia and made it subject to approval of the National Security Council in June 2025, partial exports to a selective number of countries resumed during the reporting period.
Serbia has a transparent reporting system on its strategic export controls, in line with the Arms Trade Treaty and other international obligations, but allegations of corruption in its arms trade continue and need to be investigated in order to establish whether the national measures to prevent diversion of arms and ammunition are adequate and effective. Serbia is a party to the Arms Trade Treaty and further measures to prevent diversion of arms and ammunition should be developed to support compliance. Serbia is yet to systematically align with EU statements in multilateral non-proliferation, disarmament and arms control fora. In general, Serbia aligned with the EU on technical issues, but not on political issues (e.g. Russia, Ukraine, China, Iran, DPRK). Occasionally it supported positions which were opposed to those of the EU, by consistently voting in favour of the UNGA resolution "Promoting International Cooperation on Peaceful Uses in the Context of International Security.".
In terms of security measures, Serbia continued implementing its Security of Information Agreement with the EU on procedures for exchanging and protecting classified information.
On common security and defence policy (CSDP), Serbia continued to actively participate and contribute substantially to EU military crisis management missions and operations in Africa (EUTM Somalia, EUTM RCA and EUTM Mozambique) and to EUNAVFOR Atalanta in the Western Indian Ocean and in the Red Sea. The institutional framework enabling Serbia’s participation in military crisis management is in place, but Serbia still needs to put in place relevant legislation to implement the 2023 law on the participation of civilians in international missions and operations, as well as the institutional framework required to become eligible to contribute to civilian CSDP missions. Serbia contributes significantly to cooperation in military medicine through the Balkan Medical Task Force. Serbia participates in training activities of the European Security and Defence College (ESDC).
On hybrid threats, no progress has been made on foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI), including disinformation. TV stations with national broadcasting frequencies that support the public authorities’ narratives remain primary sources of information manipulation and disinformation targeting the EU. This issue remains a matter of serious concern and requires urgent follow-up. There have been worrying reports about Serbian citizens involved in Russian hybrid operations, including subversive activities in some EU Member States and candidate countries in recent years. As a consequence, a number of persons were detained and brought to justice by Serbian authorities in September 2025. In cases concerning incidents in France and Germany, court decisions were issued, while investigations are still ongoing as regards developments related to elections in Moldova. Regarding cyber diplomacy, Serbia has actively engaged in the negotiations of the new UN Global Mechanism on Information and Communications Technologies in the Context of International Security, including through alignment with the EU statements.
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ANNEX I - RELATIONS BETWEEN THE EU AND SERBIA
As part of the accession negotiations, 22 chapters have been opened, two of which have been provisionally closed (Chapters 25 and 26). In line with the revised enlargement methodology, which Serbia accepted, negotiation chapters are grouped in six thematic clusters, and negotiations should be opened for each cluster as a whole – after fulfilling opening benchmarks – rather than on individual chapters. All chapters of cluster 1 (fundamentals) and cluster 4 (green agenda and sustainable connectivity) have been opened. Cluster 3 (competitiveness and inclusive growth) is the most advanced after those and in line to be opened next. Serbia tabled its negotiating positions on Chapters 2, 3, 10, 16, 19 and 28.
Serbia is participating in the Stabilisation and Association Process. Serbia continued to build a track record in implementing the obligations of the Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA). However, Serbian legislation still does not comply with the SAA in a number of areas, including ad hoc trade restrictions, on restrictions on the acquisition of real estate and on discriminatory practices in issuing payment cards by banks. On public procurement, intergovernmental agreements concluded with third countries and their implementation do not follow the EU principles of equal treatment, transparency, non- discrimination and competition for most of the value of public procurement contracts. As a result, EU companies are prevented from participating in large-scale infrastructure projects in the country.
Regular political and economic dialogue between the EU and Serbia has continued. Stabilisation and Association committee and subcommittee meetings were held, together with a meeting of a special group on public administration reform. Serbia also participates in the ministerial dialogue between the economic and finance ministers of the EU and candidate countries, where joint recommendations are adopted. The most recent meeting was held on 5 May 2026. A joint EU-Serbia Working group on energy was set up in October 2025 and has met 5 times since.
Economic integration with the EU remains deep and structurally anchored. The EU continues to be Serbia’s largest trade and investment partner, accounting for 58.2% of total trade in goods and 72.2% of FDI inflows in 2025. Serbia’s other main trading partners in 2025 included China (11%), CEFTA countries (9%) and Türkiye (4.5%). Russia accounted for 2.7% of total trade flows in 2025. China continues to consolidate its position as Serbia’s second-largest trading partner, driven primarily by Serbian imports of industrial goods and exports of copper ore. Despite continued efforts to facilitate trade, including through the digitalisation of customs procedures and initiatives such as the EU-Western Balkan Green Lanes, persistent bottlenecks at border crossing points with EU Member States and non- tariff barriers continue to affect trade flows.
Serbia’s pattern of alignment with the EU’s common foreign and security policy remained largely unchanged. Serbia continued to participate actively in EU crisis management missions and operations under the common security and defence policy.
The Balkans Medical Task Force, in which Serbia participates, benefits from a EUR 6 million 2022 support measure under the European Peace Facility. In October 2026, further regional EPF measure in support of Balkan Medical Task Force (EUR 10 million) was adopted.
Visa-free travel for citizens of Serbia travelling to the Schengen area has been in force since December 2009. A readmission agreement between the EU and Serbia has been in force since 2008. The Commission’s December 2025 eighth report under the visa suspension mechanism concluded that Serbia continues to meet the visa liberalisation requirements. However, the European Commission recommended that Serbia refrain from granting citizenship under accelerated or simplified procedures to nationals of countries that
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pose illegal migration or security risks to the EU.
Under the Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance 2021 – 2027 (IPA)7 the EU funding for Serbia reached EUR 1 014.4 million. The implementation of the IPA 2025-27 package (EUR 139.4 million), covering areas of fundamental reforms, good governance, local development, and acquis alignment, started along with the implementation of the two operational programmes (EUR 340 million) for the period 2024-2027 on (i) environment and energy, and on (ii) employment, skills, and social inclusion. Furthermore, EUR 288 million in EU support are provided for the rural development programme, IPARD III.
This set of programmes is complemented by significant funding under the multi-country and regional programmes, including the Western Balkans Investment Framework. Additionally, Serbia participates in three cross-border cooperation programmes with neighbouring Western Balkan countries and two transnational programmes - the EU Strategy for the Adriatic and Ionian Region and the EU Strategy for the Danube Region. The new activities add to ongoing programmes under IPA II(2014-2020), which are still providing significant support to the social and economic development of the country and contributing to key reforms in the rule of law, public administration reform and other sectors.
Under the Reform and Growth Facility, Serbia could benefit from an indicative allocation of EUR 1.586 billion, to be channelled via a Reform Agenda covering key reforms in four policy areas: business environment and private-sector development; green and digital transition; human capital development; and fundamentals / rule of law. Disbursement of EU support are conditional on compliance with the preconditions – including in terms of democratic and rule of law standards as well as, for Serbia and Kosovo, constructive engagement in the normalisation of their relations with a view to fully implementing all their respective obligations stemming from the Agreement on the Path to Normalisation and its Implementation Annex and all past Dialogue Agreements and engage in negotiations on the Comprehensive Agreement on normalisation of relations. As of September 2026, the European Commission has released EUR 167.6 million to Serbia, including EUR 111 million in pre-financing.
Serbia participates in a number of EU programmes: Horizon Europe, Erasmus+, Creative Europe, the Digital Europe Programme, the Citizens, Equality, Rights and Values Programme, the Single Market Programme, the European Social Fund Plus / EaSI strand, the Customs Programme, the Fiscalis Programme, the Union Civil Protection Mechanism, EU4Health and cooperation with the EU Fundamental Rights Agency. Serbia also participates in European cooperation frameworks such as COST and EUREKA. In addition, Serbia participates in several broader EU-supported initiatives and networks, including the European Digital Innovation Hubs network, the EU Digital Agenda for the Western Balkans, EU4Digital, WiFi4WB, the Connective Europe Facility and the EuroHPC Joint Undertaking.
To improve public administration reform and policy alignment, Serbia also participates as an observer in two pilot projects under the Technical Support Instrument, including on green budgeting and on improving labour market relevance.
7 Official Journal L 330, 20.9.2021.
114
ANNEX II – STATISTICAL ANNEX
STATISTICAL DATA (as of 14/09/2026)
Serbia
Basic data Note 2013 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
Population (thousand) 7 182 i 6 872 i 6 797 i 6 641 i 6 605 i 6 568 i
Total area of the country (km²) 77 593 iw 77 593 iw 77 538 iw 77 538 iw 77 538 iw 77 538 iw
National accounts Note 2013 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
Gross domestic product (GDP) (million national currency) 4 296 737 6 576 024 7 460 139 8 817 909 p 9 748 259 p 10 392 687
e
Gross domestic product (GDP) (million euro) 37 978 55 931 63 513 75 205 p 83 258 p 88 673 e
GDP per capita (euro) 5 300 8 180 9 530 11 350 p 12 640 p 13 540 e
GDP per capita (in purchasing power standards (PPS) 11 005 14 930 16 139 18 600 p 20 593 p 21 590 e
GDP per capita (in PPS), relative to the EU average (EU-27 = 100) 41.9 44.9 44.7 48.5 p 51.5 p 51.8 e
Real GDP growth rate: change on previous year of GDP volume (%) 0.5 7.9 2.7 3.7 p 3.9 p 2.0 e
Employment growth (national accounts data), relative to the previous year (%) - 2 1 0 0 0 0
Labour productivity growth: growth in GDP (in volume) per person employed, relative to the
previous year (%)
3 7 3 4 p 4 p 2 e
Unit labour cost growth, relative to the previous year (%) 3 2 10 10 p 10 p 10 e
Nominal unit labour cost index based on persons (3 year % change) 23.4 16.3 22.4 23.5 p 33.0 p 32.8 e
Labour productivity per person employed: GDP (in PPS) per person employed relative to EU
average (EU-27 = 100)
41 43 42 46 p 49 p 49 e
Gross value added by main sectors
Agriculture, forestry and fisheries (%) 7.4 6.2 6.3 4.4 p 3.7 p 3.8 e
Industry (%) 29.6 22.9 24.1 22.0 p 21.2 p 20.7 e
Construction (%) 3.1 6.2 5.6 5.9 p 5.9 p 5.4 e
Services (%) 59.9 i 64.7 i 64.0 i 67.8 pi 69.1 pi 70.1 i
Final consumption expenditure, as a share of GDP (%) 90.8 82.7 84.1 79.7 p 79.5 p 80.9 e
Gross fixed capital formation, as a share of GDP (%) 16.4 23.1 23.9 23.4 p 23.8 p 22.8 e
Exports of goods and services, relative to GDP (%) 38.2 52.3 60.7 55.1 p 53.6 p 54.3 e
Imports of goods and services, relative to GDP (%) 46.1 60.0 71.2 59.4 p 58.1 p 58.6 e
Gross fixed capital formation by the general government sector, as a percentage of GDP (%) : : : : : :
Business Note 2013 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
Industrial production volume index (2015 = 100) 85.6 99.8 101.9 104.8 107.7 108.9
Number of active enterprises (number) : 213 095 b 205 316 210 715 214 349 :
115
Birth rate: number of enterprise births in the reference period (t) divided by the number of
enterprises active in t (%)
: 11.1 11.5 12.5 : :
Death rate: number of enterprise deaths in the reference period (t) divided by the number of
enterprises active in t (%)
: 5.9 13.6 9.9 : :
People employed in SMEs as a share of all persons employed (within the non-financial
business economy) (%)
: 89.7 b 90.2 90.1 90.1 :
Value added by SMEs (in the non-financial business economy) (EUR million) : 16 050 bi 19 476 i 21 895 i 24 285 i :
Total value added (in the non-financial business economy) (EUR million) : 29 297 b 35 231 40 593 45 583 :
Inflation rate and house prices Note 2013 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
Consumer price index (CPI), change relative to the previous year (%) 7.7 d 4.0 d 11.7 d 12.1 d 4.8 d 4.1 d
Balance of payments Note 2013 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
Balance of payments: current account total (million euro) - 2 099.0 - 2 296.0 - 4 139.0 - 1 804.0 - 3 787.0 - 4 302.0
Balance of payments current account: trade balance (million euro) - 4 160.0 - 5 923.0 - 9 352.0 - 6 629.0 - 6 771.0 - 6 481.0
Balance of payments current account: net services (million euro) 312.0 1 399.0 2 315.0 3 103.0 2 819.0 2 322.0
Balance of payments current account: net balance for primary income (million euro) - 1 419.0 - 2 059.0 - 3 013.0 - 3 915.0 - 5 215.0 - 5 574.0
Balance of payments current account: net balance for secondary income (million euro) 3 165.0 4 287.0 5 913.0 5 638.0 5 382.0 5 437.0
Net balance for primary and secondary income: of which government transfers (million euro) 41.0 294.0 553.0 341.0 280.0 119.0
*3 year backward moving average of the current account balance relative to GDP (%) - 8.6 - 5.0 - 4.9 - 4.3 - 4.5 - 3.9
*Five year change in share of world exports of goods and services (%) : 30.6 33.1 43.2 40.1 36.7
Net balance (inward - outward) of foreign direct investment (FDI) (million euro) 1 298.1 w 3 656.9 w 4 328.2 w 4 261.6 w 4 602.5 w 2 278.2 w
Foreign direct investment (FDI) abroad (million euro) 249.7 w 229.1 w 104.2 w 302.8 w 628.4 w 1 198.8 w
of which FDI of the reporting economy in the EU-27 countries (million euro) : - 43.0 - 38.0 117.0 326.0 :
Foreign direct investment (FDI) in the reporting economy (million euro) 1 547.9 w 3 886.0 w 4 432.5 w 4 564.4 w 5 230.9 w 3 476.9 w
of which FDI of the EU-27 countries in the reporting economy (million euro) : 1 758.0 1 392.0 2 240.0 2 047.0 :
*Net international investment position, relative to GDP (%) : - 79.2 - 77.6 - 65.0 - 61.2 - 60.0
Year on year rate of change in gross inflow of remittances (in national currency) from migrant
workers (%)
: : : : : :
Public finance Note 2013 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
General government deficit / surplus, relative to GDP (%) : : : : : :
General government gross debt relative to GDP (%) : : : : : :
Total government revenues, as a percentage of GDP (%) : : : : : :
Total government expenditure, as a percentage of GDP (%) : : : : : :
Financial indicators Note 2013 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
Gross external debt of the whole economy, relative to GDP (%) 1) 67.5 iw 64.8 iw 65.5 iw 58.7 piw 58.6 piw :
116
Gross external debt of the whole economy, relative to total exports (%) 183.9 w 125.8 w 109.5 w 107.7 w 110.1 w 107.1 w
Money supply: M1 (banknotes, coins, overnight deposits, million euro) 2) 3 386.8 w 11 915.9 w 12 237.3 w 14 948.1 w 17 419.0 w 18 584.3 w
Total credit by monetary financial institutions to residents (consolidated) (million euro) : : : : : :
*Annual change in financial sector liabilities (%) : : : : : :
*Private debt, consolidated, relative to GDP (%) : : : : : :
Interest rates: day-to-day money rate, per annum (%) 7.04 w 0.23 w 4.00 w 5.23 w 4.45 w 4.42 w
Euro exchange rates: average of period (1 euro = … national currency) 113.137 117.573 117.459 117.251 117.085 117.203
Trade-weighted effective exchange rate index, 42 countries (2015 = 100) : : : : : :
*3 year change (T/T-3) in the trade-weighted effective exchange rate index, 42 countries
(2015 = 100)
: : : : : :
Value of reserve assets (including gold) (million euro) 696.0 2 620.0 2 919.0 5 104.0 2 834.0 - 1 549.0
External trade in goods Note 2013 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
Value of imports: all goods, all partners (million euro) 13 345 27 332 36 739 35 217 38 103 40 063
Value of exports: all goods, all partners (million euro) 10 413 21 053 26 354 27 039 28 944 31 404
Trade balance: all goods, all partners (million euro) - 2 933 - 6 279 - 10 386 - 8 178 - 9 159 - 8 659
Terms of trade (export price index / import price index * 100) (number) 98.5 iw 106.1 iw 102.0 iw 103.6 iw 105.6 piw :
Share of exports to EU-27 countries in value of total exports (%) 62.6 iw 65.8 iw 66.0 iw 65.7 iw 64.4 iw :
Share of imports from EU-27 countries in value of total imports (%) 54.3 iw 53.9 iw 51.9 iw 53.6 iw 53.1 iw :
Demography Note 2013 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
Crude rate of natural change of population (natural growth rate): number of births minus
deaths (per thousand inhabitants)
- 4.8 - 10.9 - 6.9 - 5.4 - 5.7 - 5.5
Infant mortality rate deaths of children under one year of age (per thousand live births) 6.3 4.7 4.0 4.7 4.6 :
Life expectancy at birth: male (years) 72.6 70.0 72.7 b 73.8 b 73.9 b :
Life expectancy at birth: female (years) 77.9 75.7 77.9 b 78.6 b 78.5 b :
Labour market Note 2013 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
Economic activity rate for persons aged 20–64: proportion of the population aged 20–64 that
is economically active (%)
66.1 74.5 b 75.9 76.8 78.0 78.4
Employment rate for persons aged 20–64: proportion of the population aged 20–64 that are
in employment (%)
51.3 66.2 b 68.8 69.6 71.3 71.6
Male employment rate for persons aged 20–64 (%) 59.6 73.6 b 75.8 75.9 77.2 77.3
Female employment rate for persons aged 20–64 (%) 43.2 58.9 b 61.8 63.4 65.5 65.8
Employment rate for persons aged 55–64: proportion of the population aged 55–64 that are
in employment (%)
34.3 50.3 b 53.6 56.7 58.7 60.0
Employment by main sectors
Agriculture, forestry and fisheries (%) 21.3 i 14.2 bi 13.9 i 13.1 i 12.8 i 12.0 i
117
Industry (%) 21.1 i 23.6 bi 23.8 i 23.5 i 23.0 i 22.9 i
Construction (%) 4.7 i 6.0 bi 5.9 i 5.9 i 6.0 i 5.7 i
Services (%) 52.8 i 56.2 bi 56.4 i 57.4 i 58.2 i 59.4 i
People employed in the public sector as a share of total employment, persons aged 20–64
(%)
: : : : : :
People employed in the private sector as a share of total employment, persons aged 20–64
(%)
: : : : : :
Unemployment rate: proportion of the labour force that is unemployed (%) 22.3 11.2 b 9.6 9.5 8.6 8.7
Male unemployment rate (%) 21.1 10.3 b 9.1 9.1 8.4 8.4
Female unemployment rate (%) 23.9 12.2 b 10.1 9.9 8.9 9.1
Youth unemployment rate: proportion of the labour force aged 15–24 that is unemployed (%) 49.4 26.0 b 24.3 25.0 23.0 23.4
Long-term unemployment rate: proportion of the labour force that has been unemployed for
12 months or more (%)
15.6 5.0 3.9 3.8 3.4 3.5
Unemployment rate for persons (aged 25–64) having completed at most lower secondary
education (ISCED levels 0-2) (%)
21.2 14.6 b 12.9 13.3 12.7 13.6
Unemployment rate for persons (aged 25–64) having completed tertiary education (ISCED
levels 5-8) (%)
17.2 8.3 b 5.9 6.4 6.2 5.8
Social cohesion Note 2013 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
Average nominal monthly wages and salaries (national currency) 3) 60 708 w 90 784 w 103 316 w 118 599 w 135 403 w 151 086 w
Index of real wages and salaries (index of nominal wages and salaries divided by the
inflation index) (2016 = 100)
80 w 107 w 123 w 140 w 158 w 178 pw
Gini coefficient : 33 33 32 32 32
Poverty gap 36.6 29.8 25.7 28.6 29.1 30.7
Standard of living Note 2013 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
Number of passenger cars relative to population size (number per thousand population) : 329.0 352.0 362.0 377.0 394.0
Infrastructure Note 2013 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
Density of railway network (lines in operation per thousand km²) 49.2 iw 43.4 iw 43.6 iw 43.6 iw 43.6 iw 43.6 iw
Length of motorways (kilometres) 607 928 941 963 999 :
Education, Innovation and Research Note 2013 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
Percentage of persons aged 30-34 with a tertiary education level (ISCED 2011 levels 5 to 8) 25.4 35.3 b 36.1 38.2 40.0 39.1
Percentage of persons aged 30-34 with a tertiary education level (ISCED 2011 levels 5 to 8),
males
20.3 27.8 b 30.7 29.8 32.3 31.6
Percentage of persons aged 30-34 with a tertiary education level (ISCED 2011 levels 5 to 8),
females
30.5 42.9 b 41.6 46.9 48.0 46.8
Participation in early childhood education (children aged 3 and over) 63.1 67.5 69.2 71.6 b 79.5 bd :
118
Participation in early childhood education (children aged 3 and over), males 63.0 67.3 69.2 71.4 b 79.2 bd :
Participation in early childhood education (children aged 3 and over), females 63.1 67.7 69.3 71.8 b 79.8 bd :
Low achieving 15-year-olds in reading (%) : : 36.4 : : :
Low achieving 15-year-olds in mathematics (%) : : 43.1 : : :
Low achieving 15-year-olds in science (%) : : 35.1 : : :
Early leavers from education and training: proportion of persons aged 18-24 with at most
lower secondary education (at most ISCED 2011 level 2) who are not in further education or
training
8.9 7.7 b 5.7 5.8 6.2 5.1
Early leavers from education and training: proportion of men aged 18-24 with at most lower
secondary education (at most ISCED 2011 level 2) who are not in further education or
training
8.2 8.7 b 6.5 5.8 6.8 5.2
Early leavers from education and training: proportion of women aged 18-24 with at most
lower secondary education (at most ISCED 2011 level 2) who are not in further education or
training
9.7 6.6 b 5.0 5.9 5.7 5.0
Proportion of persons aged 25-64 having participated in education and training (last 4
weeks)
3.9 4.8 b 5.1 6.1 5.5 5.2
Proportion of persons aged 25-64 having participated in education and training (last 4
weeks), men
3.4 4.2 b 4.4 5.5 4.9 4.6
Proportion of persons aged 25-64 having participated in education and training (last 4
weeks), women
4.5 5.3 b 5.7 6.7 6.1 5.7
Exposure of vocational education and training (VET) graduates to work-based learning (% of
population aged 20-34)
: 17.1 b 17.2 21.4 21.0 18.9
Share of individuals having at least basic digital skills (% of population aged 16-74) : 41.3 : 33.6 : 42.0
Share of individuals having at least basic digital skills (% of population aged 16-74), males : 43.9 : 35.5 : 42.3
Share of individuals having at least basic digital skills (% of population aged 16-74), females : 38.8 : 31.8 : 41.8
Public expenditure on education relative to GDP (%) : : 3.0 p : : :
Gross domestic expenditure on R&D relative to GDP (%) 0.66 0.95 0.92 0.88 0.93 :
Government budget appropriations or outlays on R&D (GBAORD), as a percentage of GDP
(%)
0.36 0.40 0.37 0.36 0.40 0.41
Percentage of households who have internet access at home (%) : 81.5 83.2 85.4 88.9 90.1
Environment Note 2013 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
Index of greenhouse gas emissions, CO2 equivalent (1990 = 100) 76.2 w 74.1 w 75.1 w 74.6 w : :
Energy intensity of the economy (kg of oil equivalent per 1 000 euro GDP at 2015 constant
prices)
399.5 353.3 348.0 325.9 313.4 :
Electricity generated from renewable sources relative to gross electricity consumption (%) 28.0 29.9 30.1 31.7 32.1 :
Road share of inland freight transport (based on tonne-km) (%) 40.4 w 62.0 w 62.5 w 66.1 w 70.9 w :
Energy Note 2013 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
Primary production of all energy products (thousand TOE) 11 371 10 179 9 617 9 508 9 315 :
119
Primary production of crude oil (thousand TOE) 1 277 894 881 886 867 :
Primary production of solid fuels (thousand TOE) 7 671 6 282 5 979 5 504 5 423 :
Primary production of gas (thousand TOE) 423 288 261 251 236 :
Net imports of all energy products (thousand TOE) 3 602 i 5 652 i 7 381 i 6 699 i 6 511 i :
Gross inland energy consumption (thousand TOE) 14 940 16 231 16 428 15 966 15 956 :
Gross electricity generation (GWh) 39 877 38 236 35 510 40 028 37 489 :
Agriculture Note 2013 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
Agricultural output volume index (at producer prices) (2015 = 100) 99.6 w 110.2 w 101.4 w 104.9 w 99.0 w :
Utilised agricultural area (thousand hectares) 3 510.2 3 506.1 3 488.8 3 396.3 3 336.8 :
Livestock numbers: live bovine animals (thousand heads, end of period) 913.0 860.0 799.8 725.4 698.6 698.9
Livestock numbers: live swine (thousand heads, end of period) 3 144.0 2 868.0 2 667.0 2 141.0 2 349.2 2 404.0
Livestock numbers: live sheep and live goats (thousand heads, end of period) 1 841.0 i 1 890.0 i 1 912.5 i 1 863.9 i 1 878.5 i 1 791.6 i
Raw milk available on farms (thousand tonnes) : 1 563.5 1 512.1 1 416.8 1 378.9 :
Harvested crop production: cereals (including rice) (thousand tonnes) 9 091.1 10 236.4 8 012.9 10 809.3 8 700.0 :
Harvested crop production: sugar beet (thousand tonnes) 3 180.0 2 048.2 1 667.1 2 040.6 1 922.9 1 806.4
Harvested crop production: vegetables (thousand tonnes) 1 033.3 795.7 815.8 704.7 855.6 927.4
Source: Eurostat and/or the statistical authorities in Serbia
: = not available b = break in time series d = definition differs e = estimated p = provisional i = Eurostat estimate w= data supplied by and under the responsibility of the national statistical authority and published on an "as is" basis and
without any assurance as regards their quality and adherence to EU statistical methodology
Footnotes:
1) Official external debt of the Republic of Serbia.
2) The money supply M1 consists of currency in circulation and funds in giro, current and other accounts belonging to the
owners of money balances in banks' liabilities, including money balances in the accounts of local government bodies, i.e.
accounts from which payments can be made without any restrictions.
3) Wages and salaries paid to employees of legal entities and of unincorporated enterprises. Wages and salaries are obtained
from administrative sources (tax administration records). Average earnings are calculated on the basis of the total amount of
accrued earnings for the reporting month and the number of full-time equivalent (FTE) employees.
120
EN EN
EUROPEAN COMMISSION
Brussels, 4.11.2026 SWD(2026) 696 final
COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT
Türkiye 2026 Report
Accompanying the document
COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN
PARLIAMENT, THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL
COMMITTEE AND THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS
2026 Communication on EU enlargement policy
{COM(2026) 690 final} - {SWD(2026) 690 final} - {SWD(2026) 691 final} -
{SWD(2026) 692 final} - {SWD(2026) 693 final} - {SWD(2026) 694 final} - {SWD(2026) 695 final} - {SWD(2026) 697 final} - {SWD(2026) 698 final} -
{SWD(2026) 699 final} - {SWD(2026) 700 final}
0
Table of Contents 1. Introduction ........................................................................................................................................ 2
1.1 Context .................................................................................................................................... 2
1.2 Main findings of the report ........................................................................................................... 3
2. CLUSTER 1: THE FUNDAMENTALS OF THE ACCESSION PROCESS ..................................................... 18
2.1 Functioning of democratic institutions and public administration reform ................................ 18
2.1.1 Democracy ........................................................................................................................... 18
2.1.2. Public administration reform .............................................................................................. 24
2.2. Rule of law and fundamental rights ...................................................................................... 26
2.2.1 Chapter 23 - Judiciary and fundamental rights .................................................................... 26
2.2.2 Chapter 24 - Justice, freedom and security ......................................................................... 45
2.3. Economic criteria ....................................................................................................................... 56
2.3.1. The existence of a functioning market economy ................................................................ 56
2.3.2. The capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union ..... 60
Chapter 5: Public procurement ..................................................................................................... 62
Chapter 18: Statistics .................................................................................................................... 64
Chapter 32: Financial control ........................................................................................................ 65
3. Good neighbourly relations and regional cooperation ..................................................................... 66
4. Resilience, security and defence ....................................................................................................... 71
5. Ability to assume the obligations of membership ................................................................. 73
Cluster 2: Internal market ................................................................................................................. 73
Chapter 1: Free movement of goods ............................................................................................ 73
Chapter 2: Freedom of movement for workers ............................................................................ 75
Chapter 3: Right of establishment and freedom to provide services ........................................... 75
Chapter 4: Free movement of capital ........................................................................................... 76
Chapter 6: Company law ............................................................................................................... 77
Chapter 7: Intellectual property law ............................................................................................. 77
Chapter 8: Competition policy ...................................................................................................... 78
Chapter 9: Financial services ......................................................................................................... 79
Chapter 28: Consumer and health protection .............................................................................. 80
Cluster 3: Competitiveness and inclusive growth ............................................................................. 82
Chapter 10: Digital transformation and media ............................................................................. 82
Chapter 16: Taxation ..................................................................................................................... 83
Chapter 17: Economic and monetary policy ................................................................................. 84
1
Chapter 19: Social policy and employment .................................................................................. 85
Chapter 20: Enterprise and industrial policy ................................................................................ 87
Chapter 25: Science and research ................................................................................................. 88
Chapter 26: Education and culture ............................................................................................... 89
Chapter 29: Customs Union .......................................................................................................... 91
Cluster 4: The green agenda and sustainable connectivity .............................................................. 92
Chapter 14: Transport policy ........................................................................................................ 92
Chapter 15: Energy ........................................................................................................................ 93
Chapter 21: Trans-European networks ......................................................................................... 95
Chapter 27: Environment and climate change ............................................................................. 96
Cluster 5: Resources, agriculture and cohesion ................................................................................ 98
Chapter 11: Agriculture and rural development ......................................................................... 98
Chapter 12: Food safety, veterinary and phytosanitary policy ..................................................... 98
Chapter 13: Fisheries .................................................................................................................... 99
Chapter 22: Regional policy and the coordination of structural instruments ............................ 100
Chapter 33: Financial and budgetary provisions ........................................................................ 101
Cluster 6: External relations ............................................................................................................ 102
Chapter 30: External relations .................................................................................................... 102
Chapter 31: Foreign, security and defence policy ...................................................................... 103
Annex I – Relations between the EU and Türkiye ........................................................................... 109
2
1. INTRODUCTION1
1.1 CONTEXT
Türkiye is a candidate country and a key partner for the European Union (EU). In December 2024, the Council Conclusions on enlargement2 restated the EU’s strategic interest in a stable and secure environment in the Eastern Mediterranean and in the development of a cooperative and mutually beneficial relationship with Türkiye. The Conclusions reaffirmed that the EU attaches particular importance to the resumption of and progress in the Cyprus settlement talks in further enhancing EU-Türkiye cooperation. The EU and Türkiye continue to pursue re-engagement in areas of mutual interest, in line with the recommendations set out in the Joint Communication on EU-Türkiye relations of 23 November 20233 and the relevant European Council Conclusions4. High-level engagement has therefore been stepped up in areas of joint interest5. The EU is re-engaging constructively with Türkiye in a
phased, proportionate and reversible manner, subject to established conditionalities.
Accession negotiations with Türkiye have remained at a standstill since 2018, as reiterated by the Council Conclusions of December 2024. The EU’s serious concerns about the continued deterioration of democratic standards, the rule of law, the independence of the judiciary and respect for fundamental rights have not been addressed. The arrests of and charges brought against elected officials, opposition figures, political activists, civil society and business representatives, journalists, and others, including judicial action targeting the main opposition party, have intensified in 2026. This has given rise to increasing doubts over Türkiye’s adherence to core democratic principles, including political pluralism, freedom of expression and association and non-discrimination while deepening concerns about the independence of the judiciary. As a result, the gap between Türkiye’s declared objective of joining the EU and its backsliding with regard to the fundamental political criteria for EU accession has further widened.
The 2016 EU-Turkey Statement has continued to yield results and has remained the key framework for cooperation on migration. Türkiye has sustained its remarkable efforts to host 2.3 million refugees, including Syrians under temporary protection. The EU has mobilised EUR 12.5 billion to support refugees and host communities since 2011 and has continued to provide assistance in areas such as basic needs, border management, education, healthcare, protection and socio-economic support. Türkiye remained the EU’s fifth largest trading partner in 2025, with bilateral trade reaching a record high of over EUR 218 billion. Growing geopolitical challenges have highlighted Türkiye’s strategic regional role, particularly in relation to developments in Syria, Ukraine, Gaza, the wider Middle East and the South Caucasus.
Since 2023, bilateral relations between Türkiye and Greece have overall improved, with Türkiye not engaging in any unauthorised drilling activities in the Eastern Mediterranean.
1 This report covers the period from 1 September 2025 to 1 September 2026. It is based on input from a variety of sources, including contributions from the government of Türkiye, EU Member States, European Parliament reports and information from various international and non-governmental organisations. It also includes the results of comparative assessments and indices produced by other stakeholders, in particular in the area of rule of law.
The report uses the following assessment scale to describe the state of play: early stage, some level of preparation, moderately prepared, good level of preparation and well advanced. To describe progress made during the reporting period, it uses the following scale: backsliding, no progress, limited progress, some progress, good progress and very good progress. Where appropriate, interim steps have also been used. 2 The Council issued Conclusions concerning Türkiye on 17 December 2024. 3 JOIN(2023) 50 final. 4 Particularly the European Councils on 25-26 March 2021, 29-30 June 2023, and on 17-18 Apil 2024. 5 The EU-Türkiye High-Level Dialogue on Climate took place in October 2025; the EU-Türkiye High-Level Dialogue on Science, Research, Technology and Innovation in November 2025, the EU-Türkiye High-Level Economic Dialogue in July 2026, and the EU-Türkiye High-Level Dialogue on Trade in October 2026.
3
Cases of flights over Greek islands have resumed and violations of Greece’s national airspace and territorial waters have risen significantly. By Presidential Decree of 15 August 2026, Türkiye declared two marine parks in the northeastern Aegean and the eastern Mediterranean, which extend predominantly beyond Turkish territorial waters into the high seas. Türkiye has continued to refuse to recognise the Republic of Cyprus and has repeatedly advocated for a two-state solution in Cyprus, contrary to UN Security Council Resolutions on the matter.
1.2 MAIN FINDINGS OF THE REPORT
THE FUNDAMENTALS OF THE ACCESSION PROCESS
Democracy
The electoral framework ensures a choice between alternative political options, but recent judicial interventions risk further undermining the level playing field for all political stakeholders. Judicial pressure on opposition politicians and the main opposition party has increasingly stifled political competition, eroding democratic principles and the integrity of the electoral process.
Parliament’s exercise of its powers, including oversight of the executive and the adoption of legislation, is constrained. The highly centralised presidential system has seriously weakened parliamentary prerogatives and eroded the separation of powers.
The governance system lacks effective checks and balances, as there are no tools to hold the government accountable beyond elections. The Presidency has authority over most regulatory bodies while public administration is highly politicised. The removal from office and prosecution of elected opposition mayors has further weakened local governance.
The institutions in charge of the EU integration process are well staffed and effective.
Civil society continues to operate in a difficult and restrictive environment, facing increasing pressure compounded by withdrawal of foreign donors. Where foreign funding links exist, civil society organisations (CSOs) are often subjected to smear campaigns, while foreign donors are stigmatised. Ongoing legal and administrative pressure from authorities restrict the civic space. Public consultations with independent CSOs on new legislation and policies remained very limited and lack a formal mechanism. Civil society continued to be vocal and to participate actively in civic life.
Public administration reform
Türkiye is between having some and a moderate level of preparation and made no progress in the reporting period.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were not implemented and remain valid. In the coming year, Türkiye should in particular:
→ prepare and adopt an overarching strategy for public administration reform and public financial management in line with the Principles of Public Administration, as well as conduct and publish a new round of public expenditure and financial accountability assessment (PEFA) to assess the performance of the current public finance management system;
→ introduce merit-based recruitment, appointments and promotions, notably to senior positions;
→ ensure policy planning documents and legislative proposals are developed using inclusive and evidence-based methods.
Chapter 23: Judiciary and fundamental rights
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Türkiye remains at an early stage of preparation in the area of the rule of law and fundamental rights. Backsliding occurred on key issues identified in previous reports and the serious concerns noted in previous reports have intensified.
Functioning of the judiciary
Türkiye’s judiciary is still at an early stage of preparation and backsliding has continued. Fundamental structural deficiencies remain unaddressed. The reporting period provided further evidence of the control exercised by the executive over the judiciary, undermining the independence and compromising the quality of judicial outcomes. The judiciary continued to act selectively, targeting opposition figures and elected officials while refraining from pursuing similar action against officials from the ruling coalition. In August 2026, the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) ruled that structural shortcomings likely facilitate the influence of the executive on judicial decisions. Certain ECtHR judgments still need to be implemented while several courts continued to refuse to implement the rulings of the Turkish Constitutional Court, compromising the integrity and the functioning of the entire system. The Grand Chamber categorised the continued detention of Osman Kavala, despite two previous judgments of the Court requiring his immediate release, a ‘flagrant denial of justice’.
The European Commission’s previous recommendations for addressing these issues still need to be implemented. These recommendations therefore remain valid and are considered even more pressing. In the coming year, Türkiye should focus on the following areas:
→ create a political and legal environment in line with European standards that allows the judiciary to carry out its duties independently and impartially, strengthen the separation of powers, and ensure that lower courts respect judgments by the Constitutional Court, whose decisions should abide by ECtHR jurisprudence;
→ amend the structure and selection processes of the Council of Judges and Prosecutors (HSK) so that the role and influence of the executive is limited, and introduce safeguards against interference by the HSK or senior officials in judicial proceedings;
→ ensure that all judicial proceedings respect fundamental rights, with particular regard to the rights of victims of crime and procedural protection for suspects and accused persons, duly guarantee the presumption of innocence, the principles of individual criminal responsibility and legal certainty, the right of defence, and the right to a fair trial.
Fight against corruption
Türkiye is still at an early stage of preparation in the fight against corruption. No progress was made during the reporting period. Türkiye continues to lack a reform strategy and action plan to prevent and control corruption and has not set up anti-corruption bodies in line with the Council of Europe’s recommendation. The legal framework has not been reformed in line with the EU acquis, the Council of Europe’s Civil and Criminal Law Conventions on Corruption, the Group of States against Corruption (GRECO) recommendations and the UN Convention against Corruption.
No measures were introduced to prevent undue political interference in the prosecution and adjudication of corruption cases. During the reporting period, several high-level corruption cases were opened against opposition-elected mayors and local politicians. Regardless of the merits of the cases, prosecutions primarily target opposition-affiliated local politicians. These selective investigations and prosecutions undermine public trust in the authorities’ efforts to combat corruption, which depend on independent, accountable, transparent, and effective institutions. Targeted risk assessments followed by specific measures are needed to address corruption in the most vulnerable sectors.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were not implemented and remain valid. In the coming year, Türkiye should, in particular:
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→ implement its international obligations in the fight against corruption, in particular the UN Convention against Corruption and relevant Council of Europe Conventions;
→ ensure effective follow-up to the recommendations issued by GRECO, including by adopting the necessary legislation, as indicated in the EU-Turkey visa liberalisation roadmap;
→ develop an anti-corruption strategy that shows clear political will and vision, to effectively address corruption, underpinned by a credible and realistic action plan.
Fundamental rights
The overall human rights situation in the country has deteriorated further. While the legal framework establishes general guarantees for the respect of human and fundamental rights, certain provisions of Türkiye’s legislation, as well as their implementation, are not in line with the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and ECtHR case law. During the reporting period, journalists, lawyers, academics, human rights defenders, and other critical voices continued to face investigations, prosecutions, and convictions, often on charges of alleged terrorism support, disinformation, or insulting public officials. LGBTIQ+ persons and civil society organisations were also targeted by judicial, law-enforcement and digital operations, notably on grounds of ‘obscenity’, with some activists reported to be charged as being members of criminal organisations.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were not implemented and remain valid. In the coming year, Türkiye should:
→ ratify the Protocol amending the Council of Europe Convention on the prevention of terrorism in order to align with the EU on the definition of terrorist offences; align its anti- terrorism legislation and its implementation with European standards, the ECHR, ECtHR case law, the Venice Commission’s recommendations, and the EU acquis and practices;
→ improve the legislative framework and its implementation in order to effectively protect women’s rights and gender equality, and tackle all forms of racism and discrimination, including against LGBTIQ+ persons, and ensure the protection of persons belonging to minorities;
→ implement the ECtHR judgments as a matter of priority, including in the case of Kavala vs Türkiye.
Freedom of expression and media freedom
Türkiye remains at an early stage of preparation in this area, while backsliding continued during the reporting period. The implementation of criminal laws related to national security and counter-terrorism continued to violate the ECHR and to diverge from the case law of the ECtHR, thereby hindering freedom of expression. There has been a sustained escalation in judicial and administrative measures against voices critical of the government, including by using criminal investigations to justify the appointment of trustees in private media or by blocking of media outlets’ online presence. The media and broadcasting regulator continued to impose discriminatory administrative and monetary fines, disproportionately targeting independent and opposition-aligned media outlets. A new amendment on social media access, alongside the Law on cybersecurity and the Law on disinformation, raises serious concerns due to vague provisions and the lack of independent oversight, risking further restrictions on fundamental rights and freedoms.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were not implemented and remain valid. In the coming year, Türkiye should in particular:
→ release journalists, human rights defenders, lawyers, writers and academics being held in pre-trial detention, and ensure that the criminal cases against them are concluded in accordance with the criteria set by the ECHR and the ECtHR;
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→ revise its criminal legislation, in particular the anti-terrorism law, the Criminal Code, the Law on data protection, the Law on the internet, the Law on disinformation, the Law on cybersecurity, as well as the legal framework on the Radio and Television Supreme Council and the Internet Supervisory Authority, to ensure that they comply with European standards and are implemented in a manner that does not curtail freedom of expression;
→ take steps to restore a safe and pluralist environment that enables the media to carry out their work independently and without fear of reprisals or dismissals.
Chapter 24: Justice, freedom and security
Türkiye is moderately prepared in the area of justice, freedom and security. Some progress was made in this area, particularly in relation to Türkiye’s capacity to survey and protect its land borders. Türkiye continued to make significant efforts to host and support 2.3 million refugees including Syrians under temporary protection.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were only partially implemented, and therefore remain valid. In the coming year, Türkiye should in particular:
→ fully implement the EU-Turkey Statement of March 2016, resume returns from the Greek islands, and implement all provisions of the EU-Turkey Readmission Agreement in relation to all EU Member States;
→ align legislation on personal data protection with the EU acquis, facilitating the conclusion of an international agreement on the exchange of personal data between Europol and Türkiye; in the meantime, Türkiye should make full use of existing cooperation channels with Europol and step up information sharing, including on counter-terrorism, where operationally relevant.
→ adopt and implement a strategy and action plan on border management to improve coordination between border services at national and international levels.
Fight against serious and organised crime
Türkiye has some level of preparation in implementing the EU acquis in this area. Limited progress was made overall in aligning with the EU acquis and practices. Law enforcement cooperation continued in some areas but needs to be improved and is hampered by Türkiye’s lack of alignment with the EU’s data protection legislation. While some legal changes have been made alongside actions to improve the operational capacity of law enforcement agencies, overall progress has been inadequate, and organised crime remains a persistent threat.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were only partially implemented, and therefore remain mostly valid. In the coming year, Türkiye should in particular:
→ continue to improve its legal framework and practices on counter-terrorism in line with the EU acquis and further strengthen its anti-money laundering, terrorist financing and proliferation financing framework in line with relevant international standards, including the FATF Recommendations;
→ conclude an agreement with the EU on cooperation with Eurojust; further increase its operational commitment to cooperate and exchange information with EU law enforcement partners and engage in effective judicial cooperation with EU Member States;
→ align its legislation on witness protection with the EU acquis, expanding it to cover all types of serious crime.
ECONOMIC CRITERIA
The existence of a functioning market economy
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Türkiye is well advanced in establishing a functioning market economy and has made some progress over the reporting period. The conflict in the Middle East and rising domestic political tensions have weighed on the ongoing economic stabilisation programme, while GDP growth has slowed down. Fiscal policy was tightened in 2025 to support disinflation. Fiscal and monetary policy stayed prudent during the first half of 2026, yet inflation remained high, prompting several upward revisions to inflation targets. The central bank has made progress in restoring its credibility, but its independence is not entrenched yet.
The current account deficit widened during the reporting period but remained moderate. The external position was broadly healthy, though still fragile, with rising downside risks.
The banking sector remained well capitalised and robust.
The labour market weakened amid persistent structural challenges, such as large labour underutilisation, a high youth unemployment rate, and a low female participation rate. Businesses struggle with long court proceedings, a lack of consultation on new legislative proposals and a large informal economy. Trade and price-setting interventions increased, and State aid transparency and control remain weak.
The policy guidance set out in the conclusions of the Economic and Financial Dialogue of May 2025 was partially implemented. To improve the functioning of the market economy, Türkiye should in particular:
→ ensure a sufficiently tight economic policy stance to support disinflation;
→ reduce consumption limits and subsidy rates on electricity and natural gas while protecting the most vulnerable households;
→ improve the business environment by increasing institutionalised and inclusive stakeholder consultation, reducing the duration of court proceedings, advancing public procurement legislation to limit the use of exclusions and negotiated procedures, and continuing efforts to reduce the informal economy.
The capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the EU
Türkiye has a good level of preparation and made limited progress in increasing its capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the EU.
The economy is diversified, with a well-developed service sector and strong manufacturing and agricultural sectors. Investment activity was strong in 2025 but decelerated during the first half of 2026. Despite continued efforts to strengthen education and human capital, structural challenges persist in the education system and progress to enhance innovation remains limited. Economic integration with the EU is high.
The Commission’s 2025 recommendations were only partially implemented and therefore remain valid. To improve competitiveness and support long-term growth, Türkiye should in particular:
→ further tailor education and training to labour market needs, including by promoting green and digital skills, improving the quality of and access to vocational education and training, and supporting the school-to-work transition;
→ further increase the share of renewables in the energy mix, while investing in the reinforcement of the transmission grid to ensure its stability and reliability;
→ improve small to medium-sized enterprises’ (SMEs) access to long-term finance.
Chapter 5: Public procurement
Türkiye is moderately prepared in the area of public procurement. There was no progress made in this area over the reporting period and significant gaps with the EU acquis remain.
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The Commission’s recommendations from last year were not implemented and therefore remain valid. In the coming year, Türkiye should in particular:
→ revise its public procurement legislation to further align it with the EU acquis including on utilities, concessions and public-private partnerships and to increase transparency;
→ reduce the excessive use of the negotiated procedure and improve instruments to evaluate contract performance and benchmark the effectiveness of public procurement procedures and contract management;
→ repeal exemptions that are incompatible with the EU acquis and avoid the use of discriminatory domestic price advantages and offset practices.
Chapter 18: Statistics
Türkiye is moderately prepared in the area of statistics. Some progress was made, by implementing a benchmark revision in national accounts, updating the methodology for calculating the Consumer Price Index, and conducting the agricultural census. However, the Turkish Statistical Institute (TurkStat) should strengthen public trust in official statistics by proactively informing users about the methodology and quality of the published statistics.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were only partially implemented and therefore remain valid. In the coming year, Türkiye should in particular:
→ set transparent, professional criteria for the appointment and dismissal of the President of TurkStat to strengthen TurkStat's professional independence;
→ step up efforts to fully align national accounts with the European System of Accounts (ESA 2010) and the requirements of the ESA 2010 transmission programme, including increased efforts to remove the flags preventing the publication of data and further alignment of the GNI inventory with Eurostat’s guidelines;
→ enhance statistics on agriculture and on migration and asylum.
Chapter 32: Financial control
Türkiye has a good level of preparation in the area of financial control, but made no progress during the reporting period.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were not implemented and therefore remain valid. In the coming year, Türkiye should in particular:
→ organise and publish a new round of public expenditure and financial accountability assessment (PEFA) to assess the performance of the current public finance management (PFM) in view of preparing a comprehensive PFM reform strategy and update the public internal financial control policy paper along with its action plan;
→ review the arrangements for including municipalities and state-owned enterprises in the treasury single account;
→ develop and adopt a national anti-fraud strategy.
CLUSTER 2: INTERNAL MARKET
Chapter 1: Free movement of goods
Türkiye has a good level of preparation on the free movement of goods. Some progress was made in aligning with the EU acquis, particularly in product legislation under the ‘old approach’ and the ‘new and global approach’. No progress was made on the import surveillance system for EU-originated products, while a good level of cooperation was maintained regarding risk-based product safety checks at imports.
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The Commission’s recommendations from last year were only partially implemented and therefore remain valid. In the coming year, Türkiye should in particular:
→ continue to eliminate the remaining non-tariff barriers to the free movement of goods that are in breach of Customs Union obligations, focusing on priority barriers discussed in the context of the High-Level Dialogue on Trade;
→ review the remaining schemes setting local content requirements;
→ increase the coverage and effectiveness of market surveillance measures, particularly on e-commerce.
Chapter 2: Freedom of movement for workers
Türkiye remains at an early stage of preparation on the freedom of movement for workers. Limited progress was made during the reporting period.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were not implemented and therefore remain valid. In the coming year, Türkiye should in particular:
→ prepare legislation and administrative practices in view of joining the European Employment Services (EURES) network;
→ start preparing for the alignment of legislation with the EU acquis on free movement of
workers, including access for EU citizens to the labour market and equal treatment of EU
workers.
Chapter 3: Right of establishment and freedom to provide services
Türkiye remains at an early stage of preparation on the right of establishment and freedom to provide services. No progress was made during the reporting period. Overall, substantial efforts are still required to achieve alignment in this area.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were not implemented and therefore remain valid. In the coming year, Türkiye should in particular:
→ align national legislation with the Services Directive and set up a point of single contact;
→ continue to align its legislation with the EU acquis in the area of postal services;
→ align national legislation with the EU acquis on mutual recognition of professional qualifications, including the Professional Qualifications Directive and the Proportionality Test Directive.
Chapter 4: Free movement of capital
Türkiye is moderately prepared in the area of free movement of capital. Some progress was made during the reporting period, including by adopting a new National AML/CFT and confiscation Strategy and an Action Plan against illegal online betting. Building on earlier reforms in line with the standards of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), Türkiye continued to strengthen its legal framework and institutional capacity to combat money laundering and terrorist financing. Limitations on capital movements and on foreign ownership persist in numerous sectors.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were only partially implemented and therefore remain valid. In the coming year, Türkiye should in particular:
→ minimise limitations on foreign ownership and capital movements;
→ further align with the FATF recommendations and the EU acquis by strengthening the legal framework and administrative capacity to more effectively prevent money laundering and the financing of terrorism.
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Chapter 6: Company law
Türkiye is well advanced in the area of company law. No progress was made during the reporting period and the Commission’s recommendations from last year remain valid.
In the coming year, Türkiye should in particular:
→ further align its national legislation with the EU acquis on shareholder rights and on cross-border conversions, mergers and divisions;
→ implement arrangements for company reporting, including alignment with the EU acquis on corporate sustainability reporting and disclosure of income tax information (country- by-country reporting);
→ take steps to align its legislation with the EU acquis to improve gender balance among directors of listed companies and implement related measures.
Chapter 7: Intellectual property law
Türkiye has a good level of preparation in the area of intellectual property law. No progress was made during the reporting period. There are still some legislative discrepancies as well as outstanding problems with implementation and enforcement, notably in relation to judicial procedures.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year remain valid. In the coming year, Türkiye should in particular:
→ improve enforcement measures to efficiently fight infringements of intellectual property rights (IPRs), including online sales of counterfeit and pirated goods, improve the level of IPR specialisation of judges, and resolve difficulties in the judicial procedures to obtain search and seizure warrants for criminal law enforcement;
→ further improve cooperation with IPR holders for efficient implementation and effective enforcement, particularly in cases involving accelerated and simplified destruction procedures applied by the judiciary and customs authorities;
→ ensure the collection and processing of accurate statistical data, especially on the effective judicial enforcement of IPRs, to better analyse systemic IPR shortcomings.
Chapter 8: Competition policy
Türkiye has some level of preparation in the area of competition policy. No progress was made during the reporting period. Concerns remain in the area of State aid.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were not met and therefore remain valid. In the coming year, Türkiye should in particular:
→ ensure the independence and functionality of the State aid institutional framework in accordance with the EU acquis;
→ implement the State aid Law by adopting implementing legislation without further delay;
→ make available a transparent and up-to-date inventory of all aid schemes.
Chapter 9: Financial services
Türkiye has a good level of preparation on financial services. Limited progress was made during the reporting period, particularly in the phasing-out all forbearance measures by early 2026. Türkiye also updated its regulatory framework by restructuring the organisational and operational procedures of the Capital Markets Board, to respond to changing needs and the expansion of its activities.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were only partially implemented and therefore remain valid. In the coming year, Türkiye should in particular:
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→ continue efforts to align its legislation with the revised Capital Requirements Regulation, Capital Requirements Directive and Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive;
→ further align its legislation with the EU acquis on capital markets and financial market infrastructures, and ensure their proper supervision;
→ further align with the EU acquis on insurance and occupational pensions, including the Solvency II Directive and the Motor Insurance Directive.
Chapter 28: Consumer and health protection
Türkiye has a good level of preparation on consumer and health protection. Limited progress was made, notably by strengthening the surveillance system for health services and improving healthcare services for vulnerable groups.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were partially implemented. In the coming year, Türkiye should in particular:
→ strengthen consumer rights enforcement, notably by taking more measures on infringements in the digital environment;
→ further improve coordination and cooperation with the consumer movement and enforcement bodies, including awareness-raising activities and introducing more measures to support vulnerable consumers;
→ further strengthen healthcare services by providing sufficient resources for sexual and reproductive health and commodities, mental health, and public health emergencies and disasters at central and provincial levels, and by increasing the access to healthcare services for vulnerable groups.
CLUSTER 3: COMPETITIVENESS AND INCLUSIVE GROWTH
Chapter 10: Digital transformation and media
Türkiye has some level of preparation in the area of digital transformation and media. Some progress was made during the reporting period, particularly through the 5G spectrum auction and start of its roll-out, updates to the e-commerce framework, the continued expansion of e-governance services and the further institutionalisation of the Cybersecurity Presidency.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were only partially implemented and therefore remain valid. In the coming year, Türkiye should in particular:
→ align its universal service, authorisation arrangements, market access rules and rights of way in e-communications with the EU acquis;
→ align its cybersecurity framework with EU cybersecurity standards, including the NIS 2 Directive and the 5G Cybersecurity Toolbox;
→ strengthen the independence of the regulatory authority and its board members, amend the internet law in line with the Venice Commission’s recommendations to ensure media pluralism, and take steps to strengthen the public broadcaster’s independence.
Chapter 16: Taxation
Türkiye is moderately prepared in the area oftaxation. No progress was made over the reporting period.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were not met and therefore remain valid. In the coming year, Türkiye should in particular:
→ enable the automatic exchange of tax information with all EU Member States;
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→ continue to align its legislation on value added tax (VAT) and excise duties, notably the range of excisable energy products with the EU acquis;
→ continue the fight against the informal economy and report on progress transparently by using performance indicators.
Chapter 17: Economic and monetary policy
Türkiye has some level of preparation on economic and monetary policy. Good progress was made during the reporting period. The central bank has kept monetary policy relatively tight to support the ongoing disinflation process. While proceeding with the simplification of the macro-prudential framework, the country took additional measures to support the monetary policy transmission mechanism.
The Commission’ recommendations from last year were largely implemented, yet their continued implementation remains relevant. In the coming year, Türkiye should in particular:
→ safeguard the independence of the central bank;
→ maintain financial stability and further simplify the monetary policy framework under a transparent monetary policy.
Chapter 19: Social policy and employment
Türkiye has some level of preparation on social policy and employment. Limited progress was made over the reporting period regarding occupational safety and health and active labour market measures. Concerns remain regarding low employment rates, particularly for women, high Not in Education, Employment, or Training (NEET) rates, trade union and collective bargaining rights, persistent levels of informal employment, discrimination in employment, the labour market gender gap, and income inequalities.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were partially implemented and therefore remain mostly valid. In the coming year, Türkiye should in particular:
→ take steps to align with the EU acquis and strengthen the enforcement of labour law, occupational health and safety, work-life balance, non-discrimination and equal opportunities in the workplace, and pay transparency;
→ remove obstacles that limit the trade union and collective bargaining rights and ensure the enabling of social dialogue mechanisms;
→ increase the formal employment rate of women and NEETs and expand affordable care services for children and older people.
Chapter 20: Enterprise and industrial policy
Türkiye is moderately prepared on enterprise and industrial policy. Limited progress was made during the reporting period. Concerns remain regarding the compatibility of public procurement practices with EU industrial policy principles, the lack of transparency in State aid for large investments, and the large informal economy.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were only partially implemented and therefore remain valid. In the coming year, Türkiye should in particular:
→ remove schemes that are incompatible with EU industrial policy principles, such as the public procurement price premiums, and substitute them with measures that effectively encourage innovation;
→ publish the amounts distributed under the industry support programme as well as the results of the industrial strategies from previous periods;
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→ continue conducting assessments on the impact of the SME support framework to identify any gaps and overlaps.
Chapter 25: Science and research
Türkiye is well advanced in science and research. Good progress was made during the reporting period, confirmed by the High-Level Dialogue in November 2025. Türkiye continued efforts to raise awareness of, and increase capacity for, Horizon Europe.
The Commission’s recommendation from last year was partially implemented and therefore remains valid. In the coming year, Türkiye should in particular:
→ ensure further improvements in the innovation pillar of Horizon Europe and European Innovation Scoreboard rankings.
Chapter 26: Education and culture
Türkiye is moderately prepared on education and culture. Limited progress was made during the reporting period regarding increased work-based learning opportunities and expanding evaluation and accreditation processes for universities.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were only partially implemented and therefore remain mostly valid. In the coming year, Türkiye should in particular:
→ ensure institutional autonomy and academic freedom safeguards in higher education, alongside further strengthening independent accreditation mechanisms; develop adult learning;
→ prioritise equitable access through early childhood education expansion, while improving inclusion, retention, and learning outcomes for vulnerable groups at all levels;
→ continue taking steps to implement the 2005 UNESCO Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions.
Chapter 29: Customs Union
Türkiye maintains a good level of preparation on the Customs Union. No progress was made during the reporting period. Duty relief, free zones and the surveillance scheme are still not fully aligned with the EU acquis and are in breach of Customs Union rules.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were not fully implemented and therefore remain valid. In the coming year, Türkiye should in particular:
→ step up efforts to fully align new legislation with the Union Customs Code and bring risk- based controls and simplified procedures in line with the EU acquis, taking into account the progressive application of the new Union Customs Code;
→ strengthen controls and continue cooperation with the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) in administrative investigations, e.g. in cases of transhipment or simple transformation of goods in the country that could lead to false declarations of origin of goods at import into the EU;
→ continue to eliminate import and export restrictions as well as additional duties on goods in free circulation in the EU-Turkey Customs Union.
CLUSTER 4: THE GREEN AGENDA AND SUSTAINABLE CONNECTIVITY
Chapter 14: Transport policy
Türkiye remains moderately prepared in the area of transport policy. Limited progress was made during the reporting period, particularly in the area of aviation. Türkiye’s alignment
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with the EU transport acquis still presents gaps in road safety, rail liberalisation, as well as rail safety, maritime safety, and multimodal transport facilitation. The provision of subsidies to the incumbent railway operator continued at an increasing pace.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were only partially implemented and therefore remain largely valid. In the coming year, Türkiye should in particular:
→ adopt and implement the transport decarbonisation roadmap, including measurable interim targets, monitoring tools and financing mechanisms for aviation, maritime, road, rail and urban mobility;
→ finalise alignment with the EU acquis on road infrastructure safety, smart tachographs, rail interoperability and rail safety, while improving enforcement and publishing implementation results;
→ operationalise the Sustainable Urban Mobility White Paper and strengthen multimodal transport, and alignment with EU passenger rights legislation, accessibility and central- local coordination, including in view of urban nodes under the revised TEN-T framework.
Chapter 15: Energy
Türkiye is moderately prepared in the area of energy. Limited progress was made on the renewable energy deployment and energy efficiency as well as further diversification of energy sources. Nonetheless, local content requirement practices in the renewable energy sector remained in place. No further legislative changes related to the natural gas market were adopted and the legislation does not yet ensure compatibility with the EU’s third energy package. Energy dependency on Russia continued despite the energy diversification objective. Türkiye continued its efforts on the legislative alignment of nuclear safety regulations with EU and international standards.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were only partially implemented and therefore remain valid. In the coming year, Türkiye should in particular:
→ deepen natural gas market reform by setting up a legally binding plan and a timetable for unbundling activities and by updating the natural gas market law to ensure it is compatible with the EU’s third energy package of 2009 and its update, the EU’s 2024 hydrogen and decarbonised gas market package;
→ complete the legislative alignment with Euratom acquis and address the recommendations from the stress tests on the Akkuyu nuclear power plant before its entry into operation. Discontinue local content requirement practices in the renewable energy sector, as such practices contradict WTO and the EU-Turkey Customs Union rules;
→ further transition to targeted non-price measures to tackle energy poverty and provide economic relief to eligible households, to restore market-based retail pricing and remove disincentives to energy efficiency gains.
Chapter 21: Trans-European networks
Türkiye is well advanced in the area of trans-European networks (TEN). Some progress was made during the reporting period, in particular on taking concrete steps to mobilise investments for Yavuz Sultan Selim bridge railway connections. Türkiye continued to advance projects that contribute to the extension of the comprehensive trans-European transport networks (TEN-T) into its territory. Construction of the first phase of the Halkalı- Kapıkule railway line was completed and phase two and three advanced.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were partially implemented and therefore remain largely valid. In the coming year, Türkiye should in particular:
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→ establish a transparent, cost-reflective and non-discriminatory gas transit regime in line with the EU acquis;
→ take concrete steps to mobilise investments for increasing rail capacity of the Marmaray tunnel and optimising freight operations and enhance institutional capacity to prepare and implement TEN-T-compliant projects;
→ accelerate action to align with key pieces of the EU acquis to facilitate alignment in the trans-European transport and energy networks.
Chapter 27: Environment and climate change
Türkiye has some level of preparation on environment and climate change and made some progress over the reporting period, in particular on industrial emissions, waste management and climate change. Türkiye published its National Circular Economy Strategy and Action Plan together with the Single-use Plastics Roadmap in October 2025. Following the adoption of the Climate Law in July 2025, Türkiye published the related secondary legislation, including on the establishment of the national Emission Trading System (ETS), which ais yet to become operational.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were only partially implementedand therefore remain valid. In the coming year, Türkiye should in particular:
→ ensure that environmental standards are met when building back better in the earthquake-affected areas, in particular by fully implementing the Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) Directive and other horizontal environmental legislation, and ensuring that protection from exposure to asbestos in the earthquakes-affected areas is duly implemented;
→ complete alignment with the EU directives on industrial emissions water and waste as well as on nature protection and air quality, and ensure that protection from exposure to asbestos is duly implemented;
→ swiftly implement the Climate Law adopted in July 2025, in particular for emission trading, and further approximation with the EU ETS Directive; complete alignment with the wider EU acquis on climate action.
CLUSTER 5: RESOURCES, AGRICULTURE AND COHESION
Chapter 11: Agriculture and rural development
Türkiye has some level of preparation on agriculture and rural development. Limited progress was made in the reporting period. Notable improvements continued to be made on the implementation of the EU Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance for Rural Development (IPARD) III programme, with entrustment of a new measure (on Rural Public Infrastructure) and tangible progress in requesting entrustment of another new measure (on Advisory Services). The funds absorption rate remained high.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were only partially implemented and therefore remain valid. In the coming year, Türkiye should in particular:
→ align legislation with the EU acquis;
→ set up and implement a farm sustainability data network (FSDN) and an integrated administration and control system (IACS);
→ pursue the opening and transparent management of import quotas for beef and live bovine animals on a lasting basis.
Chapter 12: Food safety, veterinary and phytosanitary policy
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Türkiye has some level of preparation on food safety, veterinary and phytosanitary policy. No progress was made over the reporting period. Full implementation of the EU acquis in this area requires significant further work.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were not implemented and therefore remain valid. In the coming year, Türkiye should in particular:
→ upgrade producing food, feed and animal by-products to meet EU structural standards, notably for raw milk;
→ meet EU maximum limits for pesticide residues, and effectively address recurrent shortcomings;
→ integrate the EU’s One Health approach into the zoonosis control system.
Chapter 13: Fisheries
Türkiye is moderately prepared on fisheries and aquaculture. Some progress was made, in particular on resources and fleet management, with the adoption of the Fisheries Sector Policy Document 2025-2029. On inspection and control, the fisheries control capacity was further strengthened through the establishment of the new fisheries monitoring centre and the collaboration with the European Fisheries Control Agency in onboard inspection campaigns.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were only partially implemented and therefore remain valid. In the coming year, Türkiye should in particular:
→ further improve data collection and sharing to support scientific advice for sustainable fisheries management in line with EU law;
→ step up efforts to align its market policy with EU rules, in particular on the criteria governing the recognition and roles of professional organisations;
→ accelerate alignment with European standards and adequate enforcement of monitoring, control, surveillance and inspection of fisheries in the Mediterranean Sea and strengthen efforts to effectively combat illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing.
Chapter 22: Regional policy and the coordination of structural instruments
Türkiye is moderately prepared in the area of regional policy and the coordination of structural instruments. No progress was made during the reporting period.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were only partially implemented and therefore remain mostly valid. In the coming year, Türkiye should in particular:
→ ensure proper functioning of local democracy and more balanced regional development;
→ address over-centralisation and structural weaknesses in the regional policy implementation;
→ improve monitoring and evaluation, and financial management arrangements focused on resource efficiency controls and long-term sustainability of EU-funded actions.
Chapter 33: Financial and budgetary provisions
Türkiye has some level of preparation in the area of financial and budgetary provisions. It made no progress over the reporting period.
The Commission’s recommendation from last year was not implemented and therefore remains valid. In the coming year, Türkiye should in particular:
→ further align the gross national income inventory with Eurostat’s GNI Inventory Guide.
CLUSTER 6: EXTERNAL RELATIONS
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Chapter 30: External relations
Türkiye is moderately prepared on external relations. Limited progress was made in the reporting period, notably by lifting its longstanding objection for legal incorporation of the Investments Facilitation for Development Agreement into the World Trade Organization (WTO) rulebook.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were not implemented and therefore remain valid. In the coming year, Türkiye should in particular:
→ fully realign the customs tariff with the Common Customs Tariff;
→ complete alignment with the EU’s Generalised Scheme of Preferences and dual-use export control regime;
→ align its national legislation on the screening of foreign investments with the EU acquis on the screening of foreign direct investments (FDI).
Chapter 31: Foreign, security and defence policy
Türkiye has some level of preparation on common foreign, security and defence policy, and made limited progress in the reporting period. Türkiye remained open to substantive exchanges with the EU. A number of EU-Türkiye consultations on foreign and security policy took place during the reporting period. However, Türkiye made no effort to improve its alignment with the EU’s common foreign and security policy (CFSP), despite its stated strategic goal of joining the EU.
Türkiye continued to implement an active and multi-layered foreign policy, balancing its relations with key geopolitical actors and pursuing mediation and diplomatic efforts, while striving for strategic autonomy. Increasing geopolitical shifts have underscored Türkiye’s growing strategic regional role and highlighted the shared interest and responsibility of the EU and Türkiye in addressing common challenges.
As regards Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, Türkiye continued to emphasise its role as a facilitator and potential mediator, including by hosting direct talks between Russia and Ukraine in 2025. Türkiye did not align with the EU’s restrictive measures against Russia, although it continued to partially cooperate with the EU to prevent their circumvention through Turkish territory.
On the Middle East conflict, Türkiye maintained a balanced position, made diplomatic efforts for de-escalating and ending the conflict, aligning with the EU’s position on the need for a diplomatic solution to the Iran war and for restoring freedom of navigation in the Gulf/Strait of Hormuz.
On the Middle East peace process, Türkiye aligns with the EU’s position on the need to relaunch the political process in order to implement the two-state solution and participates in the ‘Global Coalition’ for its implementation. Türkiye's position on certain issues, including Hamas, which is considered a legitimate political interlocutor by Ankara, cannot be reconciled with the EU’s, which lists Hamas as a terrorist organisation. Türkiye’s normalisation process with Armenia progressed during the reporting period.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were only partially implemented and therefore remain valid. In the coming year, Türkiye should in particular:
→ urgently step up its efforts to detect and prevent the circumvention of the EU’s restrictive measures. In particular, preventing the re-export, through the Turkish territory of Common High Priority items of EU origin and Economically Critical Goods; tackling ‘false transit’ and ‘falsified certificates of origin’; and addressing risks linked to Russia’s ‘Shadow Fleet’, particularly in relation to maritime and environmental safety. Reducing energy imports of Russian oil and gas also remains important in this context;
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→ urgently and significantly improve alignment with the High Representative’s statements on behalf of the EU and relevant Council decisions on sanctions;
→ continue to engage in political dialogue on foreign and security policy with the EU seeking collaboration on convergent interests while working on reducing divergences, particularly to ensure de-escalation in the Eastern Mediterranean.
2. CLUSTER 1: THE FUNDAMENTALS OF THE ACCESSION PROCESS
2.1 FUNCTIONING OF DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS AND PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION REFORM
2.1.1 Democracy
The functioning of democratic institutions in Türkiye remains a serious cause for concern. No steps were taken to address either the structural flaws of the presidential system or the inadequate separation of powers between the executive and the judiciary. Democratic backsliding continued, particularly in the areas of political pluralism, integrity of electoral process, the rule of law and local governance. Taken together, these factors raise increasing concerns over the country's respect for core democratic principles.
Elections
The main electoral framework allows voters to choose among competing political alternatives but falls short of ensuring a level playing field. Intensified judicial pressure on opposition figures and the Republican People’s Party (CHP) – the main opposition party until its split in May 2026 after former CHP politicians established Yeni Parti (now the second biggest parliamentary represented party) – has further restricted the political opposition’s ability to function and engage in political life without fear of intimidation. This pressure undermines fundamental democratic values and norms, such as political pluralism and freedom of association.
Istanbul mayor Ekrem İmamoğlu, who was widely regarded as the CHP’s likely presidential candidate (now member of Yeni Parti), remains in detention. His trial, based on corruption charges which also target CHP district mayors and senior officials began on 9 March 2026. The indictment carries a sentence of up to 2 430 years in prison. In October 2025, the prosecution launched an espionage investigation against him and 14 other suspects for allegedly transferring personal data abroad. The administrative case filed to challenge the annulment of his university diploma was dismissed by the first instance court and is currently pending appeal. The related criminal case remains ongoing. Should such annulment be upheld, the mayor would be disqualified from standing as a presidential candidate.
In May 2026, an appellate court annulled CHP’s 38th Congress of November 2023, as well as all subsequent ordinary and extraordinary congresses of the party. The removal of CHP leadership, more than two years after the regular Congress took place and after the Supreme Election Council had certified its results, reinforces concerns over the independence and impartiality of the judicial system. It also undermines the ability of opposition parties to operate without interference and participate in elections on equal footing with governing parties, raising questions concerning the integrity of the electoral process.
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The deficiencies in the legal framework governing elections and political parties have not been addressed. Türkiye has yet to implement any of the Organization for Security and
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)/Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) recommendations, as well as those put forward by the Venice Commission. Türkiye also needs to ensure alignment with the Regulation on the transparency and targeting of political advertising.
Parliament
The President continued to exercise extensive authority across a broad spectrum of policy areas, thereby constraining the role of the Parliament. The frequent and persistent use of presidential decrees and executive orders curtailed the Parliament’s capacity to perform its legislative and oversight function. Opposition parties had only limited influence over the parliamentary agenda-setting.
Parliamentary oversight of the executive continued to be limited and weak. While Members of Parliament may submit written questions to the Vice-President and ministers, the President is not covered by this scrutiny mechanism. In addition, standard presidential decrees remain beyond the scope of parliamentary review. There is also a pressing need to reinforce the legislature’s scrutiny over public expenditure as recommended by the Venice Commission.
Judicial and administrative measures directed against opposition parties, in particular the increasing number of criminal investigations and legal actions targeted against CHP mayors (some of whom joined Yeni Parti) and party members, further contributed to a climate of intimidation.
Despite a binding judgment by the ECtHR calling for their immediate release, several former parliamentarians from the pro-Kurdish Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP), including two former co-chairs, remain in prison. A 2023 ruling by the Constitutional Court of Türkiye ordering the release of one of the defendants in the Gezi trial, who had subsequently been elected as a Member of Parliament, is yet to be implemented. Legal proceedings concerning the closure of HDP based on terrorism-related allegations remain ongoing. Pressure on the pro-Kurdish Peoples’ Equality and Democracy Party (DEM) appears to have eased since the launch of the new Kurdish process in 2024.
Women continue to be markedly underrepresented in decision-making roles, both at national and local levels, and across the broader sphere of political life.
EU Integration
Türkiye has established institutional arrangements to effectively coordinate the accession process. The Directorate for EU Affairs at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, together with its network of contact points across line ministries, is sufficiently resourced. The Directorate maintains effective cooperation with the EU Delegation and includes a communication unit responsible for outreach on EU enlargement.
Governance
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Within the current presidential system, Parliament largely lacks effective instruments to hold the executive accountable. Presidential accountability remains largely confined to the electoral process. The executive maintains a broad degree of influence over all areas of the public administration, the judiciary, and security institutions. The President also has the authority to appoint senior leadership and board members across most key institutions and regulatory bodies. The public sector remains highly politicised. The recommendations set out in the Venice Commission’s 2017 opinion on Türkiye’s presidential system remain unimplemented.
Regarding local self-governance, the government continued to exercise high pressure on opposition mayors, through administrative, financial, and judicial channels. Judicial and administrative measures overwhelmingly targeted municipalities governed by the opposition, particularly those led by the CHP, with only two cases involving mayors affiliated with the Justice and Development Party (AK Party). The allegations brought forward included membership in terrorist organisations, corruption, and involvement in illicit financial activities, often supported up only by testimonies of secret witnesses. Concerns have been raised that, in some cases, various forms of pressure were used to intimidate mayors or councillors into switching their party allegiance to the AKP.
A report by the Venice Commission in October 2025 concluded that pre-trial detention of mayors may violate both the individual rights of the mayors and the political rights of the voters. Since 1 September 2025, 22 mayors from CHP have been suspended or arrested (bringing the total to 49 arrested and suspended mayors since the last local elections in 2024). In one case, a prison sentence was imposed. The appointment of trustees to replace the elected mayors and the selective denial of financial resources continued to be used as key pressure tools over opposition-led municipalities. A new law grants more powers to central government over the operations of companies set up by the municipalities.
Civil society
Civil society, including human rights defenders (HRDs), operates in an overall restricted environment and faces constant pressure and attacks as well as political, legal, financial and administrative constraints that hinder their effective functioning. Civil society actors working on women’s rights, LGBTIQ+ issues, environmental protection, animal rights and human rights, in particular, continued to face pressure, including systematic administrative harassment and judicial prosecutions.
Public benefit status is granted in a discriminatory manner. Frequent audits are carried out in excessive and intimidating ways. Civil society organisations (CSOs) receiving funding from foreign donors and working on issues critical of government policies were subjected to frequent audits as well as hate rhetoric and smear campaigns.
Public consultations with independent CSOs on new legislation and policies remained very limited and ineffective and no formal mechanism exists for this process. Increasingly, government-organised or close to the government non-governmental organisations are attempting to displace civil society organisations from public debates and amplify government narratives.
HRD Osman Kavala and his co-defendants in the Gezi trial remained in prison despite the ECtHR rulings and numerous resolutions adopted by the Council of Europe's Committee of Ministers, including one in June 2026, and the ECtHR’s Grand Chamber final judgement in August 2026 ruling that he must be released immediately. Despite the ruling, in October 2026, a Turkish court rejected Mr Kavala’s application for release from prison. New judicial proceedings continued to be launched against journalists, HRDs, artists, and other individuals for their alleged participation in Gezi protests, over a decade since those events. Prosecutions for defamation, and especially for alleged insults against the President have a chilling effect on the civil society. HRDs continued to be targeted on spurious terrorism- related charges.
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Cases concerning the administrative closure of CSOs and associations continued to be heard in the local and appellate courts. The case regarding the removal of Council Members of the Turkish Medical Association from their positions was dismissed. In January 2026, the Istanbul Bar Association’s leadership was acquitted of charges of ‘terrorist propaganda’ and ‘publicly disseminating misleading information’. After criticising rule of law developments, two former executives of the Turkish Industry and Business Association (TÜSIAD), including its former chair, were convicted in March 2026 for ‘publicly disseminating misleading information’ to 15 months and 18 days’ imprisonment. The court deferred the announcement of the verdict on the condition that no further offences being committed during the probation period.
In February 2026, the Council of Europe Congress of Local and Regional Authorities youth delegate Enes Hocaoğulları was acquitted on charges of ‘disinformation’ and ‘inciting people to hatred.’ He had been arrested in 2025 because of the speech he gave at the Council of Europe, where he criticised the Turkish government.
Overall, the political, legal, financial and administrative constraints hindering the effective functioning of civil society organisations and representatives in Türkiye remained largely unchanged.
Civilian oversight of the security forces
Civilian democratic oversight remains limited due to the security forces’ politicisation, weak public accountability, and insufficient parliamentary scrutiny. The executive branch holds extensive authority over the security forces, which include the Turkish Armed Forces, law enforcement agencies and the National Intelligence Organization, exceeding standard democratic civilian oversight.
Parliament lacks an effective oversight role over security agencies, the defence budget and off-budget expenditures. Strengthening cross-party parliamentary oversight of security and intelligence bodies remains a key reform priority.
Security institutions are increasingly perceived as politicised. Law enforcement agencies are often accused of selectively targeting opposition politicians, critical journalists, and civil society actors under the direction of prosecutors.
Systemic impunity within the security forces persists, with administrative protection shielding personnel from accountability in cases involving alleged human rights violations or excessive use of force. Judicial oversight is weakened by lengthy procedures and limited effectiveness.
Overall, civilian democratic oversight remains insufficient and requires stronger parliamentary scrutiny, greater transparency, improved judicial review, and safeguards for institutional independence and professionalism.
Situation in the east and south-east regions
The initiative to address the Kurdish issue and end the violence linked to the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), designated as a terrorist organisation by the EU, continued to receive broad political support. The 51-member cross-party Parliamentary National Solidarity, Brotherhood and Democracy Committee (NSBDC), created to address the need for broader reforms following PKK’s decision in 2025 to disband, provided a parliamentary platform for this process. The Committee’s final report adopted in February 2026 by a qualified majority, offered a framework for the next legislative steps. The Committee provided formal, albeit limited, space for interaction between political and civil society actors.
A Framework Law on Strengthening National Solidarity and Social Cohesion was adopted on 10 August 2026.It establishes a mechanism that will apply once it has been verified that the PKK has effectively dissolved its organisational structure and surrendered its weapons. Under certain conditions, the law provides for the deferral of investigations, prosecutions and the enforcement of sentences in relation to specified organisation-related offences. Certain
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serious offences, including intentional killing committed in the course of the organisation’s activities, remain outside its scope. The legislation received relatively broad parliamentary support.
Nevertheless, important questions remain as to whether the process will subsequently extend to broader democratisation and fundamental rights issues. The NSBDC final report of February 2026 called for reviewing terrorism legislation, strengthening freedom of expression and ending the practice of appointing ‘trustees’ to municipalities. It also urged for full compliance with the rulings of the ECtHR and the Constitutional Court. It contained no explicit reference to the imprisoned PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan.
Overall, the peace initiative has inspired cautious optimism, leading to a more positive climate in the Southeast regarding freedom of assembly and exercise of cultural rights. However, it has not been evenly felt around the region and the country in general. Most Kurdish-language media outlets and cultural rights institutions remain closed since 2016. Newroz celebrations in March 2026 took place with limited interference in certain provinces like Diyarbakir while authorities imposed restrictions in other provinces. Over 200 detentions took place.
The government has the right and responsibility to combat terrorism. However, in doing so it should respect the rule of law, human rights and fundamental freedoms. Violations of human rights by security forces continued to be reported as well as hate offences and crimes against Kurds. The administrative remedies and judicial cases in relation to property rights cases in Diyarbakır and the region are still in court. The judicial and administrative pressures and practice of applying a broad interpretation of anti-terrorism laws to journalists, political opponents, bar associations and human rights defenders working on the Kurdish issue, are ongoing.
Ten DEM Party mayors and one CHP mayor in the East and Southeast remain dismissed and replaced by state-appointed trustees. The March 2022 recommendations issued by the Congress of Local and Regional Authorities of the Council of Europe regarding local democracy in Türkiye have yet to be implemented.
Three ECtHR judgments regarding former HDP Co-Chair Selahattin Demirtaş have yet to be
implemented, and a new, 13th court case was filed against him in September 2025. The
ECtHR judgment on Demirtaş is final. The case of the killing of Diyarbakir Bar Association
Chair Tahir Elçi in 2015 is pending before the Constitutional Court.
Court cases related to government-funded construction projects on cultural, historical and religious heritage sites damaged during the military and security operations in 2015 and 2016 are ongoing. A comprehensive approach to addressing the issue of missing persons or to independently investigate alleged extrajudicial killings by security forces remained absent. To date, all cases related to enforced disappearances from the 1990s have resulted in acquittals or have been dropped due to statutes of limitation rules. The village guard system, which is one of the key obstacles in the Kurdish issue, continued to obstruct the return of displaced villagers.
Overall, there has been no progress on the situation of internally displaced people due to violence in the Southeast region during the 1990s and in more recent years. People displaced after the February 2023 earthquakes continued to encounter major challenges.
Refugees
Türkiye continues to host one of the largest refugee populations in the world. As of September 2026, official figures show that there are 2 218 101 Syrians under temporary protection and 87 321 Syrians holding short-term residence
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permits. However, Türkiye does not regularly publish comprehensive data on the number of refugees residing in the country.
According to a statement by the national authorities, 772 944 Syrians had returned to their country from Türkiye since the fall of the Assad regime. The total number of voluntary returns since 2016 has reached 1 462 758 as of August 2026. Additionally, the Ministry of Interior announced that, in April 2026, Türkiye hosted 133 600 people under international protection, mostly Afghans, Iraqis, and Iranians. As of September 2026, there were 1 276 758 foreign nationals holding residence permits, including humanitarian residence permit holders.
Türkiye continued to make significant efforts to support refugees and ensure wider access to healthcare and schooling, although restrictions on registration hampered access. Refugees (mainly Syrians under temporary protection) continued to benefit from free healthcare services, supported by the EU. In January 2026, an amendment to the Temporary Protection Regulation came into effect, requiring
temporary permit holders to make healthcare payments similar to Turkish citizens and international protection holders to access healthcare. Temporary permit holders are required to make such co-payments unless they fall under specific vulnerability criteria established in the regulation (disability, single
parenthood, or absence of working-age household members). Temporary permit holders with work permits or private insurance can use their health insurance coverage.
While the structural barriers for the formal labour market integration of the refugees still exist, socio-economic development projects under the EU’s refugee assistance have continued to address these problems by improving skills, supporting job creation via entrepreneurship and SME support, and empowering the capacities of the relevant government institutions. By the fourth quarter of 2025, over 200 000 refugees and host community members received employment counselling, 118 349 registered for vocational skills training, 103 493 completed training, 18 149 obtained a vocational certificate, 87 881 were registered with İŞKUR and 37 389 jobs were created by enterprises established or expanded with EU support.
The EU-funded PIKTES project continued to support the integration of Syrians into formal education. The number of refugee children enrolled in formal education in October 2025 was 800 836. A significant number of refugee children (79 751) were not enrolled in formal education in the academic year 2025-2026 (a reduction from 310 301 in 2024). An average of approximately 1.2 million refugees received monthly cash assistance throughout 2025.
The EU has repeatedly called on Türkiye to resume returns of irregular migrants from the Greek islands in line with the commitments made under the 2016 EU-Turkey Statement. Resettlement of Syrian refugees from Türkiye to EU Member States continued in the reporting period, totalling 44 213 by March 2026.
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2.1.2. Public administration reform
Strategic framework for public administration reform
Türkiye continues to lack a strategic framework for public administration reform. Decision- making remains heavily centralised which leads to limited autonomy of ministries, agencies and local governments. Political commitment to advancing reforms remains limited. While elements of reform appear in annual government programmes and various sectoral policy documents, these remain fragmented and do not amount to a coherent and holistic public administration policy reform perspective.
Policy development and coordination
Policy development and coordination mechanisms still need to be developed. The Presidency does not have detailed procedural rules for the preparation and adoption of policies. Policymaking and legislative processes still make limited use of evidence-based approaches, regulatory impact assessment and participatory mechanisms and often are marked by top – down decisions, weak transparency and limited scrutiny. The link between policy planning and budgeting remains weak, and public institutions do not make sufficient use of ex ante and ex post evidence in their decision-making.
Public financial management
The legislative framework for public financial management (PFM) is broadly in place, but its implementation needs to be strengthened.
On budget management, the medium-term economic programme and the annual budget fall short of effectively guiding public finance planning, as significant deviations from planned targets occur. The efficiency of the public expenditure system, accountability and financial transparency need to be improved. A gender-responsive planning and budgeting approach remains largely absent. Monthly budget execution data are published but highly aggregated, limiting possibility for external analysis. Public participation in the budget process is minimal. Parliamentary scrutiny of the budget and capacity to examine audit reports remain limited, weakening transparency and oversight. The Türkiye Wealth Fund remains unaccountable (See Chapter 32 on financial control).
No dedicated public investment management (PIM) framework is in place. Türkiye lacks a systematic, cross-government methodology for the appraisal, selection, prioritisation and monitoring of public investment projects. Capital spending decisions continue to be driven by political considerations rather than evidence-based cost-benefit analysis, resulting in inefficiencies in project selection and implementation. The post-earthquake reconstruction effort has further exposed the absence of an institutional architecture capable of managing large-scale public investment in a transparent and accountable manner. The Presidency of Strategy and Budget coordinates investment planning functions, but its remit remains fragmented and its outputs are not integrated with the budget cycle in a binding manner.
Türkiye should develop and adopt a comprehensive PIM framework, establishing clear institutional responsibilities, mandatory project appraisal standards, and a centralised public investment pipeline linked to multi-year budget programming.
Budget transparency remains insufficient. While the Presidency and the Ministry of Treasury and Finance publish monthly budget execution data, the level of disaggregation is limited, constraining external analysis and civil society scrutiny. Budget documentation does not systematically provide multi-year projections at programme level or performance indicators linked to expenditure. Information on tax expenditures, contingent liabilities and off-budget operations, including those channelled through public banks and state-owned enterprises, is incomplete and not consolidated in a publicly accessible format. A comprehensive PFM strategy, which would provide the overarching framework for addressing transparency and accountability gaps across all of these areas, has yet to be developed or adopted.
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Public service and human resources management
The public service and human resource management is outdated and requires substantial reform. The state continues to be perceived as an attractive employer, in particular due to regulated employment conditions and a high degree of job security. However, the legal framework for civil servants does not sufficiently guarantee neutrality, merit-based recruitment and promotion, undermining the effectiveness of public services. Senior civil servants’ appointments lack clear and objective criteria, making them vulnerable to favouritism and political influence. Politicisation of the civil service, across different branches of the administration, including at managerial levels, remains a concern. As of July 2026, there were more than 5,417,126 public employees, representing 16.5% of total employment. Around 43 % of public-sector employees are women. However, women remain significantly underrepresented at senior levels.
Accountability of administration
The accountability of administration is insufficient. The political accountability of ministers rests with the President, while effective parliamentary oversight mechanisms over the Presidency are still lacking.
Supervisory bodies, including the Ombudsman, internal control and audit institutions, lack independence and capacity.
Civil servant accountability is hindered by the requirement for ministerial authorisation to prosecute officials. Broad access-to-information exemptions and the absence of proactive disclosure further restrict transparency.
Service delivery to citizens and businesses
The service delivery to citizens and businesses still needs to be improved. Public services are generally accessible; however, major gaps persist in both their quality and availability. The absence of an administrative procedure law hinders compliance with good administrative practices. There is no central policy or coordination mechanism aimed at improving service quality across the public sector. Progress has been made in expanding e- services through the e-Government Gateway. Türkiye continues to face vulnerabilities in the areas of personal data protection and cybersecurity.
2.2. RULE OF LAW AND FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS
2.2.1 Chapter 23 - Judiciary and fundamental rights
The core values of the EU include the rule of law and the protection of human rights. Ensuring an independent, effective, and high-quality judiciary, alongside a firm commitment to combating corruption, is crucial. Equally important is the consistent safeguarding of fundamental rights in both law and its implementation.
Functioning of the judiciary
Strategic documents
The Judicial Reform Strategy for 2025-2029 and the 12th Judicial Reform Package adopted in July 2026 continue to be implemented. While some measures provided in the new Judicial Reform Package may contribute to procedural efficiency, it largely focuses on the functioning and speed of the judiciary rather than addressing longstanding critical shortcomings regarding judicial independence, impartiality and safeguards for fundamental rights. Concerns were also raised that expanding single-judge proceedings and restricting avenues of appeal could weaken judicial safeguards in some cases. The absence of adequate consultation processes, coupled with the continued use of omnibus legislation (the practice of combining, sometimes only loosely related measures, into a single legal act), hinders
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effective drafting and adoption, which in turn undermines the overall quality and effectiveness of legal texts.
Management bodies
The judicial management bodies are in place, but their composition continues to raise structural concerns. No steps were taken to address the concerns regarding the Council of Judges and Prosecutors (HSK), Türkiye’s highest judicial administrative authority, which is composed mainly of political appointees and has no peer-elected members. The strong influence of the executive in appointing HSK members continues to undermine the judiciary’s independence. In addition, HSK members do not have full security of tenure or functional immunity. The HSK has shown limited engagement with core problems in the judiciary, including low-quality indictments and judicial reasoning, non-compliance with procedural rules, and the frequent use of pre-trial detention. Moreover, its decisions are still not subject to judicial review thus preventing an independent body from assessing the fairness and legality of its decisions.
Independence and impartiality
The independence and impartiality of the judiciary need to be improved at both higher and first- instance levels. Executive influence persists through the composition and functioning of the HSK, while the Ministry of Justice continues to oversee judicial selection. The HSK’s failure to address allegations of politically motivated proceedings, particularly against opposition figures, journalists, and civil society members, as well as its failure to implement rulings of the ECtHR
and the Constitutional Court, undermines its credibility and Türkiye’s international legal obligations.
Government assurances on judicial independence are undermined by statements from senior political and judicial figures about pending cases, which risk interference by signalling expected outcomes and legitimising punitive judicial rulings.
Judicial proceedings against opposition politicians, often involving charges including ‘insulting public officials’, ‘terrorism-related offences’ and ‘corruption or abuse of office,’ have become regular occurrences. High-profile cases, including the arrest and indictment of the Mayor of Istanbul and the annulment of the CHP Congresses, have deepened concerns about the independence of the judiciary. The Grand Chamber of the ECtHR ruled in August 2026 that the violations found in the Kavala vs Türkiye case reveal structural shortcomings which ‘are likely to facilitate the exertion of direct or indirect influence by the executive branch on certain judicial decisions, particularly in cases with a sensitive political dimension’. The Grand Chamber also stressed that criminal proceedings should not be instrumentalised for purposes other than the impartial administration of justice.
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The judicial appointments, promotions and transfers, continue to be a concern. The lack of
public reasoning for HSK decisions, combined with opaque reassignments of judges from
cases, remains a concern and fuels perceptions of politicisation. Similarly, promotion
patterns, such as appointments to higher courts or specialised jurisdictions are not always
clearly linked to publicly available, merit-based criteria, which also contributes to perceptions
that career advancement may depend, on alignment with institutional or political positions.
Accountability
The accountability of the judiciary did not improve. The effectiveness and the transparency of asset declarations by the judiciary needs to be improved. Judges and prosecutors are required to declare their assets when assuming office, every five years, and upon leaving office. The legal framework aims to prevent misconduct, corruption and abuse of power among the judiciary and high-ranking officials. However, credible media reports alleging corruption by high-ranking officials raise concerns whether accountability mechanisms work effectively when the accused are politically exposed individuals. There is limited public information on how complaints against judges are examined, dismissed or pursued.
The Ministry of Justice Inspection Board exercises extensive inspection, examination and investigation powers within the justice system. Its authority covers, inter alia, the administrative functions of chief public prosecutors and prosecutors, judicial commissions, enforcement offices, prisons and detention centres, forensic medicine institutions, notaries and bar associations. While the Inspection Board constitutes an important mechanism, questions remain concerning its institutional and functional independence from the executive. Transparency also remains an issue. A clear distinction therefore needs to be maintained between legitimate administrative oversight and matters that could infringe upon the independence of the judiciary.
Quality of justice
The quality of justice needs to be improved and continues to face systemic shortcomings,
particularly in indictments drafting,
evidence collectionandjudicial
reasoning. Indictments often lack
clear legal reasoning while broad
legal texts grant prosecutors and
courts wide discretion in
interpreting laws. Concerns
persist regarding inconsistent
implementation in practice.
Concerns related to the anti-terror
legislation and implementation
remains. In August 2026, the
Grand Chamber of the European
Court of Human Rights (ECtHR)
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ruled that there is a ‘systematic problem of prosecution and imprisonment of human-rights
defenders, political opponents and journalists for criminal offences, the scope of which is
extensively interpreted or artificially magnified’.
In high-profile proceedings, defence rights are frequently compromised, and defence lawyers themselves have also faced detention and arrest, undermining the right to legal representation and the principle of equality of arms. Media leaks on cases have also raised concerns regarding the presumption of innocence. Serious concerns also persist regarding the use of anonymous witnesses who cannot be cross-examined which interferes with the right to a fair trial. In some reported cases, similar witness testimonies have appeared across multiple proceedings, raising questions about their reliability. There are concerns that, in certain instances, statements obtained from informants or witnesses may have been taken under coercion, as alleged by the witnesses themselves. These practices undermine the integrity of the judicial process and are not in line with the jurisprudence of the ECtHR.
According to data from the Ministry of Justice and the HSK, the number of judicial personnel serving in the judicial and administrative courts approached 26 765 as of February 2026, up from 23 800 in 2023. The Justice Academy of Türkiye continues to provide training for judges and prosecutors. However, as it is overseen by a president appointed directly by the President of Türkiye, questions remain regarding its institutional independence.
Alternative dispute resolution (ARD) mechanisms are increasingly available and used with mediation in particular. Mandatory mediation as a precondition for litigation has been extended to a broad range of labour, commercial and consumer disputes. The ADR has the potential to facilitate faster and less costly resolution of disputes and to alleviate the considerable workload of the courts. However, there are concerns that the continued expansion of mandatory mediation might create an additional barrier to effective access to justice. Despite the increased use of ADR
mechanisms, lengthy proceedings and substantial court backlogs remain a concern, including in commercial justice. Further efforts are therefore needed to ensure the quality and effectiveness of mediation, appropriate professional standards and supervision, and greater transparency and data on outcomes.
Efficiency
The efficiency of the judicial system needs to be improved, particularly in addressing the
significant backlog of cases and length of legal proceedings. Of particular concern is the
delays in issuing indictments combined with the widespread use of pre-trial detention.
Data from 2025 indicates to improved
case-processing capacity, but with
significant differences between
jurisdictions and continuing challenges
concerning the duration and accumulated
cases. In fact, high case clearance rates
alone do not necessarily indicate that
existing backlogs have been eliminated or
that individual cases are decided within a
reasonable time.
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Delays in issuing indictments can be attributed to several factors, including the
investigations’ broad scope, lack of sufficient evidence in the indictments, the slow pace of
evidence-gathering processes and judicial authorities’ heavy workload. In addition, in certain
politically related cases, delays may also reflect a deliberate preference by the authorities,
which further intensifies concerns. Frequent transfers of judges and prosecutors also affect
continuity in proceedings. Similarly, the appointment of relatively inexperienced personnel to
complex criminal courts can further slow proceedings.
The budget allocated to the justice system increased in 2026 to EUR 6.9 billion (TRY 390
billion), up from EUR 5.88 billion (TRY 280 billion) in 2025.
The National Judiciary Informatics System (UYAP) remains the backbone of the digital
justice infrastructure, providing electronic access to a range of judicial services and enabling
data exchange between courts, prosecution services and other public institutions. The use of
digital tools further increased in 2025, including through the expansion of e-hearings, while
SEGBİS, the audio-visual
information system, continued to be
widely used, particularly in criminal
proceedings. There are certain
concerns regarding the use of
SEGBİS in criminal trials where
defendants are required to
participate remotely rather than
being physically present in the
courtroom, particularly in terms of
effective participation in
proceedings, direct communication
with the court and the exercise of
defence rights. The 2025-2029
Judicial Reform Strategy also places emphasis on the use of artificial intelligence in the
judiciary.
The effective implementation of court decisions remains a concern. While judgments are
generally implemented in ordinary proceedings, problems persist in politically sensitive and
high-profile cases, particularly regarding the implementation of judgments of the
Constitutional Court and the ECtHR. Instances of delayed, incomplete or non-
implementation of binding judgments undermine legal certainty and the principle of the rule
of law.
Fight against corruption
Track record
The track record of investigations, prosecutions and convictions in corruption cases needs significant improvement. Despite several high-profile corruption cases against opposition politicians, the perception of corruption remains extremely high. According to Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index (2025), Türkiye’s score reflects a continuous decline in the perception of public sector corruption since 2012. In 2025, Türkiye ranked 124th out of 182 countries, placing it in the lower tier globally in terms of perceived corruption. Collaboration between audit and inspection units and prosecution offices remains arbitrary and insufficient. Administrative scrutiny of corruption seems politically motivated, as investigations mainly target mayors and local politicians from the opposition parties.
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As of April 2026, following the March 2024 local elections, the Ministry of Interior reported conducting 3 224 administrative reviews based on complaints, reports, and special inspections. Investigations were launched in 1 298 cases. Of these, 591 concerned AKP municipalities, 321 CHP municipalities, 102 MHP municipalities, 6 İYİ Party municipalities, 18 DEM Party municipalities, and 260 municipalities from other parties. Although 46% of investigations concerned AKP controlled municipalities, prosecutions appear to be launching criminal charges predominantly against CHP municipalities. In a rare move, in 2026, the prosecution launched an investigation against a former Ankara mayor, who is member of the ruling AKP.
Türkiye recorded increased investigative and prosecutorial activity in 2025 in relation to three corruption offences: embezzlement, bribery and misuse of public duty. Between 2024 and 2025, the total number of new investigation files concerning these offences increased by 6.6%, with particular raise in bribery and misuse of public duty investigations. Over the same period, the number of files resulting in public prosecution increased by 8.0%. Court-level results were less positive. Although the number of adjudicated defendant records increased by 4.6% between 2025 and 2024, convictions increased by only 0.8% in the same period, and the calculated
conviction share declined from 18.2% to 17.5%. By offence, convicted defendants increased from 571 to 614 for embezzlement and from 495 to 580 for bribery, but declined from 1,725 to 1,620 for misuse of public duty, making bribery the clearest area of improvement. Overall, the data indicate greater investigative and prosecutorial activity, but do not demonstrate a corresponding improvement in sanctioning outcomes.
Frequent exceptions in procurement procedures undermine the integrity of public procurement. Political financing, the judiciary, public administration, municipalities, land administration, zoning and construction continue to be vulnerable to corruption.
Legal framework
Türkiye is a party to all international anti-corruption conventions, including the UN Convention against Corruption. It has not introduced new anti-corruption legislation or reforms to fulfil these obligations. The legal framework for whistleblower protection and public procurement is not aligned with the EU acquis, particularly in the areas of exemptions, concessions, and public-private partnerships.
Corruption-related provisions in the Penal Code continue to have shortcomings. The definition of active bribery in the Criminal Code does not meet international standards, particularly regarding bribery in the private sector. Legal privileges for public officials continue to obstruct anti-corruption investigations.
The legal framework on conflicts of interest, asset declarations and financial oversight of political parties remains insufficient. Türkiye has no legislation governing lobbying.
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Strategic documents
Türkiye does not have a national anti-corruption strategy or action plan. No progress has been made in implementing long-standing GRECO recommendations on corruption prevention in respect of Members of Parliament, judges and prosecutors. These include reforms to improve legislative transparency, introduce a parliamentary code of conduct, manage conflicts of interest, enforce asset declaration rules, limit parliamentary immunity and provide confidential ethics training. More than 10 years after the adoption of GRECO’s Fourth Round Evaluation Report on Türkiye, only 3 of the 22 recommendations in the report have been fully implemented.
GRECO has repeatedly highlighted significant shortcomings in Türkiye’s political financing framework, particularly concerning transparency of party and campaign funding. There are also significant shortcomings on the limited effectiveness of independent oversight and audit mechanisms. GRECO has also underlined that transparency regarding Members of Parliament remains limited in Türkiye, particularly in relation to asset declarations, conflicts of interest, and the effective verification of declared information. It has also expressed concern that similar shortcomings apply to the judiciary, where disclosure requirements and safeguards for independence and integrity are not sufficiently robust or consistently enforced. Despite persistent and credible claims on alleged corruption, no legal steps have been taken to strengthen the framework for preventing corruption or to enhance integrity among Members of Parliament, the judiciary, and the prosecution service.
Institutional framework
Türkiye still lacks a permanent and independent anti-corruption body. Coordination between various preventive bodies remains weak. The legal framework for addressing corruption in the private sector remains inadequate. Regular public awareness campaigns on transparency and anti-corruption are lacking.
There are no specialised law enforcement units, prosecution services or courts exclusively devoted to fighting corruption. The executive continues to exercise undue political influence over the judicial police in corruption investigations. Inter-agency cooperation and information sharing between law enforcement and the Financial Crimes Investigation Board (MASAK) need to be strengthened.
Fundamental rights
General framework
The implementation and enforcement of fundamental rights is insufficient and continued to deteriorate in the reporting period. Türkiye needs to urgently align its human rights framework with European standards, notably the ECHR, the case law of the ECtHR, and the recommendations of the Venice Commission. This includes anti-terrorism legislation, and freedom of expression related provisions of the Turkish Penal Code and their implementation. The broad and disproportionate application of anti-terrorism legislation continues to exacerbate the situation. Long-standing human rights issues remain unaddressed, including the arrest and prosecution of activists and journalists, the selective application of legal provisions against journalists, activists and opposition politicians, and persistent restrictions on media freedom.
International human rights instruments
Cooperation with international human rights monitoring bodies and the follow-up to their recommendations has remained limited. While Türkiye is a party to numerous international human rights instruments, both its domestic legal framework and its implementation continue to fall short of full alignment with the ECHR and the jurisprudence of the ECtHR.
The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe maintains Türkiye under its monitoring procedure, reflecting ongoing concerns regarding compliance with human rights standards.
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Turkish authorities’ use of charges based on broad definitions such as ‘spreading misleading information to the public’ or ‘insulting the president or other government officials’ raised concerns about the potential chilling effect on civic participation and freedom expression.
European Court of Human Rights
The implementation of ECtHR judgments remains inadequate, a problem underlined by a ruling of Court’s Grand Chamber delivered in August 2026. Türkiye still has not implemented certain ECtHR rulings and the related judgments of its own Constitutional Court. During the reporting period, the ECtHR delivered 37 judgements against Türkiye. The Court found breaches of the European Convention on Human Rights relating mainly to the right to a fair trial, right to liberty and security (including
reasonableness pre-trial detention), prohibition of torture, respect for private and family life, and freedom of expression. Currently, there are 213 cases under enhanced supervision by the Committee of Ministers on similar breaches of the ECHR (205 cases last year). No progress was made on aligning legislation on human rights and its implementation with the ECHR and ECtHR case law, which raises serious concerns. Türkiye needs to address systematic issues such as judicial independence, judicial review mechanism, use of excessive force by security forces, unjustified detention, and the right to a fair trial.
Promotion, protection and enforcement of human rights
The legal and institutional framework for the promotion, protection and enforcement of human rights remains inadequate and requires further strengthening.
The 2021-2023 Human Rights
Action Plan expired, limiting the
availability of a coherent policy
framework to address persistent
shortcomings in the human rights
field.
The effectiveness of Türkiye’s
Human Rights and Equality
Institution (HREI) and the
Ombudsperson Institution
remains limited. The HREI’s legal
and institutional framework has
yet to be brought into full
alignment with the Paris
Principles. No steps were taken
to either strengthen the institutions’ operational, structural or financial independence, or
establish transparent and merit-based appointment procedures for their members. Financial
and human resources should be allocated to both bodies to secure their adequacy.
Despite the high volume of complaints submitted, there is little evidence of systematic follow-
up or meaningful institutional impact. Activities continue to focus predominantly on non-
sensitive or technical matters, with limited visible involvement in cases involving serious
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allegations of fundamental rights violations, particularly where such cases may carry political
implications.
The HREI has increased visits to removal centres used for the administrative detention of
irregular migrants and has made some complaints with the public prosecutor’s office. This
may be seen as a step toward engagement in a more sensitive area. However, the scope,
depth, and transparency of these reports remain limited. This restricted scope of
engagement overall continues to contribute to persistently low levels of public trust.
Türkiye still lacks a national action plan clarifying the public authorities’ responsibilities in
preventing and addressing human rights violations linked to business activities. No
substantial steps have been taken to align the domestic framework with the EU Corporate
Sustainability Due Diligence Directive. The absence of a comprehensive legal and regulatory
framework in this area leads to gaps in corporate accountability for human rights abuses.
Right to life
Concerns regarding accountability for alleged violations of the right to life in the context of security operations persist. No significant new measures were taken to ensure effective investigation or accountability for past extrajudicial killings and forced disappearances. There is also no meaningful progress in addressing both historical and more recent allegations involving excessive use of force by security personnel. In a significant development in 2026, the investigation on the case of a university student who disappeared before six years in the eastern Turkish province of Tunceli was reopened and considerably broadened on the basis of new evidence. A former Tunceli Governor and several other suspects, including public officials and individuals linked to the former governor, have also been detained or arrested as part of the expanded investigation. The failure to launch the investigation until 2026, exemplifies broader structural shortcomings in Türkiye’s approach to such cases, particularly in cases involving perpetrators with close ties to authorities. Following this case, authorities have declared that they will resume investigations concerning unresolved cases of possible forceful disappearance of women or femicides.
Prevention of torture and other forms of ill-treatment
Türkiye lacks adequate legal and administrative safeguards to prevent torture and ill- treatment. Cases of torture and ill-treatment continue to be reported. Mechanisms for effective investigation and follow-up of such cases remain insufficient. While prosecutions were launched against officials in a limited number of cases, they remain insufficient in both scope and effectiveness. Credible allegations of abuse by prison personnel continue to go unaddressed. Instances of torture and ill-treatment were particularly reported during the January and Februaryprotests related to attacks against Kurds in Syria, especially in southeastern provinces. On other occasions, some journalists faced court cases and investigations on their reporting on torture allegations. There were also several reports on allegations of torture and ill-treatment of migrants and refugees in removal centres.
The ECtHR ruled against Türkiye in March 2026 on violation of the prohibition of torture in the case of an academic who was sprayed with tear gas at very close range by police during the Gezi Park protests in 2013.
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Türkiye should allow the publication of the report on the 2025 visit carried out by the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CPT) to several prisons and detention centres to assess the treatment and legal safeguards provided to the persons detained during the protests in March 2025. Türkiye should allow the publication of all outstanding reports by the CPT and establish procedures for their automatic release in line with its international transparency and reporting
obligations.
Impunity in cases of torture and ill- treatment constitutes one of the most significant barriers to the prevention of torture in Türkiye. Despite Türkiye’s obligations under the Optional Protocol to the UN Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (OPCAT), no progress was made in aligning the HREI, in its capacity as the National Preventive Mechanism, with the
Protocol’s core requirements.
Türkiye should take meaningful steps to strengthen the protection of the right to life and to enhance safeguards against torture and ill-treatment. The requirement to obtain prior authorisation for the prosecution of public officials, including law enforcement personnel, should be revised or abolished in order to address systemic impunity and reinforce accountability.
Execution of criminal sanctions
The system for the execution of criminal sanctions, including probation, continues to require improvement. Turkish prisons continue to operate above their capacity, which worsens structural problems, such as overcrowding, inadequate physical conditions and restricted access to basic services and resources. The widespread and frequent use of pre-trial detention persists.
The 11th Judicial Reform Package introduced amendments concerning early release mechanisms and certain procedural aspects of criminal execution, but these do not extend to individuals convicted on political grounds. Their practical impact to date has remained limited and has not led to a sustained reduction in prison overcrowding or a comprehensive improvement in detention conditions.
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Concerns persist regarding the decisions of Prison Administration and Observation Boards, which continue to influence conditional release procedures in an arbitrary fashion.
Reports of human rights violations in prisons and detention centres continue to highlight issues such as unequal treatment of certain categories of inmates, including political prisoners, as well as persistent shortcomings in access to healthcare, education, rehabilitation and reintegration programmes. Restrictions on communal activities as a way of administrative punishment are also reported in some facilities. In high-profile cases, including involving Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality officials, members of opposition parties and CHP-affiliated defendants, serious concerns have been reported regarding the treatment of defendants during detention and judicial proceedings.
The Forensic Medicine Institute’s role has also been subject to criticism, with concerns expressed regarding the weight given to its reports in determining detention conditions and fitness for release.
Protection of personal data
The legal framework for the protection of personal data is insufficient and the capacities of the data protection agencies need to be improved.
Türkiye’s Personal Data Protection Authority (KVKK) fails to comply with the EU acquis and meet European standards. Its operation is based on the 2016 Personal Data Protection Law, which lacks key principles such as data subject rights, the scope of exemptions, institutional independence and effective enforcement mechanism.
During the reporting period, no substantive legislative amendments were adopted to address the main structural gaps in alignment with the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR). Concerns also persist regarding the operational independence and effectiveness of the KVKK. Questions persist on KVKK’s consistency of its enforcement practices, the transparency of decision-making and the adequacy of deterrent sanctions, particularly in cases involving public authorities and law enforcement bodies. Further improvements are needed to strengthen institutional independence, enhance enforcement capacity and ensure the effective protection of personal data in line with European standards.
Freedom of thought, conscience and religion
Türkiye maintains a generally adequate legal framework for the protection of freedom of thought, conscience and religion. While freedom of worship is largely upheld, shortcomings persist about the broader enjoyment of freedom of thought, conscience and religion.
The Venice Commission’s recommendation to allow the Greek Orthodox Ecumenical Patriarch to use the title ‘Ecumenical’ continues to not be implemented consistently. The lack of legal personality for the non-Muslim and Alevi communities and their worship places remains an issue. The Venice Commission’s recommendations to grant legal status to non- Muslim religions have yet to be implemented.
In May 2026, the ECtHR ruled that clergymen of the Ecumenical Patriarchate should be allowed to seek election to the administrative boards of Greek Orthodox Vakıflar (pious foundations). There are still no legal provisions on the conscientious objection to army service, despite several ECtHR judgments, a Council of Europe Committee of Ministers resolution and a decision by the UN Human Rights Committee. Jehovah’s Witnesses and
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other conscientious objector groups who refuse military service are subjected to repetitive prosecutions, fines, and imprisonment. Foreign Protestant pastors and Jehovah’s Witness ministers continued to be deported or denied entry into the country based on dubious ‘security codes’. An ECtHR judgment is pending on this issue.
A circular issued by the Ministry of National Education (MoNE) in February 2026 to implement Ramadan activities at schools again triggered debate over secularism and pluralism in education system. The Minister of Education initiated legal proceedings against intellectuals and civil groups who initiated a declaration on secularism. MoNE has renewed protocol with a youth foundation, granting it access to thousands of public schools during the summer break to promote religious-related courses, despite a previous annulment of a similar protocol by the Council of State.
Atheists and agnostics face discrimination, stigmatisation, social pressure, or restrictions on their right to education. The Turkish education system does not guarantee neutrality and impartiality towards various religions, denominations and beliefs. No measures were taken to address the shortcomings identified by the ECtHR in compulsory religious culture and ethics classes. During the reporting period, children from protestant families were required to choose one of the four Sunni elective courses in schools, despite being entitled to an exemption.
No steps were taken to reopen the Halki (Heybeliada) Greek Orthodox Seminary, which has remained closed since 1971. The UNESCO World Heritage Committee’s concerns about the Hagia Sophia and Chora museums having been converted into mosques remained unaddressed. The active Christian churches in the Hatay province are still in ruins due to lack of state funding since the 2023 earthquake. High-level officials and media used aggressive anti-Semitic statements in the context of the conflict in Gaza. Hate crimes against religious minorities need to be effectively investigated.
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Freedom of expression and media freedom
Türkiye provides insufficient legal guarantees for freedom of expression, while restrictions undermine a free, independent, and professional media environment.
Intimidation of journalists
The environment for journalists and media outlets remained restrictive, with ongoing arbitrary arrests, detentions, prosecutions and convictions. These were often based on broadly defined offences, including disinformation, defamation, and terrorism-related charges and for reporting on corruption allegations related to the government and state institutions. In October 2025, Tele1 TV was seized after its editor-in-chief’s arrest in an espionage probe, and a trustee was appointed. In October 2026, following the launch of a criminal investigation against the chairman of Halk TV, the Savings Deposit Insurance Fund (TMSF) seized the company, appointed trustees and took the channel off the air. As a result, the space for independent media has been dramatically reduced.
Pre-trial detention and judicial control measures, including travel bans abroad, remained widely used, contributing to a chilling effect on freedom of expression. Physical intimidation and pressure on journalists covering protests and politically sensitive developments persisted. Online harassment and smear campaigns targeting journalists, particularly women journalists, also continued.
Between September 2025 and September 2026, according to CSOs working in media freedom 74 journalists and media workers were arrested, imprisoned, or remained in pre-trial detention. (51 in the same period in 2024-2025).
Legislative environment
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Anti-terrorism, national security, public order, disinformation, and public morality legislation remained misaligned with international and EU standards. Access to information also continued to be restricted, often on national security grounds.
The 11th Judicial Package, adopted in November 2025, introduced shortened pre-trial detention periods. The package did not address the broad scope and application of criminal provisions frequently used to restrict freedom of expression. As a result, concerns persist regarding the lack of safeguards against arbitrary interference.
Türkiye’s Law on Cybersecurity, adopted in March 2025, was amended in July 2026 increasing the institutional and operational role of the Cybersecurity Presidency. The provisions grant the presidential body broad new powers to order measures affecting internet access, services and infrastructure. Telecom operators, access providers and other online platforms must comply with such orders, while a judge could review them after implementation, thereby increasing the risk of disproportionate interference.
No steps were taken during the reporting period to align with the EU Anti-SLAPP legal framework.
Implementation of legislation/institutions
The enforcement of existing legislation still does not align with European standards and remains selective and discriminatory. The Radio and Television Supreme Council (RTÜK) continued to lack independence and impartiality, frequently imposing fines, broadcasting bans, and content removal orders under vague justifications such as ‘contrary to national and moral values’, ‘general morality’ or ‘protection of the family’, often in a discriminatory manner. Media outlets and websites continued to be targeted with accusations of ‘propagating terrorism’, ‘obscenity’, ‘defaming Islam’, ‘insulting the President’, or ‘compromising national security’. Content critical of the government, including reports on corruption, the economic situation, election coverage, and sensitive social issues, was often penalised. The disinformation law is disproportionately used to obstruct journalists. The combined use of criminal and administrative measures, and informal pressure has reinforced a culture of self-censorship and further undermined media pluralism.
Public service broadcasters
Concerns continue over the lack of impartiality of the public broadcaster Turkish Radio and Television Corporation (TRT). During the coverage of politically sensitive developments, including investigations involving opposition-led municipalities, TRT’s reporting predominantly reflected official government narratives. This has reinforced concerns regarding the broadcaster’s failure to ensure balanced and pluralistic news coverage, particularly during periods of political tension.
Economic factors
The media market in Türkiye remains highly concentrated, with significant cross-ownership between media and business conglomerates. Thus, media ownership is controlled by few economic players that have close ties to the government. This concentration has reinforced concerns regarding editorial independence. Independent outlets, or outlets owned by religious minority groups, receiving no public advertisements which allocations continue to be perceived as lacking transparency and predictability. Rising operational costs, limited access to advertising markets, regulatory fines, and judicial pressures collectively undermine media’s financial viability.
Internet
Legislation still fails to guarantee an open and unrestricted internet, granting administrative authorities significant powers to order content removal in urgent cases without prior judicial review. Accordingly, the government requested the closure of hundreds of X accounts belonging to journalists, political figures, women’s groups, youth groups and activists, often
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in the absence court orders based on broad legal grounds such as ‘national security,’ ‘public order,’ or ‘defamation.’ The increasing obligations imposed on platforms, as well as the growing responsibilities of hosting providers and social media companies, encourage a more cautious approach and, at times, an over-removal tendency.
Between June and September 2026, access was blocked to more than 100 social media accounts and URLs belonging to or associated with LGBTIQ+, feminist and human rights organisations and activists, further restricting online space for human rights defenders and LGBTIQ+ expression and advocacy. The Minister of Justice underlined that this was done in line with the 2026–2035 Decade of the Family and Population vision.
In April 2026, a law which amends the existing framework on social media platforms, child protection and social services included significant digital regulatory measures, that may lead to further content restrictions beyond the stated objectives.
Overall, the balance between freedom of expression and considerations of public order and security has shifted against freedom of expression.
Freedom of artistic expression
Vague legal provisions such as ‘morality,’ ‘insult to religion’, ‘insult to president’ or ‘public order’ are often used to restrict freedom of artistic expression. Artistic events and performances keep being prosecuted, banned, and artists critical of government policies faced derogatory remarks from high-ranking officials and pro-government media. An arts manager, representing leading artists in Türkiye, faces charges of ‘aiding an attempt to overthrow the government’ during the 2013 protests more than decade after the events. These restrictions stifle cultural and creative expression, lead to self-censorship, and in turn further narrow the space for critical voices.
Professional organisations and working conditions
The working conditions for journalists in Türkiye continue to deteriorate with low wages, a high risk of prosecution, limited trade union rights and no job security (see also Chapter 10).
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Freedom of assembly and association
Türkiye provides insufficient legal guarantees to freedom of assembly and association, and regulation of assemblies is restrictive. The overall environment remains repressive, with a persistent pattern of selective implementation of the law and disproportionate interference by the authorities.
Legislation remains inconsistent with European standards and falls short of guarantees provided also in the Turkish Constitution and needs to be amended in line with the case law of the ECtHR, the Constitutional Court, and existing international frameworks.
Freedom of association of trade unions, opposition political parties, mainly the CHP which saw its Congresses annulled and leadership removed by a Court ruling, and rights-based CSOs have further deteriorated during the reporting period.
Provincial governorates continued to impose blanket bans, dispersals by law enforcement or administrative restrictions on public gatherings and demonstration, and maintain a consistently intolerant stance towards demonstrations and marches organised by groups perceived as critical of the government. By contrast, assemblies that are supportive of the government are generally permitted to proceed without hindrance and, in some cases, appear to benefit from facilitation and protection by the authorities. This selective approach has also been evident during March 2026 Newroz celebrations and International Women’s Day during which detentions and arrests took place.
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Most active groups on the ground, including independent women’s movement, LGBTIQ+, environmental, animal rights activists and human rights defenders and trade unionist continued to face challenges. These include frequent police intervention, disproportionate use of force during dispersals, administrative fines, and judicial proceedings. On 1 May celebrations at least 575 people were detained on grounds of ‘non-authorised demonstrations’ in Taksim Square.
Overall, the authorities enjoy a high degree of discretion, coupled with a lack of consistency, in the enforcement of freedom of assembly and association. Moreover, a pattern of differential treatment exists based on the perceived political alignment of organisers of gatherings.
Property rights
The legal framework for enforcing property rights is mostly in place. However, some legislative shortcomings persist, in particular on property rights for non-Muslim minorities. The court cases regarding the land ownership of the Mor Gabriel Syriac Orthodox Monastery are pending before the Constitutional Court. Syriac citizens’ individual property cases and court cases regarding the 2016 expropriations in Diyarbakır’s Sur district continued. The property rights of people who lost their lands and immovables in the February 2023 earthquakes need to be urgently addressed, also in view of arbitrary expropriations by the government. There are no comprehensive restoration plans for cultural and religious heritage destroyed during the earthquake, especially in Hatay. Council of Europe Resolution 1625/2008 on property rights on the islands of Gökçeada (Imbros) and Bozcaada (Tenedos) remains valid and unaddressed.
Non-discrimination
The legal and institutional framework on non-discrimination is incomplete, and the capacities of existing equality bodies need to be substantially improved. No progress has been made on ratifying Protocol No 12 of the ECHR providing for a general prohibition of discrimination. Instances of discrimination continued to be reported, particularly in relation to ethnicity, religion, and sexual orientation. The increased pressures on the LGBTIQ+ community is of particular concern.
Anti-racism and hate offences
The legal and institutional frameworks on anti-racism and hate offence are incomplete and implementation and enforcement is insufficient. Türkiye has not made any progress in revising its non-discrimination legislation to align it with the EU acquis and European standards, including the Racial Equality Directive and the Directives on standards for equality bodies. Hate speech based on sexual orientation does not fall within HREI’s mandate.
Existing legislation on hate offences, including hate speech, are still not in line with the EU acquis and European standards, failing to provide victims with adequate legal protection from bias-motivated crimes. Hate crimes against Kurds, Christian and Jewish minorities, Alevis and Syrians continued.
Gender equality
The legal and institutional framework on gender equality and combating gender-based violence is incomplete and implementation and enforcement are insufficient. Despite the presence of a comprehensive legal framework, policy documents and services, problems in gender equality, cases of violence against women (including femicides), political support for restrictive social norms continue to be a cause of major concern in Türkiye.
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The increasing government policy emphasis on traditional family roles, demographic objectives and narratives challenging gender equality risks further undermining progress on gender equality and women’s rights and continue to raise serious concerns. The 2024 Vision Document for Strengthening the Family, which portrays gender equality as a major threat to the family institution, continues to be implemented.
Türkiye’s withdrawal from the Istanbul Convention in 2021 continues to represent a significant
setback in the protection of women from gender-based violence. Since then, serious concerns persist regarding the implementation of the Law on the Protection of the Family and the Prevention of Violence against Women, with reports indicating that it is no longer effectively implemented in practice and that, in some instances, its proactive provisions are rendered largely inoperative by the authorities. However, there is a strong demand for a return to the Istanbul Convention in the Turkish society, and the political and social debate on this continue.
Recent policy developments include the adoption of the Fifth National Action Plan on Combating Violence Against Women (2026-2030) in November 2025. It includes measures on prevention, protection and support pillars, specialised support services, perpetrator programmes and improved institutional coordination. However, further efforts are needed to align the legal and policy framework with the EU acquis, including Directive (EU) 2024/1385 on combating violence against women and domestic violence, and relevant European
standards.
In June 2026, Türkiye’s Constitutional Court has annulled the legal rule allowing indefinite poverty alimony after divorce. This decision is set to come into force after nine months after the ruling.
Femicide remains a serious concern, while discrepancies between official and civil society data highlight persistent shortcomings in comprehensive and reliable data collection.
Women’s access to justice and specialised support services remains insufficient, particularly for migrant and refugee women. Women’s rights centres and legal aid offices within the bar associations provide free legal assistance to victims. However, delays in processing legal aid requests often result in a critical loss of time. The availability of shelters remains insufficient, and the effective implementation of protection orders needs to improve.
Rights of the child
The legal and institutional framework on the rights of the child remains incomplete, and its implementation and enforcement are insufficient. The legislation and practice are still not fully aligned with both international standards and the EU acquis.
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Despite the 2023–2028 Child Rights Strategy and Action Plan, significant implementation gaps persist, including in addressing violence against children, child labour, barriers to girls’ education and child and forced marriage. The best interests of the child are not yet systematically applied in practice.
The child protection system continues to face shortcomings, particularly regarding children deprived of parental care and those in institutions. Further efforts are needed to strengthen prevention, monitoring and support and to accelerate the transition towards family- and community-based care. The school shootings in April 2026 also highlighted shortcomings in prevention, risk assessment and psychosocial support in educational settings.
The school shootings that took place in April 2026 further highlighted critical shortcomings in child protection and school safety policies. The absence of comprehensive preventive measures, risk assessment mechanisms, and psychosocial support systems in educational settings point to significant gaps in the governments' response.
Significant shortcomings persist in child-friendly justice. Access to specialised legal aid and child-sensitive procedures remains insufficient, as does independent monitoring. Specialised juvenile courts and adequately trained justice and child protection professionals remain insufficient. Free legal aid is available to children in criminal proceedings but remains limited in civil proceedings and other complaints mechanisms. Children continue to be subject to investigation, detention and prosecution under the Criminal Code and anti-terrorism legislation, including in relation to freedom of expression and peaceful assembly. Reports of physical and psychological ill-treatment in detention raise serious concerns regarding safeguards for children deprived of liberty.
In August 2026, Parliament adopted amendments to the Child Protection Law and other laws, introducing custodial sentences for children convicted of serious offences and strengthening sanctions concerning the use of children by criminal organisations. The stronger reliance on custodial sentences and harsher sanctions raised concerns regards the principles of proportionality, deprivation of liberty as a measure of last resort, at the expense of rehabilitation, reintegration and the best interests of the child.
Persons with disabilities
The legal and institutional framework on the rights of persons with disabilities is incomplete and implementation and enforcement are insufficient. Türkiye is partially aligned with the European Accessibility Act, but significant gaps remain, including as regards digital services, private sector compliance and enforcement mechanisms. Further efforts are needed to ensure accessibility in practice.
Türkiye has designated bodies to implement and monitor the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (UNCRPD). However, a fully independent monitoring framework in line with the Convention is not yet in place. The National Action Plan on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (2023-2025) has not been extended. Further efforts are needed to implement the UNCRPD.
Persons with disabilities continue to face barriers to exercising their legal capacity on an equal basis with others, including due to the existing guardianship regime. The disability assessment system is not yet aligned with the WHO’s International Classification of Functioning, Disability and Health protocols and remains insufficiently oriented towards a functional and human rights-based approach to disability.
Although the legal framework provides for reasonable accommodation, implementation remains uneven, including in public services and employment.
Further efforts are needed to prevent institutionalisation and accelerate the transition towards independent living and inclusion in the community, including through accessible, person-centred community-based support services, in line with the principles of the Commission Guidance on independent living and inclusion in the community of persons with
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disabilities in the context of EU funding is a tool that needs to be taken into account Children with disabilities continue to face gaps in early identification, referral and access to appropriate support services.
LGBTIQ+ persons
The legal protection of the rights of LGBTIQ+ persons remains insufficient. LGBTIQ+ persons continue to face discrimination, restrictions to their fundamental freedoms, hate speech and stigmatisation.
Government policies and public discourse increasingly reinforce negative stereotypes against LGBTIQ+ persons. The government’s 2024-2028 Vision Document and Action Plan for Strengthening the Family include narratives portraying LGBTIQ+ identities as a threat to family and societal values. Inflammatory rhetoric by public officials and state institutions, together with the policy emphasis on the ‘Year of the Family’, further contributed to the stigmatisation and marginalisation of LGBTIQ+ persons.
Freedom of assembly and civic space for LGBTIQ+ persons and organisations deteriorated further. In 2026, the Pride March in Istanbul was officially prohibited. In September 2026, a country-wide series of judicial, law-enforcement and digital operations were carried out against LGBTIQ+ persons, activists, civil society organisations, and human rights defenders, resulting in numerous investigations and arrests on allegations of spreading ‘obscene’ materials, violations of the Law on Associations, as well as prostitution and drug-related charges. According to the Minister of Justice, judicial proceedings were under way against 162 suspects, nine associations and 13 businesses., Most of the affected CSOs are well- established organisations with long history of activity.
Reportedly, MASAK examined several associations active in the field of the rights of LGBTIQ+ persons that had reportedly received funding from foreign sources. The donors concerned included EU Member States, trans-national CSOs and independent grant-making organisations. Although no allegations of criminal activities were made, the scrutiny of the activities and foreign funding of LGBTIQ+ organisations risks creating a chilling effect on legitimate civil society activities and access to funding. In December 2025, the Young LGBTIQ+ Association was closed down by a local court in İzmir, on grounds of ‘obscenity’ based on social media posts. The case is now before the appeals court.
Transgender persons continue to face barriers in accessing gender-affirming healthcare. The Turkish Medical Association (TMA) requested clarification from the Turkish ‘Medicines and Medical Devices Agency’ after reports that patients undergoing gender-affirming hormone therapy faced barriers in the e-prescription system. Trans refugees cannot access any therapy or medicine due to cumbersome procedures. The government’s attempt to introduce legislation further restricting the rights of -LGBTIQ+ persons, although ultimately withdrawn from the 11th Judicial Reform Package, remains a cause for concern.
Procedural rights of suspects and accused persons and rights of victims of crime
The legal framework on procedural rights, as well as on the rights of victims of crime,
remains incomplete.
Significant inconsistencies with the EU acquis and European standards remain in law and in
practice. Procedural rights and safeguards are often not effectively accessible or
implemented. Reports indicate ongoing challenges related to access to case files, timely and
effective legal representation and equality of arms during proceedings. Prolonged periods of
pre-trial detention remain a structural concern. Persistent issues also include the use of
evidence that may be unreliable or obtained in breach of procedural safeguards. In
particular, the continued reliance on testimony from anonymous or secret witnesses–without
adequate opportunities for cross-examination by the defence–remains problematic. In
several cases, including those brought against the Mayor of Istanbul, concerns have been
raised regarding both the manner in which evidence is gathered and the absence of a clear
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and substantiated link between the evidence presented and the accusations set out in
indictments.
Further efforts are still required to ensure full alignment of national legislation with the EU
acquis, in particular the Victims’ Rights Directive and the Compensation to Crime Victims
Directive. Access to justice for victims remains uneven in rural areas and among
disadvantaged groups, where awareness of available legal aid and support services
continues to be limited. Persons with disabilities face systemic barriers in access to justice
and in the full exercise of their legal capacity.
The Judicial Support and Victim Services Department significantly expanded its reach,
increasing the number of Judicial Support Directorates to 175 across 81 cities by end of
2025.
Protection of minorities
The legal and institutional framework for the protection of persons belonging to minorities is incomplete and persons belonging to minorities face hatred and discrimination. Hate speech and hate crimes continued, with Syrians, Greeks, Armenians, Jews and Alevis being the main targets.
The main public events for the Armenian Genocide Commemoration Day were prohibited by the İstanbul Governorate in April 2026. The court case concerning the retrial of state officials involved in the murder of Armenian journalist Hrant Dink is still pending before the Court of Cassation.
Overall, persons belonging to minorities continued facing difficulties, such as the lack of legal status for their religious institutions, protection for minority languages, schooling support, clergy training, access to media in minority languages, legal restrictions on access to public advertisements by a handful of minority media outlets and complications in enjoying property rights. No progress was made in the revision of school textbooks to remove discriminatory and derogatory references. Minority schools received no public funding.
There are still no effective mechanisms to include persons belonging to minorities in decision-making or ensure their fair representation in public administration. Minorities are seriously underrepresented in political life and public service. The separate regulation required to enable board elections in the four minority foundation hospitals has not been adopted, and the 2023 Constitutional Court ruling, which found a violation of freedom of association remains unenforced.
Ministry of National Education inspectors conducted checks at minority schools focusing on ’guest students’. Armenian schools were verbally informed that they would no longer be permitted to admit students from Armenia, while the status of those already enrolled was also reviewed. Greek and Jewish minority schools were also reportedly included in the inspections.
Cultural rights
Legal restrictions on mother-tongue education in primary and secondary schools persist. While state schools offer optional courses in two Kurdish dialects and a few other minority languages, these are subject to strict requirements, including a minimum of 10 students per class and suffer from a shortage of qualified teachers. Six universities continue to offer faculty courses and provide degrees in Kurdish-language education.
Roma
6 In line with the terminology of European institutions, the umbrella term ‘Roma’ is used here to refer
to a number of different groups, without denying the specificities of these groups.
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The 2023-2030 National Roma Strategy and its Action Plan continue to be implemented. Concrete measures are needed to address direct discrimination and entrenched prejudices.
Overall, Roma communities face a self-reinforcing cycle of structural inequality in the labour market, driven by discrimination, informal economy, limited access to services, and underrepresentation, all of which perpetuate marginalisation and social exclusion. The integration of Roma children into the education system would help eliminate child labour and early marriages. The problem of incorrect diagnosis of Roma children with mental disabilities or learning difficulties has not been addressed.
2.2.2 Chapter 24 - Justice, freedom and security
The EU has common rules for border and migration management, visa policy, and asylum. Schengen cooperation entails the lifting of border controls inside the EU. There is also cooperation in the fight against serious and organised crime and terrorism, and judicial, police and customs cooperation, all with the support of the EU Justice and Home Affairs agencies.
Fight against serious and organised crime
The legal framework on serious and organised crime is partially aligned with the EU acquis. The capacity to combat serious and organised crime needs to be improved.
General framework
Legal alignment, strategic and institutional frameworks
A national strategy (2022-2027) and an action plan (2025-2027) against organised crime are in force and coordinated by the Ministry of Interior. There is no efficient reporting system which complicates the monitoring on the implementation of the action plan. The 11th Judicial Reform Package, adopted in December 2025, increased maximum sentences for managing and participating in criminal organisations as well as child exploitation for criminal purposes.
No new specific anti-corruption or integrity measures were introduced in the law enforcement sector. Integrity safeguards and internal oversight mechanisms are still limited and should be strengthened, particularly through independent complaint channels, internal affairs capacity and clear codes of conduct.
Türkiye has not established a dedicated, centralised asset recovery office. Asset seizure and confiscation are managed through general criminal justice procedures. The Savings Deposit Insurance Fund (TMSF/SDIF) has a legal mandate to manage assets seized under court orders.
Türkiye does not currently have a national equivalent to SOCTA (Serious and Organised Crime Threat Assessment). The authorities carry out strategic threat assessments on organised crime, though these are generally not made public and are not structured or institutionalised in the same way as SOCTA.
Legislation on witness protection provides protective measures but its effectiveness and capacity remained limited. The scope of the law on witness protection needs to be expanded to cover all types of serious crime and procedural rules need improvement. No progress was made in this area during the reporting period.
Implementation and enforcement capacity
Turkish authorities reported that 552 organised criminal groups were dismantled in the first ten months of 2025. Regarding confiscation of criminal assets in corruption and organised crime cases, between 1 September 2025 and 9 April 2026, the Gendarmerie took action against 628 suspects involved in 116 incidents. Sanctions imposed by the UN led to the freezing of assets belonging to a total of four individuals while no entity was designated by the UN under ISIL (Da’esh)/Al-Qaida regime in 2025 and 2026. The transposition time of the UN sanctions has improved.
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The operational capacity of law enforcement agencies continued to be strengthened through new recruitment and training programmes. Concerns persist about the capacity of the country's law enforcement authorities to effectively handle cases of gender-based violence and to provide adequate protection and support to victims.
The Savings Deposit Insurance Fund is increasingly entrusted with companies and assets linked to the proceeds of crime in investigations including in some high-profile cases. Türkiye should ensure that these measures remain firmly grounded in judicial decisions, proportionate, subject to clear time limits and overseen by effective and independent safeguards. By the end of 2025, the TMSF had 1 123 companies under its control, holding assets worth 361.2 billion of Turkish lira.
Law enforcement cooperation
A total of 14 EU Member States have liaison officers in Türkiye. Cooperation with the EU Agency for Law Enforcement Training (CEPOL), Eurojust, Europol and Interpol continued but, in most cases, remains limited and needs to be increased. A cooperation agreement with CEPOL is in place and during the reporting period Türkiye significantly increased activities through the agreement.
Strong operational cooperation takes place with Interpol. Cooperation with Europol remains limited to the existing Strategic Cooperation Agreement, as Türkiye’s data protection framework is not aligned with the EU acquis, preventing the exchange of personal data. However, Türkiye could intensify sharing data with Europol within the existing legal framework, as Europol may receive information from third parties where relevant for the performance of its tasks. Türkiye has two liaison officers at Europol. In 2025, as a result of Operation ‘Bulut’ in coordination between the EU Member States and Türkiye, and supported by Europol, five major drug-related criminal networks were dismantled disrupting major drug trafficking organisations.
While Türkiye has national coordination structures and participates in the European Multidisciplinary Platform Against Criminal Threats (EMPACT), enhanced participation is encouraged. After months of disengagement, Türkiye has been involved in a limited (eight) but targeted number of EMPACT actions addressing migrants smuggling, firearms and drug trafficking. While it did not contribute to the Most Threatening Criminal Networks and Individuals (MTCNI) operational action plan (see the section on drugs), Türkiye showed a good level of engagement under the migrants smuggling operational action plan.
Türkiye is connected to use SIENA (Secure Information Exchange Network Application) but is one of the least active users. To establish a sustainable professional development, Türkiye is encouraged to adopt the sectoral competencies and integrate knowledge acquired through CEPOL capacity-building actions to its law enforcement training system.
Judicial cooperation in criminal matters
The legal framework for judicial cooperation in criminal matters is partially aligned with the EU acquis to the extent that alignment is already possible. Judicial cooperation in criminal matters needs to be improved to meet European standards. An international agreement with the EU on cooperation with Eurojust is not in place. Between September 2025 and March 2026, Türkiye was involved in seven new cases at Eurojust, most related to fraud, money laundering and organised crime.
Türkiye has yet to ratify the European Convention on the Compensation of Victims of Violent Crimes. In 2025, the EPPO did not send any requests for mutual legal assistance to the authorities of Türkiye but it had 10 active cases
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with links to Türkiye at the end of the same year.
In its capacity as Member State, Türkiye participated in both the Council of Europe’s Committee on Crime Problems (CDPC) and in its Committee of Experts on the Operation of European Conventions on Cooperation in Criminal Matters (PC-OC).
There is a need to strengthen the capacity of the Ministry of Justice, courts, and prosecution offices to efficiently process judicial cooperation requests in criminal matters. This includes increasing the number of personnel dedicated to handling mutual legal assistance and extradition cases within the Central Authority.
Crime areas
Investigation and criminalisation of money laundering
The 2026–2030 Strategy Document on Enhancing the Effectiveness of Anti-Money Laundering, Counter-Terrorism Financing and Confiscation Practices was adopted on 4 July 2026.
Türkiye’s report from FATF’s fifth round of mutual evaluations was adopted in June 2026. Overall, Türkiye is rated compliant or largely compliant with most FATF recommendations.
On Immediate Outcome 7 (Money Laundering Investigation and Prosecution), Türkiye was given a moderate level of effectiveness, reflecting progress compared with the previous assessment. However, the investigations do not cover all relevant offences, such as drug trafficking and smuggling. Concerns persist regarding cross-border cash movements, and prosecutions are hindered by backlogs and challenges in demonstrating their effectiveness.
On Immediate Outcome 2 (International Cooperation), Türkiye was downgraded due to ineffective international cooperation in combating ML/TF.
Türkiye should implement the key recommended actions included in its FATF Mutual Evaluation Report, including further prioritising money laundering investigations and prosecutions related to certain high-risk predicate offences (drug trafficking, smuggling and illegal betting) that involve complex money laundering cases, particularly linked to high-risk activities (professional money launderers, goods and cross-border movement of currency, misuse of legal persons).
Türkiye should also develop clear guidelines for money laundering, prioritising prosecutions in line with Türkiye’s risk profile to reduce the backlog of pending prosecutions.
In 2025, the financial intelligence unit (MASAK) submitted criminal complaints against 559 individuals on charges related to money laundering.
Cybercrime
Türkiye is party to the Council of Europe’s Budapest Convention on Cybercrime but has not signed its Second Additional Protocol on enhanced cooperation and disclosure of electronic evidence. In compliance with the Budapest Convention, a contact point was established and is based in the National Cybercrime Department.
There is no national strategy or action plan in place against cybercrime. However, the National Cyber Security Strategy and Action Plan (2024-2028) covers some measures against cybercrime with some cyber-related offences also included in the Turkish Criminal Code. The Law on cybersecurity adopted in March 2025 introduced stronger penalties for serious cyberattacks against state systems and illegal dissemination or sale of stolen cyber data. Between 1 September 2025 and 9 April 2026, 180 cybercrime operations were conducted.
Child sexual abuse online
Although Türkiye has ratified the Council of Europe’s ‘Lanzarote Convention’, further alignment is needed on fighting child sexual abuse both online and offline, including by
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aligning with the directive on combating the sexual abuse and sexual exploitation of children and child pornography.
Trafficking in human beings
The legal framework on trafficking in human beings (THB) is largely in line with international conventions and the EU acquis. The third national action plan against THB, adopted in January 2025, is under implementation. Türkiye needs to fully align its definition of trafficking in human beings with the Council of Europe Convention on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings.
Mechanisms for the early detection and protection of victims of THB are in place, with gradual improvements in identification practices and data collection, although challenges remain. Türkiye remains an important transit and destination country for THB. An increase in the number of victims identified was observed in 2025 (261 victims) as compared with 2024 (179 victims). As of 2 April 2026, 79 victims had been identified. Most victims are of Syrian origin, subjected primarily to mixed, sexual or labour exploitation as well as forced marriage. The total capacity of shelters increased to 100 in Ankara, Kirikkale, Kütahya and Mardin.
A telephone helpline is in place as well as a cooperation agreement signed with the Turkish Red Crescent to provide psychological and social services to victims in the shelters. There is still a need to increase partnerships with civil society on victim identification and protection efforts and provide more effective and professional services to victims of THB.
Migrant smuggling
A new 2026-2030 Irregular Migration Strategy Document was adopted in November 2026. Türkiye participated in the second Senior Officials Meeting of in the Global Alliance to Counter Migrant Smuggling in July 2026 but did not endorse the Global Alliance Joint Declaration. Due to its strategic position, Türkiye's cooperation and participation in countering the activity of criminal networks involved in migrant smuggling on the Eastern Mediterranean route is key. As of October 2026, 10 692 migrant smugglers had been apprehended. In 2025, a total of 11 588 migrant smugglers were apprehended (compared with 10 482 in 2023 and 13 061 in 2024).
Trafficking in firearms
The legal and institutional framework for firearms control and trafficking of small arms and light weapons (SALW) remains only partially aligned with the EU acquis and with EU strategic frameworks on illicit firearms trafficking. Türkiye is a signatory to the UN Protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms.
Türkiye has legislation in place specifically targeting the proliferation of unlicensed firearms and enhance the penalties for illegal trafficking and possession. The Strategy Document on Increasing the Effectiveness of Countering Financing of the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction in Türkiye (2025-2029) is in place. Türkiye participates in two operational actions under the EMPACT firearms and explosives OAP for 2026-2027.
It is strongly recommended that Türkiye increases its commitment in two operational actions of the EMPACT on firearms and explosives: one focuses on the threat of counterfeit weapons and the other one on the threat of convertible alarm and signal weapons.
Cooperation in the field of drugs
The legal framework for cooperation in the field of drugs needs to be improved.
The National Strategy and Action Plan against Drugs (2024-2028) is in force and is coordinated by the Ministry of Health. The Turkish National Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction (TUBIM), attached to the Turkish National Police, is the EUDA National Focal Point. A total of 1 109 new psychoactive substances have been included in national legislation and 37 of those were put on the list in 2025.
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Türkiye is a major corridor for drug trafficking between Asia and Europe and also between Latin America and Europe. Information sharing and cooperation with EU law enforcement partners should be reinforced to improve coordination and effectiveness.
In 2025, the national law enforcement units carried out operations seizing 2.76 tonnes of heroin (4.3 tonnes in 2024), 25 tonnes of cannabis (40 tonnes in 2024), 3.1 tonnes of cocaine (3 tonnes in 2024), 25.3 tonnes of methamphetamine (33.8 tonnes in 2024), 3 tonnes of synthetic cannabinoids (2 tonnes in 2024), over 20 million amphetamine tablets bearing the Captagon logo (16 million in 2024) and 6.6 million ecstasy tablets (5.1 million in 2024).
Compared to 2024, the overall trend shows a slight decline in drug seizures while remaining within the trend of overall historically high seizure rates.
Regarding the new EMPACT cycle for 2026-2029, Türkiye proposed an operational action targeting major drug trafficking networks in Türkiye and its region, which was endorsed under the Most Threatening Criminal Networks and Individuals (MTCNI) OAP. Despite its initial proposal, Türkiye later withdrew from participating in this action. The country should increase its participation within the EMPACT MTCNI OAP and engage further in other pertinent OAPs combating drug trafficking.
Counterfeiting of the euro
Türkiye’s legal framework on currency counterfeiting is partially aligned with EU acquis.
It criminalises the production, distribution, possession and circulation of counterfeit currency, both domestic and foreign. The legislation provides for penalties, especially when offences are committed by organised crime groups or involve cross-border elements. Türkiye is a party to the 1929 Geneva Convention for the suppression of counterfeiting currency.
Counter-terrorism, prevention and resilience
Fight against terrorism and prevention of radicalisation
Legal alignment, strategic and institutional framework
The legal frameworks for the fight against terrorism and for countering violent extremism are not aligned with the EU acquis.
Considering ongoing domestic and cross-border security threats and challenges, Türkiye’s counter-terrorism efforts remain vital for national and European security.
While legal and institutional frameworks to combat terrorism exist, abuse of the frameworks persist particularly in striking an appropriate balance between protecting fundamental freedoms and addressing security needs in anti-terrorism and national security legislation. There is no comprehensive strategy, action plan, or clear political ownership guiding counter-terrorism efforts.
Türkiye should align its legislation with the EU acquis, particularly regarding the definition of terrorism as set out in the EU Directive on combating terrorism.
Implementation and enforcement capacity
The fight against terrorism and the countering of violent extremism needs to be improved.
In 2025, the Turkish government initiated a renewed peace process, seeking to achieve the PKK’s disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration into civilian life, following a declared ceasefire and a stated commitment by the PKK leadership in 2025 to dissolve its armed structures and abandon violence. The ongoing peace process has contributed to a reduction in terrorist attacks and a more stable security environment, however, the process remains in the initial stages.
Preventive measures are insufficient and should be strengthened. Cooperation with the EU and the Member States should therefore be further strengthened, including the prevention
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and countering of violent extremism, the fight against terrorism financing, and tackling the links between organised crime and terrorism.
Cooperation between the country's authorities, EU Member States, and EU agencies on counter-terrorism also remains limited. As Türkiye’s data protection framework is still not in line with the EU acquis, an international agreement enabling the exchange of personal data with Europol has yet to be concluded. In the absence of such an agreement, the transfer of data by Türkiye to Europol concerning terrorist suspects and other individuals posing security threats remains limited.
Türkiye is encouraged to apply the methodology developed with the support of the Counter Terrorism Support Network to prepare a domestic terrorism trend and situation report.
Critical infrastructure protection
Legal alignment, strategic and institutional frameworks
The legal framework for critical infrastructure protection is partially aligned with the EU acquis.
Türkiye has been moving towards a more centralised model for critical infrastructure protection. However, it lacks a comprehensive Law on critical infrastructure protection and critical entities resilience. In May 2026, the Cybersecurity Council formally identified the sectors in which critical entities and critical infrastructure could be identified under the 2025 Cybersecurity law, providing a common national classification of critical sectors.
Implementation and enforcement capacity
Implementation and enforcement capacity remains uneven across sectors. While protection measures are generally well developed in strategic areas such as energy, telecommunications and transport, capacity varies across other sectors due to the absence of a comprehensive law, fragmented institutional responsibilities and inconsistent regulatory enforcement. Differences in resources and preparedness among public authorities and infrastructure operators also contribute to uneven implementation.
Migration and asylum
Legal and irregular migration and returns
Cooperation with Türkiye on combating irregular migration is generally effective. However, the management of legal and irregular migration needs to be improved.
Legal alignment, strategic and institutional frameworks
The Presidency for Migration Management (PMM) largely relies on EU-funded projects to support its operations. PMM recruits a limited number of social workers, psychologists, lawyers and interpreters through national funds. Personnel shortages in these profiles persist, particularly in removal centres and the provincial administration. To address these, the PMM had initiated recruitment of new cadre of ‘administrative detention personnel’ to be deployed in removal centres. However, no personnel had been employed yet in these categories.
Implementation and enforcement capacity
The EU-Turkey Statement continues to be the main framework for cooperation on migration between the EU and Türkiye. Türkiye’s unilateral suspension of the return of irregular migrants from the Greek islands under the ‘one-for-one’ scheme continued. Regarding resettlement from Türkiye to the EU under that scheme, the total number of Syrian refugees resettled from Türkiye stood at 44 213 by the end of May 2026.
Türkiye continued to not fully implement the EU-Turkey Readmission Agreement and maintained its position not to implement the rules on third-country nationals until the visa liberalisation process is completed.
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Between January and December 2025, arrivals to the EU from Türkiye continued to decrease and compared to 2024 they almost halved. Similarly, during the first six months of 2026, arrivals from Türkiye decreased by more than a third and land arrivals increased by more than half. During the same period, the total number of irregular arrivals to Cyprus from Türkiye decreased by almost a third compared to the same period last year.
The number of irregular migrants apprehended in Türkiye by law enforcement agencies stood at 160 253 by the end of 2025, representing a yearly decrease by 29% (225 831 in 2024, 254 008 in 2023, 285 027 in 2022). The number of mobile migration points engaged in the fight against irregular migration reached 375 throughout all 81 provinces of Türkiye.
Türkiye returned 113 261 irregular migrants in 2025. Voluntary returns of irregular migrants financed through national as well as EU funds continued. 4 159 irregular migrants were returned until the end of 2025 since the national voluntary return scheme became operational in 2022. Voluntary returns assisted by the IOM and financed by the EU also continued, with 1 453 irregular migrants returned in 2025 alone. 12 427 irregular migrants have received voluntary return assistance through EU financed projects implemented between 2015 and 2025.
The number of removal centres remained at 32, with a total capacity to host 18 780 irregular migrants. The PMM also set up pre-reception and transfer centres (referred to as GÖKSEMs) in major provinces to screen irregular migrants apprehended by law enforcement agencies, before their transfer to removal centres for administrative detention. GÖKSEMs contributed to preventing overcrowding in removal centres. However, the legislation applied in these centres is not public or transparent.
Cases of ill-treatment in removal centres continued to be reported in Turkish and foreign media. A landmark judgment was issued by the Turkish Constitutional Court in February 2026, in an application made by an Iraqi citizen held in the Şanlıurfa Removal Centre between January and May 2025. The Constitutional Court concluded that there are no remedies to challenge detention conditions at removal centres with respect to the right to prohibition of ill-treatment and torture, which is in violation of the ‘right to effective remedy’ guaranteed by the Turkish Constitution. The
Court called for legal reform to address this issue. Considering the high number of pending applications on the same subject and pointing to a structural problem, the Court sent the judgment to the Parliament to adopt legislation that would establish an effective remedy to file complaints on detention conditions in removal centres.
A total of 1 151 969 of non-Turkish nationals were legal residents in Türkiye in 2025 (1 056 632 in 2024; 1 107 032 in 2023). Nationals of Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan, Syria and Iran were the most common holders of residence permits.
Asylum
The legal framework on asylum is partially aligned with the EU acquis. The management of asylum needs to be improved.
Legal alignment, strategic and institutional frameworks
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The PMM is the main institution responsible for all asylum-related procedures. Decisions on status determination are subject to administrative and judicial appeal procedures.
Legislation in this area is partially aligned with the EU acquis. The Law on foreigners and international protection maintains the reservation (geographical limitation) expressed in the New York Protocol to the 1951 Geneva Convention. As a result, most people seeking international protection in Türkiye cannot apply for full refugee status but only for ‘conditional refugee’ status and subsidiary protection.
Implementation and enforcement capacity
Türkiye continued to host one of the largest refugee populations in the world, with 2 280 690 Syrians with temporary protection status. There are approximately 166 000 non- Syrians, whose number slightly declined over the reporting period (172 602 in 2024).
The number of applications for international protection dropped by more than 70% in the last three years. In 2025, the cumulative total of pending international protection applications stood at 114 366 (162 787 in 2024). The significant backlog was not reduced. There is no publicly accessible data on international protection that would give a breakdown by category of decisions and pending cases on a yearly basis.
There are still barriers in accessing registration and asylum procedures across the country. Concerns remained about the quality of decisions on asylum, their reasoned notification and
challenges with the awareness of and access to legal aid for appeals.
During the reporting period, the PMM reduced overcrowding and closed temporary accommodation centres (TACs). More than 57 000 evacuated refugees are provided with three options: (i) register and live in a province; (ii) voluntary return to Syria; (iii) referral to the Adana TAC (which is one of the few remaining open TAC and the only one designated to host a limited number of the most vulnerable refugees).
NGOs have been critical of the TAC closure policy, arguing that most evacuated refugees are not left with a viable option other than voluntary return considering the ‘closed neighbourhoods’ policy to bar
evacuees from registering in places with an already high concentration of refugees and other barriers to lodging or updating registrations in provinces.
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As of January 2026, there were nine TACs hosting a total of 7 000 persons. One of these TACs (Nizip in the Gaziantep province) is piloted as the ‘International Protection Assessment Centre’ through which new international protection (IP) applicants across Türkiye are referred to for registration and processing of IP applications. During the processing, IP applicants are provided with accommodation and other basic services.
Following the fall of the Assad regime in Syria in December 2024, the number of voluntary returns to Syria exceeded 720 000 as of August 2026, with returnees citing political developments, improved security and family reunification as the main drivers of return.
Vulnerable groups such as female headed households and unaccompanied or separated children are at heightened protection risk in the voluntary return processes. It is important that returns continue to be independently monitored by UNHCR to ensure compliance with international laws and standards.
The PMM and the EU Agency for Asylum continued their cooperation as part of the 2024-2026 Cooperation Roadmap. The Roadmap provides capacity-building assistance on asylum-related legislation and procedures and an effective reception system in line with the Common European Asylum System and European standards.
Visa policy
The national visa policy is not aligned with that of the EU, in particular the list of countries whose nationals require a visa to enter the EU.
Türkiye needs to further align its visa policy with that of the EU. This would include: (i) further aligning Turkish visa requirements with the EU lists of visa-free and visa-required countries; (ii) phasing out the issuing of visas at borders and electronic visas; and (iii) ensuring that the issuing of visas at its diplomatic missions is carried out in line with the conditions and procedures set out in the EU Visa Code.
Türkiye continues to apply a discriminatory visa policy against nationals of Cyprus. Türkiye made no progress in meeting the six unfulfilled benchmarks of the visa liberalisation roadmap. While Turkish nationals are still subject to visa requirement when travelling to the EU, the European Commission adopted on 15 July 2025 more favourable visa rules for Turkish citizens applying for Schengen visas (‘cascade rule’), in order to further facilitate people-to-people contacts.
The share of multiple-entry visas increased to 68.7% in 2025, compared with 65% in 2024. More than 1 265 000 visa applications were processed by Schengen consulates in Türkiye. This is, an almost 10% yearly increase in the number of visa applications processed.
Schengen governance and external borders
The legislative framework for external border management, along with its implementation and enforcement capacity, needs to be improved.
Legal alignment, strategic and institutional frameworks
The PMM remains the main coordinating body responsible for border management.
The Integrated Border Management Coordination Board has not met since its creation. Interinstitutional meetings on specific topics were held at technical level.
The protracted operationalisation process of the National Coordination and Joint Risk Analysis Centre (NACORAC) since its formal establishment in 2016 has made significant headway. Data patterns have been exchanged, determined and harmonised, standard operating procedures (SOPs) developed, and data sharing and integration protocols signed with four national stakeholder institutions (i.e. with the Coast Guard Command within the Ministry of Interior and with the ministries of national defence, trade and health).
Negotiations to determine the procedures and methods for sharing the requested data under these protocols continue. Moreover, web service integration processes for data
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diversification are underway. Technical work is ongoing, including on a model to update the service architecture, with the aim of minimising data loss specifically for the data transferred. This process includes data pattern harmonisation, web service definitions, database changes and potential software improvements. The Centre’s first Annual Risk Analysis Report was prepared in 2025, also using real time data from the NACORAC software.
Türkiye still lacks a national Integrated Border Management (IBM) strategy and an updated action plan, but efforts have continued to finalise the existing drafts and ensure buy-in and endorsement by all stakeholders. To that end, an EU-funded project designed as a catalyst to facilitate the development and finalisation of these documents has been extended until the beginning of 2027. The IBM strategy and action plan are the main policy documents that would make it possible to coordinate national and international efforts and initiatives in this area under a single framework.
To bring the country’s border management system in line with the EU acquis, Türkiye should step up its efforts to improve interservice and international cooperation, by accelerating the adoption of an IBM strategy and updating its IBM national implementation action plan from 2006. It would also need to enact new legislation and set up a non-military border management body in charge of all aspects of border management, including border surveillance at the unmanned land borders, which are under the responsibility of the Turkish Land Forces.
Implementation and enforcement capacity
Türkiye continued to invest significant efforts and financial resources in border security at the land borders, in particular by modernising physical and technological infrastructure. As of February 2026, the modular concrete wall has reached a total length of 1 323 km, supported by 1 767 km of patrol roads along Türkiye’s borders, 1 052 km of border lighting systems (376 km of which were camera- and sensor-activated), 362 electro-optical communication and surveillance masts, as well as 289 thermal cameras and related elevator systems.
The 560 km long border with Iran has reached high protection standards, around 83% of is protected by modular concrete wall, while around 92% of it has been equipped with an electro-optical communication and surveillance mast system. Furthermore, drones and snow clearance equipment have been procured. The EU provides substantial funding to support Türkiye in modernising its border surveillance infrastructure, including: (i) electro-optical communication and surveillance masts; (ii) lighting systems; and (iii) mobile electro-optical (thermal) cameras.
Relations with the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex) are based on the 2012 Memorandum of Understanding. The memorandum should be updated to reflect the revisions of the EBCG Regulation and in order to allow the EU and Türkiye to fully benefit from Frontex’s expanded mandate. The PMM is now the national Frontex contact point. Focal points within the relevant authorities, i.e. the Turkish Coast Guard and the Turkish National Police (the Department of Combating Migrant Smuggling, and Border Gates), are ensuring cooperation and communication with Frontex and its Liaison Officer in Ankara. Several significant interactions took place between Frontex and the country's authorities during the reporting period.
Türkiye maintained cooperation with neighbouring countries Greece and Bulgaria through the trilateral Police and Customs Cooperation Centre at the Kapitan Andreevo/Kapıkule border crossing, focusing on data sharing under existing agreements.
Türkiye continued to contribute to Interpol’s databases, but only through manual requests when required. However, Interpol’s stolen and lost travel documents database is not integrated into Türkiye’s national database, and access to other international police databases remains unavailable. Authorised officers of the Turkish National Police can access local databases across all 81 provinces.
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Judicial cooperation in civil and commercial matters
The legal framework for judicial cooperation in civil and commercial matters is partially aligned with the EU acquis, to the extent that alignment is already possible.
The 11th Judicial Reform Package introduced electronic filing systems for civil and commercial cases. This improves communication between parties and cross- border legal procedures, reducing delays in international cases.
Türkiye still needs to accede to the Hague Convention of 30 June 2005 on Choice of Court agreements and the 2019 Hague Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Civil or Commercial Matters.
2.3. ECONOMIC CRITERIA7
2.3.1. The existence of a functioning market economy
Economic governance
The economic fallout of the conflict in the Middle East and rising domestic political
7 Unless otherwise indicated, the data in this section is taken from the relevant nation sources (the statistical office, Ministry of Finance and central bank)
Table: 2023 2024 2025
Türkiye - Key economic figures
GDP per capita (% of EU-27 in PPS)1) 61 67 69 67
Real GDP growth 5.3 5.0 3.5 3.7
Activity rate of the population aged 15+ (%), total 52.1 53.3 54.2 53.5
female 33.5 35.8 36.8 36.2
male 71.2 71.2 71.9 71.3
Unemployment rate of the population aged 15+ (%), total 11.9 9.4 8.7 8.3
female 14.6 12.7 11.8 11.3
male 10.6 7.7 7.1 6.8
Employment of the population aged 15+ (annual growth %) 2.2 2.9 3.1 -0.1
Nominal wages (annual growth %) 27.4 106.3 91.8 39.5
Consumer price index (annual growth %) 24.5 53.9 58.5 34.9
Exchange rate against EUR 8.7 25.7 35.5 44.7
Current account balance (% of GDP) -2.4 -3.7 -1.0 -1.9
Net foreign direct investment, FDI (% of GDP) 0.9 0.4 0.4 0.2
General government balance (% of GDP) -2.3 -5.1 -4.8 -2.6
General government debt (% of GDP) 32.3 28.3 23.6 23.7
Notes :
1) Eurostat
Sources: Turkstat, Central Bank of Türkiye, Turkish Ministry of Treasury & Finance and Eurostat
2017-22
average
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tensions weighed on the ongoing stabilisation programme. Despite the economy’s increased resilience over recent years, Türkiye’s exposure to geopolitical tensions and energy price shocks is high. The judicial procedure against the leadership of the main opposition party further rattled the markets and dented confidence. These developments have undermined economic growth and disinflation efforts, while increasing sovereign risk premiums and putting pressure on the Turkish lira. The authorities reacted by slightly tightening monetary policy (without raising the policy rate), by intervening to support the lira, and by adopting measures to curtail price pressures and financial risks.
The policy guidance set out in the conclusions of the Economic and Financial Dialogue of May 2025 was only partially implemented8. The authorities kept a relatively tight monetary and fiscal policy mix to support disinflation. Fiscal risks eased following the complete elimination of the FX-guaranteed deposits scheme. At the same time, the budget deficit stopped improving in 2026 due to the introduction of several support measures aimed at cushioning the economic impact of the conflict in the Middle East on firms and households. The central bank continued to simplify macro-prudential measures and the authorities continued to align financial sector regulation and supervision with best international practices. The planned update of corporate governance regulations in line with international standards and the revision of the public procurement legislation to limit the use of exclusions and negotiated procedures were delayed. Limited steps were taken to phase- out fossil fuel subsidies.
Macroeconomic stability
Economic growth is slowing down on the back of weakening domestic demand. Following a 3.5% increase in 2024, real gross domestic product (GDP) growth accelerated to 3.7% in 2025 but then slowed down to 2.3% year-on-year in the second quarter of 2026. Household consumption and investment were strong in 2025 but weakened during the first half of 2026. Government consumption remained subdued, with growth slowing steadily since the fourth quarter of 2025 before turning negative, contracting by 1.8% in the second quarter of 2026. In addition, in an unstable external environment and amid an appreciating real effective exchange rate, exports remained weak and the contribution of net exports to growth turned negative. Türkiye’s per capita GDP in purchasing power standards stood at 67% of the EU average in 2025, down from its peak of 69% in 2024.
The current account deficit is moderate but has widened, and downside risks are sizeable, while capital flows remain volatile. The current account deficit increased to 1.9% of GDP in 2025, up from 1.0% in 2024. It continued to widen on weak export performance in early 2026, already before the conflict in the Middle East escalated and global energy prices rose to a multi-year high. Geopolitical tensions and the court case against the main opposition party increased the country risk premium and triggered sizeable capital outflows. Due to large interventions in support of the lira and changes in the gold price, the central bank’s reserves went through significant oscillations in early 2026 – reaching a low point in end-March, and
8 2026 Economic Reform Programmes of Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo*, Moldova, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Serbia and Türkiye.
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another downtick in May. Reflecting this notable fall in international reserves, Türkiye’s sovereign credit rating outlook was downgraded in April. Heavy reliance on the nominal exchange rate as an anchor for disinflation has resulted in a pronounced real appreciation of the lira, which poses a risk to the country’s external competitiveness. Foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows remained below 1% of GDP in 2025, indicating Türkiye’s untapped potential to attract FDI. Balance-of-payments risks appear manageable in view of the moderate gross external financing needs, unhindered access to foreign financing, and a further decline of external debt to around 32% of GDP by mid-2026. Türkiye’s five-year credit default swap spread surged by around 100 basis points (bps) at the onset of the conflict in the Middle East but has since come back down.
Disinflation has stalled and inflation remains high. The central bank operates under an inflation targeting regime and has made progress towards re-establishing its credibility in recent years, although central bank independence has yet to be secured (see Chapter 17 – Economic and monetary policy). In 2025, it kept monetary policy relatively tight, slowly bringing down inflation and inflationary expectations, and improving its foreign-exchange position. Yet, since January 2026, the policy rate has been held steady at 37%, even as a large energy shock stalled disinflation. Instead, the effective bank funding rate was temporarily raised, and the central bank continued to actively regulate credit growth via caps on the growth of certain loan categories. Other steps to strengthen the monetary transmission system and to support the use of the Turkish lira were taken. Year-on-year monthly inflation figures have hovered around 31% since the end of 2025. The recently released 2027-29 Medium-Term Programme (MTP) suggests that single digit inflation will only be reached by 2029, two years later than previously projected. By September 2026, 12- month ahead inflation expectations remained largely unanchored (market participants: 23.7%, firms: 32.8, households: 45.6%).
Fiscal policy tightened in 2025 to support disinflation and remained prudent in the beginning of 2026. At 2.6% of GDP, the 2025 budget deficit was lower than planned, underpinned by robust revenue growth and spending discipline. The primary balance improved strongly and turned positive in 2025 but stopped increasing in 2026. The subsidies aimed at containing energy inflation for firms and households were an important contributing factor. The 2027-29 MTP targets a deficit of 3.1% of GDP for 2026. The budget relies on continuing strong revenue collection, helped by measures to reduce the informal economy, higher social contribution revenue and further rationalisation of tax expenditure. The restrained indexation of the main public spending categories and public finance reforms to improve spending efficiency and transparency should help limit spending pressures, despite new measures to alleviate the effects of higher international energy prices. Government debt remained moderate, with the general government debt ratio increasing slightly to 23.7% of GDP in 2025. Although the fiscal framework lacks strong anchors, fiscal risks appear manageable and budgetary outcomes have frequently outperformed targets.
Disinflation remained the overarching policy priority, although progress was slow and inflation targets were revised upwards. The policy mix tightened in 2025 as fiscal policy joined an already tight monetary policy stance. In the first half of 2026, mounting international and domestic challenges led to more complex policy dilemmas, with fiscal and monetary policy adjustment stalling amid weakened economic growth.
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Functioning of product markets
Business environment
The authorities took limited steps to improve the business environment. Structural challenges, including lack of transparency and predictability, continue to negatively impact the business sector.Specialised courts and alternative dispute settlement mechanisms have been set up, but the effectiveness of the justice system and the length of court proceedings still need to improve. The Coordination Council for Improving the Business Environment reported that Türkiye has completed 9 of the 39 actions in its 2025 action plan. Key achievements include faster renewable energy investment processes, adoption of a green industry certification system, and progress on the green taxonomy and carbon tax framework. Türkiye still lacks a mechanism for systematically consulting social partners when preparing new legislation. Market exit remains costly and time-consuming due to
complicated insolvency proceedings. In 2025, there was a further increase in the number of liquidated and closed companies, and a drop in the number of newly established businesses. Meanwhile, the acquisition and management of companies under the trusteeship of the Savings Deposit Insurance Fund is still conducted in a non-transparent manner. The government did not publish an evaluation of progress made under the action plan for the fight against the informal economy (2023-2025) and did not prepare a new action plan for the upcoming period. The informal sector’s share in the economy remains structurally high (estimated at around 30% of GDP) and well above the OECD and EU averages.
State influence on product markets
Trade and price-setting interventions increased, and State aid transparency and control remain weak. The authorities introduced various export quotas (e.g. chickpeas and dried beans) and further export restrictions (e.g. poultry meat), while new customs duty reductions were applied to certain products (i.e. lemon, oat). While these efforts aim to control food prices and ensure supply security, they risk distorting trade incentives and reducing policy predictability for producers and exporters. As part of broader efforts to support households, subsidies in 2025 covered approximately 57% of electricity and 66% of residential natural gas costs (moderating to 57% by January 2026). Consumers with high consumption levels are being gradually excluded from subsidy support. In response to rising oil prices, the Ministry of Treasury and Finance reintroduced the sliding scale system, under which the special consumption tax on fuel products is adjusted downwards in line with the increases in oil prices to protect consumers from excessive price hikes. The system is scheduled to be retired on 1 October 2026. The authorities also introduced changes in the price-setting mechanisms for various services and products (e.g. reducing backward indexation in private schools, introducing value-based pricing in human medicinal products, and strengthening price incentives for generic medicine market entry). Meanwhile, regulatory authorities continued to carry out extensive price audits to investigate allegations of unfair pricing and stockpiling. The Price Tag Regulation was amended in October 2025 to improve price transparency, digital accessibility and consumer protection. The Law on State aid cannot be enforced due to the absence of implementing legislation and an operational institutional framework. The lack of a comprehensive State aid inventory, as well as the actual or budgeted amount of State aid granted and foregone revenues, continues to be a concern (see Chapter 8 on competition policy).
Privatisation and restructuring
The scope of privatisation remains limited. This is partly because Türkiye has already privatised many of its state-owned enterprises. In 2025, privatisation receipts reached USD 1.9 billion, marking the highest level in the last 10 years, with most proceeds stemming from the sale of immovable property. The Turkish Wealth Fund (TWF) has a portfolio of assets consisting of 36 companies from the financial (including state-owned banks, Borsa Istanbul and consolidated public insurance companies), telecommunications, petrochemicals, real
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estate, mining and iron/steel, agriculture and transport/logistics sectors. The TWF’s total assets increased to TRY 12.7 trillion in terms of value in 2024, up from TRY 9.4 trillion in 2023, yet its share in GDP further declined from 35.2% to 28.5%. In September 2026, the authorities announced their decision to grant 30-year operating rights for major road infrastructure, including two Bosphorus bridges, without transferring ownership.
Functioning of the financial market
The banking sector remains sound and well capitalised. Capitalisation remained strong and the sector’s capital adequacy ratio was 19.7% at the end of 2025, unchanged from 2024, while in state-owned banks it was 19.0% (18.2% in 2024). Forbearance measures were completely phased out in the beginning of 2026. The ratio of non-performing loans to total cash loans was 2.9% in July 2026 (2.3% in state banks vs. 3.3% in domestic private banks), increasing slowly since early 2024, while loan-loss provisioning and collection of
impaired loans remained relatively high. The real growth of bank lending was largely unchanged in early 2026, with a stronger expansion of lending to households and more subdued corporate lending. The termination of the FX-protected lira deposit scheme last year was an important achievement. In 2025, the central bank recorded a significant loss for a third year in a row mainly due to higher payments related to monetary policy operations. Total banking system assets increased slightly from 73% of GDP in 2024 to 75% in 2025. The share of foreign-owned banks in total banking sector assets remained largely unchanged at 24%. Türkiye’s benchmark BIST 100 stock index recorded sharp declines on 15 and 16 September 2026 following the bursting of a speculative bubble, linked to suspected market manipulation. The crisis appears to have been contained, with limited risk of broader systemic spillovers. Nevertheless, it has raised concerns about the functioning, regulation and supervision of Türkiye’s financial and capital markets. The Turkish authorities are preparing a compensation or payment schedule for investors who incurred losses, while work on a new legislative framework is under way.
Functioning of the labour market
The labour market weakened amidst persistent structural challenges. The participation rate (15+ age group) declined to 53.5% in 2025, and to 52.5% in July 2026. The employment rate also declined to 49.1% in 2025, and to 48.3% in July 2026. The unemployment rate declined to 8.3% in 2025 and 8.1% in July 2026. The gender employment gap remained very large at 34.3 pps in 2025. Women’s labour market participation is hindered by occupational barriers, traditional gender roles, gender gaps in education, and a lack of affordable high-quality childcare facilities (see Chapter 19 – Social policy and employment). Labour underutilisation increased from to 29.7% in 2025 (39.1% for women).
Although young people continue to face difficulties entering the labour market, the youth unemployment rate (15-24) declined to 15.3% in 2025 and 14.5% by July 2026. The share of young people not in employment, education or training remained elevated at 23.3% in 2025. Regional labour market disparities continued to decline but remained high, with unemployment rates across different provinces ranging from 4.0% to 13.8% in 2025. To support disinflation, the gross minimum wage was raised by 27% in 2026, which was below the 2025 inflation rate. Almost half of formally employed workers receive the minimum wage.
2.3.2. The capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union
Education and innovation
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Despite ongoing efforts to enhance human capital, important challenges remain. Expenditure on education (public and private) was 4.9% of GDP in 20249, up from 4.2% of GDP in 2023. Government spending was 4.0% of GDP in 2024, increasing by 0.5 percentage points from 2023. Private spending on education is relatively high, and prices are increasing faster than general inflation, raising concerns about unequal access and perceived quality gaps in the public schooling system. Net enrolment rates remain low for various age groups, and were declining in 2024-25 for pre-school, lower-secondary and upper-secondary, as well as for higher education (see Chapter 26 on education and culture). Further measures are needed to improve the quality of and access to vocational education and training. On the upside, the 2026 PISA survey data highlight a strong upward trajectory in Türkiye’s education outcomes over recent years. Turkish 15-year-olds performed better than the OECD average on science and reading, and close to it on mathematics.
Innovation outcomes improved yet remain lagging behind the EU average. The Research and Development (R&D) expenditure-to-GDP ratio increased only marginally from 1.4% in 2023 to 1.5% in 2024, still significantly below the EU average of 2.2%10. Financial support schemes for innovation are rarely subject to systematic evaluation. The private sector continues to be the primary driver of R&D, accounting for 64.8% of R&D expenditure in 2024, albeit with a marginal decrease of 0.3 percentage points from 2023. Türkiye ranked 43rd out of 139 countries in the Global Innovation Index in 2025. However, Türkiye’s innovation system still lags behind its European peers, standing at 58% of the EU average in 2025, although the gap is narrowing (see Chapter 25 on science and research). Yet, in 2025, the total number of granted patents declined slightly by 1.4% compared with 2024, following a 15.9% increase relative to 2023. The growth rate of domestic patents granted slowed to 10.3%, while the number of international patents decreased by 6.3% in Türkiye in 2025 compared with 2024.
Physical capital and quality of infrastructure
Investment activity decelerated slightly amid sustained tight financial conditions. Total gross capital formation accounted for 30.6% of GDP in 2025, down by 0.7 percentage points from 2024. The share of construction in total investment remained strong during the first three quarters but declined in the last quarter. Investments in machinery and equipment gained certain momentum in the second half of 2025. Türkiye retains its ambition of becoming a regional energy hub, investing heavily in expanding its liquified natural gas import, re-gasification, and natural gas storage capacities. The share of renewable energy continued to increase, reaching 62.4% of the installed power in operation in March 2026. Türkiye continues its efforts to accelerate the digitalisation process by extending the scope of e-government services, regulating and monitoring e-commerce markets, and supporting the digitalisation of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). Yet, there is scope to raise broader awareness on service availability among SMEs. The number of users of e- government services increased from 67.95 million in August 2025 to 68.93 million in April 2026, with a total of 9 223 integrated services online.
Sectoral and enterprise structure
The economy is diversified, with a well-developed and growing service sector and a strong manufacturing base. The share of services in GDP increased to 59.4% in 2025, up from 57.5% in 2024. Similarly, its share in total employment increased from 57.9% in 2024 to 59.0% in 2025. The industry’s share declined from 19.7% in 2024 to 18.1% in 2025. Its share in total employment has decreased marginally from 20.7% in 2024 to 20.2% in 2025. The construction sector’s share in GDP increased slightly from 5.8% in 2024 to 5.9% in
9 TurkStat releases data on expenditure on education with a year delay, hence only data for 2024 is currently available: https://veriportali.tuik.gov.tr/en/press/53897 10 Due to publication delays, these are the most recent data available.
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2025, still significantly below its pre-2019 levels. Its share in total employment increased marginally to 6.8% in 2025, up by 0.2 percentage points in 2024. Amid persistent productivity challenges and adverse climate conditions, the agriculture sector’s share fell further to 5.2% of GDP in 2025 and its share in total employment to 14.0% in 202511. SMEs are the backbone of the economy, accounting for 68.5% of employment in 2024 and 41.2% of the total value added in 2024, increasing by around 1.1 percentage points compared with 2023. Approximately 54.8% of SMEs in the manufacturing sector operated in low-technology sectors in 2024, compared with 55.6% in 2023, indicating an improvement. Türkiye continued to implement various economic support schemes that target SMEs, yet access to and the cost of long-term finance remain a problem. Firms are increasingly reaching for non- bank sources of funding (e.g. equity markets, venture capital, and crowdfunding).
Economic integration with the EU and price competitiveness
Economic integration with the EU is high. Türkiye remained the EU’s fifth largest trading partner, accounting for 4.2% of the EU’s total trade in goods with non-EU countries in 2025, unchanged from 2024, while the EU is Türkiye’s largest trading partner. The EU’s share of Turkish goods exports increased to 42.8% in 2025, up from 41.4% in 2024. The share of Turkish goods imports originating from the EU decreased from 32.1% in 2024 to 31.7% in 2025, staying below its long-term average. Russia’s share in Turkish merchandise exports fell further to 2.5% in 2025, down from 3.3% in 2024 and from a historic high of 4.3% in 2023. The nominal value of imports of goods from Russia continued to decline in 2025, largely influenced by lower international energy prices, with Russia’s share of Türkiye’s total goods imports declining from 12.8% in 2024 to 11.6% in 2025. The real exchange rate (both CPI- and PPI-based) has appreciated since mid-2025, supporting the authorities’ disinflation strategy but weighing on Türkiye’s price competitiveness.
The EU’s share of FDI inflows into Türkiye increased from 58% in 2024 to 66% in 2025. Trade openness declined further to 50% in 2025 as deflators of both exports and imports of goods and services remained markedly below the GDP deflator.
2.4. PUBLIC PROCUREMENT, STATISTICS. FINANCIAL CONTROL
Chapter 5: Public procurement
EU rules ensure that the public procurement of goods and services in any Member State is transparent and open to all EU companies on the basis of non-discrimination and equal treatment.
Institutional set-up and legal alignment
11 Due to publication delays, these are the most recent data available.
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Despite a recent amendment to the Public Procurement Law (PPL), approved by the Turkish Grand National Assembly on 24 July, Türkiye’s legal framework on public procurement remains partially aligned with the EU acquis. The Turkish legislation still contains discriminatory provisions requiring the use of domestic price advantage and offsets, allowing authorities to demand compensatory measures if goods are not produced in the country. The amendment introduces the possibility for the President to grant reciprocity in public procurement, but the scope of reciprocity may still be limited as the amendment fails to provide assurance for all Member States, and also due to extensive use of negotiated procedure and the high number of exemptions from the PPL in Türkiye.
The rising number of exclusions applied in procurement that are not in line with the EU acquis narrows the scope of public procurement rules. The legislation allows to further expand the scope of exclusions by requiring contracting authorities to procure specific goods and services from the State Supply Office. An announced extensive reform of the PPL is still pending, and meanwhile sector-specific laws continue to hinder transparency in procurement. Türkiye’s 12th Development Plan (2024-2028) and newly adopted Medium- Term Economic Programme for 2026-2028 aim to support domestic products and technology transfer through public procurement.
Türkiye needs to establish an integrated system for coordination and oversight for public-- private partnership (PPP) operations. Major infrastructure projects using PPPs are frequently exempted from the existing regulatory framework.
The institutional framework needs further strengthening as the independence of the Public Procurement Board (PPB) within the Public Procurement Authority (PPA), which continues to be potentially impaired since the President is authorised to directly appoint its chair and members, without specific regard to candidates’ education or sector experience.
Implementation and enforcement capacity
In 2025, the size of Türkiye’s public procurement market continued to reduce, decreasing to 5.1% in 2025 (5.6% in 2024), despite increase in the total value. In 2025, the excessive use of negotiated procedure continued to decrease to 37.23% in terms of value (43.79% in 2024). In 2025, only 47% of procurement procedures were open to fair competition, in terms of value. In 2025, the implementation of the domestic price advantage in international tenders continued to increase to 57.14% and 43.77% (from 54.39% and 41.62% in 2024) in value and number respectively, resulting in distortion of competition for foreign bidders.
The capacity of the Public Procurement Authority (PPA) to manage public procurement processes remained sufficient with 397 staff. The level of monitoring of contract awards and implementation is adequate, with statistical data on performance provided every six months. The number of contracting authorities participating in trainings has increased substantially with 38 542 participants in 2025 (6 359 in 2024).
The number of users in the electronic procurement platform (EKAP) continued to increase as both contracting authorities and economic operators need to register. The platform covers the whole process of public procurement.
Measures remain in place to combat corruption, fraud and conflict of interest in public procurement, but implementation remains weak. A risk indicator system is still needed to detect potential integrity issues.
Efficient remedy system
The right to a legal remedy is enshrined in the constitution and in the PPL establishing the institutional framework and the remedy system. In this regard, Türkiye is not fully aligned yet with the EU directives. Concerns persist regarding both the appointment policy and the placement of the PPB within the PPA. Türkiye needs to ensure the independence of the procurement review process, by establishing an entity that is distinct from the PPA, along with guarantees of board members independence.
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The number of complaints received by the PPB increased from 1 924 in 2024 to 2 929 in 2025, corresponding to 4.17% (2.96%) of contracts that allow for complaints.
Chapter 18: Statistics
European statistics are developed, produced and disseminated by EU Member States, guided by the principles and quality criteria elaborated in the Regulation on European statistics, such as professional independence, impartiality, reliability, accessibility and statistical confidentiality. Common rules are provided for the methodology, production and dissemination of statistical information, which are further specified in sectoral legislation that constitute the EU acquis on statistics.
On statistical infrastructure, Türkiye’s statistics legislation is based on European standards and the principles of the European Statistics Code of Practice. Concerns remain regarding the declining public trust in key macroeconomic statistics despite increased transparency efforts. TurkStat still lacks transparent appointment and dismissal procedures, including professional criteria for the appointment of the institution’s President. TurkStat expanded the use of administrative records in statistical production and further strengthened its cooperation with other data providers. While a certain number of data is free for publication, a significant number of data transmitted to Eurostat remain flagged as non- publishable.
As regards classifications and registers, the registers are updated regularly. The main classifications are aligned with the EU acquis.
On macroeconomic statistics, TurkStat implemented a benchmark revision in 2025 on national accounts, with GDP time series back casted to 1995. In 2025, TurkStat transmitted all mandatory and voluntary supply use and input-output tables to Eurostat for 2023. TurkStat has gradually improved the quality and timeliness of transmitting excessive deficit procedure (EDP) data. Additional efforts are still required to address methodological issues and ensure the completeness of the EDP notifications and government finance statistics. TurkStat sends quarterly balance of payments and quarterly international investment position data according to the BPM6 methodology to Eurostat. However, it still does not provide data on monthly balance of payments. Gross National Income (GNI) is compiled based on ESA 2010. Further improvements are required regarding the updating of the GNI inventory and timeliness of the data transmission.
Regarding business statistics, TurkStat implemented the new requirements for most short- term business statistics and continued to improve the quality and completeness of the Statistical Business Register data and metadata. Yet, there is room for improvement regarding statistics on international trade in goods by enterprise characteristics, and international trade in services. Statistics on foreign direct investment and research and development are highly compliant with EU acquis.
TurkStat has updated its methodology for calculating the Consumer Price Index, amending its base year from 2003 to 2025 and using the most recent version of the classification of individual consumption expenditures according to purpose. Yet, it still does not produce harmonised indices of consumer prices at constant tax rates.
Social statistics are highly compliant with the EU acquis. TurkStat continued transmitting the quarterly labour cost index, yet improvements are still needed in the areas of labour market statistics. The Türkiye Health Survey was carried out in 2025 using the European Health Interview Survey questionnaire and additional questions based on country-specific needs. Country-specific needs, with microdata, are expected to be transmitted to Eurostat in September 2026. Türkiye also produces statistics on immigration and emigration, but it does not yet collect statistics on asylum and managed migration in line with the EU acquis.
Regarding agricultural statistics, the full enumeration of the agricultural census has been completed and data processing and analysis are in progress. The main findings of core data
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collection expected to be released during the second half of 2026. Statistics for most crops and animal production are available and submitted to Eurostat, along with cereal and oil seed crop balances. The economic accounts for agriculture are still not fully in line with the EU acquis.
Monthly and annual energy statistics and data on energy prices are produced and transmitted regularly to Eurostat. Transport statistics are produced according to the EU acquis. Railways and maritime transport statistics are well advanced, and air transport statistics are highly compliant. Road freight data is not available yet. Türkiye produces most of the environmental statistics. Further progress is still needed on waste generation statistics. Methodological studies for circular economy indicators are ongoing.
Chapter 32: Financial control
The EU promotes the reform of national governance systems to improve managerial accountability, sound financial management of income and expenditure, and external audit of public funds. The financial control rules further protect the EU’s financial interests against fraud in the management of EU funds and the euro against counterfeiting.
Public internal financial control (PIFC)
The strategic framework is partially in place. The PIFC policy paper remains unchanged since 2013 and there are no coherent strategies for public administration reform and public finance management. There are inconsistencies between the planning documents and strategies and a lack of coordination on regular monitoring and reporting.
The internal control system remains largely compliant with international standards, although capacity and ownership problems persist. Risk management, monitoring and reporting of irregularities, and listing local administrations and state-owned enterprises in the treasury single account raise concerns.
Türkiye has some elements of managerial accountability and results-oriented performance management systems. All public institutions are governed by the Public Financial Management and Control Law (PFMC). The regulations on public internal control and public ex ante financial control were updated in 2025.
The lack of a legal requirement to have internal audit units (IAUs) in ministries undermines the purpose, authority and responsibility of internal audit. The status of the heads of IAUs must be legalised, the number of internal auditors should increase, and related manuals updated. A systematic procedure to follow up on internal audit recommendations should be set up. Legislative and procedural changes should aim at clearly distinguishing internal audit functions and inspection organisations. The Internal Audit Coordination Board’s independence should be ensured and its capacity, organisational structure and resources improved.
External audit
The constitutional and legal frameworksprovide for the independence of the Turkish Court of Accounts (TCA). The TCA law complies with international standards, establishes an almost exhaustive audit mandate. TCA reports, excluding state-owned enterprises, are published online annually. However, the Türkiye Wealth Fund (TWF)is audited by third bodies that do not disclose audit reports on its operations. The TCA remains restricted from auditing companies in its portfolio and exempted from auditing the Disaster Reconstruction Fund whose relevant revenue and operational data is not made public. Continuous development of administrative capacity is ensured through training programmes in line with its strategic plan.
More parliamentary scrutiny of TCA audit findings, recommendations and the performance of public institutions is needed. TCA submits four audit reports a year and a statement of general conformity to Parliament; assessed only in budget discussions. Systematic and
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timely implementation of recommendations should be ensured, and the budget and audit discussions kept separate.
Protection of the EU’s financial interests
Legislation still needs to be fully compliant with the PIF Directive, although the country maintains a good level of alignment with the EU acquis. A national anti-fraud strategy is still pending. The State Supervisory Council acts as the anti-fraud coordination service (AFCOS) since 2019 and an AFCOS network has been set up. The cooperation with the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) is well established and should continue building up this track record on investigations as well as on reporting of irregularities. In 2025, national authorities reported 272 cases of irregularities via the Irregularity Management System (IMS), of which two classified as suspected fraud and one as established fraud.
Protection of the euro against counterfeiting
A high level of alignment with the EU acquis has been reached. Technical analyses of counterfeit currency, including euro banknotes, are conducted by a specialised department of the central bank. Furthermore, the Turkish State Mint carries out technical analyses of counterfeit coins, including euro coins. Financial penalties are imposed on financial institutions that fail to withdraw counterfeits from circulation.
3. GOOD NEIGHBOURLY RELATIONS AND REGIONAL COOPERATION
Cyprus
Türkiye continued to refuse to recognise and cooperate with the Republic of Cyprus, including on security related issues, and veto its application to join or chair several international organisations. Despite repeated calls by the European Council and the Commission, Türkiye has yet to fulfil its obligations as outlined in the Declaration of the European Community and its Member States of 21 September 2005 and in Council Conclusions. This includes those of December 2006 and December 2015.
Türkiye also failed to fulfil its obligation to ensure the full and non-discriminatory implementation of the Additional Protocol to the Association Agreement and did not remove all obstacles to the free movement of goods, including restrictions on direct transport links with the Republic of Cyprus.
During the reporting period, Türkiye did not carry out any unauthorised drilling activities in the Eastern Mediterranean. In July 2026, Türkiye signed with the so-called, internationally non-recognised ‘Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus’ (‘TRNC’) a Memorandum of Understanding on the development of an undersea natural gas pipeline without the authorization and consent of the Government of the Republic of Cyprus. It also continues to insist on its plans for an electricity interconnector with the so-called, internationally non- recognised, ‘TRNC’ in the areas where the Republic of Cyprus does not exercise effective control.
In November 2025, following the sixth annual review of the framework for restrictive measures in response to Türkiye’s unauthorised drilling activities in the Eastern Mediterranean, the Council extended the validity of the Council Decision (CFSP) 2019/1894 until 30 November 2026 with the annex empty.
Türkiye’s military exercises in the maritime zones of Cyprus continued. Flights of Turkish unmanned aerial vehicles in the flight information region and national airspace of Cyprus also continued. Türkiye upgraded further its military drone base in Lefkoniko and naval base in Bogazi, areas where the Republic of Cyprus does not exercise effective control. Türkiye also temporarily increased its military presence, including by deploying F-16 fighter jets and air defence systems, in the context of the Iran war. Harassment of Cypriot fishing vessels and illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing activities by Türkiye continued to be reported.
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Türkiye again criticised the decision of the UN Security Council (UNSC) to renew the mandate of the UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) for one year until 31 January 2027, without the consent of the Turkish Cypriot community. Restrictions on the freedom of movement of UNFICYP’s, whose mandated authority extends across the island of Cyprus, can pose risks to the safety and security of UN personnel.
Despite international condemnations, and the inadmissibility of the settlement of any parts of Varosha by people other than its inhabitants as provided for in UNSC Resolution 550 (1984), Türkiye did not reverse its actions to open the entire fenced-off area of Varosha, thereby further entrenching the fait accompli on the ground. The restrictions imposed in 2022 on the UNFICYP within the fenced-off area of Varosha remained, violating UNSC resolution 789 (1992).
Türkiye continued to call for the recognition of “the sovereign equality and international status of the Turkish Cypriot people” and for the recognition and for the establishment of political, diplomatic, and economic relations with the so-called, internationally not recognised ‘TRNC’. The latter has been participating as an observer in the Organization of Turkic States since 2022. The EU only recognises the Republic of Cyprus as a subject of international law in line with the relevant UNSC Resolutions.
The EU remains fully committed to a comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus issue within the UN framework, in line with all relevant UNSC Resolutions and in accordance with the principles on which the EU is founded and its acquis. The EU has expressed, most recently in the Council Conclusions of December 2024, its readiness to play an active role in supporting all stages of the UN-led process, with all the appropriate means at its disposal. The EU fully supports the efforts of the UNSG and its Personal Envoy on Cyprus. The EU attaches particular importance to the resumption of and progress in the Cyprus settlement talks in further strengthening EU-Türkiye cooperation. On 13 July 2026, the Commission appointed Executive Vice-President Raffaele Fitto as the Commission’s Special Representative for Cyprus. He will support UN-led reunification efforts and facilitate renewed negotiations on Cyprus settlement. As emphasised in the Negotiating Framework and Council declarations, Türkiye is expected to actively support the negotiations on a fair, comprehensive and viable settlement of the Cyprus issue within the UN framework, in line with the relevant UNSC Resolutions and in line with the principles on which the EU is founded and the EU acquis.
It is important that Türkiye reaffirms its commitment to the UN-led settlement talks on Cyprus in line with the relevant UNSC Resolutions, including their external aspects. No unilateral actions should be taken that could raise tensions on the island and prevent the resumption of talks.
On Varosha, Türkiye must immediately reverse the unilateral actions announced on 20 July 2021 and all steps taken since October 2020 that run contrary to the relevant UNSC Resolutions. The EU underlines the importance of the status of Varosha and calls for full respect of UNSC Resolutions (particularly Resolutions 550, 789 and 1251).
Peaceful settlement of border disputes
Re-engagement between Türkiye and Greece continued. In October 2025, the two Foreign Ministers met in the margins of the Ministerial Meeting on Cross-Regional Security and Connectivity in Luxembourg. The latest round of political dialogue at the level of Deputy Foreign Ministers was held in Athens on 20 January 2026. In February 2026, the Greek and Turkish presidents co-chaired the 6th High-Level Cooperation Council to increase trade and cooperation.
On the basis of the December 2023 Athens Declaration on Friendly Relations and Good Neighbourliness, Turkish and Greek delegations met several times to discuss military confidence-building measures, complemented by meetings of coast guard authorities. The implementation of the short-stay tourist visit scheme for Turkish nationals to visit 12 Greek
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islands to promote people-to-people contacts between Greece and Türkiye was extended until April 2027.
Despite the ongoing dialogue, the unresolved issue over the continental shelf and the exclusive economic zones continued to strain bilateral relations. Türkiye continued to systematically issue unauthorised general navigational warnings and making demilitarisation claims regarding Eastern Aegean islands assigned to Greece under international treaties, thereby implicitly disputing Greek sovereignty, sovereign rights and jurisdiction. The inclusion of the doctrine of "Blue Homeland" (Mavi Vatan) in Turkish school textbooks is a cause of concern and risks affecting the ongoing dialogue and regional cooperation.
Türkiye strongly protested the transfer of Patriot batteries to a Greek island in the Aegean Sea, amid the Iranian missile offensive. Although the deployment was coordinated in NATO, it was perceived as targeting Türkiye. It also reciprocated to the transfer of Greek F-16 to Cyprus, which took place in the context of the deployment of EU Member States and UK navy to protect Cyprus after the drone attack against the UK bases on the island. The possible extension of Greek territorial waters up to 12 nautical miles in the Aegean Sea under Article 3 of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) continued to weigh on Greek-Turkish relations. The 1995 declaration of the Turkish Grand National Assembly that any unilateral action by Greece to extend its territorial waters would be considered a casus belli threat still holds. Türkiye declared, in August 2026, two national marine parks in the northeastern Aegean and the eastern Mediterranean, which extend predominantly beyond Turkish territorial waters into the high seas.
In 2026, Türkiye continued to object to Greece’s establishment of three marine parks entirely within Greek territorial waters, and very recently, to spatial planning frameworks for tourism, renewables, industry and supply chain.
A higher number of flights of Turkish military jets over Greek islands, including inhabited ones, were reported, including in September 2026. Violations of Greek territorial waters continued to be reported, including illegal unreported and unregular (IUU) fishing activities of Türkiye’s fishing vessels continued to be reported with a noticeable increase in incidents compared with the previous reporting period.
Türkiye is expected to make an unequivocal commitment to good neighbourly relations, international agreements and the peaceful settlement of disputes having recourse, if necessary, to the International Court of Justice. Türkiye must: (i) avoid threats and actions that damage good neighbourly relations; (ii) normalise its relations with the Republic of Cyprus; and (iii) respect the sovereignty of all EU Member States over their territorial sea and airspace as well as all their sovereign rights. This includes the right to explore and exploit natural resources in accordance with EU and international law, in particular the UNCLOS.
In October 2026, the Benghazi-based House of Representatives ratified the long-pending 2019 so-called Türkiye-Libya Memorandum of Understanding on delimitation of maritime jurisdiction areas in the Mediterranean. The so-called 2019 Memorandum of Understanding on the delimitation of maritime jurisdiction areas between Türkiye and the Libyan Government of National Unity (GNU) infringes the sovereign rights of third states, and does not comply with the Law of the Sea. In a Joint Statement12 the Presidents of the European Commission and the European Council reiterated the EU’s position that this agreement is null and void and cannot produce any legal consequences for third states. Türkiye has still not ratified the October 2022 MoU between Türkiye and Libya’s GNU for the development of bilateral scientific, technical, technological, legal, administrative and commercial cooperation in the field of hydrocarbons.
12 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2026/10/20/joint-statement-by-the-president- of-the-european-council-and-the-president-of-the-european-commission/
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In February 2026,Libya’s National Oil Corporation granted exploration license toTürkiye's state-owned oil company, TPAO. [See also Chapter 31 - Foreign, security and defence policy]
Regional cooperation
Good neighbourly relations are an essential part of Türkiye’s accession process. During the reporting period, bilateral relations with other enlargement countries were good. However, they remained challenging with some neighbouring EU Member States, particularly Greece and Cyprus. Tensions in the Eastern Mediterranean have reduced significantly since the February 2023 earthquakes, but the situation remained volatile not least because of the geopolitical and regional environment. Sustainable de-escalation has yet to be achieved, as proved by the ratification, in October 2026, of the 2019 so-called Türkiye-Libya Memorandum of Understanding on delimitation of maritime jurisdiction areas in the Mediterranean. Türkiye should avoid actions that could undermine regional stability in the Eastern Mediterranean, which is a region of strategic significance for the EU’s security and stability. The EU remains committed to defending its interests and those of its Member States as well as to upholding regional stability.
Türkiye maintains strong, multifaceted relations with the Western Balkans, underpinned by deep historical, cultural and people-to-people ties. Türkiye’s policy broadly aligns with the EU’s strategic objectives of regional stability, Euro-Atlantic integration and economic development. The EU and Türkiye hold regular twice-yearly consultations on the Western Balkans, most recently in April 2026. The Türkiye Balkan Peace Platform initiative held its latest meeting on 18 April 2026.
Türkiye has developed strong and growing ties with the Western Balkans partners through trade, infrastructure connectivity projects and investments in sectors such as construction, transport, energy and banking. Ankara continues military and defence cooperation, providing military training, defence equipment and capacity building.
Türkiye also remains an important security actor, contributing significantly to NATO KFOR peace-keeping mission (it has held its command from October 2025 to October 2026) and to the Operation EUFOR Althea. Bilaterally, Türkiye continues to call on all countries to act against the Gülen movement and its alleged members, including through extradition requests and the closures of affiliated schools and businesses.
Türkiye and Albania continued to strengthen their strategic partnership, including on defence, infrastructure, and economic cooperation. Political dialogue remained active within the Strategic Cooperation Council framework. The Turkish Vice-President visited Albania and met with its President in October 2025. Economic relations continued to expand, with Türkiye being Albania’s third largest trade partner in 2025. Albania-Türkiye Investment Forum held in October 2025.
Türkiye remains committed to the political unity, territorial integrity and sovereigntyof Bosnia and Herzegovina, andexpresses willingness to engage with all constituent peoples and political actors in the country, emphasising inclusivity and dialogue as key principles of stability. Türkiye maintains regular bilateral high-level political contacts, including meetings with members of the Presidency as well as trilateral consultation mechanisms, notably Türkiye–BiH-Croatia and Türkiye–BiH-Serbia.
Türkiye maintained good relations with Serbia. High-level political dialogue continued, notably with the visit of the Serbian President to Türkiye (February 2026) and at the Antalya Diplomacy Forum in April 2026. Disagreement remains over Türkiye’s support to
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membership of Kosovo to international organisations, such as the Council of Europe, and to Kosovo’s defence capabilities.
Türkiye maintained strong cultural, political and economic ties with Kosovo and continued to advocate for its international recognition. Türkiye supports Kosovo’s stability, territorial integrity, development and integration with European and Euro-Atlantic institutions. Türkiye supports the EU-led Belgrade-Pristina Dialogue process and held meetings with the EU Special Representative for the Belgrade-Pristina Dialogue.
Türkiye’s relations with Montenegro remained stable, with frequent meetings. The High- Level Strategic Council agreed in 2024 – and not operationalised yet – signalled the intention to institutionalise bilateral relations at a higher level. Türkiye is a significant investor in Montenegro, particularly in tourism, real estate and banking.
Türkiye and North Macedonia continued to maintain close relations under the Strategic Partnership framework. High-level political dialogue remained active. In June 2026, the Turkish President hosted the Prime Minister of North Macedonia in Istanbul, where the Türkiye-North Macedonia Business Forum was also held. Türkiye remained a significant investor and trade partner in North Macedonia, particularly in infrastructure, construction and manufacturing. Defence cooperation persisted as a key pillar of the relationship, with ongoing implementation of previously concluded military cooperation arrangements, including training, capacity building and modernisation.
Türkiye’s relations with Georgia continued to be pragmatic and cooperative, at the level of a strategic partnership, with regular high-level contacts, including in the framework of a high- level Strategic Cooperation Council. Türkiye supports Georgia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. Türkiye is Georgia’s largest trading partners after the EU and key investor. Both countries actively cooperate on economy, energy and connectivity, including the development of the Middle Corridor. In May 2026, Türkiye decided to resume direct bilateral trade with Armenia via Georgia. The strategic trilateral cooperation between Türkiye, Georgia and Azerbaijan continues at high level with a view to enhancing regional energy and transport connectivity, as well as security cooperation. The latest meeting took place in Istanbul in June 2026.
Türkiye and the Republic of Moldova maintained strong diplomatic relations and their strategic cooperation. Türkiye supports Moldova’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. Türkiye is an important trading partner for Moldova. High-level exchanges and cooperation in the Black Sea region continued as well as Turkish support for projects in Gagauzia. President Erdogan met with President Sandu on the sidelines of the Antalya Diplomacy Forum in April 2026.
Türkiye’s relations with Ukraine remained of strategic significance, and several high-level contacts took place. Türkiye has consistently supported Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, emphasising its facilitation and potential mediation role. This includes brokering grain exports corridor and prisoner exchanges, as well as hosting three rounds of direct talks between Russia and Ukraine in Istanbul in 2025. Cooperation in the defence area continued. Türkiye has expressed strong interest in Ukraine’s reconstruction, marked by the establishment of bilateral ‘Reconstruction Task Force’ mechanism. Türkiye also takes part in the ‘Coalition of the Willing’ initiative.
4. RESILIENCE, SECURITY AND DEFENCE
Türkiye as an EU candidate country, a NATO and OSCE member and a close neighbour in a
This designation is without prejudice to positions on status and is in line with UNSCR 1244/1999 and the ICJ
Opinion on the Kosovo declaration of independence.
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crucial geostrategic location, plays an important role in European security and the cross- regional connectivity agenda. The EU-Turkey Customs Union is also an important asset contributing to the resilience and diversification of EU supply chains.
Democratic resilience
Türkiye’s democratic resilience indicators have deteriorated sharply. Trust in Turkish media continued falling in the past year, contributing to Türkiye’s vulnerability to FIMI further exacerbated by its geopolitical position, exposure to regional information conflicts and polarised political landscape. Türkiye’s digitally active and young population, with widespread social media use, also amplifies the country’s susceptibility to FIMI, making its online sphere a prime target environment for the spread of disinformation. Due to shrinking civic space and difficulties in accessing funding, Türkiye’s independent fact-checking community has been gradually eroding.
Türkiye did not restrict the operations of Russian state-controlled media outlets in the context of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine. Pro-Russian narratives are widespread in Türkiye’s information space, with penetration by Russia-linked disinformation networks. In addition, Iranian and Chinese FIMI operations are also visible in the Turkish information environment.
The Presidency’s Directorate of Communications operates a Centre for Countering Disinformation, since 2022, however independent journalism associations and civil society have criticised the organisation for its lack of transparency and political bias.
Türkiye is currently confronting a range of hybrid threats, including cyberattacks, AI-driven disinformation campaigns, vulnerabilities in critical infrastructure, and the potential manipulation of migration flows. This complex security landscape is further complicated by ongoing regional conflicts and the illicit proliferation of advanced weaponry by armed groups. Maritime security remains a significant concern, particularly with threats from unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and unmanned surface vessels (USVs) and security and environmental risks posed by Russia’s ‘shadow fleet’. The situation in the Black Sea region, amid the ongoing war in Ukraine, remains volatile.
Economic security and resilience
Türkiye’s supply chains resilience is shaped by a diversified industrial base building on comparative advantages in transport equipment, machinery, textiles and apparel. Its strategic geographic location also offersaccess to alternative trade and transport corridors, improving connectivity and reducing concentration risks exposed by recent geopolitical tensions and supply disruptions. Türkiye’s integration into European value chains remains a major asset. Thanks to the EU-Turkey Customs Union, close proximity to EU markets and a dynamic business ecosystem (with flexible sourcing and logistics networks), Türkiye is well positioned to contribute to the resilience and diversification of EU supply chains. At the same time, Türkiye is facing marked vulnerabilities such as energy dependence and macroeconomic volatility.
Türkiye has taken actions to strengthen the resilience of its energy supply chains. It has pursued a mix of import diversification policies and infrastructure investment (increasing domestic gas production, LNG re-gasification and storage capacity, and upgrading transmission and distribution networks). Regulatory reforms have also aimed to improve market flexibility and secure long-term supply contracts. However, dependence on imported hydrocarbons from Russia remains significant, representing a concern for the EU. Further progress in strengthening the resilience of its energy supply chain will require Türkiye’s sustained investment, stronger private sector participation and continued regulatory consistency.
Similarly, Türkiye is also advancing the development of its Critical Raw Materials (CRM) supply chains. In 2025 the government published its first Critical and Strategic Minerals
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Report, identifying 37 key minerals and establishing a supply risks assessment framework. A comprehensive CRM Strategy is now being finalised. Türkiye is already a major supplier to the EU, providing 99% of its boron, 63% of its antimony (63%) and 51% of its feldspar. The Beylikova Rare Earth Elements Deposit, discovered in 2022, is viewed as a strategic asset for future supply-chain resilience. Still, significant constraints remain, including limited refining and processing capacity, dependence on foreign technologies and exposure to the global concentration of rare earth processing.
As regards value added inbound investments, despite its large economy, strategic location, and diversified industrial base, Türkiye has not yet fully realised its FDI potential, with its share of global FDI inflows remaining modest at 0.8%. To address this, Türkiye has introduced several initiatives to attract value added foreign direct investment. These include the FDI strategy for 2024-2028, the HIT-30 Programme launched in July 2024, a new incentive scheme adopted in May 2025, and the ‘Century Investment Program’ announced in June 2026. Nevertheless, high-tech FDI still represents only a limited share of total FDI ranging from single digits to low teens depending on the definition used.
Türkiye has also made Artificial Intelligence (AI) a strategic priority. On 13 June 2026, it adopted an ambitious Artificial Intelligence Action Plan aiming to reach 1 gigawatt data centre capacity by 2030, to train 10 000 advanced AI specialists and to provide AI literacy training to 5 million citizens. A new ‘AI voucher program’ will help small and medium-sized enterprises deploy smart manufacturing, energy, and healthcare technologies. In parallel, the strategy earmarks at least 2% of public investment programmes for AI-related projects. Türkiye’s latest industrial strategy adopted in March 2025 is under implementation, with AI capacity building and the deployment of AI applications identified as priorities.
Overall, Türkiye is relatively resilient to economic coercion thanks to its diversified economy, broad international partnerships, large domestic market and considerable geopolitical relevance. However, key vulnerabilities remain in several areas, particularly its dependence on external financing, imported energy, and certain advanced technologies. Strengthening economic diversification, attracting high-tech investment and reducing strategic dependencies remain important policy objectives.
Defence and defence industrial dimension
Türkiye continues to maintain the second largest army in NATO, while over recent years, its defence industry has seen a significant increase in both production and exports. As a result, the country has become an important arm supplier, with Ukraine as one of its principal arms export markets. The Middle East crisis has also triggered expanded defence cooperation with the Gulf countries.
Türkiye’s defence industrial sector is supported by a broad network of state-owned and private companies, domestic supply chains, and government-backed R&D programmes. Türkiye’s domestic production covers key segments, including artillery and rocket ammunition, UAVs and USVs, armoured personnel carriers and electronic warfare systems. The sector’s growth could contribute to Türkiye’s strategic objective of strengthening its domestic industry while expanding exports, particularly to emerging markets, reducing its reliance on external suppliers, and leveraging arms export to forge new international partnerships.
Turkish companies are increasingly looking at the EU market to expand their sales and, at the same time, to gain access to know-how and technology transfers. Turkish companies are also opening joint production facilities and concluding wide-ranging memoranda of understanding joint projects with several EU Member States.
In the framework of the European Defence Fund (EDF) and the European Defence Industrial Programme (EDIP), entities established in the EU or in an associated country and subject to control by Türkiye or by a Turkish entity could only be eligible for funding if guarantees provided by the EU Member State or associated country of establishment are
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made available to the Commission. So far this has only materialised on three occasions.
Civil protection and disaster resilience
Türkiye has continued strengthening its disaster risk management and civil protection efforts
to enhance its resilience. It remains a relevant contributor to cross-border emergency
response and an active Participating State in the Union Civil Protection Mechanism (UCPM).
While its operational capacities are advancing, Türkiye should take further steps to ensure
that its national and local civil protection systems can respond effectively to natural and
human-induced crises. Continued efforts are also needed to reinforce prevention and
preparedness, including population awareness and infrastructure resilience.
5. ABILITY TO ASSUME THE OBLIGATIONS OF MEMBERSHIP
CLUSTER 2: INTERNAL MARKET
This cluster covers: free movement of goods (Chapter 1), freedom of movement for workers (Chapter 2), right of establishment and freedom to provide services (Chapter 3), free movement of capital (Chapter 4), company law (Chapter 6), intellectual property law (Chapter 7), competition policy (Chapter 8), financial services (Chapter 9), and health and consumer protection (Chapter 28). This cluster is key to the good functioning of the EU- Turkey Customs Union and to integrating Türkiye into the EU’s internal market.
Chapter 1: Free movement of goods
The free movement of goods ensures that many products can be traded freely across the EU based on common rules and procedures. Where products are governed by national rules, the principle of the free movement of goods prevents these from creating unjustified barriers to trade.
General principles
The EU horizontal framework for the free movement of goods is largely in place. Though there was intensified engagement under the High-Level Trade Dialogue in the reporting period, no progress was made to remove specific EU origin products from the scope of Turkish Import Surveillance System, and in fact new measures were introduced covering a large range of products subject to surveillance. This needs to be addressed, with the aim of ultimately removing all goods with EU origin from the system. Most of the previous ad hoc issues for EU economic operators under the risk-based TAREKS system for product safety controls have in the meantime been addressed. On preferential quotas for live bovine animals and beef meat for EU operators, the need for a transparent administration of the quota system remains an issue (see Chapter 11, Agriculture). No progress was made on the elimination of export taxes on hides, skins, and wet-blue leather. Türkiye still applies artificial exchange rate on pharmaceutical products and does not accept the EU’s good manufacturing practices certificates. Local content requirements for several products, including renewable energy (see Chapter 15 – Energy), were retained.
Türkiye needs to resolve all outstanding trade barriers between the EU and Türkiye as listed in the Access2Market database; currently 14 in total.
Non-harmonised areas
Türkiye’s mutual recognition legislation in the non-harmonised areas is in line with the EU acquis. Under the Customs Union, Türkiye notifies technical legislation under the Technical Regulation Information System (TRIS). However, Türkiye notified only one legal act in 2025, and three in 2026. This is not sufficient, given the size of Türkiye’s economy and legislative activity and its close ties with the European Union’s economy via the Customs Union.
Harmonised area: quality infrastructure
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Türkiye is aligned with the EU acquis on standardisation, technical regulations, conformity assessment, accreditation, metrology and market surveillance. In the area of standardisation, the national Standards Institute (TSE) is a full member of European standardisation organisations CEN and CENELEC. By the end of the second quarter of 2026, it had adopted 24 999 national standards aligned with European standards. The rate of harmonisation with both CEN and CENELEC standards is 100%.
In the area of accreditation and conformity assessment, Türkiye has 76 notified bodies, nine recognised third-party organisations, and two technical assessment bodies in place. The Turkish Accreditation Agency (TÜRKAK) is a member of the European co-operation for Accreditation (EA). In 2025 it digitalised its application processes and document workflow and is increasing the number of its on-site assessments. TÜRKAK participates actively in the work of EA, holding convener positions in the Artificial Intelligence Working Group and Laboratory Committee Technical Network.
While Türkiye implements market surveillance in compliance with the EU acquis and submits its annual programme to the European Commission, the coverage and effectiveness of market surveillance measures should be strengthened. Although the Ministry of Trade published a taxonomy document in December 2025 serving as a guideline for enterprises engaged in e-commerce, there is still limited market surveillance on e-commerce activities. According to the market surveillance report for 2025, a total of 302 675 products were checked by market surveillance authorities in 2025 representing a 15% increase as compared with 2024.
Türkiye has not yet aligned with IMERA (Internal Market Emergency and Resilience Act).
Harmonised area: sectoral legislation
On the EU ‘new and global approach’ product acquis, Türkiye adopted amending legislation designed to align with the latest acquis on noise emission by outdoor equipment, and on eco-design requirements for local space heaters and fans.
On the EU ‘old approach’ product acquis, Türkiye adopted new legislation on motor vehicles, agricultural and forestry vehicles and two- or three-wheel vehicles and quadricycles designed to further align with the EU acquis. On chemicals, Türkiye remains partially aligned with the EU Regulation on Registration, Evaluation, Authorisation and Restriction of chemicals (REACH). Türkiye remains fully aligned with the EU Classification, Labelling and Packaging Regulation (CLP) and Good Laboratory Practice (GLP) acquis.
On medicines for human use and veterinary medicinal products, Türkiye issued amending legislation on marketing authorisations, postponing the deadline for the completion of authorisations for radionuclide generators, kits, radionuclide precursors and radiopharmaceuticals and the deadline for the temporary authorisation of allergen products manufactured in the EU and circulating on the EU market. An amending legislation on traditional herbal medicines was also adopted. Türkiye does not accept EU good manufacturing practice certificates on medicines for human use. While Türkiye has a regulatory data protection regime in place, in the area of pharmaceuticals this regime is not aligned with the EU acquis.
On procedural measures, while Türkiye does not fully align with the EU acquis on drug precursors, it has a stringent system for licensing and regulation of these substances. Though licensing procedures are in place in the area of firearms, Türkiye still needs to complete alignment with the EU acquis on the control of the acquisition and possession of weapons. There were no developments on alignment with the EU acquis on the return of cultural goods unlawfully removed from the territory of a Member State.
On anti-corruption, the product safety law and regulations on conformity assessment bodies and notified bodies, market surveillance and accreditation contain rules on
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transparency, impartiality and prevention of conflicts of interest. The Turkish Accreditation Body, TÜRKAK has an ethical commission and ethical guidelines in place.
Chapter 2: Freedom of movement for workers
Nationals of one Member State have the right to work in another Member State and must be given the same working and social conditions as other worker nationals of that Member State.
Regarding access to the labour market, restrictions on employment in certain occupations requiring Turkish citizenship remain. In 2025, a total of 349 961 work permitswere issued including for citizens from more than 13 EU countries, compared with 300 852 in 2024.
There has been no development on access to the labour market or in preparing for future participation in the European Employment Services Network (EURES).
Türkiye still maintains six labour force agreements with EU Member States. Progress towards alignment with the European Skills, Competences, Qualifications, and Occupations classification has been limited.
On the coordination of social security systems, one Social Security Agreement with Slovenia was signed in the reporting period, bringing the total number of bilateral social security agreements concluded with EU Member States to 16.
Chapter 3: Right of establishment and freedom to provide services
EU natural and legal persons have the right to establish themselves in any Member State and to provide cross-border services. For certain regulated professions, there are rules on mutual recognition of qualifications. EU rules on postal services focus on improving the quality of universal service, gradual market opening to competition, and the establishment of an independent regulator.
There was no progress on the right of establishment. On the freedom to provide cross- border services, service providers registered in the EU still face requirements on registration, licensing and authorisation. The point of single contact has not yet been created. There is no specific regulation or practice governing the temporary or occasional provision of services.
On postal services, Türkiye is partially aligned with the Postal Services Directive and the Regulation on cross-border parcel delivery services. Türkiye still maintains a regulatory postal monopoly. Systems for accounting separation are not implemented at the universal service provider. There are currently 61 postal operators active in the postal market. Türkiye also needs to ensure that the national regulatory authority (the Information and Communication Technologies Authority) is legally separate from, and operationally independent of, the postal operators, and endowed with the appropriate powers and means to monitor and enforce compliance with the postal market rules.
On mutual recognition of professional qualifications, the Vocational Qualifications Authority (VQA) continued to implement the national qualification framework. Türkiye has drawn up a list of 341 regulated professions. However, in accordance with national legislation, certain professions require additional mandatory certification from the VQA beyond the recognition of professional qualifications which contradict the acquis. As of April 2026, the number of occupations requiring certification is 244, while the number of national occupational standards increased to 961 and 701 national qualifications were aligned with these standards. The Ministry of Labour and Social Security published a communiqué in March 2026, which bans the recruitment of workers in 40 professions categorised as dangerous and very dangerous without the mandatory certification after March 2027, unless the workers have graduated from a formal training programme specific to the occupation. Some regulated professions remain reserved for Turkish nationals, and language requirements for access to certain professions have not been removed. For the seven
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sectoral professions for which the EU has common minimum training requirements (medical doctors, dental practitioners, nurses responsible for general care, midwives, pharmacists, veterinary surgeons, and architects), Türkiye needs to intensify its efforts to align with requirements from the EU acquis. Türkiye distinguishes between the recognition of qualifications for academic purposes and the recognition of professional qualifications for access to regulated professions, in line with the acquis. It is possible to apply online for the recognition and equivalence of higher education qualifications.
Chapter 4: Free movement of capital
In the EU, capital and investments must be able to move without restrictions, with common rules for cross-border payments. Banks and other economic operators apply certain rules to support the fight against money laundering and terrorist financing.
On capital movements and payments, there were no developments in the reporting period. Restrictions on foreign ownership remain in certain sectors including broadcasting, education, transportation, financial services, the electricity market and real estate. Türkiye’s legislation on real estate acquisition by foreigners remains discriminatory as it does not apply to all EU nationals. Immovable property acquisition by citizens of neighbouring countries in border provinces continues to be restricted for national security reasons. The obligation for exporters to sell their foreign-earned incomes to the central bank was initially increased temporarily in May 2025 from 25% to 35% and this rate has been extended multiple times, most recently until 31 January 2027.
In March 2026, the central bank further improved the standards on payment systems, by introducing amendments to a by-law on payment services, electronic money issuance and payment service providers. The amendments enable balances held in payment and electronic money safeguarding accounts (except for accounts opened in foreign currency) to be placed in yield bearing accounts, allowing users to manage their financial transaction easily and more securely.
On fight against money laundering and terrorist financing, the new 2026-2030 National anti-money laundering and countering the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT) and confiscation strategy was adopted on 4 July 2026. Further efforts included the adoption of an action plan on illegal online betting, gambling and games of chance on 1 November 2025. The Action Plan builds on the 2025 updated AML/CFT National Risk Assessment of Türkiye, which assessed fraud and illegal betting as high-risk. Türkiye’s financial intelligence unit (MASAK) is responsible for the coordination of these efforts.
Stricter AML/CFT rules for cryptocurrencies and related service providers have been enforced, with MASAK updating its guidance for crypto-asset providers on 30 September 2025 as a follow-up for enforcement of obligations introduced earlier in 2025.
Türkiye needs to further align with the EU acquis, including the latest versions of the Anti- Money Laundering Directive and the Transfer of Funds Regulation, to strengthen its AML/CFT framework. Türkiye should also continue strengthening supervisory capacities, notably at regional level. A regulatory gap remains in ensuring a proportionate and risk- based approach to non-profit organisation monitoring.
Türkiye’s report from the Financial Action Task Force’s (FATF) fifth round of mutual evaluations was adopted in June 2026. In terms of technical compliance, Türkiye was found to be compliant with 38 of the FATF’s 40 Recommendations. In terms of effectiveness, Türkiye was assessed as “Substantial” for 3 of the 11 Immediate Outcomes (IOs) and “Moderate” for the remaining 8.
(For criminal aspects, See Chapter 24 – Justice, freedom and security).
Chapter 6: Company law
The EU has common rules on the formation, registration and disclosure requirements of a
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company, with complementary rules for accounting and financial reporting, and statutory audit.
On company law and corporate governance, the legislation on domestic mergers and divisions and shareholders rights, including long-term shareholder engagement and the use of digital tools and processes in company law, are not fully aligned with the EU acquis. On business registrations, Türkiye lacks provisions requiring all limited liability companies to publish annual accounts. Türkiye should also complete alignment with the Directive on corporate sustainability due diligence (CSDDD).
On company reporting, Türkiye Sustainability Reporting Standards (TSRS) and Climate Related Disclosures Standards are not fully aligned with the EU acquis but satisfy the reporting thresholds that apply under the Corporate Sustainability Reporting Directive. While banks are obliged to report, the Public Oversight, Accounting, and Auditing Standards Authority (POA) granted an exemption to portfolio management companies and allowed the incorporation of sustainability reports into annual activity reports in 2025. In March 2026, a Presidential decree extended the scope of mandatory independent audits to include domestic natural gas companies in which State-Owned Enterprises hold a controlling stake (over 50%). Türkiye should fully align national legislation with the Accounting Directive and Corporate Sustainability reporting.
On improving the gender balance among directors of listed companies and related measures, no progress was made in the reporting period.
Chapter 7: Intellectual property law
The EU has to a large extent harmonised rules for the legal protection and enforcement of copyright and related rights, as well as of industrial property rights, including
trademarks, designs, patents and related supplementary protection certificates (SPCs), geographical indications (GIs), including craft and industrial GIs.
On copyright and related rights, the Turkish law still needs to be amended to provide stronger protection that reflects technological developments to align with the Directives on copyright and related rights. While legislation to ensure legal protection against the circumvention of technological protection measures for authors, performers and phonogram producers, or protection of rights management information exists, there are notable shortcomings in its implementation. The weak or non-existent compensation for exceptions such as lending rights and exceptions in education as well as the lack of distribution of private copying levies to the rightsholders and the licensing difficulties remain to be addressed. Persistent online piracy coupled with ineffective enforcement hinder economic opportunities for domestic and foreign rightsholders in Türkiye.
On industrial property rights, particularly trademarks, the lack of clarity and consistency in consideration of ‘bad faith’ undermines the effectiveness of cancellation procedures. The Turkish Patent and Trademark Office has continued strengthening its administrative and operational capacity since it became responsible to examine requests for revocations. However, stakeholders still report expensive and lengthy procedures to revoke, oppose and invalidate trademarks and continue to signal that the trademark registration system in general remains unpredictable. Türkiye lacks a legal framework on supplementary protection certificates. The regulatory data protection regime in place since 2005 excludes biologics and combination products. The protection of undisclosed test data submitted for pharmaceutical and agrochemical marketing licensing remains inadequate by the standards of the EU acquis.
On judicial enforcement, criminal courts rarely impose sufficiently severe fines as provided in existing legislation in cases of large-scale commercial industrial property infringements. Lengthy litigation procedures, including appeals, remain inefficient. Persistent challenges and inconsistencies remain in the adjudication of preliminary injunctions and with regard to claims for monetary compensation, as well as in storage and destruction procedures
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including in their relation to their associated costs. The excessive reliance on expert witness statements further complicates proceedings. Despite recent improvements in some cities, challenges remain in obtaining search and seizure warrants, even where right holders present strong evidence of counterfeiting. Enforcement authorities must enhance the efficiency of their response against industrial property infringements.
Certain gaps in the customs enforcement legislation persist, preventing full alignment with the EU acquis. Right holders’ applications to customs for seizures have increased from 3 031 in 2024 to 3 139 in 2025. There is still scope to strengthen customs enforcement against counterfeit goods, including goods in transit and exports. According to the latest EU report on the enforcement of intellectual property rights, Türkiye’s position has deteriorated, becoming the second largest country of provenance for infringing goods detained in 2024 with the largest share of clothing (55.27%) and labels, tags and stickers (9.2%).
Further efforts are needed to increase public awareness on the risks of counterfeiting and piracy, particularly on the impact on health, safety, employment and rule of law while highlighting the economic benefits of IPR-intensive industries. The continued significant flow of counterfeit goods into the EU indicates that stronger political commitment is required to enforce intellectual property rights both inland and at the border.
Chapter 8: Competition policy
EU rules enable free competition. They include antitrust rules against restrictive agreements between companies and the abuse of a dominant position and also include rules on concentrations between companies which would significantly impede effective competition. EU rules also set out a system of State aid control. Governments are only allowed to grant State aid if strict conditions are met, with a view to prevent distortion competition.
Antitrust and mergers
The legal framework is broadly aligned with the EU acquis. The Law on the protection of competition broadly reflects Articles 101 and 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). Implementing legislation in this field is largely in place. The relevant legislation still needs to be aligned to ensure full compliance with the Vertical Block Exemption Regulation. In 2025, the Turkish Competition Authority (TCA) renewed the communiqué on the Block Exemption for the Specialization Agreements to align with the relevant EU acquis.
The institutional framework is in place. The Law on the protection of competition is enforced by the Turkish Competition Authority, which retains financial and administrative autonomy and possesses adequate enforcement capacity. In 2025, overall implementation was effective. More than 100 decisions were taken in antitrust cases (104 compared to 166 in 2024) along with 10 exemption/negative clearance decisions (unchanged from 2024). Additionally, more than 400 decisions were made on merger/acquisition/joint venture/privatisation (416, up from 311 in 2024). In 2025, the TCA imposed fines for infringements of competition law totalling TRY 8.3 billion (EUR 156 million), marking a slight increase from TRY 7.5 billion (EUR 141 million) in 2024. The number of ex officio investigations initiated by the TCA fell to 26 in 2025, significantly below the two-year average of 75. In 2025, Turkish courts upheld 92% of the 102 judgements rendered in appeals against TCA decisions.
State aid
No progress was made on the legislative framework. Overall, Türkiye’s Law on the monitoring and supervision of State aid (State aid Law) is broadly aligned with Articles 107 and 108 TFEU. However, Türkiye’s legislative framework is de facto ineffective due to the indefinite suspension of the State aid Law’s implementation.
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There is no functioning institutional framework,and the administrative structure in force significantly deviates from the EU acquis. Hence, Türkiye still needs to align its legislation with the EU acquis.
The absence of a transparent State aid inventory covering all aid schemes, including the amount (or budgeted amount) of the state support provided and foregone revenues, remains a cause for concern. The transparency of state aid schemes further deteriorated following a Presidency decision from November 2024 which allows the government not to publish project-based investment support decisions. Since then, the government has not officially shared any project-based incentive decisions (if taken). Such deficiencies are not addressed by the current incentive scheme. This scheme preserves the selective Project-Based Investment Programme used for large-scale investments, which also includes the High Technology Investment (HIT-30) Programme introduced in July 2024. The latter commits to supporting projects in 30 priority technology areas.
Liberalisation
State-owned enterprises are subject to competition and in theory to State aid rules.
Chapter 9: Financial services
EU rules aim at ensuring fair competition among financial institutions and the stability and integrity of financial markets, namely in the field of banking, insurance, supplementary pensions, investment services and securities. They include rules on authorisation, operation and supervision of these institutions.
On banking and financial conglomerates, the Banking Regulation and Supervision Agency (BDDK) adopted its strategic plan for the period 2025-2028, built around three pillars: strengthening trust and stability in financial markets, ensuring an inclusive, competitive and efficient development track, and enhancing institutional capacity for more effective regulation and supervision.
There were no developments in aligning with the EU acquis, including the latest versions of the Capital Requirements Regulation and Directive (CRR3 and CRD6) and the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD2).
On insurance and occupational pensions, the Turkish Insurance and Private Pension Regulation and Supervision Agency (SEDDK) published revised regulations governing insurance support service providers in July 2026. The revised regulations introduced a new authorisation and regulatory regime for insurance support service providers operating particularly in the fields of claims managements, 24/7 assistance services and claims investigation. In October 2025, the Insurance and Private Pension Regulation and Supervision Agency amended the regulation on private health insurance to expand consumer rights.
The financial market infrastructure continues to be partially aligned with EU acquis. In December 2025, the Capital Markets Board (CMB) increased the financial threshold applicable to companies conducting an initial public offering for the first time.
On securities markets and investment services the CMB updated the criteria for the designation of a professional client by investment firms in December 2025 and in February 2026, crypto-asset service providers and crowdfunding platforms were formally integrated into the CMB’s regulatory supervision. As a result, these entities are now required to apply for CMB membership within three months after obtaining their authorisation certificate. In November 2025, the CMB underwent a re-structuring aimed at increasing efficiency in regulation supervision and direction of market development.
On sustainable and digital finance, the National Green Finance Strategy and Action Plan (2026-2029) was adopted in July 2026 in view of strengthening the country’s green finance
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ecosystem, enhancing the resilience of financial markets to climate-related risks, and improving the investment environment in support of sustainable development goals.
Chapter 28: Consumer and health protection
EU rules protect consumers’ economic interests and also ensure product safety, prevent dangerous imitations and establish liability for defective products. The EU also ensures high common standards for tobacco control, blood, tissues, cells and organs, and human and veterinary medicinal products. The EU also guarantees a high level of protection of public health and in particular has rules for upholding patients’ rights in cross-border healthcare and in preparing for and responding to serious cross-border health threats, including communicable diseases.
Consumer protection
On product safety related issues, consumers’ awareness of the national unsafe products information system remains low. Regular monitoring and more robust regulatory tools are required to combat online sales of counterfeit goods that endanger consumer and public health (see Chapter 7 – Intellectual property law). Market surveillance of e-commerce also remains limited (see Chapter 1 – Free movement of goods).
Türkiye’s national legislation remains mostly aligned with the EU acquis on consumer protection on non-safety related issues. The alignment with the Representative Actions Directive remains at an early stage and significant work is needed. Challenges continue on the application of consumer rights, and consumer awareness and education, cooperation and coordination of sectoral stakeholders remain limited. Consumer arbitration committees need to ensure better enforcement of consumer rights
Public health
On horizontal aspects, Türkiye started implementing the One Health Strategy by adopting the National Action Plan to Combat Antimicrobial Resistance (2026-2030), prepared under the coordination of the Ministry of Health to address public health threats. Türkiye continued strengthening its preparedness for emergencies and public health threats. Türkiye also continued implementing healthy lifestyle programmes, along with regulatory changes aimed to reduce the patient caseloads for family doctors and strengthen collaboration between the Ministry of Health and the Ministry of Social Services.
On e-Health, Türkiye integrated new digital health platforms and health data processing activities. Mobile healthcare services for sexual and reproductive health were introduced during the reporting period.
Regarding tobacco control, Türkiye continues implementing its Tobacco Control Strategy
and Action Plan (2024-2028).
Türkiye has made some progress in addressing cross-border health threats.
Progress continued on communicable diseases, with a National Medical Entomology and Vectoral Diseases Research Laboratory being established in late 2025. On non- communicable diseases, population-based cancer screenings including HPV-DNA testing for cervical cancer, faecal occult blood testing for colorectal cancer, and mammography for breast cancer continued to be offered free of charge and the number of Cancer Early Diagnosis, Screening, and Education Centres (KETEM) across Türkiye has increased to 488. Regarding cardiovascular health, Türkiye continues implementing its National Cardiovascular Disease Prevention and Control Programme, which runs until the end of 2026. Türkiye is encouraged to use the EU’s Safe Hearts Plan as a reference for its next cardiovascular health programme. On blood, tissues, cells and organs, Türkiye is not fully aligned with the EU acquis. Legislation on products derived from human tissues and cells and centres related to these products entered into force in September 2025. Furthermore, an online organ donation system was established during the reporting period.
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Türkiye is not aligned with the EU acquis on patients’ rights in cross-border healthcare.
On medical devices and in vitro diagnostic medical devices, Türkiye is aligned with the EU acquis in the context of the EU-Turkey Customs Union.
On mental health, the number of community mental health centres and healthy life centres increased to 191 and 348 respectively. Türkiye does not have a mental health law. Türkiye is encouraged to use as reference the Commission Communication on a comprehensive approach to mental health adopted in 2023.
On health inequalities, sexual and reproductive health disparities remain. Adolescents’ access to sexual and reproductive health services and rights remains a critical issue. Despite progress made in maternal and infant mortality with new programmes to target risky pregnancies, the ‘Year of the Family’ initiative and campaigns against c-sections resulted in a deterioration of women’s reproductive rights, with persistent barriers to access to services, including family planning and safe maternal healthcare, especially for rural, Kurdish, and refugee women. Access to contraception and abortion services remain limited. Infant mortality decreased from 9 to 7.7 per 1 000 live births.
Vulnerable groups, such as LGBTIQ, have limited access to healthcare services. Since 1 January 2026, the introduction of mandatory health contribution fees and healthcare service payments has substantially reduced access to healthcare for Syrians under Temporary Protection in Türkiye.
Significant needs remain regarding healthcare in the regions affected by earthquakes in 2023, especially for mental health and reproductive health. Accessibility in hospitals is regulated under a Law on persons with disabilities and Ministry of Health accessibility guidelines. Hospitals are expected to comply with national accessibility standards and may receive an accessibility certificate after inspection. Türkiye is encouraged to use as reference the new EU guidelines to improve healthcare access for persons with disabilities.
On anti-corruption, regulations on market surveillance contain rules on transparency, impartiality and prevention of conflicts of interest (see Chapter 1 – Free movement of goods). Türkiye does not have a specific anti-corruption plan on public health, but horizontal anti-corruption measures apply to the healthcare sector.
CLUSTER 3: COMPETITIVENESS AND INCLUSIVE GROWTH This cluster covers: digital transformation and media (Chapter 10), taxation (Chapter 16), economic and monetary policy (Chapter 17), social policy and employment (Chapter 19), industrial policy (Chapter 20), science and research (Chapter 25), education and culture (Chapter 26), and Customs Union (Chapter 29).
Chapter 10: Digital transformation and media
The EU supports the smooth functioning of the internal market for electronic communications, electronic commerce and audiovisual services. The rules protect consumers and support the universal availability of modern services.
On electronic communications, Türkiye amended its Electronic Communication Law in December 2025 to require verified identity documents for phone subscriptions and to ensure that providers keep user data up to date. The amendments also allow prosecutors to order the suspension of mobile lines and request user information without a court order in theft or fraud investigations. Türkiye needs to ensure that these measures are applied with appropriate safeguards as they could affect end user’s rights. Further changes were made in the Regulation on Authentication and Consumer Rights Regulation on the Electronic Communications Sector in June 2026 with the motivation of preventing counterfeit lines. While authentication processes were rearranged in the establishment of subscription agreements with the new regulation, verification methods for foreign subscribers were
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clarified, line ownership controls were tightened and the activation status of subscribers was made mandatory to be verified regularly.
Türkiye has yet to align with the European Electronic Communications Code and to address remaining concerns over the financial and administrative independence of the regulatory authority, as well as the lack of transparency in the Telecommunication Regulatory Authority’s revenue transfers. A competitive and consumer-friendly telecommunications market is not yet fully developed, and further regulatory and administrative steps are needed.
The fixed broadband market remains insufficiently competitive, with penetration still below the OECD average. Mobile broadband use continued to grow, as did LTE subscribers, reaching 91.2 million by the end of 2025. Türkiye completed its 5G auction in October 2025, allocating spectrum in the 700 MHz and 3.5 GHz bands. The 5G roll-out started on 1 April 2026. Concerns remain regarding the use of non-trusted vendor equipment in network infrastructure, and implementation of the 5G Cybersecurity Toolbox should be prioritised.
On digital services, Türkiye’s e-commerce market continued to grow and the legal framework was amended in March 2026 to update monetary thresholds online platforms. Custom procedures for cross-border e-commerce were revised in January 2026. Türkiye adopted an Action Plan for Empowering Children in the Digital World in February 2026. The Turkish Law regulating Online Content and Combating Crimes Committed via Such Content was amended in May 2026 and restrictions were brought on gaming platforms. The amending law also banned children under the age of 15 from creating social media accounts and imposed strict parental control and age-verification requirements on platforms. Türkiye has not yet aligned with the Digital Services Act and Digital Markets Act.
The existing digital services legislation, including social media, disinformation and cybersecurity rules, needs to be revised to ensure compatibility with the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights and key principles of the EU acquis. The e-Government Gateway continued to expand to 9 305 services and 69.09 million users as of June 2026. Further efforts are required to align with the European Interoperability Framework and the Interoperable Europe Act.
On media, regarding digital television broadcasting, Türkiye’s objection to a new unified Cypriot digital television broadcasting plan below 700 MHz under the ITU Geneva 2006 Agreement remains unresolved. This continues to deprive Cyprus of the necessary regulatory protection against interferences from neighbouring countries. Furthermore, Türkiye needs to revise the legislation regulating radio, television and on-demand media services to clarify its scope, definitions, and licensing criteria, and to address controversial provisions relating to jurisdiction and independence of RTÜK, which persisted and were not addressed (see Chapter 23 – Judiciary and fundamental rights).
On Artificial Intelligence, Türkiye should develop the necessary legal governance and enforcement structures in line with the EU Artificial Intelligence Act. Türkiye adopted an Artificial Intelligence Action Plan in June 2026, aiming to reach 1 gigawatt data centre capacity by 2030, training 10 000 advanced AI specialists and providing AI literacy training to 5 million people. Implementation of the industrial strategy with AI priorities continues but no concrete progress was reported.
No progress was reported on data, where Türkiye has not yet adopted a National Data Strategy to enable a trusted, secure and interoperable data ecosystem in line with the EU Data Governance Act and Data Act.
On digital trust and cybersecurity, Türkiye’s compliance with the eIDAS Regulation is still pending. The institutionalisation of the Cybersecurity Presidency was completed during the reporting period and the Cybersecurity Council held its first meeting in May 2026. A December 2025 Presidential decree expanded its mandate to digital government and public- sector AI applications under its authority. Türkiye needs to continue the implementation of
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the EU 5G Cybersecurity Toolbox measures, including assessing the risk profile of suppliers and putting in place appropriate restrictions and/or exclusions for high-risk suppliers. Türkiye continued building a structured, sector-specific cyber incident response ecosystem to contribute to its alignment with the NIS 2 Directive.
In relation to the protection of minors online, a Safer Internet Centre was established in Türkiye.
Chapter 16: Taxation
EU rules on taxation cover value added tax, excise duties and aspects of corporate taxation. They also cover cooperation between tax administrations, including the exchange of information to prevent tax evasion.
In the area of indirect taxation, Türkiye continues to have a wide range of products that are subject to a 1% value added tax (VAT), which is not in line with the EU acquis. Türkiye applies a 20% ‘standard’ VAT rate, a 10% ‘reduced’ VAT rate and, for some goods, a 1% VAT rate which falls below the ‘minimum EU reduced rate’. The legislation governing the structure, exemptions, special schemes and the scope of reduced rates is not fully aligned with the EU acquis.
In terms of specific and proportional tax elements, Türkiye’s cigarette excise duty legislation diverges from the EU acquis, while the overall level of taxation (ad valorem) on cigarettes is comparable to EU levels. Excise duty legislation on alcohol and alcoholic beverages also differs from the EU acquis. Although Türkiye equalised excise duty on domestic and imported products in 2018, it reinstated in a differential excise duty between raki and similar spirits in 2024, a measure that was maintained over the reporting period. Excise duties on some of the energy products remain lower than the EU’s minimum rates. Contrary to the EU acquis, coal, coke and electricity are not subject to excise duties, while kerosene is zero rated. Türkiye engages in administrative cooperation in the area of excise duty.
On direct taxation, Türkiye continues to implement 25% corporate income tax, rising to 30% for the financial sector. Under the new tax regime adopted in the reporting period, manufacturing and agriculture industries benefit from a reduced rate of 12.5%. Türkiye keeps applying a minimum 15% corporate income tax for large multinational enterprises, a 10% local minimum corporate income tax and a 30% general corporate income tax for public-private partnerships. The 1% additional tax on service providers for goods purchased in online marketplaces is still in force, while a new 95-100% corporate income tax deduction has been introduced for qualified service centres.
The income tax exemption implemented since 2022 for the minimum wage continued, including the tax on all wages corresponding to the minimum wage. In 2025, TRY 33.6 billion was collected as a 7.5% digital services tax (on digital advertising, content, and intermediary services) which has been in effect since March 2020. In 2026, a new tax regime was enacted, offering 5% (scalable to 0%) tax on repatriated assets and a 20-year income tax exemption for new residents.
On administrative cooperation and mutual assistance, the OECD Global Forum on Transparency and Exchange of Information for Tax Purposes qualified Türkiye as ‘largely compliant’ with the exchange of information on request. However, Türkiye remains listed in Annex II of the EU Council Conclusions on non-cooperative jurisdictions for tax purposes under criterion 1.1 (automatic exchange of tax information on financial accounts), as it is still not fully compliant with the relevant requirements. Consequently, in February 2026, the Council reaffirmed its call on Türkiye to establish the outstanding automatic information exchange relationships with one Member State to fulfil this criterion.
The operational capacity of the tax administration has remained stable. The number of staff members working in the Turkish Revenue Administration in 2026 is 667 at the central level and 40 217 at the local level.
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Regarding digitalisation, the Turkish Revenue Administration uses an electronic document management system. The action plan to combat the informal economy (2023-25) lacked performance indicators and a publicly accessible system for monitoring implementation. Türkiye has not yet developed an updated action plan to tackle the informal economy in 2026 and beyond.
Chapter 17: Economic and monetary policy
EU rules require the independence of central banks and prohibit them from directly financing the public sector. Member States coordinate their economic policies and are subject to fiscal, economic and financial surveillance.
On monetary policy, despite a relatively tight monetary policy stance, inflation remains very high and well above the central bank inflation target of 5%, which is jointly set with the government. The interim inflation targets for 2026-2028 have been revised upwards amid geopolitical tensions in the Middle East. The FX-protected lira deposit scheme was terminated, removing a major contingent liability and source of financial risk. The central bank has been strengthening efforts to increase credibility regarding its statutory independence and monetary policy stance, including by enhancing transparency and communication with the public to better anchor inflation expectations. However, the central bank changed its approach by providing point estimates rather than forecast band range. Concerns over the institutional underpinning of central bank independence persist, especially with the President of the Republic maintaining extensive legal powers in the appointment of the central bank governor and board members.
As regards economic policy, further progress was made in presenting a more realistic macroeconomic framework to the European Commission, with ongoing efforts focused on further enhancing the coherence among key macroeconomic targets. However, the main policy documents do not incorporate the presentation of alternative macroeconomic and fiscal scenarios. Türkiye is not aligned with the Directive on Requirements for Budgetary Frameworks. In particular, it has neither national fiscal rules nor an independent fiscal institution. Although the fiscal framework lacks strong anchors, budgetary outcomes indicate the authorities’ preference for fiscal discipline. The transmission of excessive deficit procedure notifications and government finance statistics remains incomplete and lack transparency (see Chapter 18 - Statistics).
The Economic Reform Programme (2026-2028) was submitted on time. The structural reform Section improved with more detailed impact assessments of the proposed measures. The policy guidance set out jointly in the conclusions of the Economic and Financial Dialogue of May 2025 has been partially implemented. Türkiye was not represented at the Economic and Financial Dialogue of May 2026, but it participated in the process and endorsed the conclusions.
Chapter 19: Social policy and employment
EU rules in the social field include minimum requirements for labour law, equality and non- discrimination, health and safety at work. They also promote social inclusion, social protection and social dialogue at European level.
In the field of labour law, Türkiye’s legislation is not yet fully aligned with EU legislation, including recent directives on minimum wage and pay transparency. For the existing labour legislation, implementation challenges continue with limited inspection coverage and persistent informal employment. In 2025, the number of labour inspectors remained at 916. Enforcement falls short especially in working time compliance, occupational safety and health, and collective labour rights. Women, young people, migrant workers, and those in non-standard employment face disproportionate risks of exploitation and rights violations. Labour force participation of children aged 15-17 rose to 25.5% in 2025, up from 24.9% in the previous year. There is still no new national programme on the elimination of child
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labour. A stronger focus regarding child labour is needed for children in vulnerable situations, including refugee and Roma children.
On health and safety at work (OSH), the regulation in relation to the working procedures on National Occupational Health and Safety Council has been adopted on 20 January 2026. Social partners’ involvement has been improved with the revitalisation of the National Occupational Health and Safety Council for the first time since 2018. An amendment to the work equipment health and safety regulation tightened periodic control requirements and clarified inspector qualifications, partially addressing EU Directive 2009/104/EC on the use of work equipment. Broader gaps in enforcement and addressing emerging risks, like automated equipment, remain. Construction remains the most persistent high-risk sector for fatalities. Türkiye continues to face challenges in the reporting and recognition of occupational diseases, with officially recorded cases significantly underrepresenting actual incidence. Independent sources report 2 105 fatalities at work in 2025, 94 of them being children. Concerns persist on the MESEM vocational training programme regarding the workplace risks for minors and the lack of adequate safeguards.
Türkiye is continuing its preparatory work on the European Child Guarantee and has nominated a new child guarantee co-ordinator in the reporting period.
There was no progress on social dialogue. The labour assembly and tripartite advisory board convened. However, Türkiye still does not have a functioning economic and social council. The unionisation rate decreased to 13.8% for workers in the private and public sectors, and the unionisation rate for private sector workers remained very low, at 6.83%. The unionisation rate of civil servants increased to 77.96%. The proportion of women among unionised workers remained low. Türkiye has not introduced effective and dissuasive measures against anti-union discrimination, including anti-union dismissals. The coverage of collective bargaining for workers in the public and private sector remained low. Measures are needed to ensure that more workers’ organisations can engage in collective bargaining and to increase the coverage. Only 60 trade unions out of 246 at national level are considered representative, passing the legislative threshold of 1% of workers registered in a certain branch on national level required for collective bargaining. Barriers to collective bargaining in the private sector remain including long legal appeal procedures suspending bargaining certification of trade unions.
On employment policy, the decrease in the number of job and vocational counsellors in the Turkish Employment Agency (İŞKUR) continued in 2025. The increase in the number of active labour market programmes continued, including the number of participants. In 2026, Türkiye announced the youth employment initiative (GUC), aiming at bringing 3 million young people into the labour market. Despite the decrease in the rate of unregistered employment (15+) to 25.6% in 2025, informality continues to undermine the effectiveness of the social security system. Given the large working age population among Syrian migrants, the number of issued work permits remains low, despite an increase in 2025. Most of the Syrian refugees under temporary protection work in the informal sector.
The unemployment rate has declined, but both employment and labour force participation rates have decreased. The rate of composite measure of labour underutilisation consisting of time-related underemployment, potential labour force and unemployment observed a significant increase to 29.7% in 2025, which underlines that the absorption capacity of the labour market is limited.
Regarding labour force participation and unemployment rate, see the Statistical Annex and the Section on the functioning of the labour market under 2.3 Economic criteria.
On social protection and inclusion, Türkiye continues to rely on fragmented programmes on poverty reduction. While several social assistance schemes exist, their outreach and adequacy are insufficient, particularly for informal workers, Roma and rural populations. In 2025, cash transfer programmes helped 262 229 children remain with their families, but
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coverage and adequacy remain limited due to high inflation and weak targeting. Nearly 1 in 3 children live in poverty, with 36.8% at risk of poverty or social exclusion. The GINI coefficient dropped but remains high. These challenges underscore the urgent need for more effective social protection measures. EU-funded social assistance schemes continue to cover a majority of vulnerable refugee households. Coordination between employment and social services is weak, and community-based care for older persons and people with disabilities is underdeveloped. Progress in de-institutionalisation for children in need of protection is notable as a new emergency foster care system has been expanded to 28 provinces. Gaps persist in mental health and disability services.
There was no progress on non-discrimination in employment and social policies. The existing laws still do not offer protection against discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation and gender identity. There are still discriminatory practices against persons with disabilities and Roma population affecting access to employment. The public employment agency (İŞKUR) has developed a barrier-free web platform, a centralised tool providing persons with disabilities and employers with streamlined access to employment services. Due to the legal quota system, the number of persons with disabilities employed as civil servants in Türkiye reached 82 626 in 2025.
On equality between women and men on employment and social policy, gender disparities continue, compounded by intersecting inequalities. The gender gap in the labour market persists at nearly four times the EU average. With the female labour force participation rate decreasing to 36.2% in 2025, Türkiye continues to rank among the lowest in the OECD. In the Global Gender Gap Index 2025, Türkiye’s ranking fell to 135th
from 127th in 2024 in the overall index. The NEET rate for young women is still very high and increased in 2025. For women, the
quality of employment also remains precarious, with a high informal employment rate. Informality still disproportionately affects women in agriculture, where the rate rose to 91.9%. A new law extended working mothers' maternity leave from 16 to 24 weeks and increased paternity leave in the private sector from 5 to 10 days. Only 2 751 people were provided with the half-time work benefit in 2025. Care burdens and gender bias continue to constrain women’s employment. The enrolment rate for children aged 3-5 decreased to 48.97%, which negatively affects the employment rate of women. The gender gap in employment deepens disparities in pensions and poverty, leaving women disproportionately disadvantaged. Across all age groups, women continued to face a significantly higher risk of poverty or social exclusion than men. Regarding violence and harassment at work, new legislative measures, enforcement of existing measures and awareness-raising are still needed to prevent and eliminate all forms of workplace violence and harassment, in line with the Convention 190 of the International Labour Organisation. The share of female board members in the 50 largest companies listed on Borsa İstanbul (BIST 50) decreased to 18.3%, and the share of women in decision-making positions remained very low (see Chapter 23 – Judiciary and fundamental rights).
The good level of preparation for the participation in the European Social Fund (ESF) was maintained. Support is provided through the Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance (IPA III) for actions that pursue objectives corresponding to those of the ESF (i.e. employment, social inclusion, education, skills and administrative capacity building) (see Chapter 22 – Regional policy and coordination of structural instruments).
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Chapter 20: Enterprise and industrial policy
EU industrial policy strengthens competitiveness, facilitates structural change and encourages a business-friendly environment that stimulates small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs).
On industrial policy and competitiveness, limited progress was made. In September 2025, the Ministry of Environment, Urbanisation and Climate Change adopted a National Circular Economy Strategy 2025-2028. The strategy aims to increase the share of circular products on the market and integrate circular economy principles into industrial production processes. The strategy is aligned with EU industrial policy priorities and includes actions to harmonise the related EU acquis for the industrial sectors considered as priority. No interim evaluation report was published for the 2030 Industry and Technology Strategy and the biannual monitoring report was not foreseen in the Strategy. Türkiye kept the scope of the 15% domestic price advantage in public procurement. Its use has even further increased in terms of financial volume and number of procurement exercises (see Chapter 5 – Public procurement). Outcomes of the action plan for the fight against the informal economy (2023- 2025) remain unpublished, and there is no new action plan for 2026 onwards.
On enterprise policy and instruments, Turkish legislation is still not fully harmonised with the Late Payment Directive. The Project-Based Investment Programme for large-scale investments was maintained. Türkiye continued implementing its new incentive scheme framework adopted in 2025. The Ministry of Industry and Technology’s investment incentives bulletin reports that the greatest share of incentives was granted for the manufacturing sector by energy, services, mining and agriculture, during the reporting period. There is no public information available on these projects, nor on their implementation status. Türkiye also continued to implement support schemes for SMEs. The breakdown of State aid for investments made under the industry support programmes was not disclosed, contrary to the commitments made under the Customs Union between the EU and Türkiye (see Chapter 8 – Competition policy).
Türkiye continued to implement the Small Business Act framework and is participating in the new cycle of SME Policy Index by the OECD, funded by the EU. Although Türkiye has stronger performance than average as compared to the Western Balkans, it received consistently low scores in dimensions such as public procurement, bankruptcy and second chance, institutional and regulatory framework and access to finance for SMEs. The SME support administration (KOSGEB) continued to run a range of technical assistance and financing schemes. The Ministry of Industry and Technology published the impact evaluations of 26 support schemes, compared with 20 schemes last year, including those of KOSGEB and the Turkish Scientific and Technological Research Institution (TÜBITAK).
Türkiye participates in the SME pillar of the Single Market Programme. Country data compiled confirms that Türkiye has been successful in submitting proposals and receiving grants under the SME pillar. 15 SME pillar project proposals involving Turkish organisations have been accepted in response to different calls (excluding Erasmus for Young Entrepreneurs).
On sectoral policies, Türkiye adopted an Artificial Intelligence Action Plan in August 2026, which will lay down sectoral roadmaps for AI and digital transformation of SMEs.
Chapter 25: Science and research
The EU provides significant support for research and innovation. All Member States can participate in the EU’s research and innovation programmes and benefit from them, especially where there is scientific excellence and solid investment in research and innovation.
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The third EU-Türkiye High-Level Dialogue on Science, Technology and Innovation took place in November 2025. It underscored the role of innovation in driving economic development and of technologies in supporting the green industrial transformation.
In the area of research and innovation, Türkiye continued implementing its 2030 Industry and Technology Strategy.
Türkiye continued its positive performance trend in Horizon Europe. Since September 2025, Türkiye has joined 806 projects, securing EUR 406 million in net EU contributions. EUR 67 million of this funding has been awarded since September 2025 through 165 grants. On the other hand, Türkiye’s participation in the innovation pillar of the programme remains weak. Türkiye does not participate in the European Innovation Council (EIC) Accelerator. Despite this, seven Turkish entities received support under the EIC Pre-Accelerator, which aims to help SMEs and start-ups successfully apply for EIC Accelerator funding.
The share of research and development (R&D) expenditure in GDP resumed its upward trend, reaching 1.46% in 2024. However, the gap with the EU average of 2.24% remains significant. The total number of full-time equivalent R&D personnel increased by 7%, reaching 310 473 in 2024. Women accounted for approximately one third (34.3%) of researchers in 2024, reaching the EU average.
Türkiye continued progressing on its Smart Specialisation Strategies. In May 2026, the preliminary Smart Specialisation Strategies were completed in the three pilot regions of Kirikkale, Van and Antalya.
According to the European Innovation Scoreboard 2026, Türkiye is classified as an emerging innovator, performing at 57% of the EU average. The innovation gap between Türkiye and the EU continued to narrow.
Chapter 26: Education and culture
The EU supports cooperation in education and culture through funding programmes and the coordination of Member State policy through the ‘open method of coordination’. The EU and the Member States must also prevent discrimination and ensure quality education for children of migrant workers, including those from disadvantaged backgrounds.
On education and training, the proportion of the total public education budget in GDP increased to 3.93% in 2024, which is below the EU average of 4.6%. 33.5% of the public education budget is allocated to higher education. The share of public education expenditure in the central government budget slightly increased to 14.8% in 2025, partially due to post- earthquake school reconstruction spending. Private expenditure accounts for 20.3% of total education spending, which may contribute to the reproduction and deepening of inequalities.
‘Türkiye Century Maarif Model’, a skills-based curricula introduced in 2024, has been gradually rolled out and introduced to grades 2, 6 and 9. The new curricula’s strong emphasis on national, moral and cultural values outweighs scientific and evidence-based learning. Türkiye progressively includes green and digital skills in the education policy agenda including through curriculum reforms, and the adoption of the AI policy document and action plan for 2025-2029.
Enrolment rates in early childhood education in Türkiye remain below OECD averages and have shown a further decline. The net enrolment rate for five-year-olds remains relatively high but declined to 82.5%. Overall participation among children aged 3-5 decreased to 49% in the 2024-2025 school year. 18.8% of pre-school children are attending private pre-schools and creches – the highest rate across all education levels. Despite extending compulsory education to 12 years in 2012, Türkiye still faces significant non-participation especially at the upper secondary level.
The net enrolment among Turkish children during the 2024-2025 school year remained broadly stable for primary school, but decreased to 89.09% for lower secondary school, and
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declined further for upper secondary school, dropping to 82.85%. Around 804 250 school- aged children were not enrolled in formal education in the 2024-2025 academic year, including 611 612 Turkish nationals and 192 638 foreign nationals.
Concerning international assessments for school education, Türkiye recently took part in TALIS 2024, PISA 2025 and PIRLS 2026, and has confirmed its participation in TIMSS 2027. The PISA 2025 results were published on 8 September 2026. In Türkiye, 81% of students attained at least basic proficiency (Level 2 or higher) in science, 64% in mathematics and 76% in reading. Türkiye was one of the few participating countries whose results have improved in all three dimensions compared to PISA 2022. Results are higher than the OECD average in science and reading and very close to it in mathematics.
Vocational education and training (VET) and religious education schools account for around 40.6% of upper secondary enrolment in Türkiye, with persistent gender imbalances. School non-attendance (exceeding 20 days per school year) is as high as 40% in VET schools. The transition to higher education remains moderate, while skills mismatches affect a significant share of VET graduates. Employment outcomes are stronger than for general secondary graduates but below higher education, with better results for apprenticeship pathways. Work- based learning has expanded significantly, but concerns remain regarding quality, supervision, drop-out rates and working conditions, particularly in SMEs. Türkiye has been a member of the European Alliance for Apprenticeships (EAfA) since 2015, demonstrating its commitment to improving youth and adult employment. The country shows 26 pledges from local organisations and has increasingly promoted public-private partnerships to help strengthen apprenticeships and accelerate learners’ transition into employment.
Considering adult learning, Türkiye’s participation rate is higher than other candidate countries and potential candidates, but still below the EU target of 60% set for 2030. 7.5% of adults aged 25 to 64 participated in training in 2025.
Several incidents of school-related violence and killings in Türkiye have raised concerns regarding school safety, youth violence and potential gaps in prevention mechanisms.
Net enrolment in higher education among persons aged 18–22 was 46.34% in 2025, including 53.02% among females. External evaluation and accreditation processes in Türkiye have expanded significantly, with 182 universities under follow-up monitoring, while 103 universities have received institutional accreditation. However, structural issues remain, particularly regarding institutional autonomy, governance, and academic freedom, which continued to deteriorate with growing administrative and political interference. The 2025 Scholars at Risk report indicates that the space for academic freedom in Türkiye is extremely limited. In the reporting period, students and academics faced disciplinary actions, investigations, suspensions and police intervened in relation to protests, public statements or on-campus activities. Centralised rector appointments continued. In May 2026, the operating licence of Istanbul Bilgi University was revoked by a Presidential decree, effectively ordering its closure. Even though this decision was reversed several days later, it raised serious concerns about the predictability of administrative decision-making and the institutional autonomy of universities.
On equal access and inclusion, as of January 2026, 803 877 refugee children were enrolled in formal education, corresponding to an overall gross enrolment rate of 78%. Türkiye supports children with special needs through measures such as compulsory pre-school and free transport, with 602 729 students enrolled in special education. Despite record levels of school enrolment, the segregation continues to be significant (24% of them). Barriers to access and retention persist, particularly for girls and refugee children with disabilities, due to accessibility constraints, socio-economic factors and stigma. Further efforts are needed to retain Roma children in the schooling system.
The Ministry of National Education has been increasingly enabling the influence of religious groups and sect-affiliated structures within the education system. This trend risks
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undermining the provision of secular and quality education, while also weakening oversight and accountability mechanisms.
Türkiye remains one of the largest beneficiaries of the Erasmus+ programme, mainly under mobility actions in higher education, VET and youth. The authorities support the programme through nationwide promotion, capacity building and inclusion measures. Five Turkish universities participate in European University Alliances, mainly as partners. Türkiye also takes part in European Education Area working groups at expert level.
In the field of youth policy, Türkiye has not renewed its national youth policy originally adopted in 2011. In general, the space for independent, democratic participatory mechanisms for youth is shrinking. The Youth Organisations Forum (GoFor), a rights-based umbrella organisation of youth organisations in Türkiye, became a full member of the European Youth Forum in 2026, but remains unrecognised by the government. While there has been an increase in the number of youth centres, offices, camps and mobility programmes, inclusive and rights-based youth services remain limited. Independent youth organisations also frequently encounter financial and administrative barriers. Further, youth participating in peaceful assemblies, protests and collective actions also face arbitrary detention and judicial proceedings. The Turkish Youth Delegate to the Congress of Local and Regional Authorities of the Council of Europe, who was arrested and placed in detention in September 2025 based on the statements he gave during the Congress, was later released and acquitted of all charges in February 2026.
Türkiye does not yet have a comprehensive, standalone national sport strategy, with policy development remaining fragmented across different frameworks. The country continues to participate actively in the European Week of Sport and related initiatives.
In the area of culture, despite the increased number of cultural activities and festivals at central and local level, as well as investments in cultural infrastructure, structural challenges persist, notably on support for cultural diversity and institutional coordination. The broader environment continues to affect cultural pluralism, with limited space available for independent stakeholders and critical expressions.
The level of public expenditure on culture is still relatively limited. The Ministry of Culture and Tourism continued to promote large-scale cultural events. However, challenges remain as regards ensuring transparent stakeholder participation. Political interventions and arbitrary bans of cultural events continued in the reporting period.
Implementation of the 2005 UNESCO Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions continued at a gradual pace, without new substantial policy measures.
Türkiye does not participate in the 2021-2027 Creative Europe programme.
Chapter 29: Customs Union
All Member States are part of the EU Customs Union and follow the same customs rules and procedures. This requires legislative alignment as well as adequate implementing and enforcement capacity, and access to and interoperability with the EU electronic customs environment.
Türkiye made no progress on customs legislation. Turkish customs law is not harmonised with the Union Customs Code. Furthermore, regulations concerning free zones and the duty relief regime are still not fully aligned with the EU acquis.
Türkiye maintained a large scope of additional duties on many products originating in non- EU countries, which are in free circulation in the EU-Turkey Customs Union. Türkiye’s application of import surveillance is in contradiction with the principles of transparent, objective, and verifiable customs valuation procedures. Furthermore, the absence of a legal mechanism allowing the recovery of overpaid duties resulting from the application of import
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surveillance is not in line with the EU acquis. Export tax measures on hides, skins and wet- blue leather remain in force.
An agreement between the EU and Türkiye on mutual recognition of respective Authorised Economic Operators (AEO) programmes has been adopted on 16 July 2026 and will enter into force once all administrative and technical procedure for its implementation are completed.
In line with the provisions on mutual administrative assistance in customs matters under Annex 7 to Association Council Decision No 1/95, Türkiye should continue its cooperation with the EU to ensure the correct application of customs legislation, in particular by the prevention, detection and investigation of operations in breach of that legislation. As part of the anti-fraud efforts, it is recommended that Türkiye continues its efforts to combat customs fraud, in particular the smuggling of tobacco products, and its cooperation with the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF).
On administrative and operational capacity, efforts continued to strengthen customs enforcement capacity for border controls, particularly on anti-smuggling operations. However, full alignment with the EU acquis on the customs enforcement of intellectual property rights and in particular on export and in-transit operations is not yet completed. The 2024 statistics, based on the detentions of IPR infringing goods made by EU Member States customs authorities at the border, show that Türkiye remains an important country of origin for these goods with 5,736 cases (8.7%) having Türkiye as country of provenance. Risk- based controls to enforce safety and security measures need to be streamlined in line with the EU acquis. Türkiye implements the New Computerised Transit System in phase 5 as part of its membership in the Convention on a Common Transit Procedure and needs to update it to phase 6. Türkiye’s Tariff IT systems are not in line with the EU tariff IT systems. The customs IT strategy should be updated in line with business initiatives and customs business processes based on the legal framework.
CLUSTER 4: THE GREEN AGENDA AND SUSTAINABLE CONNECTIVITY
This cluster covers: transport policy (Chapter 14), energy (Chapter 15), trans-European networks (Chapter 21) and environment and climate change (Chapter 27).
Chapter 14: Transport policy
The EU has common rules for technical and safety standards, security, social standards, and market liberalisation in road transport, railways, inland waterways, multimodal transport, aviation and maritime transport.
In general transport, the Union of Municipalities of Türkiye adopted a White Paper on Sustainable Urban Mobility in December 2025. Adoption by national authorities is pending.
On road transport, Türkiye is developing a public monitoring website and a Traffic Safety Analysis Platform to consolidate road safety for road infrastructure, traffic, climatic and accident data and support data-based decision- making. According to the Turkish Statistics Institute, in 2025 compared with 2024, the total number of road crashes increased by 7.3%, the number of crashes with death or injury increased by
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8%, the number of crashes with material damage increased by 7.1%, and the number of injured increased by 4.9%." Deaths fell by 5%, while the vehicle fleet grew 7.4%.
On rail transport, Türkiye published the 2027 Networks Statement in December 2025, established a capacity management department under the incumbent rail operator (TCDD) and introduced digital systems for capacity requests, access contracts, charging calculations and traffic operations, reinforcing its market organisation and capacity management. Türkiye has not yet adopted a new railway framework law nor aligned with the EU’s fourth railway package. The railway safety and the interoperability regulations are not yet aligned with the EU acquis. Further training on railway safety is needed. The independence of the National Safety Authority, currently assigned to the DG for Railway Transport Services, is not yet achieved. The subsidies to the incumbent railway operator and the financial independence of the transport operator from infrastructure manager remain major issues, and the transitional period allowing subsidies to TCDD and TCDD Taşımacılık has been extended until 2033. There are still gaps in alignment requiring further efforts on regulatory independence (Directive 2012/34/EU), safety certification (Directive (EU) 2016/798), train driver certification, cost calculation modalities, public service contract regulation, and passenger rights.
On maritime transport, technical cooperation with the European Maritime Safety Agency continued. National legislation implementing the EU Port Services Regulation is not yet developed.
Türkiye continues to prohibit the docking of vessels flying the flag of the Republic of Cyprus, vessels of other nationalities linked to Cyprus through ownership, vessels whose last port of call was Cyprus, and vessels carrying cargo to or from Cyprus from calling at Turkish ports. This restriction remains incompatible with full implementation of the EU maritime acquis.
On inland waterways, alignment remains limited as Türkiye has limited inland waterway transport.
On aviation, the Turkish Sustainable Aviation Fuel Instruction (SHT-SAF) entered into force on 1 January 2026, setting standards, certification and reporting obligations. The Instruction makes SAF-use mandatory for CORSIA flights departing from Türkiye and adopts an approach based on emission reductions per litre rather than a fixed blending mandate. The Instruction also incorporates ICAO’s 5% emission reduction target from SAF-use by 2030. Türkiye needs to develop incentive mechanisms to accelerate its implementation and complete its alignment with the EU ReFuelEU Aviation Regulation.
The lack of adequate communication between air traffic control centres in Türkiye and Cyprus continued to compromise air safety in the Nicosia flight information region, requiring an operational solution. Türkiye continued not to accept the principle of EU carrier designation in its air services agreements with Member States, which is a cornerstone of the EU internal market in aviation.
On multimodal and intermodal transport, no new EU-aligned combined transport framework was adopted. The acquis gap remains on combined transport, multimodal facilitation and green corridor incentives.
As regards alignment with EU passenger rights regulations, Türkiye introduced compensation for delays of three hours or more in its legislation. Beyond this, no further steps have been reported at this stage.
As long as restrictions remain in place on vessels and aircrafts registered in Cyprus, related to Cyprus, or whose last port of call was Cyprus, Türkiye will not be in a position to fully implement the EU acquis relating to this chapter.
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Chapter 15: Energy
EU energy policy covers energy supply, infrastructure, the internal energy market, consumers, renewable energy, energy efficiency, nuclear energy, nuclear safety, radiation protection and nuclear safeguards.
On security of supply, no developments were reported on legislative alignment with the EU acquis in this area. Overall, despite diversification efforts, Türkiye’s dependence on Russian energy remained significant. The Middle East crisis did not lead to reported oil or gas supply disruptions in Türkiye but underlined the country’s exposure as a net energy importer to regional transit-route risks, shipping disruptions and energy price volatility. In 2025, Türkiye retained the second largest LNG re-gasification capacity in Europe, after Spain, at 51.3 bcm. Türkiye improved upstream operations at the Sakarya gas field in the Black Sea, with production reaching around 9-10 mcm/day in 2025 and expected to reach up to 20 mcm/day by 2026, once the second floating production platform becomes operational. The second phase of construction works at the country’s biggest underground storage facility at Tuz Golu (Salt Lake) continued with a target of 5.4 bcm of gas storage capacity. The second underground gas storage facility at Silivri was expanded, reaching 4.6 bcm of gas storage capacity.
On the internal energy market, the natural gas market law remains incompatible with the EU’s third energy package and the pricing is not yet fully transparent, cost-reflective and non-discriminatory. In April 2026, household electricity and natural gas tariffs were increased by up to 25%, and the consumption-based tiered tariff system introduced for electricity in 2025 was extended to natural gas, limiting subsidised prices to households consuming below city-specific reference levels. While this represents a step towards better-targeted support, energy prices remain largely regulated and subsidised. In order to align with the EU acquis, Türkiye needs to unbundle the state-owned gas company BOTAŞ, which continues to dominate the country’s natural gas market and trade. In view of this, Türkiye still needs to adopt a legally binding plan and timetable for unbundling activities.
On the wholesale electricity market, Türkiye maintained its position as a net electricity exporter, notwithstanding that electricity demand increased by 2.1% to reach a record of around 361 TWh. Demand growth moderated after the post-earthquake recovery in 2024, but summer cooling needs continued to contribute to peak electricity demand amid persistently high temperatures.
The share of fossil fuels in electricity generation stood at around 56-57%, slightly above the 2024 historic low of 55% but still relatively low by recent standards. Gas generation accounted for 23%. Hydropower accounted for around 16% of generation, while drought- related weakness in hydro output continued to increase the role of gas-fired generation. Wind and solar together generated just over one fifth of Türkiye’s electricity, reaching around 22% of the power mix and exceeding domestic coal generation for the third consecutive year.
On hydrocarbons, Türkiye has not yet aligned its legislation with the Directive on the safety of offshore oil and gas operations, and rules concerning the transit of hydrocarbons.
On coal, Türkiye continued to provide incentives for domestic lignite production, while electricity generation from imported coal remained significant at around 21% of total generation. When considering all coal-fired generation together (i.e. domestic lignite and imported coal combined), coal accounted for around one third of total electricity generation in 2025. In relative terms, its share declined from around 36% in 2024 to around 34% in 2025 due to higher total electricity generation and a slight decline in coal-fired output. However, Türkiye has not yet set a specific coal phase-out date. Türkiye should reduce its envisaged coal-fired power generation capacity for the next decade.
On renewable energy, the share of renewable sources in installed power continues to increase, from 60.1% in 2024 to 62.3% at the end of 2025 and 62.7% by mid-2026.
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Renewables supplied 43% of electricity generated in 2025. In 2025, hydropower generated around 57 TWh, wind 40 TWh and solar 38 TWh; geothermal and bioenergy supplied most of the remaining renewable electricity. The trend has reversed so far in 2026: hydropower generated 57 TWh in the first half of the year, compared with 33.9 TWh in the same period of 2025. This points to a higher renewable share of electricity production for 2026. Battery storage deployment remains limited compared with a pipeline of around 33 GW of pre- licensed storage-integrated projects. By early 2026, around 208 MW of storage-integrated wind and solar capacity was in operation. Türkiye's storage targets are 2.1 GW by 2030 and 7.5 GW by 2035.
In 2025, Türkiye awarded Renewable Energy Auctions (YEKA) including approximately 1.2 GW of wind and 800 MW of solar photovoltaic capacity under the 2024 YEKA rounds. Additional YEKA tenders were held later in 2025, including 650 MW of solar capacity and 1.15 GW of wind capacity, bringing total awarded wind and solar capacity in the year to close to 3.8 GW. However, Türkiye’s local content requirement practices continue to raise concerns as they contradict WTO and EU-Turkey Customs Union rules and undermine the competitiveness of EU and other international companies on the Turkish energy market.
As regards energy efficiency, Türkiye further strengthened its regulatory framework for buildings through the introduction of stricter energy performance requirements and green building standards.
On nuclear energy, nuclear safety, radioactive waste and spent fuel management and radiation protection, the first reactor of Türkiye’s first nuclear power plant (NPP) at Akkuyu on the Mediterranean Sea (a 99.2% investment by Russia’s Rosatom) is expected to be operational by the end of 2026. The construction of the second, third and fourth reactors at Akkuyu NPP continued. Türkiye partially incorporated the findings from the European Nuclear Safety Regulators Group (ENSREG) nuclear safety assessment peer review in the ongoing review of the operating licence application and other assessment activities. Türkiye committed to integrate the recommended safety improvements into a national action plan. It should be issued before the first unit starts. Türkiye is not yet member of the European Community Urgent Radiological Information Exchange (ECURIE) and continued refusing to accept its obligations to the Republic of Cyprus as a Contracting Party to the Joint Convention on the Safety of Agent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management.
Chapter 21: Trans-European networks
The EU promotes trans-European networks (TENs) in the areas of transport, telecommunications and energy to strengthen the internal market and contribute to growth and employment.
On transport networks, Türkiye continued to progress on the Halkalı–Kapıkule railway line, which remains Türkiye’s flagship TEN-T-related railway investment and a key EU-Türkiye connectivity project. Construction proceeded across the Kapıkule–Çerkezköy, Çerkezköy– Ispartakule and Ispartakule–Halkalı sections. Testing and commissioning in the Çerkezköy– Kapıkule section started and commercial operations are expected to start in October 2026.
Türkiye advanced preparatory work for the complementary Istanbul North Rail Crossing, which will provide a new high-capacity rail crossing over the Bosphorus via the Yavuz Sultan Selim Bridge. Türkiye has not yet proceeded with the procurement. Completing this link would strengthen multimodal corridors. Increasing rail capacity in the Marmaray tunnel, the only undersea rail connection across the Bosphorus, is increasingly urgent. Marmaray currently experiences capacity constraints due to mixed passenger and freight use.
The Mersin–Adana–Osmaniye–Gaziantep railway corridor, with a total length of approximately 312.5 km, reached around 85% physical progress. This corridor will strengthen southern and south-eastern rail connectivity, improve access to ports and
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logistics centres, and support industrial freight movements. Construction progress in the Ankara–Izmir high-speed railway line continued.
However, Türkiye is not complementing progress in infrastructure with stronger alignment with the revised TEN-T framework, including network planning, governance, interoperability, urban nodes, multimodal terminals and rail freight performance. Further steps are necessary on rail market opening, transparent capacity allocation, infrastructure charging, safety, interoperability and non-discriminatory access to infrastructure.
Concerning energy networks, Türkiye continued to play an important role for regional electricity connectivity but it is not yet fully aligned with the revised TEN-E Regulation. The integration of increased amounts of intermittent renewable energy continued to represent a major challenge in 2026, with growing concerns related to grid congestion and the network’s limited capacity to absorb planned renewable investments. TEİAŞ’s observer status at ENTSO-E was not renewed in June 2026. Türkiye continued to impede survey activities for the Great Sea Interconnector, an EU Project of Common Interest (PCI) under the TEN-E Regulation.
Chapter 27: Environment and climate change
The EU promotes strong climate action, sustainable development and protection of the environment. EU rules contain provisions addressing horizontal environment issues, climate change, water and air quality, waste management, nature protection, industrial pollution, chemicals, noise and civil protection.
Environment
On horizontal legislation, no development was reported. Further regulatory work remains necessary to fully align with the environmental impact assessment (EIA) and strategic environmental assessment (SEA) Directives, in particular with regard to the Espoo Convention and its SEA Protocol, as well as with Environmental Liability Directive and the Environmental Crime Directive. Türkiye is not yet part of the Aarhus Convention and difficulties persist in accessing public information, justice in environmental matters, and public participation in decision-making.
On air quality, no progress was reported. Severe air pollution in some cities continues to raise concerns. Regarding air quality monitoring, PM 2.5 is now measured at 189 of 383 monitoring stations and should reduce the threshold values for most parameters as they remain higher than the EU limit values. No new national legislation was adopted to align with the revised EU directives on ambient air quality and national emission ceiling legislation.
On waste management, Türkiye’s recycling rate increased from 36% to 38% in 2025 and the implementation of the deposit management system advanced from 1 to 18 provinces in the reporting period, nationwide roll-out has started in July 2026. The level of implementation of waste management plans at local and regional level remains insufficient. Türkiye still needs to adopt legislation on ship recycling to mirror the requirements of the EU ship recycling regulation. Concerns over non-compliance with environmental standards and fatal accidents in ship recycling facilities continues to increase. In October 2025, Türkiye adopted its national circular economy strategy and action plan together with the single-use plastics roadmap. The management of construction debris remains a major environmental challenge.
On water quality, Türkiye completed the adoption ofall flood risk, drought and groundwater management plans that were pending and 12 out of 25 river basin management plans are adopted and under implementation. However, no progress was made on aligning with the revised EU Directive on drinking water, and the coverage of wastewater treatment plants remains at 91% of the municipal population. Alignment with the EU Marine Strategy Directive as well as the marine spatial planning directive is still pending.
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On nature protection, Türkiye joined the International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling on 30 December 2025. Türkiye ratified the agreement on the conservation and sustainable use of marine biological diversity of areas beyond national jurisdiction under the United Nations Convention of the Law of the Sea (BBNJ Agreement) (see Chapter 13 – Fisheries). In February 2026, Türkiye also adopted an implementing regulation on the prevention and dispersion of invasive alien species. Planning and construction in wetlands, forests and natural sites are still not in line with the EU acquis. The mining regulation, allowing mining in agricultural and protected areas, national parks and coastal areas, remains a concern among NGOs and the public. Türkiye has not yet set national targets to implement the Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework.
On industrial pollution and risk management, Türkiye adopted a regulation on the management of industrial emissions, which entered into force on 1 December 2025, but alignment with the EU Industrial emissions directive remains partial and further work is required, especially concerning the permit system.
On chemicals, alignment is not yet achieved with the EU Regulation on the registration, evaluation, authorisation and restriction of chemicals (REACH). Although transposition of the Biocidal Products Regulation is well advanced, certain elements remain to be approximated to achieve full alignment.
No improvements were made on noise pollution but the level of alignment and implementation is already high.
On civil protection, Türkiye continued its participation in the relevant activities under the Union Civil Protection Mechanism (UCPM), including disaster prevention and preparedness capacity building. However, the country has not reported to the Commission on its disaster risk management for the 2023 period. Türkiye also contributed to the European Civil Protection Pool (ECPP) and rescEU reserve with its capacities for response to earthquakes and medical emergencies. It deployed Aerial Firefighting Assets during the 2026 wildfire season to France and Spain and an Urban Search and Rescue team in response to the earthquake in Venezuela. Additionally, Türkiye conducted Medevac operations of patients from Gaza under the UCPM. The establishment of a Secure Trans-European Services for Telematics between administrations, which is not yet in place, remains a precondition for connecting to the Common Emergency Communication and Information System (CECIS).
Climate change
Türkiye made some progress over the reporting period to align with the EU climate acquis.
Building on the Climate Law adopted in July 2025, Türkiye published in August 2026 the related implementing legislation, notably on Local Climate Change Action Plans and Climate Change Coordination Boards and the national Emission Trading System (ETS). However, the establishment of this ETS, initially scheduled in 2026, is still pending; in addition, full harmonisation with the EU ETS Directive requires further work and is a major avenue for bilateral cooperation.
In November 2025 Türkiye submitted its second Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC) under the Paris Agreement to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), with an emission reduction target for the year 2035 set at 643 million tonnes CO2eq. While this new NDC for 2035 suggests a reduction of emissions compared to the target established for 2030, it suggests a substantial increase in greenhouse gas emissions (by almost 25%) compared to 2024. Türkiye’s medium-term level of ambition therefore remains insufficient and misaligned with that of the EU, even more so as the country is actively preparing to host and preside over the upcoming UNFCCC Conference of the Parties (COP31), which will be held in Antalya in November 2026.
The Regulation implementing the Kigali Amendment to the Montreal Protocol on substances that deplete the ozone layer (adopted in October 2024, fully in force as of 1 January 2025)
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brings Turkish standard closer to the EU Regulation on fluorinated greenhouse gasses, but more efforts are needed for full alignment.
Türkiye still does not fully implement the Fuel Quality Directive. Türkiye is also not aligned with EU emissions standards for new light and heavy-duty vehicles nor with the EU carbon capture and storage directive.
CLUSTER 5: RESOURCES, AGRICULTURE AND COHESION
This cluster covers: agriculture and rural development (Chapter 11), food safety, veterinary and phytosanitary policy (Chapter 12), fisheries and aquaculture (Chapter 13), regional policy and coordination of structural instruments (Chapter 22), and financial and budgetary provisions (Chapter 33).
Chapter 11: Agriculture and rural development
The EU’s common agricultural policy supports farmers and ensures Europe’s food security. It helps tackle climate change and the sustainable management of national resources; maintains rural areas and landscapes across the EU; and keeps the rural economy alive by promoting jobs in farming, agri-food industries and associated sectors. This requires strong management and control systems. There are also common EU rules for marketing standards, quality policy and organic farming.
On horizontal issues, there were no developments as regards the establishment of the integrated administration and control system (IACS). Implementation of the agricultural census is ongoing (see Chapter 18 – Statistics).
There were no developments on agricultural markets – common market organisation. The effective opening and filling of the preferential quotas for beef and live bovine animals under the trade agreement with the EU remains non-transparent.
On rural development, implementation of the IPA rural development programme (IPARD III) is advancing steadily, with twelve calls for applications launched and with a continuous high number of applications submitted exceeding the available budget. Türkiye is the first country that was granted the entrustment to implement the measure on ‘Rural Public Infrastructure’, with the entrustment procedure ongoing for another measure (Advisory Services).
On quality policy, alignment with the EU acquis needs to continue. On organic farming, there were no developments in aligning with the EU acquis.
On the fight against corruption measures, the national authorities are obliged to prevent, detect and report irregularities.
Chapter 12: Food safety, veterinary and phytosanitary policy
The EU food acquis including hygiene rules for foodstuff production ensures a high level of food and feed safety and a high level of protection of consumers’ interests. Animal health and welfare and the safety of food of animal origin are safeguarded together with plant safety, quality of seeds, plant reproductive material, animal nutrition and the use of plant protection products.
On general food safety, the number of notifications to the rapid alert system for food and feed on pesticide residues in fruits and vegetables as well as contaminants in dried figs, pistachios, herbs and spices imported from Türkiye into the EU still remains high.
On veterinary policy, animal health legislation in Türkiye is not yet aligned with the EU’s animal health policy and acquis. Lack of enforcement continued on animal welfare, where rules on slaughterhouses, long journeys and the transition to enriched cage systems are still not aligned and implemented.
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On the placing of food, feed and animal by-products on the market, problems on raw milk quality continue as the draft raw milk action plan is not yet adopted and the general rules to be implemented by raw milk producers are not yet in place. Raw milk specifications and rules on the use of milk that does not meet the somatic cell criteria are not yet adopted. Further work is required to align Türkiye’s rules on funding inspections with the EU system. An EU compliant system of collection, storage and processing of animal by-products is not yet in place.
While Türkiye continued efforts on its food safety rules and its specific rules for feed, no significant progress was reported. Türkiye adopted a communiqué laying down the criteria on sampling and analysis methods for official controls of perfluoroalkyl substances in certain foodstuffs.
On phytosanitary policy, Türkiye adopted a regulation concerning the wholesale and retail sales and storage of Plant Protection Products (PPPs) and a Regulation on the application and inspection of PPPs. No progress on plant health law was reported. Regarding the marketing of seed and other plant reproductive material, Türkiye should fully align its national legislation with the EU acquis on the rules on plant reproductive material (PRM) and forest reproductive material (FRM). Türkiye should work on establishing the necessary institutional frameworks, governance structures, and technical capacities to implement and enforce the acquis effectively, and set up functioning certification systems for PRM and FRM, including regarding the evaluation and registration of varieties for PRM, the approval and registration of basic material for FRM, official inspection and controls, testing and laboratory infrastructures, and the registration and supervision of operators.
Türkiye has not yet aligned its legislation on novel food and on genetically modified organisms.
Chapter 13: Fisheries
The common fisheries policy lays down rules on fisheries management, protects living resources of the sea and limits the environmental impact of fisheries. This includes setting catch quotas, managing fleet capacity, rules on markets and aquaculture and support for fisheries and coastal communities. Further, it promotes a sustainable aquaculture.
Türkiye made some progress on resource and fleet management. The Fisheries Sector Policy Document (2025-2029) has been adopted. The scope of production planning has been expanded from 11 to 16 species, including a wider range of fisheries and aquaculture species. Türkiye continued working towards the operationalisation of the General Fisheries Commission for the Mediterranean’s (GFCM) non-indigenous species observatory for the Eastern Mediterranean.
On inspections and control, Türkiye made some progress on implementing the monitoring, control and surveillance measures adopted by the International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas and the GFCM. The fisheries control capacity was further strengthened with the establishment of the new fisheries monitoring centre. Within the context of international inspection schemes of regional fisheries management organisations, the collaboration with the European Fisheries Control Agency in onboard inspection campaigns further contributed to fisheries control capacity building.
On structural action, there were no significant developments in aligning with the EU acquis. Structural measures continued to support small-scale fisheries and women in fisheries.
On market policy, there has been no major progress. Türkiye continued providing State aid for aquaculture.
The GFCM decisions regarding aquaculture are integrated in the sectoral governance. The Regulation on the prevention and management of the introduction and spread of invasive alien species was published.
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On international agreements, Türkiye kept cooperating with the EU in regional and international platforms. Türkiye became an observer in the Indian Ocean Tuna Commission. Türkiye has also signed and ratified the Agreement on the conservation and sustainable use of marine biological diversity of areas beyond national jurisdiction (BBNJ Agreement). However, concerns exist regarding the BBNJ Agreement’s requirement that it will be interpreted and applied in the context of, and in a manner consistent with, the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Furthermore, Türkiye is not a Party to UNCLOS, while accession to the Convention would improve cooperation with the EU on fisheries and maritime policy.
Chapter 22: Regional policy and the coordination of structural instruments
Regional policy is the EU’s main tool for reducing regional disparities and investing in sustainable and inclusive socio-economic growth. It operates through a ‘‘shared management’ model between the Commission and EU Member States. This system applies an effective multi-level governance and partnership approach that is open to all regions, long-term, and strongly place-based. The implementation of cohesion policy programmes therefore requires appropriate administrative capacity on programme and project level, the establishment of systems of sound financial management and control and also the fulfilment of other EU acquis elements such as environmental or public procurement legislation.
Türkiye would benefit from further strengthening its legislative and policy framework for regional development by making greater use of evidence-based policymaking and systematic use of evaluations and impact assessments. Advancing reforms in public administration and public finance management would strengthen accountability, improve policy coordination and support effective multi-level governance. Further efforts are needed to strengthen the role and capacities of local authorities and ensure that local governance arrangements enable effective participation in decision-making and implementation of regional development policies.
The institutional framework for managing IPA III funding has strengthened, with improved supervision and intervention capacity by the National Authorising Officer, particularly in contracting and implementation. However, the capacity of the National IPA Coordinator (NIPAC) requires strengthening to ensure effective cross-ministerial coordination, strategic prioritisation of interventions, and rigorous results monitoring. While the institutional set-up for indirect management by the beneficiary country (IMBC) now aligns with IPA III requirements, additional reinforcement is needed to address project-specific challenges, including resource efficiency controls and long-term sustainability of EU-funded actions.
Ongoing efforts to enhance administrative capacities in programming, monitoring, and evaluation, as well as to strengthen the Audit Authority, have not yet resolved key deficiencies. A clear staff retention strategy remains absent within IPA structures, and recruitment procedures for senior civil service positions still lack objective selection criteria. The operational capacity of IMBC structures must be further developed to ensure timely and efficient contracting and implementation of IPA programmes. The project management capabilities require improvement to reinforce financial oversight and shift focus from compliance alone to performance-driven outcomes.
In programming, the NIPAC has maintained its coordinating role, overseeing implementation, monitoring and evaluation. While Türkiye has gained experience in regional policy programming and Interreg programmes, persistent structural weaknesses remain, particularly in local democratic governance and balanced regional development. To improve the effectiveness of EU support under IPA III, accelerated implementation remains a key priority.
On monitoring and evaluation, as part of the monitoring procedures applicable under IMBC, results-oriented monitoring missions continued. There was no substantial change regarding the improvement of the Management Information Systems to facilitate the tracking
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of project and programme progress through output and result. Even if the risks are partially addressed through outsourcing, the authorities should develop capacity for ex post controls. The monitoring, evaluation, and implementation tools for Türkiye’s National Strategy for Regional Development and its Regional Development Agencies require strengthening, including more robust statistical frameworks.
IPA structures possess established financial management and control systems, though their implementation effectiveness requires further enhancement, particularly in the application of performance indicators and strict adherence to financial best practices. Audit procedures continue to comply with internationally recognised standards, as defined in the Financial Framework Partnership Agreement and associated framework agreements. However, additional strengthening is necessary to address long-term project sustainability issues and assessing the broader impact on the sound financial management of EU funds.
On fight against corruption, Türkiye lacks a national anti-fraud strategy. However, the IMBC system has been addressing potential risks, detecting and combating fraud and irregularities. Türkiye needs to address legal status, independence, charters, quality assurance and reporting lines of IPA III internal audit unit structures.
Chapter 33: Financial and budgetary provisions
This chapter covers the rules governing the funding of the EU budget (‘own resources’). These resources mainly consist of: (i) contributions based on the gross national income of each Member State; (ii) customs duties; (iii) the non-recycled plastic resource and (iv) a resource based on value added tax. Member States must have the appropriate administrative capacity to adequately coordinate and ensure the correct calculation, collection, payment and control of own resources.
In the main policy areas pertaining to the functioning of the own resources system, Türkiye has already established the fundamental institutions and principles (see Chapters 16 - Taxation, 18 - Statistics, 29 - Customs Union and 32 - Financial control). For the own resources system to be administered effectively, Türkiye will eventually need to develop implementing regulations, strengthen management capacity and establish strong coordination mechanisms. The Customs Union with the EU on processed agricultural goods and industrial goods (with the exception of coal and steel products) continues to ensure considerable alignment of Türkiye’s customs legislation with the acquis on customs. However, Türkiye has not yet adopted a draft customs law aligned with the Union Customs Code, which would further contribute to the preparation of traditional own resources (mainly customs duties).
There are currently no systems to accurately calculate the VAT base and the weighted average rate for the VAT-based resource. Concerns on VAT and customs duty fraud persist, as do concerns on the scale of the informal sector, despite the government’s attempts to increase the tax base and voluntary tax compliance. Legislation on structure, exemptions, special schemes and the scope of reduced rates is not fully aligned with the EU acquis.
Regarding the gross national income-based (GNI) resource, Türkiye has undertaken attempts to fully align its national accounts and GNI calculations with the European System of Accounts (ESA 2010). Türkiye also needs to enhance the estimates’ exhaustiveness to ensure that they take account of the non-observed economy. The GNI inventory is not fully aligned with Eurostat’s Inventory Guide and the transmission of data does not always occur in a timely manner.
In terms of the administrative infrastructure, Türkiye needs to establish a fully functional coordination structure, with adequate administrative capacity and the implementing regulations needed to ensure that it can accurately calculate, forecast, account for, collect, pay, monitor and report own resources to the EU in line with the EU acquis.
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CLUSTER 6: EXTERNAL RELATIONS
There are two chapters in this cluster: external relations (Chapter 30), and foreign, security and defence policy (Chapter 31).
Chapter 30: External relations
The EU has a common trade and commercial policy towards third countries, based on multilateral and bilateral agreements, and autonomous measures. There are also EU rules on humanitarian aid and development policy.
On the common commercial policy there was limited progress during the reporting period. Türkiye maintained the large scope of the additional duties diverting from the common external tariff and partial alignment with the EU’s Generalised Scheme of Preferences in terms of beneficiary countries and products. Türkiye initiated three new safeguard investigations. In addition. Türkiye initiated two reviews of existing safeguard investigations.
Coordination between the EU and Türkiye within the World Trade Organization (WTO), in the OECD and in the G20 needs to be improved. Türkiye has lifted its longstanding objection for legal incorporation of the Investment Facilitation for Development Agreement into the WTO rulebook. At the WTO, Türkiye has been an active participant in the Joint Initiative on Electronic Commerce discussions, but it has not yet expressed support for the 2024 outcome nor is part of the group of members supporting its interim implementation. Türkiye continues to express scepticism about the meaning and scope of the commitment. Regarding the renewal of the moratorium on customs duties on electronic transmissions, Türkiye has systematically raised concerns about its scope but eventually signalled its readiness to accept the MC14 Chairman’s compromise. Türkiye did not join the Multi-party Interim Appeal Arbitration Arrangement (MPIA). Türkiye has yet to align its legislation with the EU acquis on the screening of foreign direct investments (FDI).
A technical revision of the bridging legislation of the EU-Turkey Customs Union (Decision 1/2006 of the Customs Cooperation Committee) to align it with the new rules of the revised Pan-Euro-Mediterranean Convention is expected to be adopted soon. On export controls of military equipment and technology, and dual-use goods, Türkiye did not align with the EU position on certain multilateral export control arrangements. Türkiye’s non-alignment with the EU’s restrictive measures against Russia remains a concern, although it has taken steps to prevent the circumvention of EU sanctions against Russia on dual-use goods.
On bilateral trade and investment agreements with third countries, Türkiye has 85 bilateral investment treaties in force, 24 of which are with 25 EU Member States, and 23 free trade agreements. The Free Trade Agreement signed with Ukraine is yet to be implemented. Türkiye continued to implement the free trade agreements that it concluded before the EU with Malaysia, Venezuela, the United Arab Emirates, and Qatar, thereby diverging from the common commercial policy under the EU-Turkey Customs Union. In addition, Türkiye continued to apply preferential trade agreements with Iran, Uzbekistan, Pakistan, and Azerbaijan.
As for development policy and humanitarian aid, Türkiye granted official development assistance in 2025 of EUR 6.37 billion (USD 7.52 billion), which is equivalent to 0.5% of its gross national income, down from EUR 6.87 billion (USD 7.48 billion) in 2024. It remains below the 0.7% target enshrined in Sustainable Development Goal 17. The assistance was largely directed towards humanitarian support for projects related to Syrian refugees but carried out in Türkiye.
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Chapter 31: Foreign, security and defence policy
Member States must be able to conduct political dialogue under EU foreign, security and defence policy, align with EU statements, take part in EU actions, and apply agreed restrictive measures.
The political dialogue between the EU and Türkiye on foreign and security policy issues continued, both at high- and senior officials’ level. A joint visit to Türkiye by HR/VP and Commissioners for Enlargement and Internal Affairs and Migration took place in June 2026, and the Presidents of the European Council and Commission and the HR/VP participated in the NATO Summit in Ankara in July 2026, where the Presidents met with President Erdogan. The EU and Türkiye held a new edition of the Political Dialogue at Political Directors’ level in January 2026, informal consultations on security and defence took place twice (November 2025 and June 2026) and the counter-terrorism dialogue resumed in November 2025. Türkiye also actively engaged in consultations with the EU on a range of regional developments, and several EU Special Representatives visited Türkiye. In the reporting period, military advisors were mutually appointed to the EU Delegation in Ankara and the Turkish Permanent Delegation in the EU. In May 2026, the EU Special Envoy for the implementation of EU sanctions visited Türkiye and engaged on prevention of circumvention of sanctions against Russia. The Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs participated in the Ministerial Meeting on Cross-Regional Security and Connectivity in Luxembourg (October 2025), where he also held a bilateral meeting with the HR/VP. The Turkish Vice-President participated in the video conference chaired by the Presidents of the European Council and Commission with the Leaders from Middle East countries on the war in Iran (March 2026), as well as attended the European Political Community summit in Yerevan (May 2026).
The institutional framework enabling Türkiye’s participation in the EU’s common foreign and security policy (CFSP) and common security and defence policy (CSDP) remains in place.
Regrettably, Türkiye maintained a very low alignment rate of 4% with the statements by the High Representative on behalf of the EU and Council decisions on sanctions as of 1 September 2026 compared with 3% in 2025.
Türkiye maintained its position of not supporting sanctions adopted outside the UN framework and refrained from aligning with the EU’s restrictive measures adopted as a response to Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine. However, Türkiye partially cooperated with the EU to avoid circumvention of sanctions via its territory. Since 2023, Türkiye banned the re-export of sanctioned goods transiting through its free trade zones/warehouses and has taken measures to prevent the re-export to Russia of EU origin Common High-Priority List (CHPL) items originating from the EU, the US, the UK and Japan. Türkiye’s export to Russia of CHPL items of EU origin dropped significantly in 2025, with an 86% decrease compared to 2023 (prior to the introduction of the measures), but it remains higher than the pre-war volumes. Action remains insufficient and more efforts are needed regarding preventing the re-export to Russia of EU-origin Economically Critical Goods (ECG).
Türkiye is also expected to take concrete actions to address the ‘false transit’ of CHPL items to third countries, notably Central Asia, ultimately reaching Russia and on cases of ‘falsification of origin’ of Russian-origin sanctioned goods that are illegally entering the EU’s single market. Further efforts are also expected on EU-sanctioned vessels still entering Turkish waters. In the energy sector, concerns persist over falsified certificates for refined petroleum products. Türkiye has also emerged as a major trading hub for oil products, providing substantial revenues to Russia.
Türkiye continued to operate flights to and from Russia. As of 1 September 2026, twenty- nine Türkiye-based entities were subject to tighter export restrictions, and five entities were
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subject to fully-fledged listings in the context of the EU’s restrictive measures adopted followingRussia’s war of aggression against Ukraine.
Türkiye actively engaged with international organisations, including the UN, the Council of Europe and the OSCE, while systematically obstructing the participation of the Republic of Cyprus in several organisations and arrangements. Türkiye’s alignment to the EU positions in international organisations, including the UN General Assembly, remained very low. Türkiye continued playing a pivotal role in the Organisation of Turkic States (OTS) and the Organisation for Islamic Cooperation, using them as a platform to promote efforts to legitimise the so-called, internationally not recognised, ‘Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus’, thus undermining efforts to foster an environment conducive to the resumption of settlement talks under UN auspices. Türkiye is not a State Party to some major UN treaties, including the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court and the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Türkiye does not have a national action plan for the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1325 on the Women, Peace and Security agenda.
As regards disarmament and non-proliferation, Türkiye is a party to most international treaties and conventions and participates in export control regimes and other politically binding arrangements, complying with its legally binding obligations and political commitments. Türkiye is a signatory to the Arms Trade Treaty but has yet to ratify and it does not align with EU statements in the framework of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of nuclear weapons, and within the Chemical Weapons Convention/Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. On arms export control, Türkiye does not cooperate with the EU to achieve alignment with the EU Common Position 2008/944.
On security measures, Türkiye has no Security of Information Agreement with the EU on procedures for the exchanges and protection of EU classified information (EUCI). Since 2006, a framework agreement allows Türkiye’s participation, including reception of EUCI, in the context of CSDP missions.
Under the CSDP, Türkiye continued to actively participate in and make substantial contributions to EU crisis management missions and operations. Türkiye continued being the biggest non-EU troops’ contributor to the EU Force Operation Althea in Bosnia and Herzegovina and remained a major contributor to the NATO KFOR peacekeeping force in Kosovo, as well as contributing to UN peacekeeping operations. Türkiye continued to seek involvement in CSDP and EU defence initiatives, showcasing its claim to play a significant role in strengthening the future European security, while simultaneously maintaining its policy of excluding one EU Member State from cooperation with NATO. Türkiye’s narrow interpretation of the EU-NATO cooperation framework continued to pose an obstacle to enhancing key aspects of a genuine and sustainable organisation-to-organisation relation, particularly with a view to information sharing. Informal EU-Türkiye CSDP consultations continued (November 2025 and June 2026). Türkiye hosted the NATO Summit in July 2026.
On counter-terrorism, Türkiye remains an active participant in the Global Coalition against Da’esh and has been cooperating with the EU and MS to improve the exchange of information and cross-border investigations in this context.
On hybrid threats, foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI) activities targeting Türkiye persisted. Türkiye has not imposed restrictions on the operations of Russian state-controlled media outlets leaving its information environment vulnerable to coordinated disinformation and influence campaigns. Russia-linked actors spread pro- Kremlin narratives in traditional and social media amplifying disinformation related to the war in Ukraine, NATO, energy security and anti-Western sentiment.
Türkiye continued to develop intense relations and strategic partnerships with countries worldwide, while also enhancing its regional geopolitical role and normalisation efforts, at
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the same time seeking to consolidate its stance as a facilitator and mediator as well as provider of humanitarian aid.
On Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, Türkiye maintained its support for Ukraine. Türkiye has voted for UN resolutions condemning Russia’s aggression and supporting Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity (including on 24 February 2026). Türkiye also participates in the ‘Coalition of the Willing’ initiative. Ankara has played an active role in mediation efforts, including facilitating prisoners’ exchanges and hosting direct Ukraine-Russia talks and has continued enforcing the Montreux Convention. Türkiye repeatedly called for a moratorium on strikes against its vessels in Black Sea and conveyed its concerns to both Ukraine and Russia.
At the same time, Türkiye continued to maintain close relations with Russia through high- level contacts, regular consultations and robust economic ties. High-level contacts took place through phone calls between the two Presidents, who met in December 2025 and September 2026, the Ministers of Foreign Affairs, who met in June 2026, meetings in the margins of international fora, and through parliamentary diplomacy. In April 2026, Türkiye and Russia signed a Consultation Action Plan for 2026-2027 with the objective to of cooperating constructively on ongoing crises as well as on trade and energy. Türkiye remains dependent on Russia’s energy supplies, despite US secondary sanctions on Russian oil companies, and on nuclear energy cooperation.
Türkiye remained both an important and a challenging partner for the United States. After the two Presidents’ meeting in September 2025, high-level contacts continued, including within the NATO framework. Ankara continues to seek enhancing bilateral cooperation in the defence industry. In July 2026, the US President met with the Turkish President (in the margins of the NATO Summit in Ankara) and announced the lifting of (CAATSA) sanctions and readiness to consider sales of F-35 to Türkiye, linked to the latter possibly selling the Russian S-400 surface-to-air defence system to a third country.
Türkiye has increased its engagement with the Gulf states in the wake of the US-Israel-Iran war, supported by a growing strategic alignment and driven by shared interests in regional and economic stability, with a focus on investments and defence cooperation. The latter expanded with continued Gulf states’ interest in Türkiye’s defence industry and joint production arrangements
Cooperation with the Gulf states has been most visible on Gaza and Syria’s stabilisation and reconstruction. The Middle East conflict also nurtured Türkiye’s connectivity strategy toward the Gulf, motivated by Turkish ambition to become the main land bridge between the Gulf and Europe. Qatar remained Türkiye’s closest partner in the Gulf, while ties with Saudi Arabia deepened while relations with the United Arab Emirates relied on pragmatic cooperation despite geopolitical disagreements. Regional diplomacy included regular talks between the Foreign Ministers of Türkiye, Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Pakistan, notably in the context of the Iran war, culminating in the signature of the Mecca Joint Defence Agreement on 7 August 2026 between Türkiye, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan.
Türkiye and Egypt continued to step up cooperation in several areas, including resuming military ties. A joint naval exercise in September 2025 marked their first military drill in 13 years.
Türkiye’s relations with Israel continued to deteriorate. Türkiye issued arrest warrants for dozens of Israeli officials, including the Prime Minister and Defence Minister. Türkiye strongly advocated for the recognition of Palestine and supported the UN General Assembly Resolution on the ‘Peaceful settlement of the question of Palestine’ (December 2025). Türkiye supported the US’s Gaza ceasefire efforts and, together with Egypt and Qatar, it continued to engage on the implementation of the Gaza peace plan. Türkiye continued to provide substantial humanitarian assistance to Palestinians and is a member of the ‘Ad Hoc Liaison Committee’ and the ‘Gaza Contact Group’. On the Middle East peace process,
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Türkiye aligns with the EU on the need to relaunch the political process towards the two- state solution and is a member of the ‘Global Coalition’ for its implementation.
In post-Assad Syria, Türkiye has increased its leverage, established close relations with the Syrian transitional authorities, including through diplomatic presence and military cooperation. Türkiye supports Syria’s sovereignty and territorial integrity and aims to create the conditions for additional returns of Syrians under temporary protection abroad. In October 2025, Türkiye extended the mandate of its troops deployed in Syria for three years. Ankara is providing training and advisory activities to Syrian soldiers and police, but in March 2026, pulled its civilian administrators from the area of the ‘Operation Olive Branch’, after seven years of presence. Türkiye repeatedly urged the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) to comply with agreements with Damascus towards the integration process into the Syrian army and supported the military operations carried out by the Damascus forces since January 2026 against Kurdish-controlled areas in Aleppo and northeast Syria. Türkiye welcomed SDF’s decision to dissolve in August 2026.
Relations with Iraq continued to improve, including cooperation in the fight against terrorism, energy and water management as well as the ‘Development Road’ project, that would create a new route from Iraq toward Türkiye and Europe. In September 2025, oil flows through the Kirkuk-Ceyhan pipeline to Türkiye resumed. In October 2025, Türkiye extended the mandate of its troops deployed in Iraq for three years, diverging from EU policy. In February 2026, Türkiye and Iraq reached an agreement on the return of Turkish nationals suspected of ISIS affiliation following their transfer to Iraq from Al-Hol and Syrian prison.
Relations between Türkiye and Iran remained complex, characterised by intense geopolitical competition alongside pragmatic cooperation. Türkiye strongly opposed the Israeli and US military intervention in Iran but also condemned Iran’s retaliatory strikes on the region, primarily on the Gulf countries, as well as attempted ballistic missiles attacks on its territory. Türkiye liaised closely with Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Egypt in support of mediation efforts that led to the Memorandum of Understanding between the US and Iran in June 2026, and which are still ongoing. It also called for the re-opening of the Strait of Hormuz and for freedom of navigation to be guaranteed. Given its 530 km border with Iran, Türkiye is also concerned with the prospect of a potential wave of migration (it currently applies a visa- free regime for Iranian nationals), as well as the activity of Kurdish militant groups along the border in the case of a vacuum or collapse of power in Iran.
Türkiye remained a pivotal and active player in Libya, continuing to advocate for stability and supported the efforts to revitalise the UN-facilitated political process. While keeping formal relations with Libya’s internationally recognised Government of National Unity (GNU) based in Tripoli, Türkiye also significantly strengthened its diplomatic, military and economic outreach and presence in eastern Libya, with strong expectations that Benghazi would approve the Memoranda of Understanding signed with the Tripoli authorities on the demarcation of maritime zones (2019) – which has been ratified by the House of Representatives on 20 October 2026 – and on research and drilling in the delineated areas (2022). Both are considered by the EU as an infringement upon the sovereign rights of third states, which do not comply with the Law of the Sea and cannot produce any legal consequences for third states, as also recalled by the European Council Conclusions in June 2025. Türkiye worked to enhance the cooperation in the field of oil and gas exploration. In February 2026, Libya’s National Oil Corporation granted exploration license to Türkiye's state-owned oil company TPAO.
Türkiye also continued to assert that the UN arms embargo, the UN Security Council resolutions requesting the withdrawal of all mercenaries, foreign fighters and foreign forces from the Libyan territory, and the suspension of military training, had no bearing on the GNU. The EU’s efforts to implement the UN embargo on Libya continued to be challenged by Türkiye’s scepticism towards Operation EUNAVFOR MED Irini. Türkiye conducted joint
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military exercises with the Libyan National Army’s naval forces and, in December 2025, extended the mandate of its troops deployed to Libya by 24 months.
Türkiye increased its presence in and strengthened its relations with the South Caucasus and Central Asia.
The normalisation of Türkiye-Armenia relations continued to advance, with Armenia consistently stating its readiness to progress and Türkiye taking steps but stressing the importance of balance with respect to the normalisation of Armenia-Azerbaijan relations. The Turkish Vice-President attended the eighth summit of the European Political Community meeting, hosted by Armenia in May 2026. On the sidelines, the two countries signed a MoU on the restoration of the historic Ani Bridge. Türkiye’s further positive steps towards normalisation of relations include launching daily direct flights between Yerevan and Istanbul by Turkish Airlines since March 2026. Preparations have also started for the rehabilitation of the Kars-Gyumri railway line and for opening the land border between Türkiye and Armenia. Türkiye also advanced trade relations with Armenia by adopting a new regulation allowing Armenia to be listed as the final destination for goods exported from Türkiye. Türkiye and Azerbaijan continued to engage in high-level political dialogue and hold frequent joint military exercises. Trilateral cooperation between Türkiye, Azerbaijan and Georgia continued through meetings of Foreign Ministers (June 2026), Defence Ministers (October 2025) and a Parliamentary meeting of Foreign Affairs Committees (February 2026).
Türkiye remained an important actor in Central Asia, combining bilateral engagement with a broader push for regional connectivity and cooperation. It has consistently supported enhanced EU engagement notably in economy, energy transit and connectivity, in line with its broader goal of positioning itself as a bridge between Europe, the Caucasus and Central Asia. At the multilateral level, Türkiye continued to promote a stronger role for the OTS, reflecting an expanding ‘Turkic dimension’ in its foreign policy. The EU and Türkiye held consultations on Central Asia in September 2026.
Türkiye’s relations with Pakistan further strengthened at strategic partnership level, with strong defence, security, and diplomatic cooperation, including in the context of the newly signed Mecca Joint Defence Agreement. Türkiye contributed to mediate, together with Qatar, the October 2025 ceasefire agreement between Pakistan and Afghanistan. Türkiye maintained a pragmatic approach on Afghanistan, withholding formal recognition of the Taliban administration, while expanding economic, trade and diplomatic ties (Turkish embassy in Kabul). Türkiye hosts Afghan political opponents, though, without facilitating the formation of a joint opposition or armed resistance.
Türkiye continued to expand diplomatic and economic cooperation in Asia through its ‘Asia Anew’ initiative, aiming to strengthen its role as a strategic connector between Asia and Europe. Türkiye also continued its cooperation with ASEAN, in line with its status as a dialogue partner and further deepened its engagement in the region through its membership in the Asian Development Bank. It pursued diversified partnerships across key sectors, including defence industry cooperation, while building on ties with Muslim-majority countries, such as Indonesia and Malaysia. In November 2025, the President of Republic of Korea paid a state visit to Türkiye focused ondefence industry cooperation, economy, nuclear energy and renewables.
Türkiye continued to seek opportunities to strengthen its economic and investments relations with China, aiming to reduce its structural trade deficit while expanding bilateral trade volumes. Cooperation remained focused on connectivity and infrastructure (including the potential complementarity between the Belt and Road Initiative and the Middle Corridor) and broader discussions on supply-chain resilience. The two sides held bilateral talks on key regional and global issues, including the Middle East, Ukraine, and the Global South agenda – often on the sidelines of multilateral fora like the G20, the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (where Türkiye is a dialogue partner), and BRICS.
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In Africa, Türkiye further stepped up its engagement. Its approach has focused on strengthening ties in defence industry, energy, mining, trade, and investment, alongside a growing emphasis on regional stability through diplomacy. As a supporter of the Sudanese Armed Forces and its allies, Türkiye has also engaged in broader peace efforts on Sudan (including participation in the Berlin Conference) and in support for various diplomatic initiatives addressing regional tensions. Engagement in the Horn of Africa - notably in Somalia - deepened, with expanded security cooperation and energy exploration activities. Türkiye maintained a firm stance against the recognition of Somaliland, reiterating its support for Somalia’s territorial integrity. More broadly, Ankara continues to provide security assistance and counter-terrorism support to governments across the continent, including in West Africa. In June 2026, the EU and Türkiye held consultations on developments in Africa, reflecting shared interest in regional stability, maritime security, and crises management as well as possible economic cooperation.
Türkiye maintained its political and trade relations with Latin America, including on defence cooperation. Relations with Venezuela remained strong and, in June 2026, the Venezuelan Acting President met with the Turkish President in Istanbul. Türkiye and Brazil approved a five-year agreement for defence cooperation in September 2025 and developed their agricultural trade.
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ANNEX I – RELATIONS BETWEEN THE EU AND TÜRKIYE
Türkiye is a key partner to the EU in many areas of joint interest and a candidate country. In April 2024, the European Council reiterated the EU’s strategic interest in a stable and secure environment in the Eastern Mediterranean and in the development of a cooperative and mutually beneficial relationship with Türkiye. The EU and Türkiye are engaged in advancing on the recommendations of the November 2023 Joint Communication by the High Representative and the Commission on the state of play of EU-Türkiye political, economic and trade relations. The EU is progressing in a phased, proportionate and reversible manner, subject to the established conditionalities.
Work intensified in 2024 and 2025 with the launch of the new High-Level Dialogue on Trade and the resumption of the High-Level Dialogue on Economy (both held twice), meetings of the High-Level Dialogues on Security and Migration, Climate, Science, Research, Technology and Innovation, and the intensification of political consultations on foreign and security policy with a focus on regional developments. The Council Conclusions of December 2024 stressed that Türkiye’s own constructive engagement will be instrumental in advancing the various areas of cooperation identified in the Joint Communication.
In October 2025, the Ministerial Meeting on Cross-Regional Security and Connectivity with partner countries from the Black Sea region, South Caucasus and Central Asia launched the Connectivity Agenda, opening a new strand of cooperation between the EU and Türkiye aiming to foster regional connectivity. In June 2026, the EU and the regional partners, including Türkiye, launched the Connectivity Agenda Platform which will provide a framework for participating countries, international financial institutions and other stakeholders to coordinate investments and policy action across transport, energy, digital connectivity and trade sectors.
Türkiye continues to refuse to recognise the Republic of Cyprus and advocates for a two- state solution in Cyprus, contrary to relevant UN Security Council (UNSC) resolutions. In December 2024, the Council’s Conclusions reconfirmed the commitment to a comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus problem within the UN framework, in accordance with the relevant UNSC resolutions and in line with the principles on which the EU is founded and the EU acquis. It welcomed steps taken by the UN Secretary-General towards a resumption of settlement talks, confirming that the EU remains ready to play an active role in supporting all stages of the UN-led process, with all appropriate means at its disposal. On 13 July 2026, the Commission appointed Executive Vice-President Raffaele Fitto as the Commission's Special Representative for Cyprus.
The Council Conclusions of July 2019, adopted as a response to Türkiye’s unauthorised drilling activities in the Eastern Mediterranean, remain in place. In November 2025, following a review of the framework for restrictive measures in response to the unauthorised drilling activities, the Council extended the regime for a further year, until 30 November 2026, with the annex empty. Türkiye has not engaged in any unauthorised drilling activities in the Eastern Mediterranean since the beginning of 2021.
In December 2024, in its Conclusions, the Council expressed its serious concerns about the worrying backsliding and continued deterioration in the areas of democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights. It reiterated the previous conclusion that accession negotiations with the country have come to a standstill and no further chapters can be considered for opening or closing. As part of accession negotiations before 2018, 16 chapters had been opened and one of these had been provisionally closed. Reforms and developments in Türkiye continued to be monitored by the bodies set up under the Association Agreement, with subcommittees having regular meetings throughout the reporting period. The meetings of the Association Council remain suspended in line with the 2019 Council conclusions.
The Commission continued engagement with Türkiye to discuss the functioning of the Customs Union, including a High-Level Dialogue on Trade on 13 October 2026. Türkiye
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made progress on reducing trade barriers since 2021 and took measures to prevent the circumvention of EU restrictive measures against Russia imposed in reaction to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. The EU expects further efforts in both areas. The Joint Communication of November 2023, recommended to resume discussions on the draft negotiating framework for the modernisation of the Customs Union. This was on the understanding that Türkiye rapidly addresses the circumvention of EU restrictive measures against Russia via its territory and continues to resolve trade irritants in an efficient way, while maintaining a broader environment conducive to the resumption of Cyprus settlement talks.
Türkiye was the EU’s fifth largest trading partner in 2025, while the EU continued to be Türkiye’s largest partner, with bilateral trade reaching EUR 218 billion in total.
In the area of visa, migration and asylum, the implementation of the March 2016 EU- Turkey Statement has continued to deliver concrete results in reducing irregular and dangerous crossings on the Eastern Mediterranean route to Europe and in saving lives at sea. Türkiye continued significant efforts to provide support to 2.3 million refugees (as of August 2026), while it continued working to prevent irregular migration. In the context of the EU-Türkiye visa liberalisation dialogue, no outstanding visa liberalisation benchmarks were fulfilled. An international agreement on the exchange of personal data between Europol and the Turkish authorities responsible for fighting serious crime and terrorism is yet to be concluded.
Türkiye and the EU continued to cooperate effectively in supporting refugees and host communities in Türkiye. Almost EUR 12.5 billion has been allocated for that purpose since 2011, including EUR 6 billion under the Facility for Refugees in Turkey. Support continued to focus on humanitarian assistance, education, health, municipal infrastructure, and socio- economic development and migration management. Support also covered host communities. Over 1.3 million refugees, including the most vulnerable, continue to receive basic needs support, and close to 938 610 refugee children are enrolled in schools. Other achievements include the construction of two major hospitals, 196 new schools (out of a target of 319) and delivering over 5.13 million healthcare consultations.
On bilateral financial assistance, projects under the Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance (IPA) for Türkiye continued to be implemented, in compliance with the political guidance of the EU budgetary authority. Financial assistance under IPA III focuses on priorities linked to enlargement fundamentals including support to civil society, people to people contacts, rural development, cross-border cooperation and areas of common interest, mainly related to the green and digital transition, connectivity and competitiveness.
Implementation of the EU pledge of EUR 1 billion for the people in Türkiye affected by the February 2023 earthquakes continued.
Türkiye continues to participate in EU programmes and agencies, including Erasmus+, Horizon Europe, the European Solidarity Corps programme, the Customs programme, the Single Market Programme (SME component) the Digital Europe Programme, the Union Civil Protection Mechanism, the European Environmental Agency, and the European Union Drugs Agency. On research and innovation, the positive trend of Türkiye’s performance in Horizon Europe continued in 2025, with the EU contribution awarded to Turkish stakeholders since September 2025 exceeding EUR 67 million (the total EU contribution surpassed EUR 405.82 million over the first four years of Horizon Europe). The Turkey Investment Platform under the European Fund for Sustainable Development Plus (EFSD+) enables stronger EU support to investments through guarantee programmes in the three overarching policy priorities: the Green Deal, the Global Gateway as well as jobs and growth. It is expected to mobilise close to EUR 1.6 billion of investments in Türkiye. The European Investment Bank has re-engaged in Türkiye through two projects supporting SMEs in the area of energy efficiency, renewables and green industry totalling EUR 200 million, with the support of the EU budget guarantee.
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ANNEX II – STATISTICAL DATA
STATISTICAL DATA (as of 14/09/2026)
Türkiye
Basic data Note 2013 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
Population (thousand) 75 627 i 83 614 i 84 680 i 85 280 i 85 372 i 85 665 i
Total area of the country (km²) 780 272 780 270 780 270 780 270 780 270 780 270
National accounts Note 2013 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
Gross domestic product (GDP) (million national currency) 1 831 744 7 433 800 15 325 858 27 091 469 44 587 225 63 020 906
Gross domestic product (GDP) (million euro) 723 009 707 146 880 351 1 051 700 1 253 387 1 406 211
GDP per capita (euro) 9 480 8 050 9 930 11 860 14 140 :
GDP per capita (in purchasing power standards (PPS) 16 197 19 620 23 418 25 721 27 621 :
GDP per capita (in PPS), relative to the EU average (EU-27 = 100) 61.7 59.0 64.8 67.0 69.1 :
Real GDP growth rate: change on previous year of GDP volume (%) 8.5 11.8 5.4 5.0 3.3 3.6
Employment growth (national accounts data), relative to the previous year (%) : : : : : :
Labour productivity growth: growth in GDP (in volume) per person employed, relative to the
previous year (%)
: : : : : :
Unit labour cost growth, relative to the previous year (%) : : : : : :
Nominal unit labour cost index based on persons (3 year % change) : : : : : :
Labour productivity per person employed: GDP (in PPS) per person employed relative to EU
average (EU-27 = 100)
: : : : : :
Gross value added by main sectors
Agriculture, forestry and fisheries (%) 7.6 6.4 7.5 7.2 6.6 5.9
Industry (%) 22.5 28.8 29.0 25.6 22.2 20.5
Construction (%) 9.1 5.5 5.4 6.1 6.6 6.6
Services (%) 60.8 i 59.2 i 58.2 i 60.9 i 64.7 i 67.1 i
Final consumption expenditure, as a share of GDP (%) 72.9 65.1 65.0 67.3 68.7 68.6
Gross fixed capital formation, as a share of GDP (%) 28.8 28.4 30.5 32.9 31.3 30.6
Exports of goods and services, relative to GDP (%) 24.4 35.1 38.1 31.9 27.6 24.8
Imports of goods and services, relative to GDP (%) 28.7 34.6 41.8 33.8 27.0 25.1
Gross fixed capital formation by the general government sector, as a percentage of GDP (%) : : : : : :
Business Note 2013 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
Industrial production volume index (2015 = 100)
66.0 100.0 104.4 106.1 106.5 109.5
109
Number of active enterprises (number)
2 906 413 3 513 272 3 706 578 3 788 414 : :
Birth rate: number of enterprise births in the reference period (t) divided by the number of
enterprises active in t (%)
13.8 i 16.4 i 16.3 i 15.5 i : :
Death rate: number of enterprise deaths in the reference period (t) divided by the number of
enterprises active in t (%)
12.0 i 11.9 i 12.9 i : : :
People employed in SMEs as a share of all persons employed (within the non-financial
business economy) (%)
76.1 iw 74.0 iw 73.2 iw 72.6 iw 72.2 iw :
Value added by SMEs (in the non-financial business economy) (EUR million) 96 328 iw 89 165 iw 143 240 iw 155 804 iw 233 180 iw :
Total value added (in the non-financial business economy) (EUR million) 173 793 w 178 756 w 281 066 w 304 161 w 428 981 w :
Inflation rate and house prices Note 2013 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
Consumer price index (CPI), change relative to the previous year (%) 7.5 d 19.6 d 72.3 d 54.0 d 58.5 d 34.9 d
Balance of payments Note 2013 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
Balance of payments: current account total (million euro) - 37 178.1 - 5 110.6 - 43 928.5 - 38 722.1 - 12 243.5 - 27 598.5
Balance of payments current account: trade balance (million euro) - 61 722.1 - 24 850.1 - 85 457.6 - 79 814.0 - 51 802.6 - 61 872.7
Balance of payments current account: net services (million euro) 30 099.3 27 960.7 50 559.5 51 468.3 56 594.4 55 501.9
Balance of payments current account: net balance for primary income (million euro) - 6 517.2 - 9 016.8 - 8 719.1 - 10 889.4 - 17 106.8 - 20 743.7
Balance of payments current account: net balance for secondary income (million euro) 962.0 795.6 - 311.3 513.0 71.5 - 483.9
Net balance for primary and secondary income: of which government transfers (million euro) 342.2 355.2 - 583.1 - 762.6 - 159.2 - 464.9
*3 year backward moving average of the current account balance relative to GDP (%) - 6.2 - 1.0 - 3.3 - 3.1 - 3.2 - 2.2
*Five year change in share of world exports of goods and services (%) : 5.0 10.9 17.8 12.8 22.5
Net balance (inward - outward) of foreign direct investment (FDI) (million euro) 6 583.1 i 5 336.9 i 9 042.2 i 4 228.3 i 4 737.0 i :
Foreign direct investment (FDI) abroad (million euro) 2 656.4 4 262.0 4 292.1 5 540.0 5 487.2 :
of which FDI of the reporting economy in the EU-27 countries (million euro) : 1 805.9 2 197.9 2 650.3 2 358.3 :
Foreign direct investment (FDI) in the reporting economy (million euro) 9 239.5 9 598.9 13 334.3 9 768.3 10 224.2 :
of which FDI of the EU-27 countries in the reporting economy (million euro) : 2 084.4 5 091.9 4 023.7 4 378.5 :
*Net international investment position, relative to GDP (%) : - 29.7 - 38.2 - 28.4 - 26.7 - 19.7
Year on year rate of change in gross inflow of remittances (in national currency) from migrant
workers (%)
0.1 iw 0.0 iw 0.0 iw 0.0 iw 0.0 iw 0.0 iw
Public finance Note 2013 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
General government deficit / surplus, relative to GDP (%) : : : : : :
General government gross debt relative to GDP (%) : : : : : :
Total government revenues, as a percentage of GDP (%) : : : : : :
Total government expenditure, as a percentage of GDP (%) : : : : : :
110
Financial indicators Note 2013 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
Gross external debt of the whole economy, relative to GDP (%) 41.9 iw 51.2 iw 48.6 iw 43.3 iw 38.1 iw 35.6 iw
Gross external debt of the whole economy, relative to total exports (%) 189.0 w 131.4 w 112.0 w 121.2 w 122.8 w 132.2 w
Money supply: M1 (banknotes, coins, overnight deposits, million euro) 78 128.6 w 143 842.8 w 156 740.1 w 145 708.9 w 171 564.1 w 198 962.6 w
Total credit by monetary financial institutions to residents (consolidated) (million euro) 320 629.4 365 676.5 459 427.4 489 230.0 547 073.9 589 868.1
*Annual change in financial sector liabilities (%) 19.2 43.1 80.9 53.1 29.7 29.7
*Private debt, consolidated, relative to GDP (%) 70.9 84.9 63.2 56.0 46.5 48.7
Interest rates: day-to-day money rate, per annum (%) 5.62 17.87 13.16 18.69 48.95 43.72
Euro exchange rates: average of period (1 euro = … national currency) 2.534 10.512 17.409 25.760 35.573 44.816
Trade-weighted effective exchange rate index, 42 countries (2015 = 100) 120.58 30.71 17.85 12.52 9.16 7.38
*3 year change (T/T-3) in the trade-weighted effective exchange rate index, 42 countries
(2015 = 100)
- 0.21 iw - 0.45 iw - 0.64 iw - 0.69 iw - 0.70 iw - 0.59 iw
Value of reserve assets (including gold) (million euro) 7 481.2 19 405.7 13 110.7 - 1 949.6 691.1 - 20 388.7
External trade in goods Note 2013 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
Value of imports: all goods, all partners (million euro) 189 784 219 224 324 441 311 586 296 606 304 057
Value of exports: all goods, all partners (million euro) 114 563 180 299 223 777 214 180 219 316 219 953
Trade balance: all goods, all partners (million euro) - 75 222 - 38 925 - 100 663 - 97 406 - 77 291 - 84 104
Terms of trade (export price index / import price index * 100) (number) 92.5 iw 85.9 iw 75.7 iw 85.0 iw 86.7 iw :
Share of exports to EU-27 countries in value of total exports (%) 35.7 iw 41.1 iw 40.4 iw 40.8 iw 41.9 iw :
Share of imports from EU-27 countries in value of total imports (%) 34.3 iw 31.1 iw 25.5 iw 29.0 iw 32.0 iw :
Demography Note 2013 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
Crude rate of natural change of population (natural growth rate): number of births minus
deaths (per thousand inhabitants)
12.0 6.1 6.2 5.1 5.2 4.7
Infant mortality rate deaths of children under one year of age (per thousand live births) 10.8 9.3 9.2 10.0 9.0 :
Life expectancy at birth: male (years) 75.4 : 74.3 74.8 76.4 b :
Life expectancy at birth: female (years) 81.1 : 78.4 79.8 81.7 b :
Labour market Note 2013 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
Economic activity rate for persons aged 20–64: proportion of the population aged 20–64 that
is economically active (%)
58.4 61.2 b 63.1 63.1 64.0 63.4
Employment rate for persons aged 20–64: proportion of the population aged 20–64 that are
in employment (%)
53.4 53.9 b 56.5 57.3 58.5 58.1
Male employment rate for persons aged 20–64 (%) 75.3 73.6 b 75.9 76.5 77.5 77.1
Female employment rate for persons aged 20–64 (%) 31.8 34.2 b 37.0 38.0 39.4 39.1
Employment rate for persons aged 55–64: proportion of the population aged 55–64 that are
in employment (%)
31.5 33.6 b 34.9 36.3 38.5 38.1
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Employment by main sectors
Agriculture, forestry and fisheries (%) 22.9 i 17.2 bi 15.7 i 14.6 i 14.6 i 13.9 i
Industry (%) 19.4 i 21.4 bi 21.7 i 21.3 i 20.7 i 20.3 i
Construction (%) 7.0 i 6.1 bi 6.0 i 6.3 i 6.6 i 6.8 i
Services (%) 50.7 i 55.3 bi 56.6 i 57.8 i 58.1 i 59.0 i
People employed in the public sector as a share of total employment, persons aged 20–64
(%)
: : : : : :
People employed in the private sector as a share of total employment, persons aged 20–64
(%)
: : : : : :
Unemployment rate: proportion of the labour force that is unemployed (%) 8.8 12.0 b 10.5 9.4 8.8 8.4
Male unemployment rate (%) 8.0 10.7 b 9.0 7.7 7.1 6.9
Female unemployment rate (%) 10.6 14.7 b 13.5 12.7 11.8 11.4
Youth unemployment rate: proportion of the labour force aged 15–24 that is unemployed (%) 16.9 22.7 b 19.5 17.5 16.4 15.4
Long-term unemployment rate: proportion of the labour force that has been unemployed for
12 months or more (%)
1.9 3.7 b 2.5 2.0 1.7 1.5
Unemployment rate for persons (aged 25–64) having completed at most lower secondary
education (ISCED levels 0-2) (%)
7.3 10.4 b 8.6 7.6 7.1 7.0
Unemployment rate for persons (aged 25–64) having completed tertiary education (ISCED
levels 5-8) (%)
6.9 10.0 b 9.4 8.2 7.6 7.1
Social cohesion Note 2013 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
Average nominal monthly wages and salaries (national currency) 1 509 w 3 904 w 4 742 w 8 568 w 17 480 w 31 587 w
Index of real wages and salaries (index of nominal wages and salaries divided by the
inflation index) (2016 = 100)
: : : : : :
Gini coefficient : 43 45 44 45 44
Poverty gap 27.9 27.0 24.8 24.7 24.3 24.8
Standard of living Note 2013 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
Number of passenger cars relative to population size (number per thousand population) 121.0 162.0 167.0 178.0 189.0 203.0 i
Infrastructure Note 2013 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
Density of railway network (lines in operation per thousand km²) 12.5 i 13.5 i 13.7 i 14.6 i 14.6 i :
Length of motorways (kilometres) 2 244 3 532 3 633 3 726 3 796 :
Education, Innovation and Research Note 2013 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
Percentage of persons aged 30-34 with a tertiary education level (ISCED 2011 levels 5 to 8) 19.5 35.5 b 37.6 39.9 41.7 43.2
Percentage of persons aged 30-34 with a tertiary education level (ISCED 2011 levels 5 to 8),
males
21.1 36.0 b 37.4 39.2 40.3 41.6
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Percentage of persons aged 30-34 with a tertiary education level (ISCED 2011 levels 5 to 8),
females
17.9 35.1 b 37.9 40.5 43.1 44.8
Participation in early childhood education (children aged 3 and over) 27.7 w 31.7 48.6 54.9 55.0 :
Participation in early childhood education (children aged 3 and over), males 28.2 w 32.1 48.9 55.3 55.3 :
Participation in early childhood education (children aged 3 and over), females 27.2 w 31.3 48.3 54.5 54.7 :
Low achieving 15-year-olds in reading (%) : : 29.3 : : :
Low achieving 15-year-olds in mathematics (%) : : 38.7 : : :
Low achieving 15-year-olds in science (%) : : 24.7 : : :
Early leavers from education and training: proportion of persons aged 18-24 with at most
lower secondary education (at most ISCED 2011 level 2) who are not in further education or
training
37.5 23.1 b 21.2 19.5 18.7 17.9
Early leavers from education and training: proportion of men aged 18-24 with at most lower
secondary education (at most ISCED 2011 level 2) who are not in further education or
training
35.0 23.9 b 22.2 20.1 19.6 18.7
Early leavers from education and training: proportion of women aged 18-24 with at most
lower secondary education (at most ISCED 2011 level 2) who are not in further education or
training
39.9 22.2 b 20.2 19.0 17.8 16.9
Proportion of persons aged 25-64 having participated in education and training (last 4
weeks)
4.5 6.5 b 6.7 7.4 8.0 7.5
Proportion of persons aged 25-64 having participated in education and training (last 4
weeks), men
4.6 6.5 b 6.4 7.0 7.3 6.7
Proportion of persons aged 25-64 having participated in education and training (last 4
weeks), women
4.5 6.5 b 7.0 7.8 8.6 8.2
Exposure of vocational education and training (VET) graduates to work-based learning (% of
population aged 20-34)
: : : : : :
Share of individuals having at least basic digital skills (% of population aged 16-74) : 30.1 : 33.1 : 31.5
Share of individuals having at least basic digital skills (% of population aged 16-74), males : 34.0 : 36.8 : 34.1
Share of individuals having at least basic digital skills (% of population aged 16-74), females : 26.2 : 29.4 : 28.9
Public expenditure on education relative to GDP (%) : : : : 4.0 iw :
Gross domestic expenditure on R&D relative to GDP (%) 0.81 1.37 1.30 1.39 1.46 :
Government budget appropriations or outlays on R&D (GBAORD), as a percentage of GDP
(%)
0.37 0.37 0.35 0.36 0.40 0.37 p
Percentage of households who have internet access at home (%) 49.1 92.0 94.2 95.5 96.5 96.2
Environment Note 2013 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
Index of greenhouse gas emissions, CO2 equivalent (1990 = 100) 195.9 ew 251.3 ew 245.2 ew 242.5 ew 255.3 ew :
Energy intensity of the economy (kg of oil equivalent per 1 000 euro GDP at 2015 constant
prices)
163.5 157.0 146.8 142.2 144.3 :
Electricity generated from renewable sources relative to gross electricity consumption (%) 28.1 w 35.6 w 41.6 w 41.8 w 46.1 w :
Road share of inland freight transport (based on tonne-km) (%) 95.2 w 95.6 w 95.7 w 96.5 w 96.6 w :
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Energy Note 2013 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
Primary production of all energy products (thousand TOE) 29 092 46 208 50 484 48 870 54 543 :
Primary production of crude oil (thousand TOE) 2 370 3 518 3 663 4 206 5 454 :
Primary production of solid fuels (thousand TOE) 13 542 17 151 18 835 14 682 15 805 :
Primary production of gas (thousand TOE) 443 324 312 665 1 858 :
Net imports of all energy products (thousand TOE) 86 645 i 115 096 i 113 942 i 114 008 i 116 343 i :
Gross inland energy consumption (thousand TOE) 114 029 161 774 159 458 162 366 170 163 :
Gross electricity generation (GWh) 240 154 334 723 328 379 331 149 354 570 :
Agriculture Note 2013 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
Agricultural output volume index (at producer prices) (2015 = 100) : : : : : :
Utilised agricultural area (thousand hectares) : 38 038.0 38 450.0 38 563.0 38 596.0 :
Livestock numbers: live bovine animals (thousand heads, end of period) 14 532.9 18 036.1 17 023.8 16 583.0 16 986.3 17 709.0
Livestock numbers: live swine (thousand heads, end of period) : : 1.7 e 1.7 1.7 1.4
Livestock numbers: live sheep and live goats (thousand heads, end of period) 38 509.8 i 57 519.2 i 56 265.8 i 52 363.4 i 54 902.7 i 57 874.3 i
Raw milk available on farms (thousand tonnes) : : : : : :
Harvested crop production: cereals (including rice) (thousand tonnes) 37 129.4 32 602.0 39 562.1 43 176.3 39 922.3 :
Harvested crop production: sugar beet (thousand tonnes) 16 483.0 18 250.0 19 000.0 23 498.0 22 999.0 :
Harvested crop production: vegetables (thousand tonnes) 28 820.0 31 691.0 31 525.0 31 716.0 33 496.0 :
Source: Eurostat and/or the statistical authorities in Türkiye
: = not available b = break in time series d = definition differs e = estimated p = provisional i = Eurostat estimate w= data supplied by and under the responsibility of the national statistical authority and published on an "as is" basis and
without any assurance as regards their quality and adherence to EU statistical methodology
* = Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure (MIP) indicator
114
EN EN
EUROPEAN COMMISSION
Brussels, 4.11.2026 SWD(2026) 697 final
COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT
Georgia 2026 Report
Accompanying the document
COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN
PARLIAMENT, THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL
COMMITTEE AND THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS
2026 Communication on EU enlargement policy
{COM(2026) 690 final} - {SWD(2026) 690 final} - {SWD(2026) 691 final} -
{SWD(2026) 692 final} - {SWD(2026) 693 final} - {SWD(2026) 694 final} - {SWD(2026) 695 final} - {SWD(2026) 696 final} - {SWD(2026) 698 final} -
{SWD(2026) 699 final} - {SWD(2026) 700 final}
1
Table of Contents
I. Introduction .......................................................................................................................................... 3
1.1. Context ......................................................................................................................................... 3
1.2. Main findings of the report ........................................................................................................... 3
1.3. Assessment of the implementation of the steps ........................................................................ 13
2. Cluster 1: The fundamentals of the accession process .................................................................... 13
2.1. Functioning of democratic institutions and public administration reform ................................... 13
2.1.1 Democracy ........................................................................................................................... 13
2.1.2. Public administration reform ............................................................................................... 16
2.2. Rule of law and fundamental rights ............................................................................................ 18
2.2.1 Chapter 23: Judiciary and fundamental rights .................................................................. 18
2.2.2 Chapter 24: Justice, freedom and security ....................................................................... 36
2.3. Economic criteria ........................................................................................................................ 46
2.3.1 The existence of a functioning market economy ................................................................. 46
2.3.2. The capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union ........ 50
2.4. Public procurement, statistics, financial control ......................................................................... 52
Chapter 5 - Public procurement .................................................................................................... 52
Chapter 18 - Statistics ................................................................................................................... 53
Chapter 32 - Financial control ....................................................................................................... 54
3. Good neighbourly relations and regional cooperation ...................................................................... 55
4. Resilience, security, defence ............................................................................................................ 56
5. Ability to assume obligations of membership .................................................................................... 57
Cluster 2: Internal Market .................................................................................................................. 57
Chapter 1 - Free movement of goods ........................................................................................... 57
Chapter 2 - Freedom of movement for workers ............................................................................ 58
Chapter 3 - Right of establishment and freedom to provide services ........................................... 59
Chapter 4 - Free movement of capital .......................................................................................... 59
Chapter 6 - Company law ............................................................................................................. 59
Chapter 7 - Intellectual property law ............................................................................................. 60
Chapter 8 - Competition policy ...................................................................................................... 60
Chapter 9 - Financial services ....................................................................................................... 61
Chapter 28 - Consumer and health protection .............................................................................. 62
Cluster 3: Competitiveness and inclusive growth ............................................................................. 63
Chapter 10 - Digital transformation and media ............................................................................. 63
Chapter 16 - Taxation ................................................................................................................... 64
Chapter 17 - Economic and monetary policy ................................................................................ 64
Chapter 19 - Social policy and employment ................................................................................. 65
Chapter 20 - Enterprise and industrial policy ................................................................................ 66
Chapter 25 - Science and research .............................................................................................. 67
Chapter 26 - Education and culture .............................................................................................. 68
Chapter 29 - Customs union ......................................................................................................... 69
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Cluster 4: The Green agenda and sustainable connectivity ............................................................. 70
Chapter 14 - Transport policy ........................................................................................................ 70
Chapter 15 - Energy ...................................................................................................................... 71
Chapter 21 - Trans-European networks ........................................................................................ 72
Chapter 27 - Environment and climate change ............................................................................. 72
Cluster 5: Resources, agriculture and cohesion ............................................................................... 74
Chapter 11 - Agriculture and rural development ........................................................................... 74
Chapter 12 - Food safety, veterinary and phytosanitary policy ..................................................... 75
Chapter 13 - Fisheries and aquaculture ........................................................................................ 76
Chapter 22 - Regional policy and coordination of structural instruments ..................................... 77
Chapter 33 - Financial and budgetary provisions ......................................................................... 77
Cluster 6: External relations .............................................................................................................. 78
Chapter 30 - External relations ..................................................................................................... 78
Chapter 31 - Foreign, security and defence policy ....................................................................... 79
Annex I – Relations between the EU and Georgia ........................................................................... 81
Annex II – Statistical annex ............................................................................................................... 83
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I. INTRODUCTION1
1.1. CONTEXT
In December 2023, the European Council granted Georgia candidate status on the understanding that the relevant reforms (i.e. the nine steps) set out in the Commission recommendations of 8 November 2023 were taken. In view of the developments in Georgia, the European Council concluded in June, October and December 2024 that the authorities’ course of action jeopardised Georgia’s EU path, de facto leading to a halt of the accession process. In December 2024, the European Council regretted the Georgian government’s decision to suspend the country’s EU accession process until 2028. In the 2025 Communication on EU Enlargement Policy, the Commission concluded that the actions taken by the Georgian authorities fall short of the expectations of an EU candidate country. Furthermore, it called on Georgia to urgently reverse the democratic backsliding and make comprehensive and tangible efforts to address outstanding concerns and key reforms supported by cross-party cooperation and civic engagement, in line with EU values and the principles upon which the European Union is founded.
As Georgia’s accession process remains halted, as in 2025, this report focuses on the fundamentals of the accession process that underpin its candidate status and the related recommendations. Given the continued backsliding observed in this year’s report and the need to address the steps identified by the Commission in 2023 as a matter of priority, it does not set recommendations for the chapters beyond the fundamentals.
1.2. MAIN FINDINGS OF THE REPORT
CLUSTER 1: THE FUNDAMENTALS OF THE ACCESSION PROCESS
Democracy
The state of democracy continued to deteriorate during the reporting period due to a growing erosion of democratic institutions, increased concentration of power, an escalating crackdown on civil and political liberties, further shrinking of the civic space, as well as hostile anti-EU rhetoric and disinformation. Attempts to ban main opposition parties through a Constitutional Court case threaten the foundations of the country’s democracy.
The authorities have not taken steps to reform the general electoral framework according to
longstanding recommendations. Municipal elections were held in October 2025 in a highly
polarised and repressive environment which severely undermined the competitiveness and
transparency of the process. These included legislative amendments favouring the ruling
party, a boycott by most opposition parties, the lack of impartial election administration, voter
intimidation and the lack of OSCE/ODIHR and credible domestic observers. New severe
restrictions on political activity and political participation of citizens were adopted during the
reporting period, in contradiction of international standards on pluralism and democracy.
Parliamentary oversight remains limited and the executive’s power further increased.
Political polarisation deepened and democratic pluralism deteriorated further. Most
1 This report covers the period from 1 September 2025 to 1 September 2026. It is based on input from a variety of
sources, including contributions from the government of Georgia, EU Member States, European Parliament reports and information from various international and non-governmental organisations. It also includes the results of comparative assessments and indices produced by other stakeholders, in particular in the area of rule of law.
The report uses the following assessment scale to describe the state of play: early stage, some level of preparation, moderately prepared, good level of preparation and well advanced. To describe progress made during the reporting period, it uses the following scale: backsliding, no progress, limited progress, some progress, good progress and very good progress. Where appropriate, interim steps have also been used.
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opposition leaders are now either facing criminal charges, in exile or imprisoned. Women are
increasingly under-represented in public office.
On EU integration, the authorities’ declared aspiration to join the EU is contradicted by their
systematic engagement in hostile anti-EU rhetoric, undermining of fundamental values and
failure to address key EU-related reforms.
On governance, Georgia continued the trend of centralising and concentrating political power within the ruling party and executive institutions. State authorities exercised political, administrative and financial pressure on local decision-making.
Civil society, including human rights defenders (HRDs), operates in a repressive environment, which continues to deteriorate. The role of civil society as a democratic watchdog has been compromised and organisations and HRDs are facing increasing threats. The cumulative effect of a frequently changing repressive legal framework and intimidation practices threatens the survival of independent civil society and has resulted in a further shrinking of the civic space. An additional concern is the application of criminal law against civil society actors, including criminal investigations into ‘sabotage’, ‘assisting foreign organisations in hostile activities’, ‘financing activities directed against the constitutional order, and ‘damage to state interests’. These actions are coercive and ultimately inconsistent with democratic pluralism. They are incompatible with the EU integration process.
Public administration reform
Georgia is between having some and a moderate level of preparation in the area of public administration reform (PAR). There was no progress during the reporting period. The civil service reform was not realigned with EU principles, and the legal framework does not provide for a merit-based civil service free from undue political interference. Participatory policy making has been considerably further weakened reducing opportunities for meaningful stakeholder engagement and for civil society participation.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were not implemented and therefore remain valid. In the coming year, Georgia should in particular:
→ realign the public administration reform agenda with European public administration principles and standards, and ensure an open, participatory and evidence-based process for public policy development, monitoring and evaluation;
→ restore civil service legal protection by reintroducing sufficient guarantees and protection from undue political interference and other interference;
→ ensure the right to access public information and re-engage with the Open Government Partnership.
Chapter 23: Judiciary and fundamental rights
In the area of judiciary and fundamental rights, Georgia is between an early stage of preparation and having some level of preparation. For the third consecutive year, there was backsliding.
Functioning of the judiciary
Georgia remains at an early stage of preparation and there was backsliding during the reporting period. No reforms were undertaken to address the European Commission and Venice Commission recommendations regarding a thorough and comprehensive reform of the judiciary. In particular, Georgia has yet to carry out a comprehensive reform of the High Council of Justice (HCJ) and the Supreme Court (SC) in line with the recommendations. The independence, impartiality and integrity of the judicial system remain seriously undermined. The amendments to the judiciary’s legal framework adopted in December 2025 further undermine the independence and integrity of the judicial system and exacerbate risks of
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judicial capture. The harsh and disproportionate sentences inflicted on protesters raise concerns that the judiciary is being instrumentalised to enforce a system of repression.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were not implemented and remain valid. In the coming year, Georgia needs to:
→ align the Law on common courts with Venice Commission recommendations on the powers of the HCJ concerning transfers of judges, as well as the evaluation and selection process for Supreme Court judges (including effective appeal, qualifications of Supreme Court judges and an anti-deadlock mechanism);
→ initiate a broader reform of the judiciary, in particular to reform the HCJ in line with Venice Commission recommendations, addressing restrictions on the reappointment of its members, notably by fixed non-renewable terms. Moreover, establish a system of extraordinary integrity checks, with the involvement of international experts with a decisive role in the process, for candidates and for people currently appointed to all leading positions in the judiciary, in particular the HCJ, the Supreme Court and Common Court presidents;
→ align the Law on the Prosecutor General’s Office with European standards following the recommendations of the Venice Commission, OECD and the EU-funded Technical Assistance and Information Exchange (TAIEX) peer review on the functioning of the justice sector and the fight against organised crime carried out in May 2023.
Fight against corruption
Georgia has some level of preparation in the area of the fight against corruption. There was however, no progress in the reporting period. The legal framework does not provide for an independent advisory institution, and further alignment is needed on whistle-blower protection. An anti-corruption strategy and action plan have been missing since 2020, while targeted risk assessments to address corruption in the most vulnerable sectors remain to be developed and implemented. The Anti-Corruption Bureau was abolished and its preventive functions transferred to the State Audit Office (SAO) without addressing the recommendations issues by the Group of States against Corruption (GRECO) and by the Venice Commission on effectiveness or institutional independence and risks rendering these functions ineffective.
There was a significant increase in the monitoring of asset declarations in 2025. The number of cases in the track record on the fight against corruption has increased. However, there are concerns about a selective approach, in a context where longstanding recommendations concerning guarantees for prosecutorial autonomy and judicial independence remain unaddressed. No steps were taken to address de-oligarchisation, while entrenched oligarchic influence contributes to state capture and hinders democratic consolidation.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were not implemented and remain valid. Georgia should in particular:
→ align the legislation to the ODIHR/Venice Commission/GRECO recommendations and ensure that the relevant preventive and enforcement agencies operate independently and effectively, avoiding a selective approach; adopt an anti-corruption strategy and action plan, and ensure that it is comprehensively implemented with realistic timelines, adequate funding and appropriate monitoring mechanisms; the SAO should continue to consistently monitor, verify and publish officials’ asset declarations in line with Venice Commission recommendations;
→ repeal the decision of February 2023 to withdraw from the OECD/Anti-Corruption Network Istanbul Anti-Corruption Action Plan monitoring programme and fully implement recommendations from the 2022 pilot report, including on combating bribery of foreign public officials in international business transactions;
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→ implement a systemic approach on de-oligarchisation in line with the recommendations by the Venice Commission (opinions of March 2023 and June 2023).
Fundamental rights
Human rights have been severely curtailed and undermined by increasingly repressive laws that infringe upon fundamental rights, in particular freedoms of expression, assembly and association, as well as equality and non-discrimination. Legislative amendments adopted in October 2025 and March 2026 to the Law on political associations of citizens, the Law on grants, the Criminal Code and related legislation significantly expanded the restrictive legal framework governing civil society, political participation and foreign funding in Georgia. In successive opinions2, the Venice Commission held that these amendments, combined with previously adopted restrictive measures, impose disproportionate and unnecessary restrictions on the fundamental rights and political freedoms of the Georgian citizens, concerning in particular freedom of association and expression, and is contrary to international standards. The Prosecutor General brought charges in May 2026 against five police officers for abuse of power involving the use of violence during the 2024 demonstrations. However, the large majority of reported cases of torture and ill-treatment by law enforcement have yet to be investigated. In August, a few individuals who had been arbitrarily detained in relation to the 2024-2025 protests were pardoned by the President, after admitting guilt. However, many more remain in custody. The excessive use of pre-trial detention and disproportionate sentencing deeply affect the right to a fair trial. The level of implementation of the Public Defender’s recommendations to state authorities is still very low. Implementation of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) judgments is inadequate, including systemic and structural issues regarding the justice system, penitentiary and law enforcement systems, and protection from discrimination.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were not implemented and remain valid. In the current context, Georgia should take urgent action to:
→ release all arbitrarily detained people, including politicians, journalists and activists;
→ repeal legislation that restricts fundamental rights and freedoms in breach of European and international standards, in particular the Law on transparency of foreign influence, the Foreign Agents Registration Act, amendments to the Law on grants, to the Law on assemblies and demonstrations, to the Law on political associations and related amendments to the Administrative Offences Code and Criminal Code, as well as the legislative package on family values and protection of minors;
→ comprehensively investigate allegations of excessive use of force, torture and other ill- treatment by law enforcement and bring the perpetrators to justice.
Freedom of expression and media freedom
Georgia is at an early stage of preparation in the area of freedom of expression, which was marked by backsliding for a third consecutive year. The safety of journalists and the operating environment for media have continued to be adversely affected by persistent acts of harassment, intimidation and attacks against independent and critical media outlets and journalists, including sustained online attacks amplified by pro-government media outlets. The wide-ranging restrictions on foreign funding affecting media endanger media pluralism.
2 Georgia – Venice Commission Opinion of 13 October 2026 on the amendments of 4 March 2026 to the Law on Grants, the Organic Law on Political Associations of Citizens, the Criminal Code and related legislation; Georgia – Venice Commission Opinion of 13 October 2026 on the amendments of 16 October 2025 to the Organic Law on Political Associations of Citizens, Article 381 of the Criminal Code and related legislation; Georgia – Venice Commission Opinion of 15 October 2025 on the Law on the Registration of Foreign Agents, the amendments to the Law on Grants and other Laws relating to “foreign influence”.
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Serious concerns about the independence and impartiality of the Communications Commission (ComCom), combined with the expansion of its mandate into content regulation, pose a significant risk to media editorial freedom. New amendments to the Criminal Code and the Administrative Offences Code, in conjunction with the expanded legal definition of political activity, further curtail freedom of expression of both natural and legal persons. A newly established Division for Combating Hate Speech within the Ministry of Internal Affairs raises freedom of expression concerns.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were not implemented and remain valid. Georgia should take urgent action to:
→ ensure the safety of journalists and provide prompt, impartial and due legal follow-up to all cases of attacks against and intimidation of journalists;
→ repeal legislation restricting freedom of the press and expression, including the 2025 revisions to the Law on broadcasting and other recent legislation related to ‘foreign influence’;
→ ensure an open, safe and pluralistic environment for media workers and media organisations, free from government censorship, retaliation, dismissals or legal punishment in all forms of expression, including online.
Chapter 24: Justice, freedom and security
Georgia has some level of preparation in the field of justice, freedom and security. There was no progress during the reporting period. The conduct of law enforcement authorities continued to show signs of undue political interference. The lack of comprehensive judicial follow-up to acts of excessive use of force by law enforcement authorities underscores serious shortcomings. Legal acts addressing irregular migration and international protection complemented efforts to strengthen migration management and border management procedures. The enhanced dialogue related to the temporary suspension of the visa exemption for Georgian holders of diplomatic, service and official passports did not lead to progress when it comes to the Commission’s recommendations underpinning the suspension. Visa policy still diverges substantially from the EU acquis.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were not implemented and remain valid. In the coming year, Georgia should in particular:
→ ensure fulfilment of the visa liberalisation benchmarks and address the recommendations of the seventh and eight Visa Suspension Mechanism reports;
→ continue to strengthen institutional and operational capacities to fight serious and organised crime and improve international police cooperation;
→ address the issues of Georgian nationals illegally staying and filing unfounded asylum claims in the EU, which require continuous monitoring and action by the Georgian authorities.
Fight against serious and organised crime
Georgia has some level of preparation in fighting serious and organised crime. Limited progress was made during the reporting period. The amended Law on weapons contributes to more effective crime prevention. The volume of seized and confiscated assets, especially assets from money laundering, increased substantially. Georgia set up a dedicated asset recovery office in June 2026. The country maintains a good level of cooperation with the EU Member States’ law enforcement authorities and Europol.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were only partially implemented and remain mostly valid. In the coming year, Georgia should in particular:
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→ further increase international law enforcement cooperation in particular on high-risk organised criminal networks, drug and trafficking in human beings;
→ continue addressing the recommendations set out in MONEYVAL’s Fourth Enhanced Follow-up Report and Technical Compliance Re-Rating;
→ adopt legislation on the separation of powers between criminal prosecution and investigation bodies and create a register of ultimate beneficial owners.
ECONOMIC CRITERIA
The existence of a functioning market economy
Georgia is moderately prepared and made some progress in establishing a functioning
market economy. While economic growth remained very strong for several consecutive
years, the economic outlook remains subject to some uncertainty, not least linked to the
volatile global geopolitical context and the standstill in the EU accession process. The
macroeconomic policy mix was broadly appropriate, with strong fiscal performance and
sound monetary policy. Despite strong economic growth, job creation was limited and
significant structural weaknesses remain. Wage expansion and the recent surge in inflation
require close monitoring. The authorities made progress on some economic reforms,
especially on public finances, but the reform of state-owned enterprises advanced slowly.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were only partially implemented and
therefore remain mostly valid. In the coming year, Georgia should in particular:
→ continue the reform of public finances and public investment management, including by
streamlining tax expenditures and further improving the governance and fiscal oversight
of state-owned enterprises, and continue strengthening the legislation towards ensuring
the independence of the central bank;
→ address the main weaknesses of the labour market, such as the low employment rate
and significant regional differences, adopt and start implementing the new Labour Market
Strategy, and step-up efforts to reduce the informal economy in a comprehensive
manner;
→ further develop the non-banking segments of the financial sector, including the capital market and the insurance sector.
The capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union
Georgia has some level of preparation and has made limited progress in coping with
competitive pressure and market forces within the EU. It continued to upgrade its vocational
education system. However, the recent reform of higher education could affect the quality of
academic education and raises questions about the autonomy of universities. Spending on
research and innovation remains very low. Investment in public infrastructure, especially in
transport and broadband internet networks, continued to be high, although lower than in the
previous year. The level of economic integration with the EU remains limited, with a low
value of exports from Georgia to the EU.
The Commission's recommendations from last year were only partially implemented and
therefore remain mostly valid. In the coming year, Georgia should in particular:
→ further improve the quality of education and training to ensure that their outcomes align
with labour market needs, in particular through further vocational education and training
reforms and by maintaining the institutional and financial autonomy of universities;
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→ continue efforts to develop the necessary transport, connectivity and energy
infrastructure and to increase the share of renewables in the energy mix;
→ stimulate innovation and make efforts to increase exports of higher value-added goods and services.
Chapter 5 – Public procurement
Georgia has some level of preparation in the area of public procurement. Limited progress was made during the reporting period due to the establishment of the Central Purchasing Body and changes to the legislative framework regarding the procurement procedures available and strengthening participation for SMEs.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were only partially implemented and therefore remain mostly valid. In the coming year, Georgia should in particular:
→ further align its legislative framework with the EU public procurement acquis, including on utilities and concessions and public-private partnerships, as well as in the field of defence and security;
→ ensure alignment of its legislation on the right to legal remedy with the Remedies Directives;
→ further strengthen the Procurement Dispute Resolution Council, in particular by safeguarding its independence and extending its jurisdiction to cover public procurement processes that are implemented according to the rules of international financial institutions.
Chapter 18 – Statistics
Georgia has some level of preparation in the area of statistics and made limited progress during the reporting period. It strengthened coordination of the national statistical system and made progress in increasing the production and dissemination of data and in preparing new classifications. Georgia needs to further align with the principles of the European statistics Code of Practice.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were only partially implemented and therefore remain mostly valid. In the coming year, Georgia should in particular:
→ strengthen the work of the inter-agency working group and continue to improve cooperation with data providers from line ministries and agencies;
→ improve the human resources and technical capacity of the National Statistics Office (Geostat);
→ increase the production and dissemination of timely and high-quality data and prepare new versions of classifications based on the action plan.
Chapter 32 – Financial control
Georgia has some level of preparation in the area of financial control. No progress was made during the reporting period.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were not implemented and therefore remain valid. In the coming year, Georgia should in particular:
→ implement financial management and control arrangements and strengthen managerial accountability;
→ consolidate the capacity of the central harmonisation unit within the Ministry of Finance in terms of human and financial resources;
→ increase the implementation rate of State Audit Office recommendations by the
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government.
CLUSTER 2: INTERNAL MARKET
Chapter 1 – Free movement of goods
Georgia has some level of preparation in the area of free movement of goods. There was limited progress during the reporting period by further aligning with the EU acquis on standardisation.
Chapter 2 – Freedom of movement for workers
Georgia is at an early stage of preparation in the area of freedom of movement for workers. No progress was made during the reporting period.
Chapter 3 – Right of establishment and freedom to provide services
Georgia is moderately prepared in the area of the right of establishment and freedom to provide services. There was no progress during the reporting period.
Chapter 4 – Free movement of capital
Georgia is moderately prepared in the area of free movement of capital. There was limited progress over the reporting period primarily by amending the Law on payment systems and payment services and the Law on facilitating the prevention of money laundering and the financing of terrorism.
Chapter 6 – Company law
Georgia has some level of preparation in the area of company law. There was no progress during the reporting period, although work continued on alignment with the EU acquis in the areas of digital tools and company registration.
Chapter 7 – Intellectual property law
Georgia has some level of preparation in the area of intellectual property law. Limited progress was made during the reporting period, notably by amending the Law on copyright and related rights and the Law on design.
Chapter 8 – Competition policy
Georgia is between an early stage of preparation and having some level of preparation in the area of competition policy. There was no progress during the reporting period.
Chapter 9 – Financial services
Georgia has some level of preparation in the area of financial services. Georgia made limited progress during the reporting period particularly by amending the Law on the National Bank of Georgia designating it as the prudential supervisor for crypto-asset service providers.
Chapter 28 – Consumer and health protection
Georgia has some level of preparation in the area of consumer and health protection. There was no progress in the reporting period.
CLUSTER 3: COMPETITIVENESS AND INCLUSIVE GROWTH
Chapter 10 – Digital transformation and media
Georgia has some level of preparation in the area of digital transformation and media. No progress was made during the reporting period. Amendments to the Law on broadcasting
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critically restrict media freedom. Georgia continued to implement the Law on e-commerce by adopting e-commerce guidelines.
Chapter 16 – Taxation
Georgia is between having some and a moderate level of preparation in the area of taxation. There was limited progress during the reporting period, notably by amending the Tax Code and the implementing legislation on tax administration.
Chapter 17 – Economic and monetary policy
Georgia is moderately prepared in the area of economic and monetary policy. Limited
progress was made in the reporting period by reallocating responsibilities among members
of the board of the central bank and by gradually improving fiscal oversight of state-owned
enterprises.
Chapter 19 – Social policy and employment
Georgia has some level of preparation in the field of social policy and employment. There was no progress in the reporting period.
Chapter 20 – Enterprise and industrial policy
Georgia is moderately prepared in the area of enterprise and industrial policy. There was no progress in the reporting period.
Chapter 25 – Science and research
Georgia is moderately prepared in the area of science and research. There was limited progress in the implementation of the EU science and research acquis. As regards innovation, limited progress was observed in enhancing innovation in line with the European Innovation Agenda, including boosting cooperation between research and industry. Universities and research centres continued to increase their participation in the Horizon Europe programme.
Chapter 26 – Education and culture
Georgia is moderately prepared in the area of education and culture. There was no progress during the reporting period. The Georgian higher education reform raises serious concerns regarding insufficient stakeholder participation, rapid and centralised implementation, and risks to fundamental values. This concerns in particular equal access to quality education and respect for institutional autonomy and academic freedom.
Chapter 29 – Customs union
Georgia is moderately prepared in the area of the customs union. Limited progress was made during the reporting period by amending the Customs Code.
CLUSTER 4: THE GREEN AGENDA AND SUSTAINABLE CONNECTIVITY
Chapter 14 – Transport policy
Georgia has some level of preparation in transport policy. There was some progress during the reporting period by amending the Railway Code, achieving further alignment on the certification of air traffic controllers and the adoption of the new road safety strategy and action plan.
Chapter 15 – Energy
Georgia has some level of preparation in the area of energy. There was no progress during the reporting period.
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Chapter 21 – Trans-European networks
Georgia has some level of preparation in the area of trans-European networks. There was some progress during the reporting period, with the finalisation of the railway modernisation project and further advancement of the East-West Highway.
Chapter 27 – Environment and climate change
Georgia is at an early stage of preparation in the area of environment and climate change.
There was limited progress in the reporting period, notably on transboundary water
management, air quality, the adoption of regulations on single-use plastics, and on climate
change with the set-up of the monitoring, reporting, verification and accreditation (MRVA)
framework.
CLUSTER 5: RESOURCES, AGRICULTURE AND COHESION
Chapter 11 – Agriculture and rural development
Georgia is at an early stage of preparation in the area of agriculture and rural development. Limited progress was made in the reporting period with the launch of the state co-financing support programme, including a digitalised registry of farms and rural enterprises.
Chapter 12 – Food safety, veterinary and phytosanitary policy
Georgia has some level of preparation in the area of food safety, veterinary and phytosanitary policy. Limited progress was made in the reporting period, notably on alignment with the EU Regulation on Official Controls.
Chapter 13 – Fisheries and aquaculture
Georgia has some level of preparation in the area of fisheries and aquaculture. There was limited progress during the reporting period, notably on the initial preparation of a fisheries development concept, on scientific capacity building for stock assessment and on monitoring fishing activities.
Chapter 22 – Regional policy and coordination of structural instruments
Georgia continues to be between an early stage of preparation and having some level of preparation in the area of regional policy. No progress wasmade during the reporting period.
Chapter 33 – Financial and budgetary provisions
Georgia is at an early stage of preparation in the area of own resources. There was no progress during the reporting period.
CLUSTER 6: EXTERNAL RELATIONS
Chapter 30 – External relations
Georgiais moderately prepared in the area of external relations. No progress wasmade during the reporting period.
Chapter 31 – Foreign, security and defence policy
Georgia is between having some and a moderate level of preparation in this area. There was backsliding during the reporting period. Georgia reduced its alignment with statements by the High Representative on behalf of the EU and Council decisions on EU restrictive measures during the reporting period and remains at a low level of alignment, with an
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alignment rate of 38%. Georgia has not fully aligned with the majority of EU restrictive measures against Russia, Belarus and Iran.
1.3. ASSESSMENT OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE STEPS
In December 2023, the European Council granted Georgia candidate status on the understanding that the relevant nine steps set out in the Commission recommendation of 8 November 2023 were taken. The nine steps primarily relate to reforms in the area of democracy, rule of law and fundamental rights.
During the reporting period, the Georgian authorities have failed to take action to address the nine steps set out in the Commission’s recommendations and further backsliding occurred.
2. CLUSTER 1: THE FUNDAMENTALS OF THE ACCESSION PROCESS
2.1. FUNCTIONING OF DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS AND PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION REFORM
2.1.1 Democracy
The state of democracy further deteriorated due to actions by the authorities against
democratic institutions and fundamental freedoms. This included new severe restrictions on
political activity and political participation of citizens.
In September 2026, parliamentarians from the ruling party filed a new lawsuit to the
Constitutional Court seeking to ban five opposition parties, including the four parties which
crossed the electoral threshold in the 2024 elections, for alleged unconstitutional actions.
The Court accepted the claim for a review on merits, and hearings took place in October
2026. One of the Court’s members resigned after their own request for recusal from the case
was denied. These developments further erode political pluralism in Georgia and give rise to
serious concerns about the instrumentalisation of the judiciary.
Elections
Municipal elections were held in October 2025. The ruling party won the mayoral race in all
64 municipalities and secured overwhelming majorities in every local council. The pre-
election period was marked by intense polarisation, intimidation and the jailing of several
opposition leaders. Only two opposition parties participated in the elections; the other parties
boycotted them. The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)/ODIHR
was unable to deploy an observation mission as the authorities’ invitation arrived less than a
month before election day. Credible domestic observer organisations refrained from
participating due to the repressive environment.
Several legislative measures further restricted political participation. Parliament fast-tracked
amendments to the Law on political associations, criminal code and other related laws
barring individuals linked to parties banned by the Constitutional Court from political
membership, public office and electoral candidacy (in October 2025) and abolished out-of-
country voting in parliamentary elections (December 2025). In March 2026, Parliament
adopted amendments to the Law on grants, the Law on political associations of citizens, the
Criminal Code and related legislation, introducing an eight-year ban on party membership for
people having received income from organisations receiving foreign funding and broadly
restricting businesses from engaging in political activity. In its opinions on the above-
mentioned legal amendments adopted by the Georgian parliament in October 2025 and
March 2026, the Venice Commission concluded that the legislation contradicts international
standards on pluralism and democracy. It assessed that the measures impose
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disproportionate and unnecessary restrictions on the political freedom of the Georgian
citizens, in particular preventing the formation and survival of a political opposition and that
the measures risk undermining electoral processes and political pluralism. The State Audit
Office assumed responsibility for monitoring party and campaign financing following the
abolition of the Anti-Corruption Bureau. Its powers were subsequently expanded to include
substantive monitoring of individuals.
Georgia has yet to address the longstanding OSCE/ODIHR and Venice Commission
recommendations on the impartiality of election administration, including on the appointment
process for election commission members. Georgia needs to ensure alignment with all
relevant EU acquis in this area, including Regulation (EU) 2024/900 on the transparency and
targeting of political advertising, and taking into account European and international
democratic standards.
Women representation in
politics continued to decline.
Notably as a result of the 2024
repeal of mandatory gender
quotas, the share of women in
municipal councils fell to
16.8%, down 7.7 percentage
points compared with the 2021
local elections. The share
increased in only five
municipalities, remained
unchanged in six and
decreased in 53 out of 64. Only
two of the 64 mayors are women.
Parliament
One of the four opposition parties that crossed the electoral threshold in October 2024
ended its year-long boycott in October 2025, taking up its 12 seats. The remaining three
elected opposition parties had requested their mandates to be revoked, leaving 49 of 150
seats empty.
Parliament continued to make excessive use of expedited procedures to pass legislation,
including on significant subjects such as amendments to the Administrative Offences Code,
the Criminal Code, the Law on the Constitutional Court, and the Law on assemblies and
demonstrations. Civil society participation in the legislative process was non-existent,
following the annulment of mandatory consultation requirements and persistent hostility
towards CSOs from state officials and ruling party representatives. Parliamentary oversight
of the executive and of security services remained limited.
Criminal charges were brought against 10 opposition leaders, including from parties that
crossed the 2024 electoral threshold, with most charges grouped under the treason clause
of the Criminal Code, which carries sentences of up to 15 years. The leader of the party that
ended its boycott remained in exile and was sentenced to pre-trial detention in absentia,
facing up to 13 years’ imprisonment if convicted.
EU integration
The authorities’ declared aspiration to join the EU continued to be fundamentally contradicted by their systematic engagement in hostile anti-EU rhetoric, manipulative narratives and conspiracy theories, the undermining of EU values and failure to address key
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EU-related reforms.
The Prime Minister’s announcement in November 2024 that the government would not pursue the opening of accession negotiations until 2028 contradicts the priorities set out in the Constitution and the government programme for 2025-2028. It also stands in stark contrast with Georgian citizens’ broad support for EU membership.
EU integration formally remained under the coordination of the Directorate-General on European Integration in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The EU Integration Committee within Parliament retained its oversight function. No high-level political meeting between the EU and Georgia took place in the reporting period.
Governance
The increasing concentration of political power within the ruling party and executive institutions continued. Parliamentary oversight of the executive and security services remains limited. Recent legislative and institutional changes have further centralised decision-making and regulatory functions in key areas within the government administration, including public administration, the judiciary and security. This has resulted in weakened institutional independence and fewer checks and balances. Conditions for participatory decision-making remain inadequate, as mechanisms for involving civil society and the public in policy and decision-making are still lacking.
State authorities continue to exercise political, administrative and financial pressure on local decision-making, with supervision and coordination mechanisms between the national and local levels remaining underdeveloped. The decentralisation strategy for 2020-2025 expired and a new strategy is not yet in place. During the reporting period, 885 units of properties were transferred from central government to municipalities, contributing to a further decentralisation of local assets and powers.
Civil society
Civil society, including human rights defenders (HRD), operates in a repressive environment that has continued to deteriorate. The cumulative effect of the recent legal amendments and intimidation tactics has weakened civil society’s democratic function, threatening its independence, sustainability and the broader foundations of democracy in Georgia.
Restrictive legislation related to ‘foreign influence’ (including the Law on transparency of foreign influence, Foreign Agents Registration Act, amendments to the Law on grants, relevant amendments to the Criminal Code) subjugates the work of civil society organisations (CSOs) to undue state scrutiny and enables the suppression of dissent. The legal framework is inconsistent with international human rights standards. The October 2025 and October 2026 Venice Commission Opinion on laws relating to ‘foreign influence’ concluded that these laws impose extensive and overlapping obligations combined with harsh liability rules that disproportionately burden and subject to control democratic watchdogs and HRDs. The Venice Commission found that their cumulative effect is coercive, stigmatising and ultimately threatens democratic pluralism.
The financial stability of CSOs has been severely impacted by these cumulative legislative measures taking effect. In addition, the bank accounts of several leading NGOs have been frozen in a preventive measure linked to an ongoing criminal investigation. The March 2026 amendments to the Law on grants and parallel amendments to the Criminal Code tighten the operating framework and severely restrict civil society’s access to foreign funding. The rules broaden the definition of a grant to cover virtually all forms of foreign support, mandate prior authorisation from the government and expand the application to foreign-registered legal entities with a focus on Georgia under a threat of criminal liability with up to 6-12 years’ imprisonment for non-compliance.
Following the abolition of the Anti-Corruption Bureau in March 2026, Georgia transferred the mandate to monitor application of legislation governing civil society activities to the State
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Audit Office. This monitoring contributes to the intimidation of civil society organisations.
The key mechanisms for policy dialogue and civic participation in policymaking and lawmaking have not been restored.
2.1.2. Public administration reform
Strategic framework for public administration reform
Georgia has a strategic framework for public administration reform (PAR) in place but it remains significantly undermined by the legal amendments that reversed the PAR reform.
Policy development and coordination
A framework for evidence-based policymaking is also in place, including unified procedures for policy development, monitoring and evaluation. However, efforts are needed to ensure the systematic use of data, impact assessments and evaluation in policy making, as data management and analytical capacity remain limited.
Participatory policy making has been considerably weakened, reducing opportunities for meaningful stakeholder engagement and for civil society participation. The mandatory participation of civil society in public policy and decision-making processes should be restored, in line with the core principles of public administration. This requires that all key external and internal stakeholders and the general public are actively consulted during policy development and the decision-making processes. Georgia needs to restore the ability of independent civil society organisations to effectively conduct PAR monitoring and research.
Public financial management
Public financial management (PFM) is broadly in place but needs to be further improved. Implementation of the strategic framework, notably the 2023-2026 PFM strategy and annual action plans, continued to contribute to the stable management of public finances. Budgetary control policies are keeping the budget deficit (1.2% of the GDP) and public debt (34.4% of the GDP) within the limits set by fiscal rules. The medium-term revenue strategy is being implemented.
On budget management, alignment between budget programmes and sub-programmes with different key policies, including gender equality and climate change, was reflected in the 2026 state budget as a first tangible result of the process to make eBudget operational.
Deployment of the electronic public investment management system (ePIM) progressed, resulting in new reporting formats and access rights within the system. Georgia continues to initiate and assess new investment projects using the PIM methodology, before they are included in the corresponding budget.
Progress was made in public assets inventory and valuation.
Budget transparency is broadly ensured but improvements are needed in public engagement in budget processes and in publicising citizens’ budget needs.
Public service and human resources management
The December 2024 legal amendments to the Law on public service have seriously affected public service and human resources management as they reversed key elements of earlier reforms, weakened the rights and legal safeguards of public servants (including access to legal remedies) and increased the risk of politicisation of the public administration. In 2025, mass dismissals of civil servants were carried out, or their contracts were terminated or not renewed. Civil servants submitted several hundreds of court cases against the employers for their dismissal from public sector positions. The Public Defender’s Office received dozens of related complaints and issued specific recommendations concerning due process guarantees, labour rights, and protection against politically motivated dismissal.
On gender balance, women are still underrepresented in senior management positions in
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the civil service in Georgia.
Accountability of administration
The accountability of administration needs to be significantly improved. The expanding mandate of the State Audit Office will require additional safeguards to ensure operational independence, adequate resources and separation between audit, anti-corruption and personal data protection functions. Legal gaps in freedom of information and the lack of recognition of the Council of Europe Convention on access to official documentation remain problematic. Legal entities of public law are not bound by the current legislation on access to public information.
The right to access public information is not properly enforced. Georgia made no progress on legislative reforms or on setting up an independent supervisory body to uphold the right to access public information, in line with international standards.
The rate of implementation of the recommendations issued by oversight bodies, including the Public Defender’s Office and the State Audit Office, remains low. In 2025, out of 306 recommendations issued by the Public Defender to central authorities, only 7% were fully implemented by authorities, 16% were partially implemented and 64% were not implemented. Only 46% of the recommendations by the State Audit Office were fully implemented and 28% were partially implemented. As regards administrative justice, the right to seek compensation is not enforced systematically and long judicial proceedings hinder the efficient processing of administrative disputes.
In April 2026, the Open Government Partnership (OGP) permanently suspended Georgia from the partnership. In the absence of corrective measures to address concerns related to civic space, freedom of expression and freedom of assembly, it concluded that Georgia no longer fulfils the conditions necessary for participation in the OGP – including an enabling environment for government and civil society collaboration.
Service delivery to citizens and businesses
Georgia began to implement the digital governance strategy 2025-2030 and its 2025-2026 action plan, but service delivery for the public and for businesses needs further strategic development and investment. The country made sustained progress in areas such as digital service provision, digital identity, interoperability infrastructure, service quality management and expansion of public-facing service networks. It continued to expand the service delivery infrastructure by opening new public service halls in the capital and in regions and by expanding the coverage of the mobile service centre for public service halls.
2.2. RULE OF LAW AND FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS
2.2.1 Chapter 23: Judiciary and fundamental rights
The EU’s founding values include the rule of law and respect for human rights. An effective (independent, high-quality and efficient) judicial system and an effective fight against corruption are of paramount importance, as is respect for fundamental rights in law and in practice.
Functioning of the judiciary
Strategic documents
Georgia has not yet adopted the strategic documents needed in view of a comprehensive reform of the judiciary.
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No reforms were undertaken to address the European Commission and Venice Commission recommendations. In particular, Georgia has yet to undertake a comprehensive reform of the High Council of Justice (HCJ) and the Supreme Court (SC) in line with the recommendations and conducted in a thorough and inclusive consultation process.
It lacks a strategy on the functioning of the HCJ and the judiciary.
The judiciary’s legal framework, further amended in 2025, undermines the independence and integrity of the judicial system and reverses earlier positive reform steps. The judiciary amendments of December 2025 further concentrated powers with the HCJ and continued to weaken judicial independence and transparency.
There was no progress to align the legislative framework for the Prosecutor General’s Office with European standards, including the appointment procedure of the Prosecutor General and disciplinary proceedings of prosecutors. There has been no follow-up to address the recommendations of the Venice Commission, the OECD or the EU-funded Technical Assistance and Information Exchange (TAIEX) peer review on the functioning of the justice sector and the fight against organised crime carried out in May 2023.
Management bodies
The management bodies, the HCJ and the Prosecutorial Council are in place. However, they do not meet EU and Council of Europe standards on independence, impartiality and on the transparency of judiciary.
No reforms were undertaken to align these judicial institutions with European standards, including in relation to outstanding issues with the composition, functioning and powers of both management bodies outlined in the Venice Commission recommendations.
Georgia has not taken any steps to put in place a system of integrity checks, with the involvement of international experts with a decisive role in the process, for candidates and those currently appointed to all leading positions in the judiciary, in particular the HCJ, the Supreme Court and presidents of common courts.
In the reporting period, Parliament confirmed three new lifetime judges of the Supreme Court of Georgia.
Independence and impartiality
The independence and impartiality of the judiciary is inadequate in the higher-level courts and in the courts of first instance. No progress was made regarding a thorough and comprehensive reform of the judiciary, as recommended by the Venice Commission. In
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particular, reforms are needed to ensure integrity in the HCJ and the SC, to improve independence and impartiality and to increase public trust in the judicial system. Georgia has not addressed the Venice Commission's recommendations for the evaluation of candidate judges and judges either.
No progress was noted in terms of strengthening safeguards to protect the independence and autonomy of prosecutors and the Prosecutor General’s Office, in line with EU and Venice Commission recommendations. The recommendation by the EU and the Venice Commission to adopt constitutional amendments that would require a qualified majority in the appointment procedure of the Prosecutor General has not been addressed.
The December 2025 legislative amendments to the Law on common courts contributed to a further concentration of powers within the High Council of Justice and to weaken the independence of the judiciary. The amended legislation abolished the obligation of HCJ members to publish evaluations of judicial candidates for the Supreme Court. Voting on judicial appointments will now be conducted by secret ballot in closed sessions, instead of open hearings. This significantly reduces the transparency of judicial appointments. The amendments further increased the number of judges holding administrative positions in the HCJ from six to seven.
The right of appeal of judges was reduced, which significantly undermines transparency and impartiality. Moreover, legal amendments to the transfer of judges further increase the discretionary powers of the HCJ and undermine judicial independence, in particular given the lack of safeguards. The right to a minimum 10% additional remuneration for a seconded judge was abolished. The removal of allowance benchmarks for the transfer of judges risks weakening judicial independence by concentrating powers within the High Council of Justice in the absence of effective institutional checks.
Accountability
The accountability of the judiciary is insufficient.
No steps were taken to address challenges in the effective implementation of the legislative framework and the rules on the accountability of judges and prosecutors.
The accountability of the judiciary was significantly weakened following the abolishment of the Independent Inspector’s Service in September 2025. Disciplinary proceedings against judges, including the preliminary examination and assessment of cases, are initiated by the Secretary of the HCJ. Final decisions are also taken by the unreformed HCJ.
In 2025, the number of initiated disciplinary procedures against judges and prosecutors increased significantly while the number of sanctions pronounced remained unchanged.
There has been no improvement in the transparency of the HCJ. Decisions or minutes of meetings were not published during the reporting period. The transparency of the selection of Supreme Court judges by the HCJ is undermined by the December 2025 legislative amendments to the Law on common courts. These amendments abolished the obligation for Council members to publish their evaluations and the possibility for candidates to individually challenge interim decisions.
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Quality of justice
The quality of justice needs to be improved.
More efforts are still needed to further align the quality of justice with European standards and with best practices on effective and efficient administration of justice, including the use of European Commission for the Efficiency of Justice (CEPEJ) tools (Council of Europe).
There was no improvement on increasing the number of judges but the number of prosecutors increased by 10%. The recruitment of judges and prosecutors is constrained by the number of applicants. In 2025, there were 121 open positions and 45 judges and prosecutors were recruited out of 52 applicants. The quality of justice is still undermined by the high caseload, causing delays in cases and ineffective management of backlogs in the common courts system. The effective implementation of transparency standards declined. Open access to reasoned court decisions was not systematically provided. Access to court decisions via freedom of information requests and the transparency of HCJ sessions and decisions further deteriorated during the reporting period. However, the Supreme Court provided proactive access to anonymised texts of its decisions.
The Public Defender Office highlights concerns, including on convictions issued without neutral evidence, denial of participation of lawyers in investigative cases and delays in the consideration of cases.
The number of cases with a mediation settlement agreements and finalised court-related mediations decreased (from 154/597 in 2024 to 82/367 in 2025) while the number of accredited mediators increased (by 6.8% from 2024). The mediation system is implemented in line with the strategic development plan for 2020-2025. Further efforts are needed to provide mediation as the preferred method to resolve civil disputes in all regions.
The number of cases for which legal aid was granted per 100 000 inhabitants is still low (at 0.63 in 2025).
The judicial training system needs further improvements. The total budget for training covered by training institutions, court and prosecution budget decreased by 51.4% in 2025 from 2024. The total budget for training per inhabitant covered by training institutions, court and prosecution budget was EUR 0.15 in 2025. Training and exchanges of best practices should be further developed with new training modules and integrated into professional development. The capacity of the High School of Justice requires improvement. Further progress is needed on the scope, participation rate and budget for the judicial training system.
Efficiency
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The efficiency of justice improved slightly while further efforts are needed to address the existing challenges.
The number of incoming non-criminal cases increased by 1.4% for first instance courts and by 5.8% for second instance courts in comparison to 2024, exacerbating the high caseload.
The clearance rates for non-criminal cases in first instance courts remained high in 2025 (at 94%), and the clearance rate for criminal cases in first instance courts was 100%. The average length of proceedings, at all instances, for civil and commercial litigious cases was lower in 2025 than in 2024 (-4.9%). The disposition time
remained high at 386 days for non-criminal cases in first instance courts and 161 days in second instance courts. It is comparatively lower for criminal cases at 59 days in first instance courts and 58 days in second instance courts. The backlogs are declining but remain high overall. The backlog of pending criminal cases decreased to 7 812 in 2025 (7 841 in 2024) at first instance and to 715 in 2025 (716 in 2024) at second instance courts. For non-criminal cases, the number of pending cases at first instance decreased to 97 612 in 2025 (97 899 in 2024) and increased to 4 336 (4 097in 2024) at second instance courts.
The number of decisions delivered by the Constitutional Court increased to 31 in 2025 (from 18 in 2024).
The high number of vacancies in judicial positions remains a challenge for the efficiency of the judicial system. The modernisation of court management needs to be addressed, including by implementing new IT justice tools and by fully rolling out the court case
management system for automatic/randomised case allocation. The number of cases allocated by the system remains high (95-100%). More efforts are needed to digitalise the justice system. There is still a need to improve the interoperability of IT platforms across the criminal case chain.
The judicial system budget per inhabitant has steadily increased in recent years (5.1% higher in 2025 than in 2024), remained overall stable as a percentage of GDP (0.22% in 2025), but is still below the EU average. The
overall budget of the Georgian judiciary increased. Georgia spent EUR 77 million on its judicial system in 2025, increasing the budget for courts (+5.1%), for legal aid (+2.4%) and for the Prosecution Services (+5.4%).
Fight against corruption
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Track record
On the fight against corruption, the number of cases in the track record has increased. However, there are concerns about a selective approach, in a context where longstanding recommendations concerning guarantees for prosecutorial autonomy and judicial independence remain unaddressed. The investigation, prosecution and final conviction of high-level corruption cases increased substantially in 2025. GRECO recommendations should be fully implemented.
Legal framework
The legal framework on the fight against corruption is in place but is not adequate regarding preventive measures and needs to be improved regarding law enforcement.
Amendments of November 2025 to the Law on the fight against corruption require public officials convicted of offences related to abuse of office or the unlawful receipt of financial benefit to submit annual property status declarations for 30 years.
No progress was made on a legal framework for an independent advisory institution on anti- corruption since the advisory Anti-Corruption Council was abolished in May 2024.
Further alignment is needed on whistle-blower protection.
Strategic documents
Georgia has yet to put in place strategic documents. It has not drawn up a national anti- corruption strategy or action plan since 2020, and no updated anti-corruption sectoral risk assessment was conducted in the reporting period. Following the amendments to the Law on the fight against corruption adopted in December 2025, the responsibility for the general anti-corruption policy framework, including the mandate to develop a national anti-corruption strategy and action plan, were transferred to the government.
Georgia should follow up on allrecommendations issued in GRECO’s fifth evaluation round, including on a targeted and comprehensive anti-corruption strategy, a code of conduct for top executive functions, the extension of the list of people subject to asset declarations and the investigation of corruption crimes. It should draw up strategic documents on risk assessment and the prevention of conflicts of interest, an anti-corruption strategy for the police and a targeted corruption risk approach for law enforcement agencies.
There has been no progress on implementing the de-oligarchisation action plan adopted in November 2023. The Venice Commission's recommendations also remain to be addressed.
Institutional framework
The institutional framework on the fight against corruption is in place but is not fully adequate in terms of preventive measures or in terms of law enforcement. The national legal and
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institutional anti-corruption framework was substantially revised in December 2025 redistributing key functions between the government and the State Audit Office and abolishing the Anti-Corruption Bureau (ACB) in March 2026. Operational and oversight functions were transferred to the SAO including in the areas of asset declaration, whistleblowing, political party financing and integrity control. Procedures and reporting mechanisms related to whistle-blower protection are integrated into an online platform set up under the responsibility of the State Audit Office.
Although the State Audit Office is an independent institution accountable to Parliament, concerns regarding the independence of the judiciary and the limitations affecting the functioning of democratic checks and balances significantly constrain control and effective oversight. Georgia has yet to fully address the Venice Commission and GRECO recommendations related to effectiveness and institutional independence including political neutrality, the transparent verification of officials’ assets and interest declarations, and investigative functions in high-level corruption cases.
The number of asset declarations checked by the now abolished ACB increased in 2025.
More efforts are needed to increase the efficiency and effectiveness of the relevant law enforcement investigation units. They still lack autonomous powers and safeguards to ensure their independence and to prevent risks of undue political influence.
The transparency and public access to the former ACB’s asset declaration system were affected by periods of restricted access and delayed publication.
Georgia should rejoin the OECD anti-corruption monitoring network for Eastern Europe and Central Asia. It should also follow up on the recommendations of the Fourth Round of Monitoring of the Istanbul Anti-Corruption Action Plan.
Georgia is furthermore expected to finalise the second cycle of the Implementation Review Mechanism (IRM) under the United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC).
Fundamental rights
General framework
The general framework on fundamental rights is insufficient and has undergone a marked structural deterioration, as a result of the cumulative effect of legislative, institutional and enforcement developments.
Multiple restrictive laws adopted during the previous reporting period remained in force, imposing extensive and overlapping obligations and stringent liability provisions on individuals engaged in democratic oversight and rights advocacy. According to the October 2025 Venice Commission Opinion on the laws related to ‘foreign influence’, their cumulative effect is coercive, stigmatising and ultimately inconsistent with democratic pluralism.
The situation was exacerbated by the introduction of new restrictive laws that contradict Georgia’s international human rights obligations and infringe in particular upon civil and political rights (freedoms of expression, assembly and association, and the right to stand for election/seek public positions). In successive opinions, the Venice Commission held that this legislation imposes disproportionate and unnecessary restrictions on the fundamental rights and political freedoms of the Georgian citizens, concerning in particular freedom of association and expression, and is contrary to international standards. It found that the cumulative effect of the adopted measures is coercive, stigmatising and ultimately threatens democratic pluralism.
Significant gaps persist in the national strategy for the protection of human rights 2022-2030 and its 2024-2026 action plan, particularly with regards to addressing discrimination, hate crimes, judicial independence, data protection, media freedom, protection of journalists and gender equality.
International human rights instruments
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Cooperation with international human rights monitoring bodies and the follow-up to their recommendations need to be improved.
In January 2026, 23 participating states of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) invoked the Moscow Mechanism to assess the human rights situation in Georgia. The OSCE Moscow Mechanism report3, issued in March 2026, concludes that Georgia is experiencing marked democratic backsliding. The report identifies a pattern of violence and other abuses against protesters, political opponents and journalists, combined with almost complete impunity of perpetrators, restrictive legislative actions, pressure on civil society and threats to the existence of political pluralism. Taken together, these developments undermine human rights, fundamental freedoms and the rule of law to which Georgia has committed as an OSCE participating state.
Georgian authorities did not cooperate with the Venice Commission on preparations of its opinions delivered during the reporting period. .
Georgia underwent its United Nation’s Universal Periodic Review in 2026, during which it received 307 recommendations. Georgia supported 159 recommendations (51.8%) that addressed mainly women’s and children’s rights, the rights of persons with disabilities, economic and social rights, and institutional and treaty-related measures, including the ratification of United Nations treaties. Georgia noted the remaining 148 recommendations (48.2%), largely concerning civic space, media and fundamental freedoms, justice, accountability and the rule of law, equality, including the rights of LGBTI persons, and arbitrarily detained individuals.
Georgia has ratified most European and international human rights instruments. However, it has not signed the International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance.
European Court of Human Rights
The level of cooperation with the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) and implementation of its judgments are inadequate.
In the reporting period, the ECtHR delivered 10 judgments concerning 16 applications, of which eight found at least one violation by Georgia of the European Convention on Human Rights. The ECtHR found Georgia in breach of the European Convention on Human Rights in cases relating mainly to the lack of effective investigations into allegations of ill-treatment or violations of the right to life, excessive use of force by the police in the course of arrest and/or while detaining suspects, lack of legislation governing procedures for legal gender recognition, freedom of expression and freedom of assembly and association.
Currently, 77 court cases remain pending. Georgia needs to address the systemic and structural issues raised by the Court, in particular regarding the justice system, penitentiary and law enforcement systems, and protection from discrimination. It must also ensure that ECtHR judgments are enforced
3 Report on developments in Georgia in respect of human rights and fundamental freedoms since Spring 2024 | OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights
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systematically.
Promotion, protection and enforcement of human rights
The legal and institutional framework for the promotion, protection and enforcement of human rights is incomplete and needs to be improved.
The Public Defender’s Office (PDO) (Ombudsperson’s Office) is a key institution for upholding Georgia’s human rights obligations. The PDO continues to carry out its mandate satisfactorily, despite the increasing restrictions on independent institutions. The PDO’s impartiality and independence must be safeguarded, and it must have adequate resources to continue fulfilling its mission effectively. Currently, the PDO draws on a dedicated network
of central and regional offices and specialised departments and staff. In 2025, the PDO issued 306 recommendations to state authorities, 13 special reports, 18 amicus curiae briefs, and two communications to the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe. Out of 306 recommendations
issued by the PDO, 196 remain unimplemented by the state authorities. According to the 2025 annual report, Georgia has fully implemented only 21 (6.86%) of the 306 recommendations addressed to state authorities.
Prevention of torture and other forms of ill-treatment
Georgia provides insufficient legal guarantees on the prevention of torture and other forms of ill-treatment. The follow-up to cases is insufficient. Georgia has yet to take steps to close the gaps in protection in the Administrative Offences Code, including with respect to the legal safeguards, the lack of clarity about standards of proof and the absence of a meaningful right to appeal against detention decisions.
Georgia does not fully implement ECtHR judgments concerning Article 2 (right to life) and Article 3 (prohibition of torture and inhuman or degrading treatment) of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. In particular, key cases under the Tsintsabadze group are still
supervised by the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, with persistent concerns regarding the effectiveness of investigations into allegations of ill-treatment, excessive use of force and deaths in custody.
Participants in peaceful assemblies, detainees and journalists who reportedly suffered torture and other ill- treatment by law enforcement
officers in the 2024 and 2025 demonstrations, have yet to see proper judicial follow-up to their cases. Although the Prosecutor General brought charges in May 2026 against five
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police officers for excessive use of force during the 2024 demonstrations, this response remains limited in scope and insufficient. Independent investigations into the alleged use of chemical substances in water cannons deployed against protesters in the 2024 demonstrations have not yet been carried out.
The follow-up to the recommendations issued by the National Preventive Mechanism (NPM) remains inadequate. In 2025, the NPM conducted 132 preventive visits across 104 facilities. Patients in psychiatric institutions are still not fully protected from violence and inhumane or degrading treatment. The NPM received reports of both physical and psychological violence at the hands of members of staff.
Execution of criminal sanctions
The system for applying criminal sanctions (including probation) is inadequate and requires significant reform.
According to Council of Europe SPACE I 2025 data, Georgia continues to record one of the highest incarceration rates in Europe, at approximately 232 per 100 000 inhabitants, the fourth highest in Europe. Prison occupancy is at around 90%, indicating that overcrowding is not systemic, although localised overcrowding persists. The prison population consisted of 8 592 men and 377 women held in dedicated facilities separate from adult men, and one child held in prison with his mother.
According to the 2026 report of the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture, detention conditions in Georgia were generally adequate and have improved in recent years. Prison healthcare services were satisfactory, despite persistent challenges regarding mental healthcare provision, rehabilitation programmes and the treatment of vulnerable detainees. Prison regimes remain underdeveloped, with a notable lack of out-of-cell activities, the use of solitary confinement, and excessive camera surveillance.
The generally satisfactory detention conditions also contrasted with the disproportionate application of prison sentencing and credible allegations of excessive force and ill-treatment of people detained in connection with the 2024 and 2025 protests. The 2025 Public Defender report also identifies alarming pre-detention practices: around half of interviewed detainees, including women and minors, alleged that they were ordered to completely undress and perform squats after being transferred to temporary detention facilities. The use of de- escalation and safety rooms remains a concern, particularly when applied for more than 72 hours or in a punitive manner. The PDO stressed that, in the absence of adequate safeguards, effective oversight and insufficient staff, such practices may breach international human rights standards.
Protection of personal data
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The legal framework for the protection of personal data is still insufficient, and data protection capacities still need to be improved.
No progress was made on aligning the Law on personal data protection with the EU's General Data Protection Regulation and the Law Enforcement Directive. Georgia has not
signed the Council of Europe Convention 108+. It has yet to address the key recommendations made by the Venice Commission.
In March 2026, the Personal Data Protection Service was abolished and its functions transferred to the State Audit Office. Although the latter is an independent institution accountable to Parliament, concerns have been raised regarding the effective independence of the
supervisory authority, including its ability to exercise independent oversight over sensitive data-processing activities, in line with European standards.
Recent legislative developments raise concerns about a potential rollback in equality protection, with particular implications for data protection and the privacy of groups in vulnerable situations. Following the June 2025 Anti-Corruption Bureau request to civil society organisations to disclose information on their beneficiaries, including sensitive personal data, in July 2025 the United Nations (UN) Committee on the Rights of the Child issued interim measures in a case involving a minor beneficiary of assistance. They called on the state to refrain from requesting, disclosing or transferring the child’s personal data to any third party, including the Anti-Corruption Bureau. In a similar vein, the UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women adopted temporary measures to protect the personal data of another beneficiary of assistance.
These developments highlight broader concerns regarding safeguards for the processing of sensitive personal data by public authorities and the availability of effective and independent oversight mechanisms.
Freedom of thought, conscience and religion
Georgia provides adequate legal guarantees on freedom of religion or belief. However, Georgia’s Law on transparency of foreign influence and the Foreign Agents Registration Act undermine religious freedom by exempting the Georgian Orthodox Church while targeting minority faiths. Groups receiving over 20% of foreign funding must register as ‘foreign agents’ without clear criteria, risking criminalisation of activities. The law allows state oversight of finances and personal religious data, violating constitutional and international protections. Minority religious charities and social programmes are especially at risk of stigmatisation on registration.
Georgia has not yet implemented the 2023 ECtHR judgment (Georgian Muslim Relations and Others v Georgia), which found that Georgia violated the European Convention on Human Rights regarding freedom of religion. During the reporting period, the mayor of Khashuri issued an order prohibiting the construction of a religious building intended for use by Jehovah’s Witnesses. According to the PDO, this decision reflects a disregard for the principles of freedom of religion and equality. The case has been appealed and is currently pending before the Khashuri District Court.
During 2025, the PDO conducted proceedings in seven cases concerning alleged
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discrimination on religious grounds.
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Freedom of expression and media freedom
Georgia provides insufficient legal guarantees on the freedom of expression and the enabling environment for media freedom. The independent and professional operation of media professionals is constrained. There was a marked deterioration during the reporting period. Russian-style disinformation, primarily targeting the EU, via television and various media outlets is widespread.
Intimidation of journalists
The safety of journalists is a persistent and serious concern. Throughout the reporting period, the safety of journalists deteriorated further. Harassment, intimidation and violence against independent and critical media outlets and journalists, including the use of strategic lawsuits against public participation (SLAPPs), also increased further. In the context of public demonstrations, journalists and media outlets, notably those critical to the authorities, were subjected to verbal assaults, threats, physical violence, unlawful detention, interrogations, filming bans, denial of access to administrative buildings, disproportional fines and other forms of mistreatment. Several documented cases reveal a sustained pattern of coordinated online attacks against journalists and the media by state officials and/or amplified by government-leaning media. Over the reporting period, Georgia continued to deny entry to some foreign journalists.
Despite the launch of a limited number of investigations, reported cases of violence against journalists by police and state security forces cases have remained unpunished. According to the Prosecutor General’s Office, in 2025, investigations were launched into 10 offences committed against media representatives. The offences included unlawful interference with their professional activities, violence and violent abuse of official authority by law enforcement officials. One police officer was charged in May 2026 for abuse of power with the use of violence against a journalist.
Legislative environment
The October 2025 Venice Commission Opinion on the laws related to ‘foreign influence’ raised substantial concerns regarding the blanket prohibition on foreign funding for broadcasters. It called on the authorities to repeal these provisions, noting in particular the absence of a clear distinction between funding that may threaten democratic processes and funding that supports legitimate journalistic activities and civic engagement. The Venice Commission considers that the measures undermine media pluralism and do not comply with the principles of necessity and proportionality.
Further legislative changes introduced in March 2026 have imposed ever more stringent and wider restrictions on foreign funding, adversely affecting the operating environment for independent journalism and posing additional risk to an already shrinking media space. Amendments to the Criminal Code of Georgia of March 2026 introduced a new offence establishing criminal liability with up to three years' imprisonment for ’systematic acts’ directed at non-recognition of the government’s legitimacy. Such amendments seriously restrict freedom of expression, insofar as they could be invoked to arbitrarily criminalise opinions voiced by individuals critical of the authorities.
No steps were taken during the reporting period to align Georgian legislation with the EU Anti-SLAPP legal framework. The use of SLAPPs has continued.
Implementation of legislation/institutions
The Law on transparency of foreign influence, the Law on broadcasting and repeated amendments to the Law on grants continue to have a chilling effect on the media space, stigmatising, restricting and criminalising journalistic work.
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Following the amendments to the Law on common courts adopted in June 2025, the coverage of court proceedings has been effectively restricted and reporting both inside the court building and its courtyard has been prohibited. This significantly undermines public scrutiny and has had a negative effect on the transparency of the judiciary during the reporting period.
In June 2026, amendments to the Parliament’s accreditation rules introduced the possibility of suspending individual journalists’ accreditation for up to one year in cases of repeated breaches of accreditation rules. Depending on the severity and frequency of the violations, sanctions may be extended to an entire media outlet for up to a year. To date, the accreditations of four journalists critical of the government have been suspended for durations up to one year. In May, two independent media outlets were also suspended for the rest of 2026.
Concerns about the independence and impartiality of the Georgian media regulator, the Communications Commission (ComCom), increased following the election of its new chair in July 2025, who has held party-affiliated positions over an extended period. Such concerns were amplified by the expansion of ComCom’s powers under the 2025 amendments to the Law on broadcasting, which authorised the regulator to oversee broadcast content. In the reporting period, ComCom started enforcing its new content regulation prerogatives, notably by imposing fines on three media in May, June and August 2026 over language used in their reporting, allegedly in breach of principles of impartiality and balance. These steps confirm concern over respect for editorial independence and risks of selective application of the law.
In June 2026, a newly established Division for Combating Hate Speech began operating within the Human Rights Protection Department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, raising freedom of expression concerns. The department is tasked with monitoring and detecting publicly disseminated statements considered to violate human dignity and constitute hate speech, in breach of the Administrative Offences Code. The division identifies alleged offenders, collects evidence and prepares administrative case file for submission to the courts. The legal grounds for the division’s operation are defined broadly, with the risk of arbitrary interpretation and application. Dozens of cases have already been referred to the courts, with a number of fines imposed. In one case, in July 2026, a journalist was placed in a 14-day administrative detention over statements made in social media, after being fined for similar comments the month before.
In July, a broadcaster was fined for allegedly causing ‘moral harm’ to a person featured in an investigative media report. The Prosecutor General’s Office also opened a judicial investigation under the Criminal Code provision of ‘false denunciation’, concerning allegedly false information presented in the same report. Media freedom organisations have raised concerns about the use of criminal law against media and called on authorities to respect the confidentiality of journalistic sources.
Public service broadcaster
The Georgian Public Broadcaster, whose Board of Trustees is chaired by a former high- ranking politician from the ruling party, continues to lack institutional independence and to display a biased editorial policy. In July, the Public Broadcaster's Director-General, who held this post since 2020, was re-elected to a second six-year term following the two-staged selection process in which she was the sole candidate. From March 2026, all programmes except news digests were suspended on the Public Broadcaster’s Ajara TV citing the safety of the premises as a reason and 14 employees were dismissed. This leaves the autonomous region with no local news points.
Economic factors
Concerns regarding the independence and impartiality of major media networks persisted, as political affiliations continued to influence media ownership, despite the legal prohibition on political party ownership of media. Audit reports noted that it was not possible to obtain
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needed information and funding sources were untraceable, including the identity of the lenders.
The advertising market in Georgia is underdeveloped. Many media outlets, in particular independent online outlets, remain highly dependent on donor funding, which is targeted by repressive legislation. The shrinking media market, restrictive government policies and increasing risks associated with receiving donor support make it increasingly difficult to secure sustainable funding. Small-scale broadcasters reported unfair treatment in relation to requests for debt restructuring, leading to a freeze of their banking accounts.
Internet
Due to excessive media regulation and restrictions on foreign funding in the media, the number of internet-based media sources and innovative internet media platforms has increased, alongside the volumes of content produced and distributed by them.
Professional organisations and working conditions
Employment conditions of media professionals deteriorated during the reporting period. This decline was largely due to intensified pressure on the media sector, financial difficulties of media outlets resulting in staff reductions and increased pressure on remaining staff, as well as rising verbal, online and physical attacks on journalists. Downsizing and delays in salary payments are frequent. Staff turnover is high across newsrooms, especially among regional media.
Georgian journalists and media outlets are represented by several membership-based professional associations and organisations. There is no dialogue between the government and media professional bodies.
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Freedom of assembly and association
Georgia provides insufficient legal guarantees to freedom of assembly and association, and the regulation of assemblies remains restrictive.
Developments during the reporting period indicate a consolidating pattern of restrictive policing of assemblies, both in law and in practice. Legislative amendments to the Administrative Offences Code and the Criminal Code in October 2025 have expanded police powers and penalties for assembly-related offences. These changes have brought in administrative detention for certain acts, including covering one’s face during protests, and establishing criminal liability for repeated violations. These legislative changes raise concerns regarding compliance with the principles of legality, necessity and proportionality and effectively risk criminalising the exercise of the right to peaceful assembly, as highlighted by the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (OSCE/ODIHR).
Following amendments to the Law on assemblies and demonstrations in December 2025, public protests, including protests held on pedestrian areas, became punishable by administrative detention, with repeat actions subject to criminal prosecution. Several protesters were fined, administratively detained or otherwise penalised for demonstrating on pavements, reportedly on the grounds of ‘obstructing pedestrian movement’. The PDO called for the repeal of provisions that unjustifiably restrict freedom of assembly. This was followed by a negative assessment of the ODIHR on the amendments.
In August, a few individuals who were arbitrarily detained in relation to the 2024-2025 protests were pardoned by the President, after admitting guilt. However, many more remain in custody.
Freedom of association remained severely curtailed by the cumulative effects of multiple restrictive laws and amendments (adopted prior and during the reporting period), as noted in the OSCE Moscow Mechanism report of March 2026 and the Venice Commission opinions
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of October 2025 and October 2026. The introduction of criminal liability, including imprisonment, and the link with money laundering laws further exacerbates these concerns by increasing the risk of criminalisation of civil society actors and human rights defenders. These legislative developments have increased administrative pressure, financial uncertainty and have had a chilling effect on advocacy activities. In addition to imposing restrictions on access to foreign funding, the latest amendments to the Law on grants prohibit anyone employed by an organisation largely funded from abroad from holding membership of a political party for eight years. The Venice Commission and UN human rights mechanisms have consistently emphasised that restrictions on NGO funding must be narrowly defined, necessary and proportionate.
Labour and trade union rights are covered in Chapter 19 – Social policy and employment.
Property rights
The legal and institutional framework for enforcing property rights is broadly in place. The process for initial land registration through the cadastral system has not been completed. During the reporting period, persistent challenges were identified, including the non-fulfilment of domestic state debt obligations, and excessively long enforcement proceedings in cases concerning the recovery of unlawfully held real estate.
Non-discrimination
The legal and institutional framework on non-discrimination is incomplete and capacities of equality bodies are insufficient. Better enforcement of the Law on the elimination of all forms of discrimination is needed, as are more tangible actions to improve the conditions of persons in vulnerable situations.
Anti-racism and hate offences
The legal and institutional framework on anti-racism and hate offences is incomplete, and implementation and enforcement are insufficient. Legislation on anti-racism, hate crime and hate speech is not aligned with the EU acquis. Specifically, this includes the Racial Equality Directive, the Directives on standards for equality bodies, and the Framework Decision on combating racism and xenophobia.
In May 2026, the Ministry of Internal Affairs established the Hate Speech Enforcement Unit to investigate hate speech and other hate-motivated offences. Although the unit has reportedly already initiated its first investigations, concerns persist regarding its potential impact on freedom of expression. Hate offences, including by politicians, are widespread and remain largely unaddressed. Cases of hate crime are not investigated and not prosecuted effectively.
Gender equality
The legal and institutional framework on gender equality and combating gender-based violence is incomplete and implementation and enforcement is insufficient. Anti-rights narratives, particularly targeting gender equality, have continued to be pursued.
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Georgia has previously adopted legislation that has led to regression in this area, for example by replacing the term 'gender equality’ with 'equality between women and men’ in key legislation and replacing specialised gender equality institutions with narrower 'women’s and children’s issues’ frameworks. No steps have been taken to improve alignment with EU gender equality acquis and international standards. National action plan on combating violence against women and domestic violence expired in 2024, and Georgia has yet to
draw up a new action plan. Progress in aligning with the Istanbul Convention and implementing the Group of Experts on Action against Violence against Women and Domestic Violence (GREVIO) recommendations has stalled. Following GREVIO’s first thematic evaluation visit in February 2026, and the adoption of the preliminary first thematic evaluation report in July, the final report is currently under preparation. In 2025, the General Prosecutor’s Office identified 5 cases of femicide and 3 cases of attempted femicide.
The procedure for determining and awarding compensation to victims of violence against women and domestic violence remains problematic. The utilisation rate of electronic surveillance in cases of
violence against women and domestic violence remains low (37 cases), as does the number of victims awarded compensation (six people received compensation for five cases of violence). These challenges persist in a broader context of gender stereotypes and social norms that contribute to the tolerance and underreporting of gender-based violence and domestic violence. Women in vulnerable or marginalised situations face heightened risks. While prevention and awareness-raising measures exist, further efforts are needed to challenge harmful stereotypes and improve access to protection and justice.
No progress was made in promoting the European Charter for Equality of Women and Men in Local Life, with legislative changes removing references to gender and gender equality. This further hinders adoption of the Charter at local level.
Rights of the child
The legal and institutional framework on rights of the child is incomplete and implementation and enforcement are insufficient.
Although the Permanent Council on the Protection of the Rights of the Child was set up already in 2019, its work has not yet started. Implementation of the Code of the rights of the child remains a challenge. There was no progress on an integrated child protection system, including for children deprived of parental care, while progress on deinstitutionalisation remained limited. In particular, stronger coordination is needed between social services, education, healthcare, law enforcement and the judiciary, with clear procedures for early identification, referral and follow-up of children at risk. Comprehensive data on violence against children is lacking, making it difficult to assess the scale of the problem. According to State Care Agency data, there were 1 560 cases of violence against children in 2025 compared to 2 055 in 2024. Georgia should ensure comprehensive, disaggregated and interoperable date covering all forms of violence against children. The PDO’s 2025 Annual Report called for stronger preventive mechanisms, enhanced inter-agency coordination and greater capacity to ensure the effective protection of children’s rights.
The situation deteriorated in the area of child-friendly justice, notably as a result of the adoption in December 2025 of the Law on rehabilitation and support of minors in conflict with the law. The law contradicts European and international standards on the use of deprivation of liberty only as a measure of last resort, for the shortest appropriate period, and within a system primarily oriented to the child’s best interests, reintegration and non-custodial
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responses. The Public Defender publicly expressed concern following the law’s adoption.
There are still challenges to overcome to eliminate child marriage. Due to insufficient legislative regulation, cases of child marriage initiated by parents often go unrecorded in statistics with no proper response.
Persons with disabilities
The legal and institutional framework on the rights of persons with disabilities is incompleteand implementation and enforcement need to be improved. Georgia has ratified the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (UNCRPD) and its Optional Protocol, but no progress has been made to implement the Convention and Georgia has not designated an agency to coordinate that process.
Persons with disabilities continue to face systemic barriers to the enjoyment of their rights. Limited progress was made in 2025 on disability inclusion reform, with no meaningful systemic changes made to the disability status determination framework. The 2023-2025 action plan for implementing the biopsychosocial (BPS) model expired with most measures left unimplemented. This leaves the predominantly medical model of disability assessment largely in place, in contravention of the UNCRPD. The 2025 Public Defender report noted that the state was unable to ensure access to rehabilitation services for adults with disabilities.
Public services for persons with disabilities remain limited, with insufficient geographic coverage and persistent waiting lists, including for children on the autism spectrum. Access remains inadequate, both in the built environment and in access to information. Although Georgia increased the budget for the state programme for social rehabilitation and childcare in 2025, waiting lists have persisted due to uneven regional coverage and shortages of qualified personnel. The PDO 2025 annual parliamentary report highlights shortcomings in the protection of the rights of children with disabilities.
Progress on deinstitutionalisation remained limited during the reporting period. According to the PDO, significant delays persist in the transition from large residential institutions to community-based services, particularly for persons with disabilities and for persons living in mental health facilities.
LGBTIQ+ persons
The legal protection of the rights of LGBTIQ+ persons is insufficient, and LGBTIQ+ persons face serious discrimination, intolerance and systemic violence. The UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and Council of Europe monitoring bodies raised concerns that recent legislation may undermine the equal enjoyment of rights on grounds of sexual orientation and gender identity and contribute to discrimination and the stigmatisation of LGBTI+ persons. Civil society organisations report increasing levels of hate speech, social exclusion and reduced institutional protection, indicating an alarming deterioration in the equality framework.
The legislative framework, amended in 2024 by the legislative package on family values, has led to significant limitations in the rights of LGBTIQ+ persons. It prohibits legal recognition and protection of same-sex couples, adoption and foster care by non-heterosexual persons, gender-affirming healthcare, and restricts public gatherings and the dissemination of information concerning LGBTIQ+ persons in educational settings and in the media. The Venice Commission found the legislation to be incompatible with European and international standards. Moreover, these restrictions raise serious concerns as regards relevant ECtHR and CJEU case-law. Georgia has systematically failed to implement ECtHR rulings, including in the A.D and others v. Georgia case.
The national strategy for the protection of human rights and its action plan for 2024-2026 does not cover the rights of LGBTIQ+ persons
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Hate crimes, homophobic and transphobic rhetoric - including messages incited and amplified by high-level officials – increased. At the same time, barriers limiting LGBTIQ+ persons’ access to health services, education, and employment were reported. As a result of the increased discriminatory legal framework and the anti-LGBTIQ+ rhetoric, no events in the public space were held to mark the International Day Against Homophobia, Biphobia, Interphobia, and Transphobia in 2026.
Instigators and organisers of violence targeting LGBTIQ+ persons, including at Tbilisi Pride in 2021 and 2023, continue to face impunity.
Procedural rights of suspects and accused persons and rights of victims of crime
The legal framework on procedural rights is incomplete, and its protection of victims’ rights is
insufficient. Significant challenges persist with regard to the effective implementation of
procedural safeguards for suspects and accused persons in criminal proceedings, and
effective access to justice and the protection of victims throughout judicial proceedings.
During the reporting period, the Public Defender’s Office (PDO) identified several
shortcomings that undermine the fairness of criminal proceedings. They include convictions
based on evidence lacking neutrality, the excessive use of pre-trial detention, limitations on
the defence’s ability to obtain and present evidence, the exclusion of legal counsel from
investigative actions, excessive delays in court proceedings and breaches of the
presumption of innocence. The PDO also expressed concerns regarding unlawful detention
practices, insufficient procedural safeguards during detention and delayed access to legal
assistance. Significant reforms of law and practice are therefore still necessary to ensure
alignment with the EU acquis.
The excessive use of pre-trial detention continues to significantly undermine the right to a
fair trial, raising concerns about the integrity of judicial proceedings. These violations have
been particularly pronounced in cases involving individuals detained during the 2024 and
2025 demonstrations, which have been disproportionately subjected to pre-trial detention
immediately after arrest without adequate justification or an individualised assessment of
necessity. Reliable data on the average duration of pre-trial detention are not systematically
collected, undermining transparency and accountability. Georgia is encouraged to align with
EU acquis and European standards on the procedural rights of suspects and accused in pre-
trial detention and on material conditions.
The situation of vulnerable groups remains especially problematic. Concerns persist
regarding persons with disabilities, who continue to encounter substantial barriers in
accessing justice, as well as in understanding and effectively exercising their procedural
rights.
Protection of minorities
The legal and institutional framework for the protection of persons belonging to minorities is incomplete and persons belonging to minorities face discrimination. Access for ethnic minorities to quality education, public services, civic engagement and employment within the civil service has remained constrained. Persistent structural barriers – including language and information deficits and the absence of consultative bodies at both national and local levels – continue to limit the social and political representation of minorities. Georgia has not addressed the significant gaps in the strategic framework, including the national strategy for the protection of human rights 2022-2030 and the state strategy for civic equality and integration 2021-2030. The amended Law on broadcasting and the Law on grants risk further restricting access for minority-language media to funding and sustainability.
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Roma4
There is no specific legislative framework to ensure the rights of Roma people. Roma communities continue to face discrimination, including in respect to access to housing, education and other government services.
Citizenship rights
In 2025, 2 333 persons, mostly from Russia (1 393), Germany (296) and Ukraine (114) were granted Georgian citizenship. Georgia does not currently offer a formal, guaranteed citizenship-by-investment or ’golden passport’ programme, however, the country allows foreigners to acquire temporary or permanent residence permits via investment.
2.2.2 Chapter 24: Justice, freedom and security
The EU has common rules for border and migration management, visa policy and asylum. Schengen cooperation entails the lifting of border controls inside the EU. There is also cooperation in the fight against serious and organised crime and terrorism, and judicial, police and customs cooperation, all with the support of the EU justice and home affairs agencies.
Fight against serious and organised crime
The legal framework on serious and organised crime is partially aligned with the EU acquis. The capacity to fight against serious and organised crime needs to be improved.
General framework
Legal alignment, strategic and institutional frameworks
The strategic framework for the fight against organised crime is broadly in place. The national strategy for combating organised crime 2025-2028 is implemented. A comprehensive threat analysis aligned with EU SOCTA remains outstanding. Gaps remain in the legal framework to fight against organised crime. A dedicated asset recovery office was established in June 2026. The management of confiscated assets falls within the competence of the National Agency of State Property.
Georgia should further strengthen the use of extended confiscation and confiscation of equivalent value as the norm in all cases involving income-generating serious crimes as well as on the financing of terrorism.
Amendments to a legislative package, including the Criminal Procedure Code, were adopted in September and October 2025. The amendments ban individuals convicted of financial and economic crimes from leaving the country and order them to repay damages to victims. The Public Defender noted that a court is not able to assess the proportionality and necessity of the ban on leaving the country and pointed to the necessity to harmonise the regulations with international standards.
The separation of functions between criminal prosecution and investigation bodies has still not been addressed. No progress was made on increasing the possibilities for law enforcement agencies to conduct independent investigations without the prior authorisation of the Prosecutor General’s Office for the initial investigative steps.
Implementation and enforcement capacity
The number of investigations and prosecutions into serious and organised crime cases and the number of convictions for serious crime cases increased. Convictions remained overall stable for organised crime cases. Investigations and prosecutions of ‘thief-in law’ crimes increased.
4 In line with the terminology used by European institutions, the umbrella term ‘Roma’ is used here to refer to a number of different groups, without denying the specificities of these groups.
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Georgia needs to step up efforts to combat the smuggling of goods and illicit substances.
Prosecutors and investigators need to collaborate better at operational level.
Georgia should fully implement a comprehensive and intelligence-led approach to combating serious and organised crime by forming a better intelligence picture on high-risk criminal networks and by supporting community-oriented policing in line with the European Union Serious and Organised Crime Threat Assessment (EU SOCTA) of March 2025. The current strategy formally aligns with EU SOCTA priorities and methodology, but Georgia needs to implement it.
The Ministry of Internal Affairs’ inter-agency working group on the development of community-oriented policing (COP) continued monitoring implementation of the COP 2024-2027 strategy. COP efforts are undermined by the lack of accountability of law enforcement officers for their repressive action and the brutal crackdown on
peaceful protesters in late November 2024 and early 2025.
Georgia continued work to set up a unified DNA database. Further progress has been made in the Forensic-Criminalistics Division of the Ministry of Internal Affairs with the establishment of a chemical triage laboratory, the provision of a mobile chemical laboratory and two mobile forensic laboratories.
Law enforcement agencies (police investigators and prosecutors) continue to apply the ‘double rail’ method of conducting criminal and financial investigations in parallel.
The volume of seized and confiscated assets from money laundering and organised crime increased substantially in 2025. The Prosecutor General’s Office strengthened the extended confiscation mechanism for serious crimes.
Human resources management and professional development in law enforcement agencies need to be strengthened in line with transparent, professional and merit-based criteria. This includes the implementation of the Ministry of Internal Affairs’ (MIA) 2026-2030 institutional development strategy on combatting corruption.
The percentage of female police officers in the police force slightly increased to 15.5% (from 14.7% in 2024). Further efforts are needed to improve the gender balance in law enforcement agencies.
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Law enforcement cooperation
The level of cooperation with EU Member States’ law enforcement bodies remains good. Georgia should continue to increase participation in international police cooperation on drug trafficking and high-risk organised criminal networks and share more proactively intelligence on high-risk criminal networks. Cooperation on organised property crime and intellectual property crime remains good.
The information exchanged by the Georgian competent authorities with Europol and EU Member States has shown a slight decrease compared to 2024. Georgia joined one Europol analytical project (migrant smuggling) reaching a total of nine. Georgia needs to fully implement the Europol-aligned threat assessments to identify emerging criminal trends.
The MIA continued cooperation with Interpol. Georgia was actively involved in seven working groups. Cooperation with the European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Training (CEPOL) is suspended.
The MIA deployed 22 police officers to partner countries (including 14 EU Member States) covering 39 countries (including 27 EU/Schengen countries).
Georgia participated in the European Multidisciplinary Platform against Criminal Threats (EMPACT). In the EMPACT cycle 2026-2027, the MIA participates in 11 operational action plans, including 142 operational actions.
Georgia should address the issue of impunity of law enforcement officers and ensure that it upholds applicable international conventions and standards.
Judicial cooperation in criminal matters
Judicial cooperation in criminal matters is broadly satisfactory. The legal framework for judicial cooperation in criminal matters is mostly aligned with the EU acquis to the extent that alignment is already possible. The total number of incoming and outgoing requests with EU Member States for mutual legal assistance in criminal matters under the responsibility of the Prosecutor General’s Office increased in 2025. Georgia has also participated in the negotiations on the Additional Protocol to the Council of Europe Warsaw Convention, which
focuses on money laundering and the confiscation of proceeds from crime.
The handling of judicial cooperation requests in criminal matters is still subject to significant delays.
Cooperation with Eurojust continued. Between September 2025 and March 2026, Georgia was involved in 19 new cases at Eurojust, most related to money laundering, fraud and forgery of administrative documents. Georgia continued to participate in three ongoing joint investigation teams.
Georgia appointed a new Liaison Prosecutor to Eurojust.
Georgia has working arrangements in place with the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO). In 2025, the EPPO did not send any MLA requests to Georgia, neither did it have any active cases with links to Georgia at the end of 2025.
In 2025, the Prosecution Service of Georgia exchanged information with the European
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Public Prosecutor's Office and the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) in relation to one ongoing investigation.
Georgia actively contributed to a major international operation – supported by Europol and Eurojust – which dismantled the so-called Audi A6 platform. This platform was used by criminal groups to launder cryptocurrency for an estimated amount of EUR 336 million between 2022 and 2025.
Crime areas
Investigation and criminalisation of money laundering
The number of investigations and prosecutions of money laundering cases decreased in 2025 (73/72 down from 110/99 in 2024). The number of convictions of natural persons remained stable (79 cases) and increased for legal persons (from 10 in 2024 to 23 in 2025).
Cybercrime
Georgia needs to strengthen its capacities to address cybercrime and to cooperate with EU law enforcement in this area. In particular, it should provide further training to agency employees involved in fighting cybercrime, including on the dark net. The number of convictions for cybercrime cases was higher in 2025 (208) than in 2024 (152), while fewer cases were investigated (608 in 2025 down from 749 in 2024).
Child sexual abuse
To combat online child sexual abuse, Georgia still needs to develop a national action plan for combating violence against children in the digital environment, aligned with the Lanzarote Convention.
The number of child sexual abuse cases prosecuted that resulted in convictions increased in 2025, with 164 cases prosecuted (143 in 2024) and 148 convictions secured (up from 94 in 2024). National legislation on sexual violence against children remains substantially inconsistent with international standards and institutional capacities need to be strengthened.
Trafficking in human beings
Georgia should continue its efforts to align its legislation on trafficking in human beings with Directive 2011/36/EU on preventing and combating trafficking in human beings and protecting its victims as amended by Directive 2024/1712. This was included in the 2025- 2026 national action plan. Georgia continues to cooperate with EU Member States quite actively in the field of trafficking in human beings.
Gaps persist in the implementation of protection measures, proactive investigations and intelligence-led policing. Georgia needs to continue to improve the effectiveness of criminal investigation capacities and to strengthen interinstitutional cooperation on investigations and referral mechanisms within the framework of the implementation of the 2025-2026 national action plan on combating trafficking in human beings. Public services for victims and presumed victims of trafficking in human beings are implemented. The referral system needs
to be further improved. In 2025, there were six indictments, five convictions secured and five people were granted victim status (19 in 2024). Georgia initiated procedures to join the
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Europol analytical project Phoenix on combating human trafficking. Georgia should increase its efforts to detect and identify victims of trafficking in human beings for the purpose of exploitative surrogacy.
Migrant smuggling
Georgia is increasingly a destination and hub for migrant smuggling. The legal framework is partly aligned with the EU acquis but it needs to build more capacity to investigate, prosecute and convict migrant smugglers. Georgia participates in 184 EMPACT OAs on migrant smuggling however actual interaction in migrant smuggling investigations remains low. Georgia needs to increase international cooperation on migrant smuggling and strengthen capacities, institutional cooperation and investments. In 2025, 13 investigations into crimes were conducted, 11 cases were concluded with convictions (compared with 14 indictments in 2024, all leading to convictions).
Trafficking in firearms
Amendments to the Law on weapons adopted in December 2025 extend the control for the verification of holders and applicants’ health conditions and restrict the use and circulation of specific weapons.
On arms control, 1 096 crimes were investigated in 2025 (up from 797 in 2024), of which 940 were solved (up from 688 in 2024) and 540 convictions were secured (up from 391 in 2024). Under the EMPACT Firearms and Explosives operational action plan, Georgia participates in 16 Operational Actions targeting firearms and explosives trafficking.
Cooperation in the field of drugs
The legal frameworkfor cooperation in the field of drugs remains largely aligned with the EU acquis. Rules on minimum sentences and penalties for drug-related criminal offences need to be further aligned with the EU acquis. The national drug strategy 2023-2030 and the 2022-2026 national action plan need to bet updated to reflect the 2025 EU drugs strategy, and the legislative framework needs further alignment with the policy priorities. Interinstitutional cooperation and institutional capacities were strengthened following amendments to the Customs Code of December 2025. The Southern Caucasus/Black Sea corridor is an emerging trafficking route of concern for heroin and other substances. Georgia needs to step up enforcement and strengthen its institutional capacity and international cooperation on drug trafficking.
The number of investigations and final convictions of cases related to the production and trafficking of drugs increased in 2025. The volume of drugs seized and destructed increased in 2025. International police cooperation on drug trafficking prevention expanded. Georgia initiated procedures to join a Europol analytical project on drugs. Cooperation between the National Drugs Observatory and civil society remains severely limited given the repressive
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legislation on CSOs. The national early warning system on new psychoactive substances still needs to be further strengthened, in particular as regards information exchange.
Counterfeiting of the euro
Georgia's legislation governing the suppression of counterfeit currency remains partially aligned with the EU acquis. The National Bank of Georgia further integrated its reporting systems with Europol’s Central Office for Combating Euro Counterfeiting and introduced new regulations for stablecoins and virtual asset service providers to align with the applicable rules set out in Regulation (EU) 2023/1114 on markets in crypto assets.
The 1929 International (Geneva) Convention for the Suppression of Counterfeiting Currency, which Georgia signed in 2000, has not yet been ratified.
Counter-terrorism, prevention and resilience
Fight against terrorism and prevention of radicalisation
Legal alignment, strategic and institutional frameworks
The legal framework for the fight against terrorism is largely aligned with the EU acquis.
The legal framework for countering violent extremism is also largely aligned with the EU acquis. In November 2025, amendments were adopted to the anti-money laundering/CFT law requiring all natural and legal persons to comply with the restrictions set by the United Nations Sanctions Committees.
Implementation and enforcement capacity
The national counter-terrorism strategy for 2022-2026 and the corresponding action plan are being implemented and monitored by the Permanent Interagency Commission. The supervisory framework for anti-money laundering and the fight against terrorism was improved. In December 2025, the Secure Information Exchange Network Application in counter-terrorism matters (CT SIENA) became operational between Georgia and Europol.
The terrorist threat level remains low. The government undertook several counter-terrorism operations leading to arrests, seizure of weapons and illegal substances, and convictions. In 2025, the number of indictment and conviction cases on terrorism charges remained overall stable compared with 2024 (six indictments and three convictions compared with four cases each in 2024). Georgia continued to cooperate on counter-terrorism activities with Europol, Interpol and the Council of Europe Committee on Counter-Terrorism. It also participated in preventive counter-terrorism activities with international organisations including NATO and the UN.
Critical infrastructure protection
Legal alignment, strategic and institutional framework
There was no significant progress to further align the legal framework for critical infrastructure protection on cybersecurity and it remains partially aligned with the EU acquis. The legal framework on the protection of physical critical infrastructure and the resilience of
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critical entities remains to be aligned with the EU Directive on the resilience of critical entities as well as with the Terrorist Content Online regulation.
Implementation and enforcement capacity
The protection of critical infrastructure needs to be improved.
Georgia’s critical infrastructure is exposed to vulnerabilities, in particular in the sectors of energy, transport and cybersecurity, including geopolitical tensions, ageing infrastructure, cyber threats and natural hazards. Some progress has been made with investments in transport and digitalisation. Georgia needs to draw up a strategy and legal framework on physical critical infrastructure protection.
Migration and asylum
Legal and irregular migration and returns
The legal framework for the management of legal and irregular migration is partially aligned with the EU acquis. The management of legal and irregular migration needs to be improved.
Legal alignment, strategic and institutional frameworks
Further to the 2025 legal amendments on labour migration, additional regulations to counter irregular migration were adopted in November and December 2025, and in March 2026, in part to align with the Return Directive. The regulations strengthen legal provisions on irregular stay for foreign nationals, including higher administrative fines and the introduction of temporary entry bans and require interinstitutional consultations on return proceedings.
The migration strategy 2021-2030 and integrated border management strategy 2023-2027 are being implemented. Further efforts are needed to achieve the set targets and improve
data collection, analyses and evidence-based policymaking.
The institutional framework for migration and border management remains well established. Overall, the migration policy coordination framework is in line with effective international practice, and the State Commission on Migration Issues continues to efficiently fulfil its role. The institutional set-up of migration management needs greater capacity and budgetary resources. Closer cooperation with international organisations and NGOs is also needed.
Georgia has a readmission agreementwith the EU and bilateral
implementing protocols with 13 EU Member States. It also has a bilateral agreement with Denmark, as well as with the UK, Iceland, Norway, Switzerland, Montenegro, Moldova, Belarus, Armenia and Ukraine.
Implementation and enforcement capacity
Implementation of the readmission agreement with the EU is very good. In 2025, 10 445 Georgians effectively returned following an order to leave the territory (12 095 in 2024) ranking Georgia second for the number of its nationals returned from the EU. In 2025, the MIA participated in 27 return operations organised by the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (‘Frontex’). Georgia is one of the visa-free countries whose citizens apply for asylum in the EU in greatest numbers, with 15 130 asylum applications in 2025.
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The majority of returnees from Georgia did not receive any reintegration support from
sending European countries, partly due to Georgia's restrictive legislation on donor funding.
The budget for the State Reintegration Assistance Programme has remained stable in 2026
(GEL 1.5 million). A unified policy approach to reintegration remains pending.
Georgia is increasingly a destination country for migration. The number of return decisions by the government increased substantially following a stricter model of checks and streamlined processes for returns introduced in revised labour migration regulations in 2025. In 2025, the MIA issued 1 311 return decisions (up from 363 in 2024), with the top three nationalities being India (269), Türkiye (169) and Iran (157). At the end of 2025, there were 1 060 beneficiaries of international protection in Georgia including 386 refugees and 674 persons with humanitarian status.
Georgia still needs to increase its service capacities connected to increased migration flows, also in cooperation with the service providers. There is only one temporary accommodation centre in Tbilisi, which mainly functions as a migration detention centre with a current capacity of around 60 people at a time. Shortcomings in rights protection and accountability remain, including in cases involving children. The Public Defender raised concerns about the detention of minors, in particular allegations of torture and inhuman or degrading treatment, which have been referred to the now-abolished Special Investigation Service. The procedures for unaccompanied minors were revised. The practical application of the legal framework for ’Alternative Measures to Detention’ remains limited. In early 2025, an electronic mechanism for delivering return decisions was introduced.
Asylum
While the legal framework on asylum in Georgia is partially aligned with the EU acquis as it was in force until 12 June 2026, Georgia should focus on developing its national legal framework and operational capacities on migration and asylum to align with the Pact.
Legal alignment, strategic and institutional frameworks
In October 2025, the Law on international protection entered into force, which further aligns national legislation with the EU acquis. The rules include procedures for examining applications at the state border and procedures in penitentiary institutions. Georgia has not made progress on a mechanism for detecting and addressing cases of refoulment and for protecting the rights of applicants of international protection through procedural safeguards.
Implementation and enforcement capacity
In 2025, 1 325 individuals applied for asylum in Georgia (against 1 641 in 2024), the majority from Türkiye, India, Ukraine and Iran. The total recognition rate in 2025 was 7.2%. 1 318 applications for asylum were rejected, 14 people were granted refugee status and 89 were granted humanitarian status. Proceedings on international protection were terminated in 52 cases due to the departure of the applicants for international protection. Asylum decisions are issued within 4.4 months on average.
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There are presently an estimated 33 800 Ukrainian citizens staying visa- free in Georgia. Visa-free stay for Ukrainian citizens who entered Georgia before 24 February 2025 is currently valid until 24 February 2027. The reception centre for applicants for international protection can accommodate up to 132 people. Georgia needs to strengthen the provision of services for applicants.
Visa policy
Georgia’s visa policy is not fully aligned with EU policy, in particular the list of countries whose nationals require a visa to enter the EU. Georgia's list of visa free countries continues to considerably diverge from the EU list, as it still contains 26 countries which are visa-required in EU. No steps have been taken towards further alignment. In addition, Georgia continues to pursue a visa policy that diverges substantially from the EU by granting entry to nationals of 17 countries that require a visa both in the EU and in Georgia, solely on the basis of a visa or residence permit issued by one of the Gulf Cooperation Council countries (United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Kuwait or Oman). However, the security features of visas and travel documents continue to be broadly aligned with EU standards.
The eighth Visa Suspension Mechanism (VSM) report of December 2025 noted that Georgia failed to implement nearly all recommendations issued in the seventh VSM report. Despite repeated requests, it backtracked further, in particular on key governance and rule-of-law benchmarks that form the basis for granting visa-free travel.
Due to Georgia’s deliberate and persisting violation of its commitments made under its visa- free regime, the European Commission has activated the revised VSM for Georgia, temporarily suspending visa-free travel for holders of Georgian diplomatic, service and official passports across the EU, as of 6 March 2026 and for an initial period of one year. On 11 June 2026, the Commission met with a Georgian government delegation, in accordance with the Visa Regulation, to discuss this temporary suspension with a view to remedying the circumstances that led to its adoption. This enhanced dialogue did not lead to progress when it comes to the Commission’s recommendations underpinning the suspension.
Schengen governance and external borders
The legislative and strategic framework for the management of external borders is partially aligned with the EU acquis. The management of borders is broadly satisfactory.
Legal alignment, strategic and institutional frameworks
Georgia continued strategic engagement under the integrated border management (IBM) framework. The IBM strategy and its five-year action plan (2023-2027) are broadly based on the EU concept of IBM. The 2026 action plan was approved in December 2025. Strategic decision-making remains a challenge, and implementation of key reforms is still constrained. Some progress was made, however, in addressing institutional fragmentation and the lack of coordination and resources. Institutional and human resource capacity needs to be further strengthened.
Implementation and enforcement capacity
The IBM strategy and the annual action plan are being implemented. Several infrastructure and IT improvements were recorded in 2025, including implementation of a 'smart border’ concept. The smart border concept is based on full implementation of the unified migration
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data analytical system, the advance passenger information system, the computerised transit system and installation of technical equipment along green and blue border segments.
Substantial further investments are still required to address critical gaps in surveillance and monitoring, particularly along green and blue borders.
Institutional and inter-agency coordination improved in 2025. Border crossing points (BCPs) take a one-stop-shop approach supported by shared access to multiple information systems. Cybersecurity and IT infrastructure facilitates real-time intelligence sharing between the police, customs and justice departments. Georgia needs to further strengthen the capacities of the border guard services and border police.
Cooperation with the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex) remains downgraded in the context of EU measures taken in response to the country’s democratic backsliding but remains effective, particularly in the field of returns, data and risk analysis and smuggling. Frontex-deployed standing corps officers are present at selected BCPs including Tbilisi, Kutaisi, and the Batumi international airports and the Port of Batumi in an advisory capacity. Georgia deployed observers to selected EU Member State BCPs.
Cross-border cooperation with neighbouring countries remains satisfactory. Measures to fight corruption remain to be strengthened.
Judicial cooperation in civil and commercial matters
Judicial cooperation in civil and criminal matters is broadly satisfactory. Georgia has still not acceded to two key instruments under the Hague conference on private international law: the 2000 Hague Convention on the International Protection of Adults and the 2019 Hague Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Civil or Commercial Matters.
The number of incoming requests in civil matters under the responsibility of the Ministry of Justice increased substantially in 2025.
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2.3. ECONOMIC CRITERIA5
2.3.1 The existence of a functioning market economy
Economic governance
The authorities made progress on some economic reforms, notably in public
finances. The electronic public investment management system (ePIM) has been developed
and has been fully operational since 2025, with all new public investment projects initiated
and assessed through this system resulting in better project screening and budget credibility.
In 2025 the authorities prepared a
Public Expenditure and Financial
Accountability (PEFA) self-assessment
report, which suggests further
improvements in the public financial
management system, and submitted it
to the World Bank for their review.
Climate- and gender-responsive public
financial management assessment
reports are being prepared, with
support from international partners. The
latest fiscal risks statement contains
expanded information on long-term
fiscal risks, including those related to
climate change, demographic
pressures, natural disasters, legal
claims, state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and public-private partnerships. Regarding
independence of the central bank, responsibilities among members of the board of the
central bank were reallocated in line with the IMF recommendations. More progress is
5 Unless otherwise indicated, the data in this section are taken from the relevant national sources (the statistical office, Ministry of Finance and central bank).
Table: 2017-22 2023 2024 2025
Georgia - Key economic figures average
GDP per capita (% of EU-27 in PPS) 34.9 41.2 45.3 48.0
Real GDP growth 5.3 7.8 9.7 7.5
Economic activity rate of the population aged 20-64 (%), total 62.9 68.7 70.8 70.9
Unemployment rate of the population aged over 15 (%), total 19.2 16.4 13.9 13.9
Employment of the population aged 20-64 (annual growth %) 1.8 5.4 6.1 0.1
Nominal wages (annual growth %) 8.4 14.5 11.5 15.8
Consumer price index (annual growth %) 6.7 2.5 1.1 3.9
Exchange rate against EUR 3.3 2.8 2.9 3.1
Current account balance (% of GDP) -8.0 -5.5 -5.3 -2.6
Net foreign direct investment, FDI (% of GDP) 6.4 5.3 3.3 3.6
General government balance (% of GDP) -3.3 -1.9 -2.0 -1.2
General government debt (% of GDP) 44.9 38.9 35.7 34.4
Sources: National Statistics Office of Georgia, IMF, National Bank of Georgia,
Ministry of Finance of Georgia, Eurostat, own calculations
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needed to enhance board member qualification criteria and adopting a collegial decision-
making model.The three-year stand-by arrangement with the IMF expired in 2025. Annual
Article IV consultations with the IMF continued, the latest one was approved by the IMF
Board and published in June 2026. The latest IMF Article IV report provides some
recommendations for improvement of economic governance, including streamlining tax
expenditures, enhancing spending efficiency and advancing SOE governance reform.
Macroeconomic stability
In 2025, Georgia recorded strong economic growth of 7.5%, though down from nearly double-digit expansion in 2024. Private and government consumption remained the main contributors, supported by rising wages, spending by high-skilled Russian migrants and high inflows of remittances. In contrast to previous years, investment decreased in real terms in 2025, due to delays in public investment projects. On the supply side, growth was driven by services (mainly information technology, financial services and education) as well as by manufacturing, while agricultural and mining output contracted. The tourism sector further expanded with the number of tourist arrivals reaching a record-high in 2025. Services (IT and financial) and manufacturing were also among the key economic drivers in the first half of 2026, fuelling GDP growth to 7.9% year-on-year in the first seven months of the year.
The external position improved in 2025. The current account deficit narrowed to a record low of 2.6% of GDP from 5.3% of GDP in 2024, despite a slight increase of the trade deficit. Exports of goods rose by 11.6% year-on-year in USD terms thanks to, among others, a surge in exports of precious metal ores (nearly 60%) and continued growth in re-exported cars. The latter accounted for nearly 39% of all exports of goods in 2025. Imports increased by 8.2% as a result of high demand for investment and consumer goods as well as growing car purchases. The resulting slight increase of the merchandise trade deficit in 2025 was completely offset by a rising surplus in services, especially exports of computers services as well as revenue from tourism, mainly due to growing arrivals from Russia, the EU, and Israel. The inflow of remittances also rose despite a significant drop in transfers from Russia. In the first eight months of 2026, exports of goods increased sharply due to favourable terms of trade and the launch of exports from a newly-built oil refinery. This led to a reduction of the still sizeable trade deficit.
The current account deficit was entirely covered by foreign direct investment (FDI) in 2025. While net FDI rose to 3.6% of GDP from 3.3% of GDP a year earlier, it remained relatively low in historical terms (averaging 6.5% of GDP a year in 2013-2024). As a result, Georgia continues to have a strongly negative net international investment position (NIIP) and relatively high external debt. However, both ratios have decreased substantially since 2020 thanks to the sharp increase in the nominal GDP. As of December 2025, the NIIP stood at -84.5%, while gross external debt amounted to 70.4% of GDP. The level of gross official reserves increased sharply in 2025 and continued its upward trend in the first eight months of 2026. At USD 8.1 billion, or 128% of the IMF’s Assessing Reserve Adequacy metric, they were at a historically high level at the end of July 2026. The sharp increase in reserves reflected deposit de-dollarisation and strong current account inflows boosted by robust exports in services and remittances that have enabled the National Bank of Georgia (NBG) to step up foreign exchange purchases. The rise in gold prices gave a further boost.
Inflation accelerated in 2025 from low levels in the previous year. It peaked at 5.2% in
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October 2025, well above the 3% target of the National Bank of Georgia, before easing by end-2025. The average annual inflation came in at 3.9% as compared to 1.1% in 2024. It was mainly driven by domestic food prices. Other factors that contributed to price growth included the pass-through from wage increases and base effects. Inflation accelerated ostensibly in 2026, to 5.6% in August, because of the surge in global energy prices following the start of the war against Iran, a hike of electricity prices, as well as the continuing pass- through from the ongoing high wage growth. Core inflation, while remaining significantly below the headline rate, also picked up in the course of 2026, suggesting that inflationary dynamics is relatively broad-based. In view of the mounting price pressures and amid expectations for second-round effects from the global energy price shock, the NBG raised in May 2026 its key policy rate by 25 basis points to 8.25%, the first increase in two years.
General government deficit narrowed in 2025 to 1.2% of GDP and was lower than in the previous years. Revenues increased by 13%, broadly in line with the nominal GDP growth (12%). Current expenditure rose by 16% over the same period, mainly due to a strong increase in public sector salaries and higher social benefits and subsidies. By contrast, capital expenditure fell by 20%, reflecting procurement and implementation delays and the postponement of some large public investment projects. This under-execution of capital expenditure contributed to the lower-than-budgeted overall fiscal deficit. The general government debt decreased from 35.7% of GDP in 2024 to 34.4% in 2025. In this context, the country benefits from a favourable access to financial markets. In January 2026 Georgia placed, amid strong investor demand, a USD 500 million five-year Eurobond that was used to repay a bond issuance of a similar amount issued in 2021.
Georgia implemented an overall appropriate macroeconomic policy mix. The monetary policy of the central bank was appropriate, with the recent acceleration of inflation largely due to the surge in global energy prices and other supply shocks. Georgia’s external position has strengthened, with the current account deficit narrowing and gross international reserves increasing. Fiscal performance was strong with general government deficit declining to close to 1% of GDP, although this was partially due to under-execution of capital spending. While the global economic outlook has become more challenging following the outbreak of the conflict in the Middle East, the country seems well positioned to absorb shocks, supported by fairly sound macroeconomic fundamentals and fiscal and external buffers. Yet, wage and inflation dynamics require close monitoring.
Functioning of product markets
Georgia has a fairly dynamic business fabric, but many weaknesses still hamper the business environment, and there was very limited progress in addressing them last year. Georgia’s business environment has been liberalised and the administrative barriers to market entry are low. Nonetheless, many structural obstacles constraint business’ activity including political instability, an inadequately educated workforce, reduced independence and integrity of the judicial system, and court inefficiency. Georgia was ranked 56th out of 182 countries in the 2025 Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index, as against 41st position in 2022.
The authorities continued to address the issue of informal economy. Informality in
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Georgia is closely linked to the country’s economic structure, with a high share of agriculture, construction, transport, logistics and tourism, a lack of unemployment benefits and a substantial share of self-employment. In the reporting period, an inter-ministerial working group, established in 2024, continued to work with the International Labour Organisation (ILO) on a policy plan to address the informal economy in a holistic, government-wide manner, encompassing tax, labour, social and financial policies. In September 2025, the working group defined a set of actions to be taken by the institutions, including an informal economy assessment to be elaborated by the National Statistics Office.
Despite some steps taken, the reform of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) remains incomplete, while the financial oversight has continued to improve. The state footprint in the economy remains limited and is concentrated in strategic sectors such as energy infrastructure, transport and utilities, with SOEs generating 4% of Georgia’s value added and 8% of employment. The authorities appointed independent supervisory boards at several SOEs, piloted a shared ownership of three SOEs by ministries of finance and some other ministries, and improved separation of the state’s roles as owner, policymaker, and regulator. However, the Corporate Governance Code for SOEs remains unimplemented and the draft SOE law has been on hold. Political interference and the absence of formalized processes for SOE board selection and dismissal undermines the professionalism and independence of SOE governance bodies. In parallel, the Ministry of Finance continued to gradually enhance financial oversight by bringing the accounts of 176 SOEs into the single treasury account to strengthen liquidity management. It has also improved the transparency by including quarterly information on SOEs in the quarterly and annual budget execution reports. Revenues from privatisation and sales of state property amounted to 0.21% of GDP in 2025. The total amount of state aid issued by public bodies in Georgia was very low at 0.01% of GDP in 2024, but the reporting methodology is not aligned with the EU acquis requirements. The extent of price regulations remains very limited in Georgia. The agency providing public funds for business development, Enterprise Georgia, made changes to its main business universal programme in September 2025, with a stronger focus on SMEs and loans for green expenditure. In April 2026, Enterprise Georgia and the Georgian Development Fund were consolidated into the Georgian Economic Development Corporation, aimed to become a larger development institution supporting investment and attracting equity capital. The national strategy for SMEs expired at the end of 2025, and the new strategy has not been adopted yet.
Functioning of the financial market
Georgia’s banking sector remains sound, although it is exposed to foreign exchange risks. According to data from the National Bank of Georgia, the banking system’s capital adequacy ratio stood at 22.2% in April 2026. Most lenders remained very profitable, reaching an aggregate 21.9% return on equity. The asset quality of the sector as a whole remains strong, with the ratio of non-performing loans to total loans broadly unchanged at a low 2.6%. The high dollarisation of both assets and liabilities remains a structural weakness of the banking system although, from a financial stability perspective, banks have ample foreign exchange buffers. The share of loans in foreign currencies remained broadly stable in the reporting period and amounted to 39.4% in April 2026. The level of dollarisation for deposits is higher than for loans but decreased over the last twelve months by 3 percentage points to 48.6%. Credit growth remained strong at 13.6% in April 2026 and was stronger for households than for corporate loans. Access to finance is still perceived as a major obstacle for many small businesses, although the situation has recently improved.
The non-banking part of the financial sector remains small, despite recent growth. In the reporting period, Georgia’s corporate bond market expanded with 13 public corporate bonds issued by 7 local issuers, which pushed their outstanding value to about 2.5% of GDP. Nevertheless, the size of the corporate bond market and market capitalisation of the Tbilisi Stock Exchange remain nevertheless small, with Georgia's largest firms utilising a dual-listing architecture in Georgia and abroad or listing exclusively abroad. In March 2026,
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a new Law on factoring was adopted to provide small and medium-sized enterprises with an additional instrument for access to finance. The law will support the development of a new segment of factoring companies in the financial market. The insurance market grew by 15% on average over the last years but remains relatively small with gross written premiums below 1.5% of GDP, and with health insurance being the largest segment. One of the obstacles in its development is the still pending adoption of legislation on mandatory domestic motor third party liability insurance.
Functioning of the labour market
Labour market indicators remained almost unchanged in 2025, after several years of gradual improvement, indicating a growth poor in job creation and structural weaknesses. Theemployment rate increased marginally by 0.1 pp in comparison to the previous year to 60.5%, with employment falling among self- employed workers. The unemployment rate remained high in comparison to the other candidate countries at 13.9%, unchanged from 2024, despite the high GDP growth rate. Significant structural labour market weaknesses persist, including the persistent mismatch between labour skills and business needs, high youth unemployment, significant gender disparities and regional differences. Georgia has yet to adopt a new national strategy of labour and employment policy. Following a dynamic rise in 2023 and in 2024, wages increased even stronger in 2025, by 16% in nominal terms. They were driven by pay rises in the public sector and in sectors experiencing labour shortages, such as construction.
2.3.2. The capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union
Education and innovation
Georgia continued to upgrade its vocational education system and introduced a reform of higher and general education with the announced objective to improve resource allocation, but which could affect the quality of education. Government expenditure on education in 2025 amounted to almost 4% of GDP as in 2024 and is still below the EU average (4.7%). In the 2025 PISA assessment that measured outcomes in secondary education, Georgia’s scores have improved in comparison to the 2022 PISA assessment, although the country was ranked only 58th on science and 67th on reading out of 91 countries. In the area of vocational education and training, one new state vocational college became operational in 2025, and integrated vocational programmes were expanded to 63 additional public schools. The Vocational Skills Agency was abolished in October 2025, and its functions were integrated into other institutions including the Ministry of Education, Science and Youth. In February 2026, the Parliament adopted amendments to the Laws on general education and on higher education, which, according to the authorities, aim to better focus limited financial resources provided to this sector. However, this reform raises serious concerns regarding the respect for institutional autonomy of universities and academic freedom, equity and equality of access to quality education and compatibility of Georgia’s higher education system with the European Higher Education standards. The authorities intend also to reduce the school cycle from 12 to 11 years, effective from 2027– 2028, which also raises concerns as it may adversely affect the quality of education.
Gross domestic expenditure on R&D remained broadly unchanged since 2023 and remains low at around 0.26% of GDP, which is significantly below the EU-27 average (at 2.1% of GDP) and the EU target of 3% of GDP. Georgia continues to modernise its research
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and innovation policy framework. Research and innovation policy remains integrated into the Unified National Strategy for Education and Science 2022–2030. The Georgia Innovation and Technology Agency continued to support innovative start-ups and training, with a focus on the ICT sector. The Kutaisi Technological Hub, a regional innovation centre, was inaugurated in July 2026.
Physical capital and quality of infrastructure
Public investment continued with a focus on transport infrastructure, although it slowed down in comparison to previous years (to 5.1% of GDP in 2025 from 8.5% of GDP in 2024). In December 2025, a 52 km cross-mountain Rikoti section of the East-West Highway (part of the TEN-T core network) was opened. Over 74% of the planned 430- kilometre highway is now fully operational. The recent railway modernisation project was completed in December 2025, but large parts of the rail network and rolling stock are still obsolete. In June 2026, Georgia signed a new loan agreement with the World Bank to fund transport infrastructure and rolling stock as part of the Trans-Caspian Transport Corridor, including an already launched international tender for new electric locomotives. The construction of the Anaklia Deep Sea Port started with dredging works and construction of the breakwater. However, during the reporting period, the state budget allocation for development of the port was reduced by more than half and works were stalled for several months. The government’s approach to Anaklia port has changed again with the decision to retain full ownership in the future port instead of a joint investment with the Chinese-led consortium for the construction and operation of the port. In air transport, an international consulting firm has been selected to conduct an economic feasibility study of the new Tbilisi International Airport. The authorities have also extended a concession agreement for the operation of the current Tbilisi airport until the end of 2031, to be accompanied by investment in modernising the airport. In the energy sector, preparations continued for the Black Sea submarine cable project, intended to link Georgia with Romania by electricity and fibre-optic submarine cable interconnections. The project was granted Project of Mutual Interest status in December 2025. In the area of information and communications technology, the coverage rate of fixed broadband internet subscribers among households reached 99%. Thanks to the log-in-Georgia project, the national fibre network expanded to 4 000 km, ensuring high-speed internet availability for 76% of rural communities.
Sectoral and enterprise structure
The economy is increasingly based on services, with a diminishing role of agriculture and a stable share of manufacturing. Services increased their share in GDP to 72.8% in 2025, with the biggest gains recorded last year by the information and communication technology and education sectors. The share of manufacturing, at 9.1%, is relatively low in Georgia compared with peer countries. The share of construction is relatively high at 8.0% and rising with a residential construction boom in big cities and substantial investment in public infrastructure. Agriculture, a traditionally important sector but characterised by low productivity, declined to 5.9% of GDP in 2025, but still accounts for 16% of total employment. SMEs accounted in 2025 for 54% of the value added of the business sector.
Economic integration with the EU and price competitiveness
Economic integration with the EU is limited. Georgia’s trade turnover with the EU increased by 9% in 2025. However, the EU share in Georgia’s exports was low at 12%, against 69% of exports to the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), although partially
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due to re-export of cars and other products. Georgia’s imports from the EU amounted to 25.4% of total imports. Georgia’s trade deficit with the EU amounted to USD 3.9 billion, or 10.1% of GDP. In 2025, the EU remained the biggest source of remittances to Georgia (45% of the total, or 4.3% of GDP), with the highest inflows from Italy, Germany and Greece. The EU was also the first source of foreign direct investment (34% of the total, or 1.4% of GDP).
The real effective exchange rate of the lari appreciated by 3% in the twelve months until July 2026, leading to a small deterioration of the country’s price competitiveness. The real exchange rate of Georgia’s currency strengthened against the euro and US dollar, while it weakened against the Turkish lira. As regards nominal exchange rates, the lari strengthened over the last twelve months by 5% against the euro and by 3% against the US dollar.
2.4. PUBLIC PROCUREMENT, STATISTICS, FINANCIAL CONTROL
Chapter 5 - Public procurement
EU rules ensure that the public procurement of goods, services and works in any Member State is transparent and open to all EU companies on the basis of non-discrimination and equal treatment.
Institutional set-up and legal alignment
Georgia's legal framework remains partially aligned with the EU acquis on public procurement. The current Law on public procurement (PPL) was amended in May 2026 using an expedited procedure, introducing framework agreements and e-catalogues to strengthen efficiency and transparency, as well as formalised subcontracting rules to boost SME participation. The amendment strengthened the blacklisting mechanism and increased the threshold set for low-value procurement procedures for law enforcement. The postponed effective date of the new PPL is January 2030. Further progress needs to be done regarding utilities, concessions and public-private partnerships, and on defence and security procurement, in order to align with the EU acquis.
The Central Purchasing Body became operational in June 2026, completing the restructuring of the State Procurement Agency (SPA) into three independent entities, including the SPA and the Procurement Dispute Resolution Council. As of January 2026, market research is mandatory for contracting authorities. Amendments to the time limits for conducting electronic tenders and the prevention of artificial contract splitting also entered into force.
Implementation and enforcement capacity
In 2025, Georgia’s public procurement market amounted to approximately 6.1% of GDP. 27 796 tenders were announced (30 014 in 2024). Of these, 89.5% were NAT (tender with no auction) tenders (88.6% in 2024), 10% were SPA (with auction) tenders and 0.5% were all other electronic procurement procedures. In 2025, 12.5% of the cases (12% in 2024), procuring entities used direct award procedure. The share of contracts awarded based on open electronic procedures price-quality criteria decreased in 2025 to 82.5% (GEL 5.2 billion) compared with 85.5% in 2024 (GEL 7 billion).
The SPA continued to provide training to contracting authorities at central and local levels, with 341 participants in 2025, against 273 officials in 2024.
The legal and institutional framework regarding integrity and conflicts of interest is broadly in place. Georgia needs to strengthen its risk assessment mechanisms and internal and external control systems within contracting authorities. The SPA continued to fulfil its mandate to monitor procurement procedures, to issue administrative orders and to refer irregularity related cases to court. In 2025, the SPA participated in 209 court proceedings of which 29 decisions were related to blacklisting, four to consolidated tenders, and two related to decisions on whitelist registration were appealed, with most cases still under review.
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Monitoring results are published annually.
Efficient remedy system
Georgia still needs to align its legislation with the EU acquis on the right to legal remedy. In 2025, 1 146 complaints were submitted to the Dispute Resolution Board (1 164 in 2024), while 59% of cases were resolved in favour of the complainants.
Chapter 18 - Statistics
European statistics are developed, produced and disseminated by EU Member States, guided by the principles and quality criteria elaborated in the Regulation on European statistic, such as professional independence, impartiality, reliability, accessibility and statistical confidentiality. Common rules are provided for the methodology, production and dissemination of statistical information, which are further specified in sectoral legislation that constitute the EU acquis on statistics.
As regards the statistical infrastructure, the legal framework remains partially aligned with the principles in the European statistics Code of Practice. Amendments to the Law on official statistics adopted in March 2026 removed the limitation to two terms of office of the Executive Director of the National Statistics Office of Georgia(Geostat). Furthermore, the Executive Director of Geostat is now appointed and dismissed by the Prime Minister following an open competition; the Director remains accountable to Parliament and the government. Compliance with the principle of professional independence enshrined in the European statistics Code of Practice should be ensured.
The national strategy for the development of statistics (2024-2027) remains the main strategic document. The 2026-2027 action plan approved in January 2026 includes the development and introduction of an updated version of the national classification of economic activities based on NACE Rev. 2.1. It also includes the EU Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics (NUTS), for which preparatory work started; and actions to strengthen gender statistics, such as greater use of sex-disaggregated indicators. The operation of the inter-agency working group contributes to strengthen coordination and improve cooperation with data providers. Geostat started transmitting data to Eurostat through the EDAMIS portal.
On classifications and registers, a register-based census roadmap was developed to establish a statistical population register and work was carried out to prepare to bring in population projections.
On social statistics, the final results of the 2024 population census were published in April 2026 and the population size and related data was recalculated as of 1 January 2025. Progress was made towards more accurate and internationally comparable data on the gender pay gap. In 2025, Geostat conducted the first full-scale structure of the earnings survey aligned with Eurostat guidelines. On child statistics, new indicators were added to the web portal for child and youth statistics and a score card tracking child well-being indicators was created, including indicators from SDGs and the child rights monitoring framework.
A new interactive environmental statistics portal was launched in October 2025 with regional-level disaggregation for waste statistics. In addition, in 2025, physical energy flow accounts, forest physical asset accounts, and water physical flow accounts were introduced to data users and stakeholders.
Progress was also achieved in aligning price statistics with the EU acquis with a Georgian harmonised index of consumer prices (HICP). Since 2026, Georgian HICP data is published on Eurostat’s website.
As regards agricultural statistics, the final results of the 2024 agriculture census were published in April 2026.
There were no relevant developments on business and trade statistics, as well as
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transport and energy statistics.
Chapter 32 - Financial control
The EU promotes the reform of national governance systems to improve managerial accountability, sound financial management of income and expenditure, and external audit of public funds. The financial control rules further protect the EU’s financial interests against fraud in the management of EU funds and the euro against counterfeiting.
Public internal financial control (PIFC)
The strategic framework for PIFC is in place. The 2025-2028 strategy for the development of the PIFC system and the 2025-2026 action plan are being implemented. The central harmonisation unit within the Ministry of Finance remains understaffed. It continues to lack sufficient capacity to effectively implement PIFC reform.
On the internal control system, no progress was made during the reporting period.
On managerial accountability, managers in line ministries report on progress with some elements on performance.
In the field of internal audit, capacities were strengthened by launching a certification programme for internal auditors, and risk management methodologies improved. The operationalisation of the internal auditor certification programme led to an increased number (from 19 in 2025 to 31 in 2026) of auditors from ministries and municipalities being certified.
External audit
The constitution includes guarantees for the State Audit Office’s (SAO) independence but does not explicitly guarantee the Auditor General’s independence in decision-making, which is regulated by the Law on the SAO. The Auditor General, appointed for a five-year term, lacks constitutional protection to ensure a sufficiently long and fixed term allowing them to carry out the mandate independently. The mandate for auditing tax revenues remains insufficiently defined. The financial audit of the government’s consolidated financial statements approved in December 2025 has been successfully conducted as a practice introduced in 2025 and was submitted to Parliament. The coverage of the consolidated budget increased to 95% (from 91% in 2024).
On administrative capacity, the SAO has overall a relatively well-developed administrative and institutional capacity.
Parliamentary scrutiny of public finances in Georgia is exercised through the review of the state budget, budget execution reports, and audit reports submitted by the SAO. While cooperation between Parliament and the SAO was strengthened, challenges remain in ensuring systematic follow-up to audit recommendations and enhancing the analytical capacity of parliamentary committees to effectively monitor government performance and financial management.
The expanding mandate of the SAO will require additional safeguards to ensure operational independence, adequate resources and separation between audit, anti-corruption and personal data protection functions.
The rate of implementation of recommendations remains moderate, with 48% fully implemented and 33% partially implemented in 2025.
Protection of the EU’s financial interests
The legislation continues to be partially aligned with the EU acquis requirements in the area, including the PIF Directive. There is no anti-fraud coordination service (AFCOS) or corresponding AFCOS network There is also no anti-fraud strategy in place. The Prosecution Service continues to act as the focal point for cooperation with the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) and the European Public Prosecution Office. Georgia is encouraged to build up a track record of cooperation with the Commission on investigations.
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Protection of the Euro against counterfeiting
No developments took place regarding further alignment with the EU acquis. Despite accession occurred in 2000, the 1929 Geneva Convention for the Suppression of Counterfeiting Currency has not been ratified yet.
3. GOOD NEIGHBOURLY RELATIONS AND REGIONAL COOPERATION
Georgia participates in various regional cooperation platforms, including the Eastern Partnership, the Central European Initiative, the Organisation of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation, the Organisation for Democracy and Economic Development, the South-East European Cooperation Process and the Regional Cooperation Council.
Georgia generally maintains good bilateral relations with its neighbours and other enlargement countries. In 2025, it strengthened its engagement with Serbia, through increased high-level meetings and greater parliamentary cooperation. Negotiations of a free trade agreement between Serbia and Georgia were launched in December 2025. Following the appointment of Albania’s non-resident Ambassador to Georgia, Georgia appointed a non-resident Ambassador to Albania in December 2025. In December 2025, Georgia also appointed a non-resident Ambassador to North Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo*.
Georgia and Türkiye pursue a strategic partnership with increased contacts at high-level, including an official presidential visit to Türkiye in August 2025. Türkiye is Georgia’s largest trading partner after the EU and a key investor. The two countries cooperate on major energy projects such as the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline, the Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum gas pipeline and the Southern Gas Corridor. Active cooperation takes place in the framework of the development of the Middle Corridor, notably by expanding traffic on the Baku-Tbilisi-Kars railway line. The trilateral regional cooperation format between Georgia, Türkiye and Azerbaijan continued at a high level in view of greater regional energy and transport connectivity as well as security cooperation.
Georgia and Ukraine havea strategic partnership since 2017. Bilateral relations have been strained over the past years; however, some diplomatic channels were recently reopened. Georgia supports Ukraine’s territorial integrity and sovereignty, and it broadly aligns with related EU statements and UN resolutions, including by co-sponsoring and voting in favour of the UN General Assembly Resolution of February 2026 on ‘Support to Lasting Peace in Ukraine’. In December 2025, Georgia signed the convention establishing the International Claims Commission for Ukraine. However, in May 2025, Georgia announced that it will not join the agreement establishing a Special Tribunal for investigating the crime of aggression against Ukraine. Ukraine’s sanctions on Georgian Dream honorary chairman and 19 other officials remain in place. In October 2025, the Georgian government allocated EUR 500 000 for energy support to Ukraine.
Georgia and the Republic of Moldova continue neighbourly relations based on mutual
support for each other’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.
4. RESILIENCE, SECURITY, DEFENCE
Democratic resilience
Georgia’s democratic resilience is under growing pressure. There are serious concerns that effective checks and balances of a democratic system have been eroded through the
This designation is without prejudice to positions on status and is line with UNSCR 1244/1999 and the ICJ
Opinion on the Kosovo declaration of independence.
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concentration of political and economic powers.
A vibrant civil society has historically been one of Georgia’s principal democratic strengths. However, restrictive legislation affecting foreign-funded organisations, increased administrative burden, discreditation campaigns against NGOs and activists have significantly constrained the civic space. Media networks and professionals engaged in the fight against foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI), and disinformation have been seriously undermined. The plurality and independence of the media have deteriorated, increasing societal vulnerabilities and contributing to deepening polarisation. On the other hand, democratic aspirations and support for European integration among Georgian citizens remain resilient (71% of the public support Georgia’s accession to the EU) despite a more restrictive political environment and the authorities’ active disinformation narratives targeting the EU.
Economic security and resilience
Georgia is located along the Trans-Caspian Transport Corridor (TCTC), with existing infrastructure in place. Further development of this corridor could contribute to the diversification of EU supply chains and trade routes, and to regional integration in the South Caucasus.
Georgia has the potential to contribute to regional electricity connectivity and renewable energy development and export, provided that critical infrastructure and domestic and regional integration capacities are strengthened. The recent approval of the Black Sea Submarine Cable project as a Project of Mutual Interest is relevant in this context, as it provides a framework for a potential future enhanced electricity interconnection. Georgia also has the potential to play a role on critical raw materials - as a transit country along the TCTC, as a regional processing hub, and as a supplier of some strategic raw materials, mainly copper and manganese. To realise this potential, limitations in local exploration, process capacities and technology would need to be addressed, compliance with EU standards would need to be ensured, and logistics bottlenecks along the TCTC reduced.
At the same time, Georgia’s growing economic ties with Russia and heavy dependence for certain commodities (in particular oil, gas, grain), as well as an increasingly close relationship with China, risk further distancing Georgia from EU standards, acquis, and governance models. While the largest part of foreign direct investment (FDI) originates from the EU, there are increasing investments from a broader range of countries in strategically important sectors, notably transport, logistics, energy, and digital connectivity. This raises economic security considerations related to market transparency, ownership structures, and potential strategic dependencies on third-country operators, particularly when it comes to critical infrastructures.
Defence capacity building and defence industrial dimension
As a result of the democratic backsliding, EU support under the European Peace Facility (EPF) has been suspended since 2024 and no new EPF assistance was provided to Georgia in 2025. Between 2021 and 2023, the EU had contributed EUR 62.75 million under the EPF to strengthen the Georgian Defence Force’s medical, engineering, logistics, and cyber-defence capabilities.
Georgia developed in the recent years an approach of total defence optimised for asymmetrical resistance, high operational readiness, and deep civilian-military cooperation with the declared aim to deter external territorial aggression. The domestic defence industry focuses primarily on the development and production of light armoured vehicles, UAVs, mortars, and personal protective equipment. While these domestic manufacturing capabilities provide essential light equipment and localised logistics, the defence sector remains heavily dependent on external supply chains for high-tech components, heavy weaponry, and advanced electronic systems. Georgia is currently reviewing its defence development strategy.
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Civil protection and disaster resilience
Georgia has continued to develop its civil protection, but progress remains uneven. Further
efforts are needed to ensure effective implementation of crisis management across both
natural and human-induced risks, including though enhanced local preparedness. The
country also needs to continue reinforcing disaster prevention and preparedness, especially
population awareness and institutional coordination.
5. ABILITY TO ASSUME OBLIGATIONS OF MEMBERSHIP
CLUSTER 2: INTERNAL MARKET
This cluster covers: free movement of goods (Chapter 1); freedom of movement for workers (Chapter 2); right of establishment and freedom to provide services (Chapter 3); free movement of capital (Chapter 4); company law (Chapter 6); intellectual property law (Chapter 7); competition policy (Chapter 8); financial services (Chapter 9); and consumer and health protection (Chapter 28).
Chapter 1 - Free movement of goods
The free movement of goods ensures that many products can be traded freely across the EU based on common rules and procedures. Where products are governed by national rules, the principle of the free movement of goods prevents these rules from creating unjustified barriers to trade.
General principles
Some elements of the EU legislative and institutional framework for the free movement of goods are in place. No progress was made to further align with the EU acquis in the harmonised area, although Georgia has committed to this under the Association Agreement and the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area.
Non-harmonised areas
No progress was made to further align legislation and administrative practices in accordance with articles 34-36 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and relevant case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union.
Harmonised area: quality infrastructure
On standardisation, Georgia’s National Standards Organisation has met the technical requirements defined in the guide on the organisational structure and processes for the assessment of the membership criteria of the European Committee for Standardisation and the European Committee for Electrotechnical Standardisation (CEN/CENELEC Guide), making it eligible for full membership to these organisations. In April 2026, amendments to the Law on product safety and free movement code were adopted and entered into force in June 2026.
Georgia’s ‘pre-notification’ system of market surveillance is not aligned with the EU acquis. The Market Surveillance Agency ensured 452 market surveillance controls in the reporting period and imposed penalties on 80 economic operators. In April 2026, amendments to the technical regulation on construction products were adopted extending the scope of market surveillance to 125 additional types of construction products.
Georgia made no progress on conformity assessment. On accreditation and metrology, the Georgian Accreditation Centre continued cooperation with the Mutual Recognition Arrangement of European Accreditation and the Georgian National Agency for Standards and Metrology increased cooperation with EURAMET and further strengthened capacities.
Harmonised area: sectoral legislation
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On the EU new and global approach product acquis, there was no progress in the reporting period. There was no progress on the EU old approach product acquis and procedural measures.
The Georgian market surveillance processes and procedures do not provide for measures related to anti-corruption.
Chapter 2 - Freedom of movement for workers
Nationals of one Member State have the right to work in another Member State and must be given the same working and social conditions as other worker nationals of that Member State.
Georgia’s legal framework is not yet aligned with the EU acquis.
Regarding access to the labour market, the amendments to the Law on labour migration introducing a work permit as of March 2026 entered into force. In February 2026, the procedure for a special labour permit for immigrants and self-employed foreigners was approved by the government. EU citizens and other visa-free foreigners are no longer exempted. Exceptions include project-based and temporary activities that do not result in long-term integration into the domestic labour market. In February 2026, Georgia created the department of Labour Migration in the State Agency for Employment Promotion.
There was no progress to carry out any preparatory work to join the European Network of Employment Services and the European Labour Authority noron the coordination of social security systems. No new agreements for bilateral coordination of social security systems were concluded. Georgia has three bilateral agreements with EU Member States (Germany, Bulgaria and France).
There have been no developments on the introduction of the European Health Insurance Card over the reporting period.
Chapter 3 - Right of establishment and freedom to provide services
EU natural and legal persons have the right to establish themselves in any Member State and to provide cross-border services. For certain regulated professions, there are rules on the mutual recognition of qualifications. EU rules on postal services focus on improving the quality of universal service, gradual market opening to competition, and the establishment of an independent regulator.
There was no progress on the right of establishment, the freedom to provide services and on postal services.
An inter-agency working group was established to oversee the alignment process with the EU Service Directive.
Work on the update of the Association Agreement / Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area annex on the rules applicable to postal and courier services remains on hold.
Georgia is not aligned with the EU acquis on postal services or on mutual recognition of professional qualifications.
Chapter 4 - Free movement of capital
In the EU, capital and investments must be able to move without restrictions, with common rules for cross-border payments. Banks and other economic operators apply certain rules to support the fight against money laundering and terrorist financing.
There was no progress on capital movements. Restrictions on the acquisition of agricultural land by EU nationals remain in place.
On payments, in December 2025 Georgia amended the Law on payment systems and payment services to reinforce the framework for payment initiation services and alternative dispute resolution provisions. In December 2025, the Law on the National Bank of Georgia
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(NBG) was amended, granting it the authority to have accounts of non-bank payment service providers that are participants of important payment systems.
Concerning the fight against money laundering and terrorism financing, Georgia amended its law on facilitating the prevention of money laundering and the financing of terrorism in November 2025 aiming to address recommendations by Moneyval. The NBG also adopted guidelines for off-site supervision of commercial banks and microbanks in December 2025. Georgia still does not have a beneficial ownership register. Georgia should continue strengthening the administrative capacity of competent authorities, including for addressing increasing challenges such as the circulation of cryptocurrencies.
Chapter 6 - Company law
The EU has common rules on the formation, registration and disclosure requirements of a company, with complementary rules for accounting and financial reporting, and statutory audit.
On company law and corporate governance, Georgia is partially aligned with the EU acquis. The Ministry of Justice and the National Agency of Public Registry continued work on aligning administrative practices with Directive (EU) 2019/1151 on the use of digital tools and processes in company law. Certain categories of company registration information are publicly available through the registration portal. Georgia maintains a fully digital business registration system and, as of July 2026, more than 405 000 business entities had been registered under the Law on entrepreneurs adopted in line with relevant EU directives. Georgia should also complete alignment with the Directive 2024/1760 on corporate sustainability due diligence (CSDDD), as amended by the Directive (EU) 2026/470 (Omnibus I). The amendments simplified some of the obligations and postponed the transposition deadline to July 2028 and the application deadline to July 2029.
On company reporting and statutory audit, secondary acts governing the review of IFRS compliance of companies’ reports entered into force in February 2026. They apply to all enterprises whose financial statements are publicly disclosed, except for micro-enterprises. The Service for Accounting, Reporting and Auditing Supervision continued activities aimed at strengthening reporting transparency and improving the quality of financial reporting.
The NBG amended several regulatory acts on the publication of management reports and on fines for breaches of transparency legislation.
Chapter 7 - Intellectual property law
The EU has to a large extent harmonised rules for the legal protection and enforcement of copyright and related rights, as well as of industrial property rights, including trademarks, designs, patents and related supplementary protection certificates (SPCs), geographical indications (GIs), including craft and industrial GIs.
In December 2025, amendments to the Law on copyright and related rights were adopted towards further harmonisation with Directive 2019/790/EC (Copyright in the Digital Single Market (DSM) Directive). The amendments regulate the determination of liability of intermediary service providers for infringements of copyright, related rights, and database maker’s rights, as well as the grounds for exemption from liability.
Regarding industrial property rights, in November 2025 amendments to the Law on design were adopted.
The validation requests recorded in the electronic system of the Chamber of Appeal of the National Intellectual Property Centre of Georgia (Sakpatenti) increased as of March 2026, based on the validation agreement between the government and the European Patent Organisation concerning the validation of European patents. Two European patents have also been validated in Georgia.
In December 2025, Georgia expressed interest in acceding to the European Patent
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Convention to the Administrative Council of the European Patent Organisation.
In the reporting period, certificates were awarded to 28 candidates of the qualification examinations of patent attorneys, following an eleven-year gap of not holding the examination.
In the area of enforcement, no progress can be reported.
Chapter 8 - Competition policy
EU rules protect free competition. They include antitrust rules on restrictive agreements between companies and abuse of a dominant position and also include rules on concentrations between companies which would significantly impede effective competition. EU rules also set out a system of State aid control. Governments are only allowed to grant State aid if restrictive conditions are met, with a view to preventing distortion of competition.
Antitrust and mergers
Georgia’s legislative framework is partially aligned with the EU acquis on antitrust and mergers. In December 2025, the Georgian Competition and Consumer Agency (GCCA) amended the rules for calculating fines associated with competition law violations to ensure a more rigorous and standardised approach in line with the relevant EU guidelines and Regulation (EC) No 1/2003. Legislative amendments were made towards greater alignment with Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 for the purpose of calculating the combined turnover of the entities participating in a concentration and taking into account the combined turnover of economic agents under the control of a participating entity's controlling entity. On implementation, the GCCA concluded two antitrust investigations, with no infringements established in either case, and formally rendered eleven complaint inadmissibility decisions. Two new investigations are currently ongoing.
The GCCA assessed sixteen merger (concentration) notifications. All mergers were approved, in one case with remedies and one still ongoing. The Agency also strictly enforced mandatory notification rules, identifying seven instances of unlawful concentrations implemented without prior clearance. The respective undertakings were fined a total of GEL 115 000. The GCCA proactively monitors completed mergers in cooperation with the National Agency of Public Registry and the Revenue Service.
State aid
No progress was made to align the legal framework on State aid with the EU acquis. The institutional framework and enforcement capacity of the GCCA remain to be strengthened. On implementation, no decisions were taken during the reporting period on State aid issues, only information on de minimis State aid was collected.
Liberalisation
Georgia’s competition and State aid legislation is applicable to public undertakings and those with special or exclusive rights. No progress was made in the reporting period on aligning the rules on financing services of general economic interest with the EU acquis.
Chapter 9 - Financial services
EU rules aim at ensuring fair competition among financial institutions and the stability and integrity of financial markets, namely in the field of banking, insurance, supplementary pensions, investment services and securities. They include rules on the authorisation, operation and supervision of these institutions.
As regards banks and financial conglomerates, in March 2026, amendments were introduced to the ‘rule on developing and assessment of recovery plan of a commercial bank’ according to which the NBG assesses the compliance of a recovery plan within six months.
A phased minimum requirement for own funds and eligible liabilities framework continued to
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be implemented. For systemic commercial banks, the minimum requirement for own funds and eligible liabilities increased from 10% to 15%.
Commercial banks started contributing to the resolution fund from 2025.
As regards insurance and occupational pensions, there were no developments in the reporting period. Georgia should work towards aligning with the EU acquis, including the solvency II framework. The adoption and implementation of legislation on domestic motor third party liability (MTPL) insurance is still pending. Georgia is one of the few countries in the world that does not yet have mandatory domestic MTPL.
There was no progress on aligning Georgia’s financial market infrastructure legislation and securities markets and investment services legislation with the EU acquis.
Concerning sustainable and digital finance, in January 2026, the NBG launched its green loan data dashboard and in September 2025, it introduced green collateral provisions. In February 2026, the NBG launched an updated environmental, social and governance reporting and disclosure form and amended the disclosure regulation for commercial and micro banks. Several legislative amendments were made to the regulatory framework for crypto asset service providers (CASPs), expanding the supervisory framework and broadening the supervisory mandate of the NBG, granting it the authority to exercise full prudential supervision over such entities.
Chapter 28 - Consumer and health protection
EU rules protect consumers’ economic interests and also ensure product safety, prevent dangerous imitations and establish liability for defective products. The EU also guarantees a high level of protection of public health and in particular also ensures high common standards for tobacco control, blood, tissues, cells and organs, and human and veterinary medicinal products. The EU also has rules for upholding patients’ rights in cross-border healthcare and in preparing for and responding to serious cross-border health threats, including communicable diseases.
Consumer protection
On horizontal aspects and non-safety-related issues, consumer protection laws remain partially in line with the EU acquis. The institutional framework on consumer protection is in place. With regard to enforcement and redress, the main consumer protection authority, the Georgian Competition and Consumer Agency (GCCA) continued its active role in the International Consumer Protection and Enforcement Network.
In the reporting period, the GCCA received a total of 1 868 consumer complaints along with 6 552 calls received through the consumer hotline. As a result of the GCCA’s investigations, 157 traders were sanctioned for failing to comply with obligations set out in consumer protection law. 90% of all resolved cases were decided in favour of consumers (90% in the previous reporting period).
There was some progress in aligning Georgia’s legal framework on product safety-related issues with the EU acquis. In April 2026, the Law on product safety and free movement code was amended to align with Regulation No 1025/2012 on European Standardisation. The amendments define the legal basis and functions of the Standardisation Council, the harmonisation of key definitions, and the introduction of safeguards to ensure impartiality and independence. National market surveillance legislation and processes are not aligned with the EU acquis.
Public health
As regards public health, Georgia continues to implement its national health strategy for 2022-2030 with the aim to achieve universal health coverage. Approximately 95% of the population is currently covered under the universal healthcare programme (total expenditures amounting to GEL 8 billion).
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On eHealth, the government adopted a national digital health strategy and action plan in September 2026. On blood, Georgia is not aligned with the EU acquis and is partially operationally compliant as the transition of blood establishments from profit-oriented to non- profit organisations continues. The central blood establishment was set up in September 2025 for ensuring the availability of blood and of its components throughout the country. On tissues, cells and organs, Georgia’s legal framework is not aligned with the EU acquis, and significant gaps still remain in implementation, systems, and institutional capacity.
Georgia is partly aligned with the EU acquis on tobacco control and with the World Health Organisation (WHO) Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC). Despite progress on reducing tobacco consumption, the positive trend remains fragile.
Access to cancer treatment for adults and children, including access to medicines, continues to improve, and a unified cancer screening registry and programme became fully operational in 2025. This contributed to a 143% increase in screening bookings compared with 2024 and an increase in screening participation rates to 41% (from 39% in 2024).
There was no progress on alignment with the EU acquis on non-communicable diseases. Georgia needs to continue to bolster its efforts on antimicrobial resistance.
On communicable diseases, the national guideline for syphilis and congenital syphilis
surveillance was approved in October 2025.
On medical products, pharmaceutical products placed on the Georgian market require as of October 2025 compliance with good manufacturing practice standards.
There was no progress on health technology assessment, cross-border healthcare or on drug abuse prevention and harm reduction.
On mental health, relevant services are being integrated into the primary healthcare system.
As regards anti-corruption measures, the Ministry of Internally Displaced Persons from the Occupied Territories, Health, Labour and Social Affairs’ budget has been subject to increased state audit and internal control mechanisms.
CLUSTER 3: COMPETITIVENESS AND INCLUSIVE GROWTH
This cluster covers: digital transformation and media (Chapter 10); taxation (Chapter 16); economic and monetary policy (Chapter 17); social policy and employment (Chapter 19); industrial policy (Chapter 20), science and research (Chapter 25); education and culture (Chapter 26); and the customs union (Chapter 29).
Chapter 10 - Digital transformation and media
The EU supports the smooth functioning of the internal market for electronic communications, electronic commerce and audiovisual services. The rules protect consumers and support the 83 universal availability of modern services.
On media regulation, following the April 2025 amendments to the Law on broadcasting, broadcasters and their online platforms remain prohibited from receiving financial and material support from foreign sources. Concerns about the independence, impartiality and expanded powers of the Georgian media regulator, the Communications Commission (ComCom), have increased. During the reporting period, the ComCom has started enforcement of its new regulatory prerogatives, expanded under the 2025 amendments to the Law on broadcasting, notably by overseeing broadcasters’ content, finding three of them guilty of breach of impartiality, and imposing fines on them.
On digital services, Georgia started implementing thedigital governance strategy2025- 2030, approved in April 2024, which focuses on data-driven governance, interoperability,
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and the modernisation of e-service. The national strategy for the development of the digital economy and information society 2025-2030 adopted in February 2025 aims to promote the integration of digital technologies across sectors. Responsibility for implementing the latter was transferred to the Ministry of Economy and Sustainable Development. The strategy should pay due attention to compliance with accessibility standards and ensure barrier-free access to digital public services.
Georgia advanced the implementation of the Law on e-commerce through the adoption of e- commerce guidelines by the Georgian Competition and Consumer Agency, further contributing to alignment with the E-Commerce Directive and Consumer Rights Directive. Georgia made progress ondigital inclusion, in particular by reducing gender and regional disparities in internet access. Women and men use internet at equal rates while regional disparities still remain. However, gender disparities remain significant in STEM education and professional pathways. Georgia has not yet established a national interoperability framework to align with the European Interoperability Framework and the Interoperable Europe Act.
On electronic communications, Georgia has not yet aligned with EU rules on geo-blocking and the platform-to-business relations. Alignment with the European Electronic Communications Code also remains pending. On 5G, 11 auctions were announced in the 700 MHz, 3 400-3 800 MHz, and 2 600 MHz frequency bands. Georgia has not yet aligned with the 5G cybersecurity toolbox to ensure that 5G roll-out is not based on high-risk suppliers.
On digital trust and cybersecurity, no progress was made.
On artificial intelligence (AI), Georgia does not yet have a dedicated national AI strategy,
although AI is included as a component of the strategy for the developments of the digital
economy and information society 2025-2030. Existing national frameworks indirectly
regulate or influence AI-related activities. Georgia should develop AI regulation and the
necessary governance and enforcement structures in line with the EU AI Act.
Chapter 16 - Taxation
EU rules on taxation cover value added tax, excise duties and aspects of corporate taxation. They also cover cooperation between tax administrations, including the exchange of information to prevent tax evasion.
Concerning indirect taxation, the Georgian Tax Code is partially aligned with the EU acquis on value added tax. As of January 2026, the import of investment gold is exempt from VAT, as well as the supply of investment gold with the right to deduct input tax.
There was no progress on alignment on excise duties on alcohol and alcoholic beverages and energy products. Amendments to the Tax Code were adopted and entered into force in April 2026 increasing excise duties on imported cars, discouraging imports of high-emission cars and encouraging newer, more efficient vehicles. Systems to inspect and monitor the movement of excisable products are in place. The Revenue Service continues to participate in the EU tax administration cooperation.
On direct taxation, rules on retained or reinvested profits, mergers, subsidiaries, interest and royalties remain not fully aligned with the EU acquis. Amendments to the implementing legislation on tax administration were adopted and entered into force in February 2026 adding new reporting requirements for international controlled transactions.
Concerning administrative cooperation and mutual assistance, amendments were introduced to the legislation regulating country-by-country reporting to ensure filing deadlines are within 12 months of the reporting fiscal year-end, in line with recommendations of the latest OECD peer review. Georgia has in place Double Taxation Avoidance Agreements with
all EU Member States.
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As regards operational capacity and digitalisation, the Revenue Service maintains a relatively strong staffing capacity and recruitment remained active, with 3 876 established positions and over 90% average occupancy, while the significant use of internal recruitment and internships indicates an established personnel pipeline. Georgia continued participating in the EU Fiscalis programme 2021-2027. The country continues cooperation on technical level with EU Member States’ tax administrations on tax policy and digital initiatives, such as AI in taxation, also on anti-fraud tax measures.
Chapter 17 - Economic and monetary policy
EU rules require the independence of central banks and prohibit them from directly financing the public sector. Member States coordinate their economic policies and are subject to fiscal, economic and financial surveillance.
The primary objective of the National Bank of Georgia (NBG) is to ensure price stability, which is in line with the EU monetary policy legislative framework. In March 2026, implementing legislation was adopted, in line with the IMF recommendations, to reallocate the powers and responsibilities among the Governor, the First Vice-Governor, the Vice- Governors, and the Executive Director of the Bank. The respective areas of supervision have also been redefined, and the procedures for appointing the NBG Governor have been enhanced. However, to strengthen the NBG’s independence in line with the EU acquis, more progress should be done in enhancing board member qualification criteria and by adopting a collegial decision-making model.
On economic policy, the budgetary framework is considered overall strong and transparent. The Parliamentary Budget Office’s independence needs to be further strengthened, in particular, by clarifying its mandate, qualification criteria and financial autonomy. The fiscal oversight over the general government sector continued to improve, in particular, over non-commercial state-owned enterprises (SOEs) by gradually bringing their cash management under the single treasury account (STA). As of July 2026, 176 SOEs were covered under the STA.
Chapter 19 - Social policy and employment
EU rules in the social field include minimum standards for labour law, equality and non- discrimination, health and safety at work. They also promote social inclusion, social protection, and social dialogue at EU level.
On labour law, major gaps remain in aligning the legal framework with the EU acquis and Georgia has not yet accepted to include several labour rights provisions under the European Charter of Social Rights. Georgia has still not ratified several ILO conventions, including those on labour inspections, occupational safety and health at work, maternity protection, minimum wage, social security and violence and harassment at work. The institutional framework is in place and should be further strengthened. The budget of the Labour Inspection Office and the number of employees increased by 8% and 14% respectively in 2026 against 2025. The Labour Inspection Office’s mandate was extended with regard to the detection of illegal labour migration. The December 2024 amendments to the Law on public service had significant effects in 2025, substantially weakening their labour rights and facilitating the mass dismissal of civil servants. These developments are inconsistent with the principles of ILO Convention No. 158, particularly with respect to protection against arbitrary dismissal, job security and procedural fairness.
On occupational health and safety at work, there was limited progress to further align with the EU occupational safety and health acquis and 19 EU directives are yet to be aligned with. During 2025, 32 people died (33 in 2024)and179were injured (260 in 2024) as a result of accidents in the workplace. The number of incidents in general decreased by 28% (208 incidents in 2025; 290 incidents in 2024). Although the number of occupational accidents declined steadily, the incidence of fatal occupational accidents remains higher than the EU average.
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On social dialogue, while the tripartite structures exist at the national level, the collective bargaining remains limited in practice mainly at enterprise level and it remains largely absent in the regions. There was no progress related to collective bargaining.
On employment policy, the national strategy of labour and employment policy remains to be adopted and employment-support measures continue to be implemented through annual state programmes. To improve the regulation of labour immigration, a dedicated department within the State Employment Support Agency has been established.
Regarding labour force participation and unemployment rate see the statistical annex and the section on the functioning of the labour market under 2.3 Economic criteria.
On social protection and inclusion, Georgia still lacks a comprehensive and targeted social protection system that supports employment policies. In 2025, the share of the population under the absolute poverty line reached its lowest level on record at 7.1% (down from 9.4% in 2024). The Gini coefficient decreased slightly in 2025, indicating a modest reduction in income and consumption inequality, although inequalities remain significant. A national strategy on the deinstitutionalisation of children and provision of alternative care is not in place. The de-institutionalisation of large-scale boarding homes for persons with disabilities is ongoing. The European Commission Guidance on independent living for persons with disabilities should be taken into account.
There remain important gaps in the legal, policy and strategic frameworks on non- discrimination in employment and social policy. There is no progress on the alignment with the Employment Equality Directive nor the Racial Equality Directive. Moreover, the enforcement of the national Law on the elimination of all forms of discrimination remains weak. The participation of persons with disabilities in the labour market remains a challenge.
As regards equality between women and men in employment and social
policy onlythe basic principles and general provisions exist in current legislation. Women still face structural and institutional barriers that hinder the full realisation of their rights. Georgia made no progress on the legislative alignment with the EU gender equality acquis. Women’s segregation by industry, occupation and degree concentration in humanities, education and healthcare confines them to economic activity with lower earnings. Unpaid household and care work by women is five times higher than that by men, mainly due to prevailing stereotypes and limited availability and accessibility of care and support services and local transportation, which are also the main reasons for women’s limited participation in the labour market. Women are more likely to be the beneficiaries of state social assistance than men, and the gender pay gap shows women earn 32.1% less than men.
As regards the European Social Fund (ESF), Georgia is not a participant or beneficiary of the ESF. (See also Chapter 22 - Regional policy and coordination of structural instruments).
Chapter 20 - Enterprise and industrial policy
EU industrial policy strengthens competitiveness, facilitates structural change, and encourages a business-friendly environment that stimulates small and medium-sized enterprises.
Regarding industrial policy and competitiveness, the industrial policy of Georgia is outlined in the development strategy ‘Georgia-Vision 2030’ and substantiated in the annual
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government programmes, but without a dedicated industrial strategy nor annual implementation reports covering industry-targeting measures. There has been some limited progress on competitiveness, however, the relevant governance performance have declined.
In order to reduce global dependencies of sectors, including food and beverage processing, fertiliser, pharmaceutical and certain metal industries, investments are needed in infrastructure development and logistics, and anti-corruption measures should be strengthened.
The SME development strategy 2021-2025 has expired and a final evaluation was conducted.
As of April 2026, LEPL Enterprise Georgia, the state agency in charge of facilitating private sector and SME development, has been transformed into the Georgian Economic Development Corporation (GDEC). In parallel, the LEPL Public Private Partnership Agency has been renamed as LEPL Investment Agency and placed under the Ministry of Economy and Sustainable Development of Georgia. Its mandate has been expanded with additional responsibilities for investment and export support.
Enteprise Georgia and GDEC continued to implement the business universal programme. Changes to the programme were introduced in September 2025 including an increase in the co-financing of loan and leasing interest rates and new grant components in areas such as mountainous regions, agro-tourism, green initiatives, digitalisation, and research and development. New programmes on international trade and investment funds support were launched in July 2026. In November 2025, amendments to the Law on entrepreneurs were adopted that introduced provisions that were detrimental to the business and investment environment. In December 2025, the law establishing the Business Ombudsman was repealed, dissolving the Business Ombudsman Office, annulling the positions of the Business Ombudsman and Deputies, and weakening the government-enterprise consultation process.
On enterprise policy and instruments regarding small and medium-sized enterprises, there was no progress on aligning with the Late Payment Directive. Amendments on the application of special taxation regimes were adopted in February 2026, with impact on the rules for granting and administering the special tax regimes of taxpayers holding microbusiness and fixed taxpayer statuses.
In April 2026, a new Law on factoring was adopted, effective as of January 2027, to provide small and medium-sized enterprises with an additional instrument for access to finance.
Regarding sectoral policies, consultations on an action plan for the development of a circular economy have begun. In the tourism sector, no significant policy developments were reported during the reporting period.
Chapter 25 - Science and research
The EU provides significant support for research and innovation. All Member States can participate in the EU’s research and innovation programmes and benefit from them, especially where there is scientific excellence and solid investment in research and innovation.
Georgia continues to modernise its research and innovation policy framework as redefined by the national strategy of education and science 2022-2030, where among others Open Science principles including promotion of FAIR data practices, enhancing digital repositories, and creating EOSC-aligned infrastructures are embedded. While challenges remain – particularly in developing open data services and sustaining digital infrastructures– Georgia has made notable progress in aligning its national research and innovation system with EU Open Science acquis, while strengthening its engagement with the European Open Science Cloud (EOSC).
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Georgia progressed in enhancing innovation in line with the New European Innovation Agenda, however cooperation between research and industry, remains limited due to the lack of collaborative culture among research organisations, universities and private companies. Cooperation between universities, research centres and private companies is fragmented and often project-based. Industry demand for academic R&D is limited, universities have varying levels of capacity to support applied research and commercialisation, and mechanisms such as technology transfer, proof-of-concept funding, IP services and structured university-industry cooperation remain underdeveloped. On the design of smart specialisation strategies, there has been no progress regarding the extension to additional regions.
Georgia was included for the first time in the 2026 edition of the European Innovation Scoreboard, however it ranks 39th among EU and neighbouring countries out of 40. Georgia is an Emerging Innovator, performing at 20.7% of the EU average in 2026.
As regards the EU framework programmes for research and innovation, Georgia remains associated to Horizon Europe (since 2021) and participation of universities and research centres in this programme further increased in 2026. Universities and research centres continued to increase their participation in the Horizon Europe programme. In the reporting period, 17 grants with participation from Georgia were signed with a total EU net contribution of EUR 3.4 million.
Researchers from Georgia participated in 49,30% of actions of the European Cooperation in Science and Technology (COST).
Gross domestic expenditure on R&D (GERD) as a share of GDP remained broadly unchanged since 2023 and stood at 0.26% in 2026, which is significantly below the EU-27 average of 2.1% and the EU target of 3% of GDP.
Chapter 26 - Education and culture
The EU supports cooperation in education and culture by funding programmes and the coordination of Member State policy through the open method of coordination. The EU and its Member States must also prevent discrimination and ensure quality education for children of migrant workers, including those from disadvantaged backgrounds.
Government expenditure on education in 2025 amounted to 3.9% of GDP, as in 2024, and is still below the EU average (4.7% of GDP in 2023). In February 2026, Parliament adopted amendments to the Laws on general education and on higher education. The Georgian higher education reform raises serious concerns regarding limited evidence, insufficient stakeholder participation, rapid and centralised implementation, and risks to fundamental values in particular academic freedom and institutional autonomy.
On early childhood education and care there was a slight decrease in enrolment of children aged two to three from 50.91% in 2024/2025 to 48.91% in 2025/2026 and a slight increase for children aged three to six from 79.26% in 2024/2025 to 80.76% in 2025/2026. In 2025, Georgia began implementation of the 2025-2030 authorisation process for early childhood and preschool institutions. In October 2025, a new curriculum for children aged two to six was introduced and capacity building for preschool education staff was implemented.
Regarding school education, in line with the broader education reform that Georgia introduced in early 2026, general school education was changed to eleven compulsory years of schooling and an optional twelfth grade.
Concerning international assessments of school education, according to the Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA) 2025 results, in Georgia, 55% of students attained at least basic proficiency (Level 2 or higher) in science, 47% in mathematics and 39% in reading. While results remain below the OECD average, they have improved when compared to PISA 2022. Georgia also took part to the Progress in International Reading
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Literacy Study (PIRLS) 2026.
On vocational education and training (VET), one new public vocational institution became operational in 2025. The number of VET programmes increased from 29 to 182 and their delivery was expanded to 63 additional public schools. The number of admitted VET students increased to 19 700 in 2025 (from 17 083 in 2024). The Vocational Skills Agency was abolished in October 2025 and its functions integrated in institutions including the Ministry of Education, Science and Youth.
On higher education, enrolment increased in 2025 from 2024 according to “The European Higher Education Area in 2024” Bologna Process Implementation Report. The membership of the National Centre for Educational Quality Enhancement in the European Association for Quality Assurance in Higher Education (ENQA) remains suspended and has been given action points by the partial review panel.
Regarding inclusive education, the Ministry has not yet adopted the 2026-2027 inclusive education action plan. Budgetary support increased by 13% in 2026 from 2025. In October 2025, the strategic and Inclusive Development Department was set up following the abolition of the department of inclusive education in April 2025.
Georgia continues to benefit from the international dimension of the 2021-2027 Erasmus+ programme, yet, in response to political developments in the country, as of 2026 Georgian authorities are not eligible under any Erasmus+ actions. The political developments further precluded any preparation for full association to Erasmus+.
The 2026 youth strategy action plan of the 2023-2026 youth strategy was adopted in June 2026, including 130 activities with a total budget of approximately GEL 30 million. A national survey of youth needs was conducted, covering all regions of Georgia.
Georgia continues to take part in the European Week of Sport.
The dialogue on cultural policy between the government and civil society remains halted. Georgia continues to participate in the Culture and Cross-Sectoral strands of the Creative Europe 2021-2027 programme and partially in the MEDIA strand.
Chapter 29 - Customs union
All EU Member States are part of the EU customs union and follow the same customs rules and procedures. This requires legislative alignment, as well as adequate implementing and enforcement capacity, and access to and interoperability with the EU electronic customs environment.
Georgia took some steps to align its customs legislation with the Union Customs Code (UCC). In December 2025, amendments to the Customs Code were adopted and entered into force in January 2026. The amendments introduced simplified customs formalities for members of the WTO Golden List when importing goods and/or exporting personal belongings, and the enactment of Book X not before 1 January 2028. Georgia should continue aligning along progressive application of the new UCC.
The joint centre for the prevention, detection and suppression of illicit trafficking of narcotic drugs and related joint working groups were established in January 2026.
On administrative and operational capacity of the customs service, Georgia improved its customs digitalisation and risk management. However, the customs service needs to strengthen its capacity regarding customs IT and interoperability, advanced risk analysis, operational controls and integrity, to align with the Union Customs Code and the EU electronic customs environment.
Smuggling of tobacco products and other illicit activities in the regions close to the occupied breakaway regions remains a concern. There was little reported progress on strengthening measures to combat customs fraud and on acceding to the WHO FCTC Protocol to Eliminate Illicit Trade in Tobacco Products.
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Georgia should strengthen its efforts to combat customs fraud, in particular the smuggling of tobacco products and by cooperating with the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF).
As a member of the Common Transit Convention, Georgia is preparing for the next stage of the New Computerised Transit System Phase 6 Opt-in to combine transit declaration with safety and security data. Georgia is also finalising the acceptance of the administrative arrangement on Anti-Fraud Transit Information System.
Concerning the Authorised Economic Operator (AEO) system, as of April 2026, 30 companies have an AEO status.
CLUSTER 4: THE GREEN AGENDA AND SUSTAINABLE CONNECTIVITY
The cluster on Green Agenda and sustainable connectivity covers: transport policy (Chapter 14); energy (Chapter 15); trans-European networks (Chapter 21); and environment and climate change (Chapter 27).
Chapter 14 - Transport policy
The EU has common rules on technical and safety standards, security, social standards, State aid and market liberalisation in road transport, railways, inland waterways, multimodal transport, aviation and maritime transport.
On general transport, the national transport and logistics strategy is being implemented. Improvements are needed in harmonising legislation and strengthening sustainability and multimodal integration.
Regarding road transport, Georgia had a higher fatality rate than the EU average. In 2025, there were 5 969 crashes with 469 fatalities (against 5 866 crashes with 444 fatalities in 2024). Legislation to prevent road fatalities and injuries came into force in May 2026. A new road safety strategy and action plan were adopted in August 2026.
Georgian legislation is not fully aligned with the EU acquis, especially on regulations on driving and rest times, regarding legislation on the social and market acquis in
road transport, and intelligent transport systems.
On rail transport, amendments to the Railway Code on the protection of cargo and rail transport facilities were adopted in March 2026. The legal framework on transport of dangerous goods, certification of train drivers, interoperability of the rail system and safety on railways remains partially aligned with the EU acquis. Amendments to align the Railway Code with European standards on railway interoperability have not been adopted yet.
On maritime transport, the maritime single window system is operational across all ports but is not yet aligned with Regulation (EU) 2019/1239. The Maritime Code of Georgia was further aligned with the updated regulatory framework of the International Maritime Organization.
Legislative amendments related to inland waterway transport during the reporting period facilitated a new inland waterway register, introduced rules for the registration of inland water vessels, and strengthened the safety rules governing inland waterway transport. On civil aviation, Georgia has further aligned with Regulation (EU) 2015/340 on certification of air traffic controllers. Georgia’s accession to the Convention on International Interests in Mobile
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Equipment as Applied to Aircraft Objects entered into force in December 2025.
No progress was made on multimodal transport. Georgia has not yet aligned with the Combined Transport Directive.
Chapter 15 - Energy
EU energy policy covers energy supply, infrastructure, the internal energy market, consumers, renewable energy, energy efficiency, nuclear energy, nuclear safety, radiation protection and nuclear safeguards.
Regarding security of supply, the adoption of a preventive action plan and emergency plan, to align with the requirements of the Gas Security of Supply Regulation, is pending. In the electricity sector, Georgia transposed the Risk-preparedness Regulation (2019/941) and prepared its risk-preparedness plan.
Regarding internal energy market, Georgia has not yet aligned with the Electricity Integration Package. While provisions on unbundling and market opening have been partially implemented, the 2024 amendments to the Law on state property necessary for unbundling the transmission system operator of electricity and gas (TSO) need to be strengthened by secondary legislation. Further progress has been made in 2026 with the electricity TSO completing the divestment of its shares in a trading company.
On oil security of supply, Georgia remains largely non-compliant with the requirements of
Directive 2009/119/EC, with no effective system of mandatory emergency oil stocks in place.
Since 2024, domestic refining capacity has become one of the key elements of the country’s
energy security and energy independence strategy, leading to increasing mineral fuel export.
This has been driven predominantly by the newly commissioned Kulevi refinery, where
Russian crude oil became the largest import source. As part of the 21st package of EU
restrictive measures against Russia, the Council imposed a transaction ban on the Kulevi
refinery. The measure will take effect after a six-month wind-down period, unless the Kulevi
refinery demonstrates it has shifted to alternative crude supplies, subject to monitoring. It
remains uncertain whether the oil trading flow volume can be sustained. Despite commercial
growth, Georgia still needs to develop a balanced oil security policy.
In the electricity sector, the retail electricity market is notyet fully aligned with the EU acquis. Electricity production is still largely regulated, with some limited progress made in May 2026, with deregulation of hydropower plants commissioned before August 2008 and with a design capacity not exceeding 90 MW. Further deregulation is scheduled until 2027 for hydro power plants with a capacity below 120 MW.
On renewable energy, the national energy and climate plan (NECP) adopted in 2024 includes 2030 renewable targets in line with Energy Community 2030 targets. Alignment with the Renewable Energy Directive (REDII) is pending. Provisions related to the sustainability and greenhouse gas emission saving criteria for biofuels, bioliquids and biomass from REDII have not been introduced yet.
No progress was made regarding energy efficiency, including in the area of energy performance of buildings. Georgia should adopt a long-term national building renovation plan.
All 14 implementing legislations to align with the EU acquis on energy labelling entered into force on 1 January 2026. According to the Law on energy labelling, the Georgian Market Surveillance Agency under the Ministry of Economy and Sustainable Development is the implementing entity responsible for inspecting and monitoring the given law and technical regulation.
On governance, the 2024 NECP is in line with EU requirements. No further progress was made during the reporting period.
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On nuclear energy, nuclear safety, radioactive waste management and radiation protection, Georgia still has to align with and implement the Directives on nuclear safety; the management of spent fuel and radioactive waste; basic safety standards and drinking water. Georgia also still has to consider accession to the Convention on Nuclear Safety.
On nuclear safeguards, no further alignment with the provisions of the EURATOM Treaty or its secondary legislation was done, instead Georgia aligned with the safeguards provision of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).
Chapter 21 - Trans-European networks
The EU promotes trans-European networks (TENs) in the areas of transport, telecommunications and energy to strengthen the internal market and contribute to growth and employment.
The trans-European transport networks (TEN-T) are extended to Georgia. The Georgian indicative network consists of 714 km of railways (of which 585 km are on the core network), 855 km of motorways (of which 768 km are on the core network), three ports (one of which is core) and one core airport. Georgia has not aligned its framework with TEN-T regulation (EU) 2024/1679. Its national transport strategy does not include clear priorities to align with the regulation.
Georgia continued to upgrade its road infrastructure in line with TEN-T compliance standards. The road infrastructure quality of the core network is satisfactory, but significant work is still needed to ensure compliance with TEN-T standards in view of the 2030 deadline for the completion of the core network. The E 60 Chumateleti - Khevi section was opened in December 2025. Construction of the Grigoleti - Kobuleti road section of the E-70 highway is not yet finalised.
On railways, bottlenecks identified on the core network have been addressed via the railway modernisation project, which was completed end 2025. No progress was made during the reporting period with regard to the TEN-T railway compliance indicators on line speed, train length or track gauge. Georgian Railways has not implemented the European Rail Traffic Management System. Around half of the core rail network is reported to be in average condition with the rest in poor condition. The Baku-Tbilisi-Kars railway (cargo) resumed operations after modernisation works. Passenger services between Tbilisi and Baku have also resumed.
The construction of the Anaklia deep-sea port continued including dredging works and construction of the breakwater. During the reporting period, the state budget allocation for the development of the port was substantially reduced by 60% and works were stalled for several months. In July 2026, the development model was changed to a landlord port model with full ownership of the government. Digitalisation of maritime transport continued.
On energy networks, Georgia has not aligned with the old TEN-E Regulation (EU) 347/2013. The revised TEN-E is currently not applicable to Georgia. However, Georgia is working on the transposition of the TEN-E Regulation, also to support the implementation of the interconnection between Anaklia (GE) and Constanta Sud (RO), which received the status of Project of Mutual Interest (PMI) in the Second PCI and PMI list (EU) 2026/764.
Chapter 27 - Environment and climate change
The EU promotes strong climate action, sustainable development and protection of the environment. EU rules contain provisions addressing horizontal environmental issues, climate change, water and air quality, waste management, nature protection, industrial pollution, chemicals, noise and civil protection.
Environment
On horizontal legislation, Georgia is partially aligned with the EU acquis. Limited and unstable administrative capacity continue to impact the implementation, monitoring and
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enforcement of the environmental policy. During the reporting period, the Law on environmental liability was amended to strengthen the administrative compliance mechanism. No progress was achieved to improve the quality of the preparation and implementation of environmental investments, including the transparency of procedures, compliance with the environment impact assessment and strategic environmental assessment. The Espoo Convention Protocol on strategic environmental assessment has not been ratified yet.
On air quality, the capacity to assess the health impact of air pollution was strengthened by moving towards an integrated system linking air quality data with public health analysis. As of April 2026, the initial and temporary registration of M1 category vehicles older than six years is prohibited. The restriction does not apply to electric vehicles. Ten new air quality monitoring stations have been installed, increasing the availability of air quality data for modelling and forecasting purposes.
On waste management and circular economy, alignment with EU legislation is low. The majority of municipalities have developed waste management plans. Regulations to prohibit the import, production and use of certain single-use plastics in the food industry were adopted during the reporting period. Further amendments to the Waste Management Code, include responsibilities to establish a hazardous waste landfill, but remove the obligation to draft a strategy for the management of biodegrable waste.
On water quality, two pieces of implementing legislation of the Law on water resource management were adopted during the reporting period, further aligning the national legislative framework with the Water Framework Directive. Georgia is moving on with the implementation regarding the boundaries of river basins and river basin districts as well as the establishment and operation of river basin management advisory and coordination councils. The river basin management plan for the Kura River is not finalised. The monitoring network for surface water and groundwater has been further expanded. In December 2025, Armenia and Georgia signed a memorandum of understanding regarding cooperation on transboundary water monitoring for the Khrami-Debed river basin, taking a step forward to coordinate water protection efforts.
On nature protection, Georgia’s legislation is partially aligned with the acquis. The Emerald Network covers 18% of national territory which is on track to reach the 30.8% target by 2030. Pre-designated sites that will be covered by the Natura 2000 network have not been identified. Protected areas currently cover 14.26% of the national territory. The Forest Code was amended in June 2026, with provisions to strengthen forest protection. Georgia needs to update its national biodiversity strategy and action plan. The draft Law on biodiversity is not adopted yet. The national forestry inventory covers 55% of forests. The introduction of a new timber production system was postponed until 2027.
In the area of industrial pollution control and risk management, implementing acts of the Law on industrial pollution have been adopted during the reporing period, creating an integrated environmental permit. Work towards the creation of a single national pollutant release and transfer register needs to be accelerated.
On chemicals, including also biocidal products, the level of alignment with the acquis remains low. A national action plan on peristent pollutants was adopted during the reporting period, and amendments to the rules for the export and import of certain hazardous chemicals and pesticides further aligned the national legislation with international conventions. Georgia is at a low level of alignment with the EU noise legislation. Amendments laying down the noise norms have not been implemented. Strategic noise maps and action plans have not been prepared.
On civil protection, no progress was made as regards to Georgia’s cooperation with the Union Civil Protection Mechanism. However, the country continued to strengthen its system. Georgia has developed an integrated wildfire risk map for the Kvemo Kartli region.
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Additionally, Georgia, in cooperation with Armenia, has created a strategy for shared climate-security risks and future emergencies. The national hydro meteorological observation network was expanded by two new monitoring stations reaching a total of 275 active monitoring stations.
Climate change
On climate change, some progress was registered over the reporting period. Georgia amended its law on environmental protection in May 2026, introducing the regulatory framework for monitoring, reporting, verification of greenhouse gas emissions at installation level and accreditation of verifiers (MRVA). The framework still needs to be operationalised by January 2028. In March 2026, Georgia submitted its third nationally determined contribution under the Paris Agreement for the period up to 2035.
However, administrative capacity and human and financial resources remain low, affecting Georgia’s ability to implement the climate acquis. Georgia is still working on a climate change law as well as a national adaptation plan.
CLUSTER 5: RESOURCES, AGRICULTURE AND COHESION
Cluster 5 on resources, agriculture and cohesion covers: agriculture and rural development (Chapter 11); food safety, veterinary and phytosanitary policy (Chapter 12); fisheries and aquaculture (Chapter 13); regional policy and coordination of structural instruments (Chapter 22); financial and budgetary provisions (Chapter 33).
Chapter 11 - Agriculture and rural development
The EU’s common agricultural policy supports farmers and contributes to ensuring Europe’s food security. It helps tackle climate change and the sustainable management of national resources; maintains rural areas and landscapes across the EU; and keeps the rural economy alive by promoting jobs in farming, agri-food industries and associated sectors. This requires strong management and control systems. There are also common EU rules for marketing standards, quality policy and organic farming.
On horizontal issues, the budget allocated to the implementation of the rural development and agriculture strategy was increased by 12% from 2024 to 2025, amounting to EUR 426 million and including 13 state support programmes for a total of EUR 100 million.
Implementation of the agricultural and rural development strategy of Georgia for 2021-2027 advanced as reported by the new strategic coordination and analytics department of the Ministry of Environmental Protection and Agriculture.
The state co-financing support programme, launched in July 2026 and managed by the Rural Development Agency, aims to modernise strategic value chains for primary production, storage and processing. The programme provides for the mandatory registration of applicants in the digitalised registry of farms and rural enterprises.
As of July 2026, the digitalised registry is operational and the procedure for the management of the registry and the Land Parcel Identification System (LPIS) has been approved. However, the resulting unified database may not necessarily reflect the diversity of the households' agricultural activities.
An initial data collection was conducted among state support programme beneficiaries to elaborate a Farm Sustainability Data Network.
On agricultural markets - common market organisation, alignment with the EU acquis
remains limited and is mostly related to certain marketing standards, including spirit drinks
as of December 2025. In June 2026, amendments to the Law on vine and wine were
adopted, ensuring traceability and quality control under the supervision of the National Wine
Agency. Georgia has yet to adopt legislation on producer organisations.
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On rural development, the integrated data management department within the Rural Development Agency includes two new divisions: the agricultural land parcels registry management and the farmers and rural enterprises registry management divisions.
As regards quality policy, no progress was made during the reporting period except for the applicable measures for wine market standards in the amended Law on vine and wine.
On organic farming, no progress was made during the reporting period.
On the fight against corruption, the agricultural parcels registry management division conducts field inspections, in line with the approved standard operating procedures, focusing on the monitoring of the efficiency of the implementation of the state agricultural co-financing programme.
Chapter 12 - Food safety, veterinary and phytosanitary policy
The EU food acquis including hygiene rules for foodstuff production ensures a high level of food and feed safety and a high level of protection of consumers’ interests. Animal health and welfare and the safety of food of animal origin are safeguarded together with plant health, the quality of seeds, plant reproductive material, animal nutrition and the use of plant protection products.
In the area of general food safety, Georgia has yet to put in place a comprehensive range of food safety laboratory analysis. Georgia has still to clarify the scope of methods and analysis covered by the State Laboratory of Agriculture as a national reference laboratory, in order to align with the EU acquis on official checks. Five out of ten border inspection posts need to be upgraded with infrastructure and equipment to equally conduct the risk-based control system for food importers in each border control post. Georgia has yet to put in place a food consumption database to assess the exposure of various population groups to food additives, contaminants and other substances in food supply and to address risks regarding food-borne diseases.
On veterinary policy, Georgia has to increase efforts to align its animal health legislation with the EU’s animal health policy and acquis, as well as ensure its implementation. The effectiveness of the one health national action plan on antimicrobial resistance is hampered by the regulatory gaps in veterinary medicinal product management and oversight. Georgia’s animal welfare practices and legislation are not yet aligned with the EU’s animal welfare policy and acquis. The compensation system for anthrax control was extended to rabies contracted by large ruminants. The national animal identification system (NAITS) for domestic animals now expands to include aquaculture functionality.
As regards the placing on the market of food, feed and animal by-products, the National Food Agency continued to carry out risk-based official checks. The traceability system engaging the primary responsibility of food business operators (FBOs) for food safety and quality is to be strengthened to ensure comprehensive coverage of registered FBOs throughout the food chains. Further efforts are necessary to improve private sector awareness and self-monitoring of food safety. The implementation of the control system for monitoring salmonella started in 2026.
An EU compliant system of collection, storage and processing of animal by-products is not yet in place and has to be developed. In December 2025, Georgia adopted legislation on health requirements for animal by-products.
On food safety rules and its specific rules for feed, Georgia has yet to complete the revision of its hazard analysis and critical control points requirements, to introduce simplified food safety rules for low-risks FBOs in consistency with risk analysis and EU acquis.
On phytosanitary policy, further work remains necessary to improve the implementation ofthe use of pesticides. While the list of authorised pesticides is automatically aligned with EU regulation updates, the recognition of pesticide professionals and their certification remain
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pending, subject to the adoption of new regulations in alignment with the EU plant health acquis. There was no significant progress on plant health legislation and substantial further
work remains necessaryon genetically modified organisms risk assessment and market authorisation processes.
On the marketing of seed and other plant reproductive material, the country still needs to fully align its national legislation with the EU acquis on the rules plant (PRM) and forest reproductive material (FRM). Georgia should as a next step focus on establishing the necessary institutional frameworks and capacities to implement and enforce functioning systems for the certification of seed and other PRM and FRM.
Chapter 13 - Fisheries and aquaculture
The common fisheries policy lays down rules on fisheries management, protects living resources of the sea and limits the environmental impact of fisheries. This includes setting catch quotas, managing fleet capacity, rules on control and inspection, rules on markets and aquaculture and support for fisheries and coastal communities. Further, it promotes a sustainable aquaculture.
Existing legislation sets out basic requirements such as the obligation of the flag state, coastal state, port state and market state. An initial fisheries development concept has been prepared in 2025 focusing on socio-economic development of coastal and rural areas.
On fisheries resources, the National Environment Agency (NEA) strengthened its capacities with additional human resources and equipment to assess stocks and support sustainable demersal fishing and pelagic fisheries management. NEA has not yet issued catch certificates. Regarding data collection, the NEA fisheries and aquaculture division has to improve its reporting on coastal fisheries and aquaculture to fulfil its obligations under the General Fisheries Commission for the Mediterranean and the Black Sea (GFCM), where Georgia participates as a cooperating non-contracting party.
A fleet management systemis in place for the anchovy fishery, with a fishing vessel register in place, as well as monitoring of fishing activities. Five anchovy licence holders are closely monitored under a licensing agreement and quota management system. The fisheries control system of their activities is based on a comprehensive inspection and control system instead of a risk assessment and real-time recording of catches is ensured through electronic logbooks, tracking router, and online video surveillance. However, traceability of the catches and monitoring of the fishing activities of the small-scale coastal fleet not targeting anchovy is not ensured. Georgia needs to step up its efforts to implement the GFCM recommendations on compliance.
Georgia has no specific structural action for fisheries. There has been no uptake by fishing license holders of available measures providing credit loans to modernise the fleet.
On market policy, no progress was made during the reporting period. Fishing and
aquaculture associations remain fragmented and are not yet engaged in production planning
or marketing.
On aquaculture, the implementation of the Law on aquaculture is ongoing but challenges remain. In 2025, more than 130 permits were delivered to registered farms (35% of the estimated total number of farms). Export authorisation to the EU was requested by the National Food Agency (NFA) in March 2025. In 2026, the NFA resubmitted to the Commission the results of its annual residue control plan.
On international agreements, Georgia continued to participate in GFCM meetings and other international relevant meetings and should aim for a full membership.
Chapter 22 - Regional policy and coordination of structural instruments
Regional policy is the EU’s main tool for reducing regional disparities and investing in sustainable and inclusive socio-economic growth. It is operating through shared
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management between the Commission and EU Member States. The implementation of cohesion policy programmes requires appropriate administrative capacity on programme and project level, the establishment of systems of sound financial management and control and also the fulfilment of other EU acquis elements such as environmental or public procurement legislation.
Georgia has not yet established a comprehensive legislative framework for regional development or cohesion policy. Implementation of the high mountain settlements development strategy 2024-2030 and its 2024-2026 action plan continued during the reporting period. Progress was reported in planning, coordination mechanisms and stakeholder engagement, as well as in local infrastructure and service delivery. However, evidence of a sustained reduction in regional disparities remains limited. Monitoring and evaluation systems, the use of performance indicators and institutional implementation capacity require further strengthening to ensure measurable policy impact.
Regarding the institutional framework, following its establishment as a separate ministry in April 2025, the Ministry of Regional Development focused primarily on institutional consolidation, coordination with regional authorities and municipal planning initiatives. Tangible policy outcomes and measurable improvements in regional development implementation remain low. Public reporting and access to documents is limited with lack of transparency.
On administrative capacity, the Ministry of Regional Development and Infrastructure and the state representatives in the regions have basic financial and administrative resources to coordinate and monitor the policy implementation.
On programming, there has been no advancement in the implementation of 2024-2030 smart specialisation strategy for the Imereti region. Georgia continued to participate constructively in the Interreg 2021-2027 NEXT Black Sea Basin programme.
On monitoring and evaluation, the Ministry of Regional Development prepared a semi- annual monitoring report for 2025 and a yearly consolidated monitoring report for the NUTS 2025 action plan. However, public access to monitoring documents remains limited, affecting transparency and accountability.
Onfinancial management, control and audit, no progress was recorded in the reporting period.
On the fight against corruption, the Law on the prevention of corruption applies to regional
development programmes. Procedures for reporting and handling irregularities are in place,
including the designation of an irregularity officer within the relevant authority.
Chapter 33 - Financial and budgetary provisions
This chapter covers the rules governing the funding of the EU budget (‘own resources’). These resources mainly consist of: (i) contributions based on the gross national income of each Member State; (ii) customs duties; (iii) the non-recycled plastic resource and (iv) a resource based on value added tax. EU Member States must have the appropriate administrative capacity to adequately coordinate and ensure the correct calculation, collection, payment and control of own resources.
On traditional own resources, Georgia has structures in place to levy customs duties at the point of import. It operates a national VAT system (Information on Revenue Administration and taxes is provided in Chapter 16). Georgia’s 2019 Law on customs is not fully aligned with the Union Customs Code.
On administrative infrastructure, the Ministry of Finance has the overall responsibility for financial and budgetary issues, with the Revenue Service in charge of tax and customs issues as a legal entity of public law under the Ministry. The Revenue Service should strengthen its operational capacity.
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The legal and institutional framework is not aligned with the EU’s own resources system. There is a lack of administrative and IT capacity, and a need for establishing effective mechanisms for the calculation, control, and reporting of own resources.
CLUSTER 6: EXTERNAL RELATIONS
There are two chapters in this cluster: external relations (Chapter 30); foreign, security and defence policy (Chapter 31).
Chapter 30 - External relations
The EU has a common commercial policy towards third countries, based on multilateral and bilateral agreements and autonomous measures. There are also EU rules in the field of humanitarian aid and development policy.
On the common commercial policy, Georgia continued to demonstrate good administrative capacity to manage its commitments in external commercial relations, as a World Trade Organisation member. DCFTA implementation has continued. In November 2025, Georgia signed the Ministerial Declaration on the Launch of Negotiations for the Central Asia Regional Economic Cooperation Trade and Investment Facilitation Partnership Agreement that aims at improving market access and economic diversification in the region.
In the area of dual-use goods, the 2013 Law on the control of military and dual-use goods, amended in 2019, continues to regulate the export of dual-use goods. A draft national control list ’On the Establishment of an EU Control Regime for the Export, Brokering, Technical Assistance, Transit and Transfer of Dual-Use Items’ has been prepared in accordance with Regulation (EU) 2021/821 and Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2024/2547, and legal procedures are underway to adopt it as a normative act. As regards export controls of goods that could be used for capital punishment, torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment, Georgia is yet to develop its legislation in line with the EU acquis on anti-torture. Georgia is a member of the Alliance for Torture-Free Trade. Georgia is not a member of multilateral export control regimes such as the Wassenaar arrangement, the Nuclear Suppliers Group, and the Missile Technology Control Regime.
Georgia has yet to align with the EU acquis on the screening of foreign direct investments (FDI).
Regarding bilateral trade agreements with third countries, Georgia is a party to 16 free trade agreements, including with the European Free Trade Association (EFTA), Türkiye, and the United Kingdom. Preferential agreements are in place with some countries with whom the EU does not have preferential agreements: Azerbaijan, China, the Russian Federation, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and the United Arab Emirates. In December 2025, Georgia and Serbia signed the Joint Statement on the initiation of Free Trade Agreement negotiations. In April 2026, Georgia and China signed a formal protocol to amend and upgrade the existing 2018 Free Trade Agreement, adding new cooperation areas in e-commerce, investment, and sanitary measures.
Georgia has bilateral investment treaties with 35 third countries, out of which 16 treaties with 17 EU Member States. The regulatory framework for international cooperation in development policy and humanitarian aid remains to be developed. Georgia remains primarily a recipient of aid programmes rather than a donor. A legislative framework on humanitarian aid and the allocation of dedicated funds remains to be set up. Dedicated administrative structures are still not in place. Georgia has still not developed legislation on development policy nor an administrative structure for it.
Chapter 31 - Foreign, security and defence policy
Member States must be able to conduct political dialogue under the EU foreign, security and defence policy, align with EU statements, take part in EU action, and apply agreed restrictive
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measures.
There was no political dialogue between the EU and Georgia on common foreign and security policy (CFSP) during the reporting period due to downgraded political contacts by the EU in response to the serious democratic backsliding undertaken by the Georgian authorities.
Georgia’s alignment with statements by the High Representative on behalf of the EU and Council decisions on restrictive measures (sanctions) continued to decrease during the reporting period and remains low, with an alignment rate of 38% as of 1 September 2026, against40% in 2025. Georgia has not fully aligned with the majority of sanctions against Russia, Belarus and Iran, and not fully aligned with EU statements, notably those related to Iran, Russia’s malicious cyber ecosystem, or Israel/Lebanon.
In November 2025, Georgia committed to stop the re-export of Economically Critical Goods, a list of 30 items crucial to Russia’s war effort. Georgia’s commitment to prevent circumvention of EU sanctions through its territory is monitored closely. The number of direct flights with Russia continued to increase significantly.
As part of the 21st package of EU restrictive measures against Russia, the Council listed
three entities based, or recently based, in Georgia providing crypto-assets services. It also
imposed a transaction ban on the Kulevi refinery for its involvement in the trading and
processing of Russian oil. This measure will take effect after a six-month wind-down period,
unless the Kulevi refinery demonstrates it has shifted to alternative crude supplies, subject to
monitoring. In addition, the EU Sanction Envoy reiterated with the Georgian authorities the
need to prevent circumvention of sanctions against Russia, notably with respect to energy
and the financial sector.
Georgia broadly aligned with a number of international and EU initiatives in support of Ukraine, including on resolutions adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations, the United Nation’s Human Rights Council, and the Council of Europe.
Notably, in December 2025, Georgia signed the convention establishing the International Claims Commission for Ukraine regarding claims for damages, loss, or injury caused by Russia’s invasion. On 24 February 2026, Georgia voted in favour of the UN General Assembly resolution ‘Support for Lasting Peace in Ukraine’ and the General Assembly Resolution on ‘Return of Ukrainian Children’. However, Georgia did not join the Enlarged Partial Agreement establishing the Management Committee of the Special Tribunal for the crime of aggression against Ukraine.
Georgia is a member of various international organisations, including the United Nations, the Council of Europe, the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the Organisation of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation and has formally put forward its candidacy for OSCE Chairmanship in 2027. Georgia also successfully campaigned for a World Health Organisation Executive Board Seat. For the second year in a row, Georgia did not participate in the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe. Georgia was a member of the Human Rights Council until the end of 2025.
While defence cooperation with NATO continues, some aspects of the Substantial NATO- Georgia Package have been partially reduced. Overall, Georgia continues to aspire to NATO membership but did not contribute troops directly to active NATO-led combat or peacekeeping operations during the reporting period. Georgia should still develop a new national action plan on Women, Peace and Security.
Georgia engages in disarmament and non-proliferation at international, regional, and
bilateral levels. It aligned with certain EU statements at the 11th Review Conference of the
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and regularly aligns with the EU at the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board of Governors, particularly on nuclear
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safety, security, and safeguards. At the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons
meetings, its alignment with the EU has been inconsistent. On Small Arms and Light
Weapons (SALW), Georgia showed commitment to the UN Programme of Action on SALW
and collaborates with the EU to combat illicit proliferation. It is also a party to the Arms Trade
Treaty, where it aligns with EU positions. Georgia has not joined the Anti-Personnel Mine
Ban Convention, and the Convention on Cluster Munitions. On arms export control, Georgia
largely aligns with the EU Common Position 2008/944.
On security measures, the necessary procedures to make the agreement on security
procedures for the exchange and protection of classified information operational were
concluded in 2024.
As regards the common security and defence policy (CSDP), Georgia did not participate in EU CSDP missions and operations since its last participation in 2023.Security and defence cooperation has not progressed, due to the political developments in the country.
Cooperation with the EU on hybrid threats as well as on countering foreign information manipulation and interference with the authorities is on hold. Georgian authorities continued to actively spread disinformation narratives and conspiracy theories, primarily targeting the EU, its Member States, EU enlargement process and EU officials.
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ANNEX I – RELATIONS BETWEEN THE EU AND GEORGIA
Georgia applied for EU membership on 3 March 2022. The European Council recognised the European perspective for Georgia in June 2022. Georgia was granted candidate status in December 2023, on the understanding that it takes the relevant steps set out in the Commission recommendation of 8 November 2023. On 27 June 2024, the European Council concluded that the Georgian government’s course of action jeopardised Georgia’s EU path, de facto leading to a halt of the accession process. This was reiterated by the European Council on 17 October 2024 and 19 December 2024.
There was no political dialogue between the EU and Georgia during the reporting period due to the serious democratic backsliding in the country.
The EU and Georgia signed an Association Agreement (AA) in June 2014, which entered into force in July 2016. The Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA) is an integral part of the Agreement. The Agreement provides the foundations for political association and economic integration. Yearly political and economic dialogue between the EU and Georgia, as well as subcommittee meetings under the AA/DCFTA structure remained halted. The Association Council last met in February 2024, the Association Committee in Trade Configuration in December 2023, and the Association Committee in July 2023. The Parliamentary Association Committee last met in June 2023.
The EU is Georgia’s first trading partner. In 2025, total EU-Georgia trade in goods reached approximately EUR 5.18 billion, with Georgia exporting EUR 873 million to the EU and importing EUR 4.3 billion. The EU accounts for approximately 12% of Georgia's total exports and 25.4% of its imports.
In addition to the AA/DCFTA structures, a Human Rights Dialogue with Georgia has been in place since 2009 and usually convenes annually. The Human Rights Dialogue was not held in the reporting period. The High-Level Strategic and Security Dialogue, taking forward cooperation on foreign and security policy, was last held in January 2024.
Since its launch in 2009, Georgia has participated in the Eastern Partnership (EaP).
The Georgian government does not exercise effective control over the occupied breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The EU supports Georgia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity within its internationally recognised borders and has been engaged since 2008 in peaceful conflict resolution efforts, including through the EU Monitoring Mission and the work of the EU Special Representative for the South Caucasus and the crisis in Georgia. The EU Monitoring Mission is the only international presence on the ground.
Citizens of Georgia have enjoyed visa-free travel to the Schengen area since March 2017. A readmission agreement between the European Union and Georgia has been in place since 2011. As part of the visa liberalisation monitoring mechanism, the Commission has been regularly assessing the progress made by the country in implementing reforms introduced under the visa roadmap. In its 7th and 8th reports under the visa suspension mechanism, published in December 2024 and December 2025, the Commission urged Georgia to take urgent action to address its recommendations, particularly related to fundamental rights, anti-discrimination and anti-corruption. Following a formal inquiry in July 2025, the European Commission determined that the Georgian authorities failed to implement necessary corrective actions and instead enacted further restrictive legislative acts contradicting Georgia’s commitments on fundamental freedoms. In light of Georgia’s continued breach of the benchmarks underpinning the visa-free regime granted by the EU, the Commission activated the revised Visa Suspension Mechanism for an initial period of 12 months, as of 6 March 2026. The first phase of this enforcement targets holders of diplomatic, service, and official passports, effectively ending their visa-free travel across all EU Member States. An enhanced dialogue with Georgia took place in June 2026, with a view to remedying the circumstances that led to the suspension. This enhanced dialogue did not lead to progress with regard to the Commission’s concerns underpinning the suspension.
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Bilateral financial assistance was further reviewed following the continued democratic backsliding. Since 2024, the EU has withheld EUR 121.3 million of bilateral funds directly benefiting the Georgian authorities under the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation instrument – Global Europe 2021-2027 (NDICI-GE).
Since 2014, Georgia has participated in EU programmes. It currently takes part in Horizon Europe, Creative Europe, EU4Youth, the Customs Programme, Fiscalis and the transnational cooperation Interreg programme Black Sea Basin. Since 2024, Georgia’s association to new EU programmes has been paused. Organisations and individuals from Georgia can also benefit from certain actions of the Erasmus+ and European Solidarity Corps Programme.
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ANNEX II – STATISTICAL ANNEX
STATISTICAL DATA (as of 14/09/2026)
Georgia**
Basic data Note 2013 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
Population (thousand) : 3 729 i 3 689 i 3 736 i 3 695 i 3 705 i
Total area of the country (km²) 69 700 w 69 700 w 69 700 w 69 700 w 69 700 w 69 700 w
National accounts Note 2013 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
Gross domestic product (GDP) (million national currency) 1) 29 138 w 60 724 w 72 860 w 80 883 w 93 022 w 104 598 pw
Gross domestic product (GDP) (million euro) 1) 13 188 w 15 921 w 23 662 w 28 464 w 31 597 w 33 785 pw
GDP per capita (euro) 1) 3 547 w 4 293 w 6 374 w 7 661 w 8 541 w 9 120 pw
GDP per capita (in purchasing power standards (PPS) : : : : : :
GDP per capita (in PPS), relative to the EU average (EU-27 = 100) : : : : : :
Real GDP growth rate: change on previous year of GDP volume (%) 1) 5.1 w 10.6 w 11.0 w 7.8 w 9.7 w 7.5 pw
Employment growth (national accounts data), relative to the previous year (%) - 1 iw - 2 iw 5 iw 4 iw 5 iw :
Labour productivity growth: growth in GDP (in volume) per person employed, relative to the
previous year (%)
1) 6 w 13 w 5 w 4 w 4 w 8 pw
Unit labour cost growth, relative to the previous year (%) 1) 7 w - 3 w 2 w 4 w 2 w - 3 pw
Nominal unit labour cost index based on persons (3 year % change) 1) 18.9 iw 23.0 iw 37.7 iw 44.9 iw 56.8 piw :
Labour productivity per person employed: GDP (in PPS) per person employed relative to EU
average (EU-27 = 100)
: : : : : :
Gross value added by main sectors
Agriculture, forestry and fisheries (%) 1) 2) 10.4 w 8.3 w 7.6 w 6.9 w 6.3 w 5.9 pw
Industry (%) 1) 2) 13.7 w 16.9 w 16.5 w 14.1 w 14.0 w 13.2 pw
Construction (%) 1) 2) 6.5 w 7.3 w 8.0 w 7.6 w 8.5 w 8.0 pw
Services (%) 1) 2) 69.4 w 67.5 w 67.9 w 71.4 w 71.2 w 72.9 pw
Final consumption expenditure, as a share of GDP (%) 1) 90.2 w 95.6 w 85.7 w 83.6 w 83.3 w 84.5 pw
Gross fixed capital formation, as a share of GDP (%) 1) 18.4 w 20.8 w 19.8 w 21.5 w 21.3 w 19.0 pw
Exports of goods and services, relative to GDP (%) 1) 40.9 w 42.7 w 52.5 w 49.3 w 47.8 w 47.4 pw
Imports of goods and services, relative to GDP (%) 1) 52.9 w 58.9 w 62.2 w 57.9 w 55.6 w 53.2 pw
Gross fixed capital formation by the general government sector, as a percentage of GDP (%) 1) 4 w 6 w 6 w 7 w 7 w :
Business Note 2013 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
Industrial production volume index (2015 = 100) : : : : : :
Number of active enterprises (number) 59 028 w 139 741 w 149 110 w 162 891 w 182 894 w :
Birth rate: number of enterprise births in the reference period (t) divided by the number of
enterprises active in t (%)
3) 22.4 w 21.2 w 29.5 w 25.2 w 22.3 w :
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Death rate: number of enterprise deaths in the reference period (t) divided by the number of
enterprises active in t (%)
3) 21.6 w 17.5 w 17.9 w 12.8 w 12.3 w :
People employed in SMEs as a share of all persons employed (within the non-financial
business economy) (%)
68.1 iw 63.4 iw 61.9 iw 61.4 iw 62.4 iw :
Value added by SMEs (in the non-financial business economy) (EUR million) 3 542 iw 4 647 iw 7 199 iw 8 866 iw 10 154 iw :
Total value added (in the non-financial business economy) (EUR million) 5 494 w 7 300 w 11 741 w 14 016 w 15 802 w :
Inflation rate and house prices Note 2013 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
Consumer price index (CPI), change relative to the previous year (%) : : 11.8 w 2.1 w 1.7 w
Balance of payments Note 2013 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
Balance of payments: current account total (million euro) - 715.3 w - 1 642.7 w - 1 013.7 w - 1 576.6 w - 1 684.7 w - 933.1 w
Balance of payments current account: trade balance (million euro) - 2 638.0 w - 3 211.4 w - 4 873.7 w - 5 620.1 w - 6 069.7 w - 6 068.0 w
Balance of payments current account: net services (million euro) 1 068.8 w 618.9 w 2 595.1 w 3 179.4 w 3 588.9 w 4 082.4 w
Balance of payments current account: net balance for primary income (million euro) - 239.2 w - 1 002.1 w - 1 659.1 w - 2 213.5 w - 2 321.1 w - 2 102.6 w
Balance of payments current account: net balance for secondary income (million euro) 1 093.1 w 1 952.0 w 2 924.0 w 3 077.5 w 3 117.1 w 3 155.2 w
Net balance for primary and secondary income: of which government transfers (million euro) 740.7 w 816.5 w 1 142.4 w 766.3 w 737.7 w 971.7 w
*3 year backward moving average of the current account balance relative to GDP (%) - 9.5 iw - 9.6 iw - 9.0 iw - 6.7 iw - 5.1 iw - 5.4 iw
*Five year change in share of world exports of goods and services (%) 65.6 w - 2.3 w 27.5 w 38.5 w 31.5 w 111.1 w
Net balance (inward - outward) of foreign direct investment (FDI) (million euro) 695.8 w 802.4 w 1 809.0 w 1 515.7 w 1 058.7 w 1 211.0 w
Foreign direct investment (FDI) abroad (million euro) 89.6 w 271.7 w 312.4 w 267.6 w 394.9 w 268.3 w
of which FDI of the reporting economy in the EU-27 countries (million euro) 26.3 w 110.1 w 179.0 w 143.0 w 147.1 w 103.9 w
Foreign direct investment (FDI) in the reporting economy (million euro) 785.4 w 1 074.2 w 2 121.4 w 1 783.3 w 1 453.6 w 1 479.3 w
of which FDI of the EU-27 countries in the reporting economy (million euro) 278.6 w 319.1 w 803.5 w 623.9 w 409.7 w 464.6 w
*Net international investment position, relative to GDP (%) - 93.6 w - 141.5 w - 113.8 w - 98.1 w - 87.1 w - 84.7 w
Year on year rate of change in gross inflow of remittances (in national currency) from migrant
workers (%)
1) 4.5 iw 8.5 iw 9.2 iw 6.7 iw 2.5 iw :
Public finance Note 2013 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
General government deficit / surplus, relative to GDP (%) 1) - 1.0 w - 6.2 w - 2.4 w - 2.3 w - 2.2 w - 1.4 pw
General government gross debt relative to GDP (%) 1) 31.3 w 49.0 w 39.1 w 38.8 w 35.6 w 38.5 pw
Total government revenues, as a percentage of GDP (%) 1) 25.5 w 24.9 w 26.6 w 27.4 w 27.7 w 30.6 pw
Total government expenditure, as a percentage of GDP (%) 1) 23.1 w 25.3 w 23.0 w 22.9 w 23.4 w 26.7 pw
Financial indicators Note 2013 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
Gross external debt of the whole economy, relative to GDP (%) 1) 74.0 iw 122.9 iw 94.8 iw 77.7 iw 76.3 iw :
Gross external debt of the whole economy, relative to total exports (%) 180.8 w 285.4 w 176.8 w 157.6 w 159.6 w 151.3 w
Money supply: M1 (banknotes, coins, overnight deposits, million euro) 1 803.0 w 2 970.3 w 4 341.2 w 6 205.2 w 5 853.0 w 6 706.9 w
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Total credit by monetary financial institutions to residents (consolidated) (million euro) 4 380.9 w : : : : :
*Annual change in financial sector liabilities (%) : : : : : :
*Private debt, consolidated, relative to GDP (%) 1) 36.9 w 71.5 w 61.9 w 65.3 w 67.1 w 76.0 w
Interest rates: day-to-day money rate, per annum (%) 4) 5.73 w 9.50 w 10.89 w 10.43 w 8.29 w 8.08 w
Euro exchange rates: average of period (1 euro = … national currency) 2.210 3.806 3.071 2.843 2.946 3.099
Trade-weighted effective exchange rate index, 42 countries (2015 = 100) 97.9 w 97.3 w 123.7 w 152.6 w 159.9 w 160.2 w
*3 year change (T/T-3) in the trade-weighted effective exchange rate index, 42 countries
(2015 = 100)
0.1 iw - 0.1 iw 0.2 iw 0.6 iw 0.6 iw 0.3 iw
Value of reserve assets (including gold) (million euro) 2 052.2 w 3 777.0 w 4 591.6 w 4 528.2 w 4 260.6 w 5 230.4 w
External trade in goods Note 2013 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
Value of imports: all goods, all partners (million euro) 4 380 iw 8 539 iw 12 858 iw 14 437 iw 15 603 iw 16 471 iw
Value of exports: all goods, all partners (million euro) 1 589 iw 3 587 iw 5 302 iw 5 629 iw 6 059 iw 6 452 iw
Trade balance: all goods, all partners (million euro) - 2 791 iw - 4 952 iw - 7 557 iw - 8 809 iw - 9 544 iw :
Terms of trade (export price index / import price index * 100) (number) : : : : : :
Share of exports to EU-27 countries in value of total exports (%) 19.8 iw 16.9 iw 15.5 iw 11.6 iw 8.7 iw :
Share of imports from EU-27 countries in value of total imports (%) 27.1 iw 22.9 iw 22.6 iw 24.5 iw 27.1 iw :
Demography Note 2013 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
Crude rate of natural change of population (natural growth rate): number of births minus
deaths (per thousand inhabitants)
: - 3.8 - 1.8 - 0.7 - 1.2 - 1.7
Infant mortality rate deaths of children under one year of age (per thousand live births) 11.1 : 7.6 8.2 7.4 :
Life expectancy at birth: male (years) : : 69.4 69.9 70.5 b :
Life expectancy at birth: female (years) : : 78.1 77.5 79.3 b :
Labour market Note 2013 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
Economic activity rate for persons aged 20–64: proportion of the population aged 20–64 that
is economically active (%)
76.9 w 64.5 w 65.9 w 68.7 w 70.8 w 70.9 w
Employment rate for persons aged 20–64: proportion of the population aged 20–64 that are
in employment (%)
62.9 w 50.6 w 54.0 w 56.9 w 60.4 w 60.5 w
Male employment rate for persons aged 20–64 (%) 70.8 w 58.1 w 62.2 w 64.9 w 67.8 w 68.5 w
Female employment rate for persons aged 20–64 (%) 55.8 w 43.5 w 46.4 w 49.4 w 53.3 w 52.7 w
Employment rate for persons aged 55–64: proportion of the population aged 55–64 that are
in employment (%)
69.0 w 47.3 w 50.6 w 52.3 w 55.9 w 55.6 w
Employment by main sectors
Agriculture, forestry and fisheries (%) 5) 47.1 w 18.9 w 17.9 w 16.5 w 16.0 w 15.7 w
Industry (%) 5) 7.4 w 11.3 w 11.9 w 12.2 w 12.9 w 13.2 w
Construction (%) 5) : 7.8 w 8.5 w 8.8 w 8.9 w 8.8 w
Services (%) 5) 6) 45.5 w 62.1 w 61.8 w 62.4 w 62.2 w 62.2 w
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People employed in the public sector as a share of total employment, persons aged 20–64
(%)
16.7 w 24.3 w 23.4 w 23.3 w 22.0 w 22.9 w
People employed in the private sector as a share of total employment, persons aged 20–64
(%)
83.3 w 75.7 w 76.6 w 76.7 w 78.0 w 77.1 w
Unemployment rate: proportion of the labour force that is unemployed (%) 7) 16.9 w 20.6 w 17.3 w 16.4 w 13.9 w 13.9 w
Male unemployment rate (%) 7) 19.0 w 22.7 w 19.3 w 18.3 w 16.1 w 15.8 w
Female unemployment rate (%) 7) 14.6 w 17.8 w 14.6 w 14.0 w 11.1 w 11.4 w
Youth unemployment rate: proportion of the labour force aged 15–24 that is unemployed (%) 38.9 w 42.9 w 39.4 w 34.5 w 28.9 w 32.0 w
Long-term unemployment rate: proportion of the labour force that has been unemployed for
12 months or more (%)
7) 7.3 w 7.2 w 6.6 w 6.5 w 5.0 w 4.9 w
Unemployment rate for persons (aged 25–64) having completed at most lower secondary
education (ISCED levels 0-2) (%)
8) 12.3 w 32.1 w 24.8 w 20.8 w 16.0 w 15.3 w
Unemployment rate for persons (aged 25–64) having completed tertiary education (ISCED
levels 5-8) (%)
20.4 w 15.3 w 13.0 w 13.1 w 11.0 w 10.8 w
Social cohesion Note 2013 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
Average nominal monthly wages and salaries (national currency) 773 w 1 305 w 1 543 w 1 767 w 1 971 w :
Index of real wages and salaries (index of nominal wages and salaries divided by the
inflation index) (2016 = 100)
85 w 100 w 106 w 118 w 130 w :
Gini coefficient 42 w 36 w 36 w 36 w 34 w 33 w
Poverty gap 9) 6.3 w 5.5 w 5.8 w 5.6 w 5.1 w 4.4 w
Standard of living Note 2013 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
Number of passenger cars relative to population size (number per thousand population) 165.0 343.0 357.0 389.0 414.0 419.0
Infrastructure Note 2013 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
Density of railway network (lines in operation per thousand km²) 23.2 iw 16.0 iw 16.0 iw 16.0 iw 16.0 iw :
Length of motorways (kilometres) 80 263 263 271 358 :
Education, Innovation and Research Note 2013 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
Percentage of persons aged 30-34 with a tertiary education level (ISCED 2011 levels 5 to 8) 42.1 w 35.5 w 35.2 w 35.6 w 38.8 w 36.8 w
Percentage of persons aged 30-34 with a tertiary education level (ISCED 2011 levels 5 to 8),
males
40.3 w 32.3 w 30.4 w 31.2 w 33.3 w 31.8 w
Percentage of persons aged 30-34 with a tertiary education level (ISCED 2011 levels 5 to 8),
females
44.0 w 38.9 w 40.1 w 40.3 w 44.5 w 42.0 w
Participation in early childhood education (children aged 3 and over) : 154.5 dw 148.7 dw 141.3 dw 137.1 dw :
Participation in early childhood education (children aged 3 and over), males : : : : : :
Participation in early childhood education (children aged 3 and over), females : : : : : :
Low achieving 15-year-olds in reading (%) : : : : : :
85
Low achieving 15-year-olds in mathematics (%) : : : : : :
Low achieving 15-year-olds in science (%) : : : : : :
Early leavers from education and training: proportion of persons aged 18-24 with at most
lower secondary education (at most ISCED 2011 level 2) who are not in further education or
training
5.8 w 7.3 w 6.0 w 5.3 w 6.4 w 4.3 w
Early leavers from education and training: proportion of men aged 18-24 with at most lower
secondary education (at most ISCED 2011 level 2) who are not in further education or
training
6.5 w 7.6 w 6.1 w 5.1 w 6.4 w 4.1 w
Early leavers from education and training: proportion of women aged 18-24 with at most
lower secondary education (at most ISCED 2011 level 2) who are not in further education or
training
5.2 w 7.0 w 5.9 w 5.4 w 6.5 w 4.5 w
Proportion of persons aged 25-64 having participated in education and training (last 4
weeks)
: 1.2 w 1.6 w 1.7 w 1.6 w :
Proportion of persons aged 25-64 having participated in education and training (last 4
weeks), men
: 1.1 w 1.3 w 1.6 w 1.4 w :
Proportion of persons aged 25-64 having participated in education and training (last 4
weeks), women
: 1.3 w 1.8 w 1.8 w 1.7 w :
Exposure of vocational education and training (VET) graduates to work-based learning (% of
population aged 20-34)
: : : : : :
Share of individuals having at least basic digital skills (% of population aged 16-74) : 31.5 w 32.4 w 34.5 w 36.3 w 20.7 w
Share of individuals having at least basic digital skills (% of population aged 16-74), males : 29.4 w 30.5 w 33.5 w 35.9 w 21.0 w
Share of individuals having at least basic digital skills (% of population aged 16-74), females : 33.4 w 34.1 w 35.4 w 36.6 w 20.4 w
Public expenditure on education relative to GDP (%) 1) 2.8 iw 3.6 iw 3.2 iw 3.7 iw 3.9 iw :
Gross domestic expenditure on R&D relative to GDP (%) 1) 0.09 iw : : : : :
Government budget appropriations or outlays on R&D (GBAORD), as a percentage of GDP
(%)
1) 0.26 w 0.20 w 0.17 w 0.18 w 0.16 w 0.17 pw
Percentage of households who have internet access at home (%) 10) 38.2 w 86.1 w 88.4 w 89.0 w 91.5 w 92.0 w
Environment Note 2013 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
Index of greenhouse gas emissions, CO2 equivalent (1990 = 100) 34.9 w 40.4 w 43.2 w : : :
Energy intensity of the economy (kg of oil equivalent per 1 000 euro GDP at 2015 constant
prices)
271.4 w 439.5 w 346.6 w 293.0 w 289.5 w :
Electricity generated from renewable sources relative to gross electricity consumption (%) : 51.3 55.5 66.3 68.4 :
Road share of inland freight transport (based on tonne-km) (%) 11) 10.5 ew 17.8 ew 14.8 ew 16.1 ew 15.8 ew :
Energy Note 2013 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
Primary production of all energy products (thousand TOE) 1 429 1 248 1 272 1 285 1 319 :
Primary production of crude oil (thousand TOE) 49 36 37 39 36 :
Primary production of solid fuels (thousand TOE) 168 60 59 60 72 :
Primary production of gas (thousand TOE) 4 14 13 14 14 :
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Net imports of all energy products (thousand TOE) 2 824 i 4 133 i 4 561 i 4 544 i 4 797 i :
Gross inland energy consumption (thousand TOE) 4 248 5 385 5 867 5 823 6 114 :
Gross electricity generation (GWh) 10 059 12 645 14 247 14 396 14 234 :
Agriculture Note 2013 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
Agricultural output volume index (at producer prices) (2015 = 100) 101.1 w 111.8 w 109.9 w 106.1 w 120.4 w 113.6 pw
Utilised agricultural area (thousand hectares) : : : : : :
Livestock numbers: live bovine animals (thousand heads, end of period) 1 229.7 w 928.6 w 853.7 w 837.7 w 811.5 w :
Livestock numbers: live swine (thousand heads, end of period) 191.2 w 152.9 w 150.2 w 141.6 w 138.4 w :
Livestock numbers: live sheep and live goats (thousand heads, end of period) 856.8 iw 956.8 iw 914.0 iw 761.7 iw 740.4 iw :
Raw milk available on farms (thousand tonnes) 604.7 w 587.9 w 564.8 w 584.3 w 574.4 w :
Harvested crop production: cereals (including rice) (thousand tonnes) 483.3 iw 430.2 iw 370.5 iw 392.5 iw 411.3 iw :
Harvested crop production: sugar beet (thousand tonnes) : : : : : :
Harvested crop production: vegetables (thousand tonnes) 12) 271.2 w 226.9 w 201.1 w 187.5 w 175.9 w :
Source: Eurostat and/or the statistical authorities in Georgia**
: = not available b = break in time series d = definition differs e = estimated p = provisional i = Eurostat estimate w= data supplied by and under the responsibility of the national statistical authority and published on an "as is" basis and
without any assurance as regards their quality and adherence to EU statistical methodology
* = Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure (MIP) indicator
** = Data shown for Georgia exclude the occupied breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia over which the
government of Georgia does not exercise control.
Footnotes:
1) Based on 2008 SNA.
2) Calculations are made according to NACE Rev. 2.
3) Includes: limited liability companies, joint stock companies, joint liability companies, cooperatives, limited partnerships,
individual enterprises, foreign enterprise branches. Excludes: NACE Rev. 2 Sections K, O, T and U.
4) TIBR 1 Day.
5) Since 2020 - NACE Rev.2, before 2020 - NACE Rev.1.1.
6) Including construction.
7) Persons aged 15 years and older.
8) Persons without education are excluded.
9) Consumption based relative poverty.
10) Percentage of households having fixed internet connections at
87
home (therefore excluding mobile phone network).
11) Does not follow the 'territorial principle'; including the performance
of all resident carriers on the national territory and abroad.
12) Including kitchen gardens.