Arvamuse küsimine


Delegations will find attached document SEC(2024) 97 final.

Encl.: SEC(2024) 97 final


Delegations will find attached document SWD(2024) 67 final PART 2/2.

Encl.: SWD(2024) 67 final PART 2/2


Table of Contents
Annex 1. Procedural information 4
Annex 2. Stakeholder consultation (Synopsis report) 12
A2.1. EU-level social partners’ consultation 13
A2.1.1. Results of the first phase of the consultation 13
A2.1.2. Results of the second phase of the consultation 16
A2.2. European Parliament resolution of 14 June 2023 (2020/2005(INL) 19
A2.3. Consultative bodies and Conference on the Future of Europe 21
A2.4. Other consultation activities 22
A2.4.1. Study exploring the context, challenges and possible solutions in relation to the quality of traineeships in the EU 22
A2.4.2. SME panel survey 30
A2.4.3. Bilateral meetings and position papers 31
A2.4.4. Flash Eurobarometer 523 34
Annex 3. Who is affected and how? 36
A3.1. Practical implications of the initiative 36
A3.2. Summary of costs and benefits 37
Annex 4. Analytical methods 49
A4.1. Estimation of the prevalence of trainees 50
A4.1.1. Prevalence of paid trainees 50
A4.1.2. Prevalence of unpaid trainees 52
A4.1.3. Underestimation of the number of paid and unpaid trainees 53
A4.2. Baseline projections 54
A4.3. Estimation of certain cases of work relationships disguised as traineeships and of traineeships of long duration, including consecutive/repeated traineeships 57
A4.3.1. Estimation of certain cases of work relationships disguised as traineeships 57
A4.3.2. Estimation of traineeships of long duration, including consecutive/repeated traineeships 58
A4.4. Estimation of trainees likely to benefit from the measures to address poor quality traineeships 60
A4.4.1. Proxy for the number of trainees which could potentially benefit from fair/proportionate remuneration 60
A4.4.2. Proxy for the number of trainees to benefit from the written agreement 60
A4.5. Costs of familiarisation with new provisions 61
A4.6. Costs of enforcement and reporting channels 62
A4.7. Costs transparency of vacancies and cost of recruitment 65
A4.7.1. Costs of transparency of vacancies 65
A4.7.2. Costs of recruitment 66
A4.8. Costs of remuneration and access to social protection 67
A4.9. Cost of issuing a written agreement 70
A4.10. Methodologies for Stakeholder Consultations 71
A4.10.1. Supporting study – interviews 71
A4.10.2. Supporting study – survey 73
A4.11. Supporting study – vacancy analysis 73
A4.12. Flash Eurobarometer survey 74
A4.13. SME Panel 74
A4.14. Legal analysis 74
A4.15. Comparison of options 76
Annex 5. Competitiveness check 78
A5.1. Overview of impacts on competitiveness 78
A5.2. Synthetic assessment 78
Annex 6. The principles of the 2014 QFT 80
Annex 7. Prevalence of traineeships in the EU 83
A7.1. Prevalence and distribution of paid traineeships 83
A7.2. Profile of trainees 86
A7.3. Prevalence of unpaid traineeships 92
A7.4. Territorial and sectoral prevalence of trainees 94
A7.4.1. Territorial distribution 94
A7.4.2. Sectoral distribution 95
A7.5. Projected trends in traineeship prevalence 97
Annex 8. More information on work relationships disguised as traineeships 101
A8.1. Selection of elements indicating possible work relationships disguised as traineeships 101
A8.2. Quantitative data on the excessive duration of traineeships 103
A8.3. Quantitative evidence on repeated/consecutive traineeships with the same employer 105
A8.4. Quantitative data on previous professional experience 107
A8.5. Information on the ratio of trainees within an organisation 109
A8.6. Rough evidence on the prevalence of certain types of work relationships disguised as traineeships in the EU 110
Annex 9. Additional evidence feeding into problem section 111
A9.1. Legal status of trainees 111
A9.2. Provisions on remuneration and access to social protection 113
A9.3. Traineeship duration, consecutive traineeships and previous experience in vacancy notices 116
A9.3.1. Provision of duration 116
A9.3.2. Consecutive Traineeships 118
A9.3.3. Vacancy analysis on previous work experience 119
A9.4. Enforcement and inspection mechanisms 120
A9.5. Provisions on the training component of traineeships 121
A9.6. Provisions on supervision or mentorship 122
A9.7. Transparency of vacancy notices 123
A9.8. Provisions on teleworking arrangements 125
A9.9. The weak position of trainees in the labour market 126
A9.10. Factors hampering the use, quality and access to traineeships 127
A9.11. Details on External Drivers 130
A9.12. Who is affected by the problem? 131
Annex 10. Problem definition by type of traineeships 135
A10.1. Summary of the size of the problem of the problems by type of traineeships, and Member States affected 135
A10.2. Material Scope 137
Annex 11. Problem Tree 141
Annex 12. Additional Information on Policy Options 142
A12.1. Baseline 142
A12.2. List of measures regarding the unequal access to quality traineeships 146
Annex 13. Impacts and comparison of options 148
A13.1. Member States mostly affected by each policy option 148
A13.2. Details on Comparison of options 151
A13.3. Overview of impacts of all policy options 155
A13.3.1. Estimation of benefits 155
A13.3.2. Estimation of costs per policy options 158
A13.3.3. Summary table 161
Annex 14. SMEs TEST 173
Annex 15. Additional Information on Monitoring and Evaluation 175
A15.1. Proposal of indications to monitor the progress towards achieving the objectives of the initiative 175
A15.2. Possible data sources for monitoring and evaluations 176
A15.3. Possible evaluation methods 176




Annex 1. Procedural information
1. Lead DG, Decide Planning/CWP references
The lead DG is DG EMPL, DG Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion.
Agenda planning: PLAN/2023/1510.
Work Programme 2023 reference: An Economy that Works for People; Policy Objective No 28: Fostering better traineeships; Initiative: Reinforced quality framework for traineeships (non-legislative and/or legislative, Q2 2023).  
The legislative proposal is to be adopted in a package with: PLAN/2023/1996 - Proposal for a Council Recommendation on a reinforced Quality Framework for Traineeships
2. Organisation and timing
An Interservice Steering Group (ISSG) was accompanying the work on the initiative. In addition to EMPL, representatives from SG, AGRI, CNECT, COMM, EAC, ECFIN, GROW, JRC JUST, REGIO and SJ were appointed to the ISSG. This ISSG was previously supporting the evaluation of the 2014 QFT Recommendation.
The ISSG met five times (21 October 2022, 14 March 2023, 6 July 2023, 8 November 2023, 14 December 2023) to discuss the study supporting the Impact Assessment, the Art 225 own-initiative resolution of the European Parliament, the options to define the future initiative, as well as the draft Impact Assessment.
The Analytical Document accompanying the second phase consultation of social partners, on which the Impact Assessment is based, together with the second stage consultation document, was adopted via a fast-track Interservice Consultation (ISC) meeting on 21 September 2023 (DGs present: SG, EMPL, AGRI, COMM, EAC, ECFIN, SJ). The first phase consultation document went through a shortened ISC on 20-27 June 2023 (DGs consulted AGRI, BUDG, CNECT, COMM, DGT-EDIT, EAC, ECFIN, ESTAT, GROW, JRC, JUST, REGIO, SANTE, SG, SJ), and was adopted via urgent written procedure on 11 July 2023.
3. Consultation of the RSB
The Impact Assessment report was reviewed by the Regulatory Scrutiny Board (RSB) on 13 December 2023. The RSB delivered a negative opinion and, after examining the resubmitted version (submitted on 1 February 2024), delivered a positive opinion with reservations on 22 February 2024. . The revisions introduced in response to the RSB opinion are summarised in the tables below.



(a) First RSB opinion
RSB main reservations
Changes done in the IA
(1) The report should clarify the intended scope of the initiative in terms of types of traineeships covered. It should better explain why the envisaged single regulatory approach would encompass a variety of employment and/or educational relationships with different characteristics and objectives, including regarding paid versus unpaid traineeships.
A new section 5.1 was added where the personal and material scopes of the policy options are clarified. Also, an explanation is provided on the limits for EU action and how this affects the scope of the proposed measures. In section 5, for each measure, the intended scope is clarified by describing which types of traineeships are covered and whether it concerns paid or unpaid traineeships.

In section 2 on the problem definition and in the newly regrouped Annex 10, where possible, the problem is presented by type of traineeships and separately for trainees considered as workers (proxied by paid trainees) and trainees who are non-workers (unpaid trainees). This demonstrates that the problem is common among all types of traineeships, but to a varying degree. On the basis of this analysis in section 5.1, an explanation is provided on why one single regulatory approach is adopted for all types of traineeships. It is also clarified why different regulatory approaches are envisaged for paid and unpaid traineeships.
It should define what is considered a “quality” or non-problematic traineeship, and whether the relevant parameters differ by category of traineeship.
In the introduction to section 2.1, definitions are provided on how the following terms are used in the IA report: “non-problematic traineeship”; “problematic use of traineeships”; “quality traineeship” and “poor quality traineeships”.
An explanation is also provided on parameters used to identify each of these categories.
It should justify the single approach on the proposed duration for all types of traineeships, while being clearer on the scope of justified exemptions and flexibility given to Member States to reflect adequately national conditions
A justification for the approach on duration was added at the beginning of section 5.3.2. In the description of Policy Options A2.1 (non-legislative) and A2.2 explanations were given on the scope of justified exemptions and flexibility given to Member States.
It should explain the difference between the treatment of trainees considered as workers and others.
A new section 5.1 on the personal scope of the options, including an explanation of the different treatment of trainees, was added. Furthermore, a new section was added in the introduction of section 2 explaining the different possible labour market statuses of trainees at national level and in which cases a trainee is considered as a worker under EU law.
The report should use clearer, more specific language when describing non-quality traineeships, and in particular disguised work.
The term “work relationship disguised as a traineeship “was introduced to refer to situations of “disguised work”. In the introduction to section 2.1 the difference between “non-quality traineeships” (i.e., poor quality traineeships) and “disguised work” is explained and definitions were added.
The consistency on the use of such labels to address the problems throughout the IA report was ensured: i.e., the term “work relationship disguised as a traineeship” is used to refer to “disguised work” and the term “poor quality” for “non-quality traineeships”.
(2) The report should be more transparent about the limitations and robustness of the supporting evidence.

In the introduction to Annex 4 a summary on the limitations and robustness of the supporting evidence was added with specific references to subsections where these issues are discussed in detail.
Also, a new section was added in the introduction to section 2.1. where these issues are outlined.
It should elaborate on the scale of the problems and differentiate between the specific problems affecting each type of traineeship covered.
Throughout section 2.1 on problem definition, where possible, an analysis of the scale of the problem is presented by type of traineeships. In section 2.3 an analysis of the problem drivers is also presented by type of traineeships on the basis of the results of the legal analysis. Annex 10, which has been renamed ‘Problem definition by type of traineeships’ comprises now all relevant more detailed information in one place.
It should clarify to what extent level playing field and unfair competition issues play a role and what the available evidence on this regarding traineeships is.
In the introduction to section 2.1.1 and in section 2.2 it was clarified that the problematic use of traineeships leads to uneven playing field and unfair competition among companies. A conceptual explanation of the issue has been provided.

It should be clear whether some geographical regions or specific sectors might be significantly more affected by the problems than others, and if so, explain why no more targeted measures were considered.
In the introduction to section 2.1 a paragraph was added on the sectoral and geographical distribution of the prevalence of traineeships. In section 2.1.1 some evidence from the literature is provided for some Member States and sectors. In Section 2.1.2 evidence is provided by sectors based on the study supporting the evaluation. Annex A7.4 was also strengthened with additional data on sectoral distribution. In section 5.1 it has been clarified that similar problems have been identified for all economic sectors therefore, more targeted measures were not considered.
The report should provide a realistic and balanced picture of the problems’ evolution supported by robust evidence.
Section 5.1 of the report was strengthened in order to provide a more realistic and balanced picture of the problem’s evolution. More specifically, we added an overview on drivers of labour shortages in the EU, and how the “race for talents” could explain certain improvements between 2013 and 2023. We discussed that the emergence of labour shortages seems to concern only certain sectors and that in certain occupations poor working conditions do not seem to be offset by the “race for talent.”

We also clarified that, in a foresight perspective, the above structural drivers will continue to play a significant role, but we also argued that a quick and even increase in the quality of traineeships will not materialise, without improvements to the current QFT.
(3) The report should explain whether some Member States have been able to tackle the problems identified, and if so, how has this been taken into consideration.
It should explain why national rules regulating the aspects covered by the initiative are not sufficient or not adequate.
References to existing policies of Member States to tackle some of the problems the initiative aims to address have been included, also in Section 3.2. These have mainly been identified in the legal analysis (Annex 9) and stakeholder contributions and have inspired the design of the options.
Additional information and explanations on gaps in Member States’ policies and regulations to tackle the identified problems are provided in Section 2 and Section 3.2, drawing from the findings of the 2023 evaluation of the 2014 QFT, the legal analysis conducted in support of the impact assessment report and stakeholder contributions.
The views of all stakeholders should be clearly and consistently recorded throughout the analysis.
The views of different stakeholders are now more clearly presented throughout the report. In particular, the views of employer associations have been better integrated based on the results of the two-phase social partners’ consultation and the evaluation of the 2014 QFT. The evaluation was also used to present more clearly the inputs from national authorities from Member States. Finally, the different and sometimes contrasting views of stakeholders (including social partners) have been referred to more explicitly.
The report should demonstrate why legislative action at EU level is necessary and justified. It should elaborate on the EU value-added and should explain how differences among Member States and their respective labour markets and governance regimes will be considered.
Additional information and explanations are provided in Sections 3.2 and 3.3.
The presentation of policy options and the comparison of options have been revised to explain how the specificities of Member States’ national regulations, including in particular enforcement regimes and (professional) education and training systems, are considered. The assessment of binding and non-binding policy options was revisited in light of proportionality considerations.
(4) The report should provide a more developed and dynamic analysis of the baseline that adequately reflects all available evidence on the likely evolution of the labour market and the offer and conditions of traineeships in the EU.
It should better incorporate foresight analysis on the broader demographic and labour market trends, such as the increasing scarcity and race to find and retain talent, the observed increased rates of paid and cross-border traineeships, and the economic incentives for employers to invest in quality traineeships in view of expected productivity and competitiveness benefits.
Section 5.1 of the report was strengthened in order to provide a more realistic and balanced picture of the problems’ evolution and to integrate foresight analysis. More specifically, an overview on drivers of labour shortages in the EU and an explanation of how the “race for talents” could explain certain improvements between 2013 and 2023 were added. The section clarifies that the emergence of labour shortages seems to concern only certain sectors and that in certain occupations poor working conditions do not seem to be offset by the “race for talent.”
(5) The report should include estimates of costs and benefits of the options. The cost-benefit analysis should provide monetised estimates to the extent possible, presenting total costs and benefits, as well as administrative and adjustment costs.
This should include the estimates of the increase of labour costs to businesses resulting from the requirement to provide fair and proportionate renumeration for trainees considered workers and the recommendation to provide fair and proportionate remuneration and access to social protection for all trainees. The report should also provide the estimates of the costs to businesses to undergo inspections.

Section 6 of the report has been strengthened with rough proxy estimates for quantification/monetisation of benefits and costs of the options, to the extent possible. A summary table of the main costs and benefits which were possible to quantify was included at the end of section 6. All cost and benefits are also presented in tables in annex A13.3. This includes costs to businesses resulting from the requirement to provide fair and proportionate renumeration for trainees considered workers and the recommendation to provide fair and proportionate remuneration and access to social protection for all trainees. It was clarified in the report that the costs for businesses to undergo inspections are expected to be negligible as they will take place in the framework of business-as-usual operations.
The analysis should better explain the uncertainties and more clearly present the costs and benefits that result from the Directive and the Recommendation by adequately reflecting biding and non-binding nature of the measures.

In the introduction to Annex 4 a summary of the uncertainties regarding estimation of costs was added with specific references to subsections where these issues are discussed in detail. In the introduction to Section 6 a paragraph was added explaining the limitations and robustness of the supporting evidence for the quantification/monetisation of impacts with reference to Annex 4 where more information is given on the limitations of the underlying data. A table has been added to the end of Section 6 and in Annex A13.3 where the costs and benefits that result from the Directive and the Recommendation are shown.
(6) The report should include a more developed and better substantiated analysis of unintended consequences. It should be clearer how the different options could affect the
availability of traineeships. It should comprehensively assess the risk of a reduction in the number of quality traineeships due to higher costs to employers. It should examine potential impacts as regards the future offer for trainees and the risk of a potential shift to the less regulated traineeships.
Section 6.9 on unintended consequences was added. While it is not possible to quantify the impacts on the future offer of traineeships and the risk of potential shifts from paid traineeships to unpaid traineeships, the discussion was developed and the section takes into account the different impact per type of traineeships, stemming from the existing regulatory approaches and practices at national level.
It should also assess whether treating traineeships differently, based on their worker status, could affect the level playing field.
A discussion was added in section 2.1 where it is highlighted that the diversity of national systems with regard to the classification of trainees results in considerable differences in trainees’ access to labour rights and social protection. This situation also puts unpaid trainees (vis-à-vis paid trainees) and providers of paid traineeships (vis-à-vis their competitors providing unpaid traineeships) at an unfair disadvantage. Furthermore, in section 5.1 it is explained that due to limitations in the legal basis the EU can only propose binding measures for trainees considered as workers under EU law. Taking into consideration concerns that this could affect the level playing field, the preferred option includes a proposal for a Directive for trainees considered workers and a Recommendation for all trainees. This combination is expected to level the playing field. Also, trainees who are non-workers could benefit from spill-over effects of the legislative measures. Thes arguments were presented in section 8.

The report should present the impacts on competitiveness of the most affected sectors and actors, in particular SMEs.
It should also present in concrete terms the envisaged support for SMEs and assess mitigation measures for SMEs.

Qualitative assessment of the impact on business competitiveness (including for SMEs) have been added as relevant in the report (sections 2.1.1, 2.2, 2.3.2, 2.3.5, 3.3) with explanations of the potential short- and long-term effects of relying on cheaper labour.

More details on the SMEs, including suggestions on how the support measures could be used to the benefit of SMEs, as well as a justification for the lack of exemption measures for SMEs, were added in section 5.7 and 6.
(7) The report should assess and compare all relevant options including a fully non-legislative option.
A fully non-legislative option was integrated for areas A and B (sections 5.3 and 5.4), whereas the options in areas C and D were already non-legislative only. Their impacts are presented respectively in areas A and B in the impact section (6.2 and 6.3) and included in the comparison of options (section 7).
In light of this change and in view of proportionality considerations, the options in areas A and B have also been slightly restructured and reconsidered.
It should provide a substantive discussion and comparison of the options in terms of proportionality.
It should explain thoroughly how proportionate the options are, given the uncertainty on the scale of the problems, the expected benefits, and costs, as well as broader subsidiarity considerations.
The new section 7.4. on proportionality assesses how the considered options match the identified problems and objectives, considering in particular the scale of the problems, the expected benefits and costs, and the potential and necessary scope for national action. The summary overview of the ratings of the options is provided in Table 2 while more details are provided in Annex A13.2.


(b) Second RSB Opinion
RSB main reservations
Changes done in the IA
(1) While the revised report better acknowledges the limitations of the evidence base
regarding the scale of the problems and the expected impacts of measures, it does not
systematically reflect such limitations throughout the analysis and in the findings. It
should qualify its conclusions according to the validity of the underlying evidence, in
particular where alternative views might be equally plausible.
New paragraphs have been added in the introduction of sections 7 and 8 to explain that, while the quantitative evidence on the impacts of the options is subject to some data limitations (as explained in the introduction to sections 2.1 and 6, and Annex 4), the conclusions in this report are based on triangulated evidence from different sources (as described in Annex 4) which ensures the validity of the conclusions.
Furthermore, sections 7 and 8 have been revised to further align them with the narrative in the rest of the report.
When relying on
stakeholder views and surveys, the report should address the risk of biased responses.
The text at the end of section 2.1 (right before subsection 2.1.1) was changed to clarify that the analysis was conducted in full awareness of the inherent subjectivity of some data sources, as well as of the fact that not all data sources are statistically representative.
A short explanation was added at the beginning of section A4.10 of the Annex (“Methodologies for Stakeholder Consultation”) with a reference to the relevant Better Regulation Tools (51-55).
As the report argues that the problems seem to be more prevalent in certain sectors or certain Member States and less in others where there seem fewer quality issues, this should be better reflected in the analysis.
Section 6.1 has been revised to clarify that the expected impact will be stronger in Member States and sectors where the prevalence of trainees is more pronounced (assessment by type of traineeship where available). Also, it has been explained that the impacts will be stronger for sectors where, despite labour shortages, working conditions have not been improving.
Section 6.2 was also revised to include information regarding the sectors which would potentially benefit more. Finally, section 6 was revised by presenting, where possible, a list of Member States which are likely to be more impacted by the different policy options.
(2) The report should better and more consistently assess the relevance and significance of level playing field and unfair competition issues argued to result from the problematic use of traineeships. It should be more consistent in reconciling its assessment on the
importance of unfair competition, with the small overall percentage of trainees in businesses and the resulting small impact on competitiveness. It should explain the potentially conflicting argumentation on the substantial role of competition issues, and
how these will affect businesses. It should, in addition, substantiate with evidence their significance in view of the diversity of national labour market regulatory approaches, and the differences of labour costs between Member States.
It was clarified throughout the text (sections 2.1.1, 2.2, 3.2, 3,3, 5.2, 5.7, 6.2.2, 6.3.2 of the main report; section A5.2 of the Annexes) that although the size of the (current and projected) population of trainees is relatively small compared to the overall working population, a suboptimal use of traineeships could in principle have a disproportionately negative impact on businesses, which rely on young talent and an innovation-friendly mindset for their growth.
Where appropriate (e.g., section 5.7), it was also clarified that to the extent that a lack of EU action could (even indirectly) encourage a competition based purely on labour cost, this would constitute an undesirable dynamic, which should be avoided irrespective of the relative prevalence of traineeships.
It was also mentioned (see section 3.3, 6.6) that this impact would arguably be more noticeable in those Member States where the problems identified in the analysis are more pronounced (as detailed in Annex 9 of the report).
Finally, in section 6.2.2 it was clarified that expected economic benefits for traineeship providers in terms of level playing field/fair competition would be proportionate to the number of trainees in problematic traineeships, who will benefit from the initiative.
The report should better assess the effect of additional binding measures envisaged for paid traineeships on the level playing field between “worker trainees” and “unpaid trainees”.
In section 6, for each of the binding measures (i.e. A1.2, A1.3, A2.2, B1.2, B1.3, and B2.2), the (possible) impact on the level playing field between “worker trainees” and “unpaid trainees” has been described.
It should further assess potential unintended consequences, such as the risk of having fewer traineeships.
Section 6.9 was slightly revised to avoid giving the impression we are underestimating certain unintended consequences, in particular the risk of having fewer traineeships (at least for some types of traineeships).
(3) The report should explain if other combinations of measures than the preferred combination have been assessed and whether the latter is overall the best performing one.
A paragraph was added in the introduction to section 5.1 where the approach to building policy options and assessing the impacts was explained. It is clarified that no other combinations of measures have been assessed besides the preferred combination. The policy options were structured under four different areas in order to establish a clear link between the identified problems and policy options. For each area, a number of alternative policy options were identified which were assessed and compared against the baseline scenario and one preferred option was identified for each area. These four preferred options were combined to form the preferred option for the overall initiative for which the combined effects were assessed in section 8.
The report should better explain what differentiates the two legislative options B1.2 and B1.3 and their impacts.
The description of the legislative options B1.2 and B1.3 in Section 5.4.1 of the report was revised in order to clarify the difference between option B1.2 (which incorporates non-legislative option B1.1 and introduces the principle of non-discrimination for all working conditions, including remuneration) and option B1.3(which implies a binding measure introducing an individual right to fair/proportionate remuneration, but does not bring any protection as regards other working conditions beyond remuneration).
The description of the social (Section 6.3.1) and economic (Section 6.3.2) impacts of options B1.2 and B1.3 was adapted accordingly, clarifying that, in terms of costs and benefits, similar impacts can be expected for both options as regards remuneration. It was also clarified that, unlike option B1.2, option B1.3 cannot be expected to produce any benefits or costs related to other working conditions beyond remuneration.
The tables with the detailed comparison of options in Annex 13
should be brought forward in the main report.
The tables with the detailed comparison of options in Annex13.2 were included in section 7 of the main report.

4. Evidence, sources and quality
The following sources have fed into the Impact Assessment:
• Study commissioned from external experts: "Study exploring the context, challenges and possible solution in relation to the quality of traineeships in the EU" by consortium of EY, CEPS and Open Evidence (forthcoming).
• European Commission (2023) Evaluation of the Council Recommendation on a Quality Framework for Traineeships (SWD(2023) 9 final).
• External study supporting the evaluation of the Quality Framework for Traineeships, Final Report, January 2023: https://ec.europa.eu/social/BlobServlet?docId=26544&langId=en
• A review of national legislation and case law on trainees (EU-27) – Country reports provided by the European Centre of Expertise (ECE).
• ECE expert brainstorming workshop to explore legal options to improve the quality of traineeships, 29 June 2023.
• The Flash Eurobarometer survey on the perception of young people regarding their integration into the labour market, with a particular focus on traineeships.
• The results of the ‘SME panel’ survey on quality traineeships, which ran from 12 October to 9 November 2023.
• Relevant academic literature, as referred to in footnotes.
Annex 2. Stakeholder consultation (Synopsis report)
Stakeholders' views have been an important element of input to this impact assessment, notably to develop and assess the policy options. The following inputs have been taken into account:
1. EU-level social partners’ consultation: as required by Article 154 TFEU, a formal two-phase consultation of the social partners at EU level was carried out prior to submitting this proposal in the social policy field. The first phase of the social partners’ consultation took place between 11 July and 15 September 2023. The second phase lasted from 28 September to 9 November 2023.
2. European Parliament resolution of 14 June 2023 with recommendations to the Commission on quality traineeships in the Union (2020/2005(INL)): this resolution, containing two annexes with draft proposals for EU-level legislation, was adopted under Article 225 TFEU.
3. Opinions by consultative bodies (European Economic and Social Committee; Committee of the Regions) and final report of the Conference on the Future of Europe.
4. Other consultation activities:
4.1. As part of the study exploring the context, challenges and possible solutions in relation to the quality of traineeships in the EU (thereafter “the supporting study”), an online survey was conducted with national stakeholders to gather information on current practices of businesses regarding traineeships, identify good practices implemented in Member States and their impacts on the quality of traineeships. The survey ran from 15 June 2023 to 8 September 2023 and was targeted to national public authorities, national business/employer associations, individual businesses, national trade unions, national youth organisations, civil society organisations and educational institutions. Targeted interviews with EU-level stakeholders were also carried out.
4.2. A dedicated “SME Panel” survey was conducted in cooperation between DG EMPL, DG GROW, EISMEA and with the support of the European Enterprise Network (EEN), between 12 October 2023 and 9 November 2023.
4.3. Bilateral meetings and position papers from EU and national trade unions, employer organisations and youth organisations.
4.4. Flash Eurobarometer 523: the Flash Eurobarometer looked into the perceptions of young people regarding their integration into the labour market, with a particular focus on traineeships. Between 15 and 24 March 2023, 26 334 people between 18 and 35 years from all EU Member States were surveyed online.
No public consultation was held, as during the preparation of the proposal a broad variety of consultation activities took place, and a public consultation was already held as part of the Commission's 2023 evaluation of the QFT1 (thereafter “the evaluation”). The evaluation also included targeted consultations of national and regional authorities responsible for education, training and employment policies, social and economic partners, education and training providers, academic experts working on labour market issues, organisations representing young people, young (former, current and potential future) trainees, as well as other relevant stakeholders at European, national and regional level. To adequately reach these stakeholders, different consultation activities and methods were used, such as interviews, targeted consultation meetings, a targeted trainees survey, and case studies. A detailed description of these activities and their outcome can be found in the evaluation.
A2.1. EU-level social partners’ consultation
Results of the first phase of the consultation
During the first phase of the consultation (11 July 2023 - 15 September 2023), 13 recognised social partners contributed with written replies: Four trade union organisations (European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC); Confederation of Independent Trade Unions (CESI); CEC European Managers; European Council for Professionals and Managers (Eurocadres)) and nine employer organisations (BusinessEurope; SGI Europe; SMEunited; European Chemical Employers Group (ECEG); Council of European Employers of the Metal, Engineering and Technology-Based Industries (CEEMET); Hotels, Restaurants and Cafés in Europe (HOTREC); EuroCommerce; European Hospital and Healthcare Employers’ Association (HOSPEEM); Council of European Municipalities and Regions (CEMR).
Trade unions welcome the Commission’s intention to update the QFT. They consider that, while the principles of the QFT remain relevant, trainees need binding protection (in the form of a directive) to ensure fair compensation, working conditions and social protection. It should ensure access to all rights enjoyed by regular workers under existing EU legislation.
ETUC adds that a directive should not jeopardise the possibility of social partners to maintain, conclude and enforce collective agreements that also cover traineeships. It also notes that an EU initiative should not create a new category of workers, reduce existing rights for trainees nor interfere with any existing practice, law or collective agreement regulating vocational education and training.
Regarding references for remuneration, CESI proposes to link compensation to the Minimum Wage Directive ((EU) 2022/2041), while CEC European Managers suggest a minimum threshold for remuneration linked to a common reference indicator.
Trade unions also state that the directive should set minimum standards for duration and renewal, learning objectives (to be included in vacancy notices), mentoring and supervision (to be clearly distinguished), transparent information and procedures, monitoring and reporting channels, a maximum number of trainees per company/organisation, and access to trade unions and representation. CESI calls for these aspects to be formalised in a written agreement and suggests requiring vacancy notices to be free of biased or discriminatory language. On work relationships disguised as traineeships, trade unions underline that trainees who are subject to the same working conditions (equipment, working hours, workload, treatment etc.) as workers employed in the same workplace should also benefit from the same rights and protections and be considered as workers. They state that the EU initiative should convey a strong message that using traineeships as a model to replace regular working contracts is not acceptable. Trade unions underline that the objective of a directive should be to introduce quality criteria and to prevent work relationships disguised as traineeships by setting minimum and maximum durations for traineeships and specific conditions for their renewal or extension. ETUC suggests that additional measures could entail cooperation between Member States and the European Labour Authority. In this regard, ETUC also stresses the importance of strengthening labour inspectorates.
Regarding remote traineeships, trade unions consider that trainees’ working arrangements need particular consideration in such settings. ETUC also considers it important for a directive to recall the application of the principle of reasonable accommodation for trainees, in particular in view of trainees with disabilities.
As for the scope of a possible directive, trade unions hold slightly different views. ETUC notes that a directive should cover traineeships offered on the open labour market, in the context of active labour market policies and as a mandatory part of professional training, therefore excluding traineeships done as part of educational or training curricula, as these fall under Member State competence. CESI notes that open market traineeships, those promoted under the Youth Guarantee and those required as vocational training should be within the scope of the directive. Eurocadres is of the view that the scope should be widened to include all four types of traineeships. CESI also considers that unpaid trainees should also be considered as workers.
As regards a potential update of the Council Recommendation, ETUC stresses that it should cover all types of traineeships, while apprenticeships should remain excluded. ETUC highlights the following as quality aspects to be covered: the level of trainees’ allowances; access to social protection; mentorship (and possibly remuneration of mentors); inclusiveness (in particular with regards to workers with disabilities); and cross-border aspects of traineeships.
ETUC supports, as part of ALMPs, the provision of subsidies to companies that invest in high-quality traineeship opportunities. It points out that it is important to closely monitor companies that offer one or multiple consecutive traineeship positions.
CEC European Managers note that more quantitative and qualitative data are needed. The criteria set by the QFT could serve as indicators in the collection of this data. They emphasise that an increased burden on employers and trainees should be avoided and suggest that data collection methods could be integrated or complement existing national or sectoral initiatives. They also suggest that an EU-level digital platform for traineeships (integrated in existing platforms like the European employment services network (EURES)) could improve transparency and facilitate the exchange of experiences, in particular to support cross-border traineeships. Supporting measures, for example in the area of coaching and mentoring, could also be integrated into such a platform.
Trade unions confirm their willingness to start negotiations with employers under Article 155 TFEU.
Employers consider that the principles of the 2014 Council Recommendation on a Quality Framework for Traineeships (QFT) remain relevant. In their opinion, a stronger focus should be placed on its implementation and monitoring, but for them the QFT nevertheless strikes the right balance between promoting minimum standards and preserving flexibility. BusinessEurope, SMEunited, EuroCommerce and CEEMET notably stress the principle of a common understanding of the learning outcomes to be gained, while providing for flexibility for these to change during a traineeship. HOTREC and CEEMET emphasise the importance of the learning content that should be reflected in the tasks assigned to trainees.
In terms of avenues for future EU action, employers consider that a reinforced Council Recommendation would be an appropriate instrument. As for a directive, employers warn that an overly prescriptive approach could give rise to unintended adverse consequences, such as disincentives to offering traineeships by creating more operational and reporting burdens, which could particularly weigh against SMEs.
Employers highlight that the current QFT principle on informing whether an allowance/compensation is applicable is still appropriate and sufficient. They also underline the need to uphold the contractual freedom of social partners when it comes to collective 5 bargaining on pay. Moreover, employers consider it more appropriate to use the term compensation instead of remuneration. They also recall that providing in-job training to young people entails indirect costs for businesses, for example as regards supervising the trainee. On social protection, employers highlight the subsidiarity principle and therefore do not consider that EU action is needed in this area.
Employers highlight the lack of data, in particular on open market traineeships and on the link between pay and the quality of traineeships. SMEunited notes that the lack of data makes it difficult to identify and quantify what types of traineeships are the most exposed to potential problems. CEMR highlights in particular the lack of data on the quality of traineeships that are part of formal education and training.
Regarding a potential revision of the Council Recommendation, BusinessEurope notes that the impact of remote forms of learning and working and the impact of the green transition could be explored, while SMEunited does not support including principles on hybrid or remote traineeships. CEMR sees merit in strengthening cross-border coordination.
BusinessEurope, SGI Europe, EuroCommerce and CEEMET would also see merit in complementing the existing Council Recommendation with additional supporting actions, notably mutual learning and awareness-raising activities, for example through the creation of a dedicated group of Member States and relevant stakeholders, but without creating a new permanent structure. SMEunited suggests using intermediate bodies dedicated to supporting SMEs, for example through the exchange of good practices, by explaining to SMEs legal requirements, by providing guidance on how to promote diversity, and by offering tailormade support, training, and advice in a business language. Employers also consider it relevant to engage in a wider reflection on the role of career guidance and advice. SGI Europe and SMEunited would welcome financial support to employers, in particular for SMEs, for example to offer mentorship and post-placement support. BusinessEurope and EuroCommerce consider that hiring incentives as part of active labour market policies could be helpful if they respect employers’ freedom regarding hiring decisions.
On the possible abuse of traineeships to disguise regular work relationships, BusinessEurope recalls that while trainees should not end up in a constant cycle of traineeships, traineeships (in particular those that are part of formal curricula in education) are also a way to try out several different occupations. SMEunited considers that work relationships disguised as traineeships are best addressed at national level. HOTREC and CEEMET underline that problematic traineeships should be eliminated, though HOTREC would not agree with defining a maximum duration nor with setting specific conditions for renewal or extension. CEEMET adds that traineeships of longer duration could be justified in some cases. ECEG and CEEMET consider that non-binding measures could be considered for addressing work relationships disguised as traineeships and that the QFT already sufficiently addresses the issue of extensive traineeship duration. ECEG considers that the current QFT enforcement mechanisms should be strengthened, while CEEMET calls for greater enforcement at national level.
As to the scope, employers do not support enlarging it compared with the current QFT. CEMR suggests instead to limit the current scope, focusing on open market traineeships only. BusinessEurope, SGI Europe, SMEunited and CEMR argue that traineeships that are part of formal education and training processes are already subject to structured and regulated governance systems at national level, with established learning outcomes, oversight and well-established quality assurance, and certification systems. HOTREC, ECEG, and HOSPEEM make the same argument for traineeships of which the completion is mandatory to access certain professions. EuroCommerce, CEEMET, ECEG, and CEMR underline the limitations 6 of Articles 165(4) and 166(4) TFEU. BusinessEurope and SMEunited also mention the need to differentiate between traineeships and apprenticeships and to avoid overlaps between different EU instruments. BusinessEurope states that as regards cross-border mobility, it would be better to prioritise efforts on the cross-border mobility of apprentices, while SMEunited would be in favour of better support for cross-border traineeships.
Employers do not identify any scope for a European level social dialogue process on this subject.
Results of the second phase of the consultation
During the second phase of the consultation (28 September 2023 - 9 November 2023), the same 13 recognised social partners contributed with written replies as during the first phase of the consultation.
Objectives of a possible EU action 
Trade unions stress that the main objective of EU action must be to set binding minimum standards for traineeships in the EU and to establish a level playing field discouraging abuse. Specifically, ETUC and Eurocadres highlight that the initiative should ban unpaid traineeships and support trainees in accessing their rights. It should support the prevention, detection and combating of work relationships disguised as traineeships. Finally, the initiative should improve the quality and accessibility of traineeships. CEC European Managers adds that traineeships should be integrated into lifelong learning policies and schemes and cautions about presenting traineeships as a means to address labour shortages. 
Employers stress that the purpose of a traineeship is to provide skills that will increase employability and enhance employment prospects. The objectives to address the problematic use of, improve the quality of and foster access to traineeships are supported.  
Potential avenues for EU action 
Trade unions acknowledge the importance of combatting work relationships disguised as traineeships. They argue that alongside the potential measures outlined by the Commission to support the detection and combatting work relationships disguised as traineeships, there is a need to establish common binding quality standards for traineeships across the EU.  
ETUC stresses in this regard that a decrease in the number of work relationships disguised as traineeships may lower the overall number of traineeships, but should be seen as a positive impact of the initiative. Moreover, ETUC and Eurocadres highlight that a higher quality of traineeships will also improve the access to traineeship opportunities for persons in vulnerable situations. 
In this regard, trade unions largely agree with the potential measures on quality traineeships presented in the Commission’s consultation document. They notably call for the following quality standards to be included: 
• A written contract registered with relevant authorities according to national practice, allowing for transparency, adequate control, and data collection; 
• Setting of a maximum duration of a traineeship for 6 months and in exceptional circumstances for one year (where duly justified) and the forbidding of the renewal of the traineeship with the same employer; 
• Forbidding employers to require candidates for traineeship positions to have previous work experience (including traineeships) in the field of activity; 
• Dedicated complaint channel for reporting work relationships disguised as traineeships; 
• Setting a maximum ratio of trainees in a company (max 20% of the workforce); 
• Setting up learning objectives and adequate mentoring and supervision arrangements in the written contract, whereby CEC Managers suggests foreseeing a detailed learning plan, certification of traineeship programmes and a limit on the number of trainees per mentor coupled with the provision of sufficient resources for mentoring, and Eurocadres argues that the Council Recommendation 2022/C 243/03 on individual learning accounts may offer a partial solution to ensure decent learning content; 
• Access to workers' representatives and trade unions; 
• Right to a remuneration not lower than the minimum wage in line with Directive (EU) 2022/2041 on adequate minimum wages in the EU and collective agreements. CEC notes that trainees’ remuneration should be set in line with the standard of living in each Member States, while CESI argues that, for ECT, the policy objective should be an allowance to cover the costs of living. ETUC notes that the compatibility of any traineeship allowance with benefits (in particular those related to disability) should be strongly encouraged; 
• Access to social security applicable for workers according to national practice and in line with Council Recommendation (2019/C 387/01) on access to social protection for workers and the self-employed; 
• Occupational health and safety protection in line with EU and national law and respect of rest periods in line with the Working Time Directive (2003/88/EC); 
• EU action should be accompanied by measures to support enforcement authorities and allow for access to justice by trainees and trade unions. 
Employers agree with some of the suggested avenues for action. On the misuse of traineeships, employers, with the exception of CEMR and HOTREC, agree that having an indicative common understanding at EU level would be a useful step to ensure that all relevant actors, especially employers, trainees and regulatory authorities, have an objective set of criteria against which to assess the conduct of a traineeship. National authorities should carry out dedicated checks and inspections, while not increasing reporting obligations for employers. ECEG suggests that the exchange of good practices could support addressing the misuse of traineeships.  
Employers can support clarifying that the reasonable maximum duration of traineeships as set out in the 2014 QFT (6 months, except where a longer duration is justified) can cover several traineeships, but there should be no legally binding limit. SMEunited adds that having to provide justification for longer traineeships would generate additional burden for SMEs. Employers also agree that candidates for traineeships should in principle not be required to have previous work experience in the field of activity. However, they are opposed to include information on the level of remuneration in their vacancy notices. 
As regards remuneration, employers state that trainees who are workers under national law should be subject to the applicable rules on remuneration, social protection and intellectual property. BusinessEurope and SGI Europe stress that in such cases, there can be objective grounds for a lower level of remuneration, considering the learning component of traineeships. BusinessEurope and SMEunited argue that where there is no employment relationship, reference should be made to compensation. Moreover, employers do not support any measure on increasing transparency of remuneration structures. SMEunited and SGI Europe point out that the TFEU does not leave much scope for a binding measure on social protection.  
On the learning content, employers oppose obligations on written learning objectives or learning agreements. EuroCommerce sees a risk that this would develop in overly prescriptive and restrictive learning plans, at the expense of practical experience, while ECEG adds that the learning component is sector specific. As regards the strengthening of provisions relating to information on mentoring, supervision, and evaluation, employers caution against a too formalistic approach, resulting in new administrative or reporting obligations. As for transparency requirements for vacancy notices, these are supported provided they remain non-binding, in particular in view of the risk of adding administrative burden to SMEs. Employers see an added value in supporting information provision on cross-border traineeship opportunities and in the simplification of procedures, in particular through the EURES portal.  
SGI Europe agrees that the existing Council Recommendation could be reinforced with principles on improving access to traineeships for vulnerable groups. SMEunited notes that employers, though supporting inclusiveness measures, may not be best placed to actively reach out to vulnerable groups. This would be better left to actors such as Public Employment Services. ECEG notes that the Strategy for the Rights of Persons with Disabilities 2021-2030 provides sufficient measures to address the accessibility of traineeships for persons with disabilities and welcomes the progress made on the Disability Card. Support to employers for making workplaces inclusive is viewed as essential. SMEunited supports the extension of the existing Council Recommendation to remote and hybrid traineeships, while ECEG rather suggests better promoting relevant existing EU initiatives in the area of skills. Employers support financial and non-financial support as well as guidance to employers.  
Policy instruments 
Among trade unions, ETUC and Eurocadres argue that EU action should cover all OMT, ALMP and MPT by means of a directive, whereas ECT should be covered by means of a Council Recommendation. CESI does not see non-binding measures as a promising way forward. Trade unions emphasise the need to also cover unpaid trainees by means of the directive, in order to avoid that higher quality standards result in a wider use of unpaid traineeships. ETUC adds that trainees should either be covered by lawfully paid traineeships in the open labour market or by (lawfully unpaid) traineeships in education. According to the ETUC, the legal base for an EU initiative to ban unpaid OMT, ALMP and MPT should be Article 153(1)(b) TFEU in conjunction with Article 153(1)(h) TFEU. CESI is of the opinion that a possible unanimity requirement in Council should not be a reason for the Commission to refrain from a legislative proposal. 
Employers stress that reinforcing the existing Council Recommendation would be a more adequate, proportionate and appropriate response than a directive, as the latter may risk disincentivising traineeship offers. ECEG, EuroCommerce and HOSPEEM refer to skills shortages exacerbated by the digital and green transitions as well as demographic change. BusinessEurope adds that the tackling of the misuse of traineeships, where it occurs, does not require a directive and should be addressed by better enforcement of existing rules by national authorities. SMEunited and ECEG suggest that improved implementation of the Recommendation could be achieved by increased monitoring in the context of the European Semester. Employers also suggest strengthened cooperation amongst relevant stakeholders, practical guidance, exchange of best practices, and awareness-raising of the benefits that traineeships can bring. Moreover, employers oppose the inclusion of traineeships that are part of formal education and training and those mandatory to access certain professions in the scope of an updated Council Recommendation. In particular the latter type is already subject to structured and regulated governance and quality assurance systems at national level. SGI Europe adds that measures addressing competent public bodies to support better matching of trainees and employers, as well as comparable EU-wide data on trainees(hips) would facilitate the implementation of the Recommendation.  
Willingness to enter into negotiations 
Based on the results of the first-phase consultation and the position of employer organisations, the ETUC and Eurocadres do not see a substantive basis for negotiations under Article 155 TFEU, while CEC Managers is available to initiate a dialogue. 
Employers do not identify any scope for negotiations under Article 155 TFEU.
European Parliament resolution of 14 June 2023 (2020/2005(INL)
General
On 14 June 2023, the European Parliament adopted with 404 votes in favour, 78 against, and 130 abstentions a resolution in line with Article 225 TFEU on quality traineeships in the Union with recommendations to the Commission on quality traineeships in the Union. The resolution calls on the Commission “to update and strengthen the 2014 Council Recommendation on a Quality Framework for Traineeships and turn it into a stronger legislative instrument”.
More specifically, the European Parliament requests the Commission to submit a proposal for a framework Directive on Quality Traineeships on the basis of Article 153(2)(b) TFEU in conjunction with Article 153(1)(b) TFEU setting out minimum requirements for quality standards and adequate remuneration for open labour market traineeships, traineeships in the context of active labour market policies (ALMP) and traineeships that are a mandatory part of professional training, following the recommendations set out in Annex I to the resolution.
The European Parliament also requests the Commission to submit a proposal for a Decision of the European Parliament and of the Council on a Quality Framework for Traineeships on the basis of Article 166(4) TFEU for traineeships undertaken with the aim of obtaining educational qualifications, following the recommendations set out in Annex II to the resolution.
Next to these two requests to the Commission for legislative action, the resolution also contains a call on the Commission to revise Council Directive 2000/78/EC to improve the article on reasonable accommodation in the workplace in line with the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities. Moreover, it calls on the Commission to accelerate the introduction of the EU disability card to facilitate the mobility of persons with disabilities.
In its letter of 29 June 2023 to European Parliament President Metsola, the Commission confirmed that, as part of its planned initiative on a reinforced QFT and in line with the commitment by President von der Leyen, the Commission intends to follow up with a proposal for a legislative act, in full respect of the proportionality, subsidiarity and better law-making principles. It also stressed that in the preparation of its initiative, the Commission will do its utmost to take into account the various elements of the European Parliament’s resolution, while respecting the legal boundaries set by the Treaties and without undermining the existing social acquis.
With regard to the European Parliament’s call to revise the Employment Equality Directive, the Commission recalled that, on 7 December 2022, it proposed a Council Directive on equality bodies which, by setting out minimum standards to strengthen the role and independence of equality bodies and by extending their competence to the Employment Equality Directive, contributes to strengthening its effectiveness and enforcement. In response to the European Parliament’s request to accelerate the introduction of the European Disability Card, the Commission confirmed that, in line with its 2023 Work Programme, it intended to come forward with a proposal for a European Disability Card in the third quarter of 2023, ensuring the mutual recognition of this card across the EU. The proposal was adopted in September 2023 and the European Parliament and the Council reached a provisional agreement following inter-institutional negotiations on 8 February 2024.
In detail
As regards the problematic use of traineeships, the European Parliament calls for the directive to cover duration (to be limited and not shorter than one month), renewal and prolongation in order to ensure that traineeships do not result in the replacement of entry-level jobs. Furthermore, the Parliament includes in the directive the requirement for traineeship providers to provide information on the share of trainees recruited by the traineeship provider after their traineeship in recent years, traineeship providers to not require previous working experience and to ensure that labour inspectors prohibit the substitution of entry level or permanent posts by means of a traineeship. The Parliament also calls for reporting of malpractice and poor conditions during the traineeship period by means of established channels in cooperation with the national labour inspectorates and relevant authorities.
To improve the quality of traineeships, the European Parliament calls for a proposal for a directive, setting out minimum requirements for quality standards (i.e. a written agreement setting out the duration (which should be limited but not shorter than one month), provisions for renewal, arrangements for mentorship and evaluation, learning objectives) and adequate remuneration and access to social protection. The Parliament also calls for the directive to cover recognition and validation of knowledge and skills acquired through a certificate and suggests the directive to set transparency requirements. The Parliament also includes in its proposed text for the directive that trainees shall have access to workers’ representation, including trade unions.
The Parliament also calls for a decision on a quality framework for traineeships undertaken with the aim of obtaining educational qualifications. The decision should oblige the conclusion of a written agreement, in which the educational objectives, the training conditions, adequate compensation, the rights and obligations of the parties, as well as the duration are indicated. Minimum standards are set for the learning and training objectives (including mentorship), training conditions (including access to social protection under applicable Union and national law, limits to working time, minimum rest periods, minimum holiday entitlements, sick leave, teleworking rights, and access to representation, health and accident insurance coverage, adequate compensation (relative to cost of living), remote traineeships and channels for reporting malpractice and poor conditions), duration (in principle six months unless duly justified), recognition, accessibility (in particular for vulnerable groups), transparency, and cross-border traineeships.
In order to improve the access to traineeships, the European Parliament stresses, in particular, the need to support persons with disabilities, calls for a Union-wide definition of disability, to accelerate the introduction of the EU disability card, stresses the need for an accessible workplace and calls for a revision of Council Directive 2000/78/EC to improve the article on reasonable accommodation in the workplace. The Parliament also emphasises the potential of older people. As for cross-border traineeships, the Parliament suggests that the Commission further develops EURES and that the Commission and Member States facilitate the recognition and validation of knowledge, skills and competences acquired during the traineeship, in particular when it comes to cross-border recognition of skills. The Parliament also calls for the Directive to gender neutral and inclusive vacancy notices as well as the adherence to transparency requirements related to remuneration, working conditions, expected tasks, and health and accident insurance.
In terms of supporting measures, the European Parliament also calls for awareness-raising of the Union funds, for supporting the exchange of best practices, the provision of guidance and assistance to employers, in particular microenterprises and SMEs, to offer incentives to employers, to provide assistance to the Member States on legal enquiries related to the implementation of quality principles, suggests the creation of a European Alliance for Traineeships, better and more comparative data collection on traineeships at a national and Union level (to be included in the social scoreboard). The Parliament also calls on the Commission to publish guidelines to ensure the uniformity of data collection and to monitor the application of those guidelines.
As regards the scope of a future initiative, the European Parliament calls for a directive covering open market traineeships, traineeships in the context of active labour market policies and traineeships that are a mandatory part of professional training. Traineeships that are part of formal education and training curricula should be covered in a decision.
Consultative bodies and Conference on the Future of Europe
In its Opinion “The Equal Treatment of Young People in the Labour Market” of 15 June 20232, the European Economic and Social Committee (EESC) notes that traineeships should offer good quality learning content and adequate working conditions, and should not be a substitute for regular jobs or a precondition for a job placement. The EESC highlights the importance of young people's fruitful participation in the labour market and stresses that their first participation should be a positive one and measures that treat them less favourably solely on the basis of their age are counterproductive. The EESC also recommends that the other EU institutions and bodies take a greater interest in the matter of unpaid or not compensated internships as a tangible symbol of their commitment to young people following the 2022 European Year of Youth and recalls in this regard the role of the European Commission to review whether the quality framework for traineeships (QFT) is being properly implemented.
In its Opinion “Youth Employment Support: a Bridge to Jobs for the Next Generation Reinforcing the Youth Guarantee” of 5 February 20213, the Committee of the Regions considered that traineeships and apprenticeships should primarily provide a learning experience for young people, which can help them to decide on their future career and to develop their skills in order to access permanent employment. It highlighted that traineeships and apprenticeships undertaken as part of educational curricula or VET should contain clear learning objectives, quality learning content and professional mentoring. It also emphasised that, in addition to these learning criteria, further regulations are required to ensure good working conditions for traineeships and apprenticeships on the open labour market and as part of active labour market policies (ALMPs); highlighted that the practice of unpaid ALMP and open labour market traineeships and apprenticeships can lead to the replacement of standard jobs, constitutes a form of exploitation which violates young people’s rights and reduces opportunities for young people from poorer socio-economic backgrounds; therefore supported the European Parliament in its efforts to enforce fair remuneration and access to social protection for traineeships and apprenticeships on the open labour market and in ALMPs to ensure young people can access quality opportunities.
In its final report4, the Conference on the Future of Europe proposed to ensure that young people’s internships and jobs adhere to quality standards, including on remuneration, putting an end to youth minimum wages and any other discriminatory labour law provisions specific to young people, as well as banning through a legal instrument unpaid internships on the labour market and outside formal education.
Other consultation activities
Study exploring the context, challenges and possible solutions in relation to the quality of traineeships in the EU
Online survey
As part of the supporting study, an online survey was carried out among national public authorities, national business/employer associations, businesses (traineeship providers), national trade unions, national youth organisations, civil society organisations and educational institutions from 15th June 2023 to 8th September 2023. 
A total of 173 responses were received from all 27 EU Member States and four non-EU countries (Albania, Iceland, Moldova, and Norway). A total of 97% (167) of respondents agreed to participate to the survey and 3% (6) rejected to participate. Once agreed, the 167 respondents chose their stakeholder category which determined the questionnaire they would answer, with different questions tailored to the type of respondent. As shown in figure below, within the 167 responses that agreed to participate, 11% (18) were businesses (traineeship providers), 36% (60) were public authorities, 30% (50) were business / employer associations, 13% (21) were trade unions and 11% (18) were youth associations / civil society organisations / education institutions. More details on the methodology and the questionnaire can be found in Annex 4.

Figure 1: Distribution of stakeholder categories
Among the business respondents (traineeship providers), three companies were active in professional, scientific, and technical activities, three in industry (except construction), two in wholesale and retail trade, transport, accommodation and food, two in construction, and the remaining ones in finance and insurance, public sector & administration, education, consulting, food industry or personnel services. Regarding the size of the companies, 11 have over 250 employees, four have between 51-250 and three have less than 10 employees. In total, 16 out of the 18 companies have or had trainees in the last five years, including 10 who had ECT, five who had OMT, two who had MPT and one who had ALMP trainees. 
Targeted interviews with EU-level stakeholders were also carried out in two waves. The below table below provides a summary of the number and type of stakeholders interviewed for the study. More detailed information is provided in Annex 4.
Table 1: Summary of EU-level interviews
Type of stakeholder
Inception interviews
Wave 2 interviews

Contacted
Interviewed
Contacted
Interviewed
Employer organisation
1
1
5
3
Trade union
1
0
4
2
EU institutions and policymakers
1
1
0
0
Youth organisations
1
0
2
2
Experts
1
1
1
1
EU institutions as employers
0
0
2
2
Total
5
3
14
10

• Traineeship practices and problematic use of traineeships
Regarding the average share of trainees out of total number of employees in the last five years, 9 out of the 13 companies that responded had between 0-10% of trainees out of total workers, 3 had between 11-20% and one did not know. Two companies did not have trainees in the last five years and the remaining three companies did not answer.
Regarding the reasons why companies hired trainees, the majority (77%, or 10 out of 13 recorded responses) mentioned it was for training trainees that could potentially be hired after the traineeship. Two companies also mentioned the connection with a university that may provide a pool of further recruits. The majority of companies mentioned a better performance of subsequently retained trainees compared to new hires (10 out of 13, or 77%) or improved reputation and attractiveness of the company (9 out of 13, or 69%) as being important or very important. 7 out of 13 companies (54%) said that neither the contribution to increased productivity of the company, nor the innovation in methods or tools brought by the trainees were important. Similarly, 6 out of 13 companies (46%) believed that lower costs of labour for entry level tasks was somewhat important, important, or very important.
Business associations were also asked about the benefits of having trainees for employers and similarly, the majority (63% or 31 out of 49) pointed to the better performance of subsequently retained trainees compared to new hires for the same role, 53% (26 out of 49) mentioned the improved reputation and attractiveness of companies, and 43% (21 out of 49) cited the lower cost for future recruitment of trained workers. On the other hand, only 22% of respondents (11 out of 49) cited lower costs of labour for entry level tasks as a benefit for having trainees. 
Regarding the possibility to offer recurrent (at least two consecutive) traineeship possibilities at companies for the same person or the same role, 5 out of 12 (42%) and 4 out of 12 (33%) companies that answered said only under certain circumstances, respectively. The reasons given why companies offered recurrent traineeship possibilities were because of cheaper labour force, the belief that trainees could become future employees, because of pre-established agreements or because of the performance of trainees. 
In the survey, among the business respondents that had OMT, 2 out of 15 had them between 4 and 6 months, one respondent for up to 3 months and one respondent for more than 12 months. Among the businesses that had ECT, more than half (6 out of 10 companies) indicated that they are contracted only for up to 3 months, one for 4-6 months and one for more than 12 months. Among the two businesses that had MPT, one had them for up to 3 months while the other didn’t answer. The business that had ALMP trainees had traineeship contracts of 4 to 6 months.
Analysing the share of trainees that were hired on average in the last five years in the company after their traineeship ended, 7 out of 12 companies that answered said between 0-20% were hired, two companies said between 21-40% and another two companies said between 61-80% of trainees.
Regarding the replacement of regular employment by traineeships, most respondents considered that it was not common in their country (according to 45% or 23 out of 51 public authorities, 59% or 26 out of 44 business associations, 40% or 8 out of 20 trade unions, 38% or 5 out of 13 youth associations/universities). Between 22 and 38% of respondents believed that it was somewhat common (31% or 16 out of 51 public authorities, 25% or 11 out of 44 business associations, 20% or 4 out of 20 trade unions, 38% or 5 out of 13 youth associations/universities).
Respondents were asked which measures in place help reduce the risk that traineeships are used to replace regular employment. The measures where most respondents at least somewhat or completely agreed that they help reduce this risk were mandatory remuneration of trainees (86% or 12 out of 14 public authorities, 85% or 11 out of 13 business associations, 35% or 7 out of 20 trade unions, 85% or 11 out of 13 youth associations/universities), followed by a written traineeship agreement stating tasks and responsibilities and arrangements for learning, mentorship, and evaluation (79% or 11 out of 14 public authorities, 77% or 10 out of 13 business associations, 70% or 14 out of 20 trade unions, 77% or 10 out of 13 youth associations/universities), and an obligation to offer some social protection to trainees (e.g., sickness and healthcare benefits, accident insurance etc.) (79% or 11 out of 14 public authorities, 77% or 10 out of 13 business associations, 55% or 11 out of 20 trade unions, 77% or 10 out of 13 youth associations/universities). The measure receiving the relatively largest share of disagreement was a cap on the maximum duration of traineeships (with 21% or 3 out of 14 public authorities that at least somewhat or completely disagree, 20% or 4 out of 20 business associations, trade unions, and youth associations/universities respectively). However, this measure still received support from other respondents (with 65% or 13 out of 20 business associations, trade unions and 62% or 8 out of 13 youth associations/universities respectively that at least somehow or completely agree).
• Traineeships of poor quality
All surveyed companies that had OMTs and ALMPs paid a salary, including one company that provided further compensation to OMTs. On the other hand, only 1 out of the 2 companies that had MPT paid a salary, and only 2 out of the 10 companies that had ECT paid salaries, with 3 companies providing some other type of compensation and the remaining 3 not providing any remuneration to students. Regarding social protection, 4 out of 5 companies that had OMTs, the company that had an ALMP, and 7 out of 10 companies that had ECT, gave a mix between maternity and paternity benefits, sickness and healthcare benefits, entitlement to unemployment benefits after the traineeship, accident insurance benefits, and pensions contributions. The remaining one out of 5 companies that had OMTs, 3 out of the 10 companies that had ECT, and both companies that had MPT gave no social protection to their trainees.
Regarding why companies give benefits (remuneration or social protection) to trainees, the most common reason was because of a mandatory requirement by law (3 out of the 5 companies with OMTs, the company with ALMPs, both companies with MPT, and 3 out of the 10 companies with ECT), followed by the minimum duration of the traineeships (2 out of the 5 companies with OMTs and 3 out of the 10 companies with ECT), and finally because of the respective importance of tasks/responsibilities (1 company with OMTs and 1 company with ECT). Moreover, regarding how much monetary remuneration companies provide to trainees, the majority did not specify, and the ones that did gave mixed results between minimum wage and above or below minimum wage.
Most business respondents (8 out of 15 companies) said they would take the same number of trainees if mandatory remuneration of trainees was enforced in their countries, three companies said they would take fewer trainees and one company said they would take more trainees. Moreover, 7 out of 15 companies said they would take the same number of trainees if a mandatory requirement to set remuneration at minimum wage was enforced in their countries, two said they would take more trainees and one company said they would take fewer. Finally, 6 out of 15 companies said they would take the same number of trainees if mandatory provision of social protection to trainees was made compulsory in their countries, one company said they would take fewer trainees and one company said they would take more.
When asked the extent to which the tasks of trainees differed from the tasks of entry-level employees, around half said they are ‘somewhat different’ or ‘very different’ (2 out of the 5 companies with OMTs, the company with ALMP, 6 out of the 10 companies with ECT and 1 out of the 2 companies with MPT). The remaining companies said tasks are “the same”. The main reasons given were that trainees need a more in-depth introduction and guidance on the tasks to be carried out, meaning that tasks were ‘lighter’ or easier than those of entry-level workers.
Half of business respondents (6 out of 12 companies) offer mentors to trainees. Moreover, most respondents (11 out of 12 companies) believe that giving clear instructions and following up with a supervisor is the best way to ensure that trainees acquire the skills needed in companies. Half of respondents (6 out of 12 companies) believed that defining the learning and training objectives at the beginning of traineeships was equally one of the best ways to ensure trainees acquire the correct skills. Finally, two companies believed trainees acquire the correct skills with mentoring by a dedicated person and the remaining two companies believe it is acquired by delivering a skill certificate at the end of the traineeship. 
On the same topic, 58% of public authorities (31 out 53), 55% of business/employer associations (26 out of 47), 25% of trade unions (5 out of 20) and 63% of youth associations/universities (10 out of 16) said that measures were implemented in their countries to ensure that traineeships are a learning experience, whilst the remaining respondents said none existed, were unsure or did not know.
• Unequal access to traineeships
Concerning cross-border trainees, only 4 out of the 12 companies that answered hired trainees from other EU countries and the remaining 8 did not. Those who hired other EU trainees did so by publishing the vacancy on university networks or by publishing the vacancy on EURES.
To facilitate the take-up of cross-border traineeships, 36% (19 out of 53) of public authorities, 45% (22 out of 49) of business associations, 45% (9 out of 20) of trade unions and 66% (10 out of 15) of youth associations mentioned publishing the vacancy on a European job portal (e.g., Eures). 34% (18 out of 53) of public authorities, 43% (21 out of 49) of business associations, 50% (10 out of 20) trade unions and 60% (9 out of 15) of youth associations mentioned publishing the vacancy on universities' networks. 45% (24 out of 53) of public authorities, 61% (30 out of 49) of business associations, 65% (13 out of 20) of trade unions and 80% (12 out of 15) of youth associations mentioned using Erasmus + grants.
To improve access to and inclusiveness of traineeships, 42% (22 out of 53) of public authorities, 64% (30 out of 47) of business associations, 45% (9 out of 20) of trade unions and 56% (9 out of 16) of youth associations said there are measures implemented in their country to improve the access of traineeships to vulnerable groups (e.g., persons with disabilities, from minorities or low economic background). Some measures that were mentioned included quotas of scholarships and traineeships funded by the state for orphans, persons with disabilities, national minorities, Roma, refugees, and other vulnerable social groups. Others said that compensation for trainees with disability is higher than for other youth groups in their countries. Other examples of measures included strong dissemination campaigns by trade unions and incentives for the take-up by persons with disabilities and persons in vulnerable situations encouraged through exceptions to the duration limits of the traineeships. 
Regarding the impact of these measures, 55% (12 out of 22) of public authorities, 56% (17 out of 30) of business associations, 55% (5 out of 9) trade unions and 55% (5 out of 9) youth associations believed it increased take-up by a great or moderate extent of persons with disabilities. Moreover, 32% (7 out of 22) of public authorities, 60% (18 out of 30) of business associations, 66% (6 out of 9) of trade unions and 66% (6 out of 9) of youth associations believed specific measures increased take up of persons with low socioeconomic background by a great or moderate extent. Finally, 18% (4 out of 22) of public authority, 50% (15 out of 30) of business associations, 44% (4 out of 9) of trade unions and 44% (4 out of 9) of youth associations believed specific measures increased take up of persons from (ethnic, religious, sexual) minorities by a great or moderate extent.
Interviews
The interviews focused on the current context and challenges related to the quality of traineeships as well as the impacts of policy options to address these challenges.
Context and challenges
• Work relationships disguised as traineeships
The interviews allowed for the identification of a number of potential indications of work relationships disguised as traineeships, which include: long duration; prolongation of a traineeship contract or repeated traineeships; “recycling“ trainees i.e. employers hiring consecutive trainees; internships requiring previous work experience; a high ratio of trainees relative to employees in a company; lack of educational content, including the absence of well-defined learning objectives and lack of mentorship/supervision and trainees being engaged in tasks that are indistinguishable from those of employees
However, there were diverging opinions on the extent to which the use of work relationships disguised as traineeships is a significant issue in European labour markets. According to trade union and youth organisation representatives, the practice of work relationships disguised as traineeships is one of the biggest problems relating to the quality of traineeships, which is observable across countries and sectors, but especially prevalent in OMTs and MPTs. On the other hand, views on the extent to which work relationships disguised as traineeships can be observed in Member States were split among employer associations. It was emphasised that there is a lack of data on the phenomenon, so that the issue cannot be accurately assessed.
All stakeholders interviewed emphasised that in principle, labour inspectorates play an important role in ensuring that provisions related to the quality of traineeships are upheld across Member States. Employer association representatives asserted that it was difficult to assess the extent to which inspections are currently working well in different Member States, though in principle, inspectorates play an important role, also in providing data on phenomena such as work relationships disguised as traineeships. Trade unions and youth organisations asserted that inspection and enforcement mechanisms were not working well in practice, due to a lack of effective mechanisms for monitoring and enforcement, a lack of financial and legal resources, as well as an imbalance of power between trainees and traineeship providers, which reduces the likelihood that trainees will report malpractice.
• Remote and hybrid traineeships
Across stakeholder groups interviewed, it was underlined that ensuring that remote or hybrid traineeships have the same learning content as regular traineeships is a significant challenge, requiring for instance regular check-ins from supervisors, but also access to sufficient technological equipment. There are also some skills, particularly interpersonal skills and other skills that require on-site presence, that cannot be transmitted to the same extent in an online setting Moreover, trade unions and youth organisations emphasised that while remote/hybrid traineeships could potentially increase access for persons with disabilities, they cannot be a substitute for reasonable accommodation in the workplace itself.
• Working conditions and fair remuneration
Diverging stakeholder views with respect to working conditions were observed. Though employer associations noted that in some cases trainees experience inadequate working conditions, they mainly noted that there is a lack of existing data on which types of traineeships are most problematic, and in which sectors they are located. On fair levels of remuneration, there were diverging views. While some employer associations stated that there should be a level of pay adequate to the tasks that the trainee performs and sufficient to cover living costs, others emphasised that the learning outcomes are the most significant element of a traineeship, rather than the pay.
In comparison, trade unions, youth organisations and European institutions acting as traineeship providers pointed to bad working conditions, and in particular low or lack of pay, as a crucial issue related to the quality of traineeships. On setting fair levels of remuneration, some trade union representatives and youth organisations suggested that trainees should be covered, at a minimum, by the minimum wage. Others suggested that fair remuneration levels should be designed and periodically reviewed in accordance with both the cost of living and trainees’ tasks.
• Inequalities in access to traineeships
All stakeholders interviewed acknowledged that there are likely inequalities in access to traineeships, particularly high-quality traineeships, in Europe. Employer associations pointed out that these patterns are reflective of broader inequalities across society and the labour market general, where there is widespread discrimination. It was also noted that companies are generally very supportive of diversity and inclusion, but there may be cases where it is difficult to adopt to the specific needs of a trainee due to lack of resources, particularly for SMEs. Trade union stakeholders drew attention to the link between inequality in access and pay, as unpaid traineeships mean that trainees have to rely on other resources, such as family support, to support themselves during a traineeship. This increases social inequality, as traineeships are not accessible to everyone. Moreover, barriers to access for persons with disabilities and for individuals from non-urban areas were also highlighted.
While the stakeholders interviewed agreed that cross-border traineeships can be a valuable opportunity for young people, it was also emphasised that a number of obstacles to take-up of cross-border traineeships persist. Trade unions and youth organisations particularly emphasised the financial cost, as well as legal issues related for instance to insurance and work permits.
Impacts
• Extending the scope of the QFT
Stakeholders pointed out a range of impacts of extending the scope of the QFT. Some trade unions and youth organisations pointed out that an extension would have beneficial impacts on traineeships, by introducing a set of standards for the quality of all traineeships, while no costs were identified. However, some trade unions also argued that the scope extension would only have limited benefits, given the non-binding nature of the Recommendation, and would not address the existing issues with the quality of traineeships sufficiently. Most employers put strong emphasis on costs. It was pointed out that an extension of the scope would lead to significant adjustment costs for companies, which may put particular strain on sectors that are already suffering from tight budgets and/or staff shortages. It was also stressed that there may be adverse effects on equality, as better-performing trainees may be selected in order to reduce the time investment needed.
• Actions against work relationships disguised as traineeships
Youth organisations interviewed stated that the identification of indications of work relationships disguised as traineeships would be welcome in principle, though difficult to identify in practice. It was also pointed out that action on work relationships disguised as traineeships would benefit some trainees, but not address the broader issues relating to quality, such as remuneration. Trade union representatives stated that defining indications of work relationships disguised as traineeships would not be beneficial, as only regulatory action is in principle sufficient to address the issue.
On the possible introduction of a maximum length of traineeships or a limit on consecutive traineeships, interviewees, including employers, stated that these measures could be beneficial, potentially with an exception for MPTs.
• Increased enforcement and channels for reporting
The interviewees agreed that strengthening enforcement and channels for reporting could have benefits, including the enforcement of existing rights of trainees, increasing trainee awareness of their rights and avenues for legal action, enhancing legal clarity and compliance with EU law, increasing equality of opportunities and ultimately improving the quality and attractiveness of traineeships.
• Stronger coordination between various social and educational actors
Trade unions, employer associations and youth organisations all agreed that stronger coordination – including stakeholders such as social partners, educational institutions and national authorities at different levels – would have benefits for improving the quality of traineeships. Trade union organisations emphasised, however, that these measures are only complementary to binding action that is needed, in their view, on quality standards for traineeships.
• Improved data collection and monitoring
Stakeholders agreed that high-quality data on traineeships is still lacking in the EU and that the collection of better data would entail significant benefits, such as improved quality monitoring and assessment. It would also allow a better understanding of the issues involved, and therefore enable more targeted policy action. Youth organisations also emphasised the importance of collecting disaggregated data (e.g. by socio-economic characteristics) and of making the data publicly available.
• Remuneration and social protection
Stakeholders pointed out a range of costs and benefits associated with improved working conditions – including remuneration and social protection – for trainees. Turning first to the former, trade unions and youth organisations largely emphasised the benefits of improved remuneration for trainees. This includes access to social rights for trainees, improved/faster integration into the labour market, increased social inclusion and the elimination of work relationships disguised as traineeships (in the case of binding requirements to pay trainees, due to a lack of incentives for employers to use work relationships disguised as traineeships). These stakeholders also identified broader benefits for employers, due to increased attractiveness of traineeships, and society at large, in the form of increased productivity and tax revenue. However, it was acknowledged that businesses would incur costs.
Employer associations, while recognising the benefits of quality traineeships, placed stronger emphasis on the costs associated with remunerated traineeships. It was argued that requirements on remuneration would constitute a strong disincentive to provide traineeships, resulting in a reduction in the supply of traineeships. These effects would likely be particularly pronounced for SMEs, who lack financial and administrative resources. This cost would significantly affect trainees, who would have less access to traineeships, and therefore to the labour market. While it was acknowledged that remuneration may be a way to attract trainees to a sector, it was argued that – particularly in a context of limited resources and tight budgets – the disincentive effect would prevail.
The same arguments on costs and benefits were also used in the case of social protection. An additional point made by trade union and youth organisation representatives was that lack of access to social protection has long-term costs for trainees, e.g. by reducing their pension. Ensuring access to social protection would also have positive impacts on the sustainability of social security systems, by increasing contributions.
SME panel survey
A SME Panel survey was conducted between 12 October and 9 November 2023, with the support of Enterprise Europe Network (EEN). The questionnaire was translated in all EU official languages and received 170 responses, mostly from Spain (50 responses), Portugal (34), Italy (27), and Poland (21).
Among the respondents, there were single person business (10 responses), as well as SMEs with 1-9 employees (57), 10-49 employees (60), and 50-249 employees (43). Most respondent SMEs are active in the manufacturing sector (36 responses), in other service activities (27) or in professional, scientific and technical activities (22).
About 73% of respondents (124) had trainees in the past five years. For the most part, these traineeships constituted less than 5% of the workforce (65 responses) or between 6% and 20% (39 responses). The tasks of trainees were either significantly different (44 responses) or with minor differences (41) from the tasks of entry-level employees, but in 40 cases trainees performed to a large extent the same task.
Only 19 respondents never offered the possibility to extend or renew a traineeship. Most respondents provide information on various elements of the traineeships (working conditions, remuneration, social protection, contents of the tasks, contents of the learning elements) through various channels, with only a minority explicitly stating they do not provide any such information at all (respectively 6, 8, 9, 5, 4 responses).
Very few respondents (2) offer traineeships longer than 12 months, with the majority being up to 3 months (36 respondents), between 4 and 6 months (58) and between 7 and 12 months (30). Many respondents have different strategies to ensure that trainees acquire skills needed by the company, including via dedicated mentoring (79 responses), clear instructions and follow-up by supervisors (78) and defining learning and training objectives at the beginning of the traineeship (75).
Among the top reasons why SMEs did not offer traineeships there were the fact that training them is time-consuming (score 5.94). Administrative burden was scored the lowest among the obstacles (score 2.82). On this point, the survey enquired about the number of hours necessary to (1) registering the trainee to payroll including preparatory work, (2) registering the trainee to social security, if different from payroll registration, (3) registering the trainee to healthcare or accident insurance, if different from social security. With the exception of three outliers (from two Member States, IT and EL) it appears that the number of hours necessary for the above-mentioned tasks did not exceed a total of 24 hours; in some cases, it was below 3 hours for all the tasks combined.
Among the benefits for SMEs of having trainees, respondents highlighted increases in productivity of the company (score 8.61), the ability to develop supervisors’ and/or mentors’ managerial skills (score 7.93), reduction of labour costs (score 7.78), reduction of training costs when trainees are later hired (score 7.61) as well as their better performance (score 6.82).
Among the respondents, 93 said that they offer remuneration (including compensation and/or allowances) to trainees, mostly at (39) or below (26) minimum wage levels (14 respondents above minimum wage level; 19 did not know, 72 did not answer) and 58 that they offer social protection coverage.
In terms of received support, respondents identified primarily support to find suitable candidates (37), followed by financial support (35), support to fill administrative formalities (20) and for training and monitoring trainees (18). However, 51 respondents said they received no support at all.
Bilateral meetings and position papers
Apart from the stakeholder consultation activities described above and in support of its work on an initiative to improve the use and quality of as well as access to traineeships, the Commission gathered evidence from bilateral meetings with different stakeholders and from dedicated position papers transmitted to the Commission. These notably include the following:
• European Youth Forum (EYF) discussion paper ‘The costs of unpaid internships’ of January 20235, the interview of Commissioner Schmit and the handing over of the EYF petition6 calling for an EU directive that ensures access to remuneration for interns in the labour market, signed by 8400 as part of the EYF campaign ‘can you afford to work for free?’ on 6 June 2023, the European Youth Forum's Takeaway on the Second Phase Consultation of the Social Partners transmitted to the Commission on 31 October 2023; and the bilateral meetings of 23 January 2023, 18 April 2023, 21 and 27 September 2023, and 15 November 2023.

While welcoming the Commission’s review of the 2014 QFT, the EYF advocates for a binding instrument under Article 153 TFEU to ban unpaid traineeships in the EU. In this regard, EYF argues that trainees should be considered as future workers and a directive should be based on both Article 153(1)(b) TFEU and Article 153(1)(h) TFEU. For the EYF, remuneration is the key criterion of what constitutes a quality traineeship, and it is directly related to better labour market outcomes and post-traineeship placement. According to the EYF’s research “The Costs of Unpaid Internships”, 34% of those surveyed have undertaken at least two unpaid internships and 15% have undertaken 3 or more, and those coming from marginalised backgrounds are eight times less likely to access this type of work placements. Based on its assessment of national traineeship policies, EYF also highlights the need for stronger enforcement and for labour inspectorates to take a more proactive approach against traineeships which infringe national legislation.

EYF emphasises the following key quality principles for traineeships:
◦ Use of a written contract;
◦ Remuneration at least at the level of the national minimum wage and above the national poverty threshold, with overtime additionally compensated;
◦ A limit on the length of the traineeship to a fixed number of months;
◦ Equal access to social protection in line with other workers;
◦ A limited number of trainees per employer;
◦ Presence of a mentor and evaluations to discuss progress;
◦ Transparent advertisement on the conditions and learning objectives.
Based on these priorities, the EYF argues that an EU directive must include (on top of the principles included in the 2014 Council Recommendation):
◦ a binding requirement for all open labour market trainees to be recognised as employees and entitled to, at least, either the statutory minimum wage or coverage under collective agreement – without exceptions, as well as full access to social protection on an equal basis as other employees;
◦ a maximum ratio of the number of trainees to staff;
◦ break periods for employers between the hiring of trainees (to prevent traineeships replacing existing jobs);
◦ guidelines and funding to promote proactive enforcement of traineeship policies by labour inspectorates, recognising the specific situation and power imbalance facing young people;
◦ the use of financial incentives to encourage employers to hire trainees permanently;
◦ collection of data on trainees at national and EU level disaggregated by all factors such as age, ethnicity, gender etc.

• European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC) resolution on quality traineeships7, adopted on 31 March 2023, and bilateral meetings of 10 October 2023 and 24 October 2023: these contributions are fully reflected in the position of trade unions expressed during the formal social partners’ consultation (see point 1 of Annex 2).

• Joint European Employers’ Statement on Traineeships8 (BusinessEurope, SGI Europe and SMEunited) of 18 April 2023 and bilateral meeting with SMEunited of 8 May 2023: these contributions are fully reflected in the position of employers expressed during the formal social partners’ consultation (see point 1 of Annex 2).

• Opinion of German Chamber of Commerce and Industry (DIHK) of 30 August 2023 and bilateral meeting of 28 September 2023:

DIHK opposes a binding instrument on quality traineeships at EU level. It refers to the fact that Directive (EU) 2022/2041 on adequate minimum wages in the EU already covers trainees who are workers and is concerned that obligations on the remuneration of traineeships which are part of educational curricula would be a significant financial burden on traineeship providers, especially SMEs, and would result in a reduced offer of traineeships. Moreover, a limit on the duration of traineeships would restrict the flexibility to adapt them to specific needs. DIHK also considers that transparency requirements for vacancy notices and measures on certification of traineeship outcomes would significantly increase the administrative and financial burden on companies and lead to a reduction of the traineeship offer.

• Statement of European Students’ Union (ESU) of 10 May 20239 and bilateral meeting of 14 September 2023:

ESU believes that the QFT should also apply to ECT and advocates for banning unpaid ECT. Overall, ESU considers that the costs related to traineeships, such as travel, food and accommodation in a location other than the trainee’s place of study should be covered. ECT should also be covered by work safety regulations and insurance, including health and accident insurance. Moreover, all learning opportunities should be designed with an intention to achieve a set of specific learning outcomes. At the same time, ESU argues that it needs to be acknowledged that ECT have certain specificities. Therefore, ESU considers that its needs to be carefully assessed which principles of the QFT shall be applied to ECT and where there should be exceptions or specific solutions. In this regard, ESU considers that ECT who are not employees should have qualified supervision and mentorship from both their workplace and higher education institution guiding them to achieve their learning outcomes.

• Bilateral meeting with Confederation of Finnish Industries (EK) of 27 September 2023:

EK does not support legislative action at EU level, considers that Member States’ competence (including on remuneration) must be respected, and argues that the large variety of national regulations concerning traineeships, labour law and social partners’ involvement must be taken into account. EU-level cooperation on quality traineeships should rather consist of sharing best practices. EK pointed out that industrial sectors are facing a growing challenge of recruiting and retaining talent. Additional burden on enterprises, especially SMEs, may therefore produce unintended effects, such as disincentives for offering traineeships.
Flash Eurobarometer 523
The Flash Eurobarometer 523 looked into the perception of young people regarding their integration into the labour market, with a particular focus on traineeships. Between 15 and 24 March 2023, 26,334 people between 18 and 35 years from all EU Member States were surveyed online.
Comparisons of the new data with the Flash Eurobarometer 378 on ‘The experience of traineeships in the EU” published in 201310 allow the identification of some trends. However, they must be interpreted with some caution, due to differences in the method and questionnaire used. Additionally, the averages calculated for 2013 include the UK and exclude Croatia. Moreover, due to different approaches in EU Member States and methodological constraints, the results of the Flash Eurobarometer 523 cannot always be differentiated for the different types of traineeships.
The Flash Eurobarometer 523 survey shows that traineeships are an important stepping stone for young people into the labour market. 78% of young people surveyed did at least one traineeship, and 19% their first work experience was a traineeship. 68% found a job following a traineeship, with 39% signing a contract with the same employer, according to the data.
However, although a clear majority of young Europeans (76%) participating in the survey overall agree that they learnt things that are useful professionally during their traineeship, 13% did not believe they learnt things that are useful professionally Also, 58% of the respondents said that their traineeship provider, or another organisation involved, supported them when searching for a job. The learning and support is reflected in the fact that the vast majority of young Europeans were either employed (68%) or continued their studies (18%) six months following their last traineeship, while just 6% were unemployed.
Looking into more detail, 39% of respondents continued working for the same employer, either with a fixed or a permanent contract; 26% found a job with another employer (fixed or permanent contract); and 4% became self-employed.
The survey also showed that more than half (55%) of young Europeans doing traineeships received financial compensation, which shows an increase compared to 40% in the 2013 survey. In 70% of these cases, the employer paid the salary or another financial compensation. 61% of respondents stated that they had full (33%) or partial (28%) access to social protection during their traineeship. 
The number of young people who engage in long traineeships has decreased since the last Eurobarometer survey in 2013. This time, around 11% of the respondents stated that their last traineeship lasted more than 6 months, 4 percentage points lower than in 2013 (15%). 52% of young people who took the survey did more than one internship, and 37% of those stated that they have done repeated traineeships with the same employer.
The share of young Europeans who do traineeships in another country is on the rise, the survey shows: more than one in five respondents (21%) stated that they have done at least one traineeship in another EU country. This compares to 9% in 2013.
Among those who did not do a traineeship, 36% indicated they were not interested in doing one, 18% were not able to find one, 16% felt they were not well-informed about traineeships, and 10% did not have enough financial resources.
Taking into account that the survey does not provide any indication of the respondents’ backgrounds, less than half (48%) overall agree that young people from a disadvantaged or migrant background have access to the same traineeships opportunities as others. 46% of the respondents overall disagree that persons with disabilities have access to the same traineeship opportunities.
Annex 3. Who is affected and how?
A3.1. Practical implications of the initiative
Public authorities in all Member States would have to introduce legislative changes to implement the new provisions arising from this initiative e.g., regarding dedicated and effective controls and inspections, set up designated channels for reporting malpractices and ensuring that trainees are not treated in a less favourable manner as regards working conditions, including remuneration, than comparable entry-level workers of the same category in the same establishment, unless different treatment is justified on objective grounds (see section 8 for full list). In view of ensuring effective controls and inspections to detect and take enforcement action against work relationships disguised as traineeships they will have to increase the capacity of their labour inspectorates. Also, they will need to ensure that competent authorities carry out an overall assessment to determine whether a traineeship constitutes a work relationship disguised as traineeship on the basis of a set of elements defined at EU level. To assist the controls and inspection Member States would need to Member States to define excessive duration of traineeships at national level for the purpose of controls by national authorities and to ensure that employers provide in the vacancy notices information on the expected tasks, learning content, working conditions, remuneration and social protection. Moreover, Member States will be called upon to comply with the recommendations, including regarding maximum duration of traineeships and to prevent employers from requesting previous work experience in vacancy notices, dedicated and effective controls and inspections for all trainees, ensure fair/proportionate remuneration to all trainees and access to social protection coverage, improve the inclusiveness of and access to traineeships, improve the quality of /remote/hybrid traineeships and extend the scope of the QFT to ECT and MPT. Additionally, recommendations to Member States include improving monitoring and data collection, improving awareness raising, and the exchange of best practices and providing financial and/or practical guidance to support employers and in particular SMEs, to provide high quality traineeships. Member States will also be called upon to ensure the involvement of social partners and other relevant stakeholders in the implementation and monitoring of the rights and obligation arising from this initiative.
Traineeship providers would need to comply with the provisions on ensuring that individuals are not engaged in work relationships disguised as traineeships and that they do not offer non-compliant traineeships. They would also have to ensure that trainees are not treated in a less favourable manner as regards working conditions, including pay, than comparable entry-level workers of the same category in the same establishment, unless different treatment is justified on objective grounds and that they increase the transparency regarding working conditions and the learning content in vacancy notices. Moreover, they will have to provide (upon request) to competent authorities information regarding their trainees and their working conditions. Last, they would have to comply with other provisions which might arise as a result of the implementation of the recommendations by Member States.
The initiative would not entail direct legal obligations for trainees. Nonetheless, they would contribute to enforce the provisions of the policy options, both directly and indirectly through their membership in workers’ representations and trade unions. In addition, in those countries that would introduce reporting channels, trainees would be able to denounce malpractices and poor traineeships conditions.
A3.2. Summary of costs and benefits
Trainees – The prevention and decline in the problematic use of traineeships would improve the working conditions of trainees. As a result, it is expected that a larger number of individuals will start enjoying the new rights associated with their employee status (in the case of reclassification) or improved rights (in the case of non-compliant traineeships). Further benefits arise from improved working conditions and higher transparency, which in turn contribute better working conditions and better learning opportunities, improved labour market prospects. Trainees considered as workers will also benefit in terms of protection from unjustifiably less favourable manner as regards working conditions, including pay, than comparable entry-level workers of the same category in the same establishment. The recommendations on setting a limit to the maximum traineeship duration and preventing employers/traineeship providers from requesting previous experience in the field of activity contributes to preventing young individuals from being trapped in traineeships of long duration, including repetitive/consecutive traineeships with the same or different employers. This will help ease their transition into the labour market. An important additional benefit of the policy initiative concerns the expected improvements in the access to traineeships opportunities for individuals from vulnerable groups, including people with disabilities. Finally, the extension of the scope to ECT and MPT could increase both the relevance and coherence of the initiative for all trainees. As far as the costs are concerned, while the initiative would not impose direct costs on trainees the measures could result in unintended consequences connected to a decline in offer of traineeships, and of paid traineeships, even though they are expected to be modest.
Workers – For workers, the benefits of the initiative would be associated with improvements in their working conditions associated to the decline in the problematic use of traineeships and the associated downward pressure that they exercise on the rest of the workforce. In addition, workers could enjoy the benefits of increased trainees’ productivity (fostered by the fact that they would have access to better working conditions, which could enable and motivate them to work better).
Businesses – Traineeship providers would enjoy the benefits of fairer market competition since companies would be prevented from reducing their labour costs by hiring trainees. Moreover, employers would benefit from productivity improvements connected to more qualified and competent workforce, higher motivation and engagement of trainees, and potentially a better matching of trainees’ skills to the needs of their company in the context of the twin green and digital transition. To this end, additional benefits would arise from improved labour market matching and higher retention rates which could decrease employers’ search, matching and recruitment costs of regular workers. Finally, traineeship providers would benefit from a wider and more diverse pool of candidates. In terms of costs, employers would have to sustain adjustment costs to comply with the new obligations. The costs of familiarisation with new provisions could be pooled across the different provisions and thus limited. Limited costs are also expected from the need to revise existing contracts and future vacancy notices and more frequent recruitment and onboarding processes. In addition, businesses where work relationships disguised as traineeships or non-compliant traineeships are identified during implementation or during controls and inspections would face higher labour costs arising from the need for adjustment in the rights of trainees. Labour costs would also arise to comply with the obligation to ensure that trainees are not treated in a less favourable manner as regards working conditions, including pay, than comparable entry-level workers of the same category in the same establishment and from the recommendations on ensuring fair/proportionate remuneration and access to social protection for all trainees. Some costs would also arise from the need to provide information to authorities in charge of inspections and controls, but these would be minimised by the provision to provide these information only upon request. Finally, businesses might face additional costs in cases of increased litigations resulting from new provisions of this initiative.
Public authorities – The requirements to carry out controls and inspections on the basis of a set of binding elements defined at EU level would allow competent authorities to improve their effectiveness in detecting work relationships disguised as traineeships and take respective enforcement measures. Eventually, in the long term the expected decline in the problematic use of traineeships would further reduce enforcement costs for public authorities. A positive impact on public budgets would be generated by the revenues from the fines issued by the competent authorities and some increase in tax payments and social security contributions resulting from increasing labour rights of trainees who will benefit from the initiative. Benefits can also be expected from a decreased spending on social protection and activation. The main sources of costs would be connected to implementing the provisions of the initiative in the national regulatory framework, the increase in enforcement costs connected to strengthening the capacity of competent inspection authorities and the adjustment costs to set up reporting channels. Finally, if traineeship providers decide to reduce the total number of paid positions due to increased labour costs, this would lead to a decrease of public revenues from social security contributions, but this cost is expected to be small.
In view of the uncertainties explained in Annex 4, and given that costs of some measure cannot be monetised, costs are estimated per measure, while total cost estimates of the preferred option cannot be provided.
I. Overview of Benefits (total for all provisions) – Preferred Option
Description
Amount
Comments
Direct benefits
Increase in the number of trainees (workers or not) who will enjoy the right they are entitled to under EU or national law
Non-legislative: Based on hypothetical assumptions regarding the degree of implementation by the MS at national level (33%-100%) up to 1.02 - 3.1 million trainees could benefit.

Decrease in the number of work relationships disguised as traineeships and non-compliant traineeships


Not possible to quantify the number of work relationships disguised as traineeships and non-compliant traineeships due to the absence of data.
A rough estimate of the number of trainees being at risk of doing specific types of work relationships disguised as traineeships can be obtained by combining replies from the Eurobarometer with EU-LFS data on the number of trainees in the EU in 2019. For example 370,000 paid trainees could be affected who are doing a long-duration traineeship. Out of these, it can be estimated that around 100,000 (rough proxy) did a long-duration traineeships with a poor learning content.
Decrease in the number of trainees doing traineeships of long duration, repeated and/or consecutive traineeships with the same employer
Non-legislative: Based on hypothetical assumptions regarding the degree of implementation by the MS at national level (33%-100%) up to 117,000 - 355,400 doing a traineeship longer than 6 months plus up to 68,000-207,800 doing repeated and/or consecutive traineeships with the same employer.
These estimates are based on the share of trainees that in the Eurobarometer reported having traineeships longer than six months as well as consecutive traineeships with the same employer combined with EU-LFS data on the number of trainees in the EU in 201911.
Decrease in the number of trainees doing repeated traineeships different employers

A rough estimate of the number of trainees who have done in the past repeated traineeships with different employers can be obtained on the basis of the share of trainees who reported having conducted multiple traineeships with different employers (based on the Eurobarometer) combined with EU-LFS data on the number of trainees in the EU in 2019). This gives a proxy measure of the number of traineeships vacancies asking prior work experience to candidates.
This rough estimation shows that, in 2019, around 1.1 million trainees (out of which 500,000 paid trainees) in the EU had done multiple traineeships with different employers at some point in their life. It should be noted that this is likely to be an overestimate, as 1) it is unknown if for all of this prior work experience was required and 2) respondents were asked to consider all the traineeships they ever did and not only those related to the current year.
Improvement in the labour market position of trainees in terms of labour market empowerment

Not possible to quantify due to the qualitative nature of the benefits
Protection of paid trainees from unjustifiable differential treatment
Legislative: Based on hypothetical assumptions regarding the number of paid trainees not being fairly/proportionately remunerated, up to 353,000 to 870,000 paid trainees (rough proxy, depending on scenario) could benefit.
Rough estimates. The lower bound correspond to the 22% of respondents who stated that their compensation was not at all sufficient to cover basic living expenditures (trainees’ survey, evaluation) and the upper bound to the 54% who stated that their financial allowance/compensation was below the minimum wage.
Access to remuneration for unpaid trainees


Non-legislative: Based on hypothetical assumptions regarding the degree of implementation by the MS at national level (33%-100%) up to 500,000-1.5 million unpaid trainees could benefit.
Rough estimates based on the estimation of the prevalence of unpaid trainees under the supporting study
Improved access to social protection for trainees
Non-legislative: Based on hypothetical assumptions regarding the degree of implementation by the MS at national level (33%-100%) up to 352,000 - 1,07 million trainees could benefit.
Estimates for access to social protection are based on the share of trainees that in the Eurobarometer reported not having any type of social protection coverage combined with EU-LFS data on the number of trainees in the EU in 2019.
Increased level playing field/ Fairer market competition through the alignment of the labour costs to the level of compliant traineeships.

Not possible to quantify due to the absence of data on the number of firms using traineeships to disguise regular work relationships.
Higher productivity and competitiveness for employers as a result of 1) more skilled workforce and 2) better working environment

Not possible to quantify.
Improved learning and training for trainees. Better and more relevant skills to facilitate their integration and/or transitions in the labour market
Non-legislative: Based on hypothetical assumptions regarding the degree of implementation by the MS at national level (33%-100%) up to 212,000-637,000 trainees could have access to a mentor.
Not possible to quantify due to the qualitative nature of the benefits
Improved traineeships opportunities for individuals with disabilities and people from vulnerable groups

Not possible to quantify due to the qualitative nature of the benefits.
Improved labour market matching and higher retention rate. Decrease in search, matching and recruitment costs for employers/traineeship providers

Not possible to quantify.
Improved effectiveness of controls and inspections to detect and combat work relationships disguised as traineeships

Not possible to quantify.
The increased transparency on working conditions, including in vacancies notices.
Legal certainty for trainees and regulatory clarity for employers/traineeship providers.
Non-legislative: Based on hypothetical assumptions regarding the degree of implementation by the MS at national level (33%-100%) up to 203,0000 – 609,000 trainees could benefit from a getting a written traineeship agreement.
Not possible to quantify.
Indirect benefits
Increased public revenues generated by fines, higher taxes and social security contributions

Not possible to quantify due to lack of data on work relationships disguised as traineeships and non-compliant traineeships, remuneration levels and social security contributions for trainees.
Reduced enforcement costs due to a decline in the problematic use of traineeships in the long run

Not possible to quantify. Estimates on the decline of work relationships disguised as traineeships and non-compliant traineeships could not be produced due to the lack of data.
Reduced skills mismatches

Not possible to quantify.
Improvements in business reputation

Not possible to quantify due to the qualitative nature of the benefit.
Ensuring of fundamental rights: the right to workers’ equality before the law; to fair working conditions, access to adequate social protection and healthcare, to equal opportunities and treatment of under-represented groups and non-discrimination, promote the freedom of movement within the EU and facilitate the right to family life.

Not possible to quantify.

(1) Estimates (gross values) provided with respect to the baseline; (2) costs are provided for each identifiable action/obligation of the preferred option otherwise for all retained options when no preferred option is specified; (3) If relevant and available, please present information on costs according to the standard typology of costs (adjustment costs, administrative costs, regulatory charges, enforcement costs, indirect costs;).
II. Overview of costs – Preferred option

Citizens/Consumers
Businesses
Administrations

One-off
Recurrent
One-off
Recurrent
One-off
Recurrent
All measures
Direct enforcement costs


Small costs for transversal familiarisation with all new provisions (between EUR 53 for SMEs and EUR 39 for larger companies)




Direct enforcement costs




Integration of provisions into the national regulatory scheme

Effective controls and inspections conducted by competent authorities to detect and take enforcement action and overall assessment based on a list of elements defined at EU level pointing at the risk of work relationships disguised as traineeships .
Direct adjustment costs
None
None
None
Only for businesses where work relationships disguised as traineeships or non-compliant traineeships are identified:
a) increased labour costs due to offer of regular employment or genuine compliant traineeships
b) costs for administrative or judicial procedures
c) Costs related to penalties
Also, small (negligible) costs to undergo inspections.
None
None

Direct enforcement costs
None
None
Some small costs could arise from the inclusion of traineeships in existing controls and inspections

None
None

1) Cost from including traineeships in existing controls and inspections. 2) Strengthen the capacity of labour
inspectorate (training, material and human resources)
Based on hypothetical assumptions regarding the implementation by the MS at national level the cost could range: EUR 27,000 (only training) to around EUR 1.2 million (if optimal number of inspectors hired)

Direct administrative costs
None
None
None
Provide competent authorities (upon request) data and information regarding trainees and their contracts.
None


Recommendations for effective monitoring and enforcement to ensure that the rights and working conditions of trainees under applicable EU and national law are respected
Direct enforcement costs
None
None
None
None
None

1) Cost from including traineeships in existing controls and inspections. 2) Strengthen the capacity of labour
inspectorate (training, material and human resources)
Based on hypothetical assumptions regarding way and degree of implementation by the MS at national level (33%-100%) the cost could range from: EUR 9,000 – 27,000 (only training) to around EUR 363,000 - 1.2 million (if optimal number of inspectors hired)

Obligation to employers to provide, in the vacancy notices, information on the expected tasks, learning content, working conditions, remuneration and social protection
Direct adjustment costs
None
None
Possible costs to adjust vacancy notices. EUR 46 million
None
None
None
Ensure workers’ representatives and other actors to be able to engage in procedures to enforce the rights of trainees and channels to report of malpractice and poor traineeship conditions.

Recommendation to ensure workers’ representatives and other actors to be able to engage in procedures to enforce the rights of trainees and channels to report of malpractice and poor traineeship conditions
Direct enforcement costs
None
None
None
.
Possible costs resulting for the measure on ensuring the channels. (awareness campaigns to inform trainees about the existence of such mechanisms)

Possible increase costs related to inspections
Member States to define excessive duration of traineeships at national level to assist inspections.

Recommendations for maximum traineeship duration (6 months) to include consecutive/repeated traineeships (strengthened Principle 10) and to prevent employers from requesting previous work experience in vacancy notices
Direct adjustment costs
None
None
Possible small costs to adjust existing contracts
None
None
None

Indirect adjustment costs
None
None
None
Possible increase in costs due to more frequent recruitment and onboarding processes:
Hypothetical assumptions regarding the degree of implementation by the MS at national level (33%-100%) lead to an estimate of up to EUR 22-68 million.
None
None

Indirect adjustment costs
None
None
None
For companies requiring in the previous work experience: higher training costs because of inexperienced trainees
None
None
Ensure trainees are not treated in a less favourable manner as regards working conditions, including pay, than comparable entry-level workers of the same category in the same establishment, unless different treatment is justified on objective grounds
Direct adjustment costs
None
None
Possible small costs to adjust existing contracts
Only for non-compliant business:
increase in labour costs.
EUR 41 million for paid trainees (minimum wage benchmark) and EUR 81 million (60% of a remuneration of a comparable entry level worker benchmark) under the assumption that 22% of paid trainees are not fairly/proportionately remunerated
None
None
Recommendations to ensure that all unpaid trainees receive fair/proportionate remuneration /compensation and have access to social protection
Direct adjustment costs
None
None
None
Possible increase in labour costs.
Based on hypothetical assumptions regarding the degree of implementation by the MS at national level (33%-100%) the cost for unpaid trainees could range from:
Remuneration: 731,2 million - 2.19 billion (MW benchmark);
EUR 704.2 million - 2.11 billion (60% benchmark)
Social protection for all trainees:
EUR 2.8 – 8.4 billion (depending on implementation)
None
None
Recommendations
for written traineeship agreement to include additional elements to increase transparency and to improve the learning component (strengthened Principle 2) and for access to mentors
Direct adjustment costs
None
None
None
Small additional costs to the already necessary cost arising from the TPWC12 under the baseline.
Based on hypothetical assumptions regarding degree of implementation by the MS at national level (33%-100%) the cost could be in the range of EUR 27 - 80 million (depending on implementation).
Cost to combine and formalise all pieces of information in a written agreement (negligible).
None
None

Direct enforcement costs
None
None
None
Possible costs related to litigations
None
None
Recommendations to ensure traineeships accessibility to people with disabilities and equal access to vulnerable groups
Direct adjustment costs
None
None
Possible costs to tailor traineeships and to adapt workplace to trainees
Possible costs to conduct outreach and awareness-raising activities
Possible costs for issuing guidance on outreach and awareness-raising activities as well as tailoring traineeships and on adapting workplace to trainees
None
Measures to support cross border traineeships
Direct adjustment costs
None
None

None
Possible costs for developing and producing practical guidance and information on national traineeship frameworks
Possible costs to be incurred for updating the practical guidance and information on national traineeship frameworks

Indirect adjustment costs
Possible expenses to relocate to other countries
None
None
Small costs to post vacancies and recruit international trainees
None
None
Measures to promote remote/hybrid traineeships
Direct adjustment costs
None
None

Small costs to adapt working environment (e.g. access to digital work tools) and arrangements (including mentorship)
Possible costs for issuing guidance on conditions for accessibility and quality remote/hybrid traineeships
None
(1) Estimates (gross values) to be provided with respect to the baseline; (2) costs are provided for each identifiable action/obligation of the preferred option otherwise for all retained options when no preferred option is specified; (3) If relevant and available, please present information on costs according to the standard typology of costs (adjustment costs, administrative costs, regulatory charges, enforcement costs, indirect costs;).
III. Application of the “One-in One-Out” approach


One-off
Recurrent
Total
Businesses



New Administrative Burdens
None
None
None
Removed Administrative Burdens
None
None
None
Net Administrative Burdens
None
None
None
Adjustment Costs
See Table II above
See Table II above

Citizens



New Administrative Burdens
None
None
None
Removed Administrative Burdens
None
None
None
Net Administrative Burdens
None
None
None
Adjustment Costs
None
None
None
NB: The administrative costs for providing competent authorities (upon request) data and information regarding trainees and their contracts, which is indicated in above Table II, is not subject to offsetting in the context of the one-in one-out approach and is therefore not included in the above table III (see Better Regulation Tools #58 and #59).
1. Relevant sustainable development goals
IV. Overview of relevant Sustainable Development Goals – Preferred Option(s)
Relevant SDG
Expected progress towards the Goal
Comments
SDG no. 1 – End poverty in all its forms everywhere
The expected improvements in access to traineeships, remuneration levels and labour market integration of young individuals contribute to reducing the number of people at risk of poverty and social exclusion in the EU.

SDG no. 4 – Ensure inclusive and equitable quality education and promote lifelong learning opportunities for all
The expected improvements in access to traineeships and in the learning component promote the goal of lifelong learning opportunities for all.

SDG no. 8 – Promote sustained, inclusive and sustainable economic growth, full and productive employment and decent work for all
The expected decline in the number of work relationships disguised as traineeships and the improvements in the working conditions of trainees contribute to the goal of ensuring decent working conditions to all.

SDG no. 10 – Reduced inequalities within and among countries
Improvements in access to traineeships contribute to reduce within countries inequalities.



Annex 4. Analytical methods
This annex describes the analytical methods used in the impact assessment. Unless otherwise mentioned this Annex is based on the methodology used for the supporting study.
Data limitations and robustness of evidence regarding the problem definition and estimation of benefits
Significant efforts have been made to collect data to provide an estimate of the size of the problem. However, it should be noted that these estimates are subject to several limitations. First, the total number of trainees is likely to be underestimated. This is particularly relevant for the number of unpaid trainees. The most reliable source to obtain estimates on the prevalence of trainees is the LFS data, however, as there are no direct ways to identify them in using this survey. On the contrary, data on paid trainees is more accurate (see A4.1.3). Second, the majority of the supporting evidence is based on self-reporting surveys, the 2023 Eurobarometer and the trainee survey conducted under the evaluation. Results of such surveys have the following limitations: 1) they represent only the views of the trainees and 2) are influenced by the self-response bias of the replies provided by respondents as well as by the profile of the respondents (which is not representative for all types of traineeships). Third, the quantification of the problem in terms of absolute numbers was obtained by combining data from two different sources: the 2023 Eurobarometer and EU-LFS data on the number of trainees (see A4.3 and A4.4). Finally, the data to identify work relationships disguised as traineeships rely on an incomplete set of variables (data is only available for long duration and poor learning content) work relationships disguised as traineeships The assessment of such work relationships disguised as traineeships is also complicated by the fact that the distinction between them and regular work is often blurred, thus requiring a case-by-case assessment (see A4.3).
Nevertheless, a compilation of information from literature, case law and the above-mentioned surveys provide robust evidence for the existence of the problem and its magnitude. In particular, the in-depth legal analysis of national regulatory systems carried out under the supporting study identified gaps in these systems that allow for the problematic use of traineeships to arise for current and future trainees (A4.11). Regarding the problems of quality and access, the results of the evaluation and the dedicated analysis under the supporting study provide robust evidence to substantiate the problem.
Uncertainties regarding estimation of costs
• Regarding estimation of the costs on enforcement, data on the number of hours dedicated to training specific to traineeships could not be retrieved from most of the national labour inspection reports. Thus, this information is extrapolated from the Spanish annual labour inspection reports (see Annex A4.6).
• Regarding the cost on recruitment, Empirical evidence on the magnitude of recruitment costs of trainees is rare due to the limited availability of suitable data. Therefore estimates are based on a study using firm-level data in Germany which estimated recruitment costs related to apprenticeships (see Annex A4.7).
• Regarding the cost on remuneration, the proxy used for the current level of the remuneration of trainees leads to an underestimation of the actual level of remuneration of trainees, while the proxy used to construct the benchmark wage is leads to overestimation of the benchmark wage. Therefore, the estimated proxy for the gap between current remuneration and the proxy for fair/proportionate remuneration is very likely to be overestimated (see Annex 4.8).
• Regarding the costs on social protection these are based on Eurostat data on the share of the non-wage costs in the total labour costs, which include but are not restricted to employers’ social contributions. Therefore, the costs are likely to be overestimated.
• In view of the above-mentioned uncertainties and given that costs of some measure cannot be monetised, costs are estimated per measure, while total cost estimates per option cannot be provided.
A4.1. Estimation of the prevalence of trainees
Quantitative evidence on traineeships in the EU was obtained from the scientific use file13 of the EU Labour Force Survey (EU-LFS).14 Eurostat granted the contractor of the study supporting the impact assessment15 access to the relevant anonymised files.
Prevalence of paid trainees
In order to assess the prevalence of paid trainees, the main variable used from the EU-LFS was the TEMPREAS variable, available on a yearly basis. This variable records paid fixed-term work experiences, identifying the reasons why respondents report being on fixed term contracts.16
The analysis accordingly focused on response option 5: “Training other than apprenticeship (trainees, internships, research assistants, etc.)”. This category encompasses also other temporary work arrangements than traineeships/internships. However, these alternatives are likely to represent a small share of the answers given that apprenticeships and traineeships are the two main forms of temporary work arrangements aiming at providing work-based training to individuals.17
It is important to note that before 2016, apprenticeships and traineeships were not disaggregated. Since 2016, Member States have been offered the possibility, on a voluntary basis, to provide the split between apprenticeships and traineeships. Therefore, for data before 2016, trainees cannot be identified from apprentices in any Member State, whereas the distinction is available between 2016 and 2020 for the 14 Member States which provided the split (BE, CY, DE, IE, EE, EL, LV, HU, NL, AT, PL, RO, SK, FI). In order to obtain estimates of the number of trainees for years in which these workers are aggregated with apprentices, a Multiple Imputation by Chained Equations (MICE) approach was applied. Further details are available in the supporting study to the impact assessment.
Several proxies were used to identify the types of paid traineeships and quantify their prevalence:
• For Mandatory Professional Traineeships (MPT) 3-digit codes, available through the EU-LFS, associated with specific professions (e.g. doctors, dentists, pharmacists, legal professions) were combined with the variable HATLEV1D = 3 is also applied. This restriction implies that MPT have a completed level of education equivalent to at least tertiary education.
• For Education Curriculum Traineeships (ECT) those who were not classified as MPT were filtered against the variable EDUCFED4 = 1, meaning they are still in formal education.
• For Active Labour Market Programme (ALMP) traineeships, the computation used EU-LFS variables capturing a highest level of education corresponding to upper secondary and aged lower than 30; or variables showing that the trainees are currently not in education and report receiving active support either from a Public Employment Service (PES) or another institution, or they claim to have received some help in finding their current employment (i.e. traineeship) arrangements.
• Open Market Traineeships (OMT) are obtained as residual, i.e. subtracting the number of MPT, ECT and ALMP as calculated above from the total number of trainees.
The above approach, which was deemed appropriate given resource constraints and the poor availability of data, does have a few limitations.
A first limit is that the distinction between MPT and ECT is not necessarily clear-cut. In theory, MPT should take place after the completion of university studies and are usually a requirement to be eligible for examinations required to access specific professions. On the other hand, mandatory traineeships can also be required to obtain university diplomas, with the said diploma being the requirement to access the profession. The distinction between these two types of traineeships is not always clear.
Furthermore, the EU-LFS provides only information on the highest level of education completed aggregated into three categories. It is therefore not possible to disentangle a traineeship that would take place at Master’s level (HATLEV1D = 3 since the grade of Master’s implies that a bachelor diploma has been obtained) from a traineeship taking place after the completion of the Master’s level (typically the case for lawyers).
Moreover, the conditions of MPT for several occupations are specific to each Member State, which limited the applicability of the quantitative analysis as outlined above.
Another limit of the proxy measures regards ECT and OMT. In many Member States, it is common (often during the summer period) for students to undertake traineeships which are not compulsory and do not give rise to a recognition of the traineeships for the obtention of the diploma. These traineeships take place without the involvement of the education provider, and as such, they should be recorded as OMT. The available data did not allow to appropriately capture this phenomenon.
Prevalence of unpaid trainees
Due to aspects such as lack of pay, unpaid trainees are recorded in the EU-LFS as unemployed (if they meet given criteria, i.e. search effort and availability to start working within four weeks), or as inactive. Furthermore, it seems reasonable to assume that the largest part of unpaid trainees are young. The age composition of paid traineeships indicates that the 15-29 age group represents 80% of the total number of trainees on average in the EU, so the same share could be assumed to apply to unpaid, but it could be even higher. One could reasonably assume that unpaid traineeship opportunities are (more likely to be) rejected by ‘older’ people who often have more financial constraints.
Following this reasoning, the pool of not-employed individuals aged 15-29 constituted the reference group for the computation of unpaid trainees18 and within this group, the four types of trainees were proxied and extracted:
• Based on the evidence from the legal analysis, while not all trainees in MPTs have employee status nor benefit from employee-equivalent remuneration, in most countries and for most professions (in particular health and education) they are paid. Furthermore, given the relatively small employment share that MPT represent, the assumption that all such trainees are paid should have a small impact on the overall number of unpaid trainees.
• ECT trainees are proxied by exploiting the variable HATWORK which informs on unpaid working experiences during education. Unpaid work experiences could include other types of working arrangements, in particular apprenticeships. However, apprenticeships tend to be highly regulated and almost all Member States provide specific provisions guaranteeing a certain level of pay.
• For what concerns ALMP traineeships, several proxy variables were used, focusing on the reference group of 15-20 year old not employed, receiving active support (REGISTER = 1 or 3) and narrowed with the variables EDUCNFE4 and AVAIREAS, which provide information on attendance to training, after filtering out people in education. This is not equivalent to traineeship and there is no certainty on whether the training activity took place at work.
• For unpaid OMT traineeships, the reference population of not employed is restricted by removing individuals in education and those registered at a PES (i.e. we focus on REGISTER = 4). The methodology then relies on the variables EDUCNFE4 and AVAIREAS, as above. This approach is complemented by computing the total number of ECT and ALMP traineeships, retrieving the share of paid traineeships among these aggregated numbers, and applying this proportion to the total number of OMTs to recover the number of unpaid ones.
It is clear from the above explanations, which are further detailed in the supporting study, that the limitations already outlined in the previous section for assessing the prevalence of paid traineeships, are significant for unpaid traineeships, too. Significant efforts were put in place, in cooperation with the contractor of the supporting study, but ultimately the paucity of available data was a constraining factor.
Underestimation of the number of paid and unpaid trainees
The methodology to estimate the number of trainees in the EU (presented above) suffers from some limitations, which are likely to result in an underestimation of the actual number of paid and unpaid trainees.
Paid trainees
As many surveys, also the EU-LFS suffers from issues affecting the reliability of data. The issue of stock sampling19, i.e. the fact that respondents are interviewed at precise moments in time20, is probably leading to an underestimation of the number of short-duration trainees. Labour market status, in particular short-term activity, of the interviewee outside the interview moments (i.e. reference weeks) is not captured. This could be the case in particular for short-duration traineeships, which would not be recorded in the EU-LFS, leading to an underestimation of the total number of trainees over the year. This issue is particularly relevant if one compares survey and administrative data, as the latter type of data would record all traineeships, irrespective of their duration21. The underreporting of traineeships can be expected to be greater for Member States with high shares of short-duration traineeships.22
Unpaid trainees
The estimations on the numbers of unpaid trainees are even more uncertain, as there are no direct ways to identify these trainees in the EU-LFS. Therefore, to make the estimations, a more conservative approach seemed appropriate. A minimum number (i.e. lower bound) of trainees was computed, rather than providing larger numbers without possibilities to cross-check the values. For ECT, the population currently in education was restricted to individuals who are at least in the second or third year of their curricula. Furthermore, the definition of pay used for the HATWORK variables appears to be broader than that used by the EU-LFS to determine employment. This should decrease the number of unpaid work activities reported by HATWORK, and it should be noted that in the event of multiple traineeships, the variable HATWORK records a paid work experience, if at least one of these activities is paid. Nevertheless, unpaid ECT are computed from a variable that provides information on unpaid work activities as part of the curriculum, which is not the case for unpaid ALMP and OMT. Hence, the uncertainty around the number of unpaid ALMP and OMT is greater.23 These two numbers are computed by equating attendance to training activities with traineeships, which constitutes a very narrow definition of what a traineeship is. As a matter of fact, between 7% and 10% of paid trainees at the EU level report attending a training activity in the last four weeks. This number cannot be extrapolated to obtain the total number of unpaid trainees, but it suggests that using attendance to training is likely to underestimate the actual number of unpaid trainees.
Baseline projections
This section describes the trend impact analysis24 used to obtain projections of the future number of the different types of traineeships in the EU for the period 2022-2030. The analysis uses the prevalence trends estimated through the EU-LFS. The baseline scenario assumes for each type of traineeship an annual growth rate equal to the average yearly growth rate observed in the five years before the outburst of the COVID-19 pandemic in Europe.
The motivation for selecting the 2014–2019 time-window is twofold. First, it allows to capture potential long-lasting effects of the QFT on the prevalence of traineeships in the EU. In addition, it allows to analyse structural trends in traineeship prevalence before the disruptive impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic. By applying the average yearly growth rate by traineeship type to the baseline number of trainees in 2021 we obtain the projected trends in traineeship prevalence for the period 2022-2030. Importantly, these figures should not be interpreted as point forecasts but rather as a baseline scenario based on current knowledge of trends, socio-economic and political developments. In addition to the baseline scenario, we consider an alternative scenario in which OMT grow at a stronger rate. The high-growth scenario accounts for the potential impacts of future economic developments connected to the impacts of the green and digital transition on the EU labour market and the needs for re-skilling and up-skilling. Thus, it contributes to relaxing the assumption that future trends consist of a simple continuation of earlier trends.
The table below shows the average yearly growth rate of each type of traineeship for the period 2014 and 2019, conditioning on whether the traineeships were paid or not. The third column shows the growth rates of OMT in the high-growth scenario. In this scenario, the growth rate of paid and unpaid OMT are assumed to be equal to the average yearly growth rate of paid and unpaid traineeships (for all types of traineeships) for the period 2014-2019. These correspond to 2.3% for paid traineeships (as opposed to the -0.04% yearly growth rate of the baseline scenario) and 0.4% for unpaid traineeships (as opposed to the 2.3% of the baseline scenario).
Table 2: Average yearly growth rate 2014-2019 by traineeship type and remuneration coverage
Traineeship Type
Average Yearly Growth Rate 2014-2019 (Baseline projections)
Average Yearly Growth Rate 2014-2019 (high growth scenario for OMT)
Paid OMT
-0.4%
2.3%
Paid ALMP
2.8%
2.8%
Paid ECT
5.1%
5.1%
Paid MPT
4%
4%
Unpaid OMT
2.3%
0.4%
Unpaid ALMP
3.7%
3.7%
Unpaid ECT
0%
0%

The tables below show the projected yearly growth of the number of traineeships for the period 2022-2030 under the reference and high growth scenarios, by traineeship type and conditioning on whether the traineeship was paid or unpaid. In brackets each type of traineeship is reported as a fraction of the total number of traineeships, conditioning on whether they were paid or unpaid.

Table 3: Historical and projected number of traineeships in the EU (in thousands of traineeships)
1.25
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019
2020
2021
2022
2023
2024
2025
2026
2027
2028
2029
2030
Paid MPT
122 (9.5%)
125 (8.7%)
131 (8.8%)
162 (10.9%)
161 (10.6%)
155 (10.1%)
149 (9.3%)
157 (11.3%)
159 (11.6%)
165 (11.7%)
172 (11.8%)
179 (11.9%)
186 (11.9%)
193 (12%)
201 (12.1%)
209 (12.1%)
218 (12.2%)
226 (12.2%)
Paid ECT
360 (28.1%)
398 (27.8%)
378 (25.4%)
448 (30.1%)
441 (29%)
484 (31.6%)
504 (31.4%)
443 (31.9%)
575 (42.2%)
605 (43%)
636 (43.7%)
669 (44.5%)
703 (45.2%)
740 (45.9%)
778 (46.7%)
818 (47.4%)
860 (48.1%)
904 (48.8%)
Paid ALMP
431 (33.6%)
466 (32.5%)
492 (33.1%)
496 (33.3%)
521 (34.3%)
508 (33.1%)
533 (33.2%)
461 (33.2%)
370 (27.2%)
380 (27%)
391 (26.9%)
402 (26.7%)
413 (26.5%)
425 (26.4%)
436 (26.2%)
449 (26%)
461 (25.8%)
474 (25.6%)
Paid OMT
371 (28.9%)
445 (31%)
487 (32.7%)
384 (25.8%)
396 (26.1%)
389 (25.4%)
420 (26.2%)
326 (23.5%)
258 (19%)
257 (18.3%)
256 (17.6%)
255 (16.9%)
254 (16.3%)
252 (15.7%)
251 (15.1%)
250 (14.5%)
249 (13.9%)
248 (13.4%)
Paid OMT linearity scenario)
371 (28.9%)
445 (31%)
487 (32.7%)
384 (25.8%)
396 (26.1%)
389 (25.4%)
420 (26.2%)
326 (23.5%)
258 (19%)
264 (18.7%)
270 (18.4%)
276 (18.1%)
283 (17.8%)
289 (17.6%)
296 (17.3%)
303 (17%)
310 (16.8%)
317 (16.5%)
Unpaid ECT
 
  

1,237 (85.9%)
1,227 (85.4%)
1,228 (86.1%)
1,237 (85%)
1,297 (87.5%)
1,299 (81.8%)
1,299 (81.4%)
1,299 (81%)
1,299 (80.5%)
1,299 (80.1%)
1,299 (79.6%)
1,299 (79.1%)
1,299 (78.7%)
1,299 (78.2%)
1,299 (77.7%)
Unpaid ALMP
 
 

69 (4.8%)
69 (4.8%)
67 (4.7%)
76 (5.2%)
50 (3.4%)
119 (7.5%)
124 (7.7%)
128 (8%)
133 (8.2%)
138 (8.5%)
143 (8.7%)
148 (9%)
153 (9.3%)
159 (9.6%)
165 (9.9%)
Unpaid OMT
 

 
134 (9.3%)
141 (9.8%)
131 (9.2%)
143 (9.8%)
135 (9.1%)
169 (10.6%)
173 (10.8%)
177 (11%)
181 (11.2%)
185 (11.4%)
190 (11.6%)
194 (11.8%)
199 (12%)
203 (12.2%)
208 (12.5%)
Unpaid OMT (High growth scenario)



134 (9.3%)
141 (9.8%)
131 (9.2%)
143 (9.8%)
135 (9.1%)
169 (10.6%)
170 (10.7%)
170 (10.7%)
171 (10.7%)
172 (10.7%)
172 (10.7%)
173 (10.7%)
174 (10.7%)
174 (10.7%)
175 (10.7%)

Estimation of certain cases of work relationships disguised as traineeships and of traineeships of long duration, including consecutive/repeated traineeships
Estimation of certain cases of work relationships disguised as traineeships
This section describes the methodology used to estimate the number of certain cases of work relationships disguised as traineeships in the EU, based on the data from the Eurobarometer 523 Survey and the estimated number of trainees obtained from the EU-LFS survey.
The methodology used to estimate this number builds on existing evidence from policy reports documenting the existence of practices where work relationships can be disguised as traineeship. While there are no available estimates on the number of work relationships disguised as traineeships such traineeships in the EU (partially due to the usual difficulties in identifying fraud), numerous studies have identified a list of criteria to distinguish between “real” work and traineeships. Building on empirical evidence (see A8.1) a list of elements were selected to determine work relationships disguised as traineeships. The Eurobarometer has a number of questions which allows estimate a proxy for one type of such traineeships by identifying those with long duration and poor learning content.
Table 4: Survey questions used to assess work relationships disguised as work relationships disguised as traineeships
Traineeship dimension
Eurobarometer Survey Question
Duration
a) Thinking about your last traineeship, how long did this traineeship last?
b) Thinking about your last traineeship, could you turn to a mentor who helped you and explained how to do the work?

Learning
c) During you last traineeship you learnt things that are useful professionally
d) During your last traineeship you could turn to a mentor who helped you and explained how to do the work
(agreement on a scale from 1-4)

The identification of work relationships disguised as traineeships is based on the decision tree depicted below. The green boxes represent proper traineeship relations, the red box represents work relationships disguised as traineeships.



A traineeship is considered to have good learning content if the respondent agreed (i.e., if they strongly or partially agreed) with the fact that they learnt things that are useful for their profession and they could rely on a mentor during the traineeship. Otherwise, the traineeship was assumed to have poor learning content (i.e., if the respondent was in disagreement with one or both statements). Excessively long traineeships include traineeships longer than six months and multiple short traineeships (lasting between three and six months, i.e. with total duration exceeding 6 months) with the same employer. The algorithm described above allows to estimate the fraction of work relationships disguised as traineeships by traineeship type. The product between the estimated share of such traineeships and the total number of trainees by country and traineeship type (estimated through the EU-LFS data) gives the number of work relationships disguised as traineeships in absolute terms.
These estimates are subject to numerous limitations. To start, they are influenced by the self-response bias of the respondents of the survey. In addition, they rely on an incomplete set of variables to identify work relationships disguised as traineeships. Last and most importantly, the assessment of work relationships disguised as traineeships is complicated by the fact that the distinction between training and regular work is often blurred, thus requiring a case-by-case assessment.
Estimation of traineeships of long duration, including consecutive/repeated traineeships
This section explains the methodology adopted in the supporting study to estimate (i) the number of trainees with traineeship contracts longer than six months, (ii) the number of trainees who did repeated traineeships with the same employer that were overall longer than six months and (iii) the number of trainees who did multiple traineeships with different employers. The approach proposed combines two sources of data, namely the Eurobarometer Survey and the EU-LFS data. Results of the Eurobarometer are used to obtain information on the prevalence of excessively long traineeships and repeated traineeships. The EU-LFS data are used to estimate the number of trainees in Europe. For results of these calculations, please see Annex 8 and for details Annex 4 of the study supporting the Impact Assessment.
• Traineeships longer than six months
In the Eurobarometer Survey respondents were asked to report the length of their last traineeship. This allows for computing the share of trainees who reported having undertaken a traineeship longer than six months, by country, traineeship type and whether the traineeship was remunerated or not. By multiplying the share of traineeships longer than six months by the total number of trainees estimated through the EU-LFS (by country, traineeship type and remuneration) we obtain an estimate of the number of trainees who conducted a traineeship longer than six months in absolute terms.
• Consecutive/Repeated traineeships with the same employer
In addition to the number of traineeship contracts longer than six months, excessively long traineeships occur when an individual does multiple short traineeships with the same employer whose overall duration exceeds six months. In the Eurobarometer survey, participants were asked whether they had undertaken multiple traineeships, and whether any of these traineeships occurred with the same employer. Unfortunately, respondents were not asked about the length of each single traineeship, except for their last one. Thus, it is not possible to precisely compute whether the traineeship with the same employer was longer than six months overall. To overcome this data limitation, we assume that a respondent had a traineeship longer than six months if she/he had more than one traineeship with the same employer and her last traineeship was between three and six months long. Clearly, this approach leads to an overestimation of the number of consecutive traineeships longer than six months. Importantly, information on the type of traineeship and remuneration coverage is also missing for traineeships different from the last one. Thus, we assume that prior traineeships were of the same type and had the same remuneration policy as the last one.
• Consecutive/Repeated traineeships with different employers
On the basis of Eurobarometer, the estimation of respondents conducting multiple traineeships with different employers was made based on whether (i) participants reported having done multiple traineeships, (ii) none of these traineeships were with the same employer. This allows us to obtain an approximation of the number of trainees who were asked for prior work experience to conduct a traineeship. This approach is likely to overestimate the (annual) number of employers requiring prior work experience25 of trainees for two reasons. First, not all trainees who undertook numerous traineeships were required to have prior work experience. Secondly, in the Eurobarometer survey respondents were asked to consider all possible traineeships, not only those related to the current year. This implies that the annual number of multiple traineeships with different employers could be lower.
Estimation of trainees likely to benefit from the measures to address poor quality traineeships
Proxy for the number of trainees which could potentially benefit from fair/proportionate remuneration
In the survey of trainees conducted for the 2023 Study Supporting the Evaluation of the Quality Framework for Traineeships respondents were asked whether their compensation was sufficient to cover the basic living costs such as rent, food, etc. The vast majority of the respondents said that the compensation received was either sufficient to a small extent (40%) or not sufficient at all (22%). In addition, in the survey respondents were also asked whether they considered the compensation value to be adequate relative to the national minimum wage. 54% of them considered the financial allowance/compensation received to be below the national minimum wage. This corresponds to 870 thousand paid trainees according to the 2019 estimates from the EU-LFS. Remarkably, the fraction of respondents who reported receiving a compensation below the minimum wage was significantly higher among females (36%) than males (17%).
Combining this data with the estimates of prevalence of trainees from the EU-LFS a rough proxy can be obtained for the number of trainees which could potentially benefit.
Share
Absolute number
22%
353,000
38%
610,000
54%
870,000
62%
1 million
Proxy for the number of trainees to benefit from the written agreement
Based on the evaluation and the legal analysis it is possible to identify the Member States and traineeship types where the written agreement has been implemented. Combining this with the estimates of prevalence of trainees provides an estimate for the number of trainees who would benefit from the measure on the written agreement.
Table 5: Number of trainees to potentially benefit from a written traineeships agreement
MS
Affected paid trainees (number)
Affected unpaid trainees (number)
Total
AT
5786
4272
10058
BE
6338
41894
48232
BG
0
0
0
CY
387
1561
1948
CZ
6355
19847
26202
DE
0
0
0
DK
257
2764
3021
EE
1010
5953
6963
EL
7346
602
7948
ES
0
0
0
FI
11472
35918
47390
FR
0
0
0
HR
0
0
0
HU
140
554
694
IE
12284
8339
20623
IT
96724
36018
132742
LT
0
0
0
LU
0
0
0
LV
483
1232
1715
MT
1832
1582
3414
NL
1527
29976
31503
PL
106138
21276
127414
PT
1099
61303
62402
RO
0
0
0
SE
3688
43957
47645
SI
189
0
189
SK
1728
26862
28590
Total
264780
343908
608688
Costs of familiarisation with new provisions
The unit cost for familiarisation of businesses with new provisions is based on the estimations from the REFIT study on the working time Directive26, revised in the impact assessment for the Directive on transparent and predictable working conditions to take account of inflation. The total price per person to familiarise with EU legislation is provided in the table below. The average familiarisation costs result in EUR 53 for SMEs and EUR 39 for large companies.

Table 6: Unit cost per person for familiarisation with new EU legislation
Member State
SMEs
Large companies
AT
74.4
53.6
BE
69.2
49.0
BG
7.2
5.5
CY
34.1
26.5
CZ
17.8
12.9
DE
68.3
45.6
DK
76.2
51.0
EE
14.3
9.8
EL
25.7
18.3
ES
44.6
33.7
FI
62.6
43.9
FR
65.0
47.2
HR
26.9
20.7
HU
19.3
14.0
IE
62.6
43.0
IT
73.2
56.3
LT
11.1
8.0
LU
84.1
58.0
LV
12.8
8.0
MT
24.6
16.5
NL
54.4
35.3
Source: SWD Impact assessment for the transparent and predictable working condition Directive.
Costs of enforcement and reporting channels
Three different scenarios were considered to estimate the costs arising from the policy options on controls and inspections (Policy Area A1).

In the first, conservative scenario, the number of labour inspectors in the Member States remains unchanged while a share of current labour inspectors receives new training specific to traineeships. Data on the number of hours dedicated to training specific to traineeships could not be retrieved from most of the national labour inspection reports. Thus, this information is extrapolated from the Spanish annual labour inspection reports, which explicitly indicate the amount of hours of training dedicated to traineeships rules. In particular, between 2020 and 2021, 40 hours of training were dedicated to traineeships rules (13 hours in 2020 for 16 participants27 and 27 hours in 2021 for nine participants28). In this scenario, it is assumed that the same additional number of hours of traineeships specific training is introduced in the EU Member States, independently of the number of labour inspectors and trainees in each country. The product between the 40 hours and the country specific labour costs gives an estimate of the costs of training in the EU MS in the two years following the introduction of the initiative. Summing up across MS, the initiative would cost EUR 27,256 under this scenario.
Table 7: Estimated costs of traineeships specific training for labour inspectors.
Country
Hourly Labour Costs
Estimated training costs
AT
39
1560
BE
43.5
1740
BG
8.2
328
CY
19.4
776
CZ
16.4
656
DE
39.5
1580
DK
46.8
1872
EE
16.4
656
EL
14.5
580
ES
23.5
940
FI
35.9
1436
FR
40.8
1632
HR
12.1
484
HU
10.7
428
IE
37.9
1516
IT
29.4
1176
LT
13.1
524
LU
50.7
2028
LV
12.2
488
MT
14
560
NL
40.5
1620
PL
12.5
500
PT
16.1
644
RO
9.5
380
SE
40.1
1604
SI
23.1
924
SK
15.6
624
EU 27

27256

In a second, optimistic, new labour inspectors may be hired. The optimal number of inspectors to be hired is obtained as follows. First, in countries with at least 10,000 trainees, the optimal number of inspectors (denoted by L* in what follows) is determined by dividing the number of paid trainees in each country by 10,000 – the optimal ratio inspectors/employees recommended by the ILO. Next, the gaps in the optimal number of inspectors per employees is obtained from the ILO database It is assumed that the gaps in the relative number of inspectors for trainees are equal to the gaps in the relative number of inspectors per employees. For instance, the table below shows that the optimal number of labour inspectors per trainees is 5 in Austria (45,127/10,000). Since Austria has 0.71 inspectors per 10,000 employees, we assume that 0.29*5 new inspectors would have to be hired to reach the optimal target of inspectors for trainees. This corresponds to one new labour inspector. In countries with less than 10,000 trainees it is assumed that a new labour inspector needs to be hired if there is less than one labour inspector per 10,000 employees.
Table 8: Costs of new labour inspectors and traineeship specific training under the high bound scenario
Country
Paid trainees
Optimal number of inspectors
Labour inspectors/10,000
New inspectors
Annual labour costs public sector
Total costs of new inspectors
Training costs
Total costs
AT
45127
5
0.71
1
102134.39
102134.4
1560
103694.4
BE
16484
2
0.58
1
86641.53
86641.5
1740
88381.5
BG
2205
NA
1.13
0
22812.11
0
328
328
CY
427
NA
0.53
1
69004.15
69004.1
776
69780.1
CZ
11998
1
0.95
0
56143.44
0
656
656
DE
380508
38
1.41
0
137908.83
0
1580
1580
DK
20337
2
NA
NA
114741.38
NA
1872
NA
EE
1193
NA
0.69
1
72624.16
72624.2
656
73280.2
EL
13207
1
NA
NA
26129.61
NA
580
NA
ES
163266
16
1.07
0
81769.03
0
940
940
FI
11893
1
1.26
0
108422.33
0
1436
1436
FR
166353
17
0.8
3
89948.28
269844.8
1632
271476.8
HR
12764
1
1.1
0
30222.86
0
484
484
HU
3956
NA
0.58
1
31821.93
31821.9
428
32249.9
IE
18645
2
0.25
2
77237.16
154474.3
1516
155990.3
IT
438063
44
NA
NA
53938.78
NA
1176
NA
LT
1929
NA
1.01
0
44415.09
0
524
524
LU
20
NA
2.76
0
147834.05
0
2028
2028
LV
2232
NA
1.3
0
42930.5
0
488
488
MT
2222
NA
0.21
1
38198.41
38198.4
560
38758.4
NL
3053
NA
NA
NA
102062.07
NA
1620
NA
PL
273372
27
0.92
2
28436.72
56873.4
500
57373.4
PT
4503
NA
0.87
1
43981.48
43981.5
644
44625.5
RO
1212
NA
1.92
0
27767.95
0
380
380
SE
5469
NA
0.52
1
77118.16
77118.2
1604
78722.2
SI
2706
NA
0.88
1
49079.72
49079.7
924
50003.7
SK
1877
NA
1.13
0
55327.87
0
624
624
EU27
1605023
161

16

1,051,796
27,256
1,160,445
Note: The table shows the estimated enforcements costs for hiring and training new labour inspectors. Data on the ratio between the number of labour inspectors per 10,000 employees were missing for DK, EL, IT, NL.
The third, intermediate, scenario only deviates from the second scenario by assuming that only 50% of the new inspectors will be hired. For instance, if a country would have to hire 4 inspectors according to the procedure described above, we assume that only 2 will be hired. Here we also assume that training is provided as outlined above.
Table 9: Costs of new labour inspectors and traineeship specific training under the intermediate scenario
Country
Paid trainees
Optimal number of inspectors
Labour inspectors/10,000
New inspectors
Annual labour costs public sector
Total costs of new inspectors
Training costs
Total costs
AT
45127
5
0.71
1
102134.39
102134.4
1560
103694.4
BE
16484
2
0.58
1
86641.53
86641.53
1740
88381
BG
2205
NA
1.13
0
22812.11
0
328
328
CY
427
NA
0.53
1
69004.15
69004.1
776
69780.1
CZ
11998
1
0.95
0
56143.44
0
656
656
DE
380508
38
1.41
0
137908.83
0
1580
1580
DK
20337
2
NA
NA
114741.38
NA
1872
NA
EE
1193
NA
0.69
1
72624.16
72624.2
656
73280.2
EL
13207
1
NA
NA
26129.61
NA
580
NA
ES
163266
16
1.07
0
81769.03
0
940
940
FI
11893
1
1.26
0
108422.33
0
1436
1436
FR
166353
17
0.8
2
89948.28
179896.6
1632
181528.6
HR
12764
1
1.1
0
30222.86
0
484
484
HU
3956
NA
0.58
1
31821.93
31821.9
428
32249.9
IE
18645
2
0.25
1
77237.16
77237.2
1516
78753.2
IT
438063
44
NA
NA
53938.78
NA
1176
NA
LT
1929
NA
1.01
0
44415.09
0
524
524
LU
20
NA
2.76
0
147834.05
0
2028
2028
LV
2232
NA
1.3
0
42930.5
0
488
488
MT
2222
NA
0.21
1
38198.41
38198.4
560
38758.4
NL
3053
NA
NA
NA
102062.07
NA
1620
NA
PL
273372
27
0.92
1
28436.72
28436.7
500
28936.7
PT
4503
NA
0.87
1
43981.48
43981.5
644
44625.5
RO
1212
NA
1.92
0
27767.95
0
380
380
SE
5469
NA
0.52
1
77118.16
77118.2
1604
78722.2
SI
2706
NA
0.88
1
49079.72
49079.7
924
50003.7
SK
1877
NA
1.13
0
55327.87
0
624
624
EU27
1605023
161

14

769,532.9
27,256
791,540
Note: The table shows the estimated enforcement costs for hiring and training new labour inspectors. Data on the ratio between the number of labour inspectors per 10,000 employees were missing for DK, EL, IT, NL.
From the perspective of the employers, this policy measure is not expected to introduce any additional enforcement costs. The enforcement costs for employers connected to the visits to workplaces by inspectors would not be affected by the intervention since the organisation of inspectors’ visits would not change.
Costs of reporting channels
The legal analysis conducted for this study indicates that most MS already have reporting channels where employees and some categories of trainees can report malpractices. Hence, the provision would not entail any adjustment cost to introduce new reporting mechanisms but only costs connected to awareness campaigns to inform trainees about the existence of such mechanism. Due to the lack of reliable data, these costs could not be quantified.
Costs transparency of vacancies and cost of recruitment
Costs of transparency of vacancies
The study supporting the evaluation estimated that on average it takes 1 to 2 hours for a traineeship provider to draft a vacancy notice under the baseline scenario (2014 QFT). The measure would add the following elements: the overall working conditions, coverage of social protection, and the learning and training component. Conservatively, one could estimate an additional hour per vacancy notice in order to cover these new elements. An estimate of the number of vacancies that would be affected can be obtained from the 2023 QFT Evaluation Study, which found that 42% and 59% of OMT and ALMP vacancies mentioned the allowance and compensation of the traineeships. Thus, we assume that, on average, around 50% of the yearly vacancies would have to be affected the initiative. The product between the number of vacancies (obtained from the total number of paid and unpaid trainees from the 2019 EU-LFS) and the hourly labour costs gives the aggregate costs of the binding measure. These are reported in the table below:
Table 10: Costs of transparency of vacancies
Country
Hourly Labour Costs
Estimated number of vacancies affected
Aggregate Costs (€)
AT
39
36259
1414101
BE
43.5
51280
2230701.75
BG
8.2
1900
15584.1
CY
19.4
1000
19409.7
CZ
16.4
15922
261129
DE
39.5
254025
10033987.5
DK
46.8
37212
1741545
EE
16.4
3672
60212.6
EL
14.5
13134
190435.75
ES
23.5
226042
5311975.25
EU27
30.5
1530327
46674973.5
FI
35.9
24080
864454.05
FR
40.8
191722
7822278
HR
12.1
11220
135755.95
HU
10.7
11632
124457.05
IE
37.9
16707
633195.3
IT
29.4
333056
9791846.4
LT
13.1
11636
152438.15
LU
50.7
966
48950.85
LV
12.2
1732
21130.4
MT
14
1942
27181
NL
40.5
31502
1275851.25
PL
12.5
147839
1847987.5
PT
16.1
35613
573369.3
RO
9.5
21866
207731.75
SE
40.1
25606
1026780.55
SI
23.1
1483
34257.3
SK
15.6
14370
224164.2

Costs of recruitment
Empirical evidence on the magnitude of recruitment costs of trainees is rare due to the limited availability of suitable data. Recruitment costs are determined by numerous factors, including the costs of filling a vacancy and of screening and selecting candidates, workers representation at the firm level and collective bargaining agreements coverage.

A recent study using firm-level data in Germany estimated the average costs to fill an apprenticeship vacancy at EUR 600, distributed in EUR 496 for screening and selection costs, EUR 121 for posting vacancies. Recruitment costs for trainees can be expected to be similar to those of apprentices. Importantly, these costs are significantly lower than those for hiring skilled workers, which have been estimated at EUR 160029. To obtain an updated country-level estimate of the recruitment costs, the average costs estimated in Germany (EUR 600) is divided by the average hourly labour costs in Germany in 2012 (EUR 30.5), i.e. the year of the study. This gives the average number of hours required to recruit a trainee. It corresponds to 19.7 hours of work. These are then evaluated at the average hourly labour costs of the EU Member States in 2022 to obtain the average recruitment costs per trainee at the country level.

The aggregate additional costs introduced by the measures are obtained by multiplying the recruitment costs by the number of paid trainees who had traineeships longer than six months and did not remain in the company at the end of the traineeships period. Data on duration and retention come from the 2023 Eurobarometer data on the number of trainees come from the EU-LFS. The original proposed approach of computing the recruitment costs in proportion to the contract length and to drop traineeships between six and nine months long could not be implemented since the Eurobarometer only contains information on whether the traineeships lasted more than six months.


Table 11: Estimated recruitment costs by traineeship type
country
Paid OMT
Paid ALMP
Paid ECT
Paid MPT
Total
AT
183363
307651
951340
236301
1678655
BE
673467
171148
220781
285817
1351213
BG
18067
2420
323
0
20810
CY
0
1145
763
25188
27096
CZ
37424
18712
119692
6452
182280
DE
1869582
3155600
12805007
0
17830189
DK
21175
18413
954724
61684
1055996
EE
323
323
7098
0
7744
EL
19682
29381
117808
288102
454973
ES
4618377
811799
1449310
322685
7202171
EU27
22271814
19296766
23606324
2317026
67491930
FI
10593
0
156783
30368
197744
FR
0
0
5054901
258444
5313345
HR
184235
136153
66410
113064
499862
HU
2736
6946
38309
42519
90510
IE
1293564
111836
405590
102143
1913133
IT
10532514
12762670
726999
411214
24433397
LT
773
0
5412
258
6443
LU
0
0
1995
0
1995
LV
0
62640
2160
0
64800
MT
33049
8813
46820
0
88682
NL
293990
45413
0
0
339403
PL
2103920
1396958
368850
80655
3950383
PT
163111
94066
6651
36740
300568
RO
20745
1121
0
5794
27660
SE
88351
130949
78096
8677
306073
SI
73618
19540
4544
0
97702
SK
29155
3069
15958
921
49103

Costs of remuneration and access to social protection
Cost of the policy options on remuneration (Policy Area B1)
a) Estimation of the current remuneration of trainees
Quantitative data on the current remuneration of trainees does not exist. To obtain a proxy for the current remuneration of trainees use the result of the legal analysis, which provide information on the legal minimum level of remuneration of trainees in the Member States. In most Member States this level can be assumed to be the minimum wage (as these trainees are all considered workers under EU law because they are paid), while some Member States allow for a proportion of the minimum wage or for an actual value provided by law (e.g. for ALMP in IT trainees‘ minimum remuneration is set at 500 EUR, in BE and RO it is 50%, in PT at 80% of the MW).
b) Benchmark remuneration and gap
Following the practice in the 2 MS where provisions on proportionate remuneration exist in relation to a comparable worker (SI and ES)30, a sensitivity analysis could be conducted by setting the benchmark level for fair/proportionate remuneration for OMT to a) minimum wage (conservative scenario) and b) 60% (optimistic scenario) of the average remuneration of employees aged less than 30 years old. Given the different nature of these types of traineeships, we assume that ALMP, ECT and MPT would not be paid above the minimum wage in all the scenarios.
Calculating the cost of the measure on fair/proportionate remuneration for paid trainees
The difference between the benchmark for fair/proportionate remuneration and the estimation of the current minimum remuneration of trainees can provide a range for the rough estimate of the cost of this measure per trainee per month. The product between the cost per trainee and the number of trainees who do not receive fair remuneration gives the aggregate monthly costs of ensuring fair remuneration to trainees. Proxy estimates for the fraction of paid trainees who potentially received unfair remuneration in the EU is obtained from the 2023 Study Supporting the Evaluation of the Quality Framework for Traineeships. In the survey of trainees conducted for the study, respondents were asked whether they considered their remuneration/compensation to be adequate relative to the national minimum wage and whether their compensation was sufficient to cover basic living costs such as rent, food, etc. 54% of the participants considered their remuneration/compensation below the minimum wage, while 22% reported that their compensation was not at all sufficient to cover basic living expenditures. The average between the two answers (38%) is used in an upper bound scenario and the 22% to construct a lower bound scenario. The product between the fraction of trainees receiving unfair remuneration and the number of paid trainees estimated through the EU-LFS data gives an estimate of the number of trainees receiving an inadequate/unfair remuneration. Last, the monthly costs of ensuring fair remuneration to trainees are multiplied by the country specific average traineeships duration taken from the Eurobarometer survey31. Under the assumption that trainees would be paid the minimum legal requirement over the baseline period, the aggregate cost of the measure during the baseline period can be obtained by multiplying the cost per trainee by the predicted number of paid traineeships in the EU.

Calculating the cost of the measure on fair/proportionate remuneration for unpaid trainees
An upper bound to the costs of extending fair remuneration to unpaid trainees can be obtained by multiplying the number of unpaid trainees from the EU-LFS (around 1,5 million trainees in 2019) by the two measures: MW and 60% of the average remuneration of employees aged less than 30 years old and multiplying the monthly costs by the country specific average length of traineeships duration from the Eurobarometer survey. In the optimistic scenario it is assumed that only OMT would be paid a fraction of the average remuneration of employees aged less than 30 years old. The benchmark level of remuneration for ALMP is set at the minimum wage in all the scenarios. For ECT, a sensitivity analysis is performed by considering the following three alternative scenarios: a) unpaid ECT are not affected, b) 22% of unpaid ECT are affected (that is, the fraction of participants who reported receiving insufficient remuneration in the survey conducted for the evaluation study), c) all ECT are affected and are paid 60% of the minimum wage.
Calculating the total cost of the measure on fair/proportionate remuneration
An upper bound of the total costs of ensuring fair remuneration to all trainees in the EU is obtained by adding the estimated costs from ensuring fair/proportionate remuneration for paid trainees to the respective costs for unpaid trainees. This estimate corresponds to full implementation of the non-binding measure. However, not all MS are expected to implement the measure. Therefore, a sensitivity analysis is performed where two scenarios are considered: we assume that only some MS will implement the recommendation. In particular, we consider a) 9 out of 27 Member States (33%) will implement the initiative in the respective national regulatory framework (this corresponds to the number of countries that introduced the least implemented QFT principle in their national regulatory framework for OMT according to the Study Supporting the Evaluation of the Quality Framework for Traineeships) and b) 18 out of 27 Member States will implement the non-binding measure. To obtain an estimate of the costs under this scenario, we multiply the aggregate costs of ensuring fair remuneration to paid and unpaid (the prior method always assumed full implementation for the measure on paid trainees) trainees across the EU MS under the three scenarios in the above by 33% (9/27) and 66% respectively.
For exact calculations of these costs, please see the methodological annex of the study supporting this impact assessment.
Social protection
To obtain an upper bound to the costs of extending social protection to all trainees, data from the 2023 Eurobarometer on the share of participants who reported not having access to social protection (by traineeship type and remuneration coverage) is combined with the estimated number of traineeships from the EU-LFS to obtain the total number of trainees without social protection coverage.
Next, Eurostat statistics on the share of the non-wage costs in the total labour costs is used to obtain an estimate of the hourly social protection costs. These are then scaled at the monthly level by multiplying them by the country average number of weekly hours of work (Eurostat) and by four weeks. It should be noted that these costs are not restricted to employers’ social contributions, therefore, the costs are likely to be overestimated.
The product between the monthly non-wage costs and the number of trainees without access to social protection gives the monthly costs of ensuring social security to all uncovered trainees. The yearly costs in each MS are obtained by multiplying the monthly costs by the average duration of traineeships from the Eurobarometer survey, an indicative measure of the average traineeship duration.
Since not all MS are expected to implement the recommendation, a sensitivity analysis is performed in which there are scenarios where only some MS will implement the recommendation in the scenario called ‘partial implementation. In particular, a conservative scenario in which 33% (i.e. 9 out of 27 MS will implement the initiative in the respective national regulatory framework is assumed, which corresponds to the number of countries that introduced the least implemented QFT principle in their national regulatory framework for OMT according to the Study Supporting the Evaluation of the Quality Framework for Traineeships) and a more positive partial implementation scenario of 66%, as well as a full implementation scenario. The results at the EU level are presented in the table below.
For exact calculations of these costs, please see the methodological annex of the study supporting this evaluation.
Uncertainties and data limitations
The estimates of the cost of the measures on remuneration are subject to a number of limitations:  

• Data on the level of remuneration of trainees  in the EU does not exist. A (lower bound) proxy for the level of remuneration of trainees can be obtained from the results of the legal analysis which provides information of the legal provisions on remuneration in each Member State. However, this proxy will result in an underestimation of the actual level of remuneration of trainees.
• Data on the level of  level of the remuneration of a “comparable worker” does not exist. No data is available on the wages   of entry level employees, which could be considered as a proxy of a “comparable worker” to trainees. However, this proxy results in an overestimation of the benchmark wage, as this dataset also include individuals with several years of experience and not only entry-level employees. Also, the data coming is based on the Structure of Earnings Survey, which refers to the year 2018.
Cost of issuing a written agreement
The estimation of the cost of issuing a written agreement is based on time estimates from the QFT evaluation study. These include 4 hours for drafting the learning objectives of the trainees in the written agreement. Setting and drafting learning objectives is a recurrent cost per trainee, are estimated for 2023. Information on countries where this has already been implemented is taken from the QFT evaluation study for OMT and ALMP, and from the legal analysis for ECT and MPT, carried out as part of the supporting study.
Taking note only of countries and traineeship types where this will create an additional cost, the two above time measures are extrapolated across Member States through average public and private sector labour costs (plus a 25% overhead) and applied to the overall number of trainees.
Table 12: Costs of issuing a written traineeships agreement
MS
Paid OMT
Paid ALMP
Paid ECT
Paid MPT
Unpaid OMT
Unpaid ALMP
Unpaid ECT
Unpaid MPT
Total paid
Total unpaid
Total
AT
1128270
0
0
0
833040
0
0
0
1128270
833040
1961310
BE
542010
0
462188
374318
92111
0
9019725
0
1378516
9111836
10490352
BG
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
CY
0
0
3492
34047
1261
0
150156
0
37539
151417
188956
CZ
0
0
521110
0
0
0
1627454
0
521110
1627454
2148564
DE
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
DK
60138
0
0
0
646776
0
0
0
60138
646776
706914
EE
2132
1353
65600
13694
46166
16154
425826
0
82779
488146
570925
EL
41434
0
0
491115
43609
0
0
0
532549
43609
576158
ES
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
FI
102315
0
1782435
174474
595485
0
6426639
0
2059224
7022124
9081348
FR
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
HR
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
HU
7463
0
0
0
29612
0
0
0
7463
29612
37075
IE
1602412
0
725406
0
361566
0
1218580
0
2327818
1580146
3907964
IT
13796979
0
0
421376
5294646
0
0
0
14218355
5294646
19513001
LT
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
LU
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
LV
0
0
31637
0
0
0
80696
80696
31637
161392
193029
MT
74200
0
54040
0
17780
0
92960
0
128240
110740
238980
NL
224370
84746
0
0
483469
0
5586671
0
309116
6070140
6379256
PL
4456000
0
1931438
246156
50250
0
1279500
0
6633594
1329750
7963344
PT
0
0
20528
67942
0
0
4934892
0
88470
4934892
5023362
RO
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
SE
403807
0
306164
29474
0
0
8217894
0
739445
8217894
8957339
SI
0
0
21830
0
0
0
0
0
21830
0
21830
SK
92040
0
39780
2964
20643
0
2095236
0
134784
2115879
2250663
Total
22533570
86099
5965645
1855559
8516414
16154
41156228
0
30440873
49688796
80129669
Source: Supporting study
Table 13: Costs of issuing a written traineeships per policy option
 
B2.1
B2.2
 Scenario
Total
Paid trainees
Unpaid trainees
Total
Conservative
27
30
17
47
Optimistic
53
30
33
63
Full
80
30
50
80

Cost for extending the written agreement to ECT and MP
Regarding the costs for extending the written agreement to ECT and MP these are based on the findings from the REFIT study supporting the evaluation of the Written Statement Directive (91/533/EC). The computation of the REFIT study is based on two distinct approaches, namely the average time per contract and the annual fixed costs methods. The first approach is based on the time required by an employer to issue a written statement (as elicited through a survey), multiplied by the annual number of statements. The time spent for each type of contract is then evaluated at the hourly wage of the respective Member State using data from Eurostat on national average wages. The cost per company is then divided by the number of employed persons in the company to calculate the cost per employed person. The second method is based on the reported average cost of companies considering the cost of complying with the obligation of the Written Statement Directive as annual fixed costs (estimates through a panel survey conducted in eight Member States). The two measures are then combined to obtain an overall estimate less biased by the survey population. The table below shows the estimated average annual cost per contract in EURO.

Average time per contract method
Annual fixed cost method
Merged approach
Micro enterprises
22
198
44
Small enterprises
13
156
57
Medium enterprises
18
127
57
Large enterprises
10
45
25
Source: REFIT
Methodologies for Stakeholder Consultations
This section provides some further details on the methodologies that were followed for the stakeholder consultation activities mentioned in Annex 2. Particular care was followed in the analysis to factor the inherent bias of some types of stakeholder consultations, either because they were not statistically representative, or because the evidence being gathered focused on the perceptions of respondents. In general, throughout the impact assessment, the best practices of the Better Regulation Toolbox, in particular Tools 51-55 (Stakeholder Consultation), were followed to the maximum extent possible.
Supporting study – interviews
The research team of the supporting study conducted interviews to gather input on the current context and issues relating to the quality of traineeships as well as the potential impacts of policy options. Interviews were conducted using a semi-structured approach, which is commonly used to collect qualitative data. Using semi-structured interviews allows for asking comparable questions across interviews but also leaves space for the conversation to develop according to the expertise of the interviewee.
Semi-structured interviews were conducted with a number of different stakeholders and experts at the EU level. These interviews in particular sought to focus on aspects not covered by the evaluation, to avoid duplicating information. The aim of the interviews was to:
(i) gather stakeholders and experts’ input on existing challenges related to the identified problem(s), including on the quality of traineeships, and depending on the stakeholder, the policy options;
(ii) collect stakeholders and experts’ insights on the potential impact of the different policy options to be assessed.
Consequently, interviews were conducted in two waves. A first wave of inception interviews was carried out at the start of the project. This wave of interviews primarily addressed the issues in (i) and were mainly connected to the problem definition and related drivers identified at the outset of the project, to establish stakeholder perspectives on traineeships quality, in particular aspects that are complementary to what had already been addressed in the evaluation , such as cross-border traineeships and work relationships disguised as traineeships. Particular emphasis was also put on socio-economic inequalities in access to (quality) traineeships and resulting long-term labour market disadvantage. The second wave of interviews was focused on the current challenges and context, but also on the impact of policy options as set out in (ii). The stakeholders were asked to provide their assessment of the identified policy options to address the quality of traineeships in Europe, as well as their opinion about their potential impact. These interviews especially sought to emphasize aspects or elements of the options that cannot easily be quantitatively estimated as part of the cost-benefit analysis (CBA). For instance, this included the second-order effects of increasing remuneration and social security of trainees for businesses, particularly SMEs. The interviews were also used to identify additional relevant data and literature on the issue as well as further relevant stakeholders to involve in the assessment.
Overall, 13 semi-structured interviews were conducted at EU level. A range of stakeholders were targeted, including EU policymakers, EU social partners and European youth organisations, as well as experts. A particular focus was also placed on the sectoral dimension, with interviews targeting a number of sectoral social partners.
Table 14: Summary of EU-level interviews
Type of stakeholder
Inception interviews
Wave 2 interviews

Contacted
Interviewed
Contacted
Interviewed
Employer organisation
1
1
5
3
Trade union
1
0
4
2
EU institutions and policymakers
1
1
0
0
Youth organisations
1
0
2
2
Experts
1
1
1
1
EU institutions as employers
0
0
2
2
Total
5
3
14
10

The interview questionnaire used for the semi-structured interviews is available as an annex to the supporting study. Questions were adapted depending on the stakeholder interviewed and the timing of the interview.
Supporting study – survey
An online survey was carried out among national stakeholders to collect data on current practices of businesses regarding traineeships, to identify relevant national measures and understand how these approaches are positively influencing the overall quality of traineeships. The survey was targeted to national public authorities, national business/employer associations, businesses (traineeship providers), national trade unions, national youth organisations, civil society organisations and educational institutions. The survey targeted at least one representative of each stakeholder category by Member State.
The survey was disseminated through email invitations and publications on social media (LinkedIn). Business associations were invited to disseminate the survey to their member companies. The survey included separate questionnaires for each stakeholder category with a mix of closed and open questions. The survey was available in all EU languages and ran online on Qualtrics from 15 June 2023 to 8 September 2023. 
Five interview questionnaires adapted for different stakeholder groups were prepared for the survey. These questionnaires are available as an annex to the supporting study.
Supporting study – vacancy analysis
An analysis of traineeship vacancies included in the EURES platform was carried out to examine to what extent previous experience is required for traineeship positions.
Out of the different categories in EURES, the category ‘internships’ was chosen as this was considered to be closest to the concept of traineeship. From vacancies in this category, information on experience was extracted on the following aspects: i) whether experience is explicitly included in the vacancies, and if it is, ii) whether this is a requirement to apply for the position and hence potentially to access the internship.
EURES offers a classification of cross-border vacancies according to whether the ‘experience’ is explicitly included in the vacancy and, when it is the case, whether it is required or not and its level. In order to get a deeper understanding, the relevant vacancies were analysed also more closely, and classified according to the level of experience required.
One of the limitations of the platform for this kind of analysis is that it is not used to the same extent in the different countries where it is available (EU27 and Switzerland). The distribution of vacancies by country is reflected in the figure below. In addition, only 1% of vacancies (9 vacancies) are posted in English.

Figure 2: EURES vacancies by country
Flash Eurobarometer survey
A Flash Eurobarometer survey on the “Integration of young people into the labour market with particular focus on traineeships” (FL523) was carried out by Ipsos European Public affairs, on behalf of the European Commission, between 15 and 24 March 2023. The survey covered the population of EU citizens, aged 18 to 35, residents in one of the 27 Member States of the EU. A total of 26.334 interviews were conducted.
All interviews were carried via Computer-Assisted Web Interviewing (CAWI), using Ipsos online panels and their partner network. Respondents were selected from online access panels, groups of pre-recruited individuals who have agreed to take part in research. Sampling quota were set based on age, gender and geographic region. Survey data were weighted to known population proportions (age group by gender, geographic region). The EU27 averages were weighted according to the size of the 18-35 year-old population of each EU Member State.
All the relevant information, including the text of the questionnaire, the margin of error, and other methodological details, are available in the public reports that were published between April and June 2023.32
SME Panel
A “SME Panel” survey was conducted in cooperation between DG EMPL, DG GROW, EISMEA and the support of the European Enterprise Network (EEN). The survey questionnaire was translated in all EU official languages. The survey was launched on 12 October 2023 and closed on 9 November 2023. 170 responses were received from 13 Member States plus Norway.33
Legal analysis
A comprehensive mapping and legal gap analysis across Member States was conducted. The analysis focused on the provisions related to the quality of traineeships and provided information for the estimation of the prevalence/quality of traineeships, the definition of policy options, and estimation of impacts.
The legal analysis aimed at:
• Mapping the legal frameworks governing traineeships across EU Member States, including the legal status of trainees;
• identifying whether EU and national legal frameworks and provisions are effectively and adequately protecting trainees and addressing challenges regarding their working conditions, including remuneration, their access to social protection, and quality assurance.
The existing legal literature on the topic provided a solid basis for constructing a legal mapping and gap analysis. Work by the European Centre of Expertise (ECE) in the field of labour law, employment and labour market policy, the 2023 study supporting the evaluation of the QFT and other relevant studies mapping legal provisions relating to the quality of traineeships in the EU (see non-exhaustive list of sources, below) served as a starting point for the analysis. Further research by a team of legal experts, in the framework of the study supporting the impact assessment, was conducted.
Table 15: Sources used in the analysis of national legal framework governing traineeships
Entity
Title
Scope
Coverage
European Commission (2023)
Commission Staff Working Document. Evaluation of the Council Recommendation on a Quality Framework for Traineeships
Evaluation of the 2014 QFT.
Type of traineeship: Open market, ALMP
Country: EU 27
Ecorys (2022)
Study supporting the evaluation of the QFT for traineeships
Mapping of the legal implementation of each principle of the QFT in EU27.
Type of traineeship: Open market, ALMP
Country: EU 27
European Network of Public Employment Services (2021)
Remuneration of Open-Market Traineeships in EU-27
Mapping of the legal provisions regarding the remuneration for open-market traineeships in all EU member states
Type of traineeship: Open market
Country: EU 27
ILO (2021)
Internships, Employability and the Search for Decent Work Experience
Study of several aspects such as whether traineeships deliver quality training, the effects on employability, and assessment of regulations in selected countries.
Type of traineeship: Open Market, ALMP, Apprenticeships, Curricular
Country: Selected EU MS
Sprint Project (2018)
General report on internships legislation in Member States of European Union
Mapping of student placements legislations in Member States. 18 elements have been analysed to characterise national legislations, including the definition, the accessibility, protection for civil liability or accident …
Type of traineeship: Focus on traineeships through (higher) education but the scope could be broader for certain countries and include vocational training or apprenticeship.
Country: EU 27 + Switzerland
European Commission (2018)
Traineeships under the Youth Guarantee. Experience from the ground
Report on good practices on how different types of traineeships can comply with the QFT principles in each EU MS.
Type of traineeship: Open Market, ALMP
Eurofound (2017)
Fraudulent contracting of work: abusing traineeship status (Austria, Finland, Spain, and UK)
Studying the fraudulent use of traineeships and provide practices to combat them in Austria, Finland, and Spain.

Type of traineeship: Traineeships outside education (ALMP or open market)
Country: AT, ES, FI, UK
European Commission (2016).
Commission Staff Working Document. Applying the Quality Framework for Traineeships
The staff working document maps out in how far different types of traineeships comply with the QFT principles in each EU member state.
Type of traineeship: Open market, ALMP
Country: EU 27
European Commission (2018)
Commission Staff Working Document. Impact Assessment Accompanying the document Proposal for a Council recommendation on access to social protection for workers and the self-employed
The impact assessment contains information on lack of formal coverage to social security for people in non-standard employment, including trainees.
Type of traineeship: all
Country: EU 27 + UK
European Commission (2013)
Commission Staff Working Document. Impact Assessment accompanying the document Proposal for a Council Recommendation on a Quality framework for Traineeships
The Impact Assessment aiming at identifying the policy option that can increase the share of quality traineeships and help discourage substandard traineeships.
Type of traineeship: Open market and transnational traineeships
European Commission (2012)
Study on a comprehensive overview of traineeship arrangements in Member States Final Synthesis Report
Overview of traineeship arrangements.
Type of traineeship: Open Market, ALMP, Apprenticeships, Curricular, Transnational
Country: EU27 + UK
Comparison of options
The different policy measures under each policy area are compared against the baseline scenario, based on their effectiveness, efficiency and coherence. The approach used is a multi-criteria analysis conducted in line with the Better Regulation Toolbox (“Tool#11. Format of the IA report” and “Tool#62. Multi-criteria decision analysis34).
The criteria – effectiveness, efficiency and coherence – are operationalised through the use of selected indicators for each policy area. For the purpose of comparing the impacts of the packages, all criteria have equal weight, and a seven-stage qualitative grading scale is used:
Seven-stage qualitative grading scale
+++
Positive effect compared to the baseline
++
Moderate positive effect compared to the baseline
+
Small positive effect compared to the baseline
0
No significant deviation from the baseline
-
Small negative effect compared to the baseline
--
Moderate negative effect compared to the baseline
---
Negative effect compared to the baseline

The overall score for effectiveness and coherence of each measure is an average of the score for the different indicators (presented in the table below). The overall efficiency score is based on the ratio of the effectiveness score and the efficiency indicators’ scores (see section A13.2 for more details on the comparison of options, including the indicators used).



Annex 5. Competitiveness check
A5.1. Overview of impacts on competitiveness
Dimensions of Competitiveness
Impact of the initiative
(++ / + / 0 / - / -- / n.a.)
References to sub-sections of the main report or annexes
Cost and price competitiveness
+
Sections 6 and 7
International competitiveness
0
Sections 6 and 7
Capacity to innovate
+
Sections 6 and 7
SME competitiveness
0
Sections 5.7, 6 and 7, Annex 2, Annex 14
A5.2. Synthetic assessment
Under the preferred option, businesses that provide traineeships would enjoy the benefits of fairer market competition, by reducing competitors’ use of trainees to lower labour costs. Businesses could also benefit from productivity improvements connected to a larger and more diverse pool of skilled candidates (as those belonging to vulnerable groups will be more likely to apply to traineeships), a more qualified and competent workforce, and higher motivation and engagement of trainees. Additional benefits would arise from a better matching of trainees’ skills to the needs of their company, which is particularly important in the context of the twin green and digital transition. Better skill matching and increased learning opportunities for trainees can foster companies’ medium- and long-term innovation capacity, for example because companies are more likely to retain young talent they trained. Therefore, the preferred option would have a positive impact on the capacity to innovate of traineeship providers, albeit relatively small. Improved labour market matching and higher retention rates could also decrease employers’ search, matching and recruitment costs of regular workers. It should be noted that these benefits could play a significant role, particularly in sectors where innovation is a key driver of growth and competitiveness, even though the prevalence of trainees is relatively small compared to the overall working population.
Businesses would have to sustain limited costs to familiarise and comply with the new obligations, as well as to revise existing contracts and future vacancy notices, and to handle more frequent recruitment and onboarding processes.
Where necessary, the adjustment in the rights of trainees could increase labour costs. This could also be the case, depending on how the recommendations on fair/proportionate remuneration and access to social protection for all trainees would be implemented at national level. Concerning this possible increase of labour costs - one of the many drivers of competitiveness - it is worth noting that the preferred option under policy area B (B1.2) envisages that Member States should ensure that trainees are not treated in a less favourable manner as regards working conditions (including pay) than comparable entry-level workers of the same category in the same establishment, unless different treatment is justified on objective grounds, for example due to different tasks and lower responsibilities, intensity or economic value of work. This approach allows businesses to retain significant margins of manoeuvre to modulate labour costs according to their requirements.
The need to provide information to authorities in charge of inspections and controls could generate some administrative costs. Finally, businesses might face additional costs in cases of increased litigations resulting from new provisions of this initiative.
All things considered, the short-term effects are likely to be more than offset by medium and long-term gains yielded by increased market competition, increased productivity, better skill matching and cross-border flow of talent and higher innovation capacity by European companies.
The effects of the preferred option on international competitiveness and trade are more difficult to assess. Although positive effects in domestic markets (as discussed above) may also increase EU companies’ long-term competitiveness in international markets, the sheer number of variables at play, many of which are exogenous to the initiative (e.g. EU trade flows, labour policies of third countries, overall geopolitical context, etc) suggest a prudent, neutral, assessment of impacts.
Concerning specifically SMEs, the preferred option may have a slightly negative impact on their competitiveness in the short term, as some of the envisaged measures could incur slightly higher costs for SMEs compared to large companies, due to the lack of economies of scale. However, some data (including from the SME Panel survey) suggest that SMEs benefit significantly from traineeships, including in terms of increased productivity of the company, the ability to develop supervisors’ and/or mentors’ managerial skills, reduction of labour costs, reduction of training costs if/when trainees are later hired as well as their better performance. These can also help SMEs find skilled workers, which is key to their success, as evidenced by the September 2023 Eurobarometer on “Skills shortages, recruitment, and retention strategies in SMEs.” This is expected to result in slightly positive impact on SMEs’ competitiveness in the mid- and long-term.
Such positive impact is arguably better or only achievable with high-quality traineeships, and since these do require an investment from the traineeship provider (the SME in this case) it is important to ensure a level-playing field among SMEs in the EU, which is one of the goals of the initiative. Furthermore, given the skill shortages35 and the overall economic situation, it is necessary to complement the broader financial and non-financial supporting measures outlined in the SME Relief Package36 with specific accompanying measures. The initiative plans to do this as discussed in sections 5.7 and 6.8, i.e. by: ensuring the effective involvement of social partners and other relevant stakeholders, in the implementation and monitoring of the rights and obligation arising from this initiative; strengthening awareness raising, partnerships between relevant stakeholders and the exchange of best practices, also between Member States and stakeholders, in the area of high-quality traineeships, including on cross-border traineeships; supporting employers (financial and/or practical guidance), in particular small and micro enterprises, to provide high quality traineeships.
Annex 6. The principles of the 2014 QFT
In March 2014, the Council adopted the Recommendation on a Quality Framework for Traineeships (QFT). The 2014 QFT aimed to set EU-wide quality standards for traineeships and to discourage the offer of traineeships with poor learning content or working conditions.
According to the 2014 QFT, traineeships are understood as “a limited period of work practice, whether paid or not, which includes a learning and training component, undertaken in order to gain practical and professional experience with a view to improving employability and facilitating transition to regular employment”.
The QFT urges Member States to improve the quality of open-market traineeships (OMT) and active labour market policy (ALMP) traineeships, particularly in terms of learning and training content and working conditions, with the aim of facilitating the transition from education, unemployment or inactivity to work.
• Open-market traineeships (OMT) are non-mandatory, bilateral agreements agreed between a trainee and a traineeship provider (public/private/non-profit) – the involvement of a third party and without a formal connection to education or training.
• Traineeships as part of ALMPs are organised by public employment services (PES) in cooperation with employers, based on a tripartite agreement, with the aim of helping unemployed or inactive people into employment37.
The 2014 QFT comprises a list of 21 principles in 10 main areas:
1) a written traineeship agreement
2) learning and training objectives
3) working conditions
4) rights and obligations
5) a reasonable duration
6) proper recognition of traineeships
7) transparency requirements
8) cross-border traineeships
9) use of European Structural and Investment Funds
10) applying the QFT with the active involvement of social partners and stakeholders
The QFT also outlines how the Commission supports Member States’ action through EU funds, the exchange of good practices, and monitoring.
The QFT explicitly excludes from its scope work experience placements that are part of curricula of formal education or vocational education (ECT) and training as well as traineeships that are regulated under national law and whose completion is a mandatory requirement (MPT) to access a specific profession (e.g. medicine, architecture, etc.).


Annex 7. Prevalence of traineeships in the EU
A7.1. Prevalence and distribution of paid traineeships
Following the COVID-19 outbreak in early 2020, the number of paid trainees decreased to below 1.4 million in 2021 (latest available figures). As suggested by Stewart, A. et al. (2021)38, trainees are likely to have been particularly affected by the disruptions created by the pandemic (e.g., school closures and stay-at-home orders) and evidence already suggest that young individuals were particularly affected by the pandemic. Evidence from the EU-LFS indicates that the number of paid trainees dropped more sharply than the number of employees. This holds for (almost) all sectors but is particularly significant in the public administration, accommodation and education sectors.
The evolution in the number of trainees over the 2006-2021 period suggests a certain alignment with economic developments. The number of paid trainees peaked in 2008 at the onset of the Great Recession, decreased continuously until 2013 (Euro Area crisis) and then increased steadily until 2019, in line with the recovery of EU labour markets39. Paid OMT tend to be more countercyclical, while paid ALMP traineeships seem to follow the economic cyclical trends.

Figure 3: Number of paid trainees in the EU27, by type of traineeship (2006-2021)
Note: Number of paid trainees at EU27 level in thousands, with 95% confidence obtained from the missing value imputation procedure. The EU27 level includes all Member States except IE in 2006 (missing data).
Source: Study exploring the context, challenges and possible solutions in relation to the quality of traineeships in the EU, forthcoming (VT/2022/047).

Concerning the composition by types of paid traineeships (Figure 4), ALMP traineeships represent around one-third of paid trainees in the EU27 over the most recent years, though their share has decreased by 3.2 percentage points between 2013 and 2019. ECT and OMT are the next most common, representing respectively around 30%40 and just over 20% of paid traineeships. MPT account for the residual share of approximately 10%. Moreover, it is interesting to note the increase in the share of OMT during the Euro Area crisis and the early phase of the labour market recovery, peaking at 27.5% in 2015. This suggests a potential countercyclical nature of OMT, whereby its share is less affected by economic downturns than, for instance, the ECT share. ALMP traineeships appear to be cyclical, as their share (and numbers) did not particularly rise when (youth) unemployment was high in the aftermath of the financial crisis.

Figure 4: Composition (%) of paid traineeships by type of traineeship, 2013-2021Note: Values in stacked bar charts are percentages of each type of traineeships out of the total number of paid traineeships
Source: Study exploring the context, challenges and possible solutions in relation to the quality of traineeships in the EU, forthcoming (VT/2022/047).

At Member State level, the estimates suggest important differences in the shares of paid traineeships, and in the distribution of the different types of paid traineeships. In absolute figures, the number of paid trainees over the entire sample period is highest in the five most populous EU countries – DE, ES, FR, IT, and PL – which account for more than 80% of the overall number of paid trainees in 2019. Numbers of at least ca. 10 000 paid trainees per year are on average also observed in seven other Member States (BE, DK, IE, EL, HR, AT, and FI). In the remaining Member States, the numbers of paid trainees are comparatively quite low.
A significant variation exists among Member States regarding the composition of paid traineeships by type of traineeships. In one-third of Member States (CZ, DE, DK, EE, FR, LT, AT, and FI), the largest share of trainees is doing ECT, where the share of ECT is at least equal to 50% (or very close to) while it reaches 90% in DK. Trainees doing ALMP traineeships constitute a significant share of all trainees in almost every country, but the share is especially significant in BE, IT, PL and SE where they account for around 40% of traineeships (more than 70% in IT). The share of trainees doing OMT varies substantially across Member States, and is especially large in BG, IE, EL, ES, HR, LV, LU, MT, NL, PL, PT, RO, SI and SK41. In contrast, in a quarter of Member States, shares of OMT in recent years are very low (DK, DE, EE, FR, LT, AT and FI). Finally, the shares of MPT are relatively high in nine Member States (BE, DE, EE, EL, CY, HU, AT, PT and RO) where they represent around 20% (BE, DE, HU, AT, PT) to more than 50% of the traineeships in specific years (EL, CY, and RO).
Looking at the sector distribution of paid traineeships, according to the LFS data, the highest share of the trainee population (2019 data) is found in the manufacturing sector (17.3%), followed by wholesale and retail trade (12.9%), human health (12.5%), education (11.6%), and real estate and professional and administrative support services (11.1%). In general, these patterns are aligned with shares of these sectors in the overall economy. For instance, manufacturing, is the sector with the largest share of employees in the EU27 and is also the one with the largest share of trainees.
Additional, evidence from the EU-LFS (2019 data) provides data on the prevalence of paid traineeships per sector of economic activity (NACE 2). The highest prevalence of paid trainees is found in the education sector, with a prevalence rate of 1.4% in 2019, followed by real estate and professional and administrative support services (1.2%), accommodation (1.2%), arts/entertainment and others (1.0%), and health and social work (1.0%).
Data at Member State level show higher prevalence of traineeships in the service sectors for most Member States. This is particularly true for the REPASS sector (53.3%, 26.6% and 21.4% in CY, SK and BG), education (33.7%, 32.8%, 27.7%, 25.9%, and 21.8% in LU, CZ, DE, DK, and AT), health (34.1%, 34%, 31.6%, 29%, 27.5%, 22.7%, 22.3%, 20.6%, and 20.0% in SI, RO, EL, DK, AT, BE, FR, FI) and public administration sectors (34.9% and 21.4% in HU and LU), for which a majority of Member States tend to display shares for paid trainees greater than for employees. As noted for prevalence rates, IT and PL stand out for their higher shares of trainees in the manufacturing sectors (respectively, 25.7% and 23.5%). Furthermore, a significant number of traineeships in these two Member States take place in the wholesale and retail trade (respectively, 19.7%, 19.5%). Other Member States show a high share of trainees in industrial and/or low-skilled services sectors. These Member States include LV for the manufacturing sector (19.6%), SE for the electricity and construction sector (15.9%), LT for the wholesale and retail trade and the accommodation sectors (17.7% and 17.9%), and LV and RO for the transport and storage sector (29.4% and 19.4%).
With regards to sectoral composition by type of traineeships, MPT mostly take place in the health (41.1% in 2019) and education sectors (32.3% in 2019), while a high share of ALMP traineeships takes place in the manufacturing and wholesale and retail sectors (22.3% and 18.9% respectively, 2019 data). A high share of OMT also takes place in the manufacturing sector (19.6% in 2019) but the sectoral composition appears less concentrated than what is observed for MPT and ALMP traineeships. A similar conclusion can be reached for ECT as the concentration of trainees does not exceed 15% in any sector of economic activity.  
Data on the share of paid trainees by occupational category (ISCO code) show that the largest share of paid trainees can be found in the managerial and professional occupations (27.1% for the period 2016-2019). Trainees are also more concentrated in occupations that can be linked to the service sector, like clerical support workers (13.1% of trainees and 10.9% of employees) or service and sales workers (18.9% and 16.6%). In contrast, the more manual and medium- or low-skilled occupations (e.g. elementary occupations and plant/machine operators/assemblers) only represent marginal shares of traineeships. Overall, traineeships are therefore more common in highly skilled occupations. At Member State level, the occupations linked to managers and professionals account for more than one in two trainees in CY, PT, LU, RO, and CZ (71.9%, 66.6%, 56.6%, 51.4% and 50.5%). The shares are also greater for trainees compared with employees in all Member States, but SE, LT, PL, IT, LV, and BG. This observation tends to hold consistent with the evidence extracted from the sectoral composition analysis, since these six Member States often display higher shares of trainees in the industrial and/or the low-skilled service sectors. More precisely, LT, IT, MT and PL display higher shares of trainees (above 20%)42 in the service and sales occupation (36.5%, 26.6%, 24.7% and 20.5%), whilst BG, BE, SE and IT do so in the craft and related trade workers occupation (26.8%, 20.8%, 19.3% and 19.0%), and LV, LT do so in elementary occupations (23.7% and 20.6%)43.
Finally, data regarding the composition of paid trainees by firm size44 shows that the smallest share (around 25%) of traineeships can be found in micro companies (less than 10 employees), followed by 30% in small companies (10-49 employees) and 45% in large companies (more than 50 employees). The share of traineeships is largest in large companies in almost all EU27 countries.
The results of the 2023 Eurobarometer45 confirm these findings as they show that in terms of the size of the host company or organisation, the following distribution was found for young people’s last traineeship: 20% is completed in a micro company (less than ten employees), 34% in small companies (10 to 49 employees), 24% in medium-sized companies (50 to 250 employees) and 18% in large companies (more than 250 employees). Also, the proportion of paid traineeships in micro companies (with 1 to 9 employees) was 48% and increases to 54% for traineeships in companies with between 10 and 49 employees and to 59%-60% in companies with 50 or more employees.
A7.2. Profile of trainees
In terms of prevalence rates46 of paid traineeships and composition of trainees’ population by gender, men and women are in a similar situation in the EU. Namely, the prevalence rate is only marginally higher for women as compared to men in particular during recent years (2016-2019), e.g., for 2019 the rate was 0.98% for women compared to 0.94% for men. In terms of the composition of the trainees’ population by gender, the differences are even less pronounced (e.g., the share was 50.4% for men and 49.6% for women, EU average 2016-2019). At Member State level there is a larger share of women than men among paid trainees in 16 Member States (CY, BG, NL, SK, SI, AT, HU, HR, PT, CZ, DK, LU, PL, EL, DE, FR ). The share of women is particularly high (above 55%) in CY (69%), BG (66%), NL (62%), SK (57%), SI (57%), and AT (56%). By contrast, paid traineeships are particularly male-dominated in LV (70%), BE (66%), RO (64%), MT (58%), IT (57%) and SE (56%).
Regarding the gender composition of paid traineeships in the EU27 by type of traineeships data shows that MPT tend to have a higher share of women than men (around 61% in 2019). The other three types of traineeships are more evenly split between genders.
Trainees are usually young people, but they can also be people in a transitioning stage in their professional carrier. The vast majority of trainees (77.9%) are in the age group 15-29, with trainees in the age group of 20-24 constituting almost 40% of the share of trainees followed by trainees aged 25-29 (29.3%). The trainees in these groups are young people, who are entering the labour market, and are doing a traineeship as their first work experience. In fact, according to the results of the 2023 Eurobarometer47, about one in five respondents (19%) stated that their first work experience as a traineeship. Furthermore, according to the LFS data, 1 in 5 trainees (21.9%) were 30 years old and above (9.9% for 30-34 and 12% for 35+), however, the prevalence rates of these groups are much lower as compared to younger trainees (0.8% and 0.2% respectively). The latter is to be expected as these are mostly people who are transitioning from one job to another or starting a professional career in a new specific field and who they do not have sufficient professional experience in the same field of activity to secure an entry-level position as a permanent employee. Therefore, they form a small percentage of employees in their respective age groups.
In most Member States, trainees aged 20-24 and 25-29 represent more than 50% of trainees in all Member States but EL, SE, MT, NL, LV, and BG. The shares of paid trainees aged 15-19 is relatively large (above 15%) in LV, LT, MT, EE, AT, and DE.
The age composition of paid traineeships by type of traineeship (Figure 6) shows that the youngest age group, 15-19, is only found in ECT and ALMP traineeships. Trainees aged 20-24 take up the largest share of these two types of traineeships (52.8% and 49.8% respectively in 2019), while trainees above 24 represent a large majority of MPT and OMT (around 90% for MPT and between 84% and 89% for OMT). The share of paid trainees above 35 years is highest for OMT (33.4% in 2019).


Figure 5: Evidence on paid trainees in the EU27, disaggregated by age.
Notes: Prevalence rates are calculated as the sum of paid trainees divided by the total number of employees of the relevant age group. Results are displayed in percentages. Panels b) and c) on composition show the share of each age group among paid trainees. Data by Member States displays the average for 2016-2019. Percentages below 15% are not displayed in panels b) and c).
Source: Study exploring the context, challenges and possible solutions in relation to the quality of traineeships in the EU, forthcoming (VT/2022/047).


Figure 6: Age composition of trainees by type of traineeship in the EU27
Source: Study exploring the context, challenges and possible solutions in relation to the quality of traineeships in the EU, forthcoming (VT/2022/047).
The share of paid trainees above 35 years is highest for OMT (33.4% in 2019).
The EU population of paid trainees is clearly dominated by medium and highly educated individuals48. Looking at the composition of the trainee population, individuals with a low level of education constitute the smallest share (around 12%) of all paid trainees. Around half of the paid trainees have a medium level of education (49.7%), while around 38.6% are highly educated Moreover, the share of highly-educated trainees has increased over time (from 37% in 2013). In most EU countries, the share of low-educated trainees is well below 10%.
Data on the prevalence rates of paid trainees shows that prevalence increases with the level of education. The prevalence rate of trainees with low education was 0.7% as compared to 1.0% for trainees with a medium level education and 1.1% for highly educated trainees (2019 data).
Evidence on the composition of the different types of paid traineeships by education level show that highly educated trainees represent the largest share of MPT49 and OMT (around 65.9%, 2019), a share that has significantly increased from 2018 onwards (45% 2013, 66% in 2018). In contrast, highly educated trainees are least likely to participate in ALMP traineeships, where most trainees have a medium level of education (73.5% in 2019).
The analysis of the profile of trainees responding to the 2023 Eurobarometer survey50 confirms the analysis of the LFS data. The proportion of young people with traineeship experience is higher for respondents who completed post-secondary education (75%) than for respondents with a secondary (or lower) qualification (61%). Similarly, respondents currently working as a skilled employee or worker (85%) or being self-employed (86%) are more likely than respondents working as an unskilled worker or employee (70%) to have undertaken at least one traineeship.

Figure 7: Evidence on paid trainees in the EU27, disaggregated by level of education
Note: Prevalence rates are calculated as the sum of paid trainees divided by the total number of employees of the relevant education level group. Results are displayed in percentages. Panels b) and c) on composition show the share of each education level among paid trainees. Data by Member States displays the average for 2016-2019. Percentages below 15% are not displayed in panels b) and c).
Source: Study exploring the context, challenges, and possible solutions in relation to the quality of traineeships in the EU, forthcoming (VT/2022/047).

In terms of prevalence of paid traineeships in cities, towns/suburbs and rural areas, 45.2% of paid traineeships took place in cities, 32.9% in towns/suburbs and 21.9% in rural areas (2019).

Figure 8: Paid trainees in the EU27, disaggregated by degree of urbanisation
Note: Prevalence rates are calculated as the sum of paid trainees divided by the total number of employees of the relevant degree of urbanisation. Results are displayed in percentages. Panels b) and c) on composition show the share of paid trainees by degree of urbanisation. Data by Member States displays the average for 2016-2019 and is sorted based on the share trainees residing in cities. Percentages below 5% are not displayed in panels b) and c).
Source: Study exploring the context, challenges, and possible solutions in relation to the quality of traineeships in the EU, forthcoming (VT/2022/047).
In terms of types of traineeships, the composition of paid traineeships across cities, towns/suburbs and rural areas is more even within AMLP traineeships, while for the other three types of traineeships, the shares of paid traineeships are highest in the cities (for MPT 67.6%, ECT 53.1% and OMT 46.6% in 2019) and lowest in rural areas (for MPT 9.1%, ECT 18.2% and OMT 22.3% in 2019).

Figure 9: Composition of trainees by type of traineeship and degree of urbanisation in the EU27 – LFS
Source: Study exploring the context, challenges, and possible solutions in relation to the quality of traineeships in the EU, forthcoming (VT/2022/047).
A7.3. Prevalence of unpaid traineeships
Evidence on the prevalence of unpaid traineeships is scarce. Yet the EU-LFS contains information that could be used to generate indicative estimates of the prevalence of unpaid trainees, which are recorded in the EU-LFS as inactive individuals or unemployed (not-employed). The precise methodology is described in Annex 4.
Additional evidence on unpaid traineeships can be obtained from the Flash Eurobarometer 523 and the proxy measure used in EC (2023). Across all traineeships, 44% of the respondents did not receive any type of financial compensation, down from 59% in the 2013 Flash Eurobarometer. Although the results from the Eurobarometer are not comparable to the EU-LFS numbers51, the two data sources demonstrate a similar share of unpaid trainees (44% in the EB, 48% in the LFS). Furthermore, both results indicate that the share of unpaid trainees has been on a decreasing trend. According to the EU-LFS 65% of all are concentrated in the following countries BE, DE, ES, FR and IT.
The upper panel of the Figure 10 below shows estimates of paid and unpaid trainees in the EU27. Between 2016 and 2019, the overall number of traineeships increased in the EU27 (+132 400 or 4.5%), due to an increase in the number of paid traineeships (+116300 or +7.8%). The number of unpaid traineeships only slightly increased, by 16 000 units (+1.1%). On unpaid traineeships per type of traineeship, the middle panel below further shows that ECT account for the vast majority of unpaid traineeships in the EU27 (1 237 2000 trainees in 2019 or ca. 85% of all unpaid traineeships (1 455 600)), while ALMP and OMT only account for marginal shares. The lower panel further shows the share of unpaid traineeships within each type of traineeships. ECT have by far the largest share of unpaid traineeships (71.1% in 2019). However, approximately a quarter (25.3%) of OMT are also unpaid, as well as 12.5% of ALMP traineeships.

Figure 10: Paid and unpaid trainees in the EU – an estimate using the LFS
According to the Flash Eurobarometer results, there is a considerable cross-country variation in the share of unpaid traineeships. In HR, 78% of respondents received compensation whereas at the other end of the spectrum, in BE, it is only half of this rate. These figures are generally in line with the findings of the trainee survey conducted as part of the EC (2023) study supporting the QFT evaluation52. With a sample of 1836 respondents covering OMT and ALMP traineeships, the survey results showed that 47% of trainees received a financial allowance or compensation monthly, while a further 14% benefitted occasionally. 39% indicated that they have not received any allowance or compensation.
Although not representative, data from the 2023 Eurobarometer offers some indication on the socio-demographic characteristics of unpaid trainees. According to it, a slight majority of unpaid trainees are women at EU level (54.8%). In all countries except HR (44.9%), PL (47.1%), IT (49.8%) and CZ (50%), more than 40% of unpaid trainees are women. This is in contrast to paid trainees in the Eurobarometer, where men make up a larger share (56.6%) of the population.
As regards the age of unpaid trainees, at EU level (using the results of the 2023 Eurobarometer), the largest share is in the age group 18-24 (37.9%), followed by trainees aged 30-34 (34.4%) and then 25-29 (27.6%). As such, unpaid trainees overall are younger than paid trainees. However, there is significant variation in these patterns across Member States. In FR (46.4%), PT (43.6%), IT (41.1%), NL (38.2%), HR (38.1%), DE (36.9%), ES (36%), SI (36%) and LU (34.6%), the largest share of unpaid trainees are aged 18-24. In contrast, in BG (48.4%), EE (45.7%), HU (42.9%), LV (42.5%), LT (42.1%), RO (40.9%), FI (40.7%), MT (40%), CY (39.2%), SK (38.9%), IE (38%), SE (36.5%), PL (36.4%), CZ (35.8%), EL (35.2%) and BE (35%), the age group 30-34 is the most represented. AT (35.2%) and DK (37.4%) are the only two countries where the age group 25-29 constitutes the largest share of unpaid trainees.
With regard to education level of unpaid trainees, (using the results of the 2023 Eurobarometer), the majority of unpaid trainees are in either post-secondary non-tertiary education (33.8%) or tertiary education (26.3%), followed by upper secondary VET (24.8%). The Eurobarometer data for paid trainees shows similar patterns, with the largest share in post-secondary non tertiary (39.2%), followed by upper secondary VET (24.6%) and tertiary education (24%). Individuals with either post-secondary non-tertiary education or tertiary education constitute the largest share of unpaid trainees in all EU countries, with the exception of SE, where upper secondary VET is the most represented (44.4%). Finally, on urbanisation, across the EU27, the largest share of unpaid trainees is located in a small or medium town (42.4%) or a large town/city (30.2%), with the smallest share in a rural area or village. These shares are similar to the ones for paid trainees. However, there are also a minority of Member States where the largest share of unpaid trainees is in a rural area or village, including LU (53.9%), SI (47.3%), BE (40%), MT (38.7%) and AT (36.8%).
A7.4. Territorial and sectoral prevalence of trainees
Territorial distribution
At Member State level, the estimates suggest important differences in the shares of paid traineeships, and in the distribution of the different types of paid traineeships. Five Member States represent almost 90% of the total number of paid trainees (ca. 1.4 million, 2019 data) in the EU (DE, ES, FR, IT, PL), which are also the Member States with the highest population in the EU. At the same time, these Member States also demonstrate the highest prevalence rate of paid traineeships in the population of employees aged 15-64. This indicates that the high share of trainees in these countries is not only driven by population size but is a structural feature of these countries’ labour markets. Seven other Member States each account on average for at least 10,000 paid trainees per year (BE, DK, IE, EL, HR, AT, FI). In the remaining Member States, the share of paid traineeships is comparatively low.
Furthermore, evidence of paid traineeships by degree of urbanisation shows that the largest share of traineeships takes place in cities (45.2% in 2019), followed by traineeships in towns/suburbs (32.9%). These traineeships show an increasing trend, whereas traineeships in rural areas, which are already rarer (21.9% of traineeships in 2019), show a declining trend (see Figure 8).
The situation varies, though at Member State level. The majority of traineeships in LU are in rural areas, with significant share (more than one third) of traineeships are taking place in rural areas also in SI, PL, LT and HU. In 14 Member States, 50% or more of traineeships are in cities.
When looking at the different types of traineeships, the trend is similar for most types, except for ALMP traineeships, which are more common in rural areas, and the minority of these traineeships take place in cities. For more information, please see the supporting study.
Sectoral distribution
In terms of sectoral distribution, five sectors make up the largest share of the trainees. In 2019, manufacturing, wholesale and retail, health, education and real estate and professional, administrative and support activities counted more than 1 million (paid) trainees, or close to two-thirds of the total. 
Not all types of traineeships are distributed evenly across sectors. ALPM are concentred in two main sectors. In 2019, mining, quarrying and manufacturing (NACE2) and wholesale and retail trade; repair of motor vehicles and motorcycles (NACE4), hosted 240,000 paid trainees or about 40% of the total. Italy and Poland alone account for about 2/3 of total ALPM in the EU.
Also, MPT trainees are very concentrated in a few sectors, which are associated with the professions for which the MPT is a requirement. The education (NACE 10), the health (NACE 11) and the real estate and professional sectors (NACE8) account for about 85% of the total.
Both ECT and OMT are quite spread across the sectors. The most interesting development in ECT is its growth over time. ECT increased strongly in all the service sectors. The most dramatic increase is observable in the transport, storage and communication sectors. While starting from a very low level, the number increased by more than three times between 2006 and 2019 (and it continues to increase during the COVID period). Interesting to note as well that ECT paid traineeships are highly concentrated in two countries. Germany and France in 2019 accounted for more than 60% of the total trainees of the EU. 






Data on sectoral differences between traineeships is available from the survey conducted by the study supporting the evaluation . Evidence shows that some of the sectors with a high number of trainees – notably wholesale, health and social work and education – are also some of the ones exhibiting lower scores across (some of) the quality dimensions where data is available.
In terms of overall attitude towards traineeships, there is some variation across the different sectors, ranging from 23% having reported a negative or very negative opinion in the wholesale & retail trade, transport, accommodation & food sectors to 10% in the agriculture, forest and fishing, education and construction sectors.

Figure 11 Overall opinion about traineeships
Source: Study support the evaluation, p.408.
Other quality-related indicators, however, point to a more nuanced picture than what the overall trainee perceptions imply. The study supporting the evaluation looked at the share of trainees offered a job at the end of their traineeship. The respective shares were: 43% for Wholesale & retail trade, transport, accommodation & food with 43%, 31% in education, 34% in health and social work and 36% in arts, entertainment & recreation. These shares are still below the 60% in finance and insurance and the 56% in construction.

Figure 12 Were you offered a job at the end of your traineeship?
Source: Study support the evaluation,p.53.
The study also asked about the implementation across sectors of three principles of the QFT, namely the provision of a written agreement, the stipulation of learning objectives, and the provision of a certificate at the end of the traineeship. The respective shares were: Wholesale & retail trade (65%), arts, entertainment & recreation (66%) and education (68%) rank as the lowest. Conversely, financial & insurance activities have a 78% implementation rate across the three principles.
Projected trends in traineeship prevalence
The table below shows the projections of the number of the different types of traineeships based on the prevalence trends estimated through the EU-LFS. Using a simple extrapolation exercise, the baseline projections assume for each type of traineeship an annual growth rate equal to the average yearly growth rate observed in the five years before the outburst of the COVID-19 pandemic in Europe. The motivation for selecting the 2014-2019 time-period is two-fold. First, it allows to obtain estimates that are not influenced by the shock caused by the COVID-19 pandemic. In addition, it allows to capture the trends in traineeship prevalence that occurred since the introduction of the Council Recommendation on a Quality Framework for Traineeships. This approach is, however, subject to limitations. To start, the assumption of a linear growth rate might not hold true in the time horizon considered, because of major transformations in the labour market driven by the acceleration in the digital transformation and the green transition. In addition, the limitations that apply to the estimated prevalence (see Annex 4) also affect the projected prevalence trends, especially those related to unpaid traineeships. Lastly, these projections are subject to considerable uncertainty connected to the impacts of future political, economic, and socio-demographic changes. To mitigate these limitations, we carry out a sensitivity analysis which incorporates prospected socio-economic and political developments in the EU.
The linear trend assumption suggests that by 2030 the total number of trainees in Europe will increase by 16.3% compared to its level in 2021. While the number of paid traineeships is expected to increase by 36%% (from 1,4 Mn to 1,9 Mn trainees), the projections for the number of unpaid traineeships suggest a small increase by 5.3% (from 1,6 to 1,7 Mn trainees).
Looking at the trends by type of traineeship, the largest growth in relative terms concerns MPT, which are projected to increase by 42.8% (from 159 thousand in 2021 to 227 thousand trainees in 2030). The number of ALMP traineeships is expected to increase by 30.7% (from 489 thousand to 639 thousand trainees), while ECT are expected to increase by 17.5% (from 1,9 to 2,2 Mn trainees). The projections for the number of OMT suggest a small increase by 6.8% (from 427thousand to 456 thousand trainees), driven by a decline in the number of paid OMT and an increase in the number of unpaid OMT.
The small overall growth in the number of OMT is supported by recent findings in the literature on the existence and projected increase of labour shortages in various sectors of the economy53. The study suggests that labour shortages are driven by structural factors such as the green and digital transition54.
Nonetheless, the transformations in the nature of work and skills induced by the green and digital transition could potentially increase the number of trainees in the coming years by increasing the needs for upskilling and reskilling and by stimulating policies promoting investments in trainings throughout the working life. In addition, labour shortages connected to poor working conditions could be associated to an overall decline in the number of unpaid OMT traineeships55. To capture these trends, we consider a high-growth scenario that envisages an increase in OMT driven by fast developments connected to the green and digital transition and the national targets on employment and training to deliver on the European Pillar of Social Rights Action Plan56. The high growth scenario is based on the assumption of a 2.3% yearly growth rate of paid OMT and a 0.4% yearly growth rate for unpaid OMT. These correspond to the weighted average yearly growth rates of paid and unpaid traineeships (all types of traineeships) in the time horizon considered. Under this assumption, the overall number of traineeships in the EU would increase by 17% due to the increase in the number of paid OMT (+22%) and a small increase in the number of unpaid OMT traineeships of 3.4%.
The increase in the number of ALMP traineeships could be consistent with the expected impacts of the Council Recommendation on the Reinforced Youth Guarantee (RYG) which can be expected to produce larger impacts on traineeship prevalence as (i) it extends its coverage to all young people aged 15-29 years old, compared to the 15-24 age group targeted by the previous YG; (ii) it mobilises a significantly larger amount of financial resources. In particular, the main source of EU funds for the programming period 2021-2027 is represented by the Youth Employment Initiative, one of the four funding instruments of the European Social Fund Plus (ESF+)57. In addition, Member States with a rate of young people (aged 15-29) not in employment, education or training (NEET) exceeding the average for the 2017-2019 period should devote at least 12.5% of their ESF+ resources to youth employment. Under the ESF+, almost EUR 99.3 billion will be invested in EU’s employment, social education and skills policies for the programming period 2021-2027.
Finally, the projected increase in the total number of trainees in education58 (ECT) is supported by current evidence from Eurostat suggesting that the share of people with tertiary education in the EU is trending upward59. In particular, the share of people aged 25-74 years with tertiary education has increased from 24.5% in 2012 to 31.8% in 2022, with younger people attaining higher levels of education than older ones. In 2022, 37.7% of those aged 25-54 years had attained tertiary education as opposed to 22.7% of those aged 55-74 years. These trends reflect the influence of both socio-economic dynamics and policy initiatives. From an economic perspective, the higher flexibility and complexity of jobs induced by digital technology has resulted in a growing number of employers seeking staff with capacities to think autonomously and manage complex information. These forces are expected to further increase the demand for highly skilled people in the coming years60. In addition, at EU level, the Council Resolution on a strategic framework for European cooperation in education and training towards the European Education Area and beyond (2021-2030)61 sets an EU level target of 45% of persons aged 25-34 years with tertiary educational attainment62. Within the EU, the share of the population aged 25-34 years with tertiary education was 42% in 2022. Almost half of the EU Member States already reached the target for 2030 (the highest shares were found in Luxembourg and Ireland, over 60%; the lowest shares of people with tertiary educational attainment were observed in Romania and Italy, below 30 %)63.
Table 16 : Projections in traineeships trends in the EU27 by type of traineeship (in thousands of traineeships)


Linear Trend Assumption
High Growth Scenario
Year
2021
2030
2030
Paid MPT
159
226
(42.8%)
226
(42.8%)
Paid ECT
575
904
(57.1%)
904,
(57.1%)
Paid ALMP
370
474
(28.2%)
474,
(28.2%)
Paid OMT
258
2487
(-4%)
319
(22.6%)
Unpaid ECT
1,299
1,299
(0%)
1,299
(0%)
Unpaid ALMP
119
165
(38.4%)
165
(38.4%)
Unpaid OMT
169
208
(23.2%)
175
(3.4%)
Total
2,949
3,525
(16.3%)
3,560
(17.1%)
Note: The table shows the projected number of traineeships by traineeship type and based on whether the trainee is paid or not. For each type of traineeship, the projections are based on the average yearly growth rate observed between 2014 and 2019. Column (4) considers a high growth scenario for OMT based on the assumption of a 2.3% and 0.4% yearly growth rate for paid and unpaid OMT, respectively. The percentage growth compared to the 2021 levels is shown in brackets.
Source: Study exploring the context, challenges, and possible solutions in relation to the quality of traineeships in the EU, forthcoming (VT/2022/047).


Annex 8. More information on work relationships disguised as traineeships
This annex presents additional information on the sources used to identify the elements which can be used to distinguish work relationships disguised as traineeships from genuine traineeships.
A8.1. Selection of elements indicating possible work relationships disguised as traineeships
Work relationships disguised as traineeships occur when an employer disguises regular (entry-level) employee positions as traineeships. In such cases, the individual performs the tasks of a regular employee but is wrongly treated as a trainee. As a result, the individual is deprived of a genuine learning experience and the full set of worker rights enshrined in labour law64.
Based on the following sources, a set of elements can be identified which can serve as indications to distinguish work relationships disguised as traineeships from genuine traineeships:
1) The 2014 QFT definition of traineeships
2) Evidence in the literature, in particular Eurofound reports;
3) Evidence from case law65,
4) Stakeholder views, including interviews under the supporting study66 the replies to the second phase social partners’ consultation.
The 2014 QFT definition of traineeships highlights three important aspects which can be used as guiding elements in distinguishing work relationships disguised as traineeships from genuine traineeships:
(1) the limited duration of the work experience (usually 6 months or less);
(2) a learning and training component, and
(3) the development of practical/professional experience to improve employability and facilitate the transition to employment.
Eurofound67 establishes a definition of fraudulent traineeships based on case studies of four countries (AT, FI, ES, and the UK), drawing on desk research and interviews with stakeholders from the four countries. Differences between “real” work and a traineeship are determined by the length and intensity of the activity performed and the existence of coaching and management. Fraud is associated with inadequacy or lack of training content, guidance and supervision, and may involve situations where trainees are required to carry out tasks that cannot be distinguished from those performed by regular workers in a company.
Evidence in the case law:
• the ECSR ruling in a complaint lodged in 2017 by the European Youth Forum (EYF) on issues related to unpaid work relationships disguised as traineeships in BE68 stated that work relationships disguised as traineeships can be defined as cases where an internship involves performance of real and genuine work without allowing for a real learning experience69.
• In DE, the regional labour court Berlin-Brandenburg reclassified a traineeship as an employee relationship, on the basis that the written contract contained “typical employee obligations” and did not indicate the predominance of the training purpose or provide sufficient detail on training, such as a written training plan. The duration (one year) was also indicative of an employment relationship.
Stakeholders interviewed under the supporting study70, including trade unions, employer associations and youth organisations, similarly highlighted that traineeships with low learning content and with similar task-load as the one assigned to employees, as well as traineeships of long duration or consecutive traineeships, may be indicative of cases of work relationships disguised as traineeships. They also clearly emphasised that genuine trainees typically carry out less specialised tasks, have a lighter workload, are supervised closely and are not expected to meet specific productive objectives. However, the extent to which a trainee in practice performs duties which are comparable or equivalent to a regular employee can only be assessed on a case-by-case basis by competent national inspection authorities71. Some elements of the traineeship vacancy and/or in the traineeship agreement, like a description of tasks corresponding to the ones of an employee and/or the requirement of having previous experience, can point to work relationships disguised as traineeships. An analysis of traineeship vacancies within the EURES portal conducted for the supporting study72 found evidence of a number of cases where employers require trainees to have previous experience.
Also, all stakeholder groups interviewed for this study stated that learning is a crucial element of traineeships. A structured learning component includes, for instance, clearly defined objectives and supervision during the traineeship. While the absence of a learning component per se does not automatically imply the use of a traineeship to disguise a regular work relationship (which can be of poor quality traineeship), it can lead to work relationships disguised as traineeships if combined with other indications. For instance, low/no learning content combined with an intensity of activity comparable to an employee may lead to the presumption that the traineeship constitutes a work relationship disguised as traineeships. While this cannot be measured by statistics, the quality of the learning content can be crossed with other factors pointing to work relationships disguised as traineeships, e.g. the duration of traineeships.
Finally, both ETUC and the European Youth Forum have pointed to the ratio of trainees within an organisation as an indicator of work relationships disguised as traineeships. According to the ETUC, the ratio of trainees within an organisation, should not exceed 20%.
On the basis of the above the following set of elements were identified as indications to distinguish work relationships disguised as traineeships from genuine traineeships:
• The excessive duration of traineeships and previous experience in the field of activity, gained also by doing recurrent or consecutive traineeships with the same or different employer (sources: QFT definition, stakeholders views)
• The fact that the trainee is performing the same/similar tasks with the same intensity and having the same/similar responsibilities as regular (entry-level) employees combined with the absence of a significant learning/training component, which also constitutes an element of a poor-quality traineeship (source: QFT definition, evidence in the case law, stakeholders’ views).
• The high ratio of trainees within an organisation, pointing to the substitution of employees with trainees73 (stakeholders views).
A8.2. Quantitative data on the excessive duration of traineeships
As mentioned above, the excessive duration of traineeships can be considered another indication of work relationships disguised as traineeships. Principle 10 of the 2014 QFT states that, in principle, a reasonable duration does not exceed 6 months for OMT and ALMP traineeships. However, an important aspect to consider when discussing the duration of traineeships, is the type of traineeship. In many countries, the duration of MPT is defined by law to be longer than 6 months (e.g., doctors).
According to the evaluation74, 22% of respondents (OMT and ALMP traineeships) to the trainee survey75 stated that their traineeship lasted longer than 6 months76.
These results are consistent with the results of the 2023 Eurobarometer77 which suggested that long (exceeding 6 months) traineeships (including paid and unpaid) exist in the EU. While the EU average is relatively low (11%), and down from 15% in the 2013 Eurobarometer78, in six Member States (IE, HR, CY, NL, MT and PT), 20% or more of respondents indicated that their last traineeship lasted more than 6 months. This result is relatively consistent among the four types of traineeships, (13% of OMT, 11% for the ECT, 12.5% for the MPT, 10.5% for the ALMP). In general, countries that have a higher overall share of long traineeships also have higher shares of such traineeships across the different traineeship types.
However, according to the results of the Eurobarometer79 around 15% of respondents who stated that they did a traineeship of more than 6 months do not agree that they learnt useful things during their traineeships, while 24% of them do not believe that their (long) traineeship was helpful to find a job. This is lower than the percentage who stated they did learn things that are useful professionally among trainees who did a traineeship of three to 6 months (20.5%) or 1 to 3 months (22.9%), but nevertheless constitutes a significant percentage of respondents, particularly considering that the longer traineeship by definition involves a more significant time investment.

Figure 13: Flash Eurobarometer results - Proportion of individuals whose last traineeship lasted more than 6 months
Note: Member States ordered based on the traineeships that last more than 6 months, lowest to highest percentage.
Source: Flash Eurobarometer 2023 (FE 523)3; Study exploring the context, challenges, and possible solutions in relation to the quality of traineeships in the EU, forthcoming (VT/2022/047).
A high share of long traineeships is also observed for ALMP traineeships. While the latter might be justified by the target group of such traineeships, the duration of these traineeships should be closely monitored as on the one hand they are typically supported by public funds, in the form of subsidies or tax benefits for hosting companies and on the other hand they offer monetary advantage to the employer. For example, in Italy, ALMP makes the largest part of those traineeships. In Italy, ALMP are paid, but the minimum (gross) remuneration is only 500 EUR per month, suggesting that even when the productivity of the trainee is higher, compensation may remain very low.
There are also differences in the incidence of traineeships longer than 6 months between paid and unpaid trainees. As shown in the figure below according to the 2023 Eurobarometer, 14% of paid trainees indicated that their traineeship lasted longer than six months, compared to 8% of unpaid trainees. The incidence of traineeships longer than six months among paid trainees is highest in PT (39%), HR (38%), MT (28%), IE (24%), CY (22%), NL (22%) and HU (20%). There is largely an overlap with the countries which have the highest rates of long traineeships among unpaid traineeships. These are HR (26%), NL (23%), CY (22%), PT (17%), EL (16%), RO (16%), IE (14%), MT (12%) and HU (11%).

Figure 14: Flash Eurobarometer results -: Share of paid and unpaid trainees whose traineeship lasted longer than 6 months, 2023 Eurobarometer
Source: Flash Eurobarometer 2023 (FE 523)3; Study exploring the context, challenges, and possible solutions in relation to the quality of traineeships in the EU, forthcoming (VT/2022/047).
• Evidence (approximate estimation) on the prevalence of long (more than 6 months)
An estimate of the number of trainees who have done a traineeship longer than 6 months (by country and type of traineeship) can be obtained by combining data from the 2023 Eurobarometer with the estimated number of trainees obtained from the EU-LFS (see Annex 4 for methodological details). The results are presented in the table below. Considering all traineeships80 it is estimated that more than 350,000 individuals undertook traineeships longer than six months in the EU 27, out of these 230,795 individuals were paid trainees.
Table 17: Estimated number of paid and unpaid traineeships longer than six months, by traineeship type, 2019
MS
Paid OMT
Paid ALMP
Paid ECT
Total paid
Unpaid OMT
Unpaid ALMP
Unpaid ECT
Total Unpaid
Overall total
EU27
67,088 (16%)
91,832 (17.2%)
71,875 (14.3%)
230,795

16,949 (11.9%)
7,616 (10%)
100,076 (8.1%)
124,641

355,436

Note: The table shows the estimated number of paid and unpaid trainees undertaking traineeships longer than six months in absolute and percentage terms (in parenthesis). Data on the share of trainees in traineeships longer than six months come from the Eurobarometer 523 Survey. Data on the total number of paid trainees by traineeship type come from the EU-LFS.
Source: Study exploring the context, challenges, and possible solutions in relation to the quality of traineeships in the EU, forthcoming(VT/2022/047).
A8.3. Quantitative evidence on repeated/consecutive traineeships with the same employer
The number of recurrent, including consecutive and/or traineeships with the same employer can also constitute an indication of work relationships disguised as traineeships. In the 2023 Eurobarometer81, respondents who have completed more than one traineeship were asked if any of these traineeships were with the same employer. On average, across the EU, 37% of these respondents have completed recurrent traineeships with the same employer. Across most countries, a considerable share of respondents who have had more than one traineeship reply that at least two of these traineeships were with the same employer. In fact, in 17 Member States (CZ, DK, EE, IE, EL, ES, IT, CY, LT, HU, NL, PT, RO, SI, SK, FI and SE) more than ca. 40% of respondents stated that they had done more than 1 traineeship with the same employer, with the highest share being observed in HU (50%) (Figure 15). In all the other Member States this share is above 30%, with the exception on FR and LU. The data also shows that at the EU27 level, multiple traineeships with the same employer are most common for MPT (45.7%). Regarding OMT, 1 in 4 respondents (25.7%) stated that they have done more than one traineeship with the same employer while the share is higher for ALMP and ECT (around 35% for each respectively).

Figure 15: Flash Eurobarometer results – Consecutive traineeships with the same employer in the EU
Source: Flash Eurobarometer 2023 (FE 523)

• Evidence (approximate estimation) on the prevalence of on repeated/consecutive traineeships with the same employer
As mentioned above, in addition to the number of traineeships with a duration longer than six months, excessively long traineeships occur when an individual does multiple short traineeships with the same employer. The table below represents estimates on the number of trainees (paid and unpaid) with traineeships contracts shorter than six months but who conducted repeated traineeships with the same employer with a total duration of at least six months. In the Eurobarometer survey, participants were asked whether they had conducted multiple traineeships, and whether any of these traineeships occurred with the same employer. Respondents were not asked the length of each single traineeship, except than for their last one. Thus, it is not possible to compute precisely whether the traineeship relation with the same employer was overall longer than six months. To overcome this data limitation, it was assumed that respondents had a traineeship longer than six months if they had more than one traineeship with the same employer and their last traineeship was between three and six months long. Also, it should be noted that data on the type of traineeship and remuneration is only available for the last traineeship (and not for previous ones). Based on the results it is estimated that across the EU, 207,787 individuals conducted repeated traineeships with the same employer82 that were overall longer than six months. Out of these 138,716 were paid trainees.

Table 18: Estimated number of repeated paid and unpaid traineeships with the same employer longer than six months, by traineeship type 2019
MS
Paid OMT
Paid ALMP
Paid ECT
Total paid
Unpaid OMT
Unpaid ALMP
Unpaid ECT
Total Unpaid
Overall total
EU27
27,808 (7%)
57,118 (11%)
53,790 (11%)
138,716
3,209
(2%)
4,915
(6%)
60,947
(5%)
69,071
207,787

Note: In the Eurobarometer survey, participants were asked whether they had undertaken multiple traineeships, and whether any of these traineeships occurred with the same employer. Respondents were not asked about the length of each single traineeship, except for their last one. Thus, it is not possible to compute precisely whether the traineeship with the same employer was longer than six months overall. To overcome this data limitation, we assume that a respondent had a traineeship longer than six months if she had more than one traineeship with the same employer and her last traineeship was between three and six months long. Information on the type of traineeship and remuneration coverage refer to the latest traineeship.
Source: Study exploring the context, challenges, and possible solutions in relation to the quality of traineeships in the EU, forthcoming (VT/2022/047).

Taking together these figures with the estimated in section A8.2 it can be estimated that 563,223 individuals (2019 data) did traineeships longer than 6 months including repeated/consecutive traineeships with the same employer. Out of these 369,511 were paid trainees.

Table 19: Estimated number of traineeships with a long duration of more than 6 months, including consecutive/repeated traineeships with the same employer by traineeship type 2019
MS
Paid OMT
Paid ALMP
Paid ECT
Total paid
Unpaid OMT
Unpaid ALMP
Unpaid ECT
Total Unpaid
Overall total
EU27
94,896
148,950
125,665
369,511
20,158
12,531
161,023
193,712
563,223
Source: Own elaboration, based on the study exploring the context, challenges, and possible solutions in relation to the quality of traineeships in the EU, forthcoming (VT/2022/047)
A8.4. Quantitative data on previous professional experience
The fact that a trainee has already gained professional experience by completing one or several traineeships (or has already held regular job positions), in particular in the same field of activity may also serve as an indication of work relationships disguised as traineeships, although other elements, such as the duration of each traineeship, as well as the quality and content of the learning component thereof, have to be taken into account. A traineeship should serve as a stepping stone into the labour market, mainly for young people, by providing the skills that increase their employability and enhance their employment prospects but they can also help people transition between sectors, occupations. However, more than 1 in 2 (52%) of the respondents to the 2023 Eurobarometer did two or more traineeships; 1 in 3 respondents stated that they had done two traineeships, and 1 in 4 respondents reported the completion of three or more traineeships (see figure below). Also, as shown Annex 7, one third (33.4%) of paid trainees doing OMT are people aged above 35 years old. While these are people who might be transitioning in the labour market, this can also constitute an indication of replacement of regular positions by trainees. It should be noted that consecutive traineeships with the same employer are not necessarily an issue if the duration is limited, e.g., the case of two consecutive traineeships of less than three months.

Figure 16: Flash Eurobarometer results - Repeated traineeships in the EU
Source: Flash Eurobarometer 2023 (FE 523).
Analysis at Member State level (Figure 17) reveals that the majority of respondents in all Member States have done repeated traineeships (at least two traineeships), with shares ranging from around 85% in DE, LU and SE to around 80% in BE, CZ, EE, FR, AT, NL, SK and FI to around 70% in BG, ES, LV, LT, HU, MT, RO and SI and 60% in EL. Moreover, respondents in LU (44%), followed by those in DE (40%), are the most likely to have had three or more traineeships. The largest shares having had two traineeships are observed in DE (35%), FR (35%), the NL (33%) and ES (33%).

Figure 17: Flash Eurobarometer results -Repeated traineeships by country
Source: Flash Eurobarometer 2023 (FE 523).
• Evidence (approximate estimation) on the prevalence of repeated traineeships with different employers
The results of the 2023 Eurobarometer combined with LFS data can be used to obtain an estimate of the number of trainees doing repeated traineeships with different employers. This gives a proxy measure of the number of traineeships vacancies asking prior work experience to candidates. The results, presented in the table below, suggest around 1.1 million trainees in the EU (2019 data) did multiple traineeships with different employers, out of these 491,211 were paid trainees. These estimates are higher than those obtained through the analysis of the vacancies available on the EURES portal conducted for this study, which found that about 20% of total internship vacancies require prior work experience. This discrepancy could be due to the fact that the approach based on the Eurobarometer is likely to overestimate the number of employers asking prior work experience to trainees for two reasons. First, not all trainees who conducted numerous traineeships were necessarily asked prior work experience. Secondly, in the Eurobarometer survey respondents were asked to consider all possible traineeships conducted, not only those related to the current year. This implies that the yearly number of multiple traineeships with different employers could be substantially lower.
Table 20: Estimated number of trainees who did repeated traineeships with different employers, 2019
MS
Paid OMT
Paid ALMP
Paid ECT
Total paid
Unpaid OMT
Unpaid ALMP
Unpaid ECT
Total Unpaid
Overall total
EU27
146,877 (35%)
177,716 (33%)
166,618 (33%)
491,211
64,103 (45%)
34,998 (46%)
531,285 (43%)
531,285
1,121,597 (38%)
Note: The table shows the estimated number of paid trainees undertaking multiple traineeships with different employers in absolute and percentage terms (in parenthesis). Data on the share of trainees who conducted multiple traineeships come from the Eurobarometer 523 Survey. Data on the total number of paid trainees by country and traineeship type come from the EU-LFS.
Source: Study exploring the context, challenges, and possible solutions in relation to the quality of traineeships in the EU, forthcoming (VT/2022/047).
A8.5. Information on the ratio of trainees within an organisation
Further indications for the existence of work relationships disguised as traineeships could stem from contextual elements, such as a particularly high ratio of trainees within an organisation, which could point to the substitution of employees with trainees and suggest that certain tasks in the company are systematically done by trainees. This is confirmed by the fact that in some Member States legal provisions exist regulating the maximum share of trainees in a company, in particular for OMT (BG, HU, LT, LU, AT, PL, PT, RO), the highest number across the different types of traineeships. For MPT, there are a number of cases where caps exist only for certain sectors (PL, PT, RO, SK). LT is the only country where caps exist for all types of traineeships.
In practice, it is very challenging to collect quantitative data as major EU company surveys do not collect this information and ad hoc surveys are unlikely to be informative. It is also important to note that the sector of the company (because of differences in the degree of labour intensity) can matter a lot in defining a meaningful threshold of potential use of work relationships disguised as traineeships, but even more the size. For micro companies, the ratio of trainees to employees will always be a double-digit one (at least one in 9 employees), for large companies the same percentage could imply thousands of trainees.
Hence, a sensible threshold is difficult to identify. Nevertheless, some countries have tried, by applying caps. This can be defined as the share of employees, like in FR, where for undertakings with more than 20 employees the maximum number of trainees cannot be above 15% of the employees. In LT, the limit exists for voluntary traineeship agreements and the percentage may not exceed 10 percent of the total number of employees of the organisation, and where the organisation has fewer than 10 employees, such organisation may have only one voluntary traineeship agreement. In other countries, like HU, the cap is set in relation to the number of trainees and apprentices in the previous year.
The table below provides a summary of the existence of a cap on the share of trainees in a company across Member States and types of traineeships.

Table 21: Existence of a cap on the share of trainees in a company
Type of traineeship
Yes
No
Data availability
OMT
BG, LT, LU, HU, AT, PL, PT, RO [8 MS]
CZ, DE, DK, EE, IE, EL, ES, HR, IT, CY, LV, MT, NL, SI, SK [15 MS]
1 NA (FR), 3 no data (BE, SE, FI)
ALMP
EL, IT, LV, PL, PT, [5 MS]
BG, CZ, DE, DK, EE, IE, ES, HR, CY, LT, LU, NL, AT, RO, SK [15 MS]
2 NA (HU, SI), 5 no data (BE, FR, MT, FI, SE)
ECT
LT, LU, HU, SK [4 MS]
BG, CZ, DE, DK, EE, IE, ES, IT, CY, LV, NL, AT, PL, PT, RO, SI [16 MS]
1 NA (HR), 6 no data (BE, EL, FR, MT, FI, SE)
MPT
CZ, IE, IT, LT, PL (medical), PT (law), RO (medical), SI, SK (law) [9 MS]
BG, DE, DK, EE, ES, CY, LV, LU, HU, NL, AT [11 MS]
7 no data (HR, EL, BE, SE, FR, MT, FI)
Note: OMT are prohibited in FR. For ALMP, in SI there are no formal traineeship contracts. For ECT, in HR these traineeships are conducted on a free market basis.
Source: Study exploring the context, challenges, and possible solutions in relation to the quality of traineeships in the EU, forthcoming (VT/2022/047).
A8.6. Rough evidence on the prevalence of certain types of work relationships disguised as traineeships in the EU
Estimates of the number of work relationships disguised as traineeships in the EU are difficult to obtain. However, a rough proxy can be obtained for some specific categories of trainees being at risk of being in a work relationship disguised as a traineeship. For example, as discussed in section A8.3 around 563,223 trainees (out of which 370,000 paid trainees) did a traineeship longer than 6 months, including consecutive/reaped traineeships with the same employer. Out of these, it can be estimated that around 158,186 (out of which 100,000 paid trainees) did a long-duration traineeships with a poor learning content (see table below).
Table 22: Estimated number of trainees doing long traineeships with a poor learning content in the EU, 2019
MS
Paid OMT
Paid ALMP
Paid ECT
Total paid
Unpaid OMT
Unpaid ALMP
Unpaid ECT
Total unpaid
Overall Total
EU27
28274 (6.7%)
46761 (8.8%)
27936 (5.5%)
102,971
10425
(7.3%)
6409
(8.4%)
38381
(3.1%)
55,215
(5.6%)
158,186
Note: The table shows the estimated number of misused traineeships by country in absolute and percentage terms (in parenthesis). This type of work relationships disguised as traineeships were estimated using data from the Eurobarometer 523 Survey on aspects related to remuneration, access to social protection, learning component, duration. Data on the total number of trainees by country come from the EU-LFS and refer to 2019.
Source: Study exploring the context, challenges, and possible solutions in relation to the quality of traineeships in the EU, forthcoming (VT/2022/047).

Annex 9. Additional evidence feeding into problem section
A9.1. Legal status of trainees
While the 2014 QFT contains an EU-level definition of a traineeship the evaluation83 has shown that there are still large differences between regulatory approaches to traineeships among Member States. The results of the legal analysis undertaken within the framework of the supporting study are also in line with this finding, indicating that in terms of legal status of under different national regulatory frameworks, trainees fall under three different regimes in different Member States.
Regarding OMT, in 14 Member States (BE, BG, CZ, DE, ES, CY, LT, LU, HU, AT, PL, PT, SI, RO) a specific regulation exists governing all or specific types of traineeships and/or trainees. The regulation either defines if the traineeship is an employment relationship, and in some cases, it specifies the levels of protection applicable to respective trainees (e.g., access to social protection, minimum wage, collective agreements, other specific rules). Such specific regulations may consist of dedicated provisions for trainees in the Labour Code, specific regulatory acts, or the extension of rights stemming from (components of) national labour law. It should be noted that, in CZ and AT (which have been included in both groups of Member States) while traineeships are in general not regulated, specific regulation exists for certain types of traineeships. In CZ the labour law allows for 2 specific types of more flexible traineeship contracts with lower protection for trainees and in AT special rules apply to traineeships with the state. Regardless of the applicable legal framework, most of the Member States also allow for the possibility to engage in OMT traineeships which are not regulated and are usually unpaid. In FR, OMT are forbidden by law, while in IT OMT are never considered employment relationships but there are guidelines to be followed agreed between the States and the Regions (soft law).
In 13 Member States (CZ, DK, EE, IE, EL, HR, LV, MT, NL, AT, SK, FI, SE), no specific regulation exists defining the status of OMT trainees and the working conditions are agreed bilaterally between the trainee and the employer/traineeship provider. If the traineeship is considered to fulfil the conditions of an employment relationship, then the trainees are considered as workers, and they are fully covered by the provisions of EU and national labour law and national labour and collective agreements (where they exist), which ensures some level of favourable working conditions and prevents the emergence of precarious conditions. Its absence provides no such assurance84.
ALMP traineeships are legally regulated in a vast majority of Member States (21 Member States: BE, BG, CZ, DE, DK. EE, EL, ES, FR, FI, HR, IE, LT, LU, MT, AT, PT, PL, RO, SE, SK). In 3 Member States they are covered by a national strategy (CY, HU, LV) and in IT by guidelines agreed between the States and the Regions. According to the supporting study, in 2 Member States (BG, LV) trainees are considered employees, in 15 (DK, EE, ES, HR, IT, CY, LU, MT, AT, PL, PT, RO, SK, FI, SE) unemployed and in 5 (BE, CZ, EL, FR, LT) the status depends on the characteristic of the traineeship. In 3 Member States the status is undefined.
Regarding ECT, according to the supporting study, in 9 Member States (BE, CZ, FR, IT, PT, RO, SI, SK, SE) trainers are considered students and in BG they are considered employees. In another 9 Member States (DK, DE, EE, HU, AT, LV, LT, NL, FI) the status depends on the characteristic of the traineeship. In the rest of the Member States the status is either undefined or uncertain.
Regarding MPT, according to the supporting study, the legal framework of these traineeships generally varies from profession to profession. The two most common professions which require a MPT are the medical and legal professions, for which the relevant provisions are presented below:
• Concerning MPT to access medical professions, in 18 Member States (CZ, DK, EE, EL, IE, CY, LV, LT, HU, MT, NL, AT, PL, RO, SI, SK, FI, SE) medical trainees are considered workers by statutory law and in 6 Member States (BE, DE, FR, ES, IT, PT) are covered by a specific legislation. In HR the status depends on the characteristic of the traineeship and in BG and LU their status is not defined.
• Concerning MPT to access legal professions, in 7 Member States (CZ, DK, CY, HU, NL, SK, SE) trainees are considered as workers and in 4 (DE, AT, PT, RO) they are covered by a specific legislation. In BE and LV they are self-employed and in ES students. In 5 Member States (EE, IE, HR, LT, SI) the status depends on the characteristic of the traineeship exist and in 6 Member States (BG, EL, IT, LU, MT, PL) their status is not defined.
The vast diversity of national systems with regard to the classification of trainees is reflected in their very different corresponding labour rights (including remuneration), and access to social protection, laid down in national law and collective agreements, where they exist.
However, it should be noted that paid trainees, regardless of their classification in national law, are likely to qualify as workers under EU labour law. For the purpose of Union law, trainees fall under the concept of ‘worker’ if they perform genuine and effective activity, for and under the direction of an employer, and are remunerated for the work they provide85.



Status defined in legislation
Status Undefined, and depending on the characteristics of traineeship (subordination, pay, etc)
No regulation
Comments

OMT
BE, BG, CZ, DE, ES, CY, LT, LU, HU, AT, PL, PT, SI, RO [14 MS]
CZ, DK, EE, IE, EL, HR, LV, MT, NL, AT, SK, SE FI [13 MS]
IT(soft law)
FR(forbidden)
In several Member States trainees can have different legal statuses.
ALMP
Employees: BG, LV [2MS]
Unemployed: DK, EE, ES, HR, IT, CY, LU, MT, AT, PL, PT, RO, SK, FI, SE
[15 MS]
BE, CZ, EL, FR, LT [5 MS]
DE, IE, NL [3 MS]
2 NA (HU, SI)
ECT
Employee: BG
Student: BE, CZ, FR, IT, PT, RO, SI, SK, SE [9 MS]
Uncertain: LU, MT [2 MS]
DK, DE, EE, HU, AT, LV, LT, NL, FI
[9 MS]
CY, EL, IE, ES, PL
[5 MS]
1 NA (HR)
MPT medical
CZ, DK, EE, EL, IE, CY, LV, LT, HU, MT, NL, AT, PL, RO, SI, SK, FI, SE
[18 MS]
Sui generis: BE, DE, FR, ES, IT, PT [6 MS]
HR [1 MS]
BG, LU
[2 MS]

MPT legal
CZ, DK, CY, HU, NL, SK, SE
Sui generis: DE, AT, PT, RO [4 MS]
Self-employed: BE, LV
Student: ES
EE, IE, HR, LT, SI
[5 MS]
BG, EL, IT, LU, MT, PL [6 MS]
No data: FR, FI
[2 MS]
Source: Study exploring the context, challenges, and possible solutions in relation to the quality of traineeships in the EU, forthcoming (VT/2022/047) and own analysis.
A9.2. Provisions on remuneration and access to social protection
The regulatory situation in Member States indicates considerable complexity and diversity within and between Member States in terms of trainees’ access to the labour rights, including remuneration, which apply to regular workers. The sections below provide details on the regulatory provision on remuneration in the Member States by type of traineeship.
Regarding OMT, in 22 Member States (all but BG, SI, RO, as well as FR where OMT are forbidden) unpaid traineeships are legally possible. This is usually the case where unpaid traineeship contracts or “voluntary” traineeship schemes exist. In 13 Member States (CZ, DK, EE, EL, FI, HR, IE, LV, MT, NL, AT, SE, SK) if trainees are considered to be in an employment relationship, they are entitled to full protection under EU and national labour law and collective agreements, including minimum wage provisions, where they exist. At the same time, in 14 Member States specific regulations exist for OMT (BE, BG, CY, CZ, DE, ES, HU, LT, LU, AT, PL, PT, SI, RO), regulating all or some traineeship types, which also defines the rights of trainees in terms of remuneration. For example, in seven Member States (BG, CY, DE, ES, HU, LT and SI) trainees are entitled at least the minimum wage (MW)86. In two Member States (ES and SI), while the minimum wage is guaranteed, additional provisions exist for trainees providing for proportionate remuneration. In ES, the remuneration of trainees should be at least 60%-75% (depending on duration) of the remuneration of a comparable worker114 as established in the respective collective agreement. In SI the law states that the trainee has the right to at least 70% of the remuneration of a comparable worker. In PL a recommendation on proportionate pay was adopted by the Social Dialogue Committee. Other Member States set the minimum level of remuneration to a proportion of the minimum wage. For example, in BE and RO this level is set to 50% of the MW, in LU at 40%-75% of the MW (for unskilled trainees depending on duration) and in Portugal at 80% of the MW. In PL trainees can be paid or unpaid but their remuneration cannot exceed 200% of the MW. In CZ the labour law allows for two specific types of traineeship contracts87 with greater flexibility, which provide lower levels of protection, nevertheless, under both of these contracts the minimum wage is guaranteed. In AT special regulatory provisions exist for traineeships with the state, which have their own pay scale.
In general, ALMP trainees receive some kind of remuneration, compensation or social benefit, even in Member States where there is no respective legal framework. NL is an exception where ALMP traineeships are paid only if an employment relation can be established. The status of trainees and the level of remuneration depends on the rules of the national ALMP traineeship, which vary considerable within and among Member States. The section below, provides some examples of existing provisions in Member States for certain ALMP traineeship schemes. In BE88, BG89, HR, LV and MT, ALMP trainees can be entitled to at least the minimum wage. In the majority of Member States (CZ, DK, DE, ES, IE, EL, ES, FR, HR, IT, CY, LT, LU, PL, PT, SK, SE ) other requirements exist depending on the scheme: For example, in LT, the ALMP trainees can choose between 50%MW or the unemployment benefit, in PT they receive a monthly internship grant, the value of which depends on their qualifications, while in PL they receive a training allowance equal to 120% of the unemployment benefit. In SK, ALMP trainees receive an allowance to cover their expenses. In SE, the level of remuneration is obligatory, and it has to follow the relevant collective agreement. In EL, the PES implements a number of fully subsidised work experience schemes, which takes the form of fixed-term contracts. The trainees receive remuneration which varies and depending on each scheme. In CY, young LTU are entitled to compensation decided by the National Training Authority, which usually equals the national minimum wage. In IT, according to the agreement between the state and regions, ALMP trainees shall receive remuneration (in the form of expenses compensation) of (gross) EUR500 per month (EUR800 in some regions). Finally, in six Member States (CZ, DK, EE, FI, IE, AT) ALMP trainees receive a social benefit.
In the case of ECT, legal provisions on remuneration/compensation for ECT exist only in 5 Member States (FR, HR, LU, HU and SK). Such remuneration/compensation is most often tied to minimum duration: in FR, this is 2 months, in LU four weeks, while in HU it is six weeks. In LU, for longer traineeships, compensation corresponds to at least 30% of the minimum social wage for unskilled workers. In HU, an exception relates to traineeships undertaken in public administration, which might still be unpaid. In some cases, the entitlements to remuneration/compensation also depend on the educational level of the ECT. For example, in FR for vocational training the level of remuneration must follow collective agreements, where they exist while for post-secondary and tertiary ECT the level is set to 15 % of the social security hourly “ceiling”. In SK, only students doing secondary level ECT are entitled compensation, which in SK equals least 50% of the hourly minimum wage.
Mapping two professions where MPT are undertaken, legal and medical professions, it seems that the majority of Member States have legal obligations for remuneration or compensation. This is the case for 21 in the case of legal trainees (BE, CZ, DE, DK, EE, IE, HR, IT, CY, LT, LU, HU, NL, AT, PL, PT , RO, SI, SK, FI, SE) and 25 in the case of medical trainees (BE, CZ, DE, DK, EE, IE, EL, ES, FR, HR, IT, CY, LV, LT, LU, HU, MT, NL, AT, PL, PT, RO, SI, SK, SE).
Regarding access to social protection, the study supporting the evaluation of the 2014 QFT90 noted that the diverse regulatory strategies regarding traineeships result in uncertain eligibility for social protection of trainees. The results of the legal analysis conducted under the supporting study show that indeed trainees have access to different branches of social protection (see table below). The two most widespread protection branches available to trainees are “Accidental & Occupational Injuries” (for all four types of traineeships) and sickness benefits. In most of the Member States (BE, BG, DK, DE, IE, EL, ES, HR, CY, LT, LU, HU, NL, AT, PL, PT, RO, SI, FI, SE for OMT; BE, BG, DK, EE, IE, EL, LV, LU, MT, PT, AT, RO, FI, SE for ALMP; BG, DK, IE, EL, LT, LV, LU, NL, HU, AT, FI for ECT, CZ, EE, IE, EL, ES, FR, HR, CY, LT, LV, LU, HU, MT, NL, AT, PL, RO, SI, SK, FI, SE for medical MPT and CZ, EL, ES, HR, CY, HU, NL, AT, SK, FI, SE for legal MPT) the same protection is granted as to regular employees, provided that the trainee benefits from an employment contract.
Table 23: Access to five branches of social protection by Member State and type of traineeship
Branch
Traineeship type
Access
(number of MS)
Share of 27 MS
Accidental & Occupational Injuries (A)
OMT
20
67%

ALMP
23
74%

ECT
16
56%

MPT
19
85%
Sickness Benefit (S)
OMT
17
63%

ALMP
22
81%

ECT
15
59%

MPT
19
78%
Unemployment Benefits (U)
OMT
15
52%

ALMP
12
41%

ECT
6
22%

MPT
7
41%
Old-Age Benefits (P)
OMT
16
63%

ALMP
15
52%

ECT
9
37%

MPT
14
70%
Maternity & Equivalent Paternity Benefits (M)
OMT
15
59%

ALMP
17
59%

ECT
12
41%

MPT
17
70%
Source: Study exploring the context, challenges, and possible solutions in relation to the quality of traineeships in the EU, forthcoming (VT/2022/047).
The table below shows the estimated number of trainees that could potentially be affected by this intervention. The figures were computed by multiplying the share of trainees who reported not being covered by any type of social protection by the total number of trainees in 2019 estimated using the EU-LFS survey. Averaging across Member States, 35% of the total number of trainees in Europe (corresponding to more than 1 million trainees) did not have access to social protection.
Table 24: Estimated number of trainees without social protection coverage, by country and traineeship type, 2019
MS
Paid OMT
Paid ALMP
Paid ECT
Paid MPT
Unpaid OMT
Unpaid ALMP
Unpaid ECT
Total
EU27
106,222 (25.3%)
93,281 (17.5%)
84,208 (16.7%)
16,072 (10.8%)
82,397
(57.8%)
24,126 (31.8%)
662,052 (53.5%)
1,068,358 (35%)
Note: The table shows the estimated number of traineeships without social protection coverage by country and traineeship type in absolute and percentage terms (in parenthesis). The fraction of trainees with no access to social protection was estimated using data from the Eurobarometer 523 Survey. Data on the total number of trainees by country come from the EU-LFS.
Source: Study exploring the context, challenges, and possible solutions in relation to the quality of traineeships in the EU, forthcoming (VT/2022/047).
A9.3. Traineeship duration, consecutive traineeships and previous experience in vacancy notices
Provision of duration
Excessive duration of traineeships could constitute an indication of work relationships disguised as traineeships. As shown in the table below, according to the results of the legal analysis carried under the supporting study91, legal requirements for the duration of traineeships exist in many Member States for all types of traineeships which, however, differ considerably among Member States.
Table 25: Legal requirements on the maximum duration of traineeships
Type of traineeship
Yes, max 6 months
(Some contracts)
Yes, longer than 6 months
(Some contracts)
No
Data availability
OMT
BE, BG, CZ, LT, LU, PL, RO
[7 MS]

BG, CZ, IE, ES, PT, SI, SE, FI
[8 MS]
DK, DE, EE, EL, HR, IT, CY, LV, MT, NL, AT, SK
[12 MS]
FR (forbidden) HU (no data)
[2MS]
ALMP
BE, BG, CZ, EE, EL DK, FR, IT, LT, LU, PT, PL, RO, SK
[14 MS]

BG, ES, HR, IT, LT, LU, PT, PL, SK SE, FI
[11 MS]
DE, IE, CY, LV, NL, AT
[6 MS]
MT (no data)
HU, SI (NA)
[3 MS]

ECT
BG, HU, IT, LU [4 MS]

IT, LV, LT, AT, RO
[5 MS]

BE, DK, DE, EE, IE, EL, ES, CY, MT, NL, PL, PT, SI, SK, FI, SE [16 MS]
FR, CZ (no data) HR (NA)
[3 MS]
MPT
IT , SI [2 MS]

BE, BG, EE (medical), ES, LT, LU, HU, NL, AT, PL (medical), PT, RO, SK (legal), FI (legal), SE [15 MS]
CZ, DK, DE, EL, CY, LV, MT BG, HU, IT, LU [7 MS]
IE, FR, HR (no data)
[3 MS]
Note: NA indicate cases where such traineeship types are not known. OMT are prohibited in FR, for ALMP, in HU and SI there are no formal traineeship contracts and therefore this is treated as NA, for ECT, HR is marked as NA is these traineeships are conducted on a free market basis.
Source: Study exploring the context, challenges, and possible solutions in relation to the quality of traineeships in the EU, forthcoming (VT/2022/047) and own elaborations.

The evaluation92 identified that Principle 10 of the 2014 QFT on setting a maximum duration of 6 months was among the ones that were the least93 implemented in legislative frameworks of Member States, for both OMT and ALMP traineeships. This is confirmed by the results of the legal analysis conducted under the supporting study which showed that only in seven Member States (BE, BG, CZ, LT, LU, PL, RO ) legal obligations exist mandating that for some types of OMT duration should be maximum six months, while in eight (BG, CZ, IE, ES, PT, SI, SE, FI) legal restrictions exist indicating other duration restrictions for some types. For instance, in BG, for some of the OMT94 the Labour Code indicates that traineeships cannot be less than 6 months and not more than 12 months. In ES the duration of OMT traineeships was limited to 1 year in December 2021, whereas the previous legislation allowed for a maximum duration of 3 years – some traineeships, concluded before the entry into force of the new legislation, are still under the old regime. In the CZ, if a traineeship is concluded under the “DPC modality” (agreement to perform work) the maximum length is 52 weeks. 12 Member States (DK, DE, EE, EL, HR, IT, CY, LV, MT, NL, AT, SK ) have no provisions on the duration of OMT traineeships. In some cases, traineeships exceeding six months are explicitly included in legislation.
For ALMP traineeships, a legal restriction for some types exists in 14 Member States (BE, BG, CZ, EE, EL DK, FR, IT, LT, LU, PT, PL, RO, SK) defining a maximum duration of traineeships to 6 months, while in 11 Member States other legal restrictions apply for different types of traineeships (BG, ES, HR, IT, LT, LU, PT, PL, SK SE, FI). In six Member States (DE, IE, , CY, LV, NL, AT) this legal obligation does not exist.
Regarding ECT, four Member States (BG, HU, IT, LU) have legal setting a maximum duration of 6 months. Additionally, in five Member States (IT, LV, LT, AT, RO) such legal obligations exist with diverging maximum limits. In LV, the limits on length are provided for in the specific traineeship agreement; in RO, student traineeships must take place within the 1 week – 12 months time frame. There are no restrictions in 16 Member States (BE, DK, DE, EE, IE, EL, ES, CY, MT, NL, PL, PT, SI, SK, FI, SE).

Regarding MPT, their duration is generally not restricted to 6 months and the maximum duration depends on the professional program. Such restriction can only be found in IT and SI for some contracts. Usually, the maximum duration is considerably longer than 6 months, reaching 7 years in some cases (medical traineeships in LT, RO). For example, in the case of medical students in LT or accountants in LU. In BE, auditors, lawyers and accountants must undergo 3-year training before accessing the professions.
Consecutive Traineeships
The overall duration of traineeships can also be prolonged through repeated, including consecutive, traineeships with the same employer. However, as shown in the table below, the results of the legal analysis have shown that in most Member States there are no legal restrictions on consecutive traineeships at least for one type of traineeships. In six Member States (BG, CZ, DK, EE, IE, CY), no legal restrictions exist on consecutive traineeships, for any type of traineeship. For OMT, there are restrictions only in six countries (LT, HU, RO, SK, FI, SE), for ALMP five (LU, PL, PT, SK, SE) for ECT three (LT, HU, SI) and finally, in the case of MPT, six (DE, DK, ES, LU, SI, SK).
Table 26: Restrictions on Consecutive Traineeships
Type of traineeship
Yes
No
Data availability
OMT
LT, HU, RO, SK, FI, SE [6 MS]
BG, CZ, DE, DK, EE, IE, EL, ES, HR, IT, CY, LV, MT, NL, AT, PL, PT, SI, SK [19 MS]
1 NA (FR,), 1 no data (BE)
ALMP
LU, PL, PT, SK, SE [5 MS]
BG, CZ, DE, DK, EE, IE, ES, HR, IT, CY, LT, MT, NL, AT, RO, FI
[16 MS]
2 NA (HU, SI), 4 no data (BE, EL, FR, LV)
ECT
LT, HU, SI [3 MS]
BG, CZ, DE, DK, EE, IE, EL, ES, IT, CY, LV, LU, MT, NL, PL, PT, RO, SK, FI, SE [20 MS]
1 NA (HR), 3 no data (BE, FR, AT)
MPT
DE, DK (legal) ES (legal)95, LU, SI, SK (legal) [6 MS]
BG, CZ, EE, IE, IT, CY, LV, LT, HU, MT, NL, AT, PL, PT, RO, FI, SE [17 MS]
4 no data (BE, EL, FR, HR)
Note: NA indicate cases where such traineeship types are not known. OMT are prohibited in FR, for ALMP, in HU and SI there are no formal traineeship contracts and therefore this is treated as NA, for ECT, HR is marked as NA is these traineeships are conducted on a free market basis.
Source: Study exploring the context, challenges, and possible solutions in relation to the quality of traineeships in the EU, forthcoming (VT/2022/047).
Vacancy analysis on previous work experience
The purpose of the analysis of vacancies on the EURES platform was to detect the extent to which previous work experience is required from trainee applicants. The analysis shows that 28% of the traineeship vacancies include an explicit mention of the level of experience required. Of them, about one-third (i.e. 9% of total) does not require any experience. In principle, these vacancies together with those in which the experience is ‘not specified’ (which together make about 80% of total vacancies) contain no requirement of previous experience, as expected in real traineeships.
Table 27. Overview level of experience in internship vacancies
Level of experience
Number of Internship vacancies
% of Internship vacancies
None required
101
9%
Up to 1 year
62
5%
Between 1 and 2 years
139
12%
Between 2 and 5 years
24
2%
More than 5 years
10
1%
Not Specified
844
72%

By contrast, about 20% of total traineeship vacancies seem to require prior experience. For more than half of them (12% of total), this is between 1 and 2 years and, for some, it is even higher, which seems very much against the idea of a genuine traineeship.
A disaggregation of the vacancies by country suggests that, in fact, experience to apply for a traineeship is only required in a very few cases in BE and most often in NL.
Table 28. Distribution of level of experience across countries (number of vacancies)
Level of experience
Total
NL
DE
FI
BE
CH
None required
101
92
0
0
9
0
Up to 1 year
62
57
0
0
5
0
Between 1 and 2 years
139
138
0
0
1
0
Between 2 and 5 years
24
24
0
0
0
0
More than 5 years
10
10
0
0
0
0
Not Specified
844
519
232
92
15
1

A closer look was taken to understand what level of required experience means, but due to how the vacancies were drafted, in most cases, it was not possible to have a clear understanding on whether experience is really required. However, the analysis of the EURES vacancies allows two main conclusions. First, there are cases in which traineeship vacancies include prior experience as a requirement, pointing to a work relationship disguised as traineeship. However, a closer examination shows that the number of such cases is much lower than the sheer number of EURES vacancies which express requiring prior experience.
Enforcement and inspection mechanisms
The evaluation showed that the monitoring and enforcement of the relevant national legislation governing traineeships are in many cases not fit for purpose96. This was verified by evidence from the legal analysis conducted within the framework of the supporting study. In most Member States there are no systems for inspections or guidance for labour inspectorates with specific reference to traineeships, for any of the four traineeship types. Only four Member States set out systems of inspections or guidance for all traineeships (BG, LT, LU, SK).
Table 29: Existence of systems of inspections or guidance for inspectorates
Type of traineeship
Yes
No
Data availability
OMT
BG, EL, LT, LU, HU, SK [6 MS]
CZ, DK, DE, EE, IE, ES, HR, IT, CY, LV, MT, NL, AT, PL, PT, RO, SI [17 MS]
1 NA (FR), 3 no data (BE, FI, SE)

ALMP
BG, DK, IE, IT, LT, LU, PT, SK [8 MS]
DE, CZ, EE, EL, ES, HR, CY, LV, NL, AT, PL, RO [12 MS]
2 NA (HU, SI), 5 no data (BE, FR, MT, FI, SE)

ECT
BG, DK, IE, EL, IT, LT, LU, HU, SK [9 MS]
CZ, DE, EE, ES, CY, LV, NL, AT, PL PT, RO, SI [12 MS]
1 NA (HR), 5 no data (BE, FR, MT, FI, SE)

MPT
BG, DK (medical), IE, IT (medical), LT, LU, HU, SK [8 MS]
CZ, DE, EE, EL, ES, CY, HR, LV, NL, AT, PL, PT, RO, SI,
[14 MS]
5 no data (BE, FR, MT, FI, SE)

Note: NA indicate cases where such traineeship types are not known. OMT are prohibited in FR, for ALMP, in HU and SI there are no formal traineeship contracts and therefore this is treated as NA, for ECT, HR is marked as NA is these traineeships are conducted on a free market basis.
Source: Study exploring the context, challenges, and possible solutions in relation to the quality of traineeships in the EU, forthcoming (VT/2022/047).

Available evidence also shows that procedures for registering complaints or reporting malpractice are lacking in a number of Member States and types of traineeships. The results of the legal analysis conducted within the framework of the supporting study (see table below) show that, on the basis of available data, only four countries (IE, LT, LU and SK) have procedures for registering complaints and reporting malpractice for all four types of traineeships. In seven Member States, no procedures were identified for any type of traineeship (CZ, DE, HR, CY, AT, PL, SI,). There are also some in-between cases, where only certain types of traineeships are covered (for instance ALMP, ECT and MPT are covered in DK, IT and LV, only ALMP in PT and only legal MPT in RO.


Table 30: Existence of procedures for registering complaints & reporting malpractice in the Member States by type of traineeship
Type of traineeship
Yes
No
Data availability
OMT
BG, IE, ES, LV, LT, LU, SK [7 MS]
CZ, DK, DE, EE, EL, HR, IT CY, LV, MT, HU, NL AT, PL, PT, RO, SI [16 MS]
1 NA (FR,), 3 no data (BE, FI, SE)
ALMP
BG, DK, EE, IE, IT, LV, LT, LU, PT, SK, [11 MS]
CZ, DE, EL, ES, HR, CY, NL, AT, PL, RO [10 MS]
2 NA (HU, SI), 4 no data (BE, FR, MT, FI, SE)
ECT
BG, DK, IE, LV, LT, LU, IT, HU, SK [9 MS]
CZ, DE, EE, ES, CY, NL, AT, PL, PT, RO, SI [11 MS]
1 NA (HR), 6 no data (BE, EL, FR, MT, FI, SE)
MPT
DK, EE (medical, legal), IE, IT (medical), LV, LT, LU, HU, NL (legal), RO (legal), SK [11 MS]
BG (medical, legal), CZ, DE, EL, ES, HR, CY, AT, PL, PT, SI [11 MS]
5 no data (BE, FR, MT, FI, SE)
Note: NA indicate cases where such traineeship types are not known. OMT are prohibited in FR, for ALMP, in HU and SI there are no formal traineeship contracts and therefore this is treated as NA, for ECT, HR is marked as NA is these traineeships are conducted on a free market basis.
Source: Study exploring the context, challenges, and possible solutions in relation to the quality of traineeships in the EU, forthcoming (VT/2022/047).
Provisions on the training component of traineeships
The results of the evaluation indicated gaps in the legal frameworks to ensure that the tasks of the trainees are aligned with their learning and training objectives. In fact, despite that the 2014 QFT recommends including in the written agreement the learning and training objectives, the principle on alignment of tasks with learning objectives was among the QFT principles that were the least implemented in national legal frameworks in Member States, with this trend in place for both OMT and ALMP traineeship regulation. Regarding OMT, this principle is not implemented at all in six Member States (DK, IE, CY, HU, AT and PL) but it has been partially implemented in six other countries (CZ, DE, EL, HR, PT and RO)97. Regarding ALMP traineeships, the principle has not been implemented in all countries except HU98, even though the implementation is only partial in CZ, EE, CY, PL and RO.
Further evidence, collected from the legal analysis carried out under the supporting study, provided information on the legal provisions which exist in Member States to ensure that the tasks of the trainees are aligned with their training objective, for all four types of traineeships. The results show that the largest gaps in legal provisions in this area are found in the case of OMT. In contrast, the other three types of traineeships tend to be more regulated in this regard, with provisions for MPT found in all but three (BG, EL, CY), and all but one for ALMP (CY). Regarding ECT, 15 countries (BG, DK, DE, IE, EL, ES, IT, LV, LT, LU, HU, AT, PT, RO, SK) have such provisions. The extent to which such provisions are translated into effective learning content seems to be, however, somewhat limited. According to the results of the 2023 Eurobarometer, while in AT such legal provisions exist for all types of traineeships, except OMT, only 28% of respondents stated that during their traineeship they have not learnt things that were useful professionally though other factors are likely to have contributed to this result.
Table 31: Legal provisions requiring a written agreement/written information indicating that tasks allow trainees to work towards their learning and training objectives
Type of traineeship
Yes
No
Data availability

OMT
BE, BG, CZ, DE, EL, ES, HR, LT, LU, PT, RO, SI [12 MS]
DK, EE, IE, IT, CY, LV, MT, AT, HU, PL, SK [11 MS]
1 NA (FR), 3 no data (NL, FI, SE)
ALMP
BE, BG, CZ, DE, DK, EE, IE, EL, ES, FR, HR, IT, LV, LT, LU, MT, AT, PL, PT, RO, SK, FI, SE [23 MS]
CY [1 MS]
2 NA (HU, SI), 1 no data (NL)
ECT
BG, DE99, DK, IE, EL, ES, IT, LV, LT, LU, HU, PT, RO, AT, SK [15 MS]
CZ, EE, CY, PL, SI [5 MS]
1 NA (HR), 6 no data (BE, FR, MT, NL, FI, SE)
MPT
CZ, DE, DK, EE, IE, ES, HR, IT, LV, LT, LU, HU, AT, PL, PT, RO, SI, SK (medical)
[18 MS]
BG, EL, CY
[3 MS]
6 no data (BE, FR, MT, NL, FI, SE)
Note: NA indicate cases where such traineeship types are not known. OMT are prohibited in FR, for ALMP, in HU and SI there are no formal traineeship contracts and therefore this is treated as NA, for ECT, HR is marked as NA is these traineeships are conducted on a free market basis.
Source: Study exploring the context, challenges and possible solutions in relation to the quality of traineeships in the EU, forthcoming (VT/2022/047).
Provisions on supervision or mentorship
The results of the legal analysis carried out under the supporting study showed that, in general, legal provisions on supervision or mentorship exist in several countries, however, gaps still exist. There are nine countries where OMTs are not required to be assigned either a supervisor or a mentor (AT, DE, EL, IE, IT, LV, MT, PL, SK). For MPT, there are also a number of countries (BE, EE, IT, LT, NL, PL) where only traineeships in the medical sector are covered by supervision provisions, and only two (BG and EL) are not covered by mandatory requirements on mentoring (table below).
Examples of such provisions on mentorship include the law in RO (Law 335/2013) which imposes specifically to the mentor to explain the assigned tasks and provide support to the trainee during their traineeship. Learning objectives are also discussed and agreed at the beginning of the traineeship and additional training can be considered throughout the duration of the traineeship. In other Member States, this principle is implemented more broadly. For example, in LT, the nature of the activities should be included in the written agreement but there is no specific regulation stipulating that the trainee should work towards learning and training objectives.



Table 32: Legal provisions on a supervisor and/or mentor for trainees
Type of traineeship
Yes
No
Data availability

OMT
BE, BG, CZ, DK, EE, ES, HR, CY, LT, LU, HU, NL, PT, RO, SI [15 MS]
AT, DE, EL, IE, IT, LV, MT, PL, SK [9 MS]
1 NA (FR), 2 no data (FI, SE)
ALMP
BE, CZ, DK, EE, IE, EL ES, FR, HR, IT, CY, LV, LT, LU, NL, MT, PL, PT, RO, SK, FI, SE [22 MS]
BG, DE, AT [3 MS]
2 NA (HU, SI)
ECT
BG, DK, IE, ES, IT, CY, LV, LT, LU, HU, AT, PT, RO, SI, SK [15 MS]
DE, EE, CZ, PL [4 MS]
1 NA (HR), 7 no data (BE, EL, FR, MT, NL, FI, SE)
MPT
BE (medical), CZ, DE, DK, EE (medical), IE, ES, HR, IT (medical), CY, LV, LT (medical), LU, HU, AT, NL (legal), PL (medical), PT, RO (medical, legal), SI, SK [21 MS]
BG, EL [2 MS]
4 no data (FR, MT, FI, SE)
Note: NA indicate cases where such traineeship types are not known. OMT are prohibited in FR, for ALMP, in HU and SI there are no formal traineeship contracts and therefore this is treated as NA, for ECT, HR is marked as NA is these traineeships are conducted on a free market basis.
Source: Study exploring the context, challenges and possible solutions in relation to the quality of traineeships in the EU, forthcoming (VT/2022/047).
Transparency of vacancy notices
The evaluation pointed out a lack of transparency in the vacancy notices which can be considered as a driver of poor traineeships. Namely, it identified that Principle 14, on transparency of vacancies, is among the principles that are the least100 implemented in legislative frameworks of Member States, for both OMT and ALMP traineeships. This is not implemented at all in seven Member States (DK, DE, IE, ES, HR, AT and PT) for OMT and in nine (DK, DE, IE, ES, IT, LV, SI, SK and SE) for ALMP traineeships. Across Member States, traineeship providers are generally not required to include information in their vacancies on the conditions of the traineeship. The reasons for this are twofold. Firstly, in some Member States (such as DK, EE, LV, SI) vacancies for ALMP traineeships are not available as trainees find traineeship positions through a PES consultant on a case-by-case basis. Secondly, in other Member States it is not compulsory to provide details about the objectives and the requirements of an ALMP or an OMT (e.g., IE, FR, IT, LT, HU).
Furthermore, a vacancy analysis101, conducted as part of the evaluation, examined almost 2,000 vacancies102 in the 27 Member States on their alignment with the QFT principles on transparency and showed that only around 40% for OMT and 50% form ALPM traineeships vacancies mentioned allowance or compensation and/or/ did not clarify the learning and training objectives; 63% of OMT and 40% of ALMP did not mention the duration and less than 10% mentioned information on social protection.
• 42% of OMT and 59% of ALMP traineeship vacancies mentioned allowance or compensation. 21% of OMT and 44% of ALMP traineeship vacancies indicated the amount.
• Around 40% of OMT and 58% of ALMP traineeship vacancies did not clarify the learning and training objectives, while only 11% of OMT and 8% of ALMP traineeship vacancies mentioned assigning a supervisor.
• 63% of OMT and 40% of ALMP traineeship vacancies did not mention the duration, while 86% of OMT and 92% of ALMP traineeship vacancies did not mention the conditions for an extension or renewal.
• Less than 10% mentioned information on social protection.
Furthermore, in the trainee survey conducted for the study supporting the evaluation, when asked what elements respondents would like to find in a vacancy notice advertising a traineeship, respondents ranked the tasks/job description of the traineeship as the most important element (68%), followed by the traineeship duration (65%), terms and conditions (60%), and the traineeship working hours (57%) (see Figure 18).

Figure 18: Results of trainees’ survey. Question: “Which of the following elements would you like to find in a vacancy notice advertising the traineeship?
Source: Study supporting the evaluation of the Quality Framework for Traineeships (VC/2021/0654), Final Report, January 2023. N=449
Provisions on teleworking arrangements
Based on the legal analysis, overall, it appears that most countries have not introduced formal teleworking arrangements. Ten Member States (DE, EE, EL, CY, LV, NL, AT, PT, RO, NL) have no formal teleworking arrangements for any type of traineeship. The ones that have, most often, apply the arrangements to all types of traineeships.

Table 33: Legal analysis - existence of teleworking arrangements
Type of traineeship
Yes
No
Data availability
OMT
BG, CZ, DK, IE, ES, LT, HU, SI, SK [9 MS]
DE, EE, EL, IT, CY, LV, MT, NL, AT, PL, PT, RO [12 MS]
1 NA (FR), 5 no data (BE, HR, LU, FI, SE)
ALMP
BG, CZ, DK, IE, LT [5 MS]
DE, EE, EL, ES, CY, LV, NL, AT, PL, PT, RO, SK
[12 MS]
2 NA (HU, SI), 8 no data (BE, FR, HR, IT, LU, MT, FI, SE)
ECT
BG, DK, IE, LT, HU, SI [6 MS]
CZ, DE, EE, EL, ES, CY, LV, NL, AT, PL, PT, RO, SK [13 MS]
1 NA (HR), 7 no data (BE, FR, IT, LU, MT, FI, SE)
MPT
CZ, DK, IE (legal, accountant), LT, HU, PL, SI, SK (legal, accountant) [8 MS]
BG, DE, EE, EL, ES, CY, LV, NL, AT, PT, RO
[11 MS]
8 no data (BE, FR, HR, IT, LU, MT, FI, SE)
Note: OMT are prohibited in FR. For ALMP, in SI there are no formal traineeship contracts. For ECT, in HR these traineeships are conducted on a free market basis.
Source: Study exploring the context, challenges and possible solutions in relation to the quality of traineeships in the EU, forthcoming (VT/2022/047).


The weak position of trainees in the labour market
The weak position of trainees vis-à-vis employers is an important driver, especially for problematic uses of traineeships, and to an extent poor quality traineeships. There are several reasons why trainees could face an asymmetrical power dynamic against employers.
An important first consideration is how this driver is intrinsically linked to the legal status of the trainee. Trainees not classified as workers are exposed to precarious conditions because they only benefit from limited labour rights. Evidence from the literature suggests that the written form of a traineeship agreement does not always provide sufficient protection to the trainee103. Moreover, besides the problems of weak enforcement and capacity, labour inspectorates and trade unions might lack legal competence in cases where trainees are not officially classified as workers104.
The complexity of agreements between the traineeship provider and the trainee can be another cause for an asymmetric power dynamic between the employer and the trainee. Trainees are sometimes simply unaware of their rights due to a lack of legal training, experience in dealing with contracts and the complexity of agreements presented to them105. In this respect, the fact that some types of traineeships (e.g. when educational obligations must be fulfilled, or in the case of ALMP if PES are involved) imply an interaction between a formal and a substantive employer, further complicates the position of trainees106. Moreover, trainees are often not in a position to influence the conditions of their traineeship107.
The position of ‘dependency’ in which trainees might find themselves – be it real or perceived – is yet another factor putting them in a relatively weaker position. Rosin (2016)108 argues that “Even if direct economic dependency is weak, social dependency on the employer in obtaining education or entering the labour market is stronger. Additionally, the receipt of only job-specific training can increase the trainee’s dependency”.
The weak position of trainees also results from additional elements, including the relatively short duration of a traineeship, the need to secure a more stable labour market position or the fear of negative repercussions from taking legal action or filing a complaint, and the complexity of regulations in Member States. Therefore, trainees are unlikely to go to courts to enforce their rights. There are initiatives by trade unions supporting and considering the interests of trainees. However, often trade unions as well face capacity problems in supporting trainees109. Furthermore, the problem may be exacerbated in cases where the trainee is not classified as a worker and may not have access to the support of trade unions and labour inspectorates110.
Finally, the relative bargaining position of trainees also depends on the characteristics and labour market dynamics specific to different sectors. The evaluation pointed to a few sectors where low-quality traineeships were more prevalent. These sectors included arts, entertainment and recreation, health and social work and education. Neither the evaluation nor other studies bring conclusive evidence as to why such differences exist. One of the reasons might be that a larger supply of trainees, compared to the relative demand, in these sectors, makes it possible for traineeship providers to pick from a larger pool of candidates while being less exposed to reputational risks.
Factors hampering the use, quality and access to traineeships
• Weak monitoring framework and lack of availability of data on traineeships
The evaluation provided a strong conclusion about the lack of monitoring based on comparable definitions. Besides the inexistence of a common EU level monitoring framework – which may be too burdensome to achieve – monitoring does not exist in most countries and data are often not available at national level. Lack of monitoring is an obstacle to the production of reliable data that could be used to assess the effectiveness of policy interventions and the regulatory framework, either at EU or national level. Also, lack of or limited data availability makes the design of policy interventions increasingly challenging. These challenges, in turn, make it even more difficult to enforce existing rules and ensure compliance with quality standards and relevant legislation111.
Therefore, the lack of monitoring – and the resulting lack of effective implementation – contributes not only to poor quality traineeships but also potentially non-compliant ones. It could also indirectly limit access to traineeships by failing to provide information on issues such as socio-economic background and vulnerable groups. Finally, it should be noted that, according to the interviews with national authorities and traineeship providers within the framework of the evaluation, the non-existent or ineffective monitoring and evaluation mechanisms are one of the main reasons for a weak application of the 2014 QFT.
• Issues related to the involvement of social partners and relevant stakeholders
The 2014 QFT (Principles 21 and 22) recommends promoting the active involvement of key stakeholders, including social partners, public employment services, education institutions and training providers in applying the QFT.
The evaluation gave indications that the active involvement of social partners and key stakeholders in implementing quality traineeships was considered very important or important by some stakeholders (i.e. rated as very important by all six trade union respondents (100%), two out of three business associations respondents (66%), important by 32 out of 85 public authorities (38%), 12 out of 34 former or current trainees (35%), and 23 out of 56 academic/research institutions (41%)). This aspect is deemed particularly relevant by social partners, with employer organisations and trade unions valuing stakeholders’ engagement the most (67% and 100% respectively).
The involvement of social partners through collective agreements (e.g., ES, AT, FI) tends to focus on working conditions. The case study on AT observed that improvements for trainees mainly related to establishing a minimum remuneration in certain sectors (not a QFT principle), but that in the Information Technology sector the collective agreement also required a training plan to be defined (relevant to the QFT principle of defining learning and training objectives). In FI, trade unions at sectoral level are involved in collective agreements, which also cover traineeships as regards remuneration, quality issues, rights and working conditions. The case study on ES found that trade unions regularly engage in negotiations with employer organisations and/or the government in relation to traineeship relevant legislation, such as the recently adopted labour market reform (RDL 32/2021). This reform specifies the need for supervision and individual training plans.
Besides collective agreements, only in a few Member States social partners are involved in discussions on regulation and/or policy-making with regards to traineeships (IE, HR, IT, LU, FI) and in monitoring the implementation of policies relevant to traineeships (DK and FI). It was not possible to deduce from the evidence gathered in the study supporting the evaluation whether such involvement has had an impact on the application of the QFT principles.
In all Member States, the case studies and interviews conducted in the targeted consultations found that PES are actively involved in the design, delivery and promotion of ALMP traineeship programmes, at times in cooperation with other national authorities and employers/employer organisations. PES also develop guidance and support for key actors (such as traineeship providers) on how to implement high quality traineeships.
• Lack of practical guidance on the implementation of the 2014 QFT and low awareness of the 2014 QFT principles
Lack of practical guidance on the overall implementation of the 2014 QFT as well as low awareness of the 2014 QFT principles are another challenge regarding insufficient implementation on the ground.112 The evaluation pointed out that providers often suffered from a lack of practical guidance on how to navigate and implement the QFT. In particular, guidance on regulations on hiring trainees from other countries, carrying out a skills assessment and providing adequate supervision would be necessary according to the evaluation’s findings. Insufficient awareness of 2014 QFT principles has been pointed out numerous times by the evaluation as hindering implementation on the ground and limiting the efficiency of the 2014 QFT. Both of these issues are particularly relevant in the case of SMEs, given the broader challenges they are facing (see driver D4.4 below for more details). It should also be noted that according to the 2023 Eurobarometer, 78% of respondents said that their last traineeship provider was a SME. According to the evaluation, sectors with a higher proportion of small businesses were found to be less likely to implement QFT principles on the ground. This observation can be explained by the ‘limited human and financial capacity to handle the administrative burden – or the perceived administrative burden – of ensuring quality traineeships’113.
• Insufficient resources (in particular of SMEs) to provide quality traineeships
SMEs accounted in 2022 for the majority of total employment in most industries, and for more than 80% of total employment in construction, accommodation and food services, real estate activities, and professional, scientific and technical activities. It should be noted that since early 2020 the 24 million EU27 SMEs have faced unprecedented economic uncertainty and turmoil114. The inflation rates augmented drastically, especially during 2022, also provoking rises in interest rates, which in turn has reduced access to finance. The increased energy costs and the increased raw material prices put extra pressure on enterprises.
SMEs and smaller organisations in general have considerable constraints in the resources that can be allocated to enhancing the quality of traineeships offered. Very small companies are more likely to face limited resources for recruitment and talent acquisition. They may also face challenges in promoting their trainee programmes effectively and reaching a wide pool of potential candidates, but also in offering competitive compensation and/or benefits. Finally, if traineeships are seen as an opportunity for companies to train and develop individuals in specific areas relevant to their business, a company must know their skill needs. This cannot be taken for granted in very small companies, where the lack of resources can constitute an obstacle to reaping the opportunities of training (in a broad sense)115. In addition, SMEs might struggle to offer remote/hybrid opportunities116 due to a lower degree of digitalisation117.
The imbalance in the level of resources to be allocated to this end is an important driver for all problems identified, but in particular for unequal access (P3) among traineeship providers and poor quality traineeships (P2). In particular, small(er) companies are more likely to face limited resources for recruitment. They typically have smaller budgets and fewer resources dedicated to recruitment and talent acquisition. They may also face challenges in promoting their trainee programmes effectively and reaching a wide pool of potential candidates, but also in offering competitive compensation and/or benefits.
The evaluation pointed to issues for SMEs in offering traineeships that assign supervisors, set learning objectives and provide certification at the end of the traineeship118. Notably, the study argues that such costs discourage SMEs from offering traineeships altogether. If confirmed, such a disincentive could clearly indicate an issue for tapping into the potential supply of trainees and in particular those that can only afford to take up paid opportunities.
• Barriers to engage in cross-border traineeships
Lacking information on the practical and regulatory side of traineeships abroad is also a driver limiting access to cross-border traineeships. In the 2023 Eurobarometer, 22% of the respondents said they were not well informed about traineeships abroad. Indeed, the study supporting the Commission’s ex-post evaluation of EURES119 highlighted difficulties in providing support on traineeships, mostly due to persisting differences in and a lack of harmonisation of national legislative frameworks for traineeships outside of education (e.g. legislative uncertainties regarding the definition of trainees). The trainee survey carried out in the context of the evaluation indicated that only 239 out of 1,836 (13%) of respondents made use of the EURES portal to find cross-border traineeship opportunities.
In addition to the lack of information on cross-border traineeships, the lack of financial resources is also a factor preventing trainees from doing cross-border traineeship due to the (sometimes even higher) costs involved. In fact, 37% of respondents in the trainee survey carried out under the evaluation indicated that a lack of financial resources limits their possibilities to undertake a traineeship abroad. Similarly, in the 2023 Eurobarometer 30% of those who had not done a cross-border traineeship, indicated that the reason was insufficient financial resources, while 10% reported a lack of financial resources as the main reason for not doing a traineeship (in general).
Details on External Drivers
Partially, and sometimes indirectly, the problems outlined above are influenced by global megatrends affecting labour markets in general, such as globalisation, digitalisation and ongoing societal shifts and changes. These drivers, while having some impact on the problems the EU initiative aims at tackling, are “external” to its scope and reach.
The twin green and digital transformations have the potential to increase productivity and living standards but may leave behind current and future workers. Increased automation, digitisation, and robotisation have significantly contributed to job polarisation, but new, greener economies and industries could also benefit lower-skilled workers 120. Globally, the ILO predicts some 71 million jobs to be lost and around 79 million to be created by 2030 due to the green transition. In the EU, some 2.5 million net jobs will be created by 2030. Besides job creation and destruction, the combination of such transformations is reshaping the workforce by creating new occupations, modifying existing roles, and emphasising the importance of new skills. Up- and re-skilling have become critical to embracing these technological and environmental advancements, increasing the need as well as the demand for training among both young and mid-career professionals. Traineeships can, potentially, be an important measure to bring about the twin transition, but this depends on their quality.
The shrinking of the EU working age population is particularly stark for young workers aged 15-29, whose share of the total population has declined from 18.1% in 2011 to 16.3% in 2021121. Such a demographic trend is tightening already tight labour market conditions, through a (relative) decline in the supply of labour, especially of young workers. Employers increasingly have therefore to compete to attract young talented employees. One way of doing it could be improving traineeship conditions and quality.
In periods of economic downturn or recession, youth unemployment increases faster than total unemployment, as young employees who tend to have shorter-term contracts are often the first to be let go122. Trainees typically have lower negotiating power compared to other labour market participants, due to the over-supply and competition for limited opportunities, while companies’ pressure to minimise costs is higher during times of economic difficulty. This potentially increases the prevalence of lower quality traineeships, for example without significant educational value.
The rise of remote and hybrid working arrangements, spurred by digitalisation and the COVID-19 pandemic, has disrupted organisational structures and reduced social interaction and face-to-face communication. Some studies have even found that this may lead to a deterioration of the effectiveness of knowledge transfer and learning at the workplace, which is especially relevant for young workers and trainees.
‘Job-hopping’, which refers to the practice of changing jobs frequently, typically within a short period, has become more relevant in recent years. Recent OECD research123 has illustrated an increase in job-to-job transitions in OECD countries for all age groups over the period 2012-2019, particularly for younger workers. A 2022 survey in nine European countries124 revealed that one in three workers was considering quitting in the following 3 to 6 months. While job-hopping approaches can lead to faster pay rises and acceleration in career progression, high turnover generates a negative human capital externality, as the company does not receive the full benefit of the training it gave. This can lead to the under-provision of learning opportunities and a socially inefficient market outcome, as employers are disincentivised from investing in training, including via traineeships.
Finally, language barriers constitute a barrier to take-up of cross-border traineeships. According to data from the Flash Eurobarometer 2023, 17% of respondents indicated that they did not do a traineeship abroad due to insufficient knowledge of a foreign language. However, this tends to be quite concentrated in a few countries (in the Czech Republic, Poland, Slovakia Spain and France the percentage of respondents is above 20%) while in other countries it is less of an issue (in Cyprus, Denmark, Estonia, Greece, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands it is lower than 10%).
Who is affected by the problem?
• Consequences for trainees
Legal uncertainty and vulnerability: As a result of the complexity of the regulatory approaches to traineeships, trainees suffer from legal uncertainty regarding their legal status. This, combined with their weak position in the labour market, make them vulnerable. The lack of effective controls and inspections, aggravates the issue as it prevents individuals in work relationships disguised as traineeships from enjoying the rights and protections offered by the EU and national labour acquis. At the same time, weak enforcement is likely to contribute to poor quality traineeships and cause divergence among the opportunities offered to trainees across Member States. Regulatory divergence between different Member States also poses challenges for cross-border traineeships.
Precarious working conditions: A large number of trainees do not benefit from remuneration, do not have access to social protection, and/or are exposed to sub-standard working conditions. This can affect their standards of living, but it can also undermine their self-esteem and mental health, future productivity125 and therefore normalise precarious working conditions in the future. Also, available evidence126 suggests that traineeships which provide remuneration and access to social protection, which are also usually associated with better programme structure127, are associated with better labour market outcomes. Furthermore, income insecurity and greater exposure to social security risks may also prevent people, in particular in vulnerable situations, from taking up traineeship opportunities reducing as such access to traineeships and overall social mobility since young people from lower-income households might not have the financial support to work for free.
Reduced opportunities for career development/employability: Poor learning content can have significant impacts on trainees’ professional skills development, employability and consequently, future labour market career, the latter being a principal objective of traineeships. According to the 2023 Eurobarometer, 31% of trainees found that their experience was not or would not be helpful in finding a regular job128. Further, it increased the size of the opportunity cost, including the indirect consequence of deadweight loss if the trainee would have obtained employment even without the traineeship. A traineeship characterised by inadequate learning content effectively squanders the trainee's time, and, empirical evidence suggests, can lead to scarring effects that depress wages and productivity even after the traineeship is over129. The risk may be higher for those with vulnerable/disadvantaged backgrounds, who may be more ‘liquidity constrained’ and need to accept the first job available, even if it is not a good opportunity or one they are suited130.
• Consequences for employers/traineeship providers
Skills and competencies not matching company needs and reduced pool to recruit: Poor quality traineeships or work relationships disguised as traineeships might reduce the contribution of trainees to the needs of the business. The lack of a formalised and well-structured approach will not equip trainees with the right skills, but it will also decrease trainees’ motivation leading to a situation where trainees are seen more as a burden rather than an asset or opportunity for the organisation. Such practices might also lead to the “wrong” trainee being hired for the traineeship, with misaligned expectations between trainee and employer leading to ineffective traineeships131. The issue of skills mismatches may be further exacerbated by poor-quality traineeships with low learning content. A study of UK SMEs and graduates suggests that SMEs – and other employers – may have little experience of young workers, and thus may be ill-equipped to best put them to use132. This implies that the traineeship will bring little benefit for skills development, and that trainees will not be able to acquire skills needed for the traineeship and their subsequent labour market career. This is disadvantageous for employers, as the pool of skilled trainees – and therefore future workers - is reduced, as is the degree to which the skills trainees develop during their traineeship matches future labour market needs. Finally, unequal access to traineeships, and low numbers of cross-border traineeships reduce the size of the talent pool employers can recruit from. This has negative effects on the productivity of businesses and on the overall competitiveness of the European Union.
“Uneven playing field” between providers with/out quality traineeships (within and across countries). Employers/traineeship providers offering good quality traineeships (compliant with the 2014 QFT principles) may experience unfair competition from non-compliant employers133. At the same time, such companies are in competition with companies who use traineeships to gain a competitive advantage in terms of lower labour costs, leading to distortions which impact competitiveness within the same country. Also, national differences in the regulatory frameworks governing traineeships lead to an uneven playing field between employers/traineeship providers across the EU as some of them are faced with different requirements for comparable positions (traineeships) than their peers and/or competitors in other EU countries.
Burdensome process for employers to offer quality traineeship opportunities, in particularly for SMEs. The regulatory systems governing traineeships and/or the legal status of trainees in the EU are complex and fragmented. This creates difficulties in the understanding and awareness of what constitutes a quality traineeship and the regulatory provisions (if existent in the country at hand) that apply. Business, and in particular SMEs often lack the administrative and human capital capacity to ensure QFT-compliant traineeships. Also, businesses may not have the time or resources to research a complex and ambiguous regulatory legal framework in order to provide good quality traineeship134.
• Consequences for society at large
Unemployment. Low-quality traineeships fail to sufficiently develop the trainee’s employability and thus lead to sub-optimal labour market outcomes. When the traineeship ends, the ex-trainee may remain unemployed, with reduced chances of finding a new job as compared to peers benefitting from higher quality traineeships. This is often exacerbated by traineeships reducing job-search intensity, as a trainee’s time is filled with their traineeship, further reducing employment rate if the traineeship is not of good quality135. At societal level, low-quality traineeships are therefore likely to lead to increased unemployment rates.
Skills and competences not matching labour market, reduced productivity, and loss of competitiveness. Low-quality traineeships, especially regarding matching the right employees to the right positions, can be considered opportunity costs for the labour market, and increasing productivity. Poor learning content prevents trainees from developing their skills and in turn leads to lower productivity, which prevents future employers to fully exploit their potential. If poor quality traineeships proliferate en masse, it will lead to an insufficient supply of high-quality ex-trainees to meet the demand for them from employers. The consequence of such skills shortages are stagnating productivity and economic competitiveness136. This is particularly important in the current changing labour market context. Low-quality traineeships can even have ‘locking-in’ effects whereby trainees decrease their search efforts during the traineeship for an employer that would be a better fit, thus further lowering their productivity137. Moreover, a lack of productivity gains may be felt by the traineeship provider too, if the trainee fails to be well-aligned with company needs or skill gaps138. This represents an opportunity cost for the employer and employee.
Loss of public revenue. The problematic use of traineeships and persisting access barriers for people in vulnerable situations result in the loss of public revenue. First, the replacement of regular contracts by work relationships disguised as traineeships and non-compliant traineeships may result in the loss of potential tax revenues and social security contributions. Second, persisting access barriers to (paid) traineeships may prevent the labour market inclusion of people in vulnerable situations, also resulting in the loss of potential tax revenues and social security contributions. At the same time these challenges can also exacerbate dynamics of in-work poverty and social exclusion, thereby negatively impacting intergenerational solidarity and burdening public support budgets.


Annex 10. Problem definition by type of traineeships
A10.1. Summary of the size of the problem of the problems by type of traineeships, and Member States affected
1) Problematic use of traineeships

Share of excessive duration traineeships (single traineeship)
(source: Flash EB 2023, % of total traineeships)
Number of trainees (paid and unpaid) doing long trainee
(source: Flash EB 2023, % within each type of traineeship)ships
Traineeships / requiring previous work experience share of trainees who did repeated/consecutive traineeships with the same employer)
(source: Flash EB 2023, % within each type of traineeship)
Number of trainees (paid and unpaid) repeated traineeships with the same employer

source: Flash EB 2023, % within each type of traineeship)
Number of trainees (paid and unpaid) doing long duration traineeships including consecutive/repeated traineeships with the same employer

source: Flash EB 2023, % within each type of traineeship)
Number of trainees who did repeated traineeships with different employers at some point in their life

source: Flash EB 2023, % within each type of traineeship)
No existence of a cap on the share of trainees in a company
OMT
13%

Paid: 67,088 (16%)
Unpaid: 16,949 (11.9%)
25.7%
Paid: 27,808 (7%)
Unpaid: 3,209 (2%)

Out of which with also with poor learning content:
Paid: 28274
Unpaid: 10425


Paid: 94,896 (22.3%)
Unpaid: 20,158 (14%)

Paid: 146,877 (35%)
Unpaid: 64,103 (45%)

15MS
CZ, DE, DK, EE, IE, EL, ES, HR, IT, CY, LV, MT, NL, SI, SK
ALMP
10.5%
Paid: 91,832 (17.2%)
Unpaid: 7,616 (10%)
35%
Paid: 57,118 (11%)
Unpaid: 4,915 (6%)

Out of which with also with poor learning content:
Paid: 46761
Unpaid: 6409


Paid: 148,950 (28%)
Unpaid: 12,531(17.6%)
Paid: 177,716 (33%)
Unpaid: 34,998 (46%)
15MS
BG, CZ, DE, DK, EE, IE, ES, HR, CY, LT, LU, NL, AT, RO, SK
ECT
11%
Paid: 71,875 (14.3%)
Unpaid: 100,076 (8.1%)
35%
Paid: 53,790 (11%)
Unpaid: 60,947 (5%)
Out of which with also with poor learning content:
Paid: 27936 Unpaid: 38381
Paid: 125,665 (25%)
Unpaid: 161,023 (13%)
Paid: 166,618 (33%)
Unpaid: 531,285 (43%)
16MS
BG, CZ, DE, DK, EE, IE, ES, IT, CY, LV, NL, AT, PL, PT, RO, SI
MPT
Not relevant
Not relevant for MPT.
45.7%



11MS
BG, DE, DK, EE, ES, CY, LV, LU, HU, NL, AT
Gaps in national legislation, systems and procedures 
 
No existence of a cap on the share of trainees in a company 
No legislation limiting duration to 6 months (source: legal analysis, number of Member States) 
No systems of inspections or guidance for inspectorates 
No procedures for registering complaints & reporting malpractice 
OMT 
15 MS 
CZ, DE, DK, EE, IE, EL, ES, HR, IT, CY, LV, MT, NL, SI, SK 
20 (+ 2 no information available) 
No restrictions: DK, DE, EE, EL, HR, IT, CY, LV, MT, NL, AT, SK   
Restrictions but more than 6 months: BG, CZ, IE, ES, PT, SI, SE, FI 
17 MS 
CZ, DK, DE, EE, IE, ES, HR, IT, CY, LV, MT, NL, AT, PL, PT, RO, SI  
 
16 MS 
CZ, DK, DE, EE, EL, HR, IT CY, LV, MT, HU, NL AT, PL, PT, RO, SI  
 
ALMP 
15 MS 
BG, CZ, DE, DK, EE, IE, ES, HR, CY, LT, LU, NL, AT, RO, SK 
17 (+ 3 no information available) 
No restrictions: DE, IE, CY, LV, NL, AT 
Restrictions but more than 6 months: BG, ES, HR, IT, LT, LU, PT, PL, SK SE, FI 
12 MS 
DE, CZ, EE, EL, ES, HR, CY, LV, NL, AT, PL, RO 
10 MS 
CZ, DE, EL, ES, HR, CY, NL, AT, PL, RO 
ECT 
16 MS 
BG, CZ, DE, DK, EE, IE, ES, IT, CY, LV, NL, AT, PL, PT, RO, SI 
21 (+ 3 no information available) 
No restrictions: BE, DK, DE, EE, IE, EL, ES, CY, MT, NL, PL, PT, SI, SK, FI, SE 
Restrictions but more than 6 months: IT, LV, LT, AT, RO 
12 MS 
CZ, DE, EE, ES, CY, LV, NL, AT, PL PT, RO, SI [12 MS] 
11 MS 
CZ, DE, EE, ES, CY, NL, AT, PL, PT, RO, SI 
MPT 
No existence of a cap on the share of trainees in a company 
22 (+ 3 no information available). However, not relevant for MPT. 
14 MS 
CZ, DE, EE, EL, ES, CY, HR, LV, NL, AT, PL, PT, RO, SI, 
11 MS: BG (medical, legal), CZ, DE, EL, ES, HR, CY, AT, PL, PT, SI  
 


2) Poor quality traineeships

Number of trainees not unpaid trainees by type of traineeships (139)
Number of trainees without social protection coverage
Number of trainees who reported not learning things that are useful professionally
Lack of legal requirements for written agreement/written information indicating that tasks allow trainees to work towards their learning and training objectives
Lack of legal provisions on a supervisor and/or mentor for trainees
OMT
156800
Paid: 106,222 (25.3%)
Unpaid: 82,397 (57.8%)

Paid: 91,944 (22%)

Unpaid:
44,937 (32%)
11MS
DK, EE, IE, IT, CY, LV, MT, AT, HU, PL, SK [11 MS]
9MS
DE, EL, IE, IT, LV, MT, AT, PL, SK
ALMP
83200
Paid: 93,281 (17.5%) Unpaid: 24,126 (31.8%)
Paid:
111,570 (21%)
Unpaid:
21,003 (34%)
CY
3MS
BG, DE, AT
ECT
1360000
Paid: 84,208 (16.7%)
Unpaid: 662,052 (53.5%)
Paid:
81,727 (16%)
Unpaid:
257,070 (21%)
5MS :
CZ, EE, CY, PL, SI
4MS
DE, EE, CZ, PL
MPT
-
Paid: 16,072 (10.8%)
-
3MS:
BG, EL, CY
2MS
BG, EL

A10.2. Material Scope
The 2014 QFT included OMT and ALMP traineeships, but excluded ECT and MPT. For the analysis on the extension of the scope, the supporting study assessed the differences between the four traineeship types and examined whether there is evidence pointing to the need to create an instrument that encompasses all of them.
In terms of prevalence, the supporting study using EU-LFS data showed that, in 2019, the share of ECT and MPT of total paid traineeships was 31.1% and 9.2% respectively. Of unpaid traineeships, ECT are estimated (based on LFS data) to represent 85%, but no data was available on MPT (in EU-LFS). Looking at the trends, the largest growth in relative terms concerns MPTs, which are projected to increase by 42.8% (from 158,617 in 2021 to 226,463 in 2030), while ECT are expected to increase by 17.5% (from 1,874,428 to 2,202,857).
The results of the 2023 Eurobarometer grouped by types of traineeships form the starting point of the analysis on quality. Results for selected questions are compared to see how they perform relative to other traineeship types. The table below aims to help visualise performance by grouping the results into two simple categories: the two types under each dimension that exhibit better results are coloured in green, while the other two are red. Caution should be taken during the interpretation of this simplistic categorisation – which first and foremost serves as a tool for comparison across types – as often they hide differences that are sometimes very modest.
Table 34: Results from Eurobarometer - green for better performance, red for worse (two-two for each question)
Type
Relevance to problem
OMT
ALMP
ECT
MPT
Traineeship >6 months (Q9)
1
13%
11%
11%
13%
Not paid (Q14) (LFS estimates in bracket)
2
42% (50)
38% (15)
52% (66)
35%
Equivalent conditions – disagree or totally disagree (Q13)

31%
29%
29%140
26%
Mentorship – disagree or totally disagree (Q13)

28%
26%
21%
24%
No access to social protection – numbers in brackets mean partial only (Q16)

37% (20)
23% (37)
33% (22)
18% (36)
No/limited professionally useful content (Q13)

27%
25%
20%
23%

From the above table, it seems that OMT are more problematic across all dimensions that the rest of the traineeship types. Conversely, MPT perform relatively well in all but one dimension compared to the other 3 types, exhibiting higher shares of traineeships above 6 months compared to ALMP and ECT. However, the longer duration appears to be mostly justified by the nature of this type of traineeship.
ECT is shown in red in three dimensions, namely the share of unpaid traineeships, not having equivalent conditions to regular employees and the lack of access to social protection. The share of unpaid is the highest for ECT. The share of ECT trainees lacking similar working conditions to regular employees does not show a marked difference from ALMP trainees, therefore the red-green categorisation implies a larger difference than the Eurobarometer results would warrant. Finally, lacking access to social protection is likely to follow from the status as ‘student’ (rather than employee status) in most Member States. In terms of learning content, both ECT and MPT traineeships perform relatively well compared to OMT and ALMP traineeships.
The extension to ECT could lead to an overlap with rules for apprentices, depending on national definitions of traineeships and apprenticeships. As apprenticeships are covered by the Recommendation on a European Framework for Quality and Effective Apprenticeships, the non-binding option would provide flexibility to Member States to assess which of the two quality frameworks should apply to VET work-based learning experiences, depending on their national and regional specific features. When doing so, to ensure that all learners in work-based learning receive the highest level of protection, Member States would be encouraged (as relevant) to apply the framework conditions which are more protective among the two frameworks, in line with national circumstances.
Legal provisions
To get a sense of the extent to which the different traineeship types are regulated in some of the dimensions examined by the problem definition, the table below maps the share of countries where there are no provisions in place. The table uses the same colour coding as above.
Table 35: share (%) of countries without legal provisions - green for better performance, red for worse (two-two for each question)
Type
Relevance for problem
OMT
ALMP
ECT
MPT
No general requirement on six months cap on duration
1
80%
(21 out of 26)
76%
(19 out of 25)
92%
(23 out of 25)
100%
(24 out of 24)
No procedures for registering complaints & reporting malpractice

70%
(16 out of 23)
48%
(10 out of 21)
55%
(11 out of 20)
50%
(11 out of 22)
Legislation allows for unpaid traineeship
2

85%
(22 out of 26)
16%
(4 out of 25)
100%
(26 out of 26)
4% for medical
(1 out of 26)
12% for legal
(3 out of 25)
No legal provisions to ensure that tasks allow trainees to work towards their learning and training objectives

48%
(11 out of 23)
4%
(1 out of 23)
25%
(5 out of 20)
14%
(3 out of 21)
No requirement for full access to social protection for those under employee contracts

19%
(5 out of 26)
44%
(11 out of 25)
58%
(15 out of 26)
22% (6 out of 27 for medical) and 59% (16 out of 27 for legal)
No provisions on mentorship

37%
(9 out of 24)
12%
(3 out of 25)
21%
(4 out of 19)
9%
(2 out of 23)
Note: shares based on countries where data is available were calculated to avoid biased results due to varying number of countries with data gaps
Once again, OMT emerge as a more problematic case virtually in all dimensions. However, there are two caveats to be kept in mind. The first relates to duration, where MPT are generally not expected to have a six-month cap. The second refers to access to social protection, where the low share of countries not requiring full social protection is driven by the fact that this number only refers to those trainees with employment contracts. In reality, this share is likely to be much higher in countries where variable status is possible, and those without employment contracts have partial access. Otherwise, the share of EU countries across all of these dimensions where there are no legal provisions for OMT is considerably higher than for the other traineeship types except for ECT. The latter exhibit a similar trend whereby they remain largely unregulated in the dimensions included in the table. It should be noted that for ECT, which are typically governed by tripartite agreements in which the university is one of the parties, very often the university secures financial support for the student trainee. This implies that even if the legislation allows for unpaid ECT, in practice trainees often receive some form of financial provision associated with the status of student (rather than as compensation for the work done). Conversely, MPT are fairly well-regulated with the exception of procedures for registering complaints and reporting malpractice.
Overall, OMT and ECT appear to be the two types of traineeships with worst performance regarding the above provisions, and potentially the most exposed to work relationships disguised as traineeships or poor-quality traineeships. This could partially be explained by regulatory overlaps between the two types of traineeships. In some cases, the same laws (can) apply to both types (for instance in BG, EE, HU, AT, NL). In general, the legal framework governing ECT seems to be rather loosely defined and, in some cases, there is no national framework to speak of (e.g. PL, PT). However, specific conditions could depend on the university, which sets the standards through its involvement in the tripartite agreements between the trainee and the traineeship provider. Thus, in practice, the quality of the agreement can strongly affect the use and quality of the traineeship, despite the lack of a regulatory framework. It should be noted that the requirement to set tripartite agreements does not exist in all Member States (e.g. in IE, CY, AT, PL, PT, RO and FI).



Annex 11. Problem Tree



Annex 12. Additional Information on Policy Options
A12.1. Baseline
• Existing EU Law and Instruments and relevant principles of the 2014 QFT
Over the years the European Union has built a floor of rights for workers, including trainees, who have an employment contract or employment relationship as defined by law, collective agreements or practice in force in each Member State, with consideration to the case-law of the Court of Justice of the European Union. These encompass both individual rights (information about working conditions; health and safety; working time; discrimination and abuse of non-standard employment; equal treatment at workplace; posting of workers), and collective rights (European Works Councils; information and consultation in relation to company changes, collective redundancies, transfers of undertakings). Therefore, trainees who are considered as workers under EU law will continue to be protected by the provisions of these legislative and political instruments, as described below.
These EU legislative and policy initiatives are expected to support the implementation of some of the 2014 QFT principles into the national legislation and could lead to improvements in the quality of traineeships, for trainees who are considered workers under EU law. Nonetheless, many trainees who do not classify as workers, but also those who should have been classified as workers (but are not), would continue to face challenges in terms of working conditions. In the coming years, the number of such trainees can be expected to increase given the popularity of traineeships in the youth labour market. The 2014 QFT principles provide guidance to Member States in several domains, however, as already discussed, without EU action, limited improvements can be expected regarding national (regulatory) framework governing traineeships.
For trainees who qualify as workers under EU law, several aspects of their working conditions including the duration of the traineeship, will continue to be governed by the Fixed-Term Work Directive (1999/70/EC)141 and the Part-Time Work Directive (1997/81/EC)142. The Fixed-Term Work Directive aims at improving the quality of fixed-term work by ensuring equal treatment for fixed-term workers and requires Member States to introduce provisions to prevent abuse practice of fixed-term contracts. Specifically, it requires Member States to implement at least one of the following measures in their national laws to prevent misuse of successive fixed‑term contracts: (1) objective reasons for the renewal of fixed‑term contracts; (2) maximum total duration of successive fixed‑term contracts or (3) maximum number of renewals of fixed‑term. Such provision should either limit the maximum total duration of contracts, or the maximum permitted number of renewals, or they can introduce justifications for renewing fixed-term contracts. It also ensures access by fixed-term workers to appropriate training opportunities and to information about vacancies within the undertaking with a view to secure a permanent position. The Directive applies to fixed-term workers, who have an employment contract or relationship as defined in law, collective agreement, or practice in each Member State. It also applies to trainees, if they meet the criteria to be considered workers under EU law and provided that Member States have not made use of the possibility of excluding initial vocational training relationships, apprenticeship schemes or employment contracts and relationships which have been concluded within the framework of a specific public or publicly-supported training, integration and vocational retraining programme. Nevertheless, there is a great heterogeneity in the national legal provisions implemented in the Member States following the transposition of the Fixed-Term Directive, and these national rules may not be always fit-for-purpose in the case of trainees. The Part-Time Work Directive sets out a list of principles to prevent discriminatory practices towards part-time workers.
The 2014 QFT includes a number of principles on reasonable duration of traineeships (Principles 10-12). The principles were included with the aim to limit distortions to the labour market, particularly in terms of the risk of substituting regular jobs with traineeships143. The 2014 QFT states that in principle a reasonable duration does not exceed 6 months (Principle 10), but it does not recommend a minimum duration for traineeships. However, quantitative evidence from a variety of data sources suggests that, in the absence of a policy intervention, the number of trainees under contracts longer than 6 months and undergoing consecutive traineeships would remain high for all types of traineeships144. The 2014 QFT also includes a provision on transparency concerning the renewal or extension of traineeship agreements, but it does not address the potential abuse of repeated traineeships, including consecutive traineeships, with the same or different employer to circumvent general labour law requirements or to replace regular employment.
Recently adopted legal initiatives are also expected to have some positive impact on the quality of remunerated traineeships. The Directive on Transparent and Predictable Working Conditions (TPWC) (2019/1152)145 expands workers’ rights and addresses protection for workers in precarious jobs, including trainees. It includes the obligation for employers to inform in a written form workers about the essential aspects of the employment relationship (duration, remuneration, tasks, etc.). Recital 8 of the Directive explains that trainees and apprentices could fall within the scope of the Directive, but adds that this is provided that they fulfil the criteria for determining the status of a worker established by the Court of Justice of the European Union.146 Thus, the Directive is expected to contribute to the integration of Principles 6 to 9 of the 2014 QFT (on respecting working conditions applicable to trainees and the clarification of rights and obligations of the traineeship agreement) into national legislation and to the harmonisation of national regulations. However, Article (4) of the TPWC Directive, which outlines the essential aspects of the employment relationship, does not require the provision of information on the learning objectives and the arrangements for mentorship, supervision and evaluation. These elements have been identified by the evaluation as areas where there is room for improvement.
The 2014 QFT (Principle 2 and 3) recommends to Member States to require that traineeships are based on a written agreement which indicates the educational objectives as well all the other essential elements of the traineeship. Principle 4 of the QFT requests Member States to promote best practices as regards learning and training objectives in order to help trainees acquire practical experience and relevant skills and to ensure that the tasks assigned to the trainee should enable these objectives to be attained. However, the principle of aligning the task of the trainee to the learning objectives is among the QFT principles that were least implemented in national legal frameworks in Member States. Therefore, it can be assumed that challenges regarding the learning and training component of traineeships will persist without stronger EU intervention.
Regarding the area of the learning content of traineeships, the Council Recommendation on individual learning accounts (2022/C 243/03) may contribute to filling some learning gaps by supporting the access of all working-age adults (irrespective of their labour force or professional status) to training, however it will depend on the implementation of the Recommendation by the Member States.
The 2014 QFT recognises the importance of learning and training. It also notes the importance of having recourse to a supervisor who provides guidance, monitoring and assessment of progress. In particular, Principle 5 of the 2014 QFT invites Member States to encourage traineeship providers to designate a supervisor for trainee. The evaluation also identified having a supervisor or a mentor as a critical element of quality, linked to the learning component, contributing to better post-placement outcomes.
The 2014 QFT recommends employers to be transparent in their vacancy notices about the terms and conditions of the traineeship (Principle 14). It explicitly refers to certain financial conditions, namely an allowance and/or compensation, as well as health and accident insurance. It also recommends transparency about recruitment policies.
The Directive on adequate minimum wages in the European Union (2022/2041)147 establishes a framework to improve the adequacy of statutory minimum wages and enhance effective access of workers, including trainees qualifying as workers under EU law, to minimum wage protection, including through collective bargaining. Article 6 of the Directive allows Member States to set different rates of statutory minimum wage for specific groups of workers, but they shall ensure that principles of non-discrimination and proportionality, the latter including the pursuit of a legitimate aim. However, recital 29 notes that it is important to avoid variations being used widely, as they risk having a negative impact on the adequacy of minimum wages. The transposition of the Directive can have a positive effect on trainees considered as workers under EU law, and could improve access to traineeships to individuals who may lack the financial resources to undertake traineeships, however, it will not ensure that trainees are fairly/proportionated remunerated by taking into account comparative factors such as the respective weight of learning and work components, the trainee’s tasks and responsibilities and the economic value and the intensity of the trainee’s work.
The Directive to strengthen the application of the principle of equal pay for equal work or work of equal value between men and women through pay transparency and enforcement mechanisms (2023/970)148 lays down minimum requirements to strengthen the application of the principle of equal pay for equal work or work of equal value between men and women (the ‘principle of equal pay’) enshrined in Article 157 TFEU and the prohibition of discrimination laid down in Article 4 of Directive 2006/54/EC, in particular through pay transparency and reinforced enforcement mechanisms. The new rules make it compulsory for employers to inform job seekers about the starting salary or pay range of advertised positions, whether in the vacancy notice or ahead of the interview. Employers will also be prevented from asking candidates about their pay history. Once in the role, workers will be entitled to ask their employers for information about average pay levels, broken down by sex, for categories of employees doing the same work or work of equal value. They will also have access to the criteria used to determine pay and career progression, which must be objective and gender neutral.
The “Recast” Directive 2006/54/EC implementing the principle of equal opportunities and equal treatment of men and women in matters of employment and occupation (recast) prohibits discrimination between men and women in employment and occupation, including regarding “access to all types and to all levels of vocational guidance, vocational training, advanced vocational training and retraining, including practical work experience”.149
The Council Directive 2000/78/EC establishing a general framework for equal treatment in employment and occupation introduced the principle of equal treatment in employment and occupation to combat discrimination on the grounds of religion, disability, age, or sexual orientation. The Directive also requires employers to provide reasonable accommodation for persons with disabilities.
As for the access to social protection, the 2019, the Council Recommendation on the access to social protection for workers and self-employed (2019/C 387/01)150 calls for Member States to “provide access to social protection to all workers and self-employed persons in the Member States” and explicitly mentions trainees among the categories of workers that are excluded from social protection in some Member States. However, this does not apply to trainees not considered as workers under EU law. New recommendations would thus complement the 2019 Council Recommendation on access to social protection for workers and self-employed, which is not applicable to trainees who are not considered workers.
It should also be noted that unpaid traineeships may be covered by existing Union measures on “working conditions” adopted on the basis of Article 153(1)(b) TFEU, which address first and foremost “workers” and cover trainees only in an ancillary way, namely because trainees work at the same workplace. This notably concerns the Council Directive on the introduction of measures to encourage improvements in the safety and health of workers at work151.
Other relevant EU legislation includes the Work-Life Balance Directive152, the Part-Time Work Directive153, the Directive establishing a general framework for informing and consulting employees154, and the EU’s equal treatment and anti-discrimination acquis.
Furthermore, the Council Recommendation on Reinforcing the Youth Guarantee155 is closely aligned with the objectives of the 2014 QFT and specifically recommends that “traineeship offers adhere to the minimum standards laid out in the Quality Framework for Traineeships”. The implementation of the reinforced Youth Guarantee is backed up by significant EU financial support from the European Social Fund+156 and the Recovery and Resilience Facility157 in order to support young people in gaining work experience and developing the right skills for a changing world of work, in particular those relevant to the green and digital transitions.

The 2021 Commission Recommendation on Effective Active Support to Employment (EASE) states that Member States “should introduce or strengthen support schemes for […] paid traineeships […]” which “should include a strong training component and be subject to monitoring and evaluation, offering a path to stable labour market integration”, and emphasises that support “should be linked to the relevant frameworks fostering job quality, such as […] the Quality Framework for Traineeships”158.
A12.2. List of measures regarding the unequal access to quality traineeships 
The following measures aim to address the barriers to access to traineeships for vulnerable groups, as well as to quality cross-border and remote/hybrid traineeships. They aim to address gaps identified in the evaluation, by relevant stakeholders, the 2023 Eurobarometer, and by the study.  
Unequal access to quality traineeships for vulnerable groups 
The measures to address the drivers of unequal access to quality traineeships for vulnerable groups consist of: 
• increasing outreach to vulnerable groups 
◦ targeted outreach to vulnerable groups to increase their access to traineeship opportunities either through national level campaigns and/or actions at the level of traineeship providers to make people belonging to vulnerable groups equally aware of existing traineeship opportunities 
• ensuring equal treatment 
◦ applying equal treatment of all candidate trainees, regardless of their background, through neutral language in vacancies and through non-discriminatory recruitment processes 
• increased awareness-raising of traineeship opportunities as well as of the quality standards for quality traineeships for both trainees and traineeship providers 
◦ raising awareness amongst candidate trainees, in particular those belonging to vulnerable groups, of the benefits of quality traineeships in terms of facilitation to the labour market and increased employability through information campaigns  
◦ raising awareness of what constitute quality traineeships amongst trainees and traineeship providers through information campaigns and mutual learning activities 
• increasing conformity to transparency requirements on vacancies  
◦ building on the existing transparency requirements of the existing QFT (baseline), strengthening vacancies in terms of information provided on working conditions (including remuneration and social protection) and expected learning elements (assignment of supervisor and mentor as well as learning objectives and related tasks) 
• remuneration and social protection
◦ encouraging the provision of remuneration and access to social protection to allow candidate trainees belonging to vulnerable groups to take up traineeship opportunities despite social precariousness and limitations regarding financial means  
• ensuring adaptable and accessible workplaces for trainees with disabilities   
◦ promote inclusive traineeships by adapting traineeship programmes and workplaces to individual needs (such as tailored trainings, digital tools and office equipment), in particular for trainees with disabilities 
 Unequal access to cross-border traineeships 
The measures to address access to cross-border traineeships are:  
• improve information provision on cross-border traineeships   
◦ increase awareness of the benefits of cross-border traineeships (such as the improvement of linguistic skills and gaining experience in other cultural environments) through awareness-raising campaigns and/or networks
• facilitate cross-border traineeships, using the potential of the European cooperation network of employment services (EURES)
◦ clarify national traineeship regulations in Member States by providing information and guidance to trainees using EURES  
◦ increase awareness of traineeship opportunities abroad through easing access to cross-border traineeship vacancies using EURES
• encourage that the principles of the reinforced Quality Framework for Traineeships are applied in traineeship mobility agreements with hosting organisations outside the EU.
Unequal access to remote/hybrid traineeships 
The measures to address access to remote/hybrid traineeships are:  
• facilitate remote and hybrid traineeships through an appropriate working environment including equipment and mentoring   
◦ provide guidance to employers on establishing the minimum enabling conditions (in terms of equipment, infrastructure, and appropriate work organisation, tasks, supervision and mentorship) to ensure accessibility of remote/hybrid traineeships 
◦ encourage financial incentives for employers to invest in adaptations of the working environment to make traineeships remote/hybrid proof, without overburdening candidate trainees  
• ensure quality criteria apply to remote/hybrid traineeships 
◦ extend the quality criteria of the quality framework on traineeships to remote/hybrid traineeships 
Annex 13. Impacts and comparison of options
A13.1. Member States mostly affected by each policy option
• Policy options A1.1, A1.2 and A1.3: Facilitate and strengthen enforcement and support trainees

a) Evidence from Member Sates on the impact of increasing dedicated inspections and controls
In IE dedicated joint investigations involving Revenue Commissioners and the Department of Social Protection detected almost 200 cases of disguised self-employment in the construction sector in 2014-2015.
In SE, in 2012 the Swedish Tax Agency implemented a new initiative to regulate foreign self-employed drivers and the hauliers that engaged. This resulted in the detection of over 300 falsely self-employed foreign drivers within months.
In FR in 2020, out of 107,490 controls from labour inspectors (on all aspects of labour law, not just related to traineeships), 10 penalties were addressed for misuse of traineeships159, a stable figure with 8 penalties for misuse of traineeships in 2019 and 9 in 2018.160 In 2018, the average penalty from the French labour inspection to organisations for misuse of traineeships was EUR 293 per trainee, and EUR 25,879 per organisation.161
b) Existence of specific systems of inspections or guidance for inspectorates on traineeships
Type of traineeship
No systems of inspections or guidance for inspectorates
OMT
CZ, DK, DE, EE, IE, ES, HR, IT, CY, LV, MT, NL, AT, PL, PT, RO, SI
[17 MS]
ALMP
DE, CZ, EE, EL, ES, HR, CY, LV, NL, AT, PL, RO [12 MS]
ECT
CZ, DE, EE, ES, CY, LV, NL, AT, PL PT, RO, SI [12 MS]
MPT
CZ, DE, EE, EL, ES, CY, HR, LV, NL, AT, PL, PT, RO, SI [14 MS]
c) Existence of specific procedures for registering complaints & reporting malpractice for trainees/traineeships
Type of traineeship
No procedures for registering complaints & reporting malpractice
OMT
CZ, DK, DE, EE, EL, HR, IT CY, LV, MT, HU, NL AT, PL, PT, RO, SI
[16 MS]
ALMP
CZ, DE, EL, ES, HR, CY, NL, AT, PL, RO [10 MS]
ECT
CZ, DE, EE, ES, CY, NL, AT, PL, PT, RO, SI [11 MS] 
MPT
BG (medical, legal), CZ, DE, EL, ES, HR, CY, AT, PL, PT, SI
[11 MS] 

• Policy Options A2.1 and A.2.2: Prevent the problematic use of traineeships – provisions on duration
Type of traineeship
Challenge
Member States affected
OMT
Member States with no restrictions on duration
DK, DE, EE, EL, HR, IT, CY, LV, MT, NL, AT, SK
[12 MS]

Member States with legal restriction but more than 6 months (some contracts)
BG, CZ, IE, ES, PT, SI, SE, FI
[8 MS]
ALMP
Member States with no restrictions
DE, IE, CY, LV, NL, AT
[6 MS]

Member States with legal restriction but more than 6 months (some contracts)
BG, ES, HR, IT, LT, LU, PT, PL, SK SE, FI
[11 MS]
ECT
Member States with no restrictions
BE, DK, DE, EE, IE, EL, ES, CY, MT, NL, PL, PT, SI, SK, FI, SE [16 MS]

Member States with legal restriction but more than 6 months
IT, LV, LT, AT, RO
[5 MS]
MPT
Member States with no restrictions
CZ, DK, DE, EL, CY, LV, MT
[7 MS]

Member States with legal restriction but more than 6 months
BE, BG, EE (medical), ES, LT, LU, HU, NL, AT, PL (medical), PT, RO, SK (legal), FI (legal), SE [15 MS]

• Policy option B2.1 and B2.2: Improve the learning component of traineeships

a) Lack of legal provisions requiring a written agreement/written information indicating that tasks allow trainees to work towards their learning and training objectives
Type of traineeship
Lack of legal requirements for written agreement/written information indicating that tasks allow trainees to work towards their learning and training objectives
OMT
DK, EE, IE, IT, CY, LV, MT, AT, HU, PL, SK [11 MS] 
ALMP
CY [1 MS] 
ECT
CZ, EE, CY, PL, SI [5 MS] 
MPT
BG, EL, CY [3 MS] 

b) Lack of legal provisions on a supervisor and/or mentor for trainees
Type of traineeship
No procedures for registering complaints & reporting malpractice
OMT
DE, EL, IE, IT, LV, MT, AT, PL, SK [9 MS]
ALMP
BG, DE, AT [3 MS] 
ECT
DE, EE, CZ, PL [4 MS] 
MPT
BG, EL [2 MS] 

• Policy option under Policy Area C - Improving equal access to traineeships
In the supporting study, public authority respondents from CY, LT, RO and SK and trade unions from BG, HR, and PL reported that there were no measures implemented in their countries to improve the accessibility of traineeships to vulnerable groups (e.g. persons with disabilities, from minorities or low economic background). At least these countries could thus be affected by the policy measures under Policy Area C. Regarding remote/hybrid traineeships, it appears that ten Member States (DE, EE, EL, CY, LV, NL, AT, PT, RO, NL) have no formal teleworking arrangements for any type of traineeship. The ones that have, most often, apply the arrangements to all types of traineeships. Therefore, at least the aforementioned 10 Member States may be affected by the options to increase accessibility to remote/hybrid traineeships.
Table 36: Legal analysis - existence of teleworking arrangements
Type of traineeship
No existence of teleworking arrangement
OMT
DE, EE, EL, IT, CY, LV, MT, NL, AT, PL, PT, RO [12 MS]
ALMP
DE, EE, EL, ES, CY, LV, NL, AT, PL, PT, RO, SK [12 MS]
ECT
CZ, DE, EE, EL, ES, CY, LV, NL, AT, PL, PT, RO, SK [13 MS]
MPT
BG, DE, EE, EL, ES, CY, LV, NL, AT, PT, RO [11 MS]
Source: Study exploring the context, challenges, and possible solutions in relation to the quality of traineeships in the EU, forthcoming (VT/2022/047).
Note: NA indicate cases where such traineeship types are not known (FR for OMT, HU and SI for ALMP, HR for ECT). For ALMP, in SI there are no formal traineeship contracts and therefore this is treated as NA. For ECT, HR is marked as NA is these traineeships are conducted on a free market basis.

A13.2. Details on Comparison of options
• Effectiveness
Options under Area A: Addressing the problematic use of traineeships
Baseline
A1.1
A1.2
A1.3
A2.1
A2.2
Primary Specific objectives

SO1: Facilitate and strengthen enforcement of applicable legislation and support trainees in accessing their rights

SO2: Facilitate prevention of problematic use of traineeships
Effectiveness
0
+
++
++/+++
+
+/++
Indicators for comparing policy options

• Number of trainees (workers or not) benefiting from inspections and enforcement to ensure their rights.
• Reduction in the number of paid trainees doing traineeships of a total duration of more than 6 months, including consecutive/repeated traineeships with the same employer as well as those who also had a poor learning content.
• Number of trainees doing traineeships with a duration longer than 6 months as well as those doing long (> 6 months) consecutive/repeated traineeships with the same or different employers
Options under Area B: Addressing the poor quality of traineeships
Baseline
B1.1
B1.2
B1.3
B2.1
B2.2
Primary Specific objectives

SO3. Support fair working conditions for traineeships, including remuneration and access to social protection
SO4: Improve the learning component of traineeships
Effectiveness
0
+
+++
+++
+
+/++
Indicators for comparing policy options

• Number of trainees to benefit from fair/proportionate remuneration and access to social protection.
• Transparency on working conditions, tasks and learning content (trainees benefiting from written agreement and mentorships)
Option under Area C: measures improving access to traineeships
Baseline
C.1




Primary Specific objectives

SO5. Foster inclusiveness and improve access to traineeship opportunities
Effectiveness
0
++




Indicators for comparing policy options

• Number of trainees (in particular vulnerable groups) benefiting from increased accessibility to all traineeships, including cross-border and remote/hybrid traineeships
Option under Area D: Extending the scope to all traineeships
Baseline
D1




Specific objectives


All
Effectiveness
0
++




Indicators for comparing policy options

• Number of trainees benefiting from fair/proportionate remuneration, access to social protection, transparency on working conditions, tasks and learning content, inclusiveness of and access to traineeships
All

• Expected level of implementation by Member States

• Efficiency
Options under Area A: Addressing the problematic use of traineeships
Baseline
A1.1
A1.2
A1.3
A2.1
A2.2
Primary Specific objectives

SO1: Facilitate and strengthen enforcement of applicable legislation and support trainees in accessing their rights
SO2: Facilitate prevention of problematic use of traineeships
Efficiency
0
0
+
+/++
0
0
Indicators for comparing policy options

• Fulfilment of objectives in view of the following costs
• Compliance costs on employers/traineeship providers
• Enforcement costs on public authorities
• Adjustment costs for employers/traineeship providers for more frequent recruitment
• Revenue to public sector (fines)
Options under Area B: Addressing the poor quality of traineeships
Baseline
B1.1
B1.2
B1.3
B2.1
B2.2
Primary Specific objectives

SO3. Support fair working conditions for traineeships, including remuneration and access to social protection
SO4: Improve the learning component of traineeships
Efficiency
0
0
0
0
0
0
Indicators for comparing policy options

• Fulfilment of objectives in view of the following costs
• Costs related to fair / proportionate remuneration and access to social protection
• Cost to provide written agreement and on mentorship
• Enforcement costs on public authorities
Option under Area C: measures improving access to traineeships
Baseline
C.1




Primary Specific objectives

SO5. Foster inclusiveness and improve access to traineeship opportunities
Efficiency
0
0




Indicators for comparing policy options

• Fulfilment of objectives in view of the following costs
• Compliance costs for traineeship providers and public authorities
Option under Area D: Extending the scope of recommendations to all traineeships
Baseline
D.1




Specific objectives

All
Efficiency
0
0/+




Indicators for comparing policy options

Fulfilment of objectives in view of the following costs
• Compliance costs for traineeship providers and public authorities
All

• One-off adjustment costs for business for familiarisation with all new provisions
• One-off enforcement costs for public authorities for integration of new provisions into national law




• Coherence

Options under Area A: Addressing the problematic use of traineeships
Baseline
A1.1
A1.2
A1.3
A2.1
A2.2
Primary Specific objectives

SO1: Facilitate and strengthen enforcement of applicable legislation and support trainees in accessing their rights

SO2: Facilitate prevention of problematic use of traineeships
Coherence
0
++
++
++
++
++
Options under Area B: Addressing the poor quality of traineeships
Baseline
B1.1
B1.2
B1.3
B2.1
B2.2





Coherence
0
++
++
++
++
++
Options under Area C: Measures improving access to traineeships
Baseline
C1




Primary Specific objectives

SO3. Support fair working conditions for traineeships, including remuneration and access to social protection
SO4: Improve the learning component of traineeships
Primary Specific objectives

SO5. Foster inclusiveness and improve access to traineeship opportunities
Coherence
0
+



Options under Area D: Extending the scope of recommendations to all traineeships
Baseline
D1



Specific objectives

All
Coherence
0
+



Indicators for comparing policy options

• Treaty Objective
• Principles of EPSR
• Fundamental Rights of the European Union
• EU labour acquis
• Strategy for rights of persons with disabilities 2021 – 2030 (area C)
• Erasmus+ (areas C and D)


• Proportionality

Options under policy Area A: Addressing the problematic use of traineeships
Baseline
A1.1
A1.2
A1.3
A2.1
A2.2
Primary Specific objectives

SO1: Facilitate and strengthen the enforcement of applicable legislation and support trainees in accessing their labour rights
SO2: Prevent the problematic use of traineeships
Proportionality
0
0/+
+
+/++
+/++
0/+
Options under Area B: Addressing the poor quality of traineeships
Baseline
B1.1
B1.2
B1.3
B2.1
B2.2
Primary Specific objectives

SO3. Support fair working conditions for traineeships, including remuneration and access to social protection
SO4: Improve the learning component of traineeships
Proportionality
0
0/+
++
0/+
+
0
Options under Area C: Measures improving access to traineeships
Baseline
C1




Primary Specific objectives

SO5. Foster inclusiveness and improve access to traineeship opportunities
Proportionality
0
+



Options under Area D: Extending the scope of recommendations to all traineeships
Baseline
D1




Specific objectives

All
Proportionality
0
+




Indicators for comparing policy options
• Uncertainty of the scale of the problem
• Expected benefits and costs
• Choice of instrument
• Scope for national consideration
• Broader subsidiarity considerations




A13.3. Overview of impacts of all policy options
Estimation of benefits
1) Evidence underpinning the assessment of impacts on number of trainees under Area A (rough proxies, full implementation) 162
Table 37: Summary of data on traineeships, 2019 data
Option

Traineeship Type
Paid OMT
Paid ALMP
Paid ECT
Total paid
Unpaid OMT
Unpaid ALMP
Unpaid ECT
Total unpaid
Overall total
A1.1
1) Number of trainees that could benefit from controls and inspections



1.6 million



1.5
million
3.1 million

A1.2
and
A1.3
2) Number of trainees doing traineeships of a total duration of more than 6 months, including consecutive/repeated traineeships with the same employer (4+5)
94,896
148,950
125,665
369,511
NA

3) Number of trainees doing traineeships of a total duration of more than 6 months, including consecutive/repeated traineeships with the same employer and had a poor learning content
28274
46761
27936
102.971
NA

A2.1 and A2.2
4) Number of trainees doing traineeships more than 6 months
67,088
91,832
71,875
230,800
16,949
7,616
100,076
124,641
355,436

5) Number of trainees doing consecutive/repeated traineeships with the same employers of duration more than 6 months
27,808
57,118
53,790
138,716
3,209
4,915
60,947
69,071
207,787

6) Number of trainees who did consecutive/repeated traineeships with different employers at some point in their life
146,877
177,716
166,618
491,211
64,103
34,998
531,285
630,386
1,1
million

7) Number of trainees doing traineeships of a total duration of more than 6 months, including consecutive/repeated traineeships with the same employer and had a poor learning content
28274
46761
27936
102971
10425
6409
38381
55,215
158,186

2) Potential number of trainees to benefit from policy options under Area B
2.1. Paid trainees who potential could be considered as not being fairly /proportionately remunerated (Options B1.2 and B1.3)
The table below provides different proxies on the number of paid trainees not fairly /proportionately remunerated. The shares are estimates on the basis of the total number of paid trainees: 1.6 million (see Annex A7.1 on the prevalence of paid trainees and Annex A4.4 for methodology).
Different options to obtain a proxy for the number of paid trainees not fairly /proportionately remunerated
Corresponding number of trainees
22% of paid trainees stated that their compensation was not at all sufficient to cover basic living expenditures
353,000
38% - average of 22% (above) and 54% (below)
610,000
54% of paid trainees stated that they received below the minimum wages
870,000
62% of paid trainees stated that their compensation was not sufficient to cover basic living expenditures
1 million
2.2. Total number of all trainees (paid and unpaid) who could potential receive fair /proportionate remuneration (Option B1.1)
The table below provides different estimates on the number of trainees (paid and unpaid) not fairly /proportionately remunerated under 3 scenarios, based on the estimations under point 2.1 above (see Annex A7.3 on the prevalence of unpaid trainees).
Scenario 1: 22% of paid trainees would benefit and 485,200 - 1.5 million unpaid trainees (depending on implementation)
Implementation by Member States
Paid trainees
(22% scenario)
Unpaid trainees
Total
33%
353,000
485,200
838,200
66%
353,000
970,400
1,323,400
100%
353,000
1,455,600
1,808,600
Scenario 2: 38% of paid trainees would benefit and 485,200 - 1.5 million unpaid trainees (depending on implementation)
Implementation by Member States
Paid trainees
(38% scenario)
Unpaid trainees
Total
33%
610,000
485,200
1,095,200
66%
610,000
970,400
1,580,400
100%
610,000
1,455,600
2,065,600


Scenario 3: 54% of paid trainees would benefit and 485,200 - 1.5 million unpaid trainees (depending on implementation)
Implementation by Member States
Paid trainees
(54% scenario)
Unpaid trainees
Total
33%
870,000
485,200
1,355,200
66%
870,000
970,400
1,840,400
100%
870,000
1,455,600
2,325,600
2.3. Share of trainees who could benefit for access to social protection – Area B1
Implementation by Member States
Paid Trainees
Unpaid trainees
Total
Conservative (33%)
99,928
252,192
352,119
Optimistic (66%)
199,855
512,383
712,239
Full (100%)
299,783
768,575
1,068,358
Note: Shares based on the number of trainees without access to social protection (Annex A9.2)
2.4. Number of trainees who could benefit from the measure on the written agreement (Area B2) (see Annex A4.4.2 for methodology)

B2.1
B2.2

Implementation by Member States
All trainees
Paid trainees
Unpaid trainees
Total







33%
202,896
264,780
114,636
379,416

66%
405,792
264,780
229,272
494,052

100%
608,688
264,780
343,908
608,688



Estimation of costs per policy options
• Enforcement costs (EUR) – Options A1.1, A1.2 and A1.3
Regarding enforcement costs the conservative scenario assumes that only training costs are introduced compared to the baseline, the middle scenario considers trainings costs and the costs of recruiting half of the required labour inspectors, the optimistic costs scenario considers the costs of training and hiring all the labour inspectors required to fill existing gaps (see Annex 4.6 for methodology).
 
A1.1
A1.2 & A1.3
Enforcement Scenarios/ Implementation by Member States
Conservative (only training)
Middle (close half gap)
Optimistic (close full gap)
Conservative (only training)
Middle (close half gap)
Optimistic (close full gap)
Conservative (33%)
8,910
260,700
363,000
27,000
790,000
1.2 million
Optimistic (66%)
17,820
521,400
726,000



Full (100%)
27,000
790,000
1.2 million




• Cost from measure on ensuring transparency of vacancies cost (EUR) – Options in Area A1 (see Annex A7.1 for methodology)

 Implementation by Member States
A1.1
A1.2 & A1.3
Conservative (33%)
15 million
46 million

Optimistic (66%)
30 million

Full (100%)
46 million


• Recruitment costs (EUR) Options in Area A2 ( see Annex A7.2 for methodology)

 Implementation by Member States
A2.1
A2.2
Conservative (33%)
22 million
68 million

Optimistic (66%)
45 million

Full (100%)
68 million



• Labour costs – Options under area B1
To estimate the labour costs, 3 different scenarios were considered: 22% of paid trainees would benefit; 38% of paid trainees would benefit and 54% would benefit (see point 2.1 in section A13.3.1). Annex 4.8 provide additional information on the methodology.
Also, two scenarios were considered for the benchmark wage: 1) minimum wage and 60% of the wage of comparable workers. In both scenarios it is assumed that all ALMP trainees and paid ECT trainees would receive the minimum wage. Regarding unpaid ECT trainees two cases are considered: 1) around 1/5 of unpaid ECT would receive minimum wage and 2) all unpaid ECT trainees will receive 60% of the minimum wage.
Case 1: around 1/5 of unpaid ECT to get the MW

Case 2: All unpaid ECT to get the MW

• Access to social protection – Options under Area B1 (Annex A4.8 for methodology)
Implementation by Member States
All options under Area B1 (B1.1, B1.2, B1.3)
Conservative (33%)
2.8 billion
Optimistic (66%)
5.4 billion
Full (100%)
8.4 billion

• Written agreement costs – Options under Area B2 (EUR) (see Annex A4.9)
 
B2.1
B2.2
Type of trainees/ Implementation by Member States
All trainees
Paid trainees
Unpaid trainees
All trainees
Conservative (33%)
27 million
30 million
17 million
47 million
Optimistic (66%)
53 million
30 million
33 million
63 million
Full (100%)
80 million
30 million
50 million
80 million



Summary table



The impacts in Policy areas A, B and C already take into account the extended scope explained in Policy area D.
• Summary of impacts under all policy options
Table 38: Summary of impacts under all options
Impact
Baseline
All measures
Economic impacts
Familirisation costs for traineeship providers
none
Transversal small adjustment costs (between EUR 53 for SMEs and EUR 39 for larger companies)
Enforcement costs for public authorities
none
Integration of provisions into the national regulatory scheme
Fundamental rights
Benefits
none
Policy options under policy areas A, B, and D are expected to contribute to ensuring the right to workers’ equality before the law (Article 20), the right to fair working conditions (Article 31), access to adequate social protection (Article 34) and healthcare (Article 35). These measures could also contribute to reducing the gender pay gap among trainees.
Policy options under policy area C and D are expected to contribute to ensuring the right to equal opportunities and treatment of under-represented groups and non-discrimination (Article 21). The policy option to facilitate cross-border traineeships also promote the freedom of movement within the EU (Article 45), while the policy option on hybrid/remote traineeships is expected to facilitate the right to family life (Article 7).
• Summary of impacts under Policy Area A
Table 39: Summary of impacts under Policy Area A1
Impact
Baseline
A1.1:Non- legislative
A1.2
A1.3
Social impacts
Trainees
Number of trainees (workers or not) who will enjoy the right they are entitled to under EU or national law
No or minimal improvements expected.

3.1 million trainees

Increased number of trainees (workers or not) who will enjoy the right they are entitled to under EU or national law, resulting from more controls and inspections which could contribute to reduced levels of exploitation of trainees.

All trainees could potentially benefit. Estimate: up to 1.02 - 3.1 mill (depending on implementation: 33%-100%), though data on the number of trainees being deprived their rights does not exist.

Number of people at risk of being in a work relationship disguised as traineeship and in a non-compliant traineeship
370,000 paid trainees (rough proxy) did traineeships of a total duration of more than 6 months, out of which around 100,000 (rough proxy) did a long-duration traineeships with a poor learning content.
Transparent information in vacancies would (depending on Member States’ implementation) help trainees understand their rights, the working conditions and the learning and training component of the traineeship, helping them make an informed decision.

Empowerment of trainees in addressing (risks of) mistreatment and/or unlawful practices.

Decrease in the number of non-compliant traineeships due to increased number of complaints submitted and representations for trainees to claim their rights.
Same as A1.1 but for trainees who are workers the legislative measures in these options would also lead to a reduction of the number of work relationships disguised as traineeships and non-complaint traineeships due to more effective controls and inspections to detect these unlawful arrangements and take enforcement action, supported by a list of elements defined at EU level and support measures to trainees in enforcing their rights. Benefits for the majority of Member States.
Transparent information in vacancies would result in legal certainty for trainees considered as workers and regulatory clarity for traineeship providers which can also bring benefits in terms of better enforcement and compliance.
Up to 370,000 paid trainees (rough proxy) could benefit who did long traineeships out of which around 100,000 (rough proxy) who did a long-duration traineeships with a poor learning content.




A modest decrease in the number of work relationships disguised as traineeships and non-compliant traineeships is expected and the magnitude will vary across the Member States, as different and possibly less comprehensive list of elements will be designed.
Same as A1.2 but a higher and more uniform decrease in the number of people at risk across the Member States due to the concrete and harmonised EU-level recommendations for carrying out controls and inspections and the common understanding of work relationships disguised as traineeships.
Economic impacts
Traineeship providers

Level playing field/ Fair market competition
No or minimal improvements expected.

Compliant trainee providers/employers would be less competitive, in part due to higher cost of employing workers and/or providing good quality traineeships.

Decrease the number of non-compliant traineeships.
Possible improvement in fair market competition through increased complaints from trainees and the alignment of the labour costs to the level of compliant traineeships.
Same as A1.1 but stronger improvement in fair market competition, due to the legislative measure, through the alignment of the labour costs to the level of compliant and genuine traineeships and increased complaints.
Similar impact as in A1.2 but higher improvement because this option is expected to benefit a larger number of trainees.
Productivity and competitiveness
Inexperienced trainees will continue to be a sub-optimal solution to fill regular job positions.
Enhancement of employer’s reputation and capacity to attract traineeship candidates as traineeships offered comply with the applicable EU and national law
Same as A1.1 but stronger improvement due to the legislative measure:
1) Employers who hire regular employees instead of trainees and those who offer quality traineeships, in particular with an adequate training component, will enjoy the benefits of more qualified and competent workforce and potentially a better matching of trainees’ skills to the needs of their company.
2) More employees will be satisfied and will be more productive.
3) More well-informed and motivated candidate trainees applying for a traineeship opportunity with the same expectations as the traineeship provider due to increased transparency of vacancies.
Similar impact as in A1.2 but higher improvement because this option is expected to benefit a larger number of trainees.
Labour costs and costs for potential administrative or judicial procedures and penalties
No or minimal changes. The overall share of costs for trainees in total costs for companies would remain small.
Costs cannot be quantified (no figures on the number of non-compliant traineeships nor on the magnitude of the gap that would need to be bridged in order to make those traineeships compliant to the applicable EU and national laws. In addition, such costs would depend on the extent of implementation by Member States.)
Increase costs for companies where work relationships disguised as traineeships or non-compliant traineeships are identified during implementation or controls and inspections. Given that on average the share of trainees in a company is low, the possible increase in costs would still constitute a small share of the overall costs in of a company. These costs could be relatively larger for SMEs since they could face larger capacity constraints.
Same as A1.2 but costs would be higher as they will relate to a higher number of trainees.

Cost for inspections and information provision


Some small costs could arise from the inclusion of traineeships in existing controls and inspections.
Administrative costs arising from the need to provide competent authorities data and information regarding trainees and their contracts. Data to be provided upon request
Same as A1.2
Costs related to litigation
No or minimal
Costs cannot be quantified would depend on the extent of implementation by Member States.)
Possible increase in litigation costs from more trainees claiming their rights/
Same as A1.2
Costs to adjusting vacancies
No cost
Estimated cost of EUR 15-46 million depending on implementation
Estimated cost of EUR 46 million
Public Authorities
Public budget
No improvement in the level of effectiveness detecting and combatting work relationships disguised as traineeships and non-complaint traineeships.
More effective in monitoring and enforcement as regards non-compliant traineeships.
Same as A1.1 and more effective for trainees considered workers in detecting and combatting work relationships disguised as traineeships and non-complaint traineeships.

Same as A1.2 but higher benefit due to more effective inspections.

Foregone revenues due to inaccurate classification of individuals.


Possible higher increase in public revenues, as the number of detected non-compliant traineeships could be higher due to more effective inspections. Not quantifiable.

Moderate increase in public revenues generated by fines, higher taxes and social security contributions. The magnitude would depend on the number of individuals reclassified.
Higher increase in public revenues, as the number of detected work relationships disguised as traineeships / non-compliant traineeships is expected to be higher due to more effective inspections.


Costs of business as usual inspections
Possible small costs to adjust controls and inspections systems to more effectively monitor and enforce.
Estimate: EUR 9,000 – 27,000 (only training and depending on implementation
to around 363,000 - 1.2 million (if optimal number of inspectors hired and depending on implementation)
Small costs to adjust their controls and inspections systems to also cover traineeships and to maintain the capacity of their competent authorities. The increase will be higher in Member States where traineeships are not covered by the labour market inspection systems and in those with inadequate capacity.
Estimate: 27,000 EUR (if only training will be provided) to around 1.2 million in the case Member States decide to hire and train additional staff in line with the ILO recommendations on the optimal number of inspectorates per/10 000 employees

Business as usual revenue
Possible small decrease in public revenues due to a decrease in the total number of (contributory) positions
Small decrease in public revenues due to a decrease in the total number of (contributory) positions
Same as A1.2 but costs would be higher as they will relate to a higher number of trainees

Costs of business as usual of channels to report malpractice
Costs might arise from the requirement to set up / designate channels to report malpractice and from increased inspections due to more complaints. But as such channels already exist in most Member States for employees and some categories of trainees this provision would mostly entail costs connected to awareness campaigns to inform trainees about the existence of such mechanisms.

Impact
Baseline
A2.1 Non-legislative
A2.2
Social impacts
Trainees
Prevention of long and repeated/
consecutive traineeships with the same employer
Principle on duration exists but not for repeated/consecutive traineeships. Therefore, minimal improvements expected.

355,400 trainees did a traineeship of long duration (230,800 paid and 124, 600 unpaid trainees, 2019 data) and 207,800 trainees (138,700 paid and 69,000 unpaid) did repeated/consecutive traineeships
Recommendations could help break the vicious cycle of trainees being trapped in long and repeated/consecutive traineeships with the same employer with modest impact.
Estimate:
up to up to 117,000 - 355,400 trainees doing long duration traineeships could benefit (depending on implementation – 33%-100%) trainees could benefit.

Up to 68,000-207,800 trainees doing repeated/consecutive traineeships could benefit (depending on implementation)



Same as A2.1 but higher improvement because this option is binding for trainees considered as workers.

Up to 230,800 paid trainees and 42,000 -124,600 unpaid trainees doing long traineeships could benefit (latter depending on implementation 33%-100%)

Up to 138,700 paid trainees and 23,000 - 69,000 unpaid trainees doing repeated/consecutive traineeships could benefit (the latter depending on implementation)


Prevention of long and repeated/
consecutive traineeships with different employers
No improvement
Both options would also contribute to reducing the number of trainees doing repeated/consecutive traineeships with different employers by recommending to Member States to prevent employers from asking previous working experience from candidate-trainees.
However, this potential may not be fully achieved: while trainee providers may be prevented to request previous experience in the vacancy notice, they could still hire someone with previous experience.
Economic impacts
Traineeship providers
Level playing field/ Fair market competition.

Productivity and competitiveness
No or minimal improvements expected.

Contribute to traineeship providers offering genuine traineeships (with no intention of replacing entry-level work), thereby attracting and employing motivated trainees (in search of genuine traineeships). The recommendations could also contribute to clarity on the expectations of both parties, including on duration and level of performance (with no previous work experience required).
Same as A2.1 but higher improvement because this option is binding for trainees considered as workers
Costs to adjust to new provision
No or minimal
Small adjustment costs from revising traineeship contracts in line with the maximum duration limits. Furthermore, costs related to more frequent recruitment and onboarding processes. Estimate: EUR 22 - 68 million depending on implementation (33% - 100%)

For companies requiring previous work experience, both policy options could result in modest additional costs for training inexperienced trainees.
Same as A1.2 but cost estimated at EUR 68 million as the measure is binding for all trainees.
• Summary of impacts under Policy Area B
Table 40: Summary of impacts of options under Policy Area B1
Impact
Baseline
B1.1
B1.2
B1.3
Social impacts
Trainees
Working conditions of all trainees

More trainees would benefit from good working conditions
Income of paid and unpaid trainees
No improvements expected.
353,000 paid trainees stated that their remuneration is not sufficient at all to cover basic expenses.
870,000 paid trainees stated that they earn below the minimum wage.
1.5 million unpaid trainees could benefit.
Potentially benefitting up to 840,000-1.8million trainees (paid and unpaid), depending on implementation (33%-100%)

The requirements to prevent unjustifiable differential treatment as regards working conditions is expected to benefit trainees considered workers.
The Recommendation for fair/proportionate remuneration is expected to provide a guidance on how unjustifiable differential treatment can be prevented in the area of pay. It also recommends that unpaid trainees are fairly/proportionately remunerated.
Up to 352,000 to 870,000 paid trainees could benefit (depending on scenario)
Also, up to 500,000-1.5 million unpaid trainees could benefit from access to remuneration (depending on implementation, 33%-100%).
Similar to B1.2 but the direct right to fair/proportionate remuneration is expected to have a strong impact on increasing trainees’ remuneration for trainees considered workers.
Policy option could potentially result in a reduction in the total number of traineeship opportunities, including paid traineeship opportunities, because of higher costs for traineeship providers. It is difficult to meaningfully quantify these impacts, but evidence suggest that the impact will be small.
The obligation of fair/proportionate remuneration would only apply to trainees considered as workers under EU law , the measure may be an incentive for traineeship providers to offer less paid traineeships. Such behaviour would however be deterred by the recommendations on remuneration and access to social protection for all trainees.
Number of trainees without social protection
No impact
768,600 unpaid trainees and 300,000 paid trainees do not have access to full social protection (2019 data) – total 1.,07 million
Reduction in the number of trainees without/with partial social protection to some extent. Estimate: 352,000 - 1,07 million trainees depending on depend on MS implementation (33%-100%).

Economic impacts
Traineeship providers
Productivity and competitiveness

Trainees’ retention rate
Trainees doing bad quality traineeship will continue to be non-productive and non-motivated.

Same retention rate
Increased productivity of more motivated trainees through fair/proportionate remuneration. Through improved reputation and the coverage of social protection, increased potential to attract more motivated and productive trainees as well as draw from a wider pool of candidates. Improved labour market matching and increased retention rate.
Same as B1.1 but higher improvement because this option is binding for trainees considered as workers .
Same as B1.2
Compliance costs

Labour costs
Business as usual costs

Fair/proportionate remuneration recommendations: total costs (paid and unpaid) ranging from low estimate: EUR 745 million – 2.23 billion (MW benchmark); EUR 732 million – 2.19 billion (60% benchmark) - both depending on implementation (33%-100%)

Some costs to adjust existing contracts.
Remuneration of paid trainees EUR 41 million (MW benchmark); 81 million (60% benchmark) (22% scenario)
Remuneration of unpaid trainees: EUR 731,2 million - 2.19 billion (MW benchmark) and EUR 704.2 million - 2.11 billion (60% benchmark, depending on implementation).

However, given that the average the share of trainees in a company is low, the possible increase in costs would still constitute a small share of the overall costs in of a company.

Additional costs arising from adjusting other working conditions.
Similar to B1.2 regarding remuneration.
No costs arise from other working conditions
Compliance costs
Social protection
Business as usual costs

Social protection: EUR 2.8 – 8.4 billion (depending on implementation, 33%-100%)
Society as a whole
Better working condition
Downward pressure from poor quality traineeships on working conditions in general.
Benefit for the entire workforce, in particular young people, thanks to a reduced downward pressure from poor quality traineeships on working conditions in general.
Public Authorities
Public budgets
Foregone revenue

Positive impact on the tax revenues and the level of social security contributions and reduce social expenditure. (Social security: up to EUR 2.8 billion in case of a partial implementation scenario (33% implementation by Member States), up to EUR 5.6 billion (66% implementation) and up to EUR 8.4 billion in case of full implementation)
A decline in the number of low-quality traineeships could reduce enforcement costs in the longer term.

Business as usual revenue
Small decrease in public revenues due to a decrease in the total number of (contributory) positions.

Table 41: Summary of impacts of options under Policy Area B2
Impact
Baseline
B2.1
B2.2
Social impacts
Trainees
Transparency of working conditions
Awareness of trainees about their rights regarding working conditions, tasks and learning content

No / small impact.
Already improved awareness due to TPWC Directive on working conditions however not on learning content and only for trainees considered as workers
The increased transparency on working conditions is likely to raise awareness among trainees about their rights and their (expected) tasks. This would result in legal certainty for trainees and regulatory clarity for employers/traineeship providers.
Trainees benefit from ‘contractual’ certainty on what to expect from the traineeship in terms of the learning and training component, the tasks, the arrangements for mentorship, supervision and evaluation, remuneration, and social protection. This strengthens trainees’ position, as the rights and obligations of the traineeship provider are clear.
Estimate: 203,000 – 609,000 trainees could benefit from a getting a written traineeship agreement (depending on implementation)
Same as B2.1 but higher improvement because this option is binding for trainees considered as workers .
Same as B2.1 but impacts will be stronger for trainees considered as workers. Estimate: up to 265,000 paid trainees could benefit and 115,000 – 343,000 unpaid trainees could benefit (depending on implementation).
Trainees benefiting from strengthened mentorship.

No impact
The number of trainees that would benefit is estimated at 212,000-637,000 trainees (depending on implementation) (rough proxy) which corresponds to the 22% of respondents to the 2023 Eurobarometer who stated that they could not turn to a mentor during their traineeships.
Economic impacts
Traineeship providers



Productivity and competitiveness and
Recruitment costs
Business as usual costs

Improved labour market matching and higher retention rates which could decrease employers’ search, matching and recruitment costs of regular workers.
Assigning a mentor could benefit traineeship providers, as the guidance and coaching to trainees has a productivity-enhancing potential. These benefits can however not be quantified.
Compliance costs for traineeship providers (for trainees considered as workers under EU law)
Costs in line with the TPWC Directive to provide transparent information on working conditions
Costs to provide written information to cover the additional requirements not covered by the TPWC. The additional costs are expected to be small, because only some elements are to be added to what is already requested by the TPWC.
Estimate: up to EUR 27-80 million (depending on implementation)
Extension of the written agreement to unpaid trainees, ECT and MPT, estimates range from EUR 44 for micro companies, to EUR 57 for SMEs, and are lowest for large companies at EUR 25 (average annual costs per written statement per employee
Costs of assigning a mentor to a trainee could not be quantified (one estimate based on one BE company in labour hours: six hours per mentor per trainee(ship)
Same as B2.1 but cost estimated at EUR 30 million for paid trainees and up to 17-50 million for unpaid trainees (depending on implementation) as the measure is binding for all trainees. Plus, costs for combining and formalising all information in a written traineeship agreement.



• Summary of impacts under Policy Area C
The measures under policy area C are non-binding and give flexibility to Member States in terms of implementation and approach. Consequently, the impacts can only be described qualitatively. The proposed measures would have a particularly strong impact in Member States, which are reportedly lacking measures in these areas, as identified by the supporting study (see A13.1).
Table 42: Summary of impacts under Policy Area C
Impact
Baseline
Access to quality traineeships
Social impacts
Trainees
Trainees (in particular vulnerable groups) benefiting from increased access to all traineeships, including cross-border and remote/hybrid traineeships

Low take-up of traineeships from vulnerable groups - in particular persons with disabilities, with low socio-economic and educational background - to continue in the absence of targeted outreach activities and adjustments of working conditions (e.g. persons with disabilities)
The increase in remote/hybrid traineeship/forms of work triggered by the pandemic could improve access to traineeship. However, individuals from disadvantaged socio-economic background or persons with visual or hearing impairments, will not be able to benefit if traineeships are not properly adapted to their needs. No/limited improvements in the equal access to cross-border traineeships.
The possibilities to benefit from the training opportunities offered by the twin transitions will not be available to the most vulnerable groups.
Better/targeted outreach, special attention to trainees from vulnerable group and traineeships better adjusted to the needs of trainees with disabilities, will contribute to a level playing field for all (candidate) trainees, regardless of their background, on the labour market and improve the access to quality traineeships for vulnerable groups.
Improved accessibility to remote/hybrid trainees would facilitate the uptake of such traineeships for all (candidate) trainees, with an expected larger impact on vulnerable groups with limited financial resources. Quality remote/hybrid traineeships could help overcome barriers related to costs caused by physical distance.

Increased access to quality and cross-border traineeships would ultimately contribute to the increased employability of trainees, including those from vulnerable groups.
Society
Inequalities and social cohesion
Transmission of educational disadvantage between generations to continue and inequalities to continue or even increase.

The potential to reduce inequalities and foster the integration of disadvantaged individuals into the labour market, thereby contributing to overall youth employment, social cohesion, and productivity whilst contributing to decreasing (the risk of) poverty.
Economic impacts
Traineeship providers
The diversity of pool of candidate trainees and capacity to attract candidate
Less diverse pool of candidate trainees, negative impact on reputation from being low/poor inclusive company
Traineeship providers would benefit from a wider and more diverse pool of trainee candidates. An inclusive approach could have a positive impact on the organisation’s reputation and its capacity to attract candidates.
Costs of facilitating inclusiveness of traineeships
No or negligible costs.
Some costs can be expected from campaigns/advertisements targeting those harder to reach. Also, the provision of equipment, infrastructure and ensuring an appropriate work organisation (including guidance and mentorship) to facilitate access to remote/hybrid traineeships may also bear costs. Tailoring traineeship programmes to specific needs, for example catering for certain training or accessibility needs of trainees with disabilities, could have an impact on the costs, although some of those costs are likely to be one-off. In general, all aforementioned costs could be proportionally larger for SMEs.
Public authorities
Public budget
Foregone revenues as individuals from vulnerable groups do not take up traineeships and reduce their employability opportunities.

Expenditures for activation measures for individuals from vulnerable groups and/or last resort safety nets
Decreased spending on social protection, as these measures would benefit in particular those who tend to be furthest away from the labour market.
Expenditures to facilitate inclusiveness of traineeships by actions like national level awareness raising activities or guidance to traineeship providers on quality principles or on specific inclusion measures. Financial support (incentives) to traineeship providers to implement these measures would entail costs.
The expenditures related to improved use of EURES to facilitate cross-border traineeships, adjustment costs could be involved for the European Labour Authority and competent national authorities.
• Summary of impacts under Policy Area D
Under the baseline, the quality principles of the QFT will continue to apply only to OMT and ALMP. This would include also new quality principles introduced by this initiative or to those that would be reinforced. The situation and impacts as identified in the baseline for policy areas A, B and C for different stakeholders would thus continue to apply for ECT and MPT.
The extension of the scope to ECT and MPT could increase both the relevance and coherence of the initiative for all trainees. It would support adequate working conditions and improve the learning component for all types of traineeships and strengthen support for trainees in case of malpractice or poor working conditions. The impact on ECT is expected to be greater as more quality issues were identified for this type.
In terms of costs, the extension of the scope of the non-binding measure to ECT and MPT could have a disincentivising impact on the offers of these types of traineeships, as conformity with the quality principles may entail additional costs for traineeship providers. However, the reduction of low quality traineeship offers could also be regarded as a positive impact.
For traineeship providers benefits would include more clarity as the quality principles would apply to all types of traineeships. Costs at first instance would seem to possibly affect a large majority of ECT traineeship providers, as ECT represent 85% of all unpaid traineeships (2019 data). However, costs linked to remuneration cannot be quantified. Though the non-binding instrument would strongly recommend trainees to be fairly and proportionately remunerated, the EU has no competence to oblige this for unpaid trainees. For both ECT and MPT it can be stated that if the recommendations on remuneration were complied with as regards currently unpaid ECT and MPT, this would entail a cost in terms of recurrent labour costs. However, any other costs related to the non-binding instrument would be equally difficult to quantify, as the level of implementation cannot be estimated.

Annex 14. SMEs TEST
(1) Identification of affected businesses
SMEs are in the scope of the initiative, but are not specifically targeted by it.163 The initiative targets all traineeship providers, a category which includes but is not limited to businesses. The evidence suggests that traineeships are concentrated in medium and large companies.. SMEs, in particular Medium Enterprises (i.e. with more than 49 employees) are going to be impacted directly and indirectly by the initiative, with both positive and negative expected impacts.
See sections 2.3 and 6; Annexes 2 and 4.
(2) Consultation of SME Stakeholders
The consultation strategy envisaged adequate tools to reach out to the SME community.
Notably, as part of the 2-stage Treaty-based consultation of European Social Partners, SMEUnited (representing national cross-sectoral Craft and SME federations, European SME branch organisations and associate members, speaking on behalf of 22.5 million SMEs in Europe) provided their views in both phases. Furthermore, a SME Panel survey was conducted between 12 October and 9 November 2023, with the support of Enterprise Europe Network (EEN). The questionnaire was translated in all EU official languages and received 170 responses, mostly from Spain (50 responses), Portugal (34), Italy (27) and Poland (21). Among the respondents, there were single person business (10), as well as SMEs with 1-9 employees (57), 10-49 employees (60), and 50-249 employees (43).
A summary of the responses is provided in Annex 2. Inputs relevant for SME-specific considerations were included, including when assessing the impacts.
See section 6; Annexes 2 and 4.
(3) Measurement of the impact on SMEs
Given the limitations in the available data and the scope of the initiative (see above), it was not always feasible to measure the specific impact of the relevant measures and policy options on SMEs. However, as mentioned above, specific activities to collect information on impacts for SMEs were executed.
As outlined in section 6 (impacts) these resulted in assessments of the transversal adjustment costs for familiarisation with all new provisions; economic benefits for SMEs in terms of access to a larger/more diverse pool of trainees, increased productivity, better labour matching and increased retention; adjustment costs for SMEs in terms of compliance with new rules, possible administrative adjustments, and provision of equipment and other instruments for remote/hybrid traineeships.
As outlined in more detail in Annexes 2 and 4, the SME Panel was used to gather data concerning administrative costs for SMEs (suggesting that such costs appear to provide some buffer for reasonable cost increases, should those actually materialize) and advantages for SMEs in having trainees (which appear to be significant).
Although it is not exclusively a SME-specific impact, concerns were raised by employer organisations in the course of the EU-level social partners’ consultation that the initiative might result in the unintended consequence of reducing incentives to offer traineeships, particularly by SMEs. This impact is recognized and discussed in Section 6, while also noting that, as it also emerged from the social partners’ consultation, the mere reduction in the aggregate number of traineeships cannot be considered as a negative impact “per se”, if such reduction would primarily concern low-quality traineeships or work relationships disguised as traineeships.
As discussed in section 6, the impacts of the initiative should also be seen in light of the need to create a level-playing field and foster fair competition among SMEs, and to address some of the drivers behind labour shortages in the EU, as presented in section 5.2.
See sections 6; Annexes 2, 4, 13.
(4) Assessment of alternative options and mitigating measures
The options (section 6) have duly considered both negative and positive impacts for SMEs. The need to avoid too prescriptive approaches, raised by employer organisations during the EU-level social partners’ consultation, was duly considered. Indeed, the preferred option includes a binding instrument, but in the form of a Directive, leaving appropriate margins at the national level to meet the needs of SMEs.
Furthermore, the social partners’ consultation also highlighted the desire of businesses (including SMEs) to strengthened cooperation amongst relevant stakeholders, practical guidance, exchange of best practices, and awareness-raising of the benefits that traineeships can bring.
Indeed, three accompanying measures under the preferred policy option (i.e. effective involvement of social partners and other relevant stakeholders the implementation and monitoring of the rights and obligation arising from this initiative; strengthening awareness raising, and the exchange of best practices; financial and/or practical guidance to support employers and in particular SMEs, to provide high quality traineeships) are designed to meet this need.

See sections 6, 7 and 8; Annexes 2 and 4.



Annex 15. Additional Information on Monitoring and Evaluation
A15.1. Proposal of indications to monitor the progress towards achieving the objectives of the initiative
The initiative could be evaluated some years after it enters into force (e.g., in 5 or 7 years) in line with the Better Regulation Guidelines. This would take into account a two-year period of transposition by Member States, allowing enough time to evaluate effects on traineeships and traineeships providers, which may need time to adapt to the new rules, but also to gather data in line with the new requirements. To avoid additional administrative burden due to the collection of data/ information for the purpose of monitoring, the system should rely on established data sources to the extent possible. This could rely on surveys such as the EU-LFS, the Eurobarometer, the Working Conditions Survey or the European Company Survey can be exploited to collect data on the proposed indicators. Other input from agencies such as Eurofound or CEDEFOP could also be considered.
Table 43: Indications to monitor the progress towards achieving the objectives of the initiative
Specific objective
Operational objective
Indicator
Determine, prevent and combat the problematic use of traineeships
Limit the number of potential cases of problematic use of traineeships
Duration of traineeships

Facilitate enforcement of legislation
Number of MS with channels to report malpractice
Improve working conditions and the learning component of traineeships
Ensure fair and transparent working conditions
Share of paid trainees


Share of trainees with access to social protection

Improve learning component
Learning content


Share of trainees declaring access to a mentor


% of those who report they learned professionally useful things

Create transparency in traineeship vacancies
Transparency in tasks and conditions of vacancy notices
Improve inclusiveness and access to high-quality traineeships
Improve inclusiveness and access to traineeships
Socio-economic composition: gender, degree of urbanisation, education, age, disability, (migrant) background

Enhance uptake of cross-border traineeships
Number of cross-border traineeships
General monitoring data
Improve evidence on traineeship prevalence
Traineeship composition: traineeship type, sector, firm size

A15.2. Possible data sources for monitoring and evaluations
• EU-LFS

The approach used under the supporting study to estimate the prevalence of traineeships offers a promising starting point for collection of reliable data. Limitations still hold, but the set up and the implementation of a monitoring system based on such an approach would entail very limited overall costs.

• Eurobarometer-based

The flash Eurobarometer 2023 is repeated every (few) year. This is likely to be easy to implement, as the questionnaire should not to change significantly in order to ensure comparability. The costs, which depend on the length of the questionnaire and the method of its distribution, are non-negligible but well within reason for obtaining statistically representative results. It would offer information about the quality of traineeship. The main limitation will be the representativeness of the sample across types and Member States.
A15.3. Possible evaluation methods
The impact of the initiative can be evaluated by using a counterfactual impact evaluation (CIE) approach. Counterfactual analyses would allow to attribute cause and effect between the initiative and result indicators (e.g. the number of young Europeans who were hired after the traineeship with a permanent contract / in quality jobs / in job matching personal education and skills) disentangling the effect of a specific program from other effects and variations in outcomes that would have occurred regardless, even without the initiative. These methods involve comparing the result indicators of those having benefitted from the programme (“treated group” – i.e. those who received traineeship) with those of a group similar in all respects to the treatment group (“comparison/control group” – those who did not receive the traineeships). In contrast to other types of evaluations such as monitoring, progress evaluation and pure descriptive analyses, CIEs aim at isolating the causal effect of a policy on its recipients. To conduct a proper counterfactual analysis, which allows the quantification of causal impacts, the availability of suitable and high quality representative data is necessary.
• Difference in Difference Approach
The impact of intervention can be evaluated, for instance, by comparing those who received traineeship (treated group) with those who did not (control group) before and after the implementation of the initiative on quality traineeships with a standard difference-in-differences (Diff-in-Diff) regression model (Angrist & Pischke, 2009).
In the empirical model the main independent variables will capture, first, whether (young) Europeans are in the “traineeship” group (treatment group) vs. “non-traineeship” group (control group); second, the period the implementation of the initiative on quality traineeships. The interactions between these two independent variables (the dummy variable for “traineeship” vs “non-traineeship” and the dummy variable for the period “after” vs “before” the implementation of the initiative on quality traineeships) captures the classical Diff-in-Diff estimator that allows to estimate the impact of the initiative on quality traineeships.
To be implemented Diff-in-Diff requires data that provide at least two time points (panel/longitudinal data), since Diff-in-Diff relies on the assumption that without treatment the average change between both groups (treated group and control group) would be parallel (i.e. parallel trend assumption). Although there is no statistical test for this assumption, visual inspection is useful so it would be advisable to have observations over many time points (i.e., longer longitudinal dimension).
• Propensity Score Matching
The impact of intervention can be also evaluated by using a Propensity Score Matching (PSM) approach. For each untreated individual, PSM explicitly looks at a similar treated individual to evaluate the counterfactual, i.e. what would have happened to the treatment group without the treatment (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983; Caliendo & Kopeinig, 2008). The PSM technique produces two balanced groups: one of (young) Europeans who received traineeship (treated group) and one who did not (control group). The propensity score (PS) substitutes a collection of confounding variables with a single variable that is a function of all the control variables. The PS can be considered as a balancing score, meaning that amongst subjects with the same propensity to be exposed, treatment is conditionally independent of the covariates. By summarising the intrinsic characteristics that could generate distortions, the PS uses a matching procedure to allow for comparisons between the treated and control groups. PSM has a drawback: the identification of the average treatment effects (ATTs) on the outcome variables relies on the validity of the Conditional Independence Assumption (CIA) that implies that selection into the traineeship is solely based on observable variables included in the propensity score model. Thus, it would be crucial to cover all relevant factors that may have influenced the probability of being “selected” into the traineeship and the outcome variables over the period of observation.
References
Angrist J. D., Pischke J-S. (2009). Most Harmless Econometrics An Empiricist’s Companion. Princeton University Press.
Caliendo, M., Kopeinig, S. (2008). Some practical guidance for the implementation of propensity score matching. Journal of Economic Surveys, 22: 31–72.
Rosenbaum, P. R., & Rubin, D. B. (1983). The central role of the propensity score in observational studies for causal effects. Biometrika, 70, 41–55.


Delegations will find attached document SWD(2024) 67 final PART 1/2.

Encl.: SWD(2024) 67 final PART 1/2

Table of contents
1 Introduction 1
2 Problem definition 2
3 Why should the EU act? 23
4 Objectives: What is to be achieved? 28
5 What are the available policy options? 28
6 What are the impacts of the policy options? 45
7 How do the options compare? 64
8 Preferred option 72
9 How will actual impacts be monitored and evaluated? 75


Glossary
Term or acronym
Meaning or definition
2014 QFT Recommendation
Council Recommendation on a Quality Framework for Traineeships adopted in 2014
ALMP traineeships
Traineeships which are offered to (young) unemployed or those at risk of becoming unemployed, and there is usually a public institution (most often a PES) acting as an intermediary between the training provider and the trainee.
CBA
Collective bargaining agreements
Education Curricula traineeships (ECT)
Traineeships which refer to work-based learning placements that are part of curricula of formal education and training (school, vocational or higher education and training).
EPSR
European Pillar of Social Rights
EYF
European Youth Forum
NEETs
Young people neither in employment nor in education and training
Open-market traineeships (OMT)
Non-mandatory, bilateral agreements agreed between a trainee and a traineeship provider (public/private/non-profit) without the involvement of a third party and without a formal connection to education or training.
PES
Public employment services
2014 QFT
The Quality Framework for Traineeships, consisting of 21 quality elements to be applied to open market and ALMP traineeships in the EU (set in the 2014 QFT Recommendation, see above)
Reinforced Youth Guarantee (RYG)
Council Recommendation of 30 October 2020 on A Bridge to Jobs – Reinforcing the Youth Guarantee and replacing the Council Recommendation of 22 April 2013 on establishing a Youth Guarantee 
Remuneration
In line with CJEU case law, pay or compensation, but may also include benefits in kind (e.g., food vouchers), reimbursement of travel or accommodation costs or special allowances (e.g., for overtime or daily allowance).
SMEs
Small and medium enterprises
Traineeships that are a mandatory requirement to access specific professions (MPT)
Traineeships which are regulated under national law and whose completion is a mandatory requirement to access a specific profession (e.g., medicine, architecture, etc.).
TPWC Directive
Transparent and Predictable Working Conditions Directive (2019/1152)
Youth Guarantee (YG)
(Council Recommendation on establishing the) Youth Guarantee of 22 April 2013
1 Introduction
1.1 Political and legal context
Pursuant to Article 9 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), the Union, in defining and implementing its policies and activities, is to take into account requirements linked to the promotion of a high level of employment, the guarantee of adequate social protection, the fight against social exclusion, and a high level of education, training and protection of human health.
In line with principle 4 (“Active support to employment”) of the European Pillar of Social Rights, the 2014 Council Recommendation on a Quality Framework for Traineeships aims to help young people to transition from education, unemployment or inactivity into the labour market, through quality traineeships that enhance their skills and allow them to gain work experience. As announced in the European Pillar of Social Rights Action Plan, in 2023 the Commission carried out an evaluation1 (thereafter the “evaluation) of the 2014 QFT, which found that there is scope for improvement, notably as regards working conditions.
On 14 June 2023, the European Parliament (EP) adopted a resolution on quality traineeships in the EU, in accordance with Article 225 TFEU (thereafter “EP resolution”). It ‘calls on the Commission to update and strengthen the 2014 Council Recommendation and to turn it into a stronger legislative instrument’. The Commission welcomed the EP resolution and highlighted its strong commitment to continuing its actions to combat youth unemployment in the EU. Also in view of the political commitment expressed in the President’s Political Guidelines to respond to the resolutions based on Article 225 TFEU, the Commission confirmed its intention to follow up with a legislative proposal as part of the initiative on a reinforced QFT that was announced in its 2023 Work Programme, in full respect of the Treaty limitations, the principles of proportionality, subsidiarity and better law-making.
The initiative on Quality Traineeships is part of the Commission’s follow-up to the Conference on the Future of Europe and will contribute to the implementation of the European Pillar of Social Rights Action Plan and the objectives of the European Year of Youth and the European Year of Skills. It is also expected to contribute to the United Nations (UN) Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) on poverty (SDG 1), quality education (SDG 4), Decent work and economic growth (SDG 8) and reduced inequalities (SDG 10) and to their respective targets. In the context of the green and digital transition and the shrinking working-age population, there is a need to activate all available talent, in particular young people, and to step up investments in skills across all generations. Traineeships are an important instrument to facilitate access to the labour market and job-to-job transitions and can thereby contribute to alleviating labour and skills shortages.
In line with Article 154 TFEU, the Commission has carried out a two-phase social partners’ consultation which took place between 11 July 2023 and 15 September 2023 (first phase) and between 28 September and 9 November (second phase). The social partners decided not to launch the negotiations foreseen in Article 155 TFEU. Their views are reflected throughout this report and a synopsis of the replies has been included in Annex A2.1.
1.2 The EU quality framework for traineeships
In March 2014, the Council adopted the Recommendation on a Quality Framework for Traineeships (QFT). The 2014 QFT aimed to set EU-wide quality standards for traineeships and to discourage the offer of traineeships with poor learning content or working conditions. It comprises a list of 21 principles in 10 main areas (see Annex 6 for details on the principles).
The 2014 QFT Recommendation defined traineeships as “a limited period of work practice, whether paid or not, which includes a learning and training component, undertaken in order to gain practical and professional experience with a view to improving employability and facilitating transition to regular employment”.
Four main types can be identified: Open-market traineeships (OMT), Active Labour Market Policy (ALMP) traineeships, Education Curricula traineeships (ECT) and Traineeships that are a mandatory requirement to access specific professions (MPT) (see glossary for definitions). The 2014 QFT applies to OMT and ALMP traineeships and covers all trainees (i.e. with and without worker status). It does not apply to ECT and MPT.
2 Problem definition
Findings of the evaluation: The evaluation of the 2014 QFT found that quality traineeships, i.e. traineeships that reflect the principles of the QFT, contribute to increasing young people’s employability and help employers to attract, train and retain young talent. However, in terms of effectiveness, it found that the progress toward the objective of the 2014 QFT to ensure more coherent regulatory approaches across Member States had been moderate. Concretely, since 2014, 14 Member States introduced changes to integrate QFT principles in their national legislation or policy frameworks. As for conformity to the QFT principles (i.e. the extent to which national legislation/frameworks integrate all principles fully), seven Member States were found to be in full conformity as regards OMT (an increase from four in 2016), while for ALMP traineeships, 18 Member States were found to be in full conformity with the QFT principles (an increase from 15 in 2016).
The evaluation also found that strengthened monitoring and enforcement was needed to improve the practical application of the quality principles on the ground, which is lagging behind in most Member States.
As for the non-binding nature of the QFT, the evaluation highlighted that though its effectiveness to fully achieve the QFT objectives could be improved, it allowed at the same time flexibility in national approaches to adapt to the diversity of national situations.
Furthermore, the evaluation found that, though the 2014 QFT principles remain relevant, there is a need to strengthen the framework by adding principles on remuneration and access to social protection for trainees, as well as principles on inclusion of vulnerable groups, remote/hybrid traineeships, and mentorship.
The evaluation identified that quality issues were more prevalent for OMT compared to ALMP traineeships, as the latter are known to be highly regulated in most Member States and, as illustrated above, were found to be highly conform to the 2014 QFT principles. Nevertheless, the additional quality principles identified by the evaluation as needed to strengthen the 2014 QFT are of importance for the quality of both OMT and ALMP traineeships. The evaluation also highlighted the need to reflect on extending the scope of the QFT to include traineeships that are part of formal education and training to improve coherence across the different types of traineeships.

Regulatory approaches to traineeships at national level: Trainees in the EU have different legal statuses in national law, depending on Member States’ regulatory approaches and the type of traineeship. According to the results of the legal analysis under the supporting study, broadly three types of regulatory approaches can be distinguished: specific regulation, coverage by (statutory) labour law, no regulation (status depending on content of bilateral agreement). Annex A9.1 includes a detailed analysis per traineeship type and by Member State. These approaches mostly co-exist in Member States, and usually vary according to the type of traineeship.
Importantly, in many Member States (e.g. 23 Member States in the case of OMT) unpaid traineeships are legally possible. This is usually the case where unpaid traineeship contracts or “voluntary” traineeship schemes exist or when there is no regulation for traineeships.

Definition of an EU worker at EU level and limits of EU action: The concept of “worker” under EU law has been developed in the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union, often synthesised in the Lawrie-Blum and Levin “formula”2, i.e. that a person can be considered as worker given that “the person (1) pursues activities that are real and genuine which are performed (2) under the supervision of another person (3) in return for remuneration”. Following the latter, unpaid trainees cannot be considered “workers” within the meaning of EU law.

2.1 What are the problems?
The identified problems are (1) the problematic use of traineeships by traineeship providers, (2) the poor quality of traineeships and (3) the unequal access to traineeships. The findings of these challenges are based on evidence gathered through the evaluation, consultation of social partners (Annex A2.1) and the study carried out to support the development of this initiative (thereafter “the supporting study”)3. Problems have been identified both for paid and unpaid traineeships, and in all types of traineeships (OMT, ALMP, ECT and MPT) although to varying degree in the different traineeship types (see Annex 10). These problems are relevant to all trainees: those considered as workers (proxied by paid trainees) and those who are not (mainly unpaid trainees, see definition of workers in section 1.2), however to different extents as described below. The section below provides definitions of the terms used in this report in view of distinguishing between “non-problematic traineeships” and “quality” traineeships as follows:
Regarding Problem 1:
• A non-problematic traineeship is a lawful traineeship. It is used for its intended purpose (i.e. a genuine traineeship providing the trainee with a learning experience on the job) and the rights of trainees comply with the applicable EU and/or national legislation. A non-problematic traineeship may not be conform with the principles of the 2014 QFT where these principles have not been integrated into binding law. A non-problematic traineeship is therefore not necessarily a quality traineeship (see below under problem 2).
• The problematic use of traineeships relates to unlawful practices by traineeship providers which deprive individuals from rights they are entitled to under EU/national law:
◦ Where traineeships are used for their intended purpose, they may not comply with the applicable EU or national legislation (non-compliant traineeships). This problem may occur for all trainees (considered as workers or not). Trainees who are workers enjoy the protection of the entire EU labour acquis. Non-workers are covered by the EU occupational health and safety legislation and at national level by rules on e.g. working time or leave entitlements (where they exist).
◦ Where traineeships are not used for their intended purpose, but replace regular (entry-level) employee positions they are work relationships disguised as traineeships. In these cases, traineeship providers may circumvent the EU or national law and collective agreements which apply to regular workers. This problem has mainly been identified for trainees who are workers in OMT, ECT and ALMP, and to a lesser extent MPT.

Regarding Problem 2:
• A quality traineeship is a non-problematic (lawful) traineeship, that also fulfils the non-binding principles of 2014 QFT. As mentioned above, the evaluation highlighted that some important (relevant) quality principles were missing from the 2014 QFT and would deserve to be taken into account, in particular principles on remuneration and access to social protection.
• Poor quality traineeships refer to traineeships that do not fulfil (some of) the existing principles of the 2014 QFT and/or the additional quality elements identified by the evaluation (remuneration, social protection and strengthened learning component). They may be non-problematic (lawful) traineeships, especially where the 2014 QFT implementation in national law is weak. Or they may be non-compliant traineeships, especially where the 2014 QFT is well reflected in national law. They may however never be work relationships disguised as traineeships, as the latter are not traineeships.

The problem related to the quality of traineeships is relevant to all trainees (considered as workers or not) and all types of traineeships (see Annex 10), with some differences in scale. Issues linked to remuneration and access to social protection are more problematic for trainees who are not paid (i.e. not considered as workers), whereas poor learning content may be an issue for all trainees. Most quality issues are found amongst OMT. The principle on maximum duration is less relevant for MPT and some types of ECT (see Annex 10). For the purpose of this Impact Assessment, poor quality traineeships are not included under problematic (i.e. unlawful) uses of traineeships.

The diversity of national regulatory approaches to traineeships results in considerable differences in trainees’ access to labour rights and social protection. These differences exist between the same types of traineeships in different Member States and between different types of traineeships in the same Member State. Moreover, considerably different treatment within the same category of trainees is possible in most Member States, depending on whether the trainee is a (paid) worker or not. For example, 23 Member States allow for both paid and unpaid OMT. This situation puts unpaid trainees (vis-à-vis paid trainees) and providers of paid traineeships (vis-à-vis their competitors providing unpaid traineeships) at an unfair disadvantage.

The identified ‘internal’ drivers are described in sections 2.3.2 to 2.3.4. Partially, these problems are also influenced by the ‘external’ drivers that are out of the scope the initiative (see section 2.3.1 and Annex A9.11). Problems, drivers and consequences are summarised in the problem tree (see Annex 11).
Prevalence of trainees: According to the EU-LFS there are 3.1 million trainees in the EU (2019 data) out of which 1.6 million are paid trainees (proxy for trainees with legal status of employees4) and 1.5 million are unpaid. Paid traineeships are composed by: ALMP traineeships (36%), ECT (31%), OMT (24%) and MPT (9%). It should be noted that the methodology to estimate the number of trainees in the EU suffers from certain limitations (see Annex 4)5. The vast majority (85%) of unpaid traineeships are ECT, while 10% are OMT and 5% ALMP traineeship. In 15 Member States6 financial support is provided to traineeship providers to encourage or enable traineeships. In one Member State (BG), financial support is provided to improve traineeship quality and in four Member States (BG, SK, IE, ES) to enable hiring trainees following their traineeship7.
In terms of sectoral and geographical distribution (see Annex A7.4), five Member States represent almost 90% of the total number of paid trainees (ca. 1.4 million, 2019 data) in the EU (DE, ES, FR, IT, PL), which are also the Member States with the highest population in the EU. Moreover, five sectors make up the largest share of trainees: manufacturing, retail, health, education and real estate and professional counted more than 1 million (paid) trainees, or close to two-thirds of the total (2019 data). Not all types of traineeships are distributed evenly across sectors. ALMP are concentred (40%) in two main sectors: mining, quarrying and manufacturing; wholesale and retail trade. Italy and Poland account for about two thirds of total ALMP in the EU. Out of all MPT trainees 85% is concentrated in the sectors of education, health and real estate and professional sectors. ECT and OMT are quite spread across sectors. The number of ECT trainees increased strongly in all the service sectors and in particular in transport, storage and communication. Paid ECT traineeships are concentrated (60%) in two countries: Germany and France. 
Data limitations of supporting evidence: Significant efforts have been made to collect data to provide an estimate of the size of the problems. However, it should be noted that these estimates are subject to several limitations (see Annex 4 for a detailed analysis of the robustness of the data). First, the total number of trainees is likely to be underestimated, this is particularly relevant for unpaid trainees, while data on paid trainees is more accurate. Second, many of the findings are based on surveys, such as the 2023 Eurobarometer and the trainee survey conducted under the evaluation. The relevant results have been interpreted with the full understanding that they represent the views of the respondents, and that they are influenced by their profile, which are not in all cases fully statistically representative of the wider population. Third, quantification of the problem in terms of absolute number was obtained by combining data from two different sources: the 2023 Eurobarometer and EU-LFS data on the number of trainees. Finally, data on work relationships disguised as traineeships exist only for limited elements, namely long duration and poor learning content.
Nevertheless, a compilation of information from literature, case law and surveys, complemented by stakeholder consultations and a two-stage consultation of EU social partners provided robust evidence for the existence of the problem and its magnitude (see Annex 4 for all sources used). In particular, the in-depth legal analysis of national regulatory systems carried out under the supporting study identified gaps in these systems that allow for the problematic use of traineeships to arise for current and future trainees if left unaddressed. Regarding the problems of quality and access, the results of the evaluation and the dedicated analysis under the supporting study provide robust evidence to substantiate the problem.
2.1.1 Problematic use of traineeships (P1)
The problematic use of traineeships primarily concerns issues of fairness and justice between trainees. At the same time, it can also produce an uneven playing field between traineeship providers, which is a particularly acute problem in the case of businesses, including SMEs. Problematic traineeships constitute de facto a cost-reduction measure, which creates a situation of unfair competition that, in the medium- and long-term, can prove to be particularly damaging for aggregate business competitiveness. It can lead to businesses relying excessively on such cost-reduction measures rather than investing in innovation, which requires skilled workers. While it is true that the current population of trainees is small in comparison to the overall working population, a suboptimal use of traineeships could in principle cause disproportionally negative effects for business competitiveness, as it would deprive companies of an important source of young talent, which is important to foster growth and innovation8. Furthermore, as young people are at the start of their professional career engaging in situations of problematic use of traineeships can have a negative long-term effect on them but also the overall future workforce. As discussed more extensively in section 5.1, certain sectors show an increase in labour demand and a “race for talent,” which would arguably dampen the worst effects of the above-mentioned dynamic. However, this is not observable in all sectors, nor can be assumed to continue unabated in the mid- and long-term.
Data on the actual number of work relationships disguised as traineeships and non-compliant traineeships in the EU does not exist. In the majority of Member States dedicated controls and inspection are not carried out. Moreover, the identification of such cases requires a case-by-case assessment of the individual employment relationship and the information collected by labour inspectors is covered by strict confidentiality rules9. Therefore, it is not possible to assess whether geographical regions or specific sectors are more affected by the problem. Some indications provided by a 2016 Eurofound study10 showed significant fraudulent use of traineeships and apprenticeships in 9 (EL, FR, IT, CY, NL, AT, PT, RO, SI) out of the (then) 28 Member States, mainly in the tourism and catering sectors. Further supporting evidence is presented below based on information from literature, case law and surveys.
Non-compliant traineeships
The 2013 Impact Assessment underpinning the 2014 QFT showed that, while in some Member States national legislative frameworks for traineeships existed, there were notable enforcement challenges which deprived trainees of their rights. Principle 6 of the 2014 QFT recommends that Member States ensure that the rights and working conditions of trainees under applicable EU and national law are respected; it also recommends taking appropriate measures to apply the QFT as soon as possible. However, the evaluation showed that monitoring and enforcement of the relevant national legislation governing traineeships is in many cases not fit for purpose, limiting the impact of binding regulations.
While the case law on non-compliance of traineeships with national or EU law is limited11, there is further available evidence. In 2022, the European Youth Forum (EYF) reported12 on the occurrence of illegal OMT in FR and illegal unpaid traineeships in RO. Furthermore, the findings of the ECE legal analysis13 indicate issues in terms of non-compliance. On MPT, the legal analysis showed that there is a risk of disguised self-employment among lawyer and architect trainees in BE. Issues as regards working time of resident doctors were highlighted in for example EL, ES and HR.
Work relationships disguised as traineeships
The 2013 Impact Assessment underpinning the 2014 QFT showed that there were widespread enforcement challenges related to the use of trainees to replace (permanent) employees. In cases of work relationships disguised as traineeships, the individual performs the tasks of a regular employee but is wrongly treated as a trainee. As a result, the individual is deprived of a genuine learning experience, the full set of worker rights enshrined in labour law and do not enjoy the same working conditions as other employees in the company14. This creates an unjustified unfavourable treatment of individuals who are wrongly classified as trainees instead of as regular employees. The risk of work relationships being disguised as traineeships is higher for OMT, but cannot be excluded for the other three types of traineeships15.
The attention to work relationships disguised as traineeships has been increasing over the last years. It has been raised by the International Labour Organization (ILO)16 but also by youth organisations17. Also, the problem gained policy and media attention following a complaint lodged in 2017 with the ECSR by the European Youth Forum (EYF) on the issues of unpaid traineeships and work relationships disguised as traineeships in BE, on which the ECSR ruled against BE18. In addition to the case of BE and evidence presented above, research and case law highlight the issue of work relationships disguised as traineeships in specific countries. Regarding OMT, in IT, stakeholders19 have highlighted the increasing use of traineeships to disguise precarious forms of employment20 and in DE, cases against employers using traineeships not for intended purpose have been successfully pursued in labour courts,21 while in SI in at least two cases the Supreme Court requalified a traineeship as an indefinite work contract due to the interplay between fixed-term contract rules (very limited and causal) and the conditions and duration of the traineeships22. Evidence also suggests that in some Member States employers use ALMP trainees to fill regular employment positions. In IE, the Department of Social Protection reported having investigated 200 companies for abuse on the JobBridge programme, in order to fill regular positions with trainees receiving unemployment benefits in view of gaining a competitive advantage23. In ES, stakeholders24 reported that some training companies provide OMT in their own company with PES subsidies while some traineeship providers require young people looking for traineeship to register as unemployed in order to receive a training benefit25. Under the same study focus groups with students also revealed that some companies in specific fields (such ICT), called informally “empresas cárnicas” (“meat companies”) are known for recruiting young students as trainees, while in reality they are actually responsible for key tasks in the business and replace regular workers. In FR, while open-market traineeships are prohibited, some employers have been reported to recruit beneficiaries of ALMP in a disguised form of regular employment, while certain fraudulent educational institutions have been reported to offer fictitious courses to be able to set up a tripartite traineeship contract with an employer (in the form of ECT)26. In CY, a 2015 report of the Equality body highlighted that Union citizens which come to CY to undertake an ECT engage in private regular employment contracts with employers (outside industrial collective agreements).
A number of elements can serve as indications to distinguish work relationships disguised as traineeships from genuine traineeships. The more elements present, the more likely it is a work relationship disguised as a traineeship. These elements were identified on the basis of the 1) 2014 QFT definition of traineeship, 2) evidence in literature27, 3) evidence from case law, including the European Committee of Social Rights (ECSR) ruling in the case against BE (see above) and 4) stakeholder views, including interviews under the supporting study28 and the social partners’ consultation (see Annex A8.1 for details on how these elements were identified):
• The excessive duration of traineeships and trainees’ previous experience in the field of activity, gained also by doing recurrent or consecutive traineeships with the same or different employer. The former, in principle, refers to traineeships lasting more than six months, with some possible exceptions. Evidence suggests that such traineeships are common in the EU.
• The fact that the trainee is performing the same/similar tasks with the same intensity and having the same/similar responsibilities as regular (entry-level) employees combined with the absence of a significant learning/training component, which also constitutes an element of a poor-quality traineeship (see sections 2.1.2 and 2.3.3).
• The high ratio of trainees within an organisation, pointing to the substitution of employees with trainees29.
To demonstrate the magnitude of the problem across the EU some rough estimate can be obtained for some specific categories of trainees being at risk of doing work disguised as a traineeship (subject to the data limitations described above). These rough estimates show that in 2019 around 370,000 paid trainees30 did a traineeship with a long duration (more than 6 months, as per the 2014 QFT), including consecutive/repeated ones with the same employer (see Annex A8.2 and A8.3). The shares are almost evenly distributed among traineeship types: ALMP traineeships (40%) and OMT (26%) and ECT (34%)31. Problems with duration are not relevant for MPT. Out of these, around 100,000 trainees did a long duration traineeship with a poor learning content (2019 data32, see Annex A8.6). Looking at the distribution by traineeship types, about 45% are ALMP traineeships, while OMT and ECT account for about 27% each33. Furthermore, roughly 500,000 paid trainees had done multiple traineeships with different employers at some point in their life (see Annex A8.4)34. Out of these 36% are ALMP traineeships, 30% are OMT and 34% are ECT35.
2.1.2 Poor quality traineeships (P2)
Poor quality traineeships are those which do not fulfil (some of) these existing QFT principles (baseline scenario) and/or those which carry at least one of the following dimensions identified by the evaluation:1) poor working conditions including lack of or low remuneration; 2) lack of access to social protection; 3) poor learning component, which encompasses learning content (i.e. learning objectives and tasks), and the availability of a mentor.  
Data on sectoral differences between traineeships is available from the survey conducted by the study supporting the evaluation of the QFT. Evidence shows that some of the sectors with a high number of trainees (see data in the introduction to section 2.1 and Annex A7.4.2), and notably wholesale & retail trade, health and social work, and education, are the sectors which obtained the lower scores across (some of) the quality dimensions of the 2014 QFT (where data is available). In terms of overall attitude towards traineeships, there is some variation across the different sectors: for example, 23% of trainees reported a negative attitude in the wholesale & retail trade, transport, accommodation & food sectors while only 10% in the agriculture, forest and fishing, education and construction sectors. Other quality-related indicators point to a more nuanced picture. The study also asked about the implementation across sectors of three principles of the QFT: 1) provision of a written agreement, 2) the stipulation of learning objectives, and 3) the provision of a certificate at the end of the traineeship. Respondents attributed a 65% implementation rate for wholesale and retail trade, 68% for education and 78% for financial & insurance activities. These rates show a certain level of correlation with the (self-reported) labour market outcomes of these traineeships. The study supporting the evaluations showed that 60% of trainees in finance and insurance stated that they found a job after the traineeship as compared to 43% in the wholesale & retail trade, 31% in education, and 34% in health and social work36 (see Annex A7.4.2 for details).
Working conditions, including remuneration
The 2023 Eurobarometer included, as examples, references to working hours, workload, treatment and access to equipment. While the majority of respondents (70%) indicated that their working conditions (apart from pay) were comparable to that of regular workers, a considerable share (29%) stated that this is not the case, with no notable differences among types of traineeships (34% for OMT, 32% for ECT, 31% for ALMP traineeships and 27% for MPT). In 13 Member States (BE, CZ, DK, ES, IT, CY, LV, LT, MT, NL, PL, SI, SK) this share was higher than the EU average (28%) while respondents working in an unskilled position are more likely to state that the working conditions during their last traineeship were not equivalent to those of regular employees.
The most prominent issue in the public debate on the quality of traineeships has been remuneration. Remuneration usually consists of pay or compensation, but may also include benefits in kind (e.g., food vouchers), reimbursement of travel or accommodation costs or special allowances (e.g., for overtime or daily allowance)37. This problem has two dimensions:
1) Many trainees are not paid. In 2019, there were slightly above 1.5 million unpaid trainees in the EU38 (48% of total trainees). Across different traineeship types, ECT are estimated to account for 85%, OMT for 9.8% and ALMP for 5.2%39 of unpaid trainees. The 2023 Eurobarometer showed similar results, with 44% respondents stating they did not receive financial compensation. This overarching figure, however, masks considerable cross-country variation: from 60% in BE to 20% in HR. Looking at types of traineeships, 52% of the respondents doing ECT replied they were not paid nor received financial compensation40. The share was 42% for OMT, 38% for ALMP traineeships and 35% for MPT41. These results are somewhat consistent with the trainee survey carried out during the evaluation42, showing that 39% of respondents did not receive a monthly financial allowance or compensation and 14% received it only occasionally43. The lack of remuneration for trainees also poses obstacles in terms of access to traineeships, for all trainees, and in particular those from vulnerable groups. Access to unpaid traineeships is only possible for trainees whose family or other income sources provide the means to cover their living expenses. For trainees who do not have this type of support access to unpaid traineeships is limited.

2) Among remunerated trainees there may be very different levels of remuneration, which might not always be fair/proportionate and may indicate the existence of unjustified different treatment with (entry-level) workers44. In the trainee survey conducted under the evaluation, 22% of trainees (353,000 trainees) stated that their compensation was not sufficient at all to cover the basic living costs such as rent, food, etc. while 40% stated that it was not sufficient to some extent. In total this corresponds to around 11 million trainees45. In the same survey, 54% stated that their remuneration (allowance or compensation) was below the national minimum wage (around 870,000 trainees (proxy)), with the share of respondents being significantly higher among female (36%) than male trainees (17%). Such data is not available by traineeship type. In line with these findings, a recent analysis conducted by the European Youth Forum46 indicates that paid traineeships may not cover the costs of basic living expenditure in numerous EU countries. Assuming that a traineeship is paid at the annual net earnings of a single person without children earning 50% of the average earning, the study finds that in 12 countries paid traineeships would not compensate trainees enough to cover the costs of living.
Social protection
Regarding access to social protection, evidence shows that many trainees do not have access to (full) social protection. This does not only concern trainees who are unpaid/not considered workers, but also those who are paid/considered workers, although to a smaller extent. The 2023 Eurobarometer showed that 27% respondents did not have access to social protection, 28% had access to 'some elements', and only 33% had access like regular employees. Not having access to any social protection is most likely for respondents doing OMT (37% vs 18% for MPT). They are also the least likely to have access to social protection like regular employees (25% vs 39% for MPT). At Member State level, in more than a quarter of the Member States (7) around 1 in 3 respondents stated that they did not have access to social protection (BE: 36%, CY: 35%, FR: 33%, LV: 32%, and EE, LT and DK: 30%). Using the above Eurobarometer results in combination with EU-LFS data leads to the following estimates per traineeship type: 25% of paid and 58% of unpaid OMTs, 18% of paid ALMP and 32% of unpaid ALMP, 17% of paid ECT and 54% of unpaid ECT were not covered by social protection.
Learning content
Quality in terms of learning content is generally considered one of the key elements for traineeships to help transition to stable employment. The majority (77%) of respondents of the 2023 Eurobarometer at least agree that they learnt things that are useful professionally during their traineeship. However, almost 1 in 4 respondents disagree, a share that more than doubled since 2013 (10%). Similar results were obtained by type of traineeships: OMT (26%), ALMP traineeships (25%), MPT (23%) and ECT (21%). The results of the trainee survey conducted for the evaluation were more positive, with 85% agreeing that they learnt things that are useful professionally during their traineeship. However, 13% of respondents did not believe so. Also, 15% stated they did not acquire real-life work experience and 16% stated they did not acquire skills and competences47. When comparing paid with unpaid traineeships, the supporting study48, found no difference in terms of views regarding having learnt professionally useful things during the traineeship. However, a study by Eurofound49 found that paid trainees were more satisfied with development of skills50 as part of their traineeship than unpaid trainees, but slightly less satisfied with the learning support received (i.e. through a mentor)51. The legal analysis as regards appointing a supervisor and/or a mentor showed that for OMT 9 Member States do not have corresponding legal provisions in place, while this is the case in 3 Member States for ALMP, 4 Member States for ECT and 2 Member States as regards MPT.
2.1.3 Unequal access to traineeships (P3)
P3.1 Groups in vulnerable situations
In the context of the evaluation, national authorities, public employment services (PES), youth organisations and organisations representing persons with disabilities reported that vulnerable young people (in particular from rural areas and in the outermost regions52, a lower socio-economic and/or migrant background, the Roma community, and with lower educational attainment) were less able to benefit from traineeships.
This is supported by estimates based on the EU-LFS data and the Eurobarometer results53. The prevalence of paid traineeships amongst young people from rural areas is lower compared to those residing in cities (LFS 2019: 21.9% versus 44.8%), while unpaid traineeships are slightly more prevalent in cities (2023 Eurobarometer: 30.2% versus 27.4% in rural areas54). The chances for a person from another EU country or a third-country, resident in the country of traineeship, to do a paid traineeship, are 30% lower compared to those of a person who has the nationality of the EU country where the traineeship is taking place. Furthermore, a Eurofound study55 found that those identifying themselves as from an ethnic minority, a religious minority or with an immigrant background had less traineeship experience (around 39%) than those who did not identify themselves as belonging to those groups (around 53% had at least one traineeship experience). Based on EU-LFS data, the share of young people with a low degree of education undertaking a traineeship is lower than those having a medium or higher educational attainment and these figures remain low even after taking into account that many educational and mandatory traineeships require tertiary education attainment. The 2023 Eurobarometer indicated that a large share of respondents disagrees or tends to disagree that young people coming from a disadvantaged socio-economic background (40%), with a migrant background (39%), or with disabilities (46%) have equal access to traineeship opportunities. In almost half of the EU countries56, 50% or more of the respondents believe that persons with disabilities have less access to traineeships. A Eurofound study57 found that people with disabilities were a lot less likely to be compensated58 and that they did more traineeships (4 on average) than those without disabilities (2 on average) before finding a regular job.
The available information on unequal access of vulnerable groups to traineeships does not allow for a breakdown by type of traineeship. However, considering that the objective of ALMP traineeships is reintegration and activation of the unemployed and the inactive, including those harder to reach, it could be deduced that access for those belonging to vulnerable groups to ALMP traineeships should be better compared to the other types of traineeships.
P3.2 Cross-border traineeships
There are indications that the prevalence of cross-border traineeships has increased (from 9% in the 2013 Eurobarometer to 21% in 2023), but some people still face difficulties accessing them, primarily due to a lack of financial means and the unavailability of relevant information. The costs of cross-border traineeships tend to affect people in socio-economically vulnerable situations more. Trainees have also cited the lack of information on cross-border traineeships as an obstacle in both the evaluation and the 2023 Eurobarometer. No data exists on the prevalence of the cross-border dimension per traineeship type.
P3.3 Remote/hybrid traineeships
The rise of remote/hybrid traineeships following the COVID-19 pandemic brought new traineeship opportunities for some, but posed difficulties for groups in vulnerable situations. Remote traineeships may help to overcome distance to the physical workplace and lower costs, for example for cross-border trainees or for trainees residing in rural and remote areas. However, such opportunities need to fulfil certain enabling conditions, such as appropriate equipment, adequate training and learning opportunities, sufficient connectivity and network security, adequate work arrangements (including supervision, guidance, and mentoring), and a sufficient level of digital skills. Where enabling conditions imply financial costs for trainees (e.g. equipment, network coverage and security and other expenses related to working from home), the impact is likely to be greater on groups in vulnerable situations, including those from a disadvantaged socio-economic background. For employers (in particular some SMEs), limited resources preventing them to cater for a remote/hybrid work environment including adequate digital tools may mean that they attract fewer candidates59.
Looking into the problem by type of traineeship, the legal analysis as regards formal telework arrangements indicates that these are lacking in 12 Member States for OMT, in 12 Member States for ALMP, 13 Member States for ECT, and 11 Member States for MPT. Hence, the problem exists in all types of traineeships.
2.2 Who is affected by the problems?
The identified problems have consequences for trainees, traineeship providers and society at large (for details see Annex A9.12). Trainees being in a weak position in the labour market are at greater risk of precariousness and insecurity. Specifically, consequences for trainees relate to more legal uncertainty and vulnerability, increased precariousness of their working conditions and reduced opportunities for career development/employability. The lack of effective enforcement aggravates the issue as it prevents individuals from enjoying their rights under EU and national labour law.
The consequences for traineeship providers relate to a reduced potential pool to recruit from (which can also increase challenges to match trainees’ skills with organisational needs), an “uneven playing field” and unfair competition between providers with and without quality traineeships and those using and not using trainees to replace entry-level employment (within and across countries), and a burdensome process to offer quality traineeship opportunities, in particular for SMEs, due to the complexity of the current national rules. Even though the current population of trainees is small in comparison to the overall working population, this can prove to be damaging for business competitiveness, as companies might find it harder to find the talent they need to grow and compete, particularly in innovation-intensive sectors, where the contribution of young and diverse talent is particularly important.
Regarding society at large, the identified problems lead to sub-optimal labour market outcomes, including increased unemployment rates. They also result in skills and competences not matching labour market needs, thus reduced productivity, and loss of competitiveness and finally loss of public revenue. Also, poor quality traineeships will not be able to help address the challenges hampering the transition to and achievement of a sustainable Europe by 2050 as identified in the 2023 Strategic Foresight report. Individuals engaged either in work disguised as traineeships or non-complaint traineeships or in poor quality traineeships are at a higher risk of precarious work. This can have a long-term impact in terms of wellbeing, social protection and pensions, placing trainees at a greater risk of poverty and social exclusion.
2.3 What are the problem drivers?
2.3.1 External drivers
The problems outlined above are influenced partially, and sometimes indirectly, by global megatrends affecting labour markets, such as globalisation, digitalisation and ongoing societal changes (including demographic change). These drivers, while having some impact on the problems the EU initiative aims at tackling, are “external” to its scope (see Annex A9.11 for details).
2.3.2 Drivers related to the problematic use of traineeships
D1.1 Absence, complexity and diversity of regulatory frameworks, and insufficient enforcement of applicable law
The absence, complexity and diversity of regulatory frameworks for traineeships and/or trainees observed within and across Member States (see Annex A9.1 for details)60 is an obstacle to detecting and combating the problematic use of traineeships, i.e. work relationships disguised as traineeships and non-compliant traineeships (see 2.1.1 for details).
First, the absence of worker status for trainees has been identified as an enabling condition for work disguised as traineeships as it creates legal uncertainty about the applicable rules61. The legal analysis showed that in a number of Member States the legal status of trainees depends on whether their traineeship fulfils the conditions of an employment relationship. This is the case in 13 Member States (CZ, DK, EE, IE, EL, HR, LV, MT, NL, AT, SK, FI, SE) where no specific regulation exists for OMT and the working conditions are agreed bilaterally between the trainee and the employer/traineeship provider. This lack of regulation may enable work relationships disguised as traineeships. National labour law may only contain a vague definition of an “employment relationship”, making it difficult to determine whether a traineeship fulfils these conditions. The results of the legal analysis show that in several Member States, either such cases have been pursued in judicial procedures, or concern has been raised by stakeholders regarding the correct labour market classification of trainees in their countries.62
Second, the complexity and diversity of regulatory approaches by Member States, including per type of traineeship, result in different legal classifications and corresponding rights of trainees across the EU. This raises uncertainty about the relevant rules and poses challenges to employers (especially SMEs) who might not always be aware of their obligations and the rights of trainees, or lack the administrative capacity to ensure compliance, giving rise not only to intended but also to “unintended” work relationships disguised as traineeships and non-compliant traineeships. These findings were supported by interviews with relevant stakeholders under the supporting study and the evaluation. This complexity and diversity may also lead to non-compliance of traineeships with the rights conferred to “workers” under EU law. National classifications of trainees may not always be in line with the qualification of ‘workers’ under EU law63 which may deprive trainees from some rights they are entitled to under EU law.
It should also be noted that the diversity of national systems among Member States is associated with unequal access to traineeships for both trainees and traineeship providers. First, unequal access to trainees by traineeship providers situated in different Member States can result from differing requirements across countries. The same applies to uptake of traineeships. Prevalence rates in EU countries, including the variation in the different traineeship types, provide ample evidence of the effect of regulatory diversity. This heterogeneity is likely to constitute barriers to cross-border traineeships, which are a potential vehicle for a more efficient EU labour market via a better matching of skills and demand. This might also act as a drain on business competitiveness64.
Third, as shown by the evaluation, quality monitoring and enforcement mechanisms are missing in many Member States. Furthermore, according to the legal analysis conducted under the supporting study, in most Member States there are no systems for inspections or guidance for labour inspectorates with specific reference to traineeships, for any of the four traineeship types65 (see Annex A9.4). These findings are confirmed by the survey carried out under the supporting study as 24% of respondents in public authorities indicated that there is no enforcement mechanism to ensure that quality principles are implemented in their countries. Among public authorities which stated that such mechanisms exist in their country, only 26% of respondents (from BE, BG, CZ, EE, IT, LT, MT, NL, AT, SK) noted that such mechanisms are based on inspections, 18% (from BE, DK, IT, LU, NL, SK) indicated they are based on complaints received, and 32% stated that they used ‘other’ enforcement mechanisms. It should be noted that the complexity and internal diversity of national systems exacerbate the challenges for competent authorities to enforce legal rules.
The evaluation also found a limited capacity of labour inspectorates across the EU. According to ILO data66, between 2017 and 2022, the number of inspectors declined in most Member States67, notably in DE, ES, FR and PL. Similarly, trade unions interviewed for the supporting study highlighted that labour inspectorates often lack resources – in terms of personnel and finances – to satisfactorily carry out inspections. This is particularly worrying in light of the 2016 Eurofound study68, which explicitly notes that “costs and difficulties in detecting fraudulent use” are one of the main enabling factors for the ’fraudulent’ use of traineeships. This issue was also highlighted in the decision of the ECSR on the case brought by the EYF against BE, which concluded that the Labour Inspectorate was inefficient in detecting and preventing the abusive practice of replacing paid jobs with unpaid traineeships69.
The evaluation also pointed out a lack of transparency in the vacancy notices, which is a driver of poor-quality traineeships as it prevents trainees from making well-informed decisions when applying for a traineeship. Namely, it identified that Principle 14, on transparency of vacancies is among the principles that are the least70 implemented in legislative frameworks of Member States, for both OMT and ALMP traineeships. Furthermore, a vacancy analysis71, conducted as part of the evaluation, examined almost 2,000 vacancies72 in the 27 Member States and showed that only around 40% for OMT and 50% for ALMP traineeships vacancies mentioned allowance or compensation and/or/ did not clarify the learning and training objectives; 63% of OMT and 40% of ALMP did not mention the duration and less than 10% mentioned information on social protection (see Annex A9.7).
Available evidence also shows that procedures for registering complaints or reporting malpractice are lacking in a number of Member States and types of traineeships. The legal analysis of the supporting study (see Annex A9.4) indicates that only in four Member States (IE, LT, LU and SK) there are such procedures for all four types of traineeships.
Finally, the different interpretations of the legal status of trainees also exacerbate the weak position of trainees in the labour market. This results from the complexity of the legal rules which results in an asymmetric power dynamic between the employer and the trainee; the relatively short duration of traineeship; the need to secure a more stable labour market position, and a real or perceived dependency or the fear of negative repercussions from taking legal action or filing a complaint (see Annex A9.9). Therefore, even when legal remedies against breaches of labour law exist in Member States, trainees are unlikely to go to court.
D1.2 Inadequate and insufficient rules to prevent work relationships disguised as traineeships
Inadequate and insufficient rules, in particular linked to duration, are an obstacle to preventing work relationships disguised as traineeships. As discussed in section 2.1.1, traineeships lasting longer than 6 months could be an indication of a work relationship disguised as a traineeship if they are not justified by the nature and purpose of the specific type of traineeship. The latter is notably the case for MPT which warrant a longer learning experience. The results of the legal analysis carried out under the supporting study show that a variety of legal requirements for the duration of traineeships exist in many Member States for all types of traineeships (see Annex A9.3). While the optimal duration might vary by type of traineeship, the 2014 QFT Recommendation stipulated that for OMT and ALMP traineeships, in principle, the maximum duration should be 6 months. The legal analysis by Member States by type of traineeship indicates that a corresponding legal obligation exists for some contracts in only seven Member States for OMT73, 14 for ALMP traineeships74 and in four for ECT75, while MPT are generally not restricted to six months76. The overall duration of traineeships is sometimes also prolonged through repeated, including consecutive, traineeships with the same employer. However, the results of the legal analysis show that in most Member States there are no legal restrictions on consecutive traineeships for any type of traineeship (see Annex A9.3).
Furthermore, a potential driver of the problematic use of traineeships could be the fact that traineeship providers request in vacancy notices previous experience in the field of activity77. This requires trainees to take up multiple traineeships in order to qualify as a candidate, leading to a cycle of repeated traineeships and pointing to a practice aimed at replacing entry-level jobs with work relationships disguised as traineeships.
2.3.3 Drivers related to the poor quality of traineeships
D2.1 Inadequate remuneration and lack of access to social protection
Whether traineeships are remunerated hinges on their classification in national (labour) law and the different remuneration policies for the different types of traineeships in the Member States. Trainees who are workers under EU law are covered by a number of EU directives that may allow for differentiated treatment with other workers. Fixed-term78 and Part-time Work Directives provide that those trainees, if considered workers under EU law, shall not be treated less favourably in their employment conditions, including remuneration, than comparable permanent or full-time workers, unless the difference is justified on objective grounds. Such objective grounds can relate to the characteristics of the traineeship, such as different tasks, a significant learning component and lower responsibilities or intensity. However, if the different treatment is disproportionate to the grounds, it may result in poor quality traineeships with precarious working conditions. It is to be noted that the Fixed-term work Directive (FTWD) ensures the equal treatment of fixed-term workers and comparable permanent workers79. However, it may be difficult to identify a comparable permanent worker to a trainee. Where a comparable permanent worker cannot be identified, the protection under Clause 4 of the FTWD does not apply80. It may in practice be more effective to apply a comparison between a trainee and an entry-level worker of the same category in the same establishment, which may include other fixed-term workers.
Article 6 of the Directive on adequate minimum wages allows for variations in the statutory minimum wage for specific groups of workers, if these respect the principles of non-discrimination and proportionality, the latter including the pursuit of a legitimate aim. However, recital 29 notes that it is important to avoid variations being used widely, as they risk having a negative impact on the adequacy of minimum wages.
The supporting study shows that specific provisions on the remuneration of trainees are characterised by considerable complexity across and within Member States and across the four types of traineeships (see Annex A9.2). While several Member States guarantee at least the minimum wage for trainees for some types of traineeships, others set the minimum level of remuneration to a proportion of the minimum wage. Two Member States (ES and SI) have in place legal provisions for OMT to ensure proportionate remuneration of trainees, while in PL a recommendation on proportionate pay was adopted by the Social Dialogue Committee. At the same time, 23 Member States (BE, CZ, DE, DK, EE, EL, IE, ES, HR, IT, CY, LV, LT, LU, HU, MT, NL, AT, PL, PT, SK, SE, FI)81 also allow for types of OMT traineeships which are unpaid. The lack of financial resources is also a factor preventing trainees from doing cross-border traineeship due to the (sometimes even higher) costs involved (see Annex A9.10).
Regarding access to social protection, the evaluation noted that the regulatory strategies regarding traineeships result in uncertain eligibility for social protection of trainees. Similarly, the impact assessment for the Recommendation on access to social protection82 found that in certain EU Member States trainees are not officially included in specific or all branches of the social security system and therefore are in a disadvantaged position compared to regular (standard) employees. These findings are confirmed by the results of the legal analysis conducted under the supporting study (see Annex A9.2). Gaps in access to social protection could put trainees at risk in terms of their welfare and health and contribute to their economic uncertainty as well as to their risk of poverty. This is even more so the case for vulnerable groups. Unpaid trainees do not have access to certain social protection branches, due to the lack of employment status and/or for not fulfilling the minimum contribution period. The latter makes it particularly difficult for young unemployed people with very little or no work experience to gain access to contributory benefits, such as unemployment, sickness, maternity, paternity and parental leave benefits. But also paid trainees, who are in most cases new entrants to the labour market, may face barriers in accessing social benefits due to their short contributory history. The 2023 Eurobarometer shows a large discrepancy in access to social protection between paid trainees (73.6% at EU level) and unpaid trainees (25.4% at EU level). As for types of traineeships, it can generally be observed that coverage is higher in those traineeships where trainees are considered to be in an employment relationship. As a consequence, access to social protection is found to be lowest for ECT across all branches, as trainees are often attributed a student status rather than employment status.
D2.2 Insufficient learning content of traineeships
The evaluation indicated gaps in the legal frameworks to ensure that the tasks of the trainees are aligned with their learning and training objectives. In fact, the principle on alignment of tasks with learning objectives was among the QFT principles that were the least implemented in national legal frameworks in Member States (see Annex 9.5 ). Providing transparent information about learning objectives could help in this regard. In addition, a Eurofound study83 found that trainees with a written agreement tend to be more satisfied with the improvement of skills during the traineeship than those without84. In addition, the same study found that the written agreement is a strong predictor for being offered a job (49% with a written agreement vs 18% without). The Directive on transparent and predictable working conditions (TPWC Directive) does not foresee any requirement to inform about learning objectives of trainees. Evidence shows that the largest gaps in legal provisions in this area are found in the case of OMT. The other three types of traineeships tend to be more regulated (see Annex A9.5). No legal provisions were in place to ensure that tasks allow trainees to work towards their learning and training objectives in 11 Member States for OMT, 1 Member State for ALMP, 5 Member States for ECT and 3 Member States for MPT. The extent to which such provisions are translated into effective learning content seems to be, however, somewhat limited.
The evaluation also identified having a supervisor or a mentor as part of the learning component of traineeships to be a critical quality element which would have a substantial positive impact on labour market integration. Compared to a supervisor, the concept of mentorship denotes providing help and advice and actively following up on the trainees’ progress in conducting their tasks, without necessarily having a subordinate relationship85.
However, the results of the 2013 and the 2023 Eurobarometer showed that there was a 16 percentage points drop in the share of respondents who stated they had access to mentors. The more recent results show that 23% of respondents believed they had no or insufficient access to guidance. The supporting study showed that while legal provisions on supervision or mentorship exist in several countries, gaps remain, in particular for OMT86 (Annex A9.6). For OMT 9 Member States do not have corresponding legal provisions in place, while this is the case in 3 Member States for ALMP, 4 Member States for ECT and 2 Member States as regards MPT.
D2.3 Gaps in scope
In the evaluation, various stakeholders highlighted that the relevance of the QFT could be enhanced by extending the scope of the QFT (currently covering OMT and ALMP traineeships). The supporting study investigated this issue in more depth and found evidence that the identified quality issues also exist in ECT and MPT, albeit to different degrees. It also needs to be highlighted that the quality issues identified mainly concern working conditions (P2.1) rather than learning content (P2.2). Based on the 2023 Eurobarometer, ECT are perceived to be of lower quality in terms of (the lack of) remuneration, compared to the other types of traineeships. As regards working conditions (compared to regular workers) and (the lack of) access to social protection, only OMT are perceived worse. MPT generally tend to be perceived as being of better quality compared to ECT, ALMP and OMT (see Annex 10). However, though no corroborating figures could be found in the EU-LFS, in the 2023 Eurobarometer 35% of MPT respondents claimed to be unpaid and 26% disagreed that they were subject to the same working conditions as (regular) workers. Moreover, traineeships exceeding 6 months were found to be most prevalent for MPT and OMT (both 13% in the 2023 Eurobarometer), and slightly lower for ALMP and ECT (both 11% in the 2023 Eurobarometer).
With regard to the legislative provisions at the national level, the analysis of the supporting study highlights that OMT and ECT legislations tend to allow for unpaid traineeships (85% and 100% respectively, in terms of share of Member States), while this is rare in the case of ALMP (16%) and MPT (4% for medical professions and 12% in the case of legal professions). Gaps in legislation to ensure that tasks are aligned with the learning and training objectives as well as on mentorship are more prevalent for OMT (48% and 37% respectively) and ECT (25% and 21% respectively) than for ALMP (4% and 12% respectively) and MPT (14% and 9% respectively). Finally, all types of traineeships tend to have gaps in legislation on procedures to report malpractice: OMT (70%), ECT (55%), MPT (50%) and ALMP (48%).
In general, OMT are the most problematic in terms of quality issues, while quality issues were also found in ECT and MPT to varying degrees. Both types account for a non-insignificant share of total number of traineeships87.
2.3.4 Drivers related to the unequal access
D3 Barriers of access to traineeships for vulnerable groups, cross-border and hybrid/remote traineeships
In addition to the issues discussed above (see sections 2.3.2 and 2.3.3), additional barriers exist to equal access to traineeships opportunities.
First, the lack of outreach and awareness-raising as regards traineeship opportunities prevents vulnerable groups from taking up a traineeship. As shown by the evaluation, vulnerable groups often lack personal and professional networks, they are less likely to find traineeship opportunities through such networks, and are therefore more dependent on other sources of information. As for cross-border traineeships, the trainee survey of the evaluation showed that 478 out of 1,293 (37%) mentioned a lack of interest as their main reason for not looking for a cross-border traineeship. This might indicate insufficient outreach and awareness-raising on the benefits of cross-border traineeships. Lacking information on the practical and regulatory side (linked to D2.1) of traineeships abroad is another negative driver for their access. In the 2023 Eurobarometer, 22% said they were not well informed about traineeships abroad (see Annex A9.10).
Second, the lack of adapted traineeship programmes tailored to the specific individual needs, for example adjusted workspaces or addressing specific training needs or accessibility requirements for persons with disabilities, is another barrier. In the 2023 Eurobarometer, less than half of the respondents believed that persons with disabilities receive adapted offices or a reasonable adjustment to carry out tasks. Third, equal access to remote/hybrid traineeships is hampered by uneven individual situations in terms of equipment, infrastructure, skills and guidance needed. The lack of any of those (in particular those that incur financial costs) may impede access for vulnerable groups. In this case, the resources a traineeship provider has at its disposal is of crucial importance; SMEs may struggle especially to offer quality remote/hybrid opportunities88. The 2023 Eurobarometer showed that around half of the respondents agree that they received adequate guidance and mentoring to carry out their tasks remotely (54%89) and that they were provided with all the necessary equipment to do so (50%90). Furthermore, the legal analysis of the supporting study showed that 10 Member States (DE, EE, EL, CY, LV, NL, AT, PT, RO, NL) have no formal teleworking arrangements for any type of traineeship (see Annex A9.8). Looking at the results by traineeship type formal telework arrangements indicate that these are lacking in 12 Member States for OMT, in 12 Member States for ALMP, 13 Member States for ECT, and 11 Member States for MPT.
2.3.5 Other factors hampering the use, quality of and access to traineeships
The evaluation also revealed a number of cross-cutting issues that hamper the use, quality of and access to traineeships. These include the weak monitoring frameworks on traineeships, the insufficient involvement of social partners and other relevant stakeholders, the lack of awareness about the QFT quality principles and lack of practical guidance and the lack of sufficient financial and administrative resources, in particular for SMEs (see Annex A9.10).
2.4 How likely is the problem to persist?
According to the projections, the total number of traineeships is expected to grow in the future by 16% (linear growth scenario) or 17.1% (high growth scenario) (see section 5.2 and Annex A7.5). In the absence of EU action, the QFT continues to represent the essential framework for ensuring high-quality traineeships in the EU. After the adoption of the 2014 QFT there was a gradual improvement in the degree of conformity of national regulatory systems with the QFT principles, however, progress has slowed down over the years and there is no indication that Member States are planning reforms on quality traineeships. Some of the recent legal and policy initiatives at EU level could lead to some improvements in the quality of traineeships in the EU by stimulating policies promoting fair/proportionate remuneration, access to social protection, and higher transparency. Nevertheless, these initiatives do not address all the challenges identified (see section 5.1 and Annex A12.1).
In terms of the quality and the problematic use of traineeships, an increase in labour demand could in principle create competition among traineeship providers, which could mitigate some of the challenges identified. However, the competitiveness pressure may continue to incentivise traineeship providers to hire trainees as a cheap source of labour and labour demand developments may affect occupations differently (section 5.2). According to the projections, the number of unpaid traineeships is still expected to increase. Even though the increase is expected to be small (5.3% in the linear growth scenario) this will continue to block access to traineeships for individuals who cannot rely on other sources of income to cover their living expenses, including people in vulnerable groups.
Therefore, in the future, trainees will continue to face challenges resulting from the problems and their drivers described in section 2 regarding the use, quality of and access to traineeships. In highly competitive sectors, jobseekers, in particular young people due to their weak position in the labour market, could still be inclined to engage in work relationships disguised as traineeships, non-compliant or poor-quality traineeships (including those without remuneration) in order to secure access to the labour market. Furthermore, in several sectors where traditionally working conditions were suboptimal, especially those characterised by more manual skills and lower literacy, despite persistent labour and skills shortages the quality of traineeships cannot be expected to improve, following the trend for the general workforce91. Finally, the adaptations related to improving access to traineeships (such as more targeted outreach to vulnerable groups, work organisation and tools in view of remote/hybrid traineeships, and those to facilitate the cross-border dimension) may not be prioritised in order to attract trainees.
2.5 Stakeholders’ views on the problem definition
Regarding the first identified problem (Problematic use of traineeships), the EP resolution, trade unions, employer associations and youth organisations agree on the importance of combatting work relationships disguised as traineeships. Also, according to a survey carried out under the supporting study, almost half of the representatives from Member States (17 out of 38 valid responses) stated that the replacement of regular employment by traineeships is common in their country. Regarding the second identified problem (Poor quality of traineeships), the EP resolution, trade unions and youth organisations consider that fair remuneration and access to social protection are essential quality features missing from the 2014 QFT. The EP resolution condemns unpaid traineeships and states, alongside trade unions and youth organisations, that they are a form of exploitation of young workers. On the other hand, employer associations highlight potential negative consequences of remuneration such as additional costs for employers and a reduced number of traineeship offers. Regarding the learning aspect of traineeships, the EP resolution, trade unions, employer associations and youth organisations agree on the importance of learning objectives in traineeships. Regarding the third identified problem (unequal access to traineeships), the EP resolution states that young people from vulnerable backgrounds are unfairly excluded from accessing employment opportunities. Trade unions, employer associations and youth organisations agree that the 2014 QFT is less effective for vulnerable groups and that marginalised youth are less able to benefit from traineeships due to financial barriers.
3 Why should the EU act?
3.1 Legal basis
According to Article 3 TEU, the Union aims at promoting the wellbeing of its people and works in particular for the sustainable development of Europe based on balanced economic growth and price stability, a highly competitive social market economy, aiming at full employment and social progress.
Title X of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) contains the legal bases at the disposal of the Union for pursuing these objectives in the area of “Social Policy”, commensurate with the competences conferred upon it by the Treaties (Article 5(2) TEU). The use of these competences is governed by the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality (Article 5(3) and 5(4) TEU).
In this title, Article 153(1) TFEU has a wide personal and material scope, providing the legal basis for the EU “to support and complement the activities of the Member States” in a number of fields both inside and outside the labour market. Article 153(2)(b) TFEU empowers the European Parliament and the Council to adopt – in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure – directives setting minimum requirements for gradual implementation, having regard to the conditions and technical rules in each of the Member States.
This legal basis would enable the Union to set minimum standards regarding the working conditions of people doing traineeships. However, any EU action under Article 153 TFEU is subject to strict legal limitations. Under Article 153(1)(b) TFEU, the EU can only take measures on working conditions with regard to trainees, regardless of the type of traineeship, if they are “workers” within the meaning of EU law.
Article 153(5) TFEU excludes an EU measure which would directly require that an activity such as a traineeship has to be performed for pay. Article 153(5) has been interpreted by the CJEU in such a way that the exclusion on ‘pay’ “must be construed as covering measures - such as the equivalence of all or some of the constituent parts of pay and/or the level of pay in the Member States, or the setting of a minimum guaranteed wage - that amount to direct interference by EU law in the determination of pay within the European Union”. “It cannot, however, be extended to any question involving any sort of link with pay; otherwise, some of the areas referred to in Article 153(1) TFEU would be deprived of much of their substance”92.
As regards social protection, the EU’s legislative competence is limited by Article 153(4) TFEU, which states that the measures under Article 153 TFEU “shall not affect the right of Member States to define the fundamental principles of their social security systems and must not significantly affect the financial equilibrium thereof”. Moreover, the Council would have to act unanimously under Article 153(1)(c) TFEU, in accordance with a special legislative procedure (Article 153(2) TFEU).
Article 166 TFEU requires the Union to implement a vocational training policy which supports and supplements the action of the Member States, while fully respecting the responsibility of the Member States for the content and organisation of vocational training. Article 165 TFEU requires the Union to contribute to the development of quality education by encouraging cooperation between Member States and, if necessary, by supporting and supplementing their action, while fully respecting the responsibility of the Member States for the content of teaching and the organisation of education systems and their cultural and linguistic diversity. Both Articles can be considered as legal bases for Union action, but for non-legislative measures, since both of them exclude any harmonisation of the laws and regulations of the Member States.
3.2 Subsidiarity: Necessity of EU action
Member States are confronted with common challenges such as digital, green and demographic transitions (including a shrinking working age-population93), which exacerbate existing labour shortages, skills gaps and mismatches across the EU Single Market (see also 5.1. on the baseline). To support social inclusion, additional efforts will be needed to activate the untapped employment potential of inactive groups, in particular, young people, women and people with disabilities. An EU initiative in this area is warranted to make better use of the potential of traineeships to provide a genuine learning and work experience resulting in successful education-to-work or job-to-job transitions, in line with the objective spelled out in Section 4.1 and the objectives of the 2023 European Year of Skills. Research has confirmed a positive association between traineeships with adequate working conditions94 and an adequate learning and training component95 and beneficial future labour market outcomes for trainees and employers. Notwithstanding the overall relatively small share of trainees in companies, this could also produce beneficial effects for EU business competitiveness, not the least because it would help companies tap into an important source of innovation-ready talent.
Both the 2023 Eurobarometer and the evaluation suggest some improvements in the working conditions96 of trainees across the EU since the adoption of the QFT in 2014. Among the most implemented QFT principle is the written traineeship agreement, which is included in 17 Member States’ legislation governing OMTs and 27 Member States’ legislation governing ALMP traineeships. In addition, the extensive legal analysis conducted in support of this Impact Assessment has pointed out the existence of various good practices in Member States, which are specifically targeted at addressing the identified problems in Section 2 (see Annex 9 for full details). For example, in seven Member States (BG, CY, DE, ES, HU, LT and SI) open market trainees are entitled to at least the minimum wage. In two of these Member States (ES and SI), while the minimum wage is guaranteed, additional provisions exist for trainees providing for proportionate remuneration. 15 Member States have set a maximum duration on OMT, with 6 Member States also restricting consecutive OMT. Four Member States have specific mechanisms of inspections or guidance for all traineeship types (BG, LT, LU, SK). Another four Member States (IE, LT, LU and SK) have procedures for registering complaints and reporting malpractice for all four types of traineeships. As part of its Action Plan – Fight against social fraud 2023-2024, BE has committed to perform 24 targeted investigations per year into suspicious situations related to work relationships disguised as traineeships97. These provisions and actions have inspired the design of the measures assessed in this Impact Assessment.
Nevertheless, despite the progress made, and as shown in Section 2, significant challenges in the use, quality of and access to traineeships occur in all Member States, albeit to a different extent per Member State and per traineeship type, which have similar underlying causes. While Member States can continue to take measures to improve the situation at national level, also taking into account the 2014 QFT (see baseline scenario in Section 5.1), an EU initiative can help to coordinate and focus Member States’ efforts on measures which can address the specific problems identified across all types of traineeships.
While confirming the relevance and added value of the 2014 QFT, the evaluation revealed significant potential to further improve its implementation in national legislation. More specifically, the evaluation, supported by evidence from the legal analysis (see Annex 9), confirm considerable gaps in conformity between national and regional regulatory frameworks and the 2014 QFT, with significant variations across Member States and types of traineeships. Only seven Member States’ legislation is fully/mostly aligned with the QFT principles for OMT, while in seven Member States national legislation is in partial conformity, in five Member States legislation is modestly conform and in one Member State not at all. On the other hand, 18 Member States’ legislation is fully/mostly aligned for ALMP, while in nine Member States there is partial conformity. This shows that though progress has been made, not all Member States have been able to integrate the QFT principles in their national legislation or frameworks. Yet, all national authorities consulted in the evaluation agreed on the added value of the QFT in setting out a common EU framework. Section 2.3.3 (and Annex 10) show in detail that quality issues also exist for ECT and MPT, though to a lesser extent than for OMT.
Based on the views of various stakeholders, including the Conference on the Future of Europe, the European Parliament, public authorities, trade unions and youth organisations, the evaluation also pointed out important areas for complementing the QFT with essential principles to improve the quality and accessibility of traineeships, including in particular remuneration and access to social protection. For example, according to the data presented in Section 1.2, around half of trainees in the EU do not receive a remuneration. Employers have referred to the consideration of the impact of remote forms of working as part of an update of the Council Recommendation.
Another key finding of the evaluation related to the need to strengthen the practical application and enforcement of the 2014 QFT’s principles in Member States’ labour markets. Diverse regulatory approaches at national level are generally accompanied by weak monitoring and enforcement mechanisms, which had already been described in the Impact Assessment underpinning the 2014 QFT98. The evaluation also highlighted substantial variations in the existence and functioning of monitoring and enforcement mechanisms across Member States and found that, in particular for OMT, even where such mechanisms exist, they have a limited impact on ensuring the practical application of regulations. The lack of enforcement of rights and working conditions under EU and national law, as laid down in principle 6 of the 2014 QFT, is also compounded by the trainees’ fragile labour market situation. It results in obstacles for trainees to effectively access their rights and hampers the effectiveness of EU law and of national measures implementing the 2014 QFT. Section 2.1.1 shows relevant evidence of unlawful practices whereby trainees in situations of disguised employment or in non-compliant traineeships lack effective access to the protection guaranteed by EU law (where they are workers under EU law), national legislation and collective agreements.
3.3 Subsidiarity: Added value of EU action
The main added value of EU action is to create a consistent framework of principles and minimum standards across all Member States to improve the use, quality of and access to traineeships to contribute to better labour market outcomes of traineeships. Promoting employment and improved living and working conditions are objectives which are clearly set in the EU Treaties. This initiative can also be seen as part of the EU's commitment to implement the European Pillar of Social Rights and to improving working conditions and living standards, especially of younger people, while taking into account the needs and constraints of enterprises, particularly SMEs.
EU action would therefore bring particular added value in the 12 Member States with a high prevalence of trainees (see Section 6.5 for more details) and in Member States with a limited or fragmented regulatory framework for traineeships. It would also aim to support those Member States with weak enforcement mechanisms. For the Member States that already have effective measures to tackle the identified problems in Section 2 of this Impact Assessment, the direct impact of the EU initiative might be smaller, but they would benefit from the coherent and better coordinated approach across the EU (see Annex 9 for a detailed overview per Member State and type). Companies in these Member States could also benefit from a more diverse pool of trainees (and future workers) with an innovation-ready mindset.
The initiative would support Member States’ upward regulatory convergence and better enforcement of existing labour rights, contributing to a level- playing field for trainees and traineeship providers in the EU. Such a level playing field is increasingly relevant to both social inclusion and business competitiveness, given existing skills mismatches in the EU and the significant increase of cross-border traineeships within the EU (see section 2.1.4). The evaluation illustrated the importance for trainees of reduced regulatory fragmentation, common quality requirements and transparent information about applicable rules to further facilitate their cross-border mobility in the Single Market.
From the perspective of employers, and provided that EU action avoids imposing undue burdens on businesses, especially SMEs, EU action can yield substantial advantages by ensuring a level playing field across various economic operators investing in and benefitting from traineeships, by preventing employers/ traineeship providers from lowering costs through the problematic use of traineeships, as well as helping mitigate issues related to skills mismatch, one of the drivers of labour shortages99. Indeed, notwithstanding the relatively small prevalence of trainees compared to the overall working population, business competitiveness does require companies to have easier access to young talent, in order to foster growth and innovation.
Given the diversity of national systems and rules on work-based learning and the diversity in types of traineeships described in Section 1 and Annexes 7 and 9, the form and content of EU action would need to strictly respect the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality by allowing Member States to adapt the measures taken to the specificities of their national systems, in particular when it comes to regulatory enforcement and the independence of labour inspectorates, (vocational) education and training and (access to) regulated professions. Moreover, possible unintended consequences of EU action need to be carefully considered, including as regards the supply of quality traineeships and potential shifts from paid to unpaid traineeships. Therefore, particular attention is consistently paid in Sections 5, 6 and 7 to the necessity, added value and proportionality of legislative options to address the identified problems at EU level, compared to the baseline and non-legislative options.
4 Objectives: What is to be achieved?
4.1 General objectives
The general objective of this initiative is to improve the use, quality of and access to traineeships across the EU, so that they provide a genuine learning and work experience which will result in successful education-to-work or job-to-job transitions.
4.2 Specific objectives
The specific objectives through which the general objective will be addressed are to:
1. Facilitate and strengthen the enforcement of applicable legislation and support trainees in accessing their labour rights;
2. Prevent the problematic use of traineeships;
3. Support fair working conditions for traineeships, including remuneration and access to social protection;
4. Improve the learning component of traineeships;
5. Foster inclusiveness and improve access to traineeship opportunities.

5 What are the available policy options?
This section presents policy options to achieve the specific objectives (SO). The policy options are structured under 4 different areas in order to establish a clear link between the identified problems and policy options and to simplify the assessment and comparison of options. The chosen structure derives from the different personal and material scopes of the initiative as well as the legal constraints that limit the possibility for EU action.
• Policy Options under Area A aims to achieve SO1 and SO2 and to address the problem of problematic use of traineeships (P1). They are also expected to indirectly contribute all other specific objectives.
• Policy Options under Area B correspond to SO3 and SO4 and to the problem of poor quality traineeships (P2). They are also expected to indirectly contribute to SO5.
• The Policy Option under Area C corresponds to SO5 and aims to address the problem of unequal access to traineeships (P3). 
• The Policy Option Under Area D aims to achieve SO3, SO4 and SO5 and to address the problems of poor quality traineeships (P2) and unequal access to traineeships (P3). 
For each area, alternative policy options were identified100 to achieve the specific objectives which are assessed individually against the baseline scenario (see section 6) and then compared to identify one preferred option per area (see section Error: Reference source not found). These four preferred options were combined to form the preferred option for the overall initiative for which the combined impacts are assessed in section Error: Reference source not found. Therefore, no other combinations of options were assessed. This was considered to be the most appropriate approach given that the three problems are independent of each other and thus the policy options to address them are mutually exclusive (even though the policy options under one area could indirectly contribute to achieving the specific objectives corresponding to other areas). The intervention logic is presented in Figure 1Error: Reference source not found. The scope of each measure is described in sections 5.3-5.6.
 Figure 1 Intervention Logic
5.1 Personal and material scope within the limits of EU action
The scope of all the options is all (paid and unpaid) trainees in the EU. Also, all options (non-legislative and legislative) cover all types of traineeships in all economic sectors, i.e. open market traineeships (OMT), those that are part of active labour market policy (ALMP), those that are part of formal education and training (ECT) and those mandatory to access a certain profession (MPT). The scope of the existing framework (2014 QFT) is thus extended.
Regarding the types of traineeships and sectors, one single regulatory approach is adopted in all options. While the different types of traineeships may have different objectives and characteristics, specific to the relevant circumstances in the Member States, the main quality principles are valid for all of them (see section 2.1). Overall, similar problems have been identified in all types of traineeships (OMT, ALMP, ECT and MPT), although to varying degree in the different Member States (see Annex 10) and across economic sectors (see Annex A7.4). To take all this into account, while promoting a consistent approach regarding the overarching quality principles, a single regulatory approach across all types of traineeships constitutes the rule, but policy options have in-built flexibility, where relevant, which allows for a differentiated approach depending on the specificities of the various types of traineeships, taking into consideration their objectives and characteristics, as well as specific national conditions. For example, as discussed in section 2.3.2 while an excessive long duration could be an indication of a work relationship disguised as a traineeship, this is not the case for MPT which warrant a longer learning experience. Therefore, the proposed policy options on duration (see section 5.3.2) allow Member States to define exceptions for cases where a longer duration is justified by objective grounds, taking into account national practices. More generally, this consistent approach with built-in flexibility was considered more suitable than proposing different regulatory provisions for different types of traineeships. The latter approach would make the initiative more complex and difficult to implement considering the diversity of national regulatory traineeship systems (see Annex A9.1).
Regarding paid and unpaid trainees, different regulatory approaches are necessary. This is due to the fact that the EU competence in the area of working conditions, including for trainees, is subject to strict legal limitations (see section 3.1). EU action could set minimum standards regarding the working conditions of people doing traineeships. However, under Article 153(1)(b) TFEU, the EU can only take legally binding measures by means of a Directive for trainees considered as “workers” within the meaning of EU law. Article 153(5) TFEU excludes an EU measure that would directly require that an activity such as a traineeship has to be performed for remuneration.
Therefore, legislative options are limited to trainees considered as workers under EU law101. The aim of the initiative is to make proportionate use of the available measures within the legal constraints. The EU acquis already provides for many rights for workers. As long as trainees fulfil the legal definition of “worker”, these rights should be afforded to this group of trainees. Therefore, the legislative option for only part of the trainees is considered as an appropriate and, in fact, the only legally feasible approach to ensure that all trainees considered as a worker under EU law have the same access and protection under the EU law. As a result, the option of proposing legally binding measures for trainees not considered as workers under EU law has to be disregarded upfront (see section 5.8 on discarded options).
In the sections below, for each proposed option/measure it is clarified whether it applies to all trainees, or those who are considered workers under EU law (“worker trainees”), or those who are not considered workers under EU law (“non-worker trainees”). Since most issues, except for remuneration, affect both paid and unpaid trainees in similar ways, the options include mostly the same measures for paid and unpaid traineeships, although be it in different legal instruments, to respect the legal basis. These different instruments have the potential to reinforce each other through on the one hand targeted binding measures applicable to worker trainees, complemented by a wider range of non-binding measures applicable to all trainees. Full implementation of non-binding measures (in a non-legislative option) may be difficult to ensure (the evaluation assessed the overall implementation of the 2014 Recommendation as moderate). However, if flanked by a binding instrument, renewed political commitment and ownership, and together with accompanying measures, the implementation of (reinforced) non-binding measures could be strengthened.
Concerning possible trade-offs, it can be expected that the enforcement measures help to prevent the problematic use by sending a signal to traineeship providers, thus creating synergies between SO1 regarding enforcement and SO2 regarding prevention. Also, more costs for employers might reduce the aggregate number of traineeships offered, and therefore result in fewer opportunities to access traineeships. This could indicate a possible trade-off between SO3 regarding remuneration and social protection and SO5 regarding access. Some of these trade-offs could lead to potential unintended consequences, which are recognised but can reasonably be expected to be of limited impact, and are discussed in more detail in section Error: Reference source not found.
While these interrelations exist, the main contribution to any specific objective comes from a measure/set of measures targeting this specific objective. This is why the options are presented per problem/specific objective. This approach also aims to reduce the complexity of the intervention logic.
5.2 What is the baseline from which options are assessed?
This section depicts the ‘no-policy change’ scenario against which the proposed policy options are compared (see Annex A12.1 for more details). Two scenarios are considered: a linear growth scenario and a high growth scenario).
Assuming that between 2021 and 2030 the number of traineeships in the EU will follow the same linear growth rate as during the 2014-2019102 period (linear growth scenario), by 2030 the total number of trainees is expected to increase by 16.3% (increase by 36% and 5.3% for paid and unpaid traineeships respectively). An increase is expected for ALMP traineeships, ECT and MPT, while OMT are expected to decrease driven by a decline in paid OMT (see Annex A7.5 for more details and Annex A4.2 for methodology)
Moreover, evidence shows that there are trainees who are wrongly classified as non-workers (see section 2.1.1), which would continue to be deprived from the full set of their labour rights. In the absence of EU action, the identified problems and their drivers (see section 2) are expected to persist. Work relationships disguised as traineeships found in several countries would continue to create unfair market competition. Job-seekers, in particular young people due to their weak position in the labour market, could still be inclined to engage in work relationships disguised as traineeships, non-compliant or poor quality traineeships (including those without remuneration) in order to secure access to the labour market. This might happen especially in highly competitive sectors (e.g. science and technology, engineering, ICT). Such practices constitute an obstacle to the successful transition of young people to the labour market with a long-lasting impact on their future career trajectory and exert a downward pressure on wages and opportunities of entry-level workers in the coming years, also negatively affecting skills mismatches and, notwithstanding the relatively small prevalence of trainees compared to the overall working population, business competitiveness103.
At the same time, the EU is facing labour shortages with several drivers, including the shrinking of the EU working age population104, skills mismatches driven by the twin green and digital transition, gender segregation in certain sectors, contributing to them105. This, in turn, could increase competition among traineeship providers (a “race for talent”) leading to the reduction of work relationships disguised as traineeships or non-compliant traineeships and/or the increase in the provision of good quality traineeships by traineeship providers (including pay or working conditions).
The above could explain certain improvements between 2013 and 2023 in the Eurobarometer findings such as an increase in the number of respondents who were paid or offered financial compensation for their last traineeship. Indeed, firms with higher labour shortages tend to pay higher wages to keep incumbent and attract new workers.106 Extending this finding to traineeships, however, should not be done automatically: where shortages increase the pressure on workers’ work-life balance, employers could hire trainees to perform administrative and repetitive tasks and reduce the work-burden on the rest of the workforce, which could lead to an increase in the number of poor quality traineeships.
It is important to consider that the emergence of labour shortages is concentrated in certain sectors (healthcare, STEM / ICT, construction, and certain service occupations) and that in certain occupations, especially those characterised by more manual skills and lower literacy, poor working conditions do not seem to be offset by the “race for talent”107. For example, 28 surplus occupations were identified in 24 EU countries in 2022. These include both clerical occupations and professional occupations requiring third-level qualifications (especially in humanities or creative arts)108. These are sectors of the economy in which cases of problematic use of traineeships have been reported to be particularly common109.
In a foresight perspective110 it is clear that these structural drivers will continue to play a significant role, and to the extent that they can drive a skills-based competition among traineeship providers, they should not be underestimated. However, based on past labour market dynamics, it seems too optimistic to conclude that an increase in the quality of traineeships will materialise quickly enough and evenly across sectors and Member States, in the absence of improvements to the current QFT. In any case, given the transformation of the labour market due to the twin transitions and the emergence of new skills needs111, there will be an increasing need for high quality traineeships to address labour and skills shortages and maintain the EU’s competitiveness.
To reflect the above trends, a high growth scenario,112 different from the linear growth scenario outlined above, is also considered which assumes an increase in OMT, resulting in an increase in the overall number of traineeships by 17.1% (see Annex A4.2 for more details on the methodology and Annex A7.5 on a discussion of expected trends).
In the absence of EU action, the 2014 QFT will continue to be the EU framework the quality of traineeships. As Member States do not have a legal obligation to apply or enforce its principles, the gradual improvement in the degree of conformity of national regulatory systems with the principles of the 2014 QFT seen in recent years113 can be expected to continue at a slow pace. Further gradual improvements do not concern ECT and MPT, nor issues which are not covered by QFT principles (e.g. access to remuneration and social protection, inclusiveness and accessibility). Furthermore, the 2014 QFT does not address several aspects such as the potential abuse of consecutive traineeships. While the EU acquis sets minimum rights for workers, including trainees considered as workers under EU law114 (see Annex A12.1 for overview), these initiatives are not sufficient to address all the challenges identified in section 2.1.
The persistence (or even acceleration) of the ‘job-hopping’ phenomenon115 can further disincentivise traineeship providers from offering quality traineeships, as they could consistently face the negative human capital externality of losing out on the investment made on trainees. The increase in remote forms of work triggered by the pandemic could improve access to traineeship, including for cross-border trainees or those residing in remote areas. Nonetheless, certain individuals, such as persons from a disadvantaged socio-economic background or persons with disabilities, may not benefit from the increase in remote forms of work, if not properly adapted to their needs. Due to the persistent intergenerational transmission of educational disadvantage, the most vulnerable groups will not benefit from the opportunities offered by the transitions under the baseline scenario.
5.3 Policy options for addressing the problematic uses of traineeships (Area A)
This section presents the policy options corresponding primarily to Specific Objective 1 and Specific Objective 2 while also indirectly contributing to the 3 other specific objectives (see section 4.2).
5.3.1 Options to facilitate and strengthen enforcement of the rights of trainees and support trainees (Area A1)
All options concern measures to ensure that the rights of all trainees, irrespective of their legal status (workers and non-workers) under applicable EU and national law, are respected. For trainees who are considered as workers under EU law, the options also include binding rules on effective controls and inspections to detect work relationships disguised as traineeships and non-compliant traineeships and take enforcement measures to ensure full access of individuals who are workers under EU law (persons in disguised employment and genuine trainees) to the labour rights enshrined in EU law (see section 2.1.1).
[Fully non-legislative] Option A1.1 provides recommendations to Member States to put in place effective monitoring and enforcement to ensure that the rights and working conditions of all trainees under applicable EU and national law are respected. The applicable EU law for trainees who are considered workers is the whole EU labour acquis, while for trainees considered as non-workers this includes rights stemming from EU occupational health and safety legislation and where applicable, national law (see Annex A12.1). It also entails recommendations to Member States to promote access to workers’ representations and other legal entities to defend their rights as well as to ensure channels for trainees to report malpractice and poor conditions. These measures would support trainees in enforcing their labour rights (existing rights and any possible new material rights conferred by the EU initiative). Finally, this option foresees reinforcing Principle 14 of the 2014 QFT on transparency of vacancies (baseline) by adding the level of remuneration, working conditions, the coverage of social protection, the expected tasks and learning and training component. This option would apply to all trainees (workers and non-workers) as well as to all types of traineeships (OMT, ALMP, ECT and MPT) as the need for improvements was identified for all.
Option A1.2 would include the non-legislative option A1.1 combined with a top-up legislative measure targeted only to trainees considered as workers across all types of traineeships. It would require Member States to provide for effective controls and inspections by competent authorities to detect and take enforcement action against work relationships disguised as traineeships and non-compliant traineeships. The measure would entail ensuring adequate human, technical and financial resources and developing the capability (in particular through training and guidance) of competent authorities; imposing effective, proportionate and dissuasive penalties, and putting an obligation to employers to provide (upon request) relevant information to the competent authorities. To determine whether a traineeship constitutes a work relationship disguised as a traineeship, competent authorities would need to make an overall assessment of all relevant factual elements. This option would require Member States to define a set of elements at national level (in accordance with national practices) which may point at the risk of work relationships being disguised as traineeships. In addition, this option would oblige employers to improve transparency of vacancies by providing in the notices information on the working conditions of the trainees who are considered workers across all types of traineeships, including expected tasks, learning content, working conditions, and remuneration and social protection. This would empower trainees to take informed decisions and could contribute to address work relationships disguised as traineeships. It would also make the following measures legally binding: ensuring that workers’ representatives, or other actors with a legitimate interest, may engage in procedures to enforce the rights of trainees; as well as ensuring channels for trainees to report malpractice and poor conditions for trainees who are considered as workers across all types of traineeships.
Option A1.3 would include the non-legislative Option A1.1 and the same legislative measures as in Option A1.2 targeted to trainees who are considered as workers across all types of traineeships. However, differently from Option A1.2, the elements to detect work relationships disguised as traineeships would be defined at EU level. They would rely on existing case law116 and regulatory approaches in the Member States. These elements would be formulated broad enough in view to respect existing legislation in Member States and allowing Member States’ competent authorities to consider the specificities of certain types of traineeships when evaluating the parameter, for instance in the case of MPT which might warrant a longer duration than other types of traineeships. This approach would contribute to developing a common understanding at EU level of the main features of work relationships disguised as traineeships, specifically building on the following indicative elements:
• the absence of a significant learning or training component in the traineeship.
• excessive duration of the traineeship or multiple and/or consecutive traineeships with the same employer by the same individual. The excessive duration for the purpose of controls by national authorities is to be set at Member States level to take into account national circumstances;
• the fact that the employer requires candidates for traineeships to have previous work experience in the field of activity; 
• a high ratio of traineeships compared with regular employment relationships at the same employer;
• equivalent levels of tasks, responsibilities and intensity of work for trainees and regular employees at the same employer;
• the fact that the trainee had completed two or more traineeships or held regular job positions in the field of activity, prior to taking up the traineeship.
The presence of one or more of these elements would not automatically lead to determining the existence of a work relationship disguised as a traineeship, as the overall assessment itself and the subsequent decision remain entirely in the competence of Member States’ authorities. Likewise, the absence of those indications should therefore not automatically preclude a situation from being a work relationship disguised as a traineeship by competent national authorities.
In addition, this option would make the following measures legally binding: ensuring that workers’ representatives, or other actors with a legitimate interest, may engage in procedures to enforce the rights of trainees; as well as ensuring channels for trainees to report malpractice and poor conditions for trainees who are considered as workers across all types of traineeships.
Stakeholders’ views: The EP resolution stresses the importance of reporting malpractice and poor working conditions through established channels and highlighted cooperation with the national labour inspectorates and other relevant authorities. During the two-phase social partners’ consultation, trade unions called for binding EU-level action to combat work relationships disguised as traineeships and underlined the need for a dedicated complaint channels and for the possibility to report malpractice and poor working conditions through established channels. Trade unions also stressed the importance of strengthening labour inspectorates. Employer associations argued that work relationships disguised as traineeships are best addressed at national level while most agree that having an indicative common understanding at EU-level would be useful to ensure that all relevant actors (e.g. employers, trainees and regulatory authorities) have an objective set of criteria to assess the conducts of traineeships. Employer associations also highlighted that national authorities should carry out dedicated checks and inspections without increasing reporting obligations for employers. Stakeholders interviewed under the supporting study agreed that strengthening reporting channels could have benefits, including enforcing trainees’ existing rights, increasing trainees’ awareness of their rights and providing avenues for legal redress.
5.3.2 Options to prevent the problematic use of traineeships (Area A2) 
The options in this section concern rules regarding duration of traineeships and previous experience, which were identified as important drivers of the problematic use of traineeships. On duration, alternative measures were considered which were discarded (see section 5.8). While recognising that the optimal duration might vary by type of traineeship (see section 2.3.2), the problem analysis shows that a duration longer than 6 months could be an indication of a work relationship disguised as a traineeship, if not justified by the nature and purpose of the specific type of traineeship. In order to respect subsidiarity considerations while promoting a consistent approach at EU level, both options set out below allow Member States to define what would justify a longer duration, while proposing the same maximum duration across all types of traineeships.
[Fully non-legislative] Option A2.1 would provide recommendations to Member States to establish and/or reinforce national regulation on traineeship as regards duration and requirements on candidate trainees’ previous experience. Rules on these two aspects would help prevent the problematic use of traineeships. On duration, Principle 10 of the 2014 QFT117 (baseline) would be strengthened by recommending that the duration of repeated, including consecutive118, traineeships with the same employer is limited, in principle, to 6 months. Though the recommendations on duration would apply to all types of traineeships, and – given the instrument – be legally non-binding by definition, the recommendations would provide additional flexibility to Member States by catering for exceptions for cases where a longer duration is justified by objective grounds and taking into account national practices. As there are trajectories whereby acquisition of skills and knowledge benefit from a longer duration across different types of traineeships,119 in its guidance to Member States, the non-legislative option would provide examples of exceptions to the duration recommendations, notably as regards MPT and certain ECT, whilst leaving room to Member States to provide further exemptions, if objective grounds exist. Recommendations preventing employers to require previous work experience from candidate trainees would be added as a new principle. This option would apply to all trainees (workers and non-workers) as well as to all types of traineeships (OMT, ALMP, ECT and MPT).
Option A2.2 would include a combination of the non-legislative Option A2.1 with a legislative measure which would define at EU level that the maximum total duration of traineeships, including the sum of repeated/consecutive traineeships with the same employer, should not exceed 6 months, unless a longer duration is justified by objective grounds. Principle 10 of the 2014 QFT already recommends a maximum duration of 6 months to limit distortions to the labour market, particularly in terms of the risk of substituting regular jobs with traineeships and it would be strengthened by Option A2.1. Option A2.2 makes this strengthened Principle 10 legally binding for trainees who are considered as workers across all types of traineeships as using traineeships to replace regular jobs remains a concern. Given that the evaluation pointed to divergent views of stakeholders on the exact length and in order to take into account diverse national situations, this option provides for an in-built flexibility allowing Member States to envisage exceptions justified on objective grounds. Decisions would be left to Member States, while non-exhaustive and non-binding guidance/examples of potential exceptions would be provided (e.g. specific types of mandatory traineeships which warrant a longer duration, such as those related to formal education curricula (ECT) or access to certain (regulated) professions (MPT)120 and/or some other traineeships e.g., under the Erasmus+ programme).
Stakeholders' views: The EP resolution calls for 1) a minimum duration of 1 month for OMT, ALMP and MPT and 6 months for ECT, 2) ensuring that (long) duration does not result in replacing regular jobs and 3) traineeship providers to not require previous working experience for traineeships. During the two-phase social partners’ consultation, trade unions underlined the need for a maximum duration of 6 months and in exceptional circumstances one year. Employers also agree that candidates for traineeships should in principle not be required to have previous work experience in the field of activity. Employer associations support the reasonable maximum duration of traineeships as set out in the 2014 QFT, but do not support a legally binding limit. SMEunited also states that enterprises having to provide justification for longer traineeships would generate additional burden for SMEs. In the survey conducted under the supporting study, a majority of national stakeholders at least somewhat agrees that a limit on the maximum duration of traineeships can help reduce the risk of work relationships being disguised as traineeships121. During the evaluation, employer organisations, national authorities, and some national PES argue that a limited duration can prevent work relationships being disguised as traineeships. Youth organisations, trade unions, and other national PES argue that a longer duration might in certain cases allow employers to see trainees as an investment in their future workforce or a way to transmit specialised skills.
5.4 Policy options for addressing poor quality traineeships (Area B)
This section presents the policy options corresponding primarily to Specific Objective 3 and Specific Objective 4; it also indirectly contributes to achieving Specific Objective 5 (see section 4.2). Options to improve access to remuneration and social protection (Area B1).
5.4.1 Options to improve the working conditions of trainees (Area B1)
[Fully non-legislative option] B1.1 would consist of recommendations to Member States to ensure fair/proportionate remuneration and provide guidelines to Member States on determining fairness/proportionality, such as the respective weight of learning and work components, the trainee’s tasks and responsibilities and the value and the intensity of the trainee’s work. Member States would be recommended to compare these elements to those of other entry-level workers in the same establishment, in accordance with national law, collective agreements or practice. This option would also entail recommendations to ensure that trainees have access to social protection. These recommendations would thus complement the 2019 Council Recommendation on access to social protection for workers and self-employed, which is not applicable to trainees who are not considered workers. It would be up to Member States to decide whether and how to implement these recommendations, in respect of subsidiarity and proportionality. The option would apply to all trainees (workers and non-workers) as well as to all types of traineeships (OMT, ALMP, ECT and MPT).
Option B1.2 would include a combination of the non-legislative option B1.1 and a legislative measure facilitating the application of the principle of non-discrimination to trainees considered as workers under EU law, across all types of traineeships. The legislative measure would require Member States to ensure that trainees are not treated less favourably as regards their working conditions, including remuneration, than comparable entry-level employees in the same establishment. However, objective grounds, such as different tasks and lower responsibilities may justify different treatment. This provision would apply in addition to the principle of non-discrimination laid down in the Fixed-Term Work Directive, which provides for equal treatment of fixed-term workers with comparable permanent workers in the same establishment unless different treatment is justified on objective grounds. The additional provision would be necessary first, as the Fixed-Term Work Directive allows Member States to exclude certain trainees from its scope (see footnote 79) and, second, to ensure that in addition to comparable permanent workers, comparable entry-level fixed-term workers can also serve as comparators to trainees.
Option B1.3 would include the non-legislative option B1.1 but would make the non-binding measure on fair/proportionate remuneration of Option B1.1 a legally binding individual right for trainees who are considered as workers across all types of traineeships. The principle of fair/proportionate remuneration would be construed similarly to the principle of “pro rata temporis” (Clause 4 of the Part-Time Work Directive), which applies to ensure the principle of non-discrimination for part-time workers and would have to be applied in line with the Minimum Wage Directive122. In practice this option requires Member States to ensure that paid trainees are remunerated at a level that is fair/proportionate, while it recommends to Member States to ensure that also unpaid trainees are fairly/proportionately remunerated. In contrast to option B1.2, option B1.3 would not affect any other working conditions beyond remuneration.
Stakeholders’ views: The EP resolution stresses that unpaid traineeships are a form of exploitation of young workers and a violation of their rights and calls for a common legal framework to ensure fair remuneration. The EP resolution also calls for a directive to ensure minimum quality standards, including access to social protection. Multiple stakeholders also call for a ban of unpaid traineeships. They include the Conference on the Future of Europe, civil society organisations123 and trade unions124. Trade unions express similar views during the two-phase social partners’ consultation while they also raise concerns regarding gaps in access to social protection for trainees. Employer associations state that trainees who are workers under national law should be subject to the applicable rules on remuneration, social protection and intellectual property, while the learning component of a traineeship may justify a lower remuneration than that of regular workers. In the evaluation on the 2014 QFT, some employer associations state that remuneration is not an element increasing the quality of traineeships while both youth organisations and civil society organisations raise concerns on access to social protection.
5.4.2 Options to improve the learning component of traineeships and the written agreement (Area B2)
All options concern strengthened rights to written information. The non-legislative option would recommend ensuring mentorship. These options aim to ensure a proper learning content of traineeships helping training providers and trainees to match tasks and learning objectives to better respond to the rapidly changing skills needs arising from the twin transitions125.
[Fully non-legislative option] B2.1 would entail strengthening Principle 2 of the 2014 QFT on the written agreement (baseline) by adding the following elements to improve the learning component: the tasks to be carried out, the arrangements for mentorship, supervision and evaluation. Recommendations to add information on the following elements to increase transparency on working conditions would be made: remuneration and social protection coverage. Addressing the learning content, recommendations would call on Member States to ensure that traineeship providers designate a mentor acting as an advisor to the trainee, providing coaching and support. This option would apply to all trainees (workers and non-workers) as well as to all types of traineeships (OMT, ALMP, ECT and MPT).
Option B2.2 would also include a combination of a legislative measure with the non-legislative option B2.1. The legislative measure under Option B2.2 would make the strengthened Principle 2 of the non-legislative Option B2.1 legally binding for trainees who are considered as workers across all types of traineeships. This would introduce the right for trainees considered as workers to a written traineeship agreement, for all types of traineeships, covering the information elements listed in the TPWC Directive and the additional elements listed in Option B2.1.
Stakeholders’ views: The EP resolution states that a directive should include a written traineeship agreement covering the rights and obligations of the trainee and the traineeship provider, including learning and educational objectives. The EP resolution also states that the directive should also contain transparency requirements for vacancies, including information on the terms and conditions of the traineeship (e.g. remuneration, working conditions, expected tasks). During the two-phase social partners’ consultation, trade unions advocated for mandatory written traineeship contracts covering learning objectives, mentoring, and supervision and stated that these written contracts must be registered with national authorities, allowing transparency, control and data collection. Employer associations opposed obligations on written learning objectives or learning agreements and called for transparency requirements to be non-binding, especially to reduce administrative burdens on SMEs. Youth organisations also argue for written agreements and transparency requirements. In the evaluation of the 2014 QFT, national PES and national authorities highlight that the written agreement, reflecting the transparency on the rights and obligations, is a “bedrock” of the traineeship. Furthermore, several stakeholders underline the importance of the provision of adequate mentorship, even more so in the context of digital traineeships, including youth organisations, trade unions, PES, and national authorities from a number of countries. However, some employer associations and other national authorities warn about additional costs, especially for SMEs.
5.5 Measures for addressing unequal access to quality traineeships (Area C)
This section presents the measures which aim to achieve Specific Objective 5: Foster inclusiveness and improve access to traineeship opportunities.
In this section only one (fully non-legislative) option is considered which is recommendations aiming to address the barriers to access to 1) traineeships for vulnerable groups, 2) quality cross-border traineeships and 3) remote/hybrid traineeships. These measures build on the results of the evaluation on the 2014 QFT. No alternatives are considered to the measures described below, apart from the baseline option, in line with the findings of the evaluation (see Annex A12.2 for more details on the measures).
With a view to ensuring equal access to traineeships for groups in vulnerable situations this option would make recommendations to Member States to ensure inclusive traineeship opportunities, in terms of outreach to and equal treatment of all people belonging to vulnerable groups and to ensure that workplaces are adapted to be accessible to trainees with disabilities.
To ensure equal access to cross-border traineeships, this option would give recommendations to Member States to improve information provision on cross-border traineeships and to facilitate cross-border traineeships using the European cooperation network of employment services (EURES). Member States would also be encouraged to ensure that the quality principles are applied in traineeship mobility agreements with hosting organisations outside the EU.
Finally, in order to ensure equal access to remote and hybrid traineeships, this option would give recommendations to Member States to facilitate remote and hybrid traineeships through an appropriate working arrangement and environment including equipment, infrastructure and mentoring and by ensuring that the quality criteria apply also to remote and hybrid traineeships.
Stakeholders’ views: The EP resolution stresses the need for new principles to ease the transition of all young people into the labour market, particularly people in vulnerable situations, including persons with disabilities. Regarding cross-border traineeships, the EP resolution suggests further development of EURES and that the Commission and Member States facilitate cross-border recognition of skills. During the two-phase social partners’ consultation, trade unions highlight the importance of the principle of reasonable accommodation for trainees. Trade unions also state the need for quality principles on cross-border traineeships, while creating an EU-level platform could improve transparency and allow for the exchange of experiences. Employer associations welcome support in facilitating access to traineeships for persons with disabilities. However, SMEunited notes that employers, though supporting inclusiveness measures, may not be best placed to actively reach out to vulnerable groups and that this would be better left to actors such as national PES. Employer associations also argue for the need for more data on remote and hybrid traineeships while stating that they see an added value in supporting information provision on cross-border traineeship opportunities and in the simplification of procedures, in particular through the EURES portal. 
5.6 Measure for addressing gaps in scope (Area D)
In this section only one fully non-legislative option is considered, which is to extend the scope of the QFT recommendation to ECT and MPT, rendering the existing, revised and additional quality principles applicable to all traineeships. The extension of the scope to only one of the two types was discarded at an early stage, as explained in section 5.8. The issue of scope is irrelevant for the binding instrument as, due to its legal basis, it would be applicable to all trainees who are workers, regardless of the type of traineeship they are undertaking.
The extension of the scope of the non-binding instrument to ECT would be supported by the sheer prevalence of ECT amongst the total number of traineeships, and the quality issues and gaps in national legislation that came to light in the study supporting this initiative. The analysis shows that MPT represent a smaller share of the total number of traineeships, quality issues are perceived to be fewer and gaps in legislation are less substantial compared to the other three types of traineeships. However, like the other types of traineeships, MPT were also found to lack channels for trainees to report malpractice. To safeguard the relevance and the coherence of the non-binding instrument for all trainees(hips), an extension of the scope to include both ECT and MPT is envisaged.
The extension to ECT could lead to an overlap with rules for apprentices, depending on national definitions of traineeships and apprenticeships. As apprenticeships are covered by the Recommendation on a European Framework for Quality and Effective Apprenticeships, the non-binding option would provide flexibility to Member States to assess which of the two quality frameworks should apply to VET work-based learning experiences, depending on their national and regional specific features. When doing so, to ensure that all learners in work-based learning receive the highest level of protection, Member States would be encouraged (as relevant) to apply the framework conditions which are more protective among the two frameworks, in line with national circumstances.
Stakeholders’ views: The EP resolution calls for a directive covering OMT, ALMP traineeships and MPT. ECT should be covered in a decision. During the two-phase social partners’ consultation, trade unions stated that a directive should cover OMT, ALMP traineeships and MPT, while a recommendation should cover all types of traineeships. On the other hand, employer associations did not support enlarging the scope, based on the view that ECT and MPT are already subject to structured and regulated governance systems.
5.7 Accompanying measures
All policy options in the four areas presented above could be introduced in combination with the (fully) non-legislative accompanying measures presented below, which were selected following the results of the evaluation. These correspond to other factors hampering the use, quality and access to traineeships, as identified in the evaluation and they are expected to contribute to all the specific objectives. Their main purpose is to enhance the effectiveness of all policy areas. Member States would be able to decide at national level on how to implement these measures:
1. Improving monitoring and data collection on prevalence and quality of traineeships.
2. Ensuring the effective involvement of social partners and other relevant stakeholders, in the implementation and monitoring of the rights and obligation arising from this initiative.
3. Strengthening awareness raising, partnerships between relevant stakeholders and the exchange of best practices, also between Member States and stakeholders, in the area of high-quality traineeships, including on cross-border traineeships.
4. Supporting employers (financial and/or practical guidance), in particular small and micro enterprises, to provide high quality traineeships.
Several of these accompanying measures would be used to mitigate potential negative impacts for SMEs. Notably, measure #2 could be implemented in collaboration with SME representative organisations, as to ensure the participation of SMEs. Measure #3 could be implemented via information campaigns and guidelines, in cooperation with SME representative organisations. Measure #4 would operate in the broader context of, and supporting the goals of the 2020 SME Strategy, including via the provision of financial support – under the ongoing Multiannual Financial Framework (2021-2027) and under the NextGenerationEU, the Commission expects more than 200 billion euro to be made available to SMEs under its various funding programmes126.
Given the above, the introduction of specific exemptions for SMEs was not considered appropriate, as they could inadvertently set up barriers for the further growth of companies. Furthermore, such exemptions would be difficult to justify, without compromising the goal of ensuring a level-playing field among traineeship providers and fair competition, and avoiding an indirect encouragement towards a competition based purely on labour costs – which, independently of the relative prevalence of trainees compared to the overall working population, would be a suboptimal business and societal behaviour.
It is expected that these measures would have a positive impact on achieving the objectives of the initiative, however, it is not possible to quantify this impact due to the non-binding nature of these measures and due to the flexibility allowed for Member States on how to implement them. Thus they do not feature in section 6. Nevertheless, in Section Error: Reference source not found their positive effects are considered in combination with the measures under the Preferred Option.
5.8 Options discarded at an early stage
Including all trainees in the personal scope of a new legislative initiative was discarded at an early stage. It is not possible to include in the personal scope of a legislative initiative adopted under Article 153(1)(b) TFEU trainees who are not considered workers under EU law, including unpaid trainees, given that “pay” constitutes an essential element of the definition of a “worker” in the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) (see also section 3.1). Also, Article 153(1)(h) TFEU on the integration of persons excluded from the labour market, without prejudice to Article 166 TFEU, can only be invoked as a legal basis for measures specifically intended to facilitate access to the labour market and cannot be used to enlarge the personal scope of measures based on Article 153(1)(b) TFEU. Moreover, Article 153(5) TFEU explicitly excludes any EU action on pay, such as requiring remuneration for unpaid trainees in order to ban unpaid traineeships.
Setting mandatory limits to the maximum duration of traineeships by Member States instead of setting them at EU level was discarded on the grounds of effectiveness. While this measure could be considered proportionate by giving Member States the possibility to consider national particularities, it could maintain or even increase the duration and divergencies among trainees in the EU. This could also go against the 2014 QFT principle 10.
Increasing the maximum duration for traineeships to more than 6 months was discarded since this would weaken (or be perceived to weaken) the prevention of problematic use of traineeships, which was one of the main goals of principle 10127. Though the evaluation found divergent views on the relevance of this principle, the issue of using traineeships to replace regular jobs is still very much a concern. Also, the existing rules as well as the options proposed for analysis in this report allow for exemptions in duly justified cases (for example in cases for the ECT and MPT).
Requiring mandatory access to social protection for trainees in a Directive was discarded at an early stage on the basis of Article 153(1)(c), Article 153 (4) and Article 153(2)(b) TFEU. These Articles imply that measures may be adopted in the field of social protection for trainees who are considered as workers under EU law, under the condition that they (1) shall not affect the right of Member States to define the fundamental principles of their social security systems, (2) they must not significantly affect the financial equilibrium of Member States’ social security systems and (3) shall avoid imposing administrative, financial and legal constraints in a way which would hold back the creation and development of small and medium-sized undertakings. Furthermore, trainees who are workers under EU law are already covered by the Council Recommendation on access to social protection128. Implementing the Council Recommendation with regards to trainees with worker status would ensure access to six social protection branches129. As discussed in the impact assessment accompanying the Council Recommendation on access to social protection, support for a legislative instrument in this domain was limited, including among Member States.
A mandatory requirement for ensuring equal access to traineeships for groups in vulnerable situations was discarded at an early stage. The issues of equal treatment / non-discrimination in accessing traineeships is already sufficiently covered by the Employment Equality Directive130 (2000/78/EC), the Race Equality Directive (2000/43/EC)131 and the Gender Equality Directive (2006/54/EC)132. In addition, it should be noted that the concept of “disability” was established by the CJEU in Case C 354/13133. The Court emphasises that this concept must be understood as referring not only to the impossibility of exercising a professional activity, but also to a hindrance to the exercise of such an activity. The protection under the Directive is already very broad. It covers not only cases where access to a traineeship is not made possible but also when the access is made difficult.
Extending the scope of the non-binding instrument to MPT but not to ECT was discarded at an early stage. ECT’s prevalence among the total stock of traineeships is high (31.1% of paid traineeships in 2019) and has been increasing over the years (see Annex 4). Evidence from the supporting study highlighted issues regarding quality for these types of traineeships (particularly with respect to working conditions, remuneration and social protection), despite the view that some stakeholders have expressed as regards national educational frameworks and institutions acting as safeguards to the quality standards of ECT. Furthermore, the Erasmus+ Charter134, which provides the general quality framework for European and international cooperation activities, was analysed in detail against the 2014 QFT principles as well as possible future principles. The analysis found no contradicting principles that would lead to confusion amongst trainees, traineeship providers or educational institutions, with the exception of duration. In Erasmus+, the traineeship duration may be between 2 and 12 months, while the initiative would maintain the recommendation for duration to be in principle 6 months, unless duly justified on objective grounds (no minimum would be recommended). The 2023 Eurobarometer results indicate that as regards the recommendation on duration, only 11% of ECT trainees responded to having done a traineeship longer than 6 months. Therefore, it seems that only a small share would not be conform with the recommended duration and could therefore be expected to provide due justification. The comparison between the Erasmus+ Charter also brought to light that less emphasis is placed on adequate working conditions compared to the 2014 QFT and the possible future initiative. Therefore, ECT could benefit from inclusion in the QFT when it comes to improving working conditions for ECT trainees.
Extending the scope of the non-binding instrument to ECT but not to MPT was discarded at an early stage. Due consideration was given to the perception of MPT being less exposed to quality concerns and accounting for a smaller share of total number of traineeships (9.2% of paid traineeships in 2019). Nevertheless, the 2023 Eurobarometer did find that 35% and 26% of MPT trainees were unpaid and were not subject to the same working conditions as other (regular) workers. Regarding the learning component, despite doing MPT, 24% claimed not having a mentor to turn to and finally, still 23% (compared to 27% for OMT, which performed worst in this aspect) found that their traineeship, despite being mandatory to access a certain profession, brought no or limited learning content.
6 What are the impacts of the policy options?
The policy options under the Areas considered in section 5 may have different social and economic impacts on stakeholders (trainees, traineeship providers and Member States). No environmental or climate impacts are expected. Impacts of the baseline scenario are included in section 5.1. Details regarding potential costs and benefits are presented in Annex A13.3 and on Member States mostly affected in Annex A13.1.
Limitations and robustness of data: The analysis of impacts is subject to a certain degree of uncertainty, given the general scarcity of data available on traineeships. Attempts were made to provide quantification and monetisation of the benefits and costs arising from the policy options. However, these estimates are subject to several assumptions and limitations (Annex 4). The limitations described under section 2.1 and Annex 4 are also applicable to the estimated proxies for the number of beneficiaries. Therefore, estimates should be considered as rough proxies and should be interpreted carefully given the underlying assumptions (see Annex 4).
Options under Area A and B may have low to high costs for businesses, offset by low to high benefits for traineeship providers, public authorities and trainees. These benefits are particularly important for trainees, often at the start of their professional career and for whom benefits can have positive lifelong effects. In addition, employers will benefit from fairer competition based on common minimum social standards.
6.1 Common impacts for all measures
The legislative measures are expected to have a stronger impact in the Member States and sectors of economic activity with the highest prevalence of paid trainees (proxy for trainees who are considered as workers). Overall, this concerns 12 Member States (BE, DK, DE, IE, EL, ES, FR, HR, IT, AT, PL and FI135) and five sectors (manufacturing; wholesale and retail; health; education; and real estate and professional, administrative and support activities136) which concentrate the largest share of trainees (see Annex A7.4). Furthermore, the impact for ALMP traineeships will be stronger in the sectors of mining, quarrying and manufacturing, and wholesale and retail trade were 40% of these traineeships are concentred and in Italy and Poland which account for about two thirds of total ALMP traineeships in the EU. Regarding, MPT the impact is expected to be stronger in the sectors of education, health and real estate and professional sectors where 85% of trainees is concentrated. ECT and OMT are quite spread across sectors, with a high share of OMT in the manufacturing sector (ca. 20%). The impact for ECT is expected to be stronger in Germany and France where 60% of ECT are concentrated. Regarding measures affecting all trainees (i.e. both legislative and non-legislative measures), the impacts would be higher in DE, ES, FR, IT and PL, where around 75% of all trainees (i.e. both paid and unpaid) are concentrated137. Finally, it can be expected that the initiative will have a stronger impact in sectors where traditionally working conditions were suboptimal, especially those characterised by more manual skills and lower literacy, where despite persistent labour and skills shortages the quality of traineeships cannot be expected to improve without EU action, following the trend for the general workforce (see section 2.4 and 5.2).
All measures considered have common economic costs for traineeship providers: these are small transversal one-off adjustment costs for familiarisation with all new provisions (according to the supporting study between EUR 53 for SMEs and EUR 39 for larger companies, see Annex A4.5), for public administrations, these are one-off enforcement costs related to the integration of new provisions into national law.
The measures under the non-legislative option leave the implementation to the Member States and give flexibility to Member States and traineeship providers to adapt to their specific contexts and needs accordingly. As a consequence, not all impacts could be quantified and/or monetised. Nevertheless, three scenarios were considered to provide proxy estimates (33%, 66% and 100% of implementation)138. The non-legislative option would in principle apply to all trainees (workers and non-workers) as well as to all types of traineeships (OMT, ALMP, ECT and MPT). Where possible, the impacts per type of traineeship are described.
6.2 Impacts of options under Area A
The policy options under Area A are likely to result in an increased number of trainees who will enjoy the rights they are already entitled to under EU or national law, and as such in fewer non-compliant traineeships. Also, for trainees who are considered as workers they will also result in fewer work relationships disguised as traineeships. This could happen either because the employer would ensure compliance with the law or because work relationships disguised as traineeships would be identified and then reclassified as employment relationships. It is not possible to quantify the extent of this impact due to the lack of reliable data on the prevalence of non-compliant traineeships and work relationships disguised as traineeships. The impact is expected to be strong in the sectors of tourism and catering where, according to the 2016 Eurofound survey139, significant fraudulent use of traineeships and apprenticeships can be identified (see section 2.1.1).
6.2.1 Social impacts
Benefits for trainees: The non-legislative policy option (policy option A1.1) on enforcement and support for trainees ​is expected to have benefits for trainees by ensuring that their rights and working conditions under applicable EU and national law are respected, which, according to the evaluation, could contribute to reduced levels of exploitation of trainees. The strengthened recommendations on transparent information in vacancies would help trainees understand their rights, the working conditions and the learning and training component of the traineeship, helping them make an informed decision. This non-binding option could benefit up to 1.02-3.1 million trainees depending on implementation (33%-100%, see section 6.1).
In addition to the benefits under policy option A1.1, the legislative measures under policy options A1.2 and A1.3 are expected to bring additional benefits for trainees considered as workers (i.e. paid trainees). These would be larger under option A.1.3 due to the concrete EU-level guidance for carrying out controls and inspections could, in particular, support Member States with low capacity and resources. While it is not possible to quantify the number of trainees affected due to a lack of data on work relationships disguised as traineeships, a rough proxy can be obtained for some specific categories of paid trainees being at risk of doing such traineeship. For example, 370,000 paid trainees (rough proxy) could benefit. This is calculated by taking the sum of paid trainees who did long traineeships (230,800) and those who did consecutive/repeated traineeships with the same employer (138,700). Out of these 370,000 trainees, it can be estimated that around 100,000 (rough proxy) did a long-duration traineeships with a poor learning content (see section 2.1.1, Annex A4.3, A8.6 and A13.3.1)140. While not all "trainees" in work relationships disguised as traineeships will be reclassified as workers, the impact will be stronger in Member States which do not have specific systems of inspections or guidance for inspectorates for traineeships141. In the long term, both legislative policy options are likely to also deter the problematic use of traineeships while they can have, in practice positive spill-over effect on trainees who are non-workers where Member States step up enforcement action against work relationships disguised as traineeships and non-compliant traineeships. As for the impact of the legislative measures under policy options A1.2 and A1.3 on the even level playing field between “worker trainees” and “unpaid trainees”, a distinction needs to be made between the impact of detecting employment relations disguised as traineeships versus detecting non-compliant traineeships. In the case of the former, the person involved in the employment relationship is in fact not a genuine trainee. Therefore, no (positive or negative) impact on the level playing field between “worker trainees” and “unpaid trainees” is expected in this regard. As for non-compliant traineeships, the legislative measures applying only to “worker trainees” imply a higher protection in terms of enforcement of existing rights compared to “unpaid trainees”. Although this potentially contributes to an uneven level playing field in favour of “worker trainees”, the rights to be enforced under the legislative measures are mostly already existing rights.

The measures on transparent information in vacancies would result in legal certainty for trainees considered as workers and regulatory clarity for traineeship providers which can also bring benefits in terms of better enforcement and compliance as well as trust in the rule of law. In this light, the legislative measures would bring higher benefits for “worker trainees” compared to “unpaid trainees”, who however, would also benefit in terms of being able to make better informed decisions if the transparency of information in vacancies were to increase. The impact on the level playing field between “worker trainees” and “paid trainees” would in that sense be minimal.
Additional benefits for all trainees would come from the measures on ensuring that workers’ representatives and other actors with a legitimate interest can engage in procedures to defend trainees’ rights and from establishing channels for reporting of malpractice and poor traineeship conditions (part of both options), thereby contributing to empowering trainees in addressing (risks of) mistreatment and/or unlawful practices. Stakeholders interviewed under the supporting study agreed that stronger reporting channels could facilitate enforcing trainees’ existing rights, increasing trainees’ awareness of their rights and providing avenues for legal redress. In the case of partial implementation of the non-legislative option, the benefits of option A1.1 would be stronger for trainees who are considered workers. In terms of impact on the level playing field between “worker trainees” and “unpaid trainees” (with the legislative measures applying to the former and the equivalent non-legislative measures applying to the latter), the “worker trainees” would be better protected and have a stronger position in defending their rights. This could have a positive effect on the compliance of traineeships for “worker trainees” (thus paid trainees), while this effect might be smaller for unpaid trainees, as for the latter, the level of compliance will depend on the level of Member States’ implementation of the (non-binding) recommendations. The impact will be stronger in Member States with no procedures for registering complaints and reporting malpractice for trainees142.
In Area A2, both options could help break the vicious cycle of being trapped in long and repeated/consecutive traineeships with the same and/or different employer, with modest to medium impact. With regard to long duration, under option A2.1 up to 117,000 - 355,400 (depending on implementation) trainees could benefit. Option A2.2 would benefit 230,800 paid trainees and 42,000 -124,600 unpaid trainees depending on implementation (2019 data, see Annex A8.2 and A13.3.1). For repeated/consecutive traineeships with the same employer under Option A2.1 up to 68,000-207,800 trainees could benefit (depending on implementation). Under option A2.2, 138,700 paid trainees would benefit and 23,000 - 69,000 unpaid trainees depending on implementation. Therefore, in case of likely partial implementation the benefits of option A2.2 are expected to be stronger for trainees considered as workers. For example, only few Member States have a 6-month legal restriction on the maximum duration for some types of traineeships143 (see Annex A9.3.1). Both options would also contribute to reducing the number of trainees doing repeated/consecutive traineeships with different employers by recommending to Member States to prevent employers from asking previous working experience from candidate-trainees144. However, this potential may not be fully achieved: while trainee providers may be prevented to request previous experience in the vacancy notice, they could still decide to hire someone with previous experience. As regards the level playing field between “worker trainees” and “unpaid trainees”, the legislative measure A2.2 on duration would provide higher protection to “worker trainees” against cycles of repeated/consecutive traineeships as well as lower the risk of engaging in an employment relation disguised as traineeship.
6.2.2 Economic impacts
Benefits for traineeship providers: All policy options in Area A are likely to bring moderate direct economic benefits for traineeship providers, mainly in terms of a potentially more level playing field/fairer market competition, increased productivity and competitiveness of businesses145. The extent of the benefits related to the level playing field between traineeship providers is difficult to quantify and will depend on the number of trainees in problematic traineeships. Usually, trainees are a small proportion of the total workforce of a traineeship provider. Therefore, a high share of trainees may be an indicator of the existence of work relationships disguised as traineeships. Where work relationships disguised as traineeships are successfully detected and tackled, the overall benefits in terms of level playing field/fair competition would be proportionate to the number of “trainees” reclassified as workers. The non-legislative option (A1.1) could decrease the number of non-compliant traineeships and could enhance the employer’s reputation and capacity to attract traineeship candidates as traineeships offered comply with the applicable EU and national law. The extent of this impact would depend on Member States’ implementation. The benefits would be larger under options A1.2 and A1.3, stemming from the additional legislative measures for trainees considered workers in work relationships disguised as traineeships and non-compliant traineeships, with measure A1.3 expected to affect a higher number of trainees. The level playing field would be achieved through the alignment of the labour costs to the level of compliant traineeships. Additionally, employers who hire regular employees instead of trainees and those who offer quality traineeships will enjoy the productivity and competitiveness gains deriving from a more qualified, motivated and competent workforce and potentially a better matching of trainees’ skills to the needs of their company in the context of the twin green and digital transition146. Traineeship providers would also avoid the potential reputational damage of having their traineeship policies questioned. Benefits of increased transparency as regards their vacancies (specifically by adding information on level of remuneration, working conditions, the coverage of social protection, the expected tasks and learning and training component) could include having well-informed and motivated candidate trainees applying for a traineeship opportunity with the same expectations as the traineeship provider.
The non-legislative option (A2.1), included in all policy options, on preventing traineeship providers requiring previous work experience in the same field of activity as well limiting the duration of repeated/consecutive traineeships to 6 months (with exceptions allowed on objective grounds) may also benefit traineeship providers. These two measures would contribute to traineeship providers offering genuine traineeships (with no intention of replacing entry-level work), thereby attracting and employing motivated trainees (in search of genuine traineeships). The recommendations could contribute to clarity on the expectations of both parties, including on duration and level of performance (with no previous work experience required).
Costs for traineeship providers: For the non-legislative option (A1.1) on effective monitoring and enforcement, the costs cannot be quantified, as there are no figures on the number of non-compliant traineeships nor on the magnitude of the gap that would need to be bridged in order to make those traineeships compliant to the applicable EU and national laws. In addition, such costs would depend on the extent of implementation by Member States.

Both legislative measures in policy options A1.2 and A1.3 on enforcement ​(Area A1) are likely to imply recurrent adjustment costs, but only for companies where work relationships disguised as traineeships or non-compliant traineeships are identified during implementation or during controls and inspections. These include possible labour costs for offering regular employment and costs related to potential administrative or judicial procedures and penalties. Such costs are therefore necessary to comply with the existing legal framework. The costs for traineeship providers would be higher under option A1.3 as they will relate to a higher number of trainees. It is not possible to quantify the extent of the costs due to a lack of relevant data. Given that on average the share of trainees in a company is low (even though their positive impact for the competitiveness of the company, particularly from an innovation perspective, might still be significant147) the possible increase in costs would still constitute a small share of the overall costs of a company.148 These costs could be relatively higher for SMEs as they may face greater capacity constraints and may not be able to benefit from economies of scale as much as larger companies. In addition, some small costs could arise from the inclusion of traineeships in existing controls and inspections and administrative costs from having to provide competent authorities (upon request) data and information regarding trainees and their contracts. The additional costs are expected to be negligible and are minimised by only obliging traineeship providers to provide information only upon request, thus meaning that no systemic reporting is required. This takes into account employers’ concerns on reporting obligations (Annex 2).

The costs of measures improving the transparency of vacancies, included in all 3 policy options, cannot be monetised. The study supporting the evaluation estimated that on average it takes 1 to 2 hours for a traineeship provider to draft a vacancy notice149 under the baseline scenario (2014 QFT). The measure would add the following elements: the overall working conditions, coverage of social protection, and the learning and training component. Conservatively, one could estimate an additional hour per vacancy notice in order to cover these new elements.  This would amount to an estimated cost of EUR 15-46 million depending on the level of implementation (see Annex A4.7.1).
In Area 2, the non-legislative measures on duration (Area A2.1) is likely to imply small adjustment costs from revising traineeship contracts in line with the new maximum duration limits. It could also entail adjustment costs from more frequent recruitment and onboarding processes. Such recruitment costs can be very roughly estimated as supporting evidence is scarce (see Annex A4.7.2). The available evidence suggests that the recruitment of one trainee takes on average 19.7 hours. This would lead to a rough proxy for total recruitment cost of EUR 22-68 million in the EU (depending on implementation). Large companies could be more affected than SMEs as evidence from the 2023 Eurobarometer shows that large organisations (more than 250 employees) tend to have a higher share of traineeships lasting longer than six months, for all types of traineeships. For companies requiring previous work experience, both policy options could result in modest additional costs for training inexperienced trainees. In the case of option A2.2, the costs would be the highest (68 million EUR) as full implementation would be required for trainees considered as workers (for details on the methodology, see Annex A4.7.2).
Benefits and costs for public administrations: All policy options under Area A are likely to bring moderate benefits to public authorities. First, competent authorities will be more effective in detecting and combatting work relationships disguised as traineeships. Secondly, increased taxes and social security contributions from trainees on regular employment or genuine traineeship contracts and proceeds from sanctions may benefit public revenue. While proceeds from sanctions cannot be predicted, evidence suggests that they could be significant150. The impacts will be stronger in Member States with no systems of inspections or guidance for inspectorates (see section 6.2.1 and Annex A13.1 for the list of Member States per traineeship type).
All legislative policy measures entail small recurrent enforcement costs from including traineeships in existing controls and inspections and strengthening the capacity of competent authorities. The costs under Options A1.2 and A1.3 in the EU of implementing these provisions are estimated to vary from around EUR 27,000 (only training provided to existing inspectors) to around EUR 1.2 million (Member States decide to hire and train additional staff in line with the ILO recommendations on the optimal number of inspectors per/10,000 employees) (see Annex A4.6 and A13.3.2 for details). The costs are expected to be higher in Member States where traineeships are not covered by labour inspection systems and in those with inadequate capacities (see section 2.2.2 and Annex A13.1). In the long term, enforcement costs could decline as the prevalence of problematic traineeships would decrease over time. Also, costs might arise from the requirement to set up / designate channels to report malpractice and from increased inspections due to more complaints. However, according to the results of the legal analysis conducted for this study such channels already exist in most Member States for employees and some categories of trainees. Hence, the provision would mostly entail costs connected to awareness campaigns to inform trainees about the existence of such mechanisms. Finally, if traineeship providers decide to reduce the total number of (contributory) positions due to increased labour costs, this would lead to a decrease of public revenues from social security contributions, but this cost is expected to be small. The benefits and costs of the non-legislative option are the same as those described for the legislative options. However, it is not possible to provide a quantification due to the uncertainty on the implementation by Member States. According to rough estimates the cost from controls and inspections could be, depending on implementation, in the range EUR 9,000 – 27,000 (if only training will be provided) to EUR 363,000 - 1.2 million (if the optimal number of inspectors is hired).
6.3 Impacts of options under Area B
All policy options under Area B are likely to result in more trainees doing quality traineeships, with a positive impact on their employability151. Indirectly, they are likely to lead to fewer work relationships disguised as traineeships. In view of the green and digital transitions, policy options in Area B2 aimed at improving the learning component will help companies to make the most of their investment in trainees to cover their rapidly evolving skills needs and will allow trainees to acquire the necessary skills to benefit from the transitions152. Any quality traineeship will also contribute to a better skilled workforce and will thus benefit employers.
6.3.1 Social impacts
Benefits for trainees: Under Area B1 all options are expected to improve the working conditions of trainees. The non-legislative option (B1.1), recommends that all trainees receive remuneration which would be fair/proportionate to that of a comparable entry-level worker with the level determined on the basis of a number of objective elements (see 5.4.1). This could potentially benefit 840,000-1.8 million trainees which corresponds to the sum of unpaid trainees and lower bound for paid trainees153 (depending on implementation)154 (2019 data, see section 2 and Annex A13.3.1). The evaluation highlighted that remuneration is an important element for ensuring the quality of traineeships: not only is remuneration an incentive for trainees to remain in and complete a traineeship, thereby contributing to guaranteeing equal access to traineeships, but, if set at a proportionate level rather than a low level, it would help avoid driving labour standards down.
The recommendations on social protection, which are included in all options in Area B, could benefit trainees by reducing gaps in access to social protection, leading to better protection as regards their welfare and health. In addition, if implemented, improved access to social protection would contribute to future entitlements to social benefits, alleviating trainees’ economic uncertainty as well as their risk of poverty. Overall, the 2023 Eurobarometer found that 35% of respondents had no access to any branches of social protection which means that these trainees could potentially benefit from these recommendations. Furthermore, in terms of types of traineeships, trainees in OMT would be most impacted in case of (full) implementation as OMT show the largest gap in access to social protection (25% of paid OMT trainees have no access to social protection versus 11% of MPT trainees at the lower end). This amounts to up to 256,000 - 770,000 unpaid trainees and up to 100,000 - 300,000 paid trainees, depending on implementation (2019 data, see Annex A13.3.1) who do not have access to full social protection. Furthermore, in terms of types of traineeships, trainees in OMT would be most impacted in case of (full) implementation as OMT show the largest gap in access to social protection (25% of paid OMT trainees have no access to social protection versus 11% of MPT trainees at the lower end).

Option B1.2 provides additional benefits to trainees considered workers due to the binding measure protecting them from less favourable treatment than comparable entry-level workers in terms of working conditions, including remuneration, that is not justified by objective grounds. If no objective grounds can be identified to justify a different treatment trainees would be entitled to the same rights as comparable entry-level workers, including in terms of remuneration.
However, due to the specific features of traineeships it is likely that in most cases objective grounds for different treatment would be identified. These features could include e.g., the learning content of the traineeship, lower responsibilities or lower intensity of the work performed. Where such objective grounds are identified, trainees may be treated less favourably than comparable entry-level workers in terms of working conditions, including remuneration. Under option B1.1, Member States would in these cases still be recommended to ensure that trainees receive a fair/proportionate remuneration. This could amount to either the minimum wage or a proportion of the average wage of comparable entry-level workers. Employers would on their own initiative have to ensure compliance. Cases against non-compliant employers could be brought to court. In terms of estimates and assuming that objective grounds would be identified for all paid trainees, the number of trainees that could potentially benefit in terms of remuneration amount to 353,000 - 870,000155 paid trainees (rough proxy) and 500,000-1.5 million unpaid trainees (depending on implementation). It is not possible to quantify the expected impact on other working conditions.
Benefits under option B1.3 are expected to be stronger regarding remuneration, as it directly entitles trainees considered as workers to a fair/proportionate remuneration, compared to other/entry-level workers. However, this option does not provide for protection against less favourable treatment of trainees who are workers than comparable entry-level workers based on objective grounds in terms of other working conditions.
Both legislative options B1.2 and B1.3 would thus benefit “worker trainees” more than “unpaid trainees”, either providing them equal treatment as regards working conditions (unless there are objective grounds for a differential treatment) or providing them with a direct entitlement to fair/proportionate remuneration. While “unpaid trainees” could enjoy the latter as well, the extent of the benefits would be dependent on the willingness of Member States to implement the relevant recommendations. In this sense, legislative options B1.2 and B1.3 could potentially contribute to an uneven level playing field between “worker trainees” and “unpaid trainees”.
Overall, all policy options would indirectly benefit particularly trainees in vulnerable situations, making traineeships more accessible and help fight against work relationships disguised as traineeships. They could also, indirectly, reduce the downward pressure of poor-quality traineeships on the working conditions of regular workers, in particular entry-level workers. Under Area B2, the impact of the non-legislative option (B2.1) is expected to be moderate. The recommendations for additional elements to strengthen the written agreement which would benefit trainees by providing them ‘contractual’ certainty on what to expect from the traineeship in terms of the learning and training component, the tasks to be carried out, the arrangements for mentorship, supervision and evaluation, remuneration, and social protection. This strengthens trainees’ position, as the rights and obligations of the traineeship provider are clear. Up to 203,000–609,000 trainees (rough proxy) could benefit from getting a written agreement, depending on implementation (see Annex A4.4.2 and Annex A13.3.1). The impact is expected to be stronger in Member States where there is a lack of lack of legal requirements for written agreement/written information indicating that tasks allow trainees to work towards their learning and training objectives156. Trainees would also benefit from the support of a mentor who could provide advice and coaching, while not necessarily having a hierarchical relation with the trainee. Such support could help integrate the trainee into the organisation, lead to more structured traineeships as learning experiences and facilitate practical guidance on matters related to the traineeship content and beyond. The number of trainees that would benefit is estimated at 212,000-637,000 trainees (rough proxy)157 depending on implementation which corresponds to the 22% of respondents to the 2023 Eurobarometer who stated that they could not turn to a mentor during their traineeships. The impact is expected to be stronger in Member States where there is a lack of legal provisions on a supervisor and/or mentor for trainees158.
The legislative option B2.2 is expected to result in stronger benefits for trainees considered as workers due to its legislative nature of the measure on the written agreement. The extent of the impact on the level playing field between “worker trainees” and “unpaid trainees”, with the latter benefitting from equivalent measures under the non-legislative option B2.1, would depend on the Member States’ level of implementation of the non-legislative option. On the contrary, “worker trainees” would in principle be entitled to a written agreement. It is expected to bring increased transparency of information for trainees considered as workers which would mitigate the information asymmetry vis-à-vis traineeship providers and lead to more structured traineeships which will raise awareness among trainees about their rights and their (expected) tasks and can ensure a better learning experience which is likely to ease trainees’ entry into the labour market159. Up to 265,000 paid trainees (rough proxy) could benefit and 115,000 – 343,000 unpaid trainees (rough proxy) could benefit from getting a written agreement, depending on implementation (see Annex A4.4.2 and Annex A13.3.1). In the survey carried out under the supporting study, a majority of national stakeholders at least somewhat agreed that a written traineeship agreement helps reduce the risk that traineeships are used to replace regular employment160. Also in the same survey, the majority of business associations (22 out of 26) considered that traineeships with a proper learning component ensure that trainees acquire the skills needed by the companies.
6.3.2 Economic impacts
Benefits for traineeship providers: All policy options under Area B are likely to bring moderate direct economic benefits to traineeship providers in terms of increased productivity as well as more motivated trainees. The productivity-enhancing potential of good quality traineeships was highlighted by all stakeholders during the interviews conducted under the supporting study. Benefits in terms of productivity include a larger and more diverse pool of skilled candidates (as those belonging to vulnerable groups will be more likely to apply to traineeships) and improved labour market matching, and higher retention rates which could decrease employers’ search, matching and recruitment costs of regular workers.161 Averaging across Member States, trainees who received compensation are more likely to start working with the same employer under a fixed or permanent contract162. The companies surveyed in the supporting study mentioned a better performance of subsequently retained trainees compared to new hires (10 out of 13) and improved reputation and attractiveness of the company (9 out of 13) as important or very important benefits of having trainees. Under partial implementation under option B1.1, the benefits will be likely higher for options B1.2 and B1.3. Regarding the option in Area B2 on a strengthened written agreement and recommending mentorship, traineeship providers would benefit from the increased clarity on the traineeship’s content and conditions, as it increases the likelihood that a trainee has made a ‘conscious’ choice in the uptake of a particular traineeship and is committed to the traineeship description as set out in the written agreement. Assigning a mentor could benefit traineeship providers, as the guidance and coaching to trainees has a productivity-enhancing potential. These benefits can however not be quantified. Under partial implementation of option B2.1, benefits will be likely higher for option B2.2.
Costs for traineeship providers: In particular for large companies, all policy options under Area B1 imply adjustment costs to modify existing contracts, which are expected to be small, as well as higher labour costs. For all options, various scenarios were investigated in the supporting study to provide estimates (see Annex A4.8 And A13.3.2). However, these estimates are subject to serious limitations of the underlying data, while different assumptions have been considered for different scenarios (see Annex A4.8). Moreover, it should be noted that for individual traineeship providers these costs could be expected to be relatively small, especially for SMEs, in relation to their overall labour cost. This is because trainees represent a small fraction of the labour force, even though their positive impact on productivity and innovation can be significant163. For example, according to the SMEs panel this share amounts to 5%.
It is nonetheless clear that costs for SMEs might be proportionally higher than for larger enterprises, due to well-known scale and optimization effects. Accordingly, the initiative envisaged a series of accompanying measures (see sections 5.7 and 6.8) which are either specifically focusing on SMEs, or can be adapted to the specific needs of SMEs in different Member States and sectors.
To calculate the costs resulting from the measures on remuneration, under all policy options two benchmarks were considered for fair/proportionate remuneration: 1) minimum wage scenario: all trainees would get the minimum wage except unpaid ECT and 2) 60% of the wage of a comparable entry-level worker scenario: all OMT and MPT trainees (paid and unpaid) would get the benchmark, all ALMP trainees and paid ECT would get the minimum wage and one fifth of unpaid ECT would get the minimum wage164. Also, it is assumed that 22% of the paid trainees would benefit (lower bound proxy for trainees getting less than fair/proportionate remuneration)165 (see Annex A4.4.1, A4.8 for methodology and A13.3.2 for results).
Under the non-legislative option (B1.1) if the minimum wage is used as the benchmark, the cost would amount to EUR 745 million – 2.23 billion (depending on implementation)166. If the 60% of a remuneration of a comparable entry level worker benchmark is used the cost would be similar: EUR 732 million - 2.19 billion (depending on implementation).
In the case of option B1.2 the cost for traineeship providers to ensure that in respect of working conditions trainees are not treated in a less favourable manner than comparable entry-level workers of the same category in the same establishment cannot be quantified. First, the measure concerns all working conditions, not only remuneration. Second, it is likely that in most cases objective grounds for different treatment would be identified. Nevertheless, the interplay between the legislative option in B1.2 and the recommendations (under option B1.1) would mean that for remuneration a (proxy) quantification can be provided. Assuming that the different treatment of trainees compared to other entry-level workers would be proportionate to the grounds, it can also be assumed that the guidance on fair/proportionate remuneration provided by option B1.1 would benefit most paid trainees. In this case, under the minimum wage benchmark the cost for paid trainees is estimated to EUR 41 million and for unpaid trainees to EUR 731,2 million - 2.19 billion (depending on implementation). In the case of the 60% of the remuneration of a comparable entry-level worker benchmark, the respective costs are up to EUR 81 million for paid trainees and EUR 704.2 million - 2.11 billion for unpaid trainees (depending on implementation). These costs refer to the assumption whereby objective grounds for different treatment would be identified for all paid trainees. Hence, under this assumption the costs of option B1.2 as regards remuneration (estimated above) would be very similar to the costs of option B1.3 which gives a direct right to fair/proportionate remuneration to paid trainees. Unlike option B1.2, option B1.3 does not entail other costs or benefits related to other working conditions beyond remuneration.
The costs arising from the recommendations on access to social protection, which are included in all options, were estimated in the supporting study on the basis of Eurostat data on the share of the non-wage costs in the total labour costs, which include but are not restricted to employers’ social contributions. Therefore, the costs are likely to be overestimated. Nevertheless, a sensitivity analysis on the average non-wage costs (LFS) combined with data on the share of trainees with no access to social protection and the average traineeship duration (2023 Eurobarometer), provides the following estimates EUR 2.8 billion - EUR 8.4 billion depending on implementation (see Annex A4.8 and Annex A13.3.2 for details).
Policy options related to improving the learning component and strengthening the written agreement (Area B2) imply costs across both policy options for traineeship providers. As regards the non-legislative option (B2.1), the written agreement is already a 2014 QFT principle. However, this baseline principle would be strengthened by adding more elements and also it will be extended to a wider scope of traineeships (i.e. including ECT and MPT). Quantification of costs on the addition of these additional elements were estimated in the supporting study at being in a range of EUR 27 – 80 million, depending on implementation (see Annex A4.9 and A13.3.2). As for the extension of the written agreement to ECT and MPT, estimates range from EUR 44 for micro companies, to EUR 57 for SMEs, and are lowest for large companies at EUR 25 (average annual costs per written statement per employee, see Annex A4.9). The costs of assigning a mentor to a trainee could not be quantified. However, the study supporting the evaluation provided the information for one Belgian company as regards the hours spent by a supervisor on a six-month traineeship, in particular in explaining the tasks to a trainee, amounting to six hours per trainee(ship). This could give an indication of the labour hours for a mentor per traineeship (of six months). Regarding policy option B2.2, employers are already obliged to provide information to workers in the baseline according to the TPWC Directive167 the additional a cost which would derive from the need to provide information on additional elements were estimated in the supporting study to around EUR 30 million for paid trainees and EUR 17-50 million for unpaid trainees depending on implementation (see Annex A4.9 and A13.3.2). The cost for combining and formalising all information in a written traineeship agreement is considered negligible.
Benefits and costs for public administrations: Policy options under Area B1 could produce a positive impact on the tax revenues and the level of social security contributions and reduce social expenditure. In particular, if some of the currently unpaid traineeships were to be remunerated, this would increase the tax revenues and the level of social security contributions, which would correspond to the costs mentioned above for traineeship providers – though as explained, there are overestimations (EUR 2.8 billion -EUR 8.4 billion depending on implementation). In addition, the policy options could reduce public expenditure on last resort safety nets (such as social assistance) by supporting the integration of people, especially those in vulnerable situations, into the labour market. Thus, they can also reduce the burden for public finances through reduced need for public support during and after traineeships. Furthermore, a decline in the number of poor-quality traineeships could reduce enforcement costs in the longer term. In terms of costs for public authorities, there is a risk of decreased public revenues in terms of tax and social security contributions in the case that traineeship providers decide to lower the number of (contributory) positions. 
6.4 Impacts of non-legislative option under Area C
The measures under this option are recommendations to improve access to traineeships, which give flexibility to Member States in terms of implementation and approach. Consequently, the impacts can only be described qualitatively. The proposed measures would have a particularly strong impact in Member States, which are reportedly lacking measures in this area (see Annex A13.1).
Benefits and costs for trainees: The measures would support the equality in access to quality traineeships and contribute to a level playing field for all (candidate) trainees, regardless of their background, on the labour market. Increased access to quality and cross-border traineeships would ultimately contribute to the increased employability of trainees, including those from vulnerable groups. Considering that the objective of ALMP traineeships is reintegration and activation of the unemployed and the inactive, including those harder to reach, it could be deduced that the impact of the recommendations on access for those belonging to vulnerable groups would be smaller for ALMP traineeships compared to the other types of traineeships as ALMP traineeships in principle are targeting vulnerable groups already. Improved access to quality remote/hybrid trainees would facilitate the uptake of such traineeships for all (candidate) trainees and help overcome barriers related to costs caused by physical distance, with an expected larger impact on vulnerable groups with limited financial resources. In the 2023 Eurobarometer, around 50% the EU trainees said that they did not have adequate equipment or did not receive adequate guidance to carry out their traineeships remotely, with unpaid traineeships performing worse than paid traineeships. If this percentage were applied to the total number of trainees in the EU (using EU-LFS), this would correspond to roughly 1.5 million trainees168. The benefits of the recommendations on remote/hybrid traineeships would likely be greater for trainees in Member States where large shares of trainees reported (to the 2023 Eurobarometer) that they did not have adequate equipment or did not receive adequate guidance to carry out their traineeships remotely. While there is some variation in this share across Member States, it is at least 19% in all countries. The highest levels of dissatisfaction were found in SK, IT, DE, BE and NL. The highest shares of respondents who reported a lack of guidance were found in IT, DE, BG, NL and ES.
Benefits and costs for traineeship providers: Traineeship providers would benefit from a wider and more diverse pool of candidates. An inclusive approach could have a positive impact on the organisation’s reputation and its capacity to attract candidates. As for costs, pro-active outreach implies costs related to campaigning/advertisements. The provision of equipment, infrastructure and ensuring an appropriate work organisation (including mentorship) to facilitate access to remote/hybrid traineeships may also bear costs. Tailoring traineeship programmes and workplaces to specific needs, such as those of trainees with disabilities, could imply (likely one-off) costs. In general, all costs could be proportionally larger for SMEs, though quantification of such costs was not possible.
Benefits and costs for public administrations: Benefits include a decreased spending on social protection and activation, as these measures would benefit in particular those who tend to be furthest away from the labour market. Costs are involved issuing guidance to traineeship providers on quality principles as well as on specific inclusion measures. Any financial support (incentives) to traineeship providers would entail costs. Regarding the improved use of EURES to facilitate cross-border traineeships, adjustment costs could be involved for the European Labour Authority and competent national authorities.
Benefits and costs for society: The policy options improving the access to traineeships have the potential to reduce inequalities and foster the integration of disadvantaged individuals into the labour market, thereby contributing to overall youth employment, social cohesion, and productivity whilst contributing to decreasing (the risk of) poverty.
6.5 Impacts of the non-legislative option under Area D
Benefits and costs to trainees: The extension of the scope of the (baseline) non-binding instrument to ECT and MPT could increase both the relevance and coherence of the initiative for all trainees. It would support adequate working conditions and improve the learning component for all types of traineeships and strengthen support for trainees in case of malpractice or poor working conditions. The impact on ECT is expected to be greater as more quality issues were identified for this type (for details, see Annex 10). As ECT represent about 57% of the total number of traineeships (2019), the impacts of extending the scope to this type of traineeships are expected to be larger than extending it to MPT, which represent about 4.9% of all traineeships. While both ECT and MPT lack procedures for complaints and reporting malpractice, national legislation on ECT often allows unpaid traineeships and lacks provisions on mentorship as well as on ensuring that tasks are aligned with learning and training objectives. Extending the scope to ECT would also increase the coherence of the initiative with Erasmus+, which offers traineeships abroad in particular for students currently enrolled in higher education, but also recent graduates. In terms of costs, the extension of the scope of the non-binding instrument to ECT and MPT could have a disincentivising impact on the offers of these types of traineeships, as conformity with the quality principles may entail additional costs for traineeship providers (see below). However, the reduction of low quality traineeship offers could also be regarded as a positive impact.
Benefits and costs to traineeship providers: Benefits would include more clarity as the quality principles would apply to all types of traineeships. Costs at first instance would seem to possibly affect a large majority of ECT traineeship providers, as based on LFS data and its definition of remuneration, ECT represent 85% of all unpaid traineeships. As for MPT traineeship providers, the prevalence of unpaid traineeships seems to be lower (no LFS estimate is available, but in the 2023 Eurobarometer, 35% of respondents having done a MPT stated to be unpaid). However, costs linked to remuneration cannot be quantified. Though the non-binding instrument would strongly recommend trainees to be fairly and proportionately remunerated, the EU has no competence to oblige this for unpaid trainees. The CJEU has taken a wide approach to the concept of remuneration (see footnote 37) and ECT trainees who receive grants or scholarships can be considered as paid trainees under CJEU case law. However, such cases cannot be captured by LFS, therefore the number of unpaid ECT is overestimated (even if not all paid ECT will be considered as workers under EU law as pay is only one of the criteria considered). For both ECT and MPT it can be stated that if the recommendations on remuneration were complied with as regards currently unpaid ECT and MPT, this would entail a cost in terms of recurrent labour costs. However, any other costs related to the non-binding instrument would be equally difficult to quantify, as the level of implementation cannot be estimated. In the evaluation, though, the most often held perception of stakeholders was that the total costs related to the implementation of the 2014 QFT are proportionate to the benefits. However, the implementation of the quality principles is also likely to be less efficient in small companies and micro-enterprises than in larger firms. Similar expectations for the new initiative are held.
Benefits and costs for public administrations: Benefits include increased coherence across all types of traineeships when it comes to the recommendations on quality principles. Costs may be involved in designing new or updating existing guidance and issuing such guidance to a wider range of traineeship providers. Any financial support (incentives) to traineeship providers to implement these measures would entail costs.
Benefits and costs for society: Extending the scope of the non-binding instrument would contribute to improving the quality of and access to all traineeships. This would in turn have the potential to reduce inequalities and contribute to overall youth employment, social cohesion, and productivity.
6.6 Territorial impacts
The impacts of the policy options would differ across Member States and would depend on national regulatory frameworks (see Annex 9 and Annex A13.1 for details). Also, the benefits and costs would be larger for trainees and organisations in sectors and Member States in which work relationships disguised as traineeships or non-compliant traineeships are more pronounced169. Policy options under Area B are likely to have a stronger impact on 12 Member States where the prevalence of trainees considered as workers under EU law (proxied by paid trainees) is high170. Also, the impact is expected to be higher in cities, where almost half of paid traineeships is concentrated (45%) as compared to 22% in rural areas (see Annex A7.4.1)171. As for Area C, the impact could be larger on those Member States where vulnerable groups are perceived to face unequal access to traineeships172 as well as those Member States where persons with disabilities seem to not receive adapted office equipment and reasonable adjustments173. Regarding remote/hybrid traineeships, the ten Member States without any provisions on teleworking arrangements are likely to be most impacted174. Under Area D, the extension of the scope to ECT and MPT is likely to impact those Member States where these two types are particularly prevalent (see Annex 7).
6.7 Impacts of all options on fundamental rights and SDGs
All policy options proposed under this initiative are expected to have a strong positive impact on ensuring fundamental rights in the EU. In particular, policy options under policy areas A, B, and D by preventing and combating the problematic use of traineeships and ensuring fair working conditions are expected to contribute to ensuring the right to equality before the law (Article 20 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU), the right to fair working conditions (Article 31), access to adequate social protection (Article 34) and healthcare (Article 35). These measures could also contribute to reducing the gender pay gap among trainees. Evidence from the Eurobarometer shows that only 52% of female respondents were paid compared to 65% of male participants. The policy options in Areas C and D are expected to contribute to ensuring the right to equal opportunities and treatment of under-represented groups and non-discrimination (Article 21). The policy option to facilitate cross-border traineeships also promote the freedom of movement within the EU (Article 45), while the policy option on hybrid/remote traineeships is expected to facilitate the right to family life (Article 7).
All policy options are expected to contribute to the SDGs on poverty (SDG 1), quality education (SDG 4), decent work and economic growth (SDG 8) and reduced inequalities (SDG 10) and to their respective targets.
6.8 Impacts of accompanying measures
The accompanying measures are expected to reinforce the effectiveness of the initiative by improving the overall quality of traineeships, through improved implementation of the updated and strengthened QFT. Most importantly, the supporting measures for companies, e.g. on financial and non-financial support and guidance, can act as mitigation measures by supporting SMEs to implement this initiative, which would imply costs for public authorities.
The introduction of specific exemptions for SMEs was not considered appropriate, as they could inadvertently create barriers to the further growth of companies. Furthermore, such exemptions would be difficult to justify, without compromising the goal of ensuring a level playing field between traineeship providers and avoiding incentives to compete on the basis of labour costs alone, which could be damaging for aggregate business competitiveness.
6.9 Unintended consequences of policy options
Labour costs to employers arising from the initiative are relatively limited in so far as they do not comprise mandatory remuneration. Making remuneration mandatory was discarded upfront for lack of a legal basis. Therefore, costs of the binding measure on remuneration only refer to the gap between the current remuneration of trainees and a benchmark set for fair/proportionate remuneration. Potentially higher costs for providing remuneration where it is currently not at all provided and for social protection coverage is only part of the non-binding measures, which can be implemented in a proportionate way as deemed appropriate by Member States.  
The legislative policy options could potentially result in fewer traineeship opportunities including paid ones and a decrease in overall employment, because of higher costs for traineeship providers (see section 6.3.2). In general, these impacts can be expected to be small given that trainees only represent a small fraction of the workforce. For example, more than half of the respondents to the SME Panel survey which had trainees in the past five years (n = 124) said that trainees constituted less than 5% of the total number of employees. At the same time, the measures to prevent and combat work relationships disguised as traineeships and the measures to improve the quality of traineeships could drive some employers to offer more regular (entry-level) employment positions to cover the needs of their companies.  
Importantly, it can be expected that a majority of the lost traineeship offers as a result of the measures under Policy Area A will be work relationships disguised as traineeships, i.e. unlawful work arrangements given that their detection and reduction through improved controls and inspections is one of the objectives of this initiative. Thus this cannot be considered as a cost/negative consequence given the harm to trainees and long-term business competitiveness. While it is difficult to quantify the precise impact of the measures on the offer of traineeships and regular employment, it can be expected that most work relationships disguised as traineeships will be converted in regular employment relationships. Some may however not be replaced by regular positions, leading to the (unlawful) trainee’s unemployment or inactivity in the short term, or may be replaced by legally compliant traineeships. Such short-term costs would however not outweigh the benefits of ensuring fair competition between traineeship providers and proper enforcement of workers’ rights under the EU acquis.
The policy options in Policy Area B are expected to further contribute to an increase in the number of quality traineeships. Employers are expected to either choose to adhere to the updated quality requirements in Union law (which is the intended consequence) or to no longer offer poor quality traineeships. It is also difficult to meaningfully quantify the potential impact of the policy options as there are no studies investigating the elasticity of traineeships in particular with respect to the levels of remuneration. However, available evidence (outlined below) suggests that an increase in labour cost would not necessarily and directly lead to decreased traineeship opportunities:
• The impact assessment of the Minimum wage Directive showed that the impact of the Minimum wage Directive on overall employment is expected to be muted175. Research has shown that the negative effects of increasing the minimum wage on employment are small, and significantly smaller than was believed years ago176.
• Evidence from prior studies177 investigating the consequences of extending access to social protection to all forms of employment suggest that these initiatives would not change the hiring behaviour of traineeship providers.  
• The survey conducted under the supporting study showed that only 1 out of 15 companies said they would take fewer trainees in case of a requirement to set remuneration at minimum wage level.  
Overall, the risk of a shift from paid to unpaid traineeships appears very limited for MPT and ALMP traineeships, which are subject to detailed regulations and legal obligations on remuneration in most Member States. Regarding OMT, the situation is more complex. In 4 Member States unpaid traineeships or OMT as such are forbidden. In the other Member States, employers currently already have the choice to offer unpaid traineeships instead of paid traineeships (the latter either as employment relationships, subject to full protection under labour law and collective agreements, or as contractual relationships regulated by specific provisions, including on remuneration). The potential additional labour costs stemming from the introduction of a binding measure on fair/proportionate remuneration (option B1.3) could however lead to more providers of OMT opting for unpaid traineeships. While the options in Area B also foresee a non-legislative measure on fair/proportionate remuneration, the Union cannot legally forbid Member States’ possibility to allow for unpaid traineeships. 
On ECT, legal provisions on remuneration/compensation only exist in 5 Member States. Moreover, it should be stressed that ECT are more likely than other traineeships not to fulfil the notion of “worker” as developed in the case law of the CJEU, i.e. the person (1) pursues activities that are real and genuine which are performed (2) under the supervision of another person (3) in return for remuneration.  
Overall, it should also be highlighted that paid traineeship providers would not necessarily switch from offering paid traineeships to unpaid ones, given the consequences in terms of reputational damage as well as the decrease in their attractiveness as employer. Furthermore, as already discussed in section 5.2 demographic challenges as well as labour and skills shortage, in particular in some sectors, lead to a tightening of the labour market and a race for talent. This is an additional factor deterring traineeship providers from switching from offering paid traineeships to unpaid ones – a shift which, however, for the reasons outlined above, cannot be entirely excluded.
Summary table of main benefits and costs
Table 1: Summary table of main benefits and costs


7 How do the options compare?
The options for each Area are compared against the baseline for the criteria of effectiveness, efficiency and coherence, based on the indicators set out in the tables below. When rating the policy options, the social and economic impacts (including on competitiveness and SMEs) and on fundamental rights (see section 6) were all taken into account. Based on this assessment, a preferred option is identified for all Policy Areas and then described in section 8. Policy options are scored from “0” to “+++” (“---") depending on the direction of the impact178. The baseline scenario is rated 0 (for details see Annex A4.15). A list of the main indicators used for the comparison of options is presented in Table 1. It should be noted that estimates in this table are subject to some data limitations (for details see the introduction to sections 2.1 and 6, and Annex 4), therefore, they should be treated with caution. While this poses certain limitations to the validity of the conclusions on the basis of quantitative data, the analysis was complemented and triangulated with evidence from other sources (e.g., legal analysis, two-stage social partners’ consultation, survey of stakeholders and interviews – see Annex 4 for details) to overcome these shortcomings and the risk of biased responses. Such an approach supports the validity of the conclusions. For each of the criteria used for the tables comparing different options, a detailed table on the rating of the options, including a comprehensive list of the criteria used for the assessment, is presented (Tables 2-5). Table 6 provides a summary overview. Annex A13.3 presents tables on benefits and costs of all options (where possible).
7.1 Effectiveness
“Effectiveness” refers to the extent to which the options under all Policy Areas help achieve the objectives of the initiative, as outlined in section 5. Table 2 provides a detailed comparison. The effectiveness of non-legislative measures depends on the implementation by the Member States and to inform the assessment below, the experience from the implementation of the 2014 QFT is taken into account.179
Under Area A1, all three options score positively as they would contribute to ensuring the rights of individuals. Policy Option A1.1 has a small positive effect in view of the expected number of trainees benefiting (partial implementation). In addition, options A1.2 and A1.3 can be expected to effectively improve detecting and combating work relationships disguised as traineeships and can reduce the number of work relationships disguised as traineeships180 and non-compliant traineeships, leading as such to a reduction of the replacement of entry level jobs. Option A1.3 is the most effective in terms of paid trainees affected as it defines a list of binding elements at EU level. This would result in a common understanding of the main features of work relationships disguised as traineeships and can ensure that all Member States apply uniformly the same comprehensive list to detect work relationships disguised as traineeships. This provides concrete guidance to competent authorities to carry out effective controls and inspections, resulting in more efficient inspection and enforcement mechanisms. Under Area A2, both policy options score positively as they can prevent work relationships disguised as traineeships and can potentially reduce the replacement of entry level jobs. Policy Option A2.1 is expected to have a small positive effect (under partial implementation) on trainees exposed to either too long-duration or consecutive traineeships with the same employer and can potentially reduce the number of trainees doing repeated traineeships with different employers. Policy Option A2.2 is the most effective since it can give more certainty that trainees will be protected, with established binding rules for trainees considered workers.
Under Area B1, all policy options score positively. Policy Option B1.1 has a small positive effect in view of the expected number of trainees that could benefit (under partial implementation). Policy Options B1.2 and B1.3 are more effective for trainees considered workers. Option B1.2 is the most effective for all working conditions but Option B1.3 is the most effective for remuneration due to the direct right for fair/proportionate remuneration. Under Area B2, both options score positively as they can improve the transparency of working conditions through the provision of a strengthened written traineeship agreement clearly specifying obligations and rights and envisage access to mentors. Policy Option B2.1 has a small positive effect in view of the expected number of trainees that could benefit (under partial implementation). Policy Option B2.2 is the most effective as it establishes binding rules for trainees considered workers.
Under Area C, the recommendations (all identified in the evaluation) to address access for vulnerable groups and to facilitate access to remote/hybrid traineeships will add new elements which are absent from the 2014 QFT. The 2014 QFT has measures facilitating cross-border traineeships, which will be updated and strengthened through revised as well as new measures. Therefore, it is expected that the measures under Area C will be more effective than the baseline in addressing the access to traineeships.
Under Area D, the extension of the scope of the non-binding instrument to all types of traineeships is expected to be more effective than the baseline in improving the quality of working conditions and learning content for an increased number of trainees, as the recommendations would cover not only OMT and ALMP but also ECT and MPT. However, as the baseline option, the recommendations would be non-binding. If flanked by binding measures, as described in the preferred option, the non-binding instrument can be expected to benefit from some spill-over effect in terms of increased awareness of the non-binding quality principles.
Table 2: Effectiveness - detailed comparison of options
Options under Area A: Addressing the problematic use of traineeships
Baseline
A1.1
A1.2
A1.3
A2.1
A2.2
Primary Specific objectives

SO1: Facilitate and strengthen enforcement of applicable legislation and support trainees in accessing their rights

SO2: Facilitate prevention of problematic use of traineeships
Effectiveness
0
+
++
++/+++
+
+/++
Indicators for comparing policy options

• Number of trainees (workers or not) benefiting from inspections and enforcement to ensure their rights.
• Reduction in the number of paid trainees doing traineeships of a total duration of more than 6 months, including consecutive/repeated traineeships with the same employer as well as those who also had a poor learning content.
• Number of trainees doing traineeships with a duration longer than 6 months as well as those doing long (> 6 months) consecutive/repeated traineeships with the same or different employers
Options under Area B: Addressing the poor quality of traineeships
Baseline
B1.1
B1.2
B1.3
B2.1
B2.2
Primary Specific objectives

SO3. Support fair working conditions for traineeships, including remuneration and access to social protection
SO4: Improve the learning component of traineeships
Effectiveness
0
+
+++
+++
+
+/++
Indicators for comparing policy options

• Number of trainees to benefit from fair/proportionate remuneration and access to social protection.
• Transparency on working conditions, tasks and learning content (trainees benefiting from written agreement and mentorships)
Option under Area C: measures improving access to traineeships
Baseline
C.1




Primary Specific objectives

SO5. Foster inclusiveness and improve access to traineeship opportunities
Effectiveness
0
++




Indicators for comparing policy options

• Number of trainees (in particular vulnerable groups) benefiting from increased accessibility to all traineeships, including cross-border and remote/hybrid traineeships
Option under Area D: Extending the scope to all traineeships
Baseline
D1




Specific objectives


All
Effectiveness
0
++




Indicators for comparing policy options

• Number of trainees benefiting from fair/proportionate remuneration, access to social protection, transparency on working conditions, tasks and learning content, inclusiveness of and access to traineeships
All

• Expected level of implementation by Member States

7.2 Efficiency
“Efficiency” refers to the ratio of the benefits of each option to its associated costs (see section 6 for an overview of the social and economic impacts of the options). As it is difficult to monetise/quantify benefits, the efficiency is presented as cost-effectiveness. Table 3 provides a detailed comparison.
Under Area A all policy options would imply costs for trainees, employers/traineeship providers and public authorities, with lower costs under A1.1 and A2.1 (assuming partial implementation). However, based on the assessment of the effectiveness of the options, A1.2 and A1.3 are assessed as having small positive efficiency compared to the baseline, with A1.3 considered as the most efficient. Policy options A1.1. and A2.1 and A2.2 are assessed to have the same efficiency as the baseline.
Under Area B, all policy options have the same efficiency as the baseline. Policy Option B1.1 and B2.1 would imply the lowest additional cost but also the lowest benefits. Options B1.2, B1.3 and B2.2 would have higher costs with proportionately higher benefits, so the efficiency remains the same as in the baseline.
Under Area C, the recommendations are expected to bring benefits to all trainees, but in particular to vulnerable groups. Traineeship providers would benefit from a wider and more diverse pool of trainee candidates as well as increased ability to attract recruits as a result of improved reputation. Costs involved would affect mainly public authorities (related to new or revised guidance) and traineeship providers (related to outreach, the tailoring of traineeship programmes, workplaces and work arrangements, revised recruitment procedures (including vacancy templates)). Most of these would be one-off. Quantification is not possible as this would depend on the level of implementation. With no further data available and building on the evaluation findings on efficiency, where the costs of implementing the 2014 QFT were found to be proportionate to its benefits, it is assessed that the costs of the measures under Area C would be offset by the benefits as well.
Under Area D, the option to extend the non-binding instrument to all traineeships is found to be slightly more efficient than the baseline, with the main benefit being the increased coherence and clarity across all traineeships, which potentially might reduce time and resources of all involved parties for resolving uncertainties. Otherwise, the relation between costs and benefits would remain the same as in the baseline, since potential adjustment costs for in particular traineeship providers and public authorities would be proportionate to the higher number of benefitting trainees. Building on the evaluation findings on efficiency, where the costs of implementing the 2014 QFT were found to be proportionate to its benefits, the revised and strengthened initiative with flanking binding measures is expected to bring higher benefits than the 2014 QFT and therefore, the benefits are more likely to outweigh the costs.
Table 3: Efficiency - detailed comparison of options
Options under Area A: Addressing the problematic use of traineeships
Baseline
A1.1
A1.2
A1.3
A2.1
A2.2
Primary Specific objectives

SO1: Facilitate and strengthen enforcement of applicable legislation and support trainees in accessing their rights
SO2: Facilitate prevention of problematic use of traineeships
Efficiency
0
0
+
+/++
0
0
Indicators for comparing policy options

• Fulfilment of objectives in view of the following costs
• Compliance costs on employers/traineeship providers
• Enforcement costs on public authorities
• Adjustment costs for employers/traineeship providers for more frequent recruitment
• Revenue to public sector (fines)
Options under Area B: Addressing the poor quality of traineeships
Baseline
B1.1
B1.2
B1.3
B2.1
B2.2
Primary Specific objectives

SO3. Support fair working conditions for traineeships, including remuneration and access to social protection
SO4: Improve the learning component of traineeships
Efficiency
0
0
0
0
0
0
Indicators for comparing policy options

• Fulfilment of objectives in view of the following costs
• Costs related to fair / proportionate remuneration and access to social protection
• Cost to provide written agreement and on mentorship
• Enforcement costs on public authorities
Option under Area C: measures improving access to traineeships
Baseline
C.1




Primary Specific objectives

SO5. Foster inclusiveness and improve access to traineeship opportunities
Efficiency
0
0




Indicators for comparing policy options

• Fulfilment of objectives in view of the following costs
• Compliance costs for traineeship providers and public authorities
Option under Area D: Extending the scope of recommendations to all traineeships
Baseline
D.1




Specific objectives

All
Efficiency
0
0/+




Indicators for comparing policy options

Fulfilment of objectives in view of the following costs
• Compliance costs for traineeship providers and public authorities
All

• One-off adjustment costs for business for familiarisation with all new provisions
• One-off enforcement costs for public authorities for integration of new provisions into national law

7.3 Coherence
This section assesses the coherence of each option with the values, aims, objectives of existing and forthcoming initiatives of the EU (for details see Annex A12.1 on Existing EU law and instruments). Table 4 provides a detailed comparison.
Under Area A, all options score positively and equally on coherence as they would contribute to the Treaty-based goals of promoting employment and improved living and working conditions (Article 151 TFEU). They are coherent with the implementation of the European Pillar of Social Rights, in relation to fair working conditions and with the UN SDGs, the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, and the EU labour acquis in relation to fixed-term work which requires Member States to prevent misuse of fixed‑term contracts.
Under Area B, all options score positively on coherence. All options are coherent with the Treaty-based goals of promoting employment and improved living and working conditions (Article 151 TFEU) and with the UN SDGs. They are also coherent with the implementation of the European Pillar of Social Rights regarding wages (principle 6), equal opportunities (principle 3), and social protection (principle 12). Coherence is also observed with the Council recommendation on access to social protection, which covers trainees who are workers. The recommendations, while making reference to the Council Recommendation on social protection, will encourage ensuring access to social protection for all trainees, in line with national legislation. All options are also highly coherent with the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. Options B1.2 and B1.3 are also coherent with the EU labour acquis in relation to fixed-term and part-time work and minimum wages. Policy options under Area B2 are coherent with the implementation of the European Pillar of Social Rights, as regards training (principle 1), and information about employment conditions (principle 7). All policy options are consistent with the EU labour acquis on transparent and predictable working conditions as they aim to improve the transparency of information provided (in writing) to trainees.
Under Area C, the recommendations are more coherent than the baseline, as they will bring benefits for equal opportunities and inclusion of people with disabilities, in line with the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, principles 3 and 17 of the European Pillar of Social Rights, and the Strategy for the Rights of Persons with Disabilities 2021-2030. The measures facilitating cross-border mobility are in line with the objectives of the Erasmus+ programme.
Under Area D, the option to extend is found to be more coherent than the baseline with the above-mentioned existing and forthcoming initiatives of the EU, since all trainees, regardless of the type of traineeship, would benefit and the same quality principles would apply to all traineeships. Coherence with the Erasmus+ standards, which apply to transnational ECT in the field of higher education, would be ensured by strengthening working conditions in a complementary way. The recommendations would be sufficiently flexible to allow for the different standards on duration for duly justified cases, which would include MPT and some other traineeships, e.g. in Erasmus+ (which provides a wider range than 6 months).
Table 4: Coherence - detailed comparison of options

Options under Area A: Addressing the problematic use of traineeships
Baseline
A1.1
A1.2
A1.3
A2.1
A2.2
Primary Specific objectives

SO1: Facilitate and strengthen enforcement of applicable legislation and support trainees in accessing their rights

SO2: Facilitate prevention of problematic use of traineeships
Coherence
0
++
++
++
++
++
Options under Area B: Addressing the poor quality of traineeships
Baseline
B1.1
B1.2
B1.3
B2.1
B2.2





Coherence
0
++
++
++
++
++
Options under Area C: Measures improving access to traineeships
Baseline
C1




Primary Specific objectives

SO3. Support fair working conditions for traineeships, including remuneration and access to social protection
SO4: Improve the learning component of traineeships
Primary Specific objectives

SO5. Foster inclusiveness and improve access to traineeship opportunities
Coherence
0
+



Options under Area D: Extending the scope of recommendations to all traineeships
Baseline
D1



Specific objectives

All
Coherence
0
+



Indicators for comparing policy options

• Treaty Objective
• Principles of EPSR
• Fundamental Rights of the European Union
• EU labour acquis
• Strategy for rights of persons with disabilities 2021 – 2030 (area C)
• Erasmus+ (areas C and D)

7.4 Proportionality
This section assesses how the approach and the options under consideration match the identified problems and objectives, considering in particular the scale of the problems, the expected benefits and costs, and scope for national decisions. Table 5 provides a detailed comparison.
Under Area A1: all options score positively with respect to proportionality as they respond to the identified need to strengthen the monitoring and enforcement while aiming to keep costs to a minimum. The combination of measures and instruments (Recommendation and Directive) in both options A1.2. and A1.3 give Member States enough scope to put in place monitoring and enforcement arrangements taking into account national systems and prerogatives. When it comes to the criteria for assessment, Option A1.3 with dedicated and effective controls on work relationships disguised as traineeships and non-compliant traineeships as well as the binding EU list of criteria is considered more commensurate to the challenges, as it ensures that in all Member States the applicable rules are implemented appropriately and coherently. Option A1.2 does not go far enough in view of the identified problem of work relationships disguised as traineeships, since it is less likely to ensure a coherent and consistent approach to identifying work relationships disguised as traineeships by giving full scope to Member States to define the specific elements for controls. With regard to supporting trainees in enforcing their rights, the measures do not impose significant costs for Member States as such structures for employees and some groups of trainees already exist in most Member States, and no costs for businesses, while they have the potential to benefit trainees who are not granted the rights they are entitled to. Options A1.2 and A1.3, strike the right balance as they maximise the benefits by ensuring that all Member States implement the measures consistently, while at the same time limiting additional costs by allowing Member States to use existing structures for reporting malpractice, rather than creating new ones. Option A1.1 leaves all decisions to Member States. However, it has limited benefits and potential to effectively meet policy objectives (under partial implementation). In light of these considerations, option A1.3 is assessed most positively in terms of proportionality, followed by option A1.2 and A1.1.
Under Area A2, both options score positively with respect to proportionality as they respond to the identified need to facilitate prevention of problematic use of traineeships, with small costs for traineeship providers. The combination of instruments (Recommendation and Directive) in option A2.2 acknowledges the legal limitations for the EU to act. The EU competencies allow legislative action at the EU level to protect and improve the situation of workers and the choice of a Directive for trainees considered as workers allows for more effective enforcement. However, setting a binding maximum duration at EU level (A2.2) goes too far in view of the uncertainty on the size of problem across Member States and differences across Member States and by type of traineeships, despite the possibility to allow for duly justified exceptions. Option A2.1 strikes a good balance, as the problem varies considerably by type of traineeship and therefore Member States are in the best position to adjust a non-binding principle to the specific circumstances. In light of these considerations, option A2.1 is assessed most positively in terms of proportionality, while the proportionality of the option A2.2 is low.
Under Area B1: all options address the challenges trainees are facing and have the potential for strong benefits, albeit at an important cost if implemented evenly in all Member States. This requires striking a proportionate balance regarding the measures, the scope and the choice of instrument. In this light, Option B1.3 combining a Directive and Recommendation would achieve good results towards the objectives and would give scope for Member States’ implementation. However, the binding measure of fair/proportionate remuneration would go too far, considering the important costs for businesses, and that it might thus lead to unintended consequences, such as shifts from paid to unpaid traineeships. Option B1.1 with exclusively non-binding measures gives flexibility to Member States without, however, ensuring even implementation across the EU. It would thus not sufficiently reach the intended objectives and Member States could also be hesitant to act first if others might not follow. The option therefore ranks low in terms of proportionality, even though the impact on costs may be lower. Option B1.2’s proportionality is considered as good. Its binding rules are focussed on preventing unjustified different treatment of trainees considered as workers while not prescribing to Member States any binding rules, including on remuneration. This leaves space for Member States to implement them according to their specific circumstances in a proportionate way. In light of these considerations, Option B1.2 is assessed most positively in terms of proportionality, while both Option B1.1 and Option B1.3 rank lower.
Under Area B2 option B2.1, which reinforces the QFT Recommendation with provisions on more comprehensive written agreement while it highlights the beneficial role of a mentor, can have positive effects without creating binding rules for training providers. Considering that the QFT Recommendation already promotes the quality of learning content and Member States have started progressing, these additions are commensurate to the remaining challenges. Option B2.2 would result in too prescriptive requirement at EU level. Option B2.1 is thus considered to rate positively regarding proportionality, while Option B2.2 is comparable to the baseline.
Under Area C: by proposing non-binding guidance, addresses the identified challenges without overregulating traineeship provision. By adding principles regarding access for vulnerable groups, cross-border and remote/hybrid traineeships it is more proportionate than the baseline, which does not address these issues, although clear challenges have been identified. Thus Option 1 is assessed as more proportionate than the baseline.
Under Area D extending the scope of the QFT Recommendation to ECT and MPT is considered commensurate to the problems that have also been identified in these types of traineeships. This option keeps unchanged the discretion given to Member States for implementation, while having a potential to improve traineeships currently not covered by the QFT Recommendation. It is therefore considered more proportionate than the baseline. Thus Option 1 is assessed as more proportionate than the baseline.
Table 5: Proportionality - detailed comparison of options
Options under policy Area A: Addressing the problematic use of traineeships
Baseline
A1.1
A1.2
A1.3
A2.1
A2.2
Primary Specific objectives

SO1: Facilitate and strengthen the enforcement of applicable legislation and support trainees in accessing their labour rights
SO2: Prevent the problematic use of traineeships
Proportionality
0
0/+
+
+/++
+/++
0/+
Options under Area B: Addressing the poor quality of traineeships
Baseline
B1.1
B1.2
B1.3
B2.1
B2.2
Primary Specific objectives

SO3. Support fair working conditions for traineeships, including remuneration and access to social protection
SO4: Improve the learning component of traineeships
Proportionality
0
0/+
++
0/+
+
0
Options under Area C: Measures improving access to traineeships
Baseline
C1




Primary Specific objectives

SO5. Foster inclusiveness and improve access to traineeship opportunities
Proportionality
0
+



Options under Area D: Extending the scope of recommendations to all traineeships
Baseline
D1




Specific objectives

All
Proportionality
0
+




Indicators for comparing policy options
• Uncertainty of the scale of the problem
• Expected benefits and costs
• Choice of instrument
• Scope for national consideration
• Broader subsidiarity considerations
Table 6: Summary overview of ratings of the options
 
Area A
Area B
Area C
Area D
Options/Criteria
A1.1
A1.2
A1.3
A2.1
A2.2
B1.1
B1.2
B1.3
B2.1
B2.2
C1
D1
Effectiveness
+
++
++/+++
+
+/++
+
+++
+++
+
+/++
++
++
Efficiency
0
+
+/++
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0/+
Coherence
++
++
++
++
++
++
++
++
++
++
+
+
Proportionality
0/+
+
+/++
+/++
0/+
0/+
++
0/+
+
0
+
+
8 Preferred option
The preferred option is a package combining the below measures under the different Policy areas and consisting of a Directive and an update of the 2014 Council Recommendation (see Table 7). This is regarded as the most suitable combination to deliver on the objectives of the initiative and is also considered to be the most proportionate and effective option. Annex 3 provides a summary of the main combined impacts of the preferred option. As mentioned above, the quantitative evidence on the impacts of the options are subject to some data limitations (for details see the introduction to sections 2.1 and 6, and Annex 4). However, the conclusions in this report are based on triangulated evidence from different sources (see Annex 4 for details) which supports the validity of the conclusions.
Table 7: The preferred package

Policy Options
DIR

REC

Area A
Option A.1.3 and Option A2.1
• Effective controls and inspections to detect and take enforcement action against work relationships disguised as traineeships and non-compliant traineeships and overall assessment based on a list of elements defined at EU level. To assist the assessment:
-Member States to define excessive duration of traineeships at national level
-Employers to provide in the vacancy notices information on the expected tasks, learning content, working conditions, remuneration and social protection
• Workers’ representatives and other actors to be able to engage in procedures to enforce the rights of trainees and channels to report of malpractice and poor traineeship conditions. 
• Recommendations
-for effective monitoring and enforcement to ensure that the rights and working conditions of trainees under applicable EU and national law are respected
-for maximum traineeship duration (6 months) to include consecutive/repeated traineeships (strengthened Principle 10) and to prevent employers from requesting previous work experience in vacancy notices

X








X

















X


X



Area B
Option B1.2 and B2.1:  
• Ensure trainees are not treated in a less favourable manner as regards working conditions, including pay, than comparable entry-level workers of the same category in the same establishment, unless different treatment is justified on objective grounds.
• Recommendations on
-fair/proportionate remuneration and access to social protection for all trainees
- written traineeship agreement to include additional elements to increase transparency and to improve the learning component (strengthened Principle 2)
- mentorship

X











X
Area C
Recommendations to
1) ensure equal access to traineeships for vulnerable groups.   
2) improve cross-border traineeships. 
3) improve remote/hybrid traineeships.  


X
Area D
Extend the non-binding instrument to ECT and MPT

X
Accompanying measures
• Improving monitoring and data collection.
• Involvement of social partners and other stakeholders the implementation and monitoring of the rights and obligation arising from this initiative.
• Strengthening awareness raising, and the exchange of best practices.
• Financial and/or practical guidance to support employers and in particular SMEs, to provide high quality traineeships.


X
X

X
X

Under Area A, the preferred options are A1.3 and A2.1. Option A1.3 has the highest score in effectiveness, efficiency and proportionality compared to the baseline. Option A2.1, despite scoring lower on effectiveness it scores more strongly on proportionality. Regarding coherence, all options in this Area rate equally. It should be pointed out the option A2.1 relates to provisions on maximum duration of traineeships, on which stakeholders have expressed divergent views.
Under Area B, the preferred options are B1.2 and B2.1. While option B1.2 rates equally with option B1.3 on in effectiveness and efficiency, but better than B.1.1, its score on proportionality is higher. Option B2.1, despite scoring lower on effectiveness, it scores more strongly on proportionality. Regarding coherence, all options in this Area rate equally.
Under Area C, all measures are included in the preferred package as the measures build upon the results of the evaluation.
Under Area D, the option to extend the scope to all traineeships is included in the preferred package building upon the evaluation findings as regards the possible extension of the scope to ECT, the analysis in the study supporting this initiative on both ECT and MPT, as well as the positive scores in effectiveness, efficiency and coherence, compared to the baseline.
The accompanying measures will also be included in the preferred package, as they will improve its effectiveness in reaching the objectives of the initiative.
The impacts will be reinforced by the combination of policy options/areas. The combination under policy areas A and B have the potential to bring cumulative positive impacts to trainees in terms of better working conditions (in particular fair/proportionate remuneration and access to social protection) and improved learning/training components. The combination of Area A and C is expected to bring cumulative benefits, in particular protecting vulnerable groups from the problematic use of traineeships and improving access to traineeships. The combination of policy options under Area B and C can ensure equal treatment of trainees in terms of working conditions (in particular on fair/proportionate remuneration and access to social protection) and increase transparency, thereby rendering quality traineeships more inclusive and accessible, including cross-border and/or remote/hybrid traineeships. The combination of all policy options and the combination of the preferred instruments have the potential to contribute to levelling the playing field among trainees. While legislative measures will provide stronger protection to trainees who are workers, the proposal for Council Recommendation recommends Member States to ensure good quality traineeships for all trainees. In case of full implementation by Member States, the impact of the Council Recommendation will be the same as legislative measures. Also, trainees who are non-workers could benefit from spill-over effects of the legislative measures.
Some stakeholders were concerned that mandatory provisions could reduce the offer of traineeships, in particular paid traineeships. The majority of these potentially reduced offers are likely to be work relationships disguised as traineeships and/or non-compliant or poor-quality traineeships, in line with the objectives of this initiative. The risk of a reduction in the number of paid traineeships is expected to be further mitigated due to a fairer competition between law-abiding traineeship providers. In addition, employers would benefit from the skills and competences that trainees develop in quality traineeships. This will help addressing skills and labour shortages and increasing productivity and competitiveness.
The scope of the Directive would cover all trainees considered as workers under EU law, regardless of the type of traineeship. Covering all trainees (including those who have no worker status) had to be discarded due to limitations imposed by the legal basis (see section 3.1). The updated QFT Council Recommendation would replace the 2014 QFT and provide recommendations through an updated and strengthened common policy framework at EU level for quality traineeships, while not setting mandatory requirements. The scope of the updated QFT Council Recommendation would cover all trainees (workers and non-workers) and all traineeship types, i.e., OMT, ALMP, ECT and MPT. In case of overlapping provisions in the Directive and the updated QFT Council Recommendation for trainees who are workers, the provisions in the Directive would prevail. This would be clearly specified in the updated QFT Council Recommendation.
The Policy options included in the preferred option respect the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality. The preferred option, by setting minimum standards regarding the working conditions of trainees who are considered as workers under EU law, and by providing recommendations covering all trainees in the EU, leaves room for the Member States to define the method and form of intervention to achieve the objectives. Thus, it does not go beyond what is necessary to address the problems identified and achieve specific objectives 1-5.
8.1 REFIT (simplification and improved efficiency)
Based on the case studies and targeted consultations under the study supporting the evaluation, the latter found that most stakeholders held the perception that the total costs related to the implementation of the QFT are proportionate to the benefits. Stakeholders highlighted benefits more often than costs, and, while quantification was difficult, their inability to identify significant costs associated with the QFT in its current form suggests that such costs are unlikely to be large enough to outweigh the benefits. Thus, the evaluation has not identified any significant burden reduction potential.
8.2 Application of the ‘one in, one out’ approach
The preferred option does not introduce administrative obligations for companies such as notifications, reports submissions, certifications. Some administrative costs might arise for businesses from the need to cooperate with national authorities during reinforced controls and inspections, but as this will be done on request the cost is expected to be marginal. This type of administrative cost does not require offsetting. The adjustment costs for businesses created by the preferred option are presented in Annex 3.
9 How will actual impacts be monitored and evaluated?
Progress towards achieving the objectives of the initiative will be monitored by a series of core indicators related to the objectives of the initiative. These and the related data sources are summarised in Annex A15.2. The monitoring framework will be subject to further adjustment according to the final legal and implementation requirements and timeline.
The initiative could be evaluated some years after it enters into force in line with the Better Regulation Guidelines (see Annex A15.3 for possible evaluation methods). This would take into account a two-year period of transposition by Member States, allowing enough time to evaluate effects on traineeships and traineeships providers, which may need time to adapt to the new rules, but also to gather data in line with the new requirements. To avoid additional administrative burden due to the collection of data/ information, the system should rely on established data sources to the extent possible, such as EU-LFS, the Eurobarometer, the Working Conditions Survey or the European Company Survey. Other input from agencies such as Eurofound or CEDEFOP could also be considered.


Delegations will find attached document SWD(2024) 66 final.

Encl.: SWD(2024) 66 final

Subsidiarity Grid
1. Can the Union act? What is the legal basis and competence of the Unions’ intended action?
1.1 Which article(s) of the Treaty are used to support the legislative proposal or policy initiative?
The proposed directive is based on Article 153 (2)(b), in conjunction with Article 153 (1)(b), which allows the Union to adopt directives setting minimum requirements with respect to working conditions.

The proposed Council Recommendation is based on Article 292 TFEU, in conjunction with Articles 153, 165 and 166 TFEU. Article 153 TFEU allows the Union to support and complement Member States' activities in the field of, inter alia, working conditions, social security and social protection of workers, the integration of persons excluded from the labour market and the combating of social exclusion. Article 165 TFEU allows the Union to contribute to the development of quality education by encouraging cooperation between Member States and, if necessary, by supporting and supplementing their action. Article 166 TFEU provides the legal basis for the Union to implement a vocational training policy which shall support and supplement the action of the Member States.
1.2 Is the Union competence represented by this Treaty article exclusive, shared or supporting in nature?
In the case of social policy and in particular working conditions (Article 153(1)(b) TFEU), the Union’s competence is shared with the Member States. For the area of education and training (Articles 165 and 166 TFEU), the Union has supporting competences.
Subsidiarity does not apply for policy areas where the Union has exclusive competence as defined in Article 3 TFEU1. It is the specific legal basis which determines whether the proposal falls under the subsidiarity control mechanism. Article 4 TFEU2 sets out the areas where competence is shared between the Union and the Member States. Article 6 TFEU3 sets out the areas for which the Unions has competence only to support the actions of the Member States.
2. Subsidiarity Principle: Why should the EU act?
2.1 Does the proposal fulfil the procedural requirements of Protocol No. 24:
• Has there been a wide consultation before proposing the act?
• Is there a detailed statement with qualitative and, where possible, quantitative indicators allowing an appraisal of whether the action can best be achieved at Union level?
A two-stage Treaty-based consultation of the European Social Partners under Article 154 TFEU was carried out by the Commission. The first stage (11 July – 15 September 2023) sought their views on the need for and possible direction of EU action to address the challenges, while the second stage (28 September – 9 November 2023) consulted them on the possible content of the EU action.

Various stakeholder consultation activities were carried out to collect factual evidence and stakeholder views on possible problems and necessary measures to improve the use and quality of, and the access to traineeships in the EU.
As part of the dedicated Flash Eurobarometer 523, between 15 and 24 March 2023, 26,334 people between 18 and 35 years from all EU Member States were surveyed online about their perceptions on integration into the labour market, with a particular focus on traineeships. The Commission also conducted a dedicated “SME Panel” survey. 170 responses were received between 12 October 2023 and 9 November 2023.
Additional consultation activities were organised by an external contractor in the context of a study supporting the preparation of the Impact Assessment (targeted online survey with national stakeholders to gather information on current practices and targeted interviews with EU-level stakeholders). Annex 2 of the Impact Assessment provides the outcomes of the stakeholder consultation (Synopsis report).

The European Parliament called for improvements in its 2023 resolution on quality traineeships in the EU (2020/2005(INL)). The resolution calls on the Commission to update and strengthen the 2014 Council Recommendation on a Quality Framework for Traineeships and turn it into a stronger legislative instrument and contains 2 annexes with proposals for legislative action. The Commission has also taken into account opinions by the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions and the final report of the Conference on the Future of Europe.
As part of the Commission's 2023 evaluation of the 2014 Quality Framework for Traineeships (QFT), a public consultation was held. The evaluation also entailed targeted consultations of national and regional authorities responsible for education, training and employment policies, social and economic partners, education and training providers, academic experts working on labour market issues, organisations representing young people, young (former, current and potential future) trainees, as well as other relevant stakeholders at European, national and regional level.
2.2 Does the explanatory memorandum (and any impact assessment) accompanying the Commission’s proposal contain an adequate justification regarding the conformity with the principle of subsidiarity?
The 2014 QFT has helped Member States, in particular those with less developed traineeship systems to implement policy and legislative changes. However, significant challenges in the use and quality of, and access to traineeships occur in all Member States. An EU initiative can help to coordinate and focus Member States’ efforts on measures which can address the specific problems identified across all types of traineeships. While fully respecting the specificities of national systems, the initiative would support Member States’ upward regulatory convergence in terms of quality and access of traineeships and lead to better enforcement of existing labour rights, contributing to a level-playing field for trainees and traineeship providers in the EU. EU action would also improve the transparency and mutual understanding of traineeship systems across the EU. This would also have a positive impact on cross-border mobility of trainees in the EU. The identified challenges must therefore be tackled at EU level. However, given the diversity of national systems and rules on work-based learning and the diversity in types of traineeships and given the need to respect the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality, Member States will be able to adapt the measures to the specificities of their national systems, in particular when it comes to regulatory enforcement and the independence of labour inspectorates, (vocational) education and training and (access to) regulated professions.
2.3 Based on the answers to the questions below, can the objectives of the proposed action be achieved sufficiently by the Member States acting alone (necessity for EU action)?
The objectives of the proposed initiative cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States acting alone. Given the common challenges and need to better use the potential of traineeships to provide a genuine learning and work experience resulting, an EU initiative can help to coordinate and focus Member States’ efforts on measures which can address the specific problems identified across all types of traineeships.
(a) Are there significant/appreciable transnational/cross-border aspects to the problems being tackled? Have these been quantified?
It is estimated that the prevalence of cross-border traineeships has increased between 2013 and 2023 from 9% to 21%. The Commission evaluation of the 2014 QFT showed the importance for trainees of reduced regulatory fragmentation, common quality requirements and transparent information about applicable rules to further facilitate their cross-border mobility in the Single Market.
(b) Would national action or the absence of the EU level action conflict with core objectives of the Treaty5 or significantly damage the interests of other Member States?
The EU Treaties promote well-being, employment and improved living and working conditions. While the absence of EU level action might not significantly damage the interests of other Member States, only EU action can ensure a consistent approach to improving the use and quality of, and access to traineeships and to contributing to better labour market outcomes of traineeships. A level playing field for trainees and traineeship providers and the enforcement of existing rights is increasingly relevant to both social inclusion and business competitiveness, given the skills mismatches, labour shortages and the significant increase of cross-border traineeships in the EU.
(c) To what extent do Member States have the ability or possibility to enact appropriate measures?
In accordance with the Treaty legal base of this initiative, Member States have broad discretion in setting and enforcing the rules on use, quality and access of traineeships. However, an EU initiative can help to coordinate and focus Member States’ efforts to improve implementation. The assessment in the Commission evaluation and the supporting impact assessment pointed to persistent and considerable gaps in conformity between national and regional regulatory frameworks and revealed significant potential to further improve the 2014 QFT implementation in national legislation.
(d) How does the problem and its causes (e.g. negative externalities, spill-over effects) vary across the national, regional and local levels of the EU?
The problem and its causes generally do not vary substantially within Member States, while there are some divergences between Member States in particular regarding the prevalence of trainees, how developed or fragmented their regulatory framework for traineeships and the enforcement mechanisms are. For the Member States that already have effective measures to tackle the identified problems, the direct impact of the EU initiative might be smaller, but they would benefit from the coherent and better coordinated approach across the EU.
(e) Is the problem widespread across the EU or limited to a few Member States?
Significant challenges in the use and quality of, and access to traineeships occur in all Member States, albeit to a different extent per Member State and per traineeship type. Importantly, the estimates about the prevalence of (paid) traineeships in the EU suggest that DE, ES, FR, IT and PL account for more than 80% of paid trainees, whereas seven other Member States (BE, DK, IE, EL, HR, AT, FI) also have total numbers of over 10 000 paid trainees per year on average.
(f) Are Member States overstretched in achieving the objectives of the planned measure?
The proposed measures are proportionate. They impose few administrative burdens on Member States while bringing substantial social benefits when fully implemented (e.g. increased fiscal revenues, improved quality of traineeships, including better working conditions and more adequate access to social protection for trainees). In assessing the policy options, due consideration was given to the need to afford sufficient discretion to Member States in implementing the measures into their respective national systems, in accordance with the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality and the Treaty legal base for social policy measures.
(g) How do the views/preferred courses of action of national, regional and local authorities differ across the EU?
In the preparation of this initiative the views of authorities were gathered in an online survey (60 responses from national public authorities) and during the public consultation under the 2023 evaluation of the 2014 QFT (public authorities represented 85 out of 259 respondents). The public authorities expressed the highest support for the 2014 QFT and its added value in improving the quality of traineeships across the EU, while they have heterogeneous views on how to address the identified challenges.
2.4 Based on the answer to the questions below, can the objectives of the proposed action be better achieved at Union level by reason of scale or effects of that action (EU added value)?
The main added value of EU action is to create a consistent common framework of principles and minimum standards across all Member States to improve the use and quality of, and access to traineeships to contribute to better labour market outcomes of traineeships and to foster cross-border mobility of trainees. It should trigger upward social convergence and enhance the coherence of the Single Market, by supporting Member States in ensuring a level playing field, the enforcement of applicable rules and a consistent and fair level of protection of trainees in the EU. It will also enlarge the pool of (future) workers with relevant skills, contributing to supporting the competitiveness of businesses and fostering social inclusion.
(a) Are there clear benefits from EU level action?
The initiative would support Member States’ upward regulatory convergence and better enforcement of existing labour rights, contributing to a level playing field for trainees and traineeship providers in the EU. Such a level playing field is increasingly relevant to both social inclusion and business competitiveness, given existing skills mismatches, labour shortages in the EU and the significant increase of cross-border traineeships within the EU.
(b) Are there economies of scale? Can the objectives be met more efficiently at EU level (larger benefits per unit cost)? Will the functioning of the internal market be improved?
EU action can yield advantages by ensuring a level playing field across various economic operators investing in and benefitting from traineeships (including cross-border traineeships), as well as helping mitigate issues related to skills mismatch, one of the drivers of labour shortages in the EU internal market.
(c) What are the benefits in replacing different national policies and rules with a more homogenous policy approach?
The EU initiative would support Member States in ensuring a level playing field, the enforcement of applicable rules and a consistent and fair level of protection of trainees in the EU. It will also enlarge the pool of (future) workers with relevant skills, contributing to supporting the competitiveness of businesses and fostering social inclusion. However, given the diversity of national systems and rules on work-based learning and the diversity in types of traineeships, the initiative allows Member States to adapt the measures proposed, including those in the directive, to the specificities of their national systems, in particular when it comes to regulatory enforcement and the independence of labour inspectorates, (vocational) education and training and (access to) regulated professions.
(d) Do the benefits of EU-level action outweigh the loss of competence of the Member States and the local and regional authorities (beyond the costs and benefits of acting at national, regional and local levels)?
The initiative will not lead to loss of competences of the Member States. It consists of a directive focused on the enforcement of existing rights and an update of the 2014 Council Recommendation, leaving a lot of possibilities to Member States to adjust the measures to the national specificities.
(e) Will there be improved legal clarity for those having to implement the legislation?
The proposed directive will improve legal clarity on the minimum measures to put in place to improve and enforce working conditions of trainees and to combat employment relationships disguised as traineeships.
3. Proportionality: How the EU should act
3.1 Does the explanatory memorandum (and any impact assessment) accompanying the Commission’s proposal contain an adequate justification regarding the proportionality of the proposal and a statement allowing appraisal of the compliance of the proposal with the principle of proportionality?
This proposal sets minimum requirements, thus ensuring that the degree of intervention will be kept to the minimum necessary in order to reach the objectives of the proposal. Member States which already have more favourable provisions in place than those put forward in this proposal will not have to change or lower them. Member States may also decide to go beyond the minimum standards set out. The costs linked to this proposal are reasonable and justified in light of the objective of strengthening the enforcement of working conditions of trainees.
The principle of proportionality is respected considering the size and nature of the identified problems. For instance, employers must provide authorities with information on traineeships upon request only. The impact assessment accompanying this initiative assessed and compared the policy options as to their proportionality relative to the baseline. The preferred option leaves room for Member States to define the method and form of intervention to achieve the objectives. Thus, it does not go beyond what is necessary to address the problems identified and achieve the specific objectives.
3.2 Based on the answers to the questions below and information available from any impact assessment, the explanatory memorandum or other sources, is the proposed action an appropriate way to achieve the intended objectives?
The proposed initiative is appropriate to achieve the objectives of improving the use and quality of, and access to traineeships across the EU, so that they provide a genuine learning and work experience facilitating education-to-work and job-to-job transitions by improving and strengthening the enforcement of working conditions of trainees who are considered as workers under EU law, and by providing recommendations to improve the quality of traineeships covering all trainees in the EU. The proposed legislative measures are limited to the aspects that Member States cannot achieve satisfactorily on their own and, while costs can be anticipated for traineeship providers and national authorities, these are reasonable and justified in light of the objectives. Furthermore, the proposed binding measures leave enough flexibility for Member States for implementation.
(a) Is the initiative limited to those aspects that Member States cannot achieve satisfactorily on their own, and where the Union can do better?
Yes, the initiative is limited to the aspects that Member States cannot achieve satisfactorily on their own and where the Union can do better. The Commission evaluation of the 2014 QFT: 1) revealed significant potential to further improve its implementation in national legislation, 2) pointed to missing elements to improve the quality (in particular regarding remuneration and access to social protection) of, and access to traineeships, and 3) highlighted the need to strengthen the practical implementation and enforcement of the 2014 QFT’s principles in Member States’ labour markets. While Member States could adopt measures at national level, the EU initiative will help to coordinate and focus Member States’ efforts. EU action can contribute to establishing a consistent level of minimum protection for trainees across the EU, benefitting also the increasing number of trainees and traineeship providers operating in a cross-border context.
(b) Is the form of Union action (choice of instrument) justified, as simple as possible, and coherent with the satisfactory achievement of, and ensuring compliance with the objectives pursued (e.g. choice between regulation, (framework) directive, recommendation, or alternative regulatory methods such as co-legislation, etc.)?
The relevant legal basis allows for the adoption of binding (minimum) requirements only in the form of Directives and only for trainees considered as workers. Including all trainees, also unpaid, in the personal scope of a legislative initiative was therefore not possible given that “pay” constitutes an essential element of the definition of a “worker” in the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU). To address the problematic uses of traineeships and poor-quality traineeships, both binding and non-binding options were considered. Regarding addressing unequal access to quality traineeships only a non-binding option is possible. The preferred package includes a Directive applying to trainees who are workers under EU law and an updated Council Recommendation covering all trainees.
(c) Does the Union action leave as much scope for national decision as possible while achieving satisfactorily the objectives set? (e.g. is it possible to limit the European action to minimum standards or use a less stringent policy instrument or approach?)
The EU initiative leaves much scope for national decisions. When it comes to binding rules, these are focused on improving the enforcement of rules and prevention of unjustified treatment of trainees considered as workers while not prescribing to Member States binding rules on remuneration. This leaves space for Member States to implement them according to their specific circumstances in a proportionate way. Sufficient scope for national decisions is also allowed under the Council Recommendation, for example with regard to improving access to social protection and setting of maximum duration of traineeships, in view of the uncertainty on the size of problem across Member States and differences across Member States and by type of traineeships. Thus, the initiative does not go beyond what is necessary to address the problems identified and achieve the specific objectives. Member States which already have more favourable provisions in place than those put forward in this proposal will not have to change or lower them. Member States may also decide to go beyond the minimum standards set out.
(d) Does the initiative create financial or administrative cost for the Union, national governments, regional or local authorities, economic operators or citizens? Are these costs commensurate with the objective to be achieved?
The initiative creates some costs for traineeship providers and national governments which are reasonable and justified in light of the objective of strengthening the enforcement of working conditions of trainees and combating employment relationships disguised as traineeships.
The main costs of the legislative measures for traineeship providers relate to a possible increase in labour costs and administrative or judicial procedures and penalties. These would mainly apply to traineeship providers where controls and inspections identify work relationships disguised as traineeships or non-compliant traineeships. Small costs could arise from the inclusion of traineeships in existing controls and inspections and administrative costs from having to provide competent authorities (upon request) data and information regarding trainees and their contracts.
Labour costs could also arise for traineeship providers who are treating trainees unequally compared to other/entry-level workers and no grounds for such an unjustifiable treatment can be identified. Where such objective grounds can be identified, labour cost could arise to ensure that the differentiated treatment should be proportionate to the grounds). However, it should be noted that for individual traineeship providers these costs could be expected to be relatively small, especially for SMEs, in relation to their overall labour cost. This is because trainees represent a small fraction of the overall labour force. It is roughly estimated that costs could be around EUR 41 million (under the minimum wage benchmark) and EUR 81 million (under the comparable entry level worker benchmark)6.
Regarding public administrations, the main costs of the legislative measures would be linked to a possible increase in enforcement costs to strengthening the capacity of competent inspection authorities and adjustment costs to ensure channels to report malpractice. The former costs could be roughly estimated to EUR 27,000 (if only training would be provided to existing inspectors) to around EUR 1.1 million (if Member States decide to hire and train additional staff in line with the ILO recommendations on the optimal number of inspectors per/10,000 employees). No continuous reporting or other administrative requirements are imposed.
Some stakeholders expressed concerns that these costs could reduce the offer of traineeships, especially paid traineeships. The majority of these potentially lost traineeships are likely to be problematic and/or poor-quality traineeships, in line with the aim of the initiative. The effect on the reduction of paid traineeships is expected to be small, given the benefits for traineeship providers, demographic trends and tight labour markets. The risk of a reduction in the number of paid traineeships is expected to be further mitigated due to a fairer competition between law-abiding traineeship providers.
The costs of non-legislative measures would depend on the degree of implementation by the Member States.
(e) While respecting the Union law, have special circumstances applying in individual Member States been taken into account?
The initiative respects national competencies and allows Member States to adapt the measures taken to the specificities of their national systems, in particular when it comes to regulatory enforcement and the independence of labour inspectorates, (vocational) education and training and (access to) regulated professions. In particular, the initiative gives Member States enough scope to put in place monitoring and enforcement arrangements taking into account national systems and prerogatives while it avoids prescriptive rules regarding working conditions. Furthermore, despite the proposed single regulatory approach across all types of traineeships, the proposed measures have in-built flexibility, where relevant, which allows for a differentiated approach depending on the specificities of the various types of traineeships, taking into consideration their objectives and characteristics, as well as specific national conditions. The principle of proportionality is also respected considering the size and nature of the identified problems. For instance, employers must provide authorities with information on traineeships upon request only.


Delegations will find attached document SWD(2024) 68 final.

Encl.: SWD(2024) 68 final

A. Need for EU action
What is the problem being addressed?
There are 3.1 million trainees in the EU, and the demand for traineeships is expected to grow. Quality traineeships can be an entry into the labour market. However, challenges exist despite improvements brought by the 2014 Council Recommendation on a quality framework for traineeships (2014 QFT).
The first challenge relates to the problematic use of traineeships by traineeship providers, i.e. unlawful practices whereby regular work relationships are disguised as traineeships or whereby traineeships do not comply with the law. People in unlawful traineeships are deprived of their relevant rights enshrined in EU law, national law or collective agreements. The second challenge is the existence of poor-quality traineeships, with no or unjustifiably low remuneration, no access to social protection and/or a substandard learning component, though they may be lawful. The third relates to unequal access due to barriers faced by vulnerable groups, obstacles to cross-border traineeships and challenges for remote/hybrid traineeships.
These problems negatively affect the transition of (young) people to the labour market, deprive some of them of labour rights they are entitled to and increase the risk of poverty and social exclusion. They also create unfair market competition, may perpetuate skills mismatches and hamper the EU’s competitiveness.
What is this initiative expected to achieve?
Its general objective is to improve the use, quality of, and access to traineeships across the EU, so that they provide a genuine learning and work experience facilitating education-to-work and job-to-job transitions. Specifically, it aims to strengthen the enforcement of applicable legislation and support trainees in accessing their labour rights, prevent the problematic use of traineeships, support fair working conditions (including remuneration and access to social protection), improve the learning component of traineeships, and access to traineeship opportunities.
What is the added value of action at EU level?
The EU initiative will contribute to achieving the Treaty’s objectives of promoting sustainable economic growth and social progress. It should trigger upward social convergence and enhance the coherence of the Single Market, by supporting Member States in ensuring a level playing field, the enforcement of applicable rules and a consistent and fair level of protection of trainees in the EU. It will also enlarge the pool of (future) workers with relevant skills, contributing to business competitiveness and social inclusion.
B. Policy options
What legislative and non-legislative policy options have been considered? Is there a preferred choice? Why?
The impact assessment considered four policy areas addressing: problematic uses of (A), poor quality of (B) and unequal access to traineeships (C), and gaps in scope (D). These policy options were selected due to their highest positive scores in terms of effectiveness, efficiency, coherence and proportionality, compared to the baseline.
Under Policy Area A the preferred option requires effective controls and inspections to detect and take enforcement action against non-compliant traineeships and work relationships disguised as traineeships, supported by a non-exhaustive list of elements defined at EU level. It includes measures to support competent authorities in their assessment and dedicated support measures for trainees to enforce their rights.
Under Policy Area B it ensures that trainees who are workers are not treated in a less favourable manner as regards working conditions, including pay, than comparable entry-level workers, unless justified on objective grounds. It i.a. provides recommendations on fair/proportionate remuneration, access to social protection and mentorship for all trainees and to extend the information provided through written traineeship agreements.
Under Policy Area C it includes recommendations to 1) ensure equal access to traineeships for vulnerable groups, 2) facilitate cross-border traineeships and 3) improve remote/hybrid traineeships. Under Policy Area D it extends the scope to all traineeships.
The preferred option is a package of a Directive applying to trainees who are workers under EU law and an updated Council Recommendation covering all trainees.
Who supports which option?
The preferred option reflects the priorities of the 2023 European Parliament Resolution under Article 225 TFEU that called on the Commission to update and strengthen the 2014 QFT and turn it into a stronger legislative instrument. It also responds to a recommendation by the Conference on the Future of Europe and the positions of trade unions and youth organisations. However, due to subsidiarity, proportionality and legality considerations, the preferred option does in several areas not include the legally binding measures called for by these stakeholders. Employers agree with the general objective and most policy options under the preferred option but are against a legally binding measure and advocate for non-legislative action.
C. Impacts of the preferred option
What are the benefits of the preferred option?
It will bring social benefits to trainees by reducing problematic and poor-quality traineeships. It will also result in fewer trainees doing traineeships with an excessive duration, including repeated/consecutive traineeships with the same employer. Trainees would also benefit from fairer remuneration, more access to social protection and better learning opportunities. Depending on implementation, this could potentially affect up to 1.5 million unpaid trainees and 300,000 paid trainees without access to full social protection. Trainees considered as workers will benefit from equal treatment with other/entry-level workers in the same establishment, unless different treatment is justified on objective grounds. The preferred option would also make traineeships more accessible to trainees from vulnerable groups, including persons with disabilities.
The preferred option is expected to bring economic benefits to traineeship providers who will enjoy a fairer market competition. Moreover, employers would benefit from productivity and competitiveness gains due to a more skilled workforce. Additional benefits would come from improved labour market matching and higher retention rates which could reduce employers’ search, matching and recruitment costs. Traineeship providers would also benefit from a wider, more diverse pool of candidates.
What are the costs of the preferred option?
The main costs of the preferred option relate to a possible increase in labour costs and administrative or judicial procedures and penalties. These would only apply to traineeship providers where controls and inspections identify problematic traineeships and those offering poor quality traineeships. It also implies some costs to adjust to the new provisions and to provide (upon request) information on trainees and their contracts to competent authorities.
Some stakeholders were concerned that these costs could reduce the offer of traineeships, especially paid traineeships. The majority of these potentially lost traineeships are likely to be problematic and/or poor-quality traineeships, corresponding to the aim of the initiative. The effect on the reduction of paid traineeships is expected to be small, given the benefits for traineeship providers, demographic trends and tight labour markets.
How will enterprises and SMEs be affected?
SMEs will enjoy a larger trainee pool and better level-playing field, helping their competitiveness.
Will there be significant impacts on national budgets and administrations?
National authorities would become more effective in detecting and combating work relationships disguised as traineeships. A positive impact on public budgets would come from increased tax and social security receipts, from fines imposed and reduced social protection and activation spending. The main sources of costs would stem from implementation in national regulatory frameworks, strengthening the capacity of inspection authorities and setting up reporting channels. A small negative impact on the budget might be observed if traineeship providers decide to reduce the total number of paid positions.
Will there be other significant impacts?
The preferred option is expected to have a strong positive impact on ensuring fundamental rights in the EU.
D. Follow-up
When will the policy be reviewed?
The Directive will be evaluated 5 years after its entry into force, following a 2-year transposition period, and the Recommendation within three years after its adoption.


Delegations will find attached document COM(2024) 133 final.

Encl.: COM(2024) 133 final

EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM
1. CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL
• Reasons for and objectives of the proposal
In her Political Guidelines (1), President von der Leyen stressed the need to strengthen Europe’s social market economy and to foster “growth which creates quality jobs, especially for young people”.
Youth unemployment remains a persistent challenge in the EU, with the youth unemployment rate being more than twice as high as the overall unemployment rate (2). A particular challenge lies in activating more young people who are not in employment, education or training (NEETs) and who face specific obstacles that hinder their participation in the labour market. Therefore, the European Pillar of Social Rights Action Plan (3) sets out the target of decreasing the rate of young people aged 15-29 who are NEETs from 12.6% (2019) to 9% by 2030 by improving their employment prospects.
Traineeships can provide an opportunity for young people to gain practical and professional experience, improve their skills and thereby facilitate their access to the labour market. They offer an opportunity for employers to attract, train and retain their staff. However, the value of a traineeship depends on its quality. A quality traineeship requires fair and transparent working conditions and adequate learning content. Moreover, inclusive traineeships can help provide opportunities for everyone to access the labour market, including young people in vulnerable situations.
According to estimations based on the European Labour Force Survey (EU-LFS) data, there are 3.1 million trainees in the EU (2019 data) out of which 1.6 million are paid trainees and 1.5 million are unpaid. An increasing number of trainees in the EU participate in cross-border traineeships (21% of trainees in 2023 compared to 9% in 2013) (4), demonstrating the potential of traineeships to contribute to fair labour mobility in the EU. Estimates also indicate that in 2019 around 370 000 paid trainees (5) did a traineeship of a long duration (more than 6 months), including consecutive/repeated ones with the same employer. Out of these, around 100 000 trainees did a traineeship of a long duration with poor learning content (6).
The 2014 Council Recommendation on a Quality Framework for Traineeships (QFT) is an important reference point for determining what constitutes a quality traineeship. It sets out guidelines for traineeships outside education curricula and mandatory professional training.
In its 2023 evaluation of this Council Recommendation (7), the Commission found indications that the QFT had a positive impact on the quality of traineeships in the EU. It also confirmed that traineeships continue to be an important pathway for young people to enter the labour market. In addition, quality traineeships can be useful upskilling and/or reskilling opportunities for people of any age to acquire practical skills on the job to set their career in a new direction.
However, the evaluation also highlighted areas that could be further strengthened and improved. For instance, it recommended better integrating quality principles in national legislation, in particular for open-market traineeships (OMTs), stronger monitoring and enforcement to ensure the application of the quality principles on the ground and increasing awareness amongst various key stakeholders. The need for stronger support to employers, for example, through financial support and practical guidance, was also highlighted. Furthermore, the evaluation stressed that efforts to provide more concrete and practical information to young people on cross-border traineeships should be stepped up. It also identified additional quality criteria, such as fair pay and social protection, rules on remote/hybrid traineeships, better addressing the needs of groups in vulnerable situations, and strengthened support to trainees during and after the traineeship. Moreover, the evaluation noted the possibility of extending the scope of QFT from OMTs and traineeships that are part of active labour market policies (ALMP) to also cover other traineeships, such as those that are part of formal education and training curricula.
Various stakeholders called on the Commission to improve the quality of traineeships:
• The report on the final outcome of the Conference on the Future of Europe (8) includes the call to ensure that young people’s traineeships and jobs comply with quality standards, including on pay, and that unpaid internships on the labour market and outside formal education are banned through a legal instrument.
• In its Opinion “The Equal Treatment of Young People in the Labour Market” of 15 June 2023 (9), the European Economic and Social Committee (EESC) noted that traineeships should offer good quality learning content and adequate working conditions, and should not be a substitute for regular jobs or a precondition for a job placement.
• In its Opinion “Youth Employment Support: a Bridge to Jobs for the Next Generation Reinforcing the Youth Guarantee” of 5 February 2021 (10), the Committee of the Regions considered that traineeships and apprenticeships should primarily provide a learning experience for young people, which can help them to decide on their future career and to develop their skills in order to access permanent employment.
In particular, the European Parliament adopted on 14 June 2023 a resolution based on Article 225 TFEU (11) calling on the Commission to update and strengthen the 2014 Council Recommendation and to turn it into a stronger legislative instrument. It also called on the Commission to ensure minimum quality standards for traineeships, including pay.
In this context, the Commission announced an update of the Quality Framework for Traineeships in its 2023 Commission Work Programme (12), to address issues including fair pay and access to social protection, as part of its engagement to implement the European Pillar of Social Rights Action Plan and to reach the EU’s 2030 targets in the areas of employment, skills, and poverty reduction.
The proposed recommendation aims to improve the quality of traineeships, in particular as regards learning and training content and working conditions, with the aim of easing the transition from education, unemployment or inactivity to work. It applies to all trainees, regardless of their employment status. It applies to trainees who are workers only insofar and to the extent that equivalent or more favourable provisions are not laid down in EU law.
As for types of traineeships, the proposed recommendation extends the scope of the 2014 Recommendation (covering open-market traineeships and traineeships that are part of active labour market policies) to cover also traineeships that are part of curricula of formal education and training and those of which their completion is mandatory to access a specific profession (e.g., medicine, architecture, etc.).
This proposal is based on the findings of the evaluation of the 2014 Council Recommendation, the European Parliament’s resolution, the views gathered through the consultation of social partners at EU level in line with Article 154 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), the views raised by other stakeholders, evidence collected through the study supporting the initiative on quality traineeships (13) and the Eurobarometer survey mentioned above.
Alongside the proposed updated recommendation, the Commission also proposes a directive (COM(2024) 132) focused on supporting Member States in improving and enforcing the working conditions of trainees who are workers and in combating regular employment relationships disguised as traineeships. The proposed directive applies to trainees in the EU who have an employment contract or employment relationship as set out in the law, collective agreements or practices in force in the Member States, and that are in line with consideration to the case-law of the Court of Justice of the European Union.
• Consistency with existing policy provisions in the policy area
As part of the European Year of Skills, the EU has set out to promote a mindset where upskilling and reskilling are the norm. Closing skills gaps and addressing skills mismatches across the EU will boost competitiveness, in particular of micro, small and medium-sized enterprises by better matching employers’ needs with peoples’ skills and aspirations. Equal access to skills development and work-based learning will help reduce inequalities, notably by empowering people to fully participate in the economy and society. The European Year of Skills follows the European Year of Youth, which emphasised the need to provide further impetus to the creation of quality employment opportunities for young people in line with the eleven youth goals of the 2019-2027 EU Youth Strategy (14). In its Communication on the European Year of Youth 2022, the Commission committed to updating its quality framework for traineeships in 2024 to address issues including fair pay and access to social protection (15).
The Commission’s Youth Employment Support package (16) of July 2020 proposed Recommendations on a Bridge to jobs - reinforcing the Youth Guarantee (17) and a modernised European framework for vocational education and training, both of which the Council adopted (18). The former specifically recommends that traineeship offers comply with the minimum standards laid out in the QFT. The latter sets out key principles for ensuring that vocational education and training adapts swiftly to labour market needs and provides quality learning opportunities for young people and adults. It places a strong emphasis on better opportunities for work-based learning and improved quality assurance.
In a similar way to traineeships, apprenticeships are an important pathway to facilitate transitions to the labour market. The Youth Employment Support package gave a renewed impetus to apprenticeships, including through the European Alliance for Apprenticeships (19).
These initiatives aimed to improve the quality and effectiveness of the EU’s measures to promote youth employment and are supported by EU funding. They implement amongst others the first and the fourth principle of the European Pillar of Social Rights. These principles lay down the right to ‘quality and inclusive education, training and life-long learning’ and the right of young people to ‘continued education, apprenticeship, traineeship or a job offer of good standing within four months of becoming unemployed or leaving education’.
The proposed recommendation is consistent with relevant existing instruments notably:
• Directive (EU) 2019/1152 on transparent and predictable working conditions by aiming to improve the transparency of information provided (in writing) to trainees.
• The Occupational Health and Safety (OSH) Framework Directive (20) that lays down the main principles for encouraging improvements in the health and safety at work. It guarantees minimum safety and health requirements throughout the EU. The Framework Directive confirms that, as regards a secure workplace, the same rules apply to workers and trainees and is accompanied by further directives focusing on specific aspects of safety and health at work.
• The Council Recommendation on access to social protection for workers and the self-employed (21) recommends Member States to ensure that both workers (including trainees who are workers) and the self-employed have access to effective and adequate social protection. This Recommendation covers unemployment, sickness and health care, maternity and paternity, invalidity, old-age and survivors’ benefits and benefits in respect of accidents at work and occupational diseases. While making reference to this Recommendation, the proposed recommendation will encourage ensuring access to adequate social protection for all trainees, in line with national legislation.
• The Council Directive establishing a general framework for equal treatment in employment and occupation (22) lays down a general framework for combating discrimination on the grounds of religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation as regards employment and occupation, with a view to putting into effect in the Member States the principle of equal treatment.
The objectives of the proposed recommendation on equal opportunities and the inclusion of groups in vulnerable situations, including persons with disabilities, are in line with the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, with principles 3 and 17 of the European Pillar of Social Rights, and the 2021-2030 Strategy for the Rights of Persons with disabilities.
The proposed recommendation can also help contribute to address the employment objective of the EU Roma strategic framework 2020-2030 (23) to ensure that by 2030, the gap in Roma NEET rate is cut by at least half. It is consistent with the Council Recommendation on Roma equality, inclusion and participation (24), in particular under its chapter 8 on access to quality and sustainable employment for Roma.
The proposed measures facilitating cross-border mobility are in line with the objectives of the Erasmus+ programme, which offers transnational and international learning mobility opportunities, including for trainees.
Moreover, the proposed recommendation is consistent with the Council Recommendation of 15 March 2018 on a European Framework for Quality and Effective Apprenticeships (25), which sets out 14 key criteria to define quality and effective apprenticeships, ensuring both the development of job-related skills and the personal development of apprentices. According to this Recommendation, apprenticeships are formal VET schemes that combine learning in education or training institutions with substantial work-based learning in companies and other workplaces. They lead to nationally recognised qualifications, are based on an agreement defining the rights and obligations of the apprentice, the employer and, where appropriate, the vocational education and training institution, and with the apprentice being paid or otherwise compensated for the work-based component. Apprenticeships refer to full programmes leading to a qualification, where apprentices ideally spend at least half of the apprenticeship at the workplace. By contrast, traineeships that are part of formal education and training curricula refer to a limited work-based learning experience embedded in an education and training programme. Hence, apprenticeships tend to be longer than traineeships. As traineeships and apprenticeships vary significantly across Member States, Member States are encouraged to assess which of the two quality frameworks applies to VET work-based learning experiences, depending on their national and regional specific features. To ensure that all learners in work-based learning receive the highest level of protection, Member States are encouraged to apply the framework conditions which are more protective among the two frameworks, in line with national circumstances.
Furthermore, the proposed recommendation addresses the views of the European Court of Auditors. The Court noted in its review, ‘EU actions addressing traineeships for young people’ (26), that EU guidance on quality traineeships is not applied consistently by Member States and that there may be unequal opportunities for traineeships and the access to them.
• Consistency with other Union policies
The proposal is consistent with recent EU policies that aim at empowering people through education, training and skills. The European Skills Agenda (27) seeks to strengthen the EU’s sustainable competitiveness, ensure social fairness and support young people’s resilience.
The proposal is also consistent with the proposal for a Council Recommendation ‘Europe on the Move’ – learning mobility opportunities for everyone of 15 November 2023 (28). This aims at making learning opportunities across the EU more accessible for all young people, including young people with fewer opportunities, such as persons with disabilities. It also promotes the attractiveness of the EU as a learning destination for talents from outside the EU.
Financial investments in upskilling and reskilling are at the heart of the European Social Fund Plus (ESF+), the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF), the Just Transition Fund and Erasmus+ and the Digital Europe Programme. Skills development is also supported by the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) investments in education and training infrastructure and equipment. The proposed recommendation reflects the objectives of the ESF+ that support Member States and regions in their endeavours to ensure equal access to training and skills development opportunities and increase the employability of the European workforce, in particular young people. It supports the objectives of the RRF, in particular its pillars on policies for the next generation. The proposed recommendation is also in line with the aim of the Just Transition Fund to support a fair transition towards a climate-neutral economy, focusing on the most affected regions.
Furthermore, its objectives are consistent with those of the ALMA (Aim, Learn, Master, Achieve) initiative, which is funded by the ESF+ and aims to help disadvantaged young people not in employment, education or training (NEETs) integrate into society by easing their way back into education, training or employment. The Technical Support Instrument offers Member States, upon request, tailor-made expertise to reform and improve learning mobility, particularly through Flagship initiatives focusing on attracting talent, youth education and skills. Finding skilled staff is a challenge for an increasing number of small and medium enterprises (SMEs), which is also highlighted in the SME Strategy for a sustainable and digital Europe (29). The Strategy stresses that the EU can further help address these challenges, facilitating access to training and helping match SMEs’ demand for talents with labour market supply. The proposal will complement this approach. The proposal also is consistent with the Net-Zero Industry Act, in particular the proposed setting up of European skills academies, by contributing to a skilled workforce through quality traineeships that can help address skills shortages and mismatches. This should alleviate the net-zero technology industries’ need for skills.
This initiative is also one of the actions set out in the Commission’s action plan on skills and labour shortages in the EU (30).
2. LEGAL BASIS, SUBSIDIARITY AND PROPORTIONALITY
• Legal basis
The proposal is based on Articles 153(1)(b), 165(4), 166(4) and 292 TFEU.
Under Article 153(1)(b) TFEU, the EU must support and complement Member States’ activities in the field of working conditions.
Under Article 165 TFEU, the EU must contribute to the development of quality education by encouraging cooperation between Member States and, if necessary, by supporting and supplementing their action, while fully respecting the responsibility of the Member States for the content of teaching and the organisation of education systems and their cultural and linguistic diversity. Under paragraph 4 of Article 165 TFEU, harmonisation of the laws and regulations of the Member States is excluded, while the Council, on a proposal from the Commission, can adopt recommendations.
Under Article 166 TFEU, the EU must implement a vocational training policy that supports and supplements the action of the Member States, while fully respecting the responsibility of the Member States for the content and organisation of vocational training. Under paragraph 4 of Article 166 TFEU, harmonisation of the laws and regulations of the Member States is excluded, while the Council, on a proposal from the Commission, can adopt recommendations.
Under Article 292 TFEU, the Council can adopt recommendations on the basis of a Commission proposal in areas under EU competence.
• Subsidiarity (for non-exclusive competence)
In its work towards the development of quality education and training and the implementation of a vocational training policy, the EU is responsible for encouraging cooperation between Member States, supporting and supplementing their action where necessary. In this context, setting out a common understanding of what constitutes quality traineeships across the EU is a task that can only be addressed at EU level.
A reinforced Quality Framework for Traineeships will support and supplement national action in this area in line with Articles 165, 166 and 153 TFEU. This initiative applies the subsidiarity principle by fully taking into account that education and training systems are a national competence, while the EU may support and complement national policies on working conditions. The initiative fully respects the diversity of national traineeship systems and proposes a set of common criteria to underpin those different schemes, ensuring benefits for both the trainee (regardless of their employment status) and traineeship providers.
The initiative will improve the transparency and mutual understanding of traineeship systems, in particular, the quality of traineeships, across the EU. This may also have a positive impact on cross-border mobility of trainees as a coordinated approach at EU level would ensure synergies and cooperation, maximising positive spillovers.
Moreover, providing guidelines at EU level contributes to creating a shared understanding of how the quality of traineeships can be improved. This may also help Member States in their use of the European Structural and Investment Funds, in particular the European Social Fund+ and the Recovery and Resilience Facility, addressing youth unemployment and inactivity.
• Proportionality
The actions proposed in the proposed recommendation are proportionate to the objectives being pursued. The proposal will support the reform processes launched by individual countries on traineeships and will complement Member States’ efforts in this area as part of the European Semester framework of economic Governance. The proposal respects Member States’ practices and the diversity of their systems. It allows for a differentiated approach reflecting Member States’ different economic, financial and social situations and the diverse labour market conditions. Using existing monitoring mechanisms under the European Semester will ensure that no additional administrative burden is created.
• Choice of the instrument
The proposed instrument is a Council Recommendation. This respects the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality. It builds on the existing body of EU law and is in line with the type of instruments available for EU action in the areas of education and training and employment. As a legal instrument, it signals the commitment of Member States to the measures laid down in this recommendation and provides a strong political basis for cooperation at EU level in this area. It also fully respects Member States’ competence in the field of education and training and social policies.
3. RESULTS OF EX-POST EVALUATIONS, STAKEHOLDER CONSULTATIONS AND IMPACT ASSESSMENTS
• Ex-post evaluations/fitness checks of existing legislation
An evaluation (31) of the 2014 Council Recommendation on a Quality Framework for Traineeships was carried out in 2022-2023. It found that traineeships continue to be an important pathway for young people to enter the labour market. Quality traineeships, which are those that reflect the principles of the QFT, contribute to increasing employability and help employers attract, train and retain staff.
In terms of effectiveness, the QFT principles that were most likely to have a positive impact on labour market integration of young people were the setting out of learning and educational objectives and the written agreement. However, actual progress in the take-up of its quality principles in national legislation was moderate. Since 2014, 14 Member States introduced changes (either to OMTs or ALMP traineeships or both), integrating the quality principles of the QFT in their legislative or policy frameworks. Such changes were more prevalent in national legislation governing ALMP traineeships (identified in 12 Member States) than OMTs (identified in five Member States). Furthermore, while the prevalence of specific legal provisions as well as their conformity with the principles of the QFT were found to be high for ALMP traineeships, they were more limited for OMTs. Overall, a slight improvement in terms of conformity was observed for OMTs with four Member States fully/mostly aligned in 2016 compared to seven Member States in 2021. A larger improvement was observed for ALMP traineeships, with 18 Member States fully/mostly in conformity in 2021 versus 15 in 2016. Room for improvement was identified in the actual application of the QFT on the ground and its monitoring and enforcement. As for the QFT facilitating cross-border mobility of trainees in the EU, there were indications that the number of cross-border traineeships had increased, but young people still faced difficulties participating in them due to a lack of financial means and the unavailability of practical information. The use of the European Employment Services (EURES) as a source of information was found to be limited.
The QFT provided added value as a reference point at EU level for Member States’ regulatory action on the quality of traineeships. This was particularly the case for Member States with less developed traineeship systems, where the QFT helped foster policy and legislative changes at national level.
As for efficiency, though the evaluation lacked quantitative evidence on costs and benefits, stakeholders generally perceived the cost related to implementing the QFT as proportionate to the benefits. Benefits for employers included a better understanding of traineeship quality, reputational advantages, increased attractiveness to young talent, and a more sustainable way to invest in potential future workers. However, the implementation of the QFT could have been less cost effective for small and micro enterprises than for larger firms as costs for those businesses (due to limited human and financial resources) may have been higher relative to the benefits. Benefits of the QFT for trainees included improved working conditions and better training and learning content, which increased their chances of getting regular jobs.
The QFT was found to be coherent with other EU level initiatives, strategies, programmes and funding instruments. At national and regional level, a higher level of coherence was found with measures on ALMP traineeships than with those on OMTs. Despite the many similarities in quality principles, the European framework for quality and effective apprenticeships (EFQEA)(32) was perceived as leading to a greater involvement of stakeholders (e.g. through dedicated networks). The EFQEA was also viewed as having higher and more specific quality objectives and more benefits because stronger language was used in the EFQEA recommendation and apprenticeships are often more regulated on a tripartite basis in Member States.
Some respondents (particularly employers) considered that the QFT should remain ‘as is’ as they deem it sufficiently relevant in addressing trainees’ needs. However, various stakeholders considered that the relevance of the QFT could be further strengthened, in particular, when it comes to pay and social protection for trainees and outreach to as well as access for groups in vulnerable situations. In addition, some stakeholders considered there was a need for the QFT to address the challenges of remote working and guidance and mentorship in that context. Furthermore, some stakeholders suggested adding traineeships that are part of formal education and training to the scope of the QFT. Some stakeholders also considered that to ease the transition of a young trainee to a stable job, the QFT could place more emphasis on post-placement support. As for the non-binding nature of the QFT, views diverged on whether this is appropriate for fully reaching the QFT objectives. On the one hand, some (notably youth organisations and trade unions) argued for a binding instrument to increase the effectiveness of the QFT. On the other hand, others (especially employers and national authorities) argued that, given the differences in national circumstances and legal limitations at EU level, the QFT’s non-binding nature gave an adequate and flexible reference framework for national regulations.
• Stakeholder consultations
Specific consultation activities took place in 2022 as part of the Commission’s 2023 evaluation of the QFT (33), in particular through a public consultation survey. The evaluation also included targeted consultations of national and regional authorities responsible for education, training and employment policies, social partners, education and training providers, academic experts working on labour market issues, organisations representing young people, young (former, current and potential future) trainees and other stakeholders at EU, national and regional level. To reach all these stakeholders, different consultation activities and methods were used, such as interviews, targeted consultation meetings, a targeted trainees survey and case studies.
A two-stage consultation of the EU social partners under Article 154 TFEU was carried out for this proposal. During the first stage, which took place between 11 July and 15 September 2023, social partners were consulted on the need and possible direction of EU action (34). During the second stage, between 28 September and 9 November 2023, the Commission consulted social partners on the objectives and potential legal avenues for EU action (35). Trade unions welcomed the Commission’s intention to update the QFT. They considered that, although the principles of the QFT remained relevant, trainees needed binding protection (in the form of a directive) to ensure fair compensation, working conditions and social protection. This directive should ensure access to all rights enjoyed by regular workers under existing EU legislation. Trade unions stressed that the main objective of EU action must be to set binding minimum standards for traineeships in the EU and to create a level playing field that discourages abuse. Employers considered that the principles of the 2014 QFT remain relevant. In their opinion, a stronger focus should be placed on its implementation and monitoring, but in their view a revised Council Recommendation would strike the right balance between promoting minimum standards and preserving flexibility. The objectives to address the problematic use of, improve the quality of and foster access to traineeships were supported by employers. Employers also highlighted the lack of data, in particular on open-market traineeships, and the link between pay and the quality of traineeships. There was no agreement among social partners to enter into negotiations to conclude an agreement at Union level in accordance with Article 155 TFEU.
Furthermore, as part of the study exploring the context, challenges and possible solutions in relation to the quality of traineeships in the EU, an online survey was conducted with national stakeholders. This aimed to gather information on the current practices of businesses regarding traineeships and identify good practices implemented in Member States and their impact on the quality of traineeships. The survey ran from 15 June to 8 September 2023 and was targeted at national public authorities, national business/employer associations, individual businesses, national trade unions, national youth organisations, civil society organisations and educational institutions. Targeted interviews with EU-level stakeholders were also carried out.
A dedicated ‘SME Panel’ survey was conducted by the Directorate General for Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion (DG EMPL), the Directorate General for Internal Market, Industry, Entrepreneurship and SMEs (DG GROW), the European Innovation Council and the SMEs Executive Agency (EISMEA) and with the support of the Enterprise Europe Network between 12 October and 9 November 2023.
The Flash Eurobarometer survey (523) (36) looked into young people’s perceptions of their integration into the labour market, with a particular focus on traineeships. Between 15 and 24 March 2023, 26 334 people aged between 18 and 35 from all Member States were surveyed online.
• Collection and use of expertise
The proposed recommendation draws on several studies carried out to underpin the analysis of the initiative:
• a study commissioned from external experts, of which the preliminary results were used: "Study exploring the context, challenges and possible solution in relation to the quality of traineeships in the EU" by a consortium of Ernst & Young (EY), the Centre of European Policy Studies (CEPS) and Open Evidence (forthcoming)
• an external study supporting the evaluation of the Quality Framework for Traineeships, Final Report, January 2023 (37)
• the Flash Eurobarometer survey on the perception of young people regarding their integration into the labour market, with a particular focus on traineeships (38)
The European Parliament’s 2023 legislative own-initiative resolution on quality traineeships in the EU was also taken into account, in conjunction with the relevant European added value Assessment of Parliament’s research service (39).
• Impact assessment
In line with its Better Regulation policy, the Commission carried out an impact assessment (40). This gave a structured analysis of the policy problems, corresponding policy objectives and policy options and assessed their impact. It considered the subsidiarity, effectiveness, efficiency, coherence and proportionality of the identified options and how to monitor and evaluate the initiative in the future. This work was supported by a structured consultation in the Commission via an inter-service steering group (41) and the forthcoming “Study exploring the context, challenges and possible solution in relation to the quality of traineeships in the EU” referred to above.
The impact assessment identified three problems: (1) the problematic use of traineeships by traineeship providers, (2) the poor quality of traineeships and (3) unequal access to traineeships. The impact assessment examined three policy options, which combined both legislative and non-legislative measures addressing the objectives of the initiative in terms of enforcing applicable rights of trainees, preventing the problematic use of traineeships, ensuring fair working conditions, improving the learning content, and improving the access to and the inclusiveness of traineeships. The assessment of the impact of the options also took into consideration the potential unintended consequences of the different policy options, including on the offer of traineeships.
The preferred policy option identified in the impact assessment is a package made up of a directive applying to trainees who are workers under EU law and an updated Council recommendation covering all trainees. This package is expected to bring social benefits to trainees by reducing problematic and poor-quality traineeships through equal treatment, fairer pay and adequate social protection, and by improving access to traineeships, in particular for persons in vulnerable situations, including persons with disabilities, those residing in rural, remote and outermost regions, those with a disadvantaged socio-economic and/or migrant background, those from the Roma community, and those with lower educational attainment. The preferred option is expected to result in economic benefits for traineeship providers, such as fairer market competition, productivity and competitiveness gains due to a more skilled and diverse workforce and lower search, matching and recruitment costs. As for costs associated with the preferred option, these relate to a possible increase in labour costs, adjustment costs and potential costs resulting from administrative or judicial procedures. National budgets and administrations are expected to benefit from increased tax and social security receipts and reduced social protection and activation spending.
The impact assessment was first discussed with the Commission’s Regulatory Scrutiny Board on 13 December 2023. On 1 February 2024, a revised impact assessment Report was submitted to the Board. On 22 February 2024, the Board issued a positive opinion with reservations (42). The remaining comments were subsequently addressed, by specifying further the limitations of the used data, strengthening the discussions on level playing field and competition issues and providing additional targeted clarifications on the description and assessment of the policy options.
• Fundamental rights
The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union protects a broad range of employment rights. The objectives of this proposal are in line with the Charter. The proposed recommendation is expected to contribute to ensuring the right to equality before the law (Article 20 of the Charter), the right to fair working conditions (Article 31), the protection of young people at work (Article 32), access to adequate social protection (Article 34) and healthcare (Article 35).
4. BUDGETARY IMPLICATIONS
The proposed recommendation does not require additional EU budget or staff resources.
5. OTHER ELEMENTS
• Implementation plans and monitoring, evaluation and reporting arrangements
The recommendation proposes that Member States take appropriate measures to apply the reinforced QFT as soon as possible and submit an implementation plan setting out the corresponding measures to be taken at national level by [date of adoption + [18 months].
• Explanatory documents (for directives)
Not applicable.
• Detailed explanation of the specific provisions of the proposal
The proposed recommendation offers a set of criteria for quality traineeships, while allowing flexibility in implementation by Member States. This enables them to take into account the specific nature and different needs of their national traineeship schemes.
Objective and scope
Point 1 sets out the objective of the reinforced framework to improve the quality of traineeships, in particular learning and training content and working conditions.
Point 2 explains the scope of the reinforced framework, which applies to all trainees, regardless of their employment status. It clarifies that, for those trainees who are workers, the framework only applies if there are no equivalent or more favourable provisions laid down in EU law.
Written agreement
Points 3 and 4 recommend that traineeships are based on a written agreement and update the contents of the written agreement by recommending additional information on the learning component, tasks, mentorship arrangements and social protection.
Learning and working conditions
Points 5 to 15 set out the learning and working conditions, including the learning and training objectives, fair pay, applicable rights and working conditions under applicable EU and national law, the assignment of a supervisor and a mentor, conditions for remote/hybrid traineeships, a reasonable duration (including for repeated/consecutive traineeships), renewal and termination of traineeships and channels for trainees to report malpractice and poor conditions. They also set out that traineeship providers cannot require candidates to have previous work experience.
Social protection
Point 16 recommends access to adequate social protection in line with national practices and taking into consideration Council Recommendation on access to social protection for workers and the self-employed.
Recognition of traineeships
Point 17 updates the proper recognition of traineeships by adding that such recognition, where appropriate and if possible, should be produced in a digital format.
Transparency requirements
Points 18 to 20 set out transparency requirements and adds that vacancy notices and advertisements should also provide information on the level of pay, working conditions, social protection coverage and the expected tasks.
Inclusive traineeships
Points 21 to 24 recommend measures on inclusive traineeships (including by ensuring equal treatment and non-discrimination and by improving access and outreach to those in vulnerable situations), neutral language in vacancy notices / advertisements, raising awareness and changes, where relevant, to ensure accessibility, including for those in vulnerable situations, in particular (candidate) trainees with disabilities.
Cross-border traineeships
Points 25 to 29 update the measures aimed at facilitating cross-border traineeships, calling for practical guidance and information on cross-border traineeships through EURES and by encouraging the application of the principles of the reinforced framework, where applicable, in traineeship mobility agreements with hosting organisations outside the EU.
Additional traineeship support
Point 30 recommends additional traineeship support, in particular by providing career guidance and network opportunities.
Framework conditions
Points 31 to 33 set out the elements regarding the framework conditions, including on the involvement of social partners, employment services, education and training institutions and other stakeholders. It is also recommended to ensure that workers’ representatives may defend the rights of trainees.
Applying the reinforced quality framework
Points 34 to 35 provide recommendations on applying the reinforced QFT, including for Member States to submit an implementation plan, and by envisaging financial and non-financial support to traineeship providers, in particular SMEs.
Support to increase trainees’ employability
Points 36 to 37 set out support measures to increase trainees’ employability and recommend giving incentives to traineeship providers to propose a job after a traineeship and use EU funds for traineeships that are in line with the principles of the reinforced Framework.
Follow-up
Point 38 recommends Member States and the Commission work jointly on the collection of data.
2024/0069 (NLE)
Proposal for a
COUNCIL RECOMMENDATION
on a reinforced Quality Framework for Traineeships
THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,
Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and in particular Article 292, in conjunction with Articles 153(1)(b), 165(4) and 166(4) thereof,
Having regard to the proposal from the European Commission,
Whereas:
(1) In March 2014, the Council adopted the Recommendation on a Quality Framework for Traineeships (43) (‘2014 Recommendation) to provide Union-wide quality standards for traineeships. It recommended 21 principles for traineeships to improve the quality of traineeships, in particular to ensure high quality learning and training content and adequate working conditions to support education-to-work transition and increase the employability of trainees. The 2014 Recommendation covers all traineeships except for those that are part of curricula of formal education and training and those regulated under national law and the completion of which is a mandatory requirement to access a specific profession.
(2) The Council Recommendation on a European Framework for Quality and Effective Apprenticeships (44) contains 14 criteria for quality and effective apprenticeships aiming to ensure that apprenticeship schemes are responsive to labour market needs and provide benefits to both learners and employers. These include criteria for learning and working conditions and criteria for framework conditions.
(3) The reinforced Youth Guarantee (45) aims at ensuring that young people under the age of 30 receive a good quality offer of employment, continued education, apprenticeship or traineeship within a period of four months of becoming unemployed or leaving education. The 2014 Recommendation has served as an important reference point to measure the quality of traineeships offers under the reinforced Youth Guarantee.
(4) Facilitating the transition to quality employment is necessary for achieving the Union headline target of a 78% employment rate of the population aged 20-64 by 2030 (46).
(5) Traineeships can help young people gain practical and professional experience, improve their employability, and facilitate their transition into stable employment. As such, traineeships constitute an important pathway to the labour market. For employers, traineeships provide opportunities to attract, train and retain young people. They can reduce the cost of searching for and recruiting skilled staff, when trainees are offered a regular position after their traineeship.
(6) Labour shortages exist in many occupations and at all skills levels. They are expected to increase with the projected decline in the working age population and increasing demand for several occupations relevant for the green and digital transition. Increasing the labour market participation and up-and/or reskilling of young people could contribute to alleviating these shortages. Quality traineeships can be a useful up- and/or reskilling pathway for persons of any age to acquire practical skills on the job to enter the labour market or to take their career in a new direction.
(7) The Conference on the Future of Europe put forward a proposal on ensuring that young people’s internships and jobs adhere to quality standards, including on pay and banning unpaid internships on the labour market and outside formal education (47).
(8) The European Parliament adopted a resolution pursuant to Article 225 TFEU with recommendations to the Commission on quality traineeships in June 2023 (48). In its resolution, it called on the Commission “to update and strengthen the 2014 Recommendation and to turn it into a stronger legislative instrument”. It further called on the Commission to include additional principles in an updated quality framework for traineeships. Specifically, the European Parliament called for the Commission to “propose a directive on open labour market traineeships, traineeships in the context of active labour market policies and traineeships that are a mandatory part of professional training, in order to ensure minimum quality standards, including rules on the duration of the traineeships, access to social protection in accordance with national law and practice as well as pay that ensures a decent standard of living in order to avoid exploitative practices”.
(9) The Commission carried out a two-stage consultation of social partners at Union level under Article 154 TFEU on the need, objectives and legal avenues for a potential action further improving the quality of traineeships. There was no agreement among the social partners to enter into negotiations with regard to those matters. It is, however, important to take action at Union level in this area by adapting the current framework on traineeships while taking into account the outcomes of the consultation of social partners.
(10) The Commission has extensively consulted with stakeholders, including trainees and youth organisations, traineeship providers, national public authorities, educational institutions, and experts from academia.
(11) Furthermore, in 2023, the Commission evaluated the 2014 Recommendation (49) and found that quality traineeships, which reflect the principles of that Recommendation, contribute to increasing young people’s employability. While the quality principles of the 2014 Recommendation were considered still relevant and of added value, the evaluation also concluded that the application of those principles and their monitoring and enforcement needed to be improved. It also found room for strengthening the framework, including on aspects related to pay and access to social protection. Furthermore, to ease the transition to a regular employment relationship, more emphasis on post-placement support could be provided by traineeship providers. It also found that employers could be better assisted through practical guidance and financial support as well as by linking such support to the application of the quality principles.
(12) The evaluation also identified the need to ensure inclusiveness and improve access to traineeships for people in vulnerable situations. In particular, minorities, persons with disabilities, those residing in rural, remote and outermost regions, those with a disadvantaged socio-economic and/or migrant background, the Roma community, and those with lower educational attainment, face obstacles in accessing traineeship opportunities. Among other obstacles, a barrier for persons with disabilities to access traineeships is the lack of traineeship programmes adapted to their needs, for example catering for specific accessibility requirements.
(13) The 2023 Eurobarometer survey (FL523) (50) found that 55% of respondents having done a traineeship were paid or financially compensated, which is an increase from 40% in the 2013 Eurobarometer survey (FL378) (51). Furthermore, in 2023 33% of respondents answered that they had full (and 28% of respondents partial) access to social protection (52).
(14) This Recommendation addresses the need to reinforce the quality framework for traineeships as identified by the evaluation and by various stakeholders mentioned above. It aims to improve the quality of traineeships, in particular as regards learning and training content and working conditions, with the aim of easing the transition from education, unemployment or inactivity to work.
(15) For the purposes of this Recommendation, traineeships should be understood as a limited period of work practice, which includes a significant learning and training component, undertaken in order to gain practical and professional experience with a view to improving employability and facilitating transition to a regular employment relationship or accessing a profession. Without prejudice to other types of traineeships that may exist, the following four types of traineeships have been identified: open market traineeships, traineeships that are part of active labour market policies, traineeships that are part of curricula of formal education and training, and traineeships that are a mandatory requirement to access a certain profession.
(16) Open market traineeships are based on non-mandatory, bilateral agreements between a trainee and a traineeship provider (public/private/non-profit) without the involvement of a third party and without a formal connection to education or training.
(17) Traineeships as part of active labour market policies (ALMP) are offered to the inactive or unemployed or those at risk of becoming unemployed, with usually a public institution (often an employment service) acting as an intermediary between the traineeship provider and the trainee.
(18) Traineeships can also be work-based learning placements that are part of curricula of formal education and training (school, vocational or higher education and training).
(19) National law can also regulate certain traineeships and make their completion mandatory to access a specific profession (e.g., medicine, architecture, etc.).
(20) This Recommendation applies to all traineeships referred to in recitals (16) to (19).
(21) As traineeships and work-based learning programmes in vocational education and training as set out in Council Recommendation on a European Framework for Quality and Effective Apprenticeships (53) vary significantly across Member States, Member States are encouraged to assess which of the two quality frameworks applies to vocational education and training (VET) work-based learning experiences, depending on their national and regional specific features. When doing so, to ensure that all learners in work-based learning receive the highest level of protection, Member States are encouraged to apply the framework conditions which are more protective among the two frameworks, in line with national circumstances.
(22) The lack of fair pay and access to adequate social protection present barriers to equal access to traineeship opportunities. In the absence of an alternative source of income, groups in vulnerable situations tend to refrain from engaging in traineeships, in particular when pay is absent or low, or when additional costs are incurred, for example doing a traineeship in a different region or country.
(23) Gaps in access to social protection can put the welfare and (mental) health of trainees at risk, contribute to their economic uncertainty, precariousness and risk of poverty. This risk is especially high for trainees from socio-economically disadvantaged groups and/or in other vulnerable situations. Trainees may face barriers in accessing social rights and benefits notably due to their short contributory history. Furthermore, most social protection schemes (with the exception of healthcare benefits) require an employment status, which excludes trainees who are not considered workers.
(24) A prolonged duration or accumulation of multiple traineeships can delay the access to regular employment relationships for the individual trainees concerned. They can also be indicative of traineeships being used to replace regular employment relationships.
(25) A prolonged duration of a traineeship could be warranted if justified by the nature and purpose of the specific type of traineeship. Examples of exceptions could be traineeships whose completion is a mandatory requirement to access a specific profession, where the trajectory to acquire the necessary knowledge, competences and experience warrants a longer traineeship experience. Certain traineeships that are part of active labour market policies aimed at the integration of persons in a vulnerable situation could also benefit from a longer duration. Some traineeships that are part of curricula of formal education and training may have a longer duration for reasons linked to the curricula.
(26) Repeated traineeships, and practices aimed at replacing jobs with employment relationships disguised as traineeships, could be induced by traineeship providers requesting previous experience in the same or similar field of activity in vacancy notices. The overall duration of traineeships is sometimes also prolonged through repeated, including consecutive, traineeships with the same employer. Such practices may be another indication of an employment relationship disguised as traineeship. However, there may be objective grounds based on which traineeship providers may require previous work experience from (candidate) trainees. Such instances could entail an equivalent period of previous work experiences being an alternative to having a degree in a certain field of activity or expertise. A trajectory to access a specific profession may also warrant having previous work experience before embarking in a more specialised traineeship.
(27) The evaluation highlighted the need to strengthen the support to trainees during the traineeship through appropriate mentorship. Therefore, the role of the supervisor should be complemented with a mentor, whose role would encompass advising, coaching and supporting the trainee with a view on personal development as well as integration into the work environment, wherever possible considering the organisational needs and size of the traineeship provider.
(28) Since the COVID-19 pandemic, the prevalence of remote and hybrid working arrangements has increased. To ensure the quality and accessibility of remote and hybrid traineeships, adaptations to the increased practice of telework are needed in terms of appropriate working environment (including equipment) and work organisation. The latter comprises guidance, mentorship, and tasks suited for a remote and hybrid way of working.
(29) To increase the transparency of information on a traineeship opportunity, traineeship providers should be encouraged to include information on the terms and conditions of the traineeship, in particular on the level of pay, working conditions, the coverage of social protection, including health and accident insurance, the expected tasks and learning and training component in the vacancy notices and advertisements for traineeships possibly by including a link to a website containing this information therein.
(30) Traineeship providers should be encouraged to provide information on recruitment policies, in particular on the share of trainees recruited. This is calculated by dividing the number of trainees that were hired (following the completion of the traineeship) to fill a regular employment position by the total number of trainees at the same establishment in the same year.
(31) Employment services and other providers of career guidance should be encouraged to apply the same transparency requirements as traineeship providers when providing information on traineeship opportunities. It is however acknowledged that employment services and other providers of career guidance may not be aware of all the information elements listed under the transparency requirements and may be dependent on the traineeship providers’ willingness to share such information.
(32) To ensure equal access for groups in vulnerable situations, strengthened outreach to such groups is needed, such as through targeted communication and awareness-raising strategies. To ensure the effectiveness of such outreach strategies, it is key to involve relevant stakeholders such as employment services and education and training institutions and to tailor the communication and information tools used to reach the widest range of people possible, including those with certain disabilities (e.g. adapted and easy to read websites).
(33) To ensure the application of the Recommendation, support to employers needs to be strengthened through practical guidance and financial support, the latter of which could depend on the condition that the traineeships offered adhere to the quality principles of this Recommendation.
(34) Cross-border traineeships can be particularly valuable as trainees may learn another language, are exposed to a new environment or culture and can thus acquire relevant transversal skills. There are indications that cross-border mobility of trainees has increased (54), yet young people still face difficulties in accessing cross-border traineeships due to a lack of financial means and the unavailability of relevant (and sufficient) information. More concrete and practical information on cross-border traineeships, such as on EURES, is needed to improve accessibility.
(35) Channels to report malpractice and poor working conditions can support trainees in enforcing their labour rights. In addition, allowing trainees to have their rights defended by workers’ representations would strengthen their position.
(36) Member States' programmes promoting and offering quality traineeships can be financially supported by the European Funds. The European Social Fund Plus (ESF+) established by Regulation (EU) 2021/1057 (55), the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF) established by Regulation (EU) 2021/241 (56) for eligible reforms and investments foreseen in Member States’ recovery and resilience plans for delivery during the Facility’s lifetime until the end of 2026, the Just Transition Fund established by Regulation (EU) 2021/1056 (57) and the Technical Support Instrument (TSI) established by Regulation (EU) 2021/240 (58), could support Member States’ implementation of the Recommendation.
(37) To ensure consistent approaches among Member States, the Commission has proposed a directive (COM(2024) 132) which lays down a common framework of principles and measures to improve and enforce the working conditions of trainees and to combat regular employment relationships disguised as traineeships.
(38) As far as information to be provided to trainees in the written traineeship agreement is concerned, trainees who are workers are entitled to the minimum requirements on information duties as set out in Directive (EU) 2019/1152 of the European Parliament and of the Council (59). Insofar not covered by this directive, the elements in this recommendation should be taken into account in addition to those minimum requirements for trainees who are workers.
(39) The implementation of this Recommendation should not constitute valid grounds for reducing the general level of protection afforded to trainees covered by this Recommendation.
(40) This Recommendation should avoid imposing administrative, financial or legal constraints in a way which would hold back the creation or development of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). Member States are therefore invited to assess the impact of their policies or reforms on SMEs in order to make sure that SMEs are not disproportionately affected, with specific attention be paid to micro-enterprises and the administrative burden, and to publish the results of such assessments.
(41) This Recommendation supersedes Council Recommendation of 10 March 2014 on a Quality Framework for Traineeships which therefore should no longer be applied anymore by Member States.
ACKNOWLEDGES THE COMMISSION’S INTENTION TO
(42) foster close cooperation with Member States, social partners and other stakeholders with a view to swiftly applying this Recommendation.
(43) work with Member States, social partners, employment services, youth and trainee organisations, education and training institutions and other stakeholders to promote this Recommendation, including through awareness-raising on the quality principles and benefits of traineeships for young people and traineeship providers.
(44) encourage and support the implementation of this Recommendation, including through facilitating the exchange of best practices among Member States and among stakeholders through existing networks, including skills partnerships under the Pact for Skills.
(45) support the implementation of this Recommendation through relevant Union funding, in accordance with the relevant legal frameworks, to increase the number of quality traineeships.
(46) work jointly with Member States on the collection of a limited set of data on traineeships, with a particular view to monitoring the progress in applying this Recommendation while being mindful of unnecessary reporting burden.
(47) continue monitoring in cooperation with the Member States and with the support of the Employment Committee, the progress in applying the reinforced Quality Framework for Traineeships, building on the existing monitoring instruments used in the framework of the European Semester.
(48) report to the Council on the progress in applying this Recommendation based on information provided by Member States within [three years] from the date of its adoption.
HAS ADOPTED THIS RECOMMENDATION
Objective and scope
1. This Recommendation aims to improve the quality of traineeships, in particular as regards learning and training content and working conditions, with the aim of easing the transition from education, unemployment or inactivity to work.
2. This Recommendation should cover all trainees, regardless of their employment status, including trainees who are workers only insofar and to the extent that equivalent or more favourable provisions are not laid down in Union law.
Quality principles
HEREBY RECOMMENDS THAT MEMBER STATES:
Written agreement
3. ensure that traineeships are based on a written agreement concluded at the beginning of the traineeship between the trainee and the traineeship provider.
4. ensure that traineeship agreements set out the information elements listed in Article 4 of Directive (EU) 2019/1152, the learning and training component, including its objectives, the working conditions, the tasks to be carried out, the arrangements for mentorship, supervision and evaluation, details on social protection coverage, including with regards to coverage for sickness and healthcare as well as for accidents at work and occupational diseases, the rights and obligations of the parties under applicable Union and national law, collective agreements and practice, and, where relevant, the traineeship provider's policies on confidentiality and the ownership of intellectual property rights.
Learning and working conditions
5. ensure that trainees are consulted when setting the specific learning and training objectives of the traineeship in order to help trainees acquire practical experience and relevant skills. The tasks assigned to the trainee should enable these objectives to be attained.
6. ensure that trainees are fairly paid, taking into account elements such as the trainee’s tasks and responsibilities, the intensity of the trainee’s work, and the weight of the learning and training component.
7. ensure that the rights and working conditions of trainees under applicable Union and national law, including health and safety legislation, limits to maximum weekly working time, minimum daily and weekly rest periods and, where applicable, minimum holiday entitlements, are respected through effective monitoring and enforcement.
8. ensure that traineeship providers designate a supervisor for guiding the trainee through the assigned tasks, overseeing the activities carried out by the trainee and monitoring and assessing their progress.
9. ensure that traineeship providers designate a mentor acting as an advisor to the trainee, and providing coaching and support, wherever possible considering the organisational needs and size of the traineeship provider.
10. ensure that traineeship providers provide an appropriate, safe and healthy working environment, including equipment and work organisation in the case of remote and hybrid traineeships.
11. ensure a reasonable duration of traineeships that does not exceed six months, except in cases where a longer duration is justified by objective grounds and taking into account national practices. In the event of repeated, including consecutive, traineeships with the same employer, ensure that the overall duration of those traineeships does not exceed six months, except in cases where a longer duration is justified by objective grounds.
12. clarify the circumstances and conditions under which a traineeship may be extended or renewed after the end of the initial traineeship.
13. ensure that employers do not require candidates for traineeships to have previous work experience in the field of activity, except in cases where such requirement is justified by objective grounds.
14. ensure the practice of specifying in the traineeship agreement that either the trainee or the traineeship provider may terminate it by written communication, providing advance notice of an appropriate duration in view of the length of the traineeship and relevant national practice.
15. ensure, in cooperation with competent authorities, channels for trainees to report malpractice and poor working conditions and provide information on those channels.
Social protection
16. ensure that trainees have access to adequate social protection, including necessary coverage in line with national legislation, and taking into account, where applicable, the Council Recommendation 8 November 2019 (60).
Proper recognition of traineeships
17. promote the recognition and validation of the knowledge, skills and competences acquired during traineeships and encourage traineeship providers to attest them, on the basis of an assessment, through a certificate, where appropriate, and if possible in a digital format.
Transparency requirements
18. ensure that traineeship providers include in their vacancy notices and advertisements information on the terms and conditions of the traineeship, in particular on the level of pay, working conditions, the coverage of social protection, including health and accident insurance, the expected tasks and learning and training component.
19. encourage traineeship providers to give information on recruitment policies, including the share of trainees recruited in recent years.
20. encourage employment services and other providers of career guidance, when providing information on traineeships, to apply the transparency requirements as listed in point 18.
Inclusive traineeships
21. improve outreach to potential trainees belonging to groups in vulnerable situations, including by raising awareness of the benefits of quality traineeships in terms of increased employability.
22. ensure equal treatment and non-discrimination in traineeships, including in selection criteria and recruitment policies, and improve access to traineeship opportunities for all potential applicants, in particular those from groups in vulnerable situations.
23. ensure that traineeship providers use gender neutral and inclusive language in their vacancy notices and advertisements.
24. ensure that traineeship programmes, including workplaces, trainings, digital tools, office and work equipment, are adapted to the individual needs of trainees where relevant, in particular for trainees with disabilities, also through the provision of appropriate reasonable accommodation in line with Article 5 of Council Directive 2000/78/EC.
Cross-border traineeships
25. facilitate the cross-border mobility of trainees in the Union inter alia, by clarifying the national legal framework applicable to traineeships and establishing clear rules on hosting trainees from and the sending of trainees to other Member States and by reducing administrative formalities.
26. make use of the EURES network to support cross-border mobility of trainees and exchange information on paid traineeships through the EURES portal, in accordance with the corresponding provisions of Regulation (EU) 2016/589 of the European Parliament and of the Council (61).
27. further develop practical guidance material and information for (potential) trainees on cross-border traineeships through EURES, including in formats that are accessible to persons with different types of disabilities.
28. support traineeship providers and education and training institutions in facilitating cross-border traineeships, making the best use of European initiatives, in particular the Erasmus+ programme established by Regulation (EU) 2021/817 of the European Parliament and the Council (62).
29. encourage applying the principles of this Recommendation, where applicable, in traineeship mobility agreements between sending organisations in the European Union and hosting organisations outside the Union.
Additional traineeship support
30. encourage traineeship providers as well as intermediary organisations, such as employment services and education and training institutions, to provide career guidance support during the traineeship, such as career counselling and networking opportunities, to facilitate the transition to a regular employment relationship after the traineeship.
Framework conditions
31. ensure the active involvement of social partners in applying this Recommendation.
32. promote the active involvement of employment services, education and training institutions, training providers and other relevant stakeholders in applying this Recommendation.
33. ensure that representatives of workers may engage in any relevant judicial or administrative procedure to enforce any of the rights and obligations arising from applicable national law. They may act on behalf or in support of one or several trainees in the case of an infringement of any right or obligation arising from applicable national law, with that trainee’s or those trainees’ approval.
Implementation at national level
Applying the reinforced Quality Framework for Traineeships
34. take appropriate measures to apply this Recommendation as soon as possible and submit an implementation plan setting out the corresponding measures to be taken at national level by [date of adoption + 18 months].
35. envisage financial and/or non-financial support such as practical guidance to traineeship providers particularly for reaching out to vulnerable groups and for micro-, small and medium-sized companies, in applying this Recommendation.
Support to increase trainees’ employability
36. offer incentives to traineeship providers for offering trainees a regular employment relationship after the successful completion of a traineeship.
37. make use of the relevant Union funds and instruments for increasing the number of quality traineeships which follow the guidance outlined in this Recommendation.
Follow-up
38. jointly with the Commission, work on the collection of data on traineeships, with a particular view to informing policy making on quality traineeships.
Done at Brussels,
For the Council
The President


Delegations will find attached document COM(2024) 132 final.

Encl.: COM(2024) 132 final

EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM
1. CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL
• Reasons for and objectives of the proposal
In her Political Guidelines1, President von der Leyen stressed the need to strengthen Europe’s social market economy and to foster “growth which creates quality jobs, especially for young people”.
Youth unemployment remains a persistent challenge in the EU, with the youth unemployment rate being more than twice as high as the overall unemployment rate2. A particular challenge lies in activating more young people who are not in employment, education or training (NEETs) and who face specific obstacles that hinder their participation in the labour market. Therefore, the European Pillar of Social Rights Action Plan3 sets out the target of decreasing the rate of young people aged 15-29 who are NEETs from 12.6% (2019) to 9% by 2030 by improving their employment prospects.
Traineeships can provide an opportunity for young people to gain practical and professional experience, improve their skills and thereby facilitate their access to the labour market. They offer an opportunity for employers to attract, train and retain their staff. However, the value of a traineeship depends on its quality. A quality traineeship requires fair and transparent working conditions and adequate learning content. Moreover, inclusive traineeships can help provide opportunities for everyone to access the labour market, including young people in vulnerable situations.
According to estimations based on the European Labour Force Survey (EU-LFS) data, there are 3.1 million trainees in the EU (2019 data) out of which 1.6 million are paid trainees and 1.5 million are unpaid. An increasing number of trainees in the EU participate in cross-border traineeships (21% of trainees in 2023 compared to 9% in 2013)4, demonstrating the potential of traineeships to contribute to fair labour mobility in the EU. Estimates also indicate that in 2019 around 370 000 paid trainees5 did a traineeship of a long duration (more than 6 months), including consecutive/repeated ones with the same employer. Out of these, around 100 000 trainees did a traineeship of a long duration with poor learning content6.
The 2014 Council Recommendation on a Quality Framework for Traineeships (QFT) is an important reference point for determining what constitutes a quality traineeship. It sets out guidelines for traineeships outside education curricula and mandatory professional training.
In its 2023 evaluation of this Council Recommendation7, the Commission found indications that the QFT had a positive impact on the quality of traineeships in the EU. It also confirmed that traineeships continue to be an important pathway for young people to enter the labour market. In addition, quality traineeships can be useful upskilling and/or reskilling opportunities for people of any age to acquire practical skills on the job to set their career in a new direction.
However, the evaluation also highlighted areas that could be further strengthened and improved. For instance, it recommended better integrating quality principles in national legislation, in particular for open-market traineeships (OMTs), stronger monitoring and enforcement to ensure the application of the quality principles on the ground and increasing awareness amongst various key stakeholders. The need for stronger support to employers, for example, through financial support and practical guidance, was also highlighted. Furthermore, the evaluation stressed that efforts to provide more concrete and practical information to young people on cross-border traineeships should be stepped up. It also identified additional quality criteria, such as fair pay and social protection, rules on remote/hybrid traineeships, better addressing the needs of groups in vulnerable situations, and strengthened support to trainees during and after the traineeship. Moreover, the evaluation noted the possibility of extending the scope of QFT from OMTs and traineeships that are part of active labour market policies (ALMP) to also cover other traineeships, such as those that are part of formal education and training curricula.
Various stakeholders called on the Commission to improve the quality of traineeships:
• The report on the final outcome of the Conference on the Future of Europe8 includes the call to ensure that young people’s traineeships and jobs comply with quality standards, including on pay, and that unpaid internships on the labour market and outside formal education are banned through a legal instrument.
• In its Opinion “The Equal Treatment of Young People in the Labour Market” of 15 June 20239, the European Economic and Social Committee (EESC) noted that traineeships should offer good quality learning content and adequate working conditions, and should not be a substitute for regular jobs or a precondition for a job placement. 
• In its Opinion “Youth Employment Support: a Bridge to Jobs for the Next Generation Reinforcing the Youth Guarantee” of 5 February 202110, the Committee of the Regions considered that traineeships and apprenticeships should primarily provide a learning experience for young people, which can help them to decide on their future career and to develop their skills in order to access permanent employment. 
In particular, the European Parliament adopted on 14 June 2023 a resolution based on Article 225 TFEU11 calling on the Commission to update and strengthen the 2014 Council Recommendation and to turn it into a stronger legislative instrument. It also called on the Commission to ensure minimum quality standards for traineeships, including pay.
In this context, the Commission announced an update of the Quality Framework for Traineeships in its 2023 Commission Work Programme12, to address issues including fair pay and access to social protection, as part of its engagement to implement the European Pillar of Social Rights Action Plan and to reach the EU’s 2030 targets in the areas of employment, skills, and poverty reduction.
This proposal for a directive reflects the political commitment expressed in President von der Leyen's Political Guidelines to respond to European Parliament resolutions based on Article 225 TFEU with a legislative proposal, in full respect of proportionality, subsidiarity and better law-making principles. Considering these principles and the legal limits to EU action set by the Treaties, the proposal for a directive focuses on supporting Member States in improving and enforcing working conditions of trainees and combating regular employment relationships disguised as traineeships.
The proposed directive applies to trainees who have an employment relationship as defined by the law, collective agreements or practice in force in the Member States with consideration to the case-law of the Court of Justice, regardless of the type of traineeship. The proposed directive is complemented by a proposal for a strengthened Council Recommendation13, which applies to all trainees and which addresses wider issues of quality and inclusiveness, including access to social protection. The proposed Council Recommendation applies to trainees who are workers only insofar and to the extent that equivalent or more favourable provisions are not laid down in EU law.
The proposal for a directive addresses two problematic and unlawful situations that have been identified across all types of traineeships in the EU:
• Where traineeships are used for their intended purpose, that is to offer an opportunity for trainees to gain practical and professional experience, improve their skills and access the labour market, but do not comply with the applicable EU or national legislation, they are non-compliant traineeships. In these cases, trainees do not enjoy all the rights that they are entitled to. As illustrated in the accompanying impact assessment report, evidence of non-compliance has been found across the EU. In addition, non-compliance is likely to be underreported due to the complexity of regulatory approaches in Member States, their generally weak enforcement and the specific obstacles preventing trainees from taking legal action or filing complaints (e.g. short duration of contracts; the need to secure a more stable labour market position; a real or perceived dependency from the employer; the fear of negative repercussions from taking legal action or filing a complaint; or the lack of reporting channels or access to representation).
• Where purported traineeships are not used for their intended purpose and replace regular employee positions, they are regular employment relationships disguised as traineeships. In these cases, traineeship providers circumvent the EU or national law and collective agreements that apply to regular workers.
The problematic and unlawful use of traineeships undermines the working conditions of trainees and regular workers and harms social fairness. It can also produce an uneven playing field between traineeship providers, which is a problem for businesses, including for small and medium-sized companies (SMEs). The use of non-compliant traineeships or regular employment relationships disguised as traineeships constitutes a cost-reduction measure for employers, which creates a situation of unfair competitive advantage compared to compliant employers. Unlawful traineeship arrangements, in particular those disguised as employment, are also a burden on public revenue through the loss of due social security contributions and tax payments.
Based on the results of the evaluation of the QFT, further evidence gathering, and the two-stage consultation of EU social partners in line with Article 154 TFEU, the proposed directive aims at achieving the following specific objectives.
Improving and enforcing trainees’ working conditions
The proposed directive lays down the principle of non-discrimination to ensure that, with regard to working conditions (including pay), trainees are not treated in a less favourable manner than comparable workers in the same establishment, unless a different treatment is justified on objective grounds. The proposed directive contains a number of provisions that help trainees defend their rights as ‘workers’. For instance, it ensures that workers’ representatives may engage in procedures to enforce the rights of trainees. It introduces the obligation for Member States to set up channels for trainees to report malpractice and poor working conditions.
Combating regular employment relationships disguised as traineeships
The proposed directive requires Member States to provide for effective checks and inspections by competent authorities to detect regular employment relationships disguised as traineeships and take enforcement action. To determine whether a traineeship constitutes a regular employment relationship disguised as a traineeship, competent authorities would need to consider in their overall assessments a set of indicative elements set out at EU level. To facilitate this assessment, employers must give competent authorities access to certain information, including the number, duration and working conditions of traineeships. Member States are also required to set a limit indicating an excessive duration of a traineeship and of repeated, including consecutive, traineeships with the same employer. This will help national authorities identify possible regular employment relationships disguised as traineeships. In addition, the proposed directive requires Member States to ensure that employers improve transparency by including information on the expected tasks and working conditions including pay, social protection, learning and training elements in vacancy notices and advertisements of traineeships.
• Consistency with existing policy provisions in the policy area
As part of the European Year of Skills, the EU has set out to promote a mindset where upskilling and reskilling are the norm. Closing skills gaps and addressing skills mismatches across the EU will boost competitiveness, in particular of micro, small and medium-sized enterprises by better matching employers’ needs with peoples’ skills and aspirations. Equal access to skills development and work-based learning will help reduce inequalities, notably by empowering people to fully participate in the economy and society. The European Year of Skills follows the European Year of Youth, which emphasised the need to provide further impetus to the creation of quality employment opportunities for young people in line with the eleven youth goals of the 2019-2027 EU Youth Strategy14. In its Communication on the European Year of Youth 2022, the Commission committed to updating its quality framework for traineeships in 2024 to address issues including fair pay and access to social protection15.
The Commission’s Youth Employment Support package16 of July 2020 proposed Recommendations on a Bridge to jobs - reinforcing the Youth Guarantee17 and a modernised European framework for vocational education and training, both of which the Council adopted18. The former specifically recommends that traineeship offers comply with the minimum standards laid out in the QFT. The latter sets out key principles for ensuring that vocational education and training adapts swiftly to labour market needs and provides quality learning opportunities for young people and adults. It places a strong emphasis on better opportunities for work-based learning and improved quality assurance.
In a similar way to traineeships, apprenticeships are an important pathway to facilitate transitions to the labour market. The Youth Employment Support package gave a renewed impetus to apprenticeships, including through the European Alliance for Apprenticeships19.
These initiatives aimed to improve the quality and effectiveness of the EU’s measures to promote youth employment and are supported by EU funding. They implement amongst others the first and the fourth principle of the European Pillar of Social Rights. These principles lay down the right to ‘quality and inclusive education, training and life-long learning’ and the right of young people to ‘continued education, apprenticeship, traineeship or a job offer of good standing within four months of becoming unemployed or leaving education’.
The EU labour and social acquis sets minimum standards through a number of legal instruments. The enforcement provisions included in this proposal for a directive are aimed at ensuring that trainees who are workers enjoy these rights. The following EU-level legal instruments are of particular relevance for these trainees:
• The Directive on transparent and predictable working conditions20 provides for measures to ensure proper working conditions of people who work in non-standard work relationships. This includes the right to receive detailed information in written form on the essential aspects of their work. The minimum standards set out in the Directive are particularly relevant for trainees, given the usually limited duration of their employment relationship and vulnerable position on the labour market.
• The Fixed-Term Work Directive21 aims at improving the quality of fixed-term work by ensuring the application of the principle of non-discrimination of fixed-term workers (including trainees) vis-à-vis comparable permanent workers. It establishes a legal framework to prevent abuse arising from the use of successive fixed-term employment contracts or relationships. It also ensures access of fixed-term workers to appropriate training opportunities and to information about vacancies within the undertaking with a view to secure a permanent position.
• The Directive on adequate minimum wages in the EU22 creates a framework to improve the adequacy of minimum wages in Member States with statutory minimum wages. It also aims to promote collective bargaining in all Member States, while enhancing effective access of workers to rights to minimum wage protection, where provided for in national law and/or collective agreements. It provides that where Member States allow for different rates of statutory minimum wage for specific groups of workers, they shall ensure that such variations of statutory minimum wages respect the principles of non-discrimination and proportionality.
• The Occupational Health and Safety (OSH) Framework Directive23 lays down the main principles for encouraging improvements in the health and safety at work. It guarantees minimum safety and health requirements throughout the EU. The Framework Directive confirms that, as regards a secure workplace, the same rules apply to workers and trainees and is accompanied by further directives focusing on specific aspects of safety and health at work.
• The Council Directive establishing a general framework for equal treatment in employment and occupation24 lays down a general framework for combating discrimination on the grounds of religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation as regards employment and occupation. It notably prohibits discrimination of young trainees due to their age.
The Council Recommendation on access to social protection for workers and the self-employed25 recommends Member States to ensure that both workers (including trainees who are workers) and the self-employed have access to effective and adequate social protection. The Recommendation covers unemployment, sickness and health care, maternity and paternity, invalidity, old-age and survivors’ benefits and benefits in respect of accidents at work and occupational diseases.
The Council Recommendation on a European Framework for Quality and Effective Apprenticeships (EFQEA)26 sets out 14 criteria to define quality and effective apprenticeships, ensuring both the development of job-related skills and the personal development of apprentices. It takes into account the diversity of vocational education and training (VET) systems across the EU. In some cases, apprentices covered by the EFQEA might also fall within the scope of this Directive, insofar as the apprentices fall under the notion of ‘worker’ as defined by the law, collective agreements or practice in force in the Member States, with consideration to the case-law of the EU Court of Justice.
• Consistency with other Union policies
The proposal is consistent with recent EU policies that aim at empowering people through education, training and skills. The European Skills Agenda27 seeks to strengthen the EU’s sustainable competitiveness, ensure social fairness and support young people’s resilience.
The proposal is also consistent with the proposal for a Council Recommendation ‘Europe on the Move’ – learning mobility opportunities for everyone of 15 November 202328. This aims at making learning opportunities across the EU more accessible for all young people, including young people with fewer opportunities, such as persons with disabilities. It also promotes the attractiveness of the EU as a learning destination for talents from outside the EU.
Financial investments in upskilling and reskilling are at the heart of the European Social Fund Plus (ESF+), the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF), the Just Transition Fund, Erasmus+ and the Digital Europe Programme. Skills development is also supported by the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) investments in education and training infrastructure and equipment.
This initiative is also one of the actions set out in the Commission’s action plan on skills and labour shortages in the EU29.
2. LEGAL BASIS, SUBSIDIARITY AND PROPORTIONALITY
• Legal basis
The proposal is based on Article 153(2)(b) TFEU, which provides for the adoption of directives setting minimum requirements with respect to, inter alia, ‘working conditions’ as set out in Article 153(1)(b) TFEU, while avoiding imposing administrative, financial and legal constraints in a way which would hold back the creation and development of small and medium-sized undertakings. Since it does not contain measures directly affecting the level of pay, it fully respects the limits imposed to Union action by Article 153(5) TFEU.
• Subsidiarity (for non-exclusive competence)
The 2014 Quality Framework for Traineeships has helped Member States implement policy and legislative changes, in particular in those that have less developed traineeship systems. However, significant challenges in the use, quality of and access to traineeships remain in all Member States. An EU initiative can help to coordinate and focus Member States’ efforts on measures that can address the specific problems identified across all types of traineeships. Only an EU action can set common rules to create a consistent framework of principles and minimum standards across all Member States. The initiative would support Member States’ upward social convergence and the better enforcement of existing labour rights, contributing to a better level-playing field for trainees and traineeship providers in the EU.
Action solely by Member States in response to the need of enforcing working conditions of trainees and combating regular employment relationships disguised as traineeships would not necessarily have the same level of protection in terms of transparency and predictability and would risk increasing divergences between Member States. The identified challenges must therefore be tackled at EU level.
The proposed directive is based on a minimum harmonisation of national systems which respects Member States' discretion to set higher standards and provides the possibility for social partners to be entrusted with the implementation of the proposed directive. In line with Article 153(2)(b) TFEU, it will support and complement the activities of the Member States through minimum requirements for gradual implementation.
• Proportionality
This proposal sets minimum requirements, thus ensuring that the degree of intervention will be kept to the minimum necessary in order to reach the objectives of the proposal. Member States which already have more favourable provisions in place than those put forward in this proposal will not have to change or lower them. Member States may also decide to go beyond the minimum standards set out. The costs linked to this proposal are reasonable and justified in light of the objective to strengthen the enforcement of working conditions of trainees.
The principle of proportionality is respected considering the size and nature of the identified problems. For instance, employers must provide authorities with information on traineeships upon request only. The impact assessment accompanying this initiative assessed and compared the policy options as to their proportionality relative to the baseline. The preferred option leaves room for Member States to define the method and form of intervention to achieve the objectives. Thus, it does not go beyond what is necessary to address the problems identified and achieve the specific objectives.
• Choice of the instrument
Article 153(2)(b) in combination with 153(1)(b) TFEU provides explicitly that directives are the legal instrument to be used for establishing minimum requirements concerning working conditions to be gradually implemented by Member States.
3. RESULTS OF EX-POST EVALUATIONS, STAKEHOLDER CONSULTATIONS AND IMPACT ASSESSMENTS
• Ex-post evaluations/fitness checks of existing legislation
An evaluation30 on the 2014 Council Recommendation on a Quality Framework for Traineeships was carried out in 2022-2023. While traineeships continue to be an important pathway for young people to enter the labour market, it found room for improvement in terms of the implementation of the QFT principles on the ground, as well as monitoring and enforcement of the relevant national legislation governing traineeships. Various stakeholder groups saw a need to further strengthen the rights of trainees regarding pay and social protection.
• Stakeholder consultations
Specific consultation activities took place in 2022 as part of the Commission’s 2023 evaluation of the QFT31, in particular through a public consultation survey. The evaluation also included targeted consultations of national and regional authorities responsible for education, training and employment policies, social partners, education and training providers, academic experts working on labour market issues, organisations representing young people, young (former, current and potential future) trainees and other stakeholders at EU, national and regional level. To reach all these stakeholders, different consultation activities and methods were used, such as interviews, targeted consultation meetings, a targeted trainees survey and case studies.
A two-stage consultation of the EU social partners under Article 154 TFEU was carried out for this proposal. During the first stage, which took place between 11 July and 15 September 2023, social partners were consulted on the need and possible direction of EU action32. During the second stage, between 28 September and 9 November 2023, the Commission consulted social partners on the objectives and potential legal avenues for EU action33. Trade unions welcomed the Commission’s intention to update the QFT. They considered that, although the principles of the QFT remained relevant, trainees needed binding protection (in the form of a directive) to ensure fair compensation, working conditions and social protection. This directive should ensure access to all rights enjoyed by regular workers under existing EU legislation. Trade unions stressed that the main objective of EU action must be to set binding minimum standards for traineeships in the EU and to create a level playing field that discourages abuse. Employers considered that the principles of the 2014 QFT remain relevant. In their opinion, a stronger focus should be placed on its implementation and monitoring, but in their view a revised Council Recommendation would strike the right balance between promoting minimum standards and preserving flexibility. The objectives to address the problematic use of, improve the quality of and foster access to traineeships were supported by employers. Employers also highlighted the lack of data, in particular on open-market traineeships, and the link between pay and the quality of traineeships. There was no agreement among social partners to enter into negotiations to conclude an agreement at Union level in accordance with Article 155 TFEU.
Furthermore, as part of the study exploring the context, challenges and possible solutions in relation to the quality of traineeships in the EU, an online survey was conducted with national stakeholders. This aimed to gather information on the current practices of businesses regarding traineeships and identify good practices implemented in Member States and their impact on the quality of traineeships. The survey ran from 15 June to 8 September 2023 and was targeted at national public authorities, national business/employer associations, individual businesses, national trade unions, national youth organisations, civil society organisations and educational institutions. Targeted interviews with EU-level stakeholders were also carried out.
A dedicated ‘SME Panel’ survey was conducted by the Directorate General for Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion (DG EMPL), the Directorate General for Internal Market, Industry, Entrepreneurship and SMEs (DG GROW), the European Innovation Council and the SMEs Executive Agency (EISMEA) and with the support of the Enterprise Europe Network between 12 October and 9 November 2023.
The Flash Eurobarometer survey (523)34 looked into young people’s perceptions of their integration into the labour market, with a particular focus on traineeships. Between 15 and 24 March 2023, 26 334 people aged between 18 and 35 from all Member States were surveyed online.
• Collection and use of expertise
The proposed directive draws on several studies carried out to underpin the analysis of the initiative:
• preliminary results from a study commissioned from external experts: "Study exploring the context, challenges and possible solution in relation to the quality of traineeships in the EU" by a consortium of Ernst & Young (EY), the Centre of European Policy Studies (CEPS) and Open Evidence (forthcoming);
• an external study supporting the evaluation of the Quality Framework for Traineeships, Final Report, January 202335;
• the Flash Eurobarometer survey on the perception of young people regarding their integration into the labour market, with a particular focus on traineeships36;
The European Parliament’s 2023 legislative own-initiative resolution on quality traineeships in the EU was also taken into account, in conjunction with the relevant European added value Assessment of Parliament’s research service37.
• Impact assessment
In line with its Better Regulation policy, the Commission carried out an impact assessment38. This gave a structured analysis of the policy problems, corresponding policy objectives and policy options and assessed their impact. It considered the subsidiarity, effectiveness, efficiency, coherence and proportionality of the identified options and how to monitor and evaluate the initiative in the future. This work was supported by a structured consultation in the Commission via an inter-service steering group39 and the forthcoming “Study exploring the context, challenges and possible solution in relation to the quality of traineeships in the EU” referred to above.
The impact assessment identified three problems: (1) the problematic use of traineeships by traineeship providers, (2) the poor quality of traineeships and (3) unequal access to traineeships. The impact assessment examined three policy options, which combined both legislative and non-legislative measures addressing the objectives of the initiative in terms of enforcing applicable rights of trainees, preventing the problematic use of traineeships, ensuring fair working conditions, improving the learning content, and improving the access to and the inclusiveness of traineeships. The assessment of the impact of the options also took into consideration the potential unintended consequences of the different policy options, including on the offer of traineeships.
The preferred policy option identified in the impact assessment is a package made up of a directive applying to trainees who are workers under EU law and an updated Council recommendation covering all trainees. This package is expected to bring social benefits to trainees by reducing problematic and poor-quality traineeships through equal treatment, fairer pay and social protection, and by improving access to traineeships, in particular for persons in vulnerable situations, including persons with disabilities, those residing in rural, remote and outermost regions, those with a disadvantaged socio-economic and/or migrant background, those from the Roma community, and those with lower educational attainment. The preferred option is expected to result in economic benefits for traineeship providers, such as fairer market competition, productivity and competitiveness gains due to a more skilled and diverse workforce and lower search, matching and recruitment costs. As for costs associated with the preferred option, these relate to a possible increase in labour costs, adjustment costs and potential costs resulting from administrative or judicial procedures. National budgets and administrations are expected to benefit from increased tax and social security receipts, and reduced social protection and activation spending.
The impact assessment was first discussed with the Commission’s Regulatory Scrutiny Board on 13 December 2023. On 1 February 2024, a revised impact assessment Report was submitted to the Board. On 22 February 2024, the Board issued a positive opinion with reservations40. The remaining comments were subsequently addressed, by specifying further the limitations of the used data, strengthening the discussions on level playing field and competition issues and providing additional targeted clarifications on the description and assessment of the policy options.
• Fundamental rights
The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union protects a broad range of employment rights. The objectives of this proposal are in line with the Charter. By enshrining the principle of non-discrimination of trainees and providing measures to combat regular employment relationships disguised as traineeships, the proposal would strengthen Article 31 on fair and just working conditions and Article 32 on the protection of young people at work which stipulates that young people admitted to work must be protected against economic exploitation
4. BUDGETARY IMPLICATIONS
The proposal does not require additional resources from the EU budget.
5. OTHER ELEMENTS
• Monitoring, evaluation and reporting arrangements
It is proposed that Member States transpose the proposed directive 2 years after its adoption and communicate to the Commission the national transposition measures via the MNE (National Measures for Execution)-Database. In line with Article 153(3) TFEU they may entrust the social partners with the transposition through collective agreements. The Commission stands ready to provide technical support to Member States to implement the proposed directive.
The Commission proposes to review the implementation of the proposed directive 5 years after the transposition deadline and propose, where appropriate, legislative amendments. Progress in achieving the objectives of the initiative will be monitored by a series of core indicators related to the policy objectives. These indicators and the related data sources are specified in Annex 15 of the impact assessment. The monitoring framework will be subject to further adjustments based on the final legal and implementation requirements and timeline.
• Explanatory documents
Member States might use different legal instruments to transpose the proposed directive, which is why it is justified to request that Member States accompany the notification of their transposition measures with one or more documents. These should explain the relationship between the components of the proposed directive and the corresponding parts of national transposition instruments, in accordance with the Joint Political Declaration of 28 September 2011 of Member States and the Commission on explanatory documents41.
• Detailed explanation of the specific provisions of the proposal
Chapter I – General provisions
Article 1 – Subject matter
This provision sets out the subject matter of the Directive, which is to lay down a common framework of principles and measures to improve and enforce the working conditions of trainees and to combat regular employment relationships disguised as traineeships.
Article 2 – Definitions
This provision defines a number of terms and concepts necessary to interpret the provisions of the Directive (‘traineeship’, ‘trainee’, ‘regular employment relationship’ and ‘regular employee’).
Chapter II – Equal treatment
Article 3 – Principle of non-discrimination
Article 3 enshrines the principle of non-discrimination of trainees. It requires Member States to have measures in place to ensure that trainees are not discriminated against as to their working conditions, including pay. However, objective grounds, such as different tasks, lower responsibilities, work intensity or the weight of the learning and training component may justify different treatment.
This provision applies in addition to the principle of non-discrimination laid down in the Fixed-Term Work Directive, which provides for the equal treatment of fixed-term workers with comparable permanent workers in the same establishment unless different treatment is justified on objective grounds. The additional provision in the Directive is necessary, on the one hand, as the Fixed-Term Work Directive allows Member States to exclude certain trainees from its scope and, on the other hand, to ensure that fixed-term workers in a comparable position can also serve as comparators.
Chapter III – Regular employment relationships disguised as traineeships
Article 4 – Measures to combat regular employment relationships disguised as traineeships
This provision requires Member States to take appropriate measures to combat the phenomenon of regular employment relationships disguising as traineeships. Member States must put in place provisions for effective controls and inspections by competent authorities to detect cases where regular employment relationships disguised as traineeships lead to lower levels of protection of workers, including working conditions and pay, and to take action in such cases.
Article 5 – Assessment of regular employment relationships disguised as traineeships
This article requires competent authorities to perform an overall assessment of all relevant factual elements when determining whether a regular employment relationship is disguised as a traineeship. This assessment should take into account various elements such as the duration, the existence of a significant learning and training component, equivalent levels of tasks and responsibilities and whether the employer requires previous work experience for the traineeship.
It further stipulates an information obligation for employers towards competent authorities in order to help the latter carry out the assessment. This obligation only applies upon request by the authorities. Information must be provided on the number and duration of traineeships, working conditions (including pay), learning and training components and traineeship vacancy notices.
Additionally, it stipulates that Member States must set a limit for excessive duration of traineeships for the purpose of the assessment and lays down rules for the content of traineeship vacancy notices.
Chapter IV – Enforcement and supporting measures
Article 6 – Implementation and enforcement of relevant Union law
Article 6 requires Member States to take measures to implement and enforce EU law applicable to workers in relation to trainees.
Article 7 – Right to redress
This provision requires Member States to provide access to an effective and impartial dispute resolution mechanism and a right to redress, including adequate compensation, if a trainee’s rights are infringed under the Directive or other EU law applicable to workers.
Article 8 – Procedures on behalf or in support of trainees
This article enables workers’ representatives to engage on behalf or in support of one or several trainees in judicial or administrative proceedings in order to enforce the rights of trainees, provided the trainee or the trainees agree. This should help trainees overcome cost-related or procedural barriers.
Article 9 – Protection against adverse treatment and consequences
This provision stipulates the protection of trainees and their representatives against adverse treatment or consequences, in particular, regarding dismissal or its equivalent, for exercising the rights provided for under the Directive. It further stipulates a right of trainees, if they consider they have been dismissed for exercising their rights under the Directive to request the employer to provide duly substantiated grounds for the dismissal. If a trainee presents facts pointing to a dismissal for exercising their rights under the Directive the provision places the burden on the employer to prove that the dismissal or equivalent measures were based on other grounds.
Article 10 – Penalties
This article requires Member States to provide for effective, proportionate and dissuasive penalties for breaches of the obligations under the Directive.
Chapter V – Final provisions
Article 11 – Non-regression and more favourable provisions
This article clarifies that no provision in the Directive should be interpreted to lower the protection of workers afforded by other instruments and that the Directive does not constitute a valid ground to lower the general level of protection awarded to workers, including trainees. It also allows Member States to introduce provisions that are more favourable to workers or to encourage or allow the application of collective agreements that are more favourable to workers.
Article 12 – Transposition and implementation
This provision sets out the maximum period that Member States have to transpose the Directive into national law and communicate the relevant texts to the Commission. This period is set at 2 years after the date of entry into force. Moreover, it highlights that Member States must ensure adequate involvement of social partners and may entrust them with implementation of the Directive.
Article 13 – Reporting and review
This article requires Member States to submit to the Commission the information needed to draft a report on the implementation of the Directive, including data on traineeships, 5 years after its entry into force. It also requires the Commission to submit the report to the European Parliament and to the Council, accompanied by a legislative proposal if needed.
Article 14 and 15 – Entry into force and addressees
These provisions stipulate that the Directive is to enter into force on the twentieth day following its publication in the Official Journal and is addressed to Member States.
2024/0068 (COD)
Proposal for a
DIRECTIVE OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL
on improving and enforcing working conditions of trainees and combating regular employment relationships disguised as traineeships (‘Traineeships Directive’)
(Text with EEA relevance)
THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,
Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and in particular Article 153 (2), point (b), in conjunction with Article 153 (1), point (b) thereof,
Having regard to the proposal from the European Commission,
After transmission of the draft legislative act to the national parliaments,
Having regard to the opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee42,
Having regard to the opinion of the Committee of the Regions43,
Acting in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure,
Whereas:
(1) In March 2014, the Council adopted the Recommendation for a Quality Framework on Traineeships (‘2014 Recommendation’) to provide Union-wide quality standards for traineeships. It recommends 21 principles for traineeships to improve the quality of traineeships, in particular to ensure high quality learning and training content and adequate working conditions to support education-to-work transitions and increase the employability of trainees. The 2014 Recommendation covers all traineeships except for those that are part of curricula of formal education and training and those regulated under national law and completion of which is a mandatory requirement to access a specific profession.
(2) The Council Recommendation on a European Framework for Quality and Effective Apprenticeships44 contains 14 criteria for quality and effective apprenticeships aiming to ensure that apprenticeship schemes are responsive to labour market needs and provide benefits to both learners and employers. These include criteria for learning and working conditions and criteria for framework conditions.
(3) The reinforced Youth Guarantee45 aims at ensuring that young people under the age of 30 receive a good quality offer of employment, continued education, apprenticeship or traineeship within a period of four months of becoming unemployed or leaving education. The 2014 Recommendation is an important reference point to measure the quality of traineeships offers under the reinforced Youth Guarantee.
(4) Labour shortages exist in many occupations and at all skills levels. They are expected to increase with the projected decline in the working age population and increasing demand for several occupations relevant for the green and digital transition. The lower labour market participation of young people contributes to these shortages. Quality traineeships can be a useful up- and/or reskilling pathway for persons of any age to acquire practical skills on the job to enter the labour market or take their career in a new direction.
(5) Traineeships can help young people gain practical and professional experience, improve their employability, and facilitate their transition into stable employment. As such, traineeships constitute an important pathway to the labour market. For employers, traineeships provide opportunities to attract, train and retain young people. They can reduce the cost of searching for and recruiting skilled staff, when trainees are offered a regular position after their traineeship. However, this can only be achieved if traineeships are of good quality and offer decent working conditions.
(6) Challenges persist regarding the problematic use of traineeships, including when regular employee positions are disguised as traineeships, depriving those workers of their full rights under Union law, national law and collective agreements and risking to trap them in precarious working conditions. Employment relationships disguised as traineeships distort competition between companies by putting compliant employers at a disadvantage, lead to the circumvention of employers' fiscal and social security obligations and to a substitution of permanent posts. In other cases, employers of ‘genuine’ trainees may not comply with all requirements stemming from Union law, national law, collective agreements or practice, depriving them of their full rights.
(7) Additionally, trainees are less likely to defend their rights due to their vulnerable positions in the labour market. The absence, complexity or diversity of regulatory frameworks for traineeships in various Member States alongside an insufficient enforcement of national legislation and the lack of capacity for controls and inspections, as well as a lack of clarity regarding the authority responsible for control and enforcement, are among the main factors leading to the problematic use of traineeships.
(8) Evidence shows that a significant proportion of trainees are subject to less favourable working conditions compared to regular employees, including regarding working hours, leave entitlements, and access to equipment as well as pay.
(9) At Union level, existing legal instruments provide a framework for the protection of workers, including the directives on transparent and predictable working conditions46, adequate minimum wages47, working time48, health and safety at work49, equality and non-discrimination50, work-life balance for parents and carers51, information and consultation of employees52, fixed-term work53, part-time work54, posting of workers55 and on temporary agency work.56. This legal framework fully applies to trainees who have an employment contract or employment relationship as defined by law, collective agreements or practice in force in each Member State, with consideration to the case-law of the Court of Justice of the European Union. The Union legal framework also encompasses recommendations on the quality of traineeships57 and apprenticeships58 and on access to social protection for workers and self-employed59.
(10) The Conference on the Future of Europe60 put forward a proposal on ensuring that young people’s internships and jobs adhere to quality standards, including on pay and banning unpaid internships on the labour market and outside formal education.
(11) The European Parliament adopted a resolution pursuant to Article 225 TFEU with recommendations to the Commission on quality traineeships in June 202361. In its resolution, it called on the Commission “to update and strengthen the 2014 QFT and to turn it into a stronger legislative instrument”. It further called on the Commission to include additional principles in an updated quality framework for traineeships. Specifically, the European Parliament called for the Commission to “propose a directive on open labour market traineeships, traineeships in the context of active labour market policies and traineeships that are a mandatory part of professional training, in order to ensure minimum quality standards, including rules on the duration of the traineeships, access to social protection in accordance with national law and practice as well as pay that ensures a decent standard of living in order to avoid exploitative practices”.
(12) The Commission carried out a two-stage consultation of social partners at Union level under Article 154 TFEU on the need, objectives and legal avenues for a potential action further improving the quality of traineeships. There was no agreement among the social partners to enter into negotiations with regard to those matters. It is, however, important to take action at Union level in this area by adapting the current framework on traineeships while taking into account the outcomes of the consultation of social partners.
(13) The Commission has extensively consulted with stakeholders, including trainees and youth organisations, traineeship providers, national public authorities, educational institutions, and experts from academia.
(14) Article 153(2) in conjunction with (1)(b) TFEU empowers the European Parliament and the Council to adopt Directives setting minimum requirements on working conditions with a view to achieving the objectives set out in Article 151 TFEU, namely the promotion of employment and improved living and working conditions.
(15) Considering the persisting challenges regarding the problematic use of traineeships in the Union, further action is needed to combat regular employment relationships disguised as traineeships and to ensure that the relevant Union and national law applicable to workers is fully implemented and enforced in relation to trainees. This Directive addresses these challenges by laying down minimum requirements to improve and enforce the working conditions of trainees in the Union and to combat employment relationships disguised as traineeships, by establishing a common framework of principles and measures necessary to ensure equal treatment and to implement and enforce Union and national law applicable to workers more effectively.
(16) This Directive should apply to trainees in the Union who have an employment contract or employment relationship as defined by the law, collective agreements or practice in force in the Member States, with consideration to the case-law of the Court of Justice of the European Union. In its case law, the Court of Justice has established criteria for determining the status of a worker, which is to be based on a case-by-case-analysis.
(17) Work-based learning programmes falling under the definition of traineeship vary significantly across Member States. Hence, apprenticeships may fall within the scope of this Directive, insofar as apprentices fall under the notion of ‘worker’ as defined by the law, collective agreements or practices in force in the Member States, with consideration to the case-law of the Court of Justice of the European Union.
(18) Chapter III of the Directive applies to regular employees who are falsely labelled as trainees, i.e. when employers label a regular employment relationship either as a traineeship which is not an employment relationship, or as a traineeship which does constitute an employment relationship, however with a lower level of pay or other working conditions than those which regular employees would be entitled to under Union or national law, collective agreements or practice.
(19) Traineeships which are employment relationships can be distinguished from ‘regular’ employment relationships in that they are limited in time, they include a significant learning and training component and that they are undertaken in order to gain practical and professional experience with a view to improving employability and facilitating transition to employment or accessing a profession.
(20) The principle of non-discrimination is suitable to combat abuses of traineeships, such as granting trainees less favourable working conditions or lower pay compared with regular employees without appropriate justification, and to ensure the sustainability of traineeships as a pathway to stable employment opportunities. It can also help make traineeships more accessible to groups of workers in a vulnerable situation.
(21) It is therefore necessary to lay down the principle of non-discrimination for trainees which should apply in addition to Clause 4 of the Annex to the Council Directive 1999/70/EC of 28 June 1999 concerning the framework agreement on fixed-term work concluded by ETUC, UNICE and CEEP, which provides that in respect of employment conditions, fixed-term workers are not to be treated in a less favourable manner than comparable permanent workers solely because they have a fixed-term contract or relation unless different treatment is justified on objective grounds. Trainees who have an employment relationship are by definition ‘fixed-term workers’ within the meaning of that Directive. Its clause on the principle of non-discrimination, however, does not allow for comparison with other fixed-term workers. Moreover, Clause 2 (2) of the Annex to that Directive allows Member States to exclude certain types of workers from its scope, including initial vocational training relationships and apprenticeship schemes or employment contracts and relationships which have been concluded within the framework of a specific public or publicly supported training, integration and vocational retraining programme. It also fails to recognise the particularly vulnerable position that trainees are in. It is therefore necessary to guarantee that the principle of equal treatment compared to regular employees applies to all trainees who have an employment relationship.
(22) Member States should therefore ensure that, in respect of working conditions including pay, trainees are not treated in a less favourable manner than comparable regular employees in the same establishment, unless different treatment is justified on objective grounds. The sole fact of being a trainee cannot constitute grounds for less favourable treatment compared to regular employees in the same establishment. At the same time, different tasks, lower responsibilities or work intensity in relation to comparable regular employees may constitute objective grounds for different treatment, where relevant, with regard to the employment condition at issue. The extent of different treatment should, however, be proportionate to those grounds.
(23) The application of the principle of non-discrimination requires the identification of a comparable regular employee engaged in the same or similar type of work or occupation as the trainee, due regard being given to qualifications and skills.
(24) Member States should have appropriate measures in place to combat regular employment relationships disguised as traineeships with the effect of granting lower levels of protection, including working conditions and pay, than the worker concerned would be entitled to under Union or national law, collective agreements or practice.
(25) It is necessary to ensure effective controls and inspections conducted by competent authorities as they are essential to protect the rights of trainees and to combat regular employment relationships disguised as traineeships. They should be targeted to avoid the substitution of regular employment by disguised traineeships and to protect workers’ rights.
(26) The assessment whether a regular employment relationship is disguised as a traineeship should be based on the factual circumstances and not on the formal designation of the contractual relationship. In order to determine whether a regular employment relationship is disguised as a traineeship, competent authorities should perform an overall assessment of all relevant facts. In order to facilitate the assessment for competent authorities, key elements that would allow to make the distinction between a regular employment relationship and a disguised traineeship should be set out. The assessment of those elements should be performed on a case-by-case basis, taking due account of the circumstances of each specific case. Therefore, the elements referred to are indicative and non-exhaustive and without the necessity to meet a specific threshold.
(27) Requiring previous work experience for a traineeship in the same or similar field of activity may not indicate a regular employment relationship disguised as a traineeship if the employer provides justification such as an equivalent period of previous work experiences being an alternative to having a degree in a certain field of activity or expertise.
(28) When competent authorities carry out their analysis of the relevant facts to determine the existence of a regular employment relationship disguised as a traineeship, the information needed to perform this analysis might not always be easily accessible to them. In order to enable competent authorities to perform their tasks, employers should be obliged to provide them with the necessary information that lies in their control upon request of the competent authorities.
(29) Member States should have appropriate measures in place to facilitate the assessment of whether a purported traineeship genuinely constitutes a traineeship. This should include a time limit indicating excessive duration of a traineeship and of repeated, including consecutive, traineeships with the same employer. A reasonable maximum duration of traineeships should, in principle, not exceed six months, as stipulated in the 2014 Recommendation. However, Member States may provide that a longer duration can be justified if it is based on objective grounds. Examples of such exceptions could be traineeships whose completion is a mandatory requirement to access a specific profession, the trajectory of which to acquire the necessary knowledge, competences and experience warrants a longer traineeship experience. Certain traineeships that are part of active labour market policies aimed at the integration of persons in a vulnerable situation could also benefit from a longer duration. Some traineeships that are part of curricula of formal education or vocational education and training may have a longer duration for reasons linked to the curricula. 
(30) The obligation for employers to include information on the expected tasks, working conditions, including pay, social protection, learning and training elements in the vacancy notices and advertisements for traineeships could be fulfilled by including a link to a website containing this information.
(31) In addition to this Directive, Member States should ensure full implementation and enforcement of the rights enshrined in the Union acquis applicable to trainees who have an employment relationship.
(32) An extensive system of enforcement provisions for the social acquis in the Union has been developed in recent legal instruments, such as Directive (EU) 2019/1152 and Directive (EU) 2023/97062. Such provisions should be included in this Directive to help ensure effective enforcement and defence of rights of trainees stemming from this Directive and from other Union law applicable to workers.
(33) Trainees should have access to effective and impartial dispute resolution and a right to redress, including adequate compensation. Trainees should be informed about the redress mechanisms for the purpose of exercising their right to redress. Having regard to the fundamental nature of the right to effective legal protection, trainees should continue to enjoy such protection even after the end of the traineeship giving rise to an alleged breach of rights under this Directive and other relevant Union law applicable to workers.
(34) To provide a more effective level of protection of trainees, representatives of workers should be able to engage in proceedings in order to defend any of the rights and obligations arising from this Directive or from other Union law applicable to workers either on behalf or in support of one or several trainees.
(35) Trainees should be provided with adequate judicial and administrative protection against any adverse treatment and consequences in reaction to any complaint lodged with the employer or resulting from any proceedings initiated with the aim of enforcing compliance with the rights provided for in this Directive or in other Union law applicable to workers. In particular, trainees should be protected from dismissal or its equivalent and all preparations for dismissal or its equivalent for exercising the rights provided for in this Directive or in other Union law applicable to workers.
(36) Member States should lay down rules on effective, proportionate and dissuasive penalties for cases of infringement of the rights provided for in the scope of this Directive. Penalties can include administrative and financial penalties, such as fines or the payment of compensation, as well as other types of penalties.
(37) This Directive lays down minimum requirements, thus leaving untouched Member States’ prerogative to introduce and maintain more favourable provisions. Rights acquired under the existing legal framework should continue to apply, unless more favourable provisions are introduced by this Directive.
(38) Since the objectives of this Directive, namely to enforce working conditions of trainees and combat regular employment relationships disguised as traineeships, cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States, but can, by reason of their scale and effects, be better achieved at Union level, the Union may adopt measures, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity as set out in Article 5 TEU. In accordance with the principle of proportionality, as set out in that Article, this Directive does not go beyond what is necessary in order to achieve those objectives.
(39) In implementing this Directive Member States should avoid imposing unnecessary administrative, financial and legal constraints, in particular if they hold back the creation and development of micro, small and medium-sized enterprises. Member States are therefore encouraged to assess the impact of their transposition measures on those enterprises in order to ensure that they are not disproportionately affected, paying particular attention to microenterprises and to the administrative burden, to publish the results of such assessments, and to provide support to those enterprises as necessary.
(40) Member States may entrust the social partners with the implementation of this Directive, where the social partners jointly request to do so and provided that the Member States take all the necessary steps to ensure that they can at all times guarantee the results sought under this Directive. They should also, in accordance with national law and practice, take adequate measures to ensure the effective involvement of the social partners and to promote and enhance social dialogue with a view to implementing the provisions of this Directive.
HAVE ADOPTED THIS DIRECTIVE:
Chapter I
General provisions
Article 1
Subject matter
This Directive lays down a common framework of principles and measures to improve and enforce the working conditions of trainees and to combat regular employment relationships disguised as traineeships
Article 2
Definitions
For the purposes of this Directive, the following definitions apply:
(a) ‘traineeship’ means a limited period of work practice which includes a significant learning and training component, undertaken to gain practical and professional experience with a view to improving employability and facilitating transition to a regular employment relationship or accessing a profession;
(b) ‘trainee’ means any person undertaking a traineeship who has an employment contract or employment relationship as defined by the law, collective agreements or practice in force in every Member State with consideration to the case law of the Court of Justice;
(c) ‘regular employment relationship’ means any employment relationship that is not a traineeship;
(d) ‘regular employee’ means any person in a regular employment relationship.
Chapter II
Equal treatment
Article 3
Principle of non-discrimination
Member States shall ensure that, in respect of working conditions including pay, trainees are not treated in a less favourable manner than comparable regular employees in the same establishment, unless different treatment is justified on objective grounds, such as different tasks, lower responsibilities, work intensity or the weight of the learning and training component.
Where there is no comparable regular employee in the same establishment, the comparison shall be made by reference to the applicable collective agreement, or where there is no applicable collective agreement, in accordance with national law or practice.
Chapter III
Regular employment relationships disguised as traineeships
Article 4
Measures to combat regular employment relationships disguised as traineeships
Member States shall provide for effective controls and inspections conducted by competent authorities to detect and take enforcement measures against practices where a regular employment relationship is disguised as traineeship with the effect of granting lower levels of protection, including working conditions and pay, than the worker concerned would be entitled to under Union or national law, collective agreements or practice.
Article 5
Assessment of regular employment relationships disguised as traineeships
1. In order to determine whether a purported traineeship constitutes a regular employment relationship, competent authorities shall make an overall assessment of all relevant factual elements. That assessment shall take into account, among others, the following indicative elements:
(a) the absence of a significant learning or training component in the purported traineeship;
(b) the excessive duration of the purported traineeship or multiple and/or consecutive purported traineeships with the same employer by the same person;
(c) equivalent levels of tasks, responsibilities and intensity of work for purported trainees and regular employees at comparable positions with the same employer;
(d) the requirement for previous work experience for candidates for traineeships in the same or a similar field of activity without appropriate justification;
(e) a high ratio of purported traineeships compared with regular employment relationships with the same employer;
(f) a significant number of purported trainees with the same employer who had completed two or more traineeships or held regular employment relationships in the same or similar field of activity, prior to taking up the purported traineeship.
2. To enable competent authorities to carry out the assessment referred to in paragraph 1, the employer shall, upon request, provide those authorities with the following information:
(a) the number of traineeships and regular employment relationships
(b) the duration of traineeships;
(c) the working conditions, including pay, tasks and responsibilities of purported trainees and of regular employees at comparable positions;
(d) the descriptions of the learning and training components of traineeships;
(e) the vacancy notices for traineeships.
3. To facilitate the assessment referred to in paragraph 1, Member States shall:
(a) define a time limit indicating excessive duration of a traineeship and of repeated, including consecutive, traineeships with the same employer;
(b) require employers to include information on the expected tasks, working conditions, including pay, social protection, learning and training elements in the vacancy notices and advertisements for traineeships.
Member States may provide for exceptions to the time-limit in point (a) in cases where a longer duration is justified by objective grounds.
Chapter IV
Enforcement and supporting measures
Article 6
Implementation and enforcement of relevant Union law
Member States shall take effective measures to ensure that all relevant Union law applicable to workers is fully implemented and enforced in relation to trainees. In particular they shall:
(a) ensure that information on the rights of trainees is publicly available in a clear, comprehensive and easily accessible way;
(b) develop guidance for employers of trainees regarding the legal framework for traineeships, including relevant labour law and social protection aspects;
(c) provide for effective controls and inspections conducted by competent authorities to enforce relevant labour law in relation to trainees;
(d) ensure that the competent authorities are provided with the human, technical and financial resources necessary to perform effective controls and inspections and have the competence to impose effective, proportionate and dissuasive penalties;
(e) develop the capability of the competent authorities, in particular through training and guidance, to proactively target and pursue non-compliant employers;
(f) ensure, in cooperation with the competent authorities, channels for trainees to report malpractice and poor working conditions, and provide information on those channels
Article 7
Right to redress
Member States shall ensure that trainees, including those whose employment relationship has ended, have access to effective and impartial dispute resolution and a right to redress, including adequate compensation, in the case of infringements of their rights arising from this Directive or from other Union law applicable to workers.
Article 8
Procedures on behalf or in support of trainees
Member States shall ensure that representatives of workers may engage in any relevant judicial or administrative procedure to enforce the rights and obligations arising from this Directive or from other Union law applicable to workers. They may act on behalf or in support of one or several trainees in the case of an infringement of any right or obligation arising from this Directive or from other Union law applicable to workers, with that trainee’s or those trainees’ approval.
Article 9
Protection against adverse treatment and consequences
1. Member States shall introduce the necessary measures to protect trainees and their representatives from any adverse treatment by the employer and from any adverse consequences resulting from a complaint lodged with the employer or resulting from any proceedings initiated with the aim of enforcing compliance with the rights provided for in this Directive or in other Union law applicable to workers.
2. In particular, Member States shall take the necessary measures to prohibit the dismissal or its equivalent, and all preparations for dismissal or its equivalent, of trainees on the grounds that they have exercised the rights provided for in this Directive or in other Union law applicable to workers.
3. Trainees who consider that they have been dismissed, or have been subject to measures with equivalent effect, on the grounds that they have exercised the rights provided for in this Directive, or in other Union law applicable to workers, may request the employer to provide duly substantiated grounds for the dismissal or the equivalent measures. The employer shall provide those grounds in writing.
4. Member States shall take the necessary measures to ensure that, when trainees referred to in paragraph 3 establish, before a court or other competent authority or body, facts from which it may be presumed that there has been such a dismissal or equivalent measures, it shall be for the employer to prove that the dismissal or equivalent measures were based on grounds other than those referred to in paragraph 2.
5. Member States shall not be required to apply paragraph 4 to proceedings in which it is for the court or other competent authority or body to investigate the facts of the case.
6. Paragraph 4 shall not apply to criminal proceedings, unless otherwise provided by the Member State.
Article 10
Penalties
Member States shall lay down the rules on penalties applicable to infringements of national provisions adopted pursuant to this Directive or the relevant provisions already in force concerning the rights which are within the scope of this Directive. The penalties provided for shall be effective, proportionate and dissuasive.
Chapter V
Final provisions
Article 11
Non-regression and more favourable provisions
1. No provision in this Directive shall be construed as lowering the protection of workers afforded by other instruments of Union law, national law, collective agreements or practice.
2. This Directive shall not constitute valid grounds for reducing the general level of protection already afforded to workers, including trainees, within Member States.
3. This Directive shall not affect Member States’ prerogative to apply or to introduce laws, regulations or administrative provisions which are more favourable to workers or to encourage or permit the application of collective agreements which are more favourable to workers.
Article 12
Transposition and implementation
1. Member States shall take the necessary measures to comply with this Directive by [2 years after entry into force]. They shall immediately inform the Commission thereof.
2. When Member States adopt the measures referred to in paragraph 1, they shall contain a reference to this Directive or shall be accompanied by such reference on the occasion of their official publication. The methods of making such reference shall be laid down by Member States.
3. Member States shall communicate to the Commission the text of the measures of national law which they adopt in the field covered by this Directive.
4. Member States shall, in accordance with their national law and practice, take adequate measures to ensure the effective involvement of the social partners and to promote and enhance social dialogue with a view to implementing this Directive.
5. Member States may entrust the social partners with the implementation of this Directive, where the social partners jointly request to do so and provided that Member States take all necessary steps to ensure that they can at all times guarantee the results sought under this Directive.
Article 13
Reporting and review
1. By [5 years after the date of transposition], Member States shall communicate to the Commission all information concerning the implementation of this Directive that is necessary for the Commission to draw up a report. That information shall include data on traineeships for the purposes of allowing the proper monitoring and assessment of the implementation of this Directive.
2. The Commission shall submit the report referred to in paragraph 1 to the European Parliament and to the Council. The report shall, if appropriate, be accompanied by a legislative proposal.
Article 14
Entry into force
The Directive shall enter into force on the twentieth day following its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union.
Article 15
Addressees
This Directive is addressed to the Member States.
Done at Brussels,
For the European Parliament For the Council
The President The President