Pöördumine

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XIV JUDICIAL YEAR OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOSOVO

Conference proceedings of the Solemn Ceremony and International Conference

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Tekstet e publikuara në këtë botim janë punime autoriale të autorëve përkatës, të prezantuara publikisht në Ceremoninë Solemne të Vitit të 14-të Gjyqësor të Gjykatës Kushtetuese, të mbajtur më 23 tetor 2023 në Prishtinë dhe me rastin e Konferencës Ndërkombëtare “Kontributi i Gjykatave Kushtetuese në mbrojtjen dhe forcimin e vlerave themelore të demokracisë, sundimit të ligjit dhe të drejtave dhe lirive themelore të njeriut”, të organizuar më 24 tetor 2023 në Prishtinë.

Punimet janë publikuar me lejen e autorëve përkatës dhe qëndrimet e paraqitura në to nuk reflektojnë qëndrimet e Gjykatës Kushtetuese të Republikës së Kosovës

Tekstovi objavljeni u ovoj publikaciji su autorska dela relevantnih autora, javno predstavljena na Svečanoj ceremoniji 14. sudske godine Ustavnog suda, održanoj 23. oktobra 2023. godine u Prištini i povodom Međunarodne konferencije „Doprinos ustavnih sudova u zaštiti i jačanju osnovnih vrednosti demokratije, vladavine prava i osnovnih ljudskih prava i sloboda“, organizovane 24. oktobra 2023. godine u Prištini.

Radovi su objavljeni uz dozvolu relevantnih autora i stavovi predstavljeni u njima ne odražavaju stavove Ustavnog suda Republike Kosovo.

The texts published in this publication are authorial works of the respective authors, publicly presented at the Solemn Ceremony of the 14th Judicial Year of the Constitutional Court, held on 23 October 2023 in Prishtina and on the occasion of the International Conference “Contribution of Constitutional Courts in the protection and strengthening of the fundamental values of democracy, the rule of law and fundamental human rights and freedoms”, organized on 24 October 2023 in Prishtina. The works are published with the permission of the respective authors and the positions presented in them do not reflect the positions of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Kosovo

Les textes publiés dans cette publication sont les œuvres des auteurs respectifs, présentées publiquement lors de la cérémonie solennelle de la 14e année judiciaire de la Cour Constitutionnelle, qui s’est tenue le 23 octobre 2023 à Prishtina et à l’occasion de la Conférence internationale “Contribution des Tribunaux Constitutionnels dans la protection et le renforcement des valeurs fondamentales de la démocratie, de l’État de droit et des droits et libertés fondamentaux de l’homme”, organisé le 24 octobre 2023 à Prishtina.

Les ouvrages sont publiés avec l’autorisation des auteurs respectifs et les positions qui y sont présentées ne reflètent pas les positions de la Cour Constitutionnelle de la République du Kosovo.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Fjala e Kryetares së Gjykatës Kushtetuese të Republikës së Kosovës, znj. Gresa Caka-Nimani 1

Obraćanje predsednice Ustavnog suda Republike Kosovo, gđe Grese Caka-Nimani 7

Address by the President of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Kosovo, Ms. Gresa Caka-Nimani 12

Allocution de Mme. Gresa Caka-Nimani, Présidente de la Cour Constitutionnelle de la République du Kosovo 18

Fjala e z. John R. Tunheim, Gjyqtar Federal i Shteteve të Bashkuara 24

Obraćanje g. Johna R. Tunheima, saveznog sudije Sjedinjenih Država 29

Address by Mr. John R. Tunheim, United States Federal Judge 33

Allocution de M. John R. Tunheim, Juge fédéral des États-Unis 37

Fjala kryesore e z. Laurent Fabius, Kryetar i Këshillit Kushtetues të Republikës së Francës 42

Uvodno obraćanje g. Laurenta Fabiusa, predsednik Ustavnog saveta Republike Francuske 48

Keynote address by Mr. Laurent Fabius, President of the Constitutional Council of the Republic of France 53

Discours d’ouverture de M. Laurent Fabius, Président du Conseil Constitutionnel de la République française 58

Fjala përshëndetëse dhe hyrëse nga znj. Gresa Caka-Nimani, Kryetare e Gjykatës Kushtetuese të Republikës së Kosovës 81

Dobrodošlica i uvodna reč gđe Grese Caka-Nimani, predsednica Ustavnog suda Republike Kosovo 84

Welcome and Opening Remarks by Ms. Gresa Caka-Nimani, President of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Kosovo 86

Allocution de bienvenue de Mme Gresa Caka-Nimani, Présidente de la Cour Constitutionnelle de la République du Kosovo 89

Contribution by Mr. Zühtü Arslan, President of the Constitutional Court of Türkiye 92

Fjala e znj. Holta Zaçaj, Kryetare e Gjykatës Kushtetuese të Republikës së Shqipërisë 96

Contribution by Mr Aldis Laviņš, President of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Latvia 101

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Contribution by Mr. Georg Lienbacher, Judge of the Constitutional Court of Austria 104

Contrbituion by Mr. José Figueiredo Dias, Judge at the Constitutional Tribunal of Portugal 111

Contribution by Ms. Marie Baker, Judge of the Supreme Court of Ireland 115

Contribution by Mr. Tom Ginsburg, Professor of Comparative Constitutional Law at Chicago University Law School 119

Contribution de M. Pierre Nihoul, Président de la Cour Constitutionnelle de Belgique 135

Contribution by Ms. Anna Austin, Jurisconsult of the European Court of Human Rights 140

Contribution by Ms. Grainne McMorrow, Representative of the Venice Commission 147

Doprinos od G. Mirsad Ćeman, potpredsednik Ustavnog suda Bosne i Hercegovine 151

Contribution by Mr. Atanas Semov, Judge of the Constitutional Court of Bulgaria 163

Contribtuion by Mr. Louis Aucoin, Foreign Advisor on Rule of Law, Constitutional Development and Transitional Justice (United States Government Advisor throughout the drafting of the Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo) 165

Contribution by Ms. Dineke de Groot, President of the Supreme Court of the Netherlands 171

Contribution by Mr. Villu Kõve, President of the Supreme Court of Estonia 177

Contribution by Mr. Tomas Davulis, Judge of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Lithuania 183

Contribution by Claudio Monteiro, Supreme Administrative Court of Portugal 193

Contribution by Mr. Mato Arlović, Judge of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Croatia 198

Fjala e z. Osman Kadriu, Gjyqtar i Gjykatës Kushtetuese të Republikës së Maqedonisë së Veriut 233

Contribution by Ms. Christie S. Warren, Professor of the Practice of International and Comparative Law (United States Government Advisor throughout the drafting of the Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo) 242

Contribution by Mr. Diego Solana, International Advisor of the World Jurist Association 247

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VITI I KATËRMBËDHJETË GJYQËSOR I GJYKATËS KUSHTETUESE TË REPUBLIKËS SË KOSOVËS

CEREMONIA SOLEMNE Prishtinë, 23 tetor 2023

14. SUDSKA GODINA USTAVNOG SUDA REPUBLIKE KOSOVO

SVEČANO OTVARANJE Priština, 23. Oktobra 2023. godine

FOURTEENTH JUDICIAL YEAR OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CORUT OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOSOVO

SOLEMN CEREMONY Prishtina, 23 October 2023

14EME ANNEE JUDICIAIRE DE LA COUR CONSTITUTIONNELLE DE LA REPUBLIQUE DU KOSOVO

CÉRÉMONIE D’OUVERTURE SOLENNELLE Prishtina, 23 octobre 2023

CEREMONIA SOLEMNE E HAPJES Salla “Beethoven”, Hoteli “Emerald” 23 tetor 2023

AGJENDA 17:15 - 17:20 Fjala hyrëse e Ceremonisë Solemne të Vitit të 14-të Gjyqësor të Gjykatës

Kushtetuese të Republikës së Kosovës

17:20 - 17:40 Fjala e znj. Gresa Caka-Nimani, Kryetare e Gjykatës Kushtetuese të Republikës së Kosovës

17:40 - 17:45 Fjalë rasti e SH.S. znj. Vjosa Osmani-Sadriu, Presidente e Republikës së Kosovës (video-adresim)

17:45 - 18:00 Fjala e z. John R. Tunheim, Gjyqtar Federal i Shteteve të Bashkuara dhe Këshilltari Kryesor i Shteteve të Bashkuara në mbështetje të procesit të krijimit të Kushtetutës së Republikës së Kosovës

18:00 - 18:25 Fjala kryesore e z. Laurent Fabius, Kryetar i Këshillit Kushtetues të Republikës së Francës

18:25 - 18:35 Shfaqja e video-dokumentarit për 14-vjetorin e Gjykatës Kushtetuese

18:35 - 18:45 Fjala përmbyllëse

SVEČANO OTVARANJE Sala “Beethoven”, hotel “Emerald” 23. oktobra 2023. godine

DNEVNI RED 17:15 - 17:20 Uvodni govor Svečane ceremonije 14. sudske godine Ustavnog suda Republike

Kosovo

17:20 - 17:40 Obraćanje gđe Grese Caka-Nimani, predsednice Ustavnog suda Republike Kosovo

17:40 - 17:45 Pogodan govor NJ.E. gđe. Vjose Osmani-Sadriu, predsednica Republike Kosovo (video obraćanje)

17:45 - 18:00 Obraćanje g. Johna R. Tunheima, saveznog sudije Sjedinjenih Država i glavnog savetnika Sjedinjenih Država, koji je podržavao proces donošenja Ustava Republike Kosovo

18:00 - 18:25 Uvodno obraćanje g. Laurenta Fabiusa, predsednik Ustavnog saveta Republike Francuske

18:25 - 18:35 Projekcija video-dokumentarnog filma povodom 14. godišnjice Ustavnog suda

18:35 - 18:45 Završna reč

SOLEMN OPENING CEREMONY “Beethoven” Hall, Hotel “Emerald” 23 October 2023

AGENDA 17:15 - 17:20 Opening remarks of the Solemn Ceremony of the 14th Judicial Year of the

Constitutional Court of Republic of Kosovo

17:20 - 17:40 Address by Ms. Gresa Caka-Nimani, President of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Kosovo

17:40 - 17:45 Video-address by H.E. Ms. Vjosa Osmani-Sadriu, President of the Republic of Kosovo

17:45 - 18:00 Address by Mr. John R. Tunheim, United States Federal Judge and the Lead United States Advisor supporting the constitution-making process of the Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo

18:00 - 18:25 Keynote address by Mr. Laurent Fabius, President of the Constitutional Council of the Republic of France

18:25 - 18:35 Screening of video-documentary on the 14th Anniversary of the Constitutional Court

18:35 - 18:45 Closing remarks

CÉRÉMONIE D'OUVERTURE SOLENNELLE Salle “Beethoven”, Hôtel “Emerald” Prishtina, 23 octobre 2023

ORDRE DU JOUR 17:15 - 17:20 Discours d'ouverture de la Cérémonie Solennelle de la 14e Année Judiciaire de

la Cour Constitutionnelle de la République du Kosovo

17:20 - 17:40 Allocution de Mme. Gresa Caka-Nimani, Présidente de la Cour Constitutionnelle de la République du Kosovo

17:40 - 17:45 Allocution de Mme. Vjosa Osmani, Présidente de la République du Kosovo (adresse vidéo)

17:45 - 18:00 Allocution de M. John R. Tunheim, Juge fédéral des États-Unis et conseiller principal des États-Unis ayant soutenu le processus d'élaboration de la Constitution de la République du Kosovo

18:00 - 18:25 Discours d'ouverture de M. Laurent Fabius, Président du Conseil Constitutionnel de la République française

18:25 - 18:35 Projection du documentaire sur le 14ème anniversaire de la Cour Constitutionnelle

18:35 - 18:45 Remarques finales

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Të nderuar pjesëmarrës të ceremonisë së shënimit të përvjetorit të katërmbëdhjetë të themelimit

të Gjykatës Kushtetuese të Republikës së Kosovës;

Të nderuar deputetë, ministra, udhëheqës të pushtetit gjyqësor e të institucioneve të pavarura;

Të nderuar Presidentë Sejdiu e Jahjaga;

Të nderuar Ambasadorë e përfaqësues të institucioneve ndërkombëtare;

E nderuar ish-Kryetare e Gjykatës, Zonja Rama-Hajrizi e ish-gjyqtarë të Gjykatës Kushtetuese;

Të nderuar kryetarë komunash, përfaqësues të institucioneve, të shoqërisë civile dhe medies;

I nderuar z. Fabius, Kryetar i Këshillit Kushtetues të Francës;

Të nderuar Kryetarë të Gjykatave Kushtetuese e Supreme të Belgjikës - z. Nihoul dhe z. Lavrysen; të

Estonisë - z. Kõve; të Holandës - zonja De Groot; të Letonisë - z. Laviņš; të Shqipërisë - zonja Zaçaj e

z. Sadushi; dhe të Turqisë - z. Zühtü Arslan;

Të nderuar gjyqtarë të Gjykatave Kushtetuese e Supreme të Bosnje e Hercegovinës, Austrisë, Bull-

garisë, Irlandës, Kroacisë, Lituanisë, Maqedonisë së Veriut, Portugalisë, Shqipërisë dhe Shteteve të

Bashkuara të Amerikës – gjyqtar Tunheim;

Të nderuar përfaqësues të Gjykatës Evropiane për të Drejtat e Njeriut dhe të Komisionit të Venecias;

Të nderuar pjesëmarrës/Zonja dhe Zotërinj,

Fjala e Kryetares së Gjykatës Kushtetuese të Republikës së Kosovës,

znj. Gresa Caka-Nimani

Obraćanje predsednice Ustavnog suda Republike Kosovo,

gde Grese Caka-Nimani

Address by the President of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Kosovo,

Ms. Gresa Caka-Nimani

Allocution de Mme. Gresa Caka-Nimani, Présidente de la Cour Constitutionnelle de la

République du Kosovo

Fjala e Kryetares së Gjykatës Kushtetuese të Republikës së Kosovës, znj. Gresa Caka-Nimani

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Ju lutem më lejoni që fillimisht të shprehë kënaqësinë e mirënjohjen e thellë për praninë tuaj. Prania

juaj në shënimin e këtij përvjetori të Gjykatës Kushtetuese, na nderon. Pjesëmarrja e delegacioneve

nga mbarë Bota reflekton respektin për Gjykatën tonë dhe solidaritetin e përkushtimin e palëkundur

të Gjykatave për të bashkëpunuar në mbrojtje të vlerave të përbashkëta.

Sot, simbolikisht, shënojmë 14-të vjetorin e Gjykatës Kushtetuese, të themeluar përmes një Kushte-

tute, e cila ka kurorëzuar sakrificën e gjeneratave të tëra për liri e pavarësi, por edhe idealin e palëkun-

dur të një populli për një shtet të së drejtës të bazuar në vlerat që reflekton tradita e përbashkët e

shteteve demokratike.

Kjo Gjykatë, simbol i një rendi të pavarur kushtetues, është mveshur me detyrën e interpretim-

it dhe të mbrojtjes së kësaj Kushtetute. Themelimi i njëkohshëm i Republikës dhe Gjykatës së saj

Kushtetuese, ka përcaktuar rolin e kësaj të fundit, që shkon përtej ushtrimit klasik të juridiksionit

kushtetues, duke ngërthyer pashmangshëm edhe atë të formësimit dhe konsolidimit të identitetit

shtetëror e ndërkombëtarë të Kosovës.

Katërmbëdhjetë vite më parë, gjenerata e parë e gjyqtarëve të Gjykatës Kushtetuese, mori përgjeg-

jësinë për të interpretuar një Kushtetutë të posamiratuar të një Republike të posathemeluar.

Konteksti dinamik i shtetndërtimit, i ka mundësuar kësaj Gjykate që të ketë një rol thelbësor në për-

caktimin e dinamikave të zhvillimit demokratik të Kosovës. Gjykata ka mbajtur baraspeshën në mes

(i) të hovit të ndërtimit të shpejtë institucional të një shteti të ri; dhe (ii) detyrimit të konsolidimit të

një rendi shoqëror e institucional bazuar në vlerat që ngërthente një Kushtetutë e re.

Si rezultat, sot, në gjysmën e parë të dekadës së saj të dytë, Gjykata tashmë ka një histori të jashtëza- konshme dhe një praktikë gjyqësore thelbësisht të pasur.

Janë dy karakteristika që burojnë nga kjo praktikë gjyqësore e që shënojnë rolin e palëkundur të

Gjykatës Kushtetuese në realizimin e aspiratës që ngërthen Kushtetuta - për një shtet që qëndron

krenarë në mesin e shteteve të familjes evropiane.

E para, ndërlidhet me kontributin e Gjykatës në mbrojtjen dhe avancimin e të drejtave dhe lirive

themelore përgjatë konsolidimit të një shteti të përkushtuar për barazinë e të gjithëve para ligjit.

Gjykata ka shërbyer si urë lidhëse në mes vlerave që reflekton praktika gjyqësore e Gjykatës Evro-

piane për të Drejtat e Njeriut dhe të drejtave dhe lirive të të gjithë qytetarëve dhe komuniteteve të

Republikës, pa asnjë dallim.

Ndërsa, e dyta ndërlidhet me kontributin e çmuar të Gjykatës Kushtetuese në konsolidimin e parimit

të ndarjes dhe balancimit të pushteteve në rendin kushtetues të Republikës së Kosovës. Kjo sepse,

demokracia është e plotë vetëm atëherë kur ushtrimi i sovranitetit është i mbështetur nga sundimi

i ligjit dhe ky i fundit, nuk mund të ekzistojë pa ndarjen dhe ndërveprimin e nevojshëm në mes tri

pushteteve pavarura.

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Të nderuar pjesëmarrës,

Marrë parasysh kontekstin e shtetndërtimit të Kosovës, përfshirë sfidën, por edhe përparësinë

e ndërtimit të një rendi të ri kushtetues, çështjet që ndërlidhen me ndarjen dhe ndërveprimin e

pushteteve, i janë nënshtruar vlerësimit të Gjykatës në mënyrë të vazhdueshme ndër vite.

Ajo ka dhënë fjalën e saj përfundimtare në një mori çështjesh që ngërthejnë ndërveprimin në mes

pushteteve, përfshirë por pa u kufizuar në (i) procedurat e zgjedhjes e funksionin e Presidentit të

Republikës; (ii) konstituimin e institucioneve pas zgjedhjeve parlamentare, përfshirë zgjedhjen e

Qeverisë pas mocionit të mosbesimit; (iii) rolin mbikëqyrës të Kuvendit në raport me Qeverinë dhe

institucionet e pavarura; dhe (iv) kufijtë e ndërveprimit në mes pushtetit lokal e qendror.

Kjo vendimmarrje e Gjykatës, me raste, ka rezultuar në ndryshime rrënjësore në dinamikën politike,

por edhe bartjen dhe/ose përbërjen e pushtetit ekzekutiv dhe legjislativ. Të gjitha forcat politike

kanë respektuar këto vendime, duke reflektuar kështu përkushtimin e palëkundur të Republikës për

shtetin e së drejtës.

Thënë këtë, praktika gjyqësore dërrmuese e Gjykatës në kontekst të ndarjes dhe balancimit të pushteteve,

ndërlidhet me kufijtë e ushtrimit të kompetencave të pushtetit ekzekutiv dhe/ose legjislativ në raport me

atë gjyqësor dhe/ose institucione të pavarura kushtetuese.

Marrë parasysh historikun relativisht të ri të pavarësisë së pushtetit gjyqësor dhe institucioneve të

pavarura, janë këto të fundit, që i ekspozohen rrezikut më të madh të mundësisë së cenimit të pa-

varësisë së tyre përmes ushtrimit të kompetencave të dy pushteteve tjera dhe kjo tendencë, sigurisht

që nuk është karakteristikë vetëm e Republikës tonë.

Sipas, ndër të tjera, Opinioneve të Këshillit Konsultativ të Gjyqtarëve Evropian të Këshillit të Evropës,

gjatë dekadave të fundit, marrëdhënia ndërmjet tri pushteteve është transformuar (i) duke rezultuar në

zvogëlimin e funksionit mbikëqyrës të pushtetit legjislativ ndaj atij ekzekutiv; ndërsa (ii) rritja e kom-

petencës ekzekutive ka rezultuar në numër të shtuar të kontesteve në gjykata dhe kjo nga ana tjetër, ka

rezultuar në pasojën e kontestimit të legjitimitetit të pushtetit gjyqësor në diskursin publik.

Një fenomen të tillë, në demokracitë me traditë më pak të konsoliduar, në mbrojtje të vlerave

themelore të demokracisë, e kanë kundër-balancuar gjykatat me karakter supranacional, përkatë-

sisht Gjykata Evropiane për të Drejtat e Njeriut dhe Gjykata e Drejtësisë e Bashkimit Evropian.

Ndërsa, në Republikën e Kosovës, e ka kundër-balancuar Gjykata Kushtetuese.

Qëndrueshmërinë konsistente në mbrojtje të ndarjes, pavarësisë, por dhe ndërveprimit të pushteteve,

me theks në pavarësinë e pushtetit gjyqësor, Gjykata e ka mbajtur duke u bazuar në parimet që buro-

jnë nga Kushtetuta, por edhe nga praktika gjyqësore e dy gjykatave të lartcekura. Praktika gjyqësore

e Gjykatës Evropiane për të Drejtat e Njeriut është detyrim kushtetues, ndërsa praktika gjyqësore e

Gjykatës së Drejtësisë përkon me aspiratën kushtetuese për anëtarësimin në Bashkimin Evropian.

Të nderuar pjesëmarrës,

Ndërveprimi në mes të pushteteve, medoemos që reflekton edhe tension në mes tyre. Ky tension, të

cilit Këshilli Konsultativ i Gjyqtarëve Evropian të Këshillit të Evropës i referohet si “tension kreativ”,

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reflekton faktin që demokracia në Republikën e Kosovës funksionon. E kundërta, përkatësisht,

mungesa e një tensioni të tillë, do të nënkuptonte që pushtetet nuk po e luajnë funksionin ndërve-

prues dhe/ose mbikëqyrës në mënyrë efektive, duke e dëmtuar kështu ruajtjen e ekuilibrit të duhur

kushtetues.

Thënë këtë, ky tension, jo rrallëherë është manifestuar edhe me sulme publike kundër Gjykatës

Kushtetuese, por edhe institucioneve tjera të pavarura. Një diskurs i tillë publik, gjithashtu, nuk

është unik vetëm për Republikën tonë. Esenca e tij, dhe edhe pse jo i artikuluar në mënyrë të tillë,

ngërthen diskutimin e nivelit teorik ndërlidhur me argumentin e kundër-balancimit të shumicës, i

cili, në esencë, ngrit dilemën e mungesës së legjitimitetit të pushtetit gjyqësor dhe/ose Gjykatave

Kushtetuese - pushteti i të cilave nuk buron në mënyrë të drejtpërdrejtë nga populli, për të vlerësuar

ligjet e aktet miratuara nga përfaqësuesit e zgjedhur të popullit.

Megjithatë, në demokracitë me traditë më të konsoliduar kushtetuese është tejkaluar kjo dilemë dhe

ka mbizotëruar qëndrimi/kundër-argumenti sipas të cilit legjitimiteti i kontrollit gjyqësor në raport

me dy pushtetet tjera, buron nga Kushtetuta… nga besnikëria ndaj saj.

Sigurisht që legjitimiteti kushtetues i kontrollit gjyqësor është i ndërvarur nga legjitimiteti funksion-

al i gjyqtarëve dhe prokurorëve, dhe të cilët, i nënshtrohen detyrimit kushtetues të vetëpërmbajtjes,

profesionalizmit dhe llogaridhënies, duke kryer funksionin e tyre në mbrojtje të Kushtetutës dhe/

ose ligjit. Në të kundërtën, janë vetë bartësit e pushtetit gjyqësor dhe sistemit prokurorial, të cilët

do të cenonin autoritetin e një pushteti të tërë në dëm të ekuilibrit kushtetues. Këto parime, Gjykata

i ka theksuar në mënyrë të vazhdueshme, përfshirë faktin që ndarja dhe ndërveprimi i pushteteve

nuk nënkupton funksionimin e tyre në izolim, por bazuar në parimin e lojalitetit kushtetues, në

mbështetje të njëri-tjetrit, për të siguruar funksionimin e mirëfilltë të rendit kushtetues në një sho-

qëri demokratike.

Zonja dhe Zotërinj,

Sigurisht që debati publik e teorik, përfshirë kritikën që është vlerë thelbësore e rendit tonë kushtetues,

lidhur me burimin e legjitimitetit demokratik të kontrollit gjyqësor e kushtetues, është me vlerë.

Thënë këtë, duhet gjithashtu të kujtojmë që teoria e ndarjes dhe ndërveprimit të pushteteve të pavar-

ura, është e vetmja që i ka rezistuar kohës dhe përbën themelet e demokracive kushtetuese liberale.

Këto të fundit, për gati tre shekuj, i kanë qëndruar besnike, esencës së teorisë së zhvilluar përmes

mendjeve më të rralla të mendimit filozofik e politik, përfshirë (i) mendimtarin francez Montesquieu

përmes Frymës së Ligjeve; dhe (ii) Alexander Hamilton e James Madison përmes Letrave Feder-

aliste, sipas të cilëve, në esencë, liritë civile dhe politike janë efektive vetëm përmes një sistemi të

pushteteve të ndara e të kontrolluara për të pamundësuar koncentrimin e pushtetit dhe/ose arbitrar-

itetin e secilës prej tyre.

Frymëzuar edhe nga Montesquieu, në një nga Letrat Federaliste (që në vitin 1788), në mënyrë të

thjeshtësuar por madhështore, reflektohet pyetja thelbësore që ka sfiduar dhe formësuar modelet

kushtetuese në kontekst të funksionit të pushteteve shekuj më pas dhe po citoj si në vijim:

5

“Nëse njerëzit do të ishin engjuj, asnjë qeverisje nuk do të ishte e nevojshme. Nëse engjujt do të

qeverisnin njerëzit, asnjë kontroll i jashtëm ose i brendshëm në qeverisje nuk do të ishte i nevo-

jshëm. Në formimin e një qeverisje të administruar nga njerëzit për njerëzit, vështirësia e madhe

është në këtë: së pari duhet të mundësohet që qeverisja të kontrolloj të qeverisurit, dhe më pas, të

obligohet të kontrolloj vetveten”.

Mbi frymën e këtyre koncepteve qëndrojnë ndër rendet më të vjetra demokratike në Botë. Mbi frymën

e këtyre parimeve qëndron emëruesi i përbashkët i traditës kushtetuese të shteteve demokratike. Mbi

parimet e kësaj trashëgime, qëndron edhe Kushtetuta e Republikës së Kosovës.

Është detyrë e Gjykatës Kushtetuese t’u qëndrojë besnike këtyre vlerave. E njëjta detyrë u takon edhe

të gjitha autoriteteve publike. Kushtetuta është edhe përkushtimi kolektiv i të gjitha autoriteteve pub-

like, në emër të qytetarëve, për një shtet të së drejtës në përputhje me vlerat që ngërthen Kushtetuta

e parë e këtij shteti që fillon me shprehjen “Ne, Populli i Kosovës”. Gjykata, gjithnjë nën kufizimet që

i përcakton Kushtetuta por pa marrë parasysh dinamikat e zhvillimet ditore, do t’i qëndrojë besnike

këtyre parimeve.

Zonja dhe Zotërinj,

Katërmbëdhjetë vite pas themelimit, Gjykata Kushtetuese, sot qëndron dinjitoze mes Gjykatave

Kushtetuese anëtare të Konferencës Botërore të Drejtësisë Kushtetuese. Ajo është ndër anëtaret më

aktive të Forumit të Komisionit të Venecias. Praktika e saj gjyqësore është garanci e argument shtesë

që Kosova e ka vendin në mes shteteve anëtare të Këshillit të Evropës.

Të arriturat e saj dhe përkundër sfidave, janë reflektim i përkushtimit të palëkundur të të gjitha gjen-

eratave të gjyqtarëve të Gjykatës Kushtetuese. Sigurisht, edhe i mbështetjes së pakursyer të gjykat-

ave kushtetuese simotra nga mbarë bota, bashkëpunimi i thellë me të cilat reflektohet edhe nga

pjesëmarrja e madhe e tyre në këtë ceremoni e të cilave, në emër të Gjykatës, ju shpreh edhe një herë

mirënjohjen e thellë. Pjesëmarrja juaj e nderon Gjykatën tonë. Pjesëmarrja juaj e nderon Republikën

e Kosovës.

Falënderime për një bashkëpunim e mbështetje të pakursyer duhet t’i drejtohen edhe Komision-

it të Venecias dhe Këshillit të Evropës, me mbështetjen e të cilit, Gjykata ka vënë bashkëpunim

të jashtëzakonshëm me Gjykatën Evropiane për të Drejtat e Njeriut. Jam thellësisht e bindur që,

atëherë kur Republika jonë ta marr vendin e merituar si anëtare e Këshillit të Evropës, praktika

gjyqësore e Gjykatës Kushtetuese do t’i bëjë ballë filtrit të mbikëqyrjes të Gjykatës Evropiane për të

Drejtat e Njeriut.

Në fund, falënderime i shpreh Ambasadave të shteteve mike në Republikën e Kosovës dhe agjencive

të tyre për bashkëpunim ndërkombëtar, të cilat në mënyrë të pakursyer kanë mbështetur Gjykatën

tonë.

Mirënjohje e veçantë për dy shtete mike, ndër shumë sosh prezentë sot këtu, Shtetet e Bashkuara

të Amerikës dhe Republikën e Francës, dhe të cilat, në këtë ceremoni, përfaqësohen nga dy folës të

nderuar: (i) gjyqtari federal Tunheim, i cili ka lënë gjurmë në shtetndërtimin e Kosovës, përfshirë

6

përmes mbështetjes së Komisionit Kushtetues për hartimin e Kushtetutës tonë; dhe (ii) Kryetarit

Fabius, mbështetja e pakursyer e të cilit ka lartësuar Gjykatën tonë, përfshirë me pasurinë e traditës

së çmuar kushtetuese franceze.

Të dashur miq,

Republika e Kosovës është e ndërtuar nëpërmjet historive, në të cilat dhimbja gërshetohet me

krenarinë dhe qëndresën.

Por, mbi të gjitha, Republika e Kosovës është një histori suksesi. Jo vetëm sa i përket rrugëtimit his-

torik të shtetndërtimit, por edhe zhvillimit të demokracisë. Ky sukses është medoemos, edhe reflek-

tim i mbështetjes e partneritetit të palëkundur të shteteve mike të Republikës së Kosovës.

Thënë këtë, demokracia është proces i vazhdueshëm, i cili i nënshtrohet edhe testit të përkushti-

mit… të durimit - të besimit të palëkundur për një ide të përbashkët që reflekton vet preambula e

Kushtetutës – ndërtimit të një Republike që bazohet në vlerat e përbashkëta të shteteve paqedashëse

në Botë.

Për tu kthyer edhe një herë te Montesquieu – nuk ka një popull më të fuqishëm se ai që respekton ligjet,

jo nga arsyeja apo frika, por nga pasioni – nga përkushtimi e respekti për shtetin.

Duke ju falënderuar për vëmendjen tuaj - në emër të kolegëve të mi gjyqtarë të Gjykatës Kushtetuese:

zëvendëskryetarit Bajram Ljatifi e gjyqtarëve Selvete Gërxhaliu-Krasniqi, Safet Hoxha, Radomir Laban,

Remzije Istrefi-Peci, Nexhmi Rexhepi e Enver Peci - urojmë dhe festojmë së bashku këto katërmbëdhjetë

vite tradite të drejtësisë kushtetuese në Republikën e Kosovës.

Ju faleminderit!

Gresa Caka-Nimani

Kryetare e Gjykatës Kushtetuese të Republikës së Kosovës

7

Uvaženi učesnici ceremonije obeležavanja četrnaestogodišnjice osnivanja Ustavnog suda Republike

Kosovo;

Poštovani poslanici, ministri, rukovodioci pravosudne vlasti i nezavisnih institucija;

Poštovani predsedniče Sejdiu i predsednice Jahjaga;

Poštovani ambasadori i predstavnici međunarodnih institucija;

Poštovana bivša predsednice Suda, gđo Rama-Hajrizi i bivše sudije Ustavnog suda;

Poštovani predsednici opština i predstavnici institucija, civilnog društva i medija;

Poštovani g. Fabiuse, predsedniče Ustavnog saveta Francuske;

Poštovani predsednici ustavnih i vrhovnih sudova Belgije – g. Nihoule i g. Lavrysene; Estonije – g.

Kõve; Holandije – gđo De Groot; Letonije – g. Laviņš; Albanije – gđo Zaçaj i g. Sadushi; i Turske – g.

Zühtü Arslan;

Poštovane sudije ustavnih i vrhovnih sudova Bosne i Hercegovine, Austrije, Bugarske, Irske, Hrvatske,

Litvanije, Severne Makedonije, Portugala, Albanije i Sjedinjenih Američkih Država - sudijo Tunheime;

Poštovani predstavnici Evropskog suda za ljudska prava i Venecijanske komisije;

Poštovani učesnici/dame i gospodo,

Dozvolite mi da na početku izrazim svoje zadovoljstvo i duboku zahvalnost na vašem prisustvu. Svo-

jim prisustvom obeležavanju ove godišnjice Ustavnog suda ukazali ste nam čast. Učešće delegacija

iz celog sveta odražava poštovanje prema našem Sudu i solidarnost i nepokolebljivu posvećenost

sudova da sarađuju u odbrani zajedničkih vrednosti.

Danas, simbolično, obeležavamo 14. godišnjicu Ustavnog suda, ustanovljenog Ustavom, koji je kruni-

sao požrtvovanost čitavih generacija za slobodu i nezavisnost, ali i nepokolebljivi ideal jednog naroda za

pravnu državu zasnovanu na vrednostima koje odražava zajednička tradicija demokratskih država.

Ovom Sudu, simbolu nezavisnog ustavnog poretka, dodeljena je dužnost tumačenja i zaštite ovog

Ustava. Istovremeno osnivanje Republike i njenog Ustavnog suda odredilo je ulogu ovog poslednjeg,

koja prevazilazi klasično vršenje ustavne nadležnosti, zahvativši neminovno i ulogu oblikovanja i

konsolidovanja državnog i međunarodnog identiteta Kosova.

Pre četrnaest godina, prva generacija sudija Ustavnog suda, preuzela je odgovornost za tumačenje

novousvojenog Ustava novoosnovane Republike.

Obraćanje predsednice Ustavnog suda Republike Kosovo, gđe Grese Caka-Nimani

8

Dinamičan kontekst izgradnje države omogućio je ovom Sudu da ima suštinsku ulogu u određivanju

dinamika demokratskog razvoja Kosova. Sud je održavao ravnotežu između (i) zamaha brze insti-

tucionalne izgradnje jedne mlade države i (ii) obaveze konsolidovanja društvenog i institucionalnog

poretka zasnovanog na vrednostima sadržanim u jednom novom Ustavu.

Kao rezultat toga, danas, u prvoj polovini svoje druge decenije, Sud već ima izuzetnu istoriju i suš-

tinski bogatu sudsku praksu.

Dve su karakteristike koje proizilaze iz ove sudske prakse, a koje obeležavaju nepokolebljivu ulogu Ustav-

nog suda u ostvarivanju težnje koju oličava Ustav – za državom koja sa ponosom stoji među državama

evropske porodice.

Prva se odnosi na doprinos Suda zaštiti i unapređenju osnovnih prava i sloboda tokom konsolidacije

države koja je posvećena jednakosti svih pred zakonom. Sud je služio kao most između vrednosti

koje se ogledaju u sudskoj praksi Evropskog suda za ljudska prava i prava i sloboda svih građana i

zajednica Republike, bez ikakve razlike.

Druga se pak odnosi na dragoceni doprinos Ustavnog suda u konsolidovanju načela podele i rav-

noteže vlasti u ustavnom poretku Republike Kosovo. To stoga što je demokratija potpuna samo

onda kada je vršenje suvereniteta podržano vladavinom prava, a vladavina prava ne može posto-

jati bez neophodnog razdvajanja i interakcije među trima nezavisnim vlastima.

Poštovani učesnici,

Uzimajući u obzir kontekst izgradnje države Kosovo, uključujući i izazov, ali i prioritet izgradnje

jednog novog ustavnog poretka, pitanja koja se tiču podele i interakcije vlasti, bila su tokom godina

neprestano predmet ocene Suda.

Ustavni sud je dao svoju konačnu reč u nizu pitanja koja uključuju interakciju između vlasti, ukl-

jučujući ali ne ograničavajući se na (i) procedure izbora i funkciju predsednika Republike; (ii) kon-

stituisanje institucija nakon parlamentarnih izbora, uključujući i izbor Vlade nakon izglasavanja

nepoverenja; (iii) nadzornu ulogu Skupštine u odnosu na Vladu i nezavisne institucije; i (iv) granice

interakcije između lokalne i centralne vlasti.

Ovo odlučivanje Suda je u pojedinim slučajevima rezultiralo temeljitim promenama u političkoj di-

namici, ali i prenosu i/ili sastavu izvršne i zakonodavne vlasti. Sve političke snage su poštovale ove

odluke, pokazujući tako nepokolebljivu posvećenost Republike vladavini prava.

Pri tome, preovladavajuća sudska praksa Suda u kontekstu podele i ravnoteže vlasti odnosi se na

granice vršenja ovlašćenja izvršne i/ili zakonodavne vlasti u odnosu na sudsku vlast i/ili nezavisne

ustavne institucije.

S obzirom na relativno noviju istoriju nezavisnosti sudske vlasti i nezavisnih institucija, upravo su

ove poslednje te koje su izložene najvećem riziku od mogućnosti da njihova nezavisnost bude naruše-

na vršenjem ovlašćenja druge dve vlasti, a ova tendencija svakako nije karakteristična samo za našu

Republiku.

9

Prema, između ostalog, mišljenjima Konsultativnog veća evropskih sudija Saveta Evrope, tokom

poslednjih decenija došlo je do transformacije odnosa između triju vlasti (i) što je rezultiralo sman-

jenjem nadzorne funkcije zakonodavne vlasti nad izvršnom vlašću; dok je (ii) povećanje izvršne

nadležnosti rezultiralo povećanim brojem sporova pred sudovima, a to je s druge strane imalo za

posledicu osporavanje legitimiteta sudske vlasti u javnom diskursu.

Ovakvu pojavu su u demokratijama sa manje konsolidovanom tradicijom, u odbrani osnovnih vred-

nosti demokratije, uravnotežavali sudovi nadnacionalne prirode, odnosno Evropski sud za ljudska

prava i Sud pravde Evropske unije. U Republici Kosovo je ovu pojavu uravnotežavao Ustavni sud.

Doslednu stabilnost u odbrani podele, nezavisnosti, ali i interakcije vlasti, sa naglaskom na nezavis-

nosti sudske vlasti, Sud je održavao na osnovu načela koja proističu iz Ustava, ali i iz sudske prakse

dva gore navedena suda. Sudska praksa Evropskog suda za ljudska prava je ustavna obaveza; dok se

sudska praksa Suda pravde poklapa sa ustavnom težnjom za članstvom u Evropskoj uniji.

Poštovani učesnici,

Interakcija između vlasti bezuvetno odražava i tenziju među njima. Ova tenzija, koju Konsultativno

veće evropskih sudija Saveta Evrope naziva „kreativnom tenzijom“, odražava činjenicu da demokrati-

ja u Republici Kosovo funkcioniše. Nasuprot tome, odsustvo takve tenzije značilo bi da vlasti ne

igraju delotvorno interaktivnu i/ili nadzornu funkciju, čime bi naštetile održavanju odgovarajuće

ustavne ravnoteže.

Naime, ova tenzija se neretko manifestovala i javnim napadima na Ustavni sud, ali i druge nezavisne

institucije. Takav javni diskurs nije svojstven samo našoj Republici. Njegova suština, iako nije artikulisan

na takav način, podrazumeva diskusiju na teorijskom nivou po pitanju argumenta protivteže većini, koja,

u suštini, otvara dilemu nedostatka legitimiteta sudske vlasti i/ili ustavnih sudova – čija vlast ne potiče

direktno od naroda, da ocenjuju zakone ili akte koje su usvojili izabrani predstavnici naroda.

Međutim, u demokratijama sa konsolidovanijom ustavnom tradicijom ova dilema je prevaziđena i

preovladao je stav/protivargument prema kojem legitimitet sudske kontrole u odnosu na dve druge

vlasti potiče iz Ustava... iz privrženosti njemu.

Naravno, ustavni legitimitet sudske kontrole zavisi od funkcionalnog legitimiteta sudija i tužilaca,

koji podležu ustavnoj obavezi uzdržanosti, profesionalizma i odgovornosti prilikom vršenja svoje

funkcije u odbrani Ustava i/ili zakona. U suprotnom bi sami nosioci sudske vlasti i tužilačkog siste-

ma bili ti koji bi narušili autoritet čitave vlasti na štetu ustavne ravnoteže. Sud je dosledno isticao

ova načela, uključujući i činjenicu da podela i interakcija vlasti ne znači da je njihovo funkcionisanje

izolovano, već zasnovano na načelu ustavne lojalnosti, u međusobnoj podršci, kako bi se obezbedilo

pravilno funkcionisanje ustavnog poretka u demokratskom društvu.

Dame i gospodo,

Svakako je dragocena i javna i teorijska debata, uključujući i kritiku koja čini suštinsku vrednost

našeg ustavnog poretka, po pitanju izvora demokratskog legitimiteta sudske i ustavne kontrole.

10

Naime, moramo takođe zapamtiti da je teorija podele i interakcije nezavisnih vlasti jedina koja je

izdržala test vremena i predstavlja temelje liberalnih ustavnih demokratija.

Ove poslednje su, skoro tri veka, ostale verne suštini teorije koju su razvili retki umovi filozofske i

političke misli, uključujući (i) francuskog mislioca Montesquieua koji je to učinio svojim delom „O

duhu zakona“ i (ii) Alexandera Hamiltona i Jamesa Madisona putem „Federalističkih spisa“, prema

kojima su, građanske i političke slobode, u suštini, delotvorne samo kroz sistem odvojenih i kon-

trolisanih vlasti kako bi se onemogućila koncentracija vlasti i/ili arbitrarnost svake od njih.

Inspirisano i Montesquieueom, u jednom od Federalističkih spisa (još 1788. godine) je na pojednos-

tavljen, ali veličanstven način, prikazano fundamentalno pitanje koje je vekovima kasnije izazivalo i

oblikovalo ustavne modele u kontekstu funkcije vlasti, a ja citiram sledeće:

„Kad bi ljudi bili anđeli, tada ne bi ni trebalo da postoji nikakva vlast. Kada bi anđeli vladali ljudima,

ne bi bilo potrebe ni za kakvom, ni spoljašnjom, niti unutrašnjom kontrolom. A pri uspostavljanju

sistema vladavine koju će ljudi sprovoditi nad ljudima, velika poteškoća se sastoji u sledećem: prvo

morate omogućiti vladi da kontroliše one kojima vlada - a zatim je obavezati da kontroliše samu

sebe“.

Na duhu ovih koncepata počivaju najstariji demokratski poreci u svetu. Na duhu ovih načela počiva

zajednički imenitelj ustavne tradicije demokratskih država. Na načelima ovog nasleđa počiva i Ustav

Republike Kosovo.

Dužnost je Ustavnog suda da ostane privržen ovim vrednostima. Ista dužnost pripada i svim javnim

vlastima. Ustav je i kolektivno zalaganje svih javnih organa vlasti, u ime građana, za pravnu državu

u skladu sa vrednostima sadržanim u prvom Ustavu ove države koji počinje frazom – „Mi, građani

Kosova“. Sud će, uvek prema ograničenjima propisanim Ustavom, ali bez obzira na svakodnevne

dinamike i dešavanja, ostati privržen ovim načelima.

Dame i gospodo,

Četrnaest godina nakon osnivanja, Ustavni sud danas stoji dostojanstveno među ustavnim sudovima

koji su članovi Svetske konferencije ustavne pravde. On je među najaktivnijim članovima Foruma

Venecijanske komisije. Njegova sudska praksa je dodatna garancija i argument da Kosovo ima svoje

mesto među državama članicama Saveta Evrope.

Njegova dostignuća su, uprkos izazovima, odraz nepokolebljive posvećenosti svih generacija sudi-

ja Ustavnog suda. Naravno i nesebične podrške sestrinskih ustavnih sudova iz celog sveta, duboka

saradnja sa kojima se ogleda i u njihovom velikom učešću na ovoj svečanosti, na čemu im, u ime

Suda, još jednom izražavam duboku zahvalnost. Svojim učešćem ste ukazali čast našem Sudu. Svo-

jim učešćem ste ukazali čast Republici Kosovo.

Zahvalnost na saradnji i nesebičnoj podršci treba uputiti i Venecijanskoj komisiji i Savetu Evrope, uz

čiju podršku je Sud uspostavio izvanrednu saradnju sa Evropskim sudom za ljudska prava. Duboko

sam uverena da će sudska praksa Ustavnog suda, onda kada naša Republika bude zauzela zasluženo

mesto u Savetu Evrope, izdržati filter nadzora Evropskog suda za ljudska prava.

11

Na kraju, izražavam zahvalnost ambasadama prijateljskih zemalja u Republici Kosovo i njihovim

agencijama za međunarodnu saradnju, koje su nesebično podržavale naš Sud.

Posebno se zahvaljujemo dvema prijateljskim državama, među mnogima koje su prisutne danas

ovde, Sjedinjenim Američkim Državama i Republici Francuskoj, a koje na ovoj ceremoniji pred-

stavljaju dvojica uvaženih govornika: (i) savezni sudija Tunheim, koji je ostavio svoj trag u izgradnji

države Kosovo, uključujući i putem podrške Ustavnoj komisiji za izradu našeg Ustava; i (ii) pred-

sednik Fabius, čija je nesebična podrška izdigla naš Sud, obuhvatajući i blago dragocene francuske

ustavne tradicije.

Dragi prijatelji,

Republika Kosovo je građena kroz priče u kojima se bol prepliće sa ponosom i izdržljivošću.

Ali, povrh svega, Republika Kosovo je priča o uspehu. I to ne samo u pogledu istorijskog puta izgrad-

nje države, već i razvoja demokratije. Ovaj uspeh je svakako i odraz podrške i nepokolebljivog part-

nerstva prijateljskih država Republike Kosovo.

Naime, demokratija je neprekidni proces, koji podleže i testu posvećenosti… strpljenja – nepokolebljive

vere u zajedničku ideju koju odražava sama preambula Ustava – izgradnje Republike zasnovane na

zajedničkim vrednostima miroljubivih država u svetu.

Vratiću se još jednom misliocu Montesquieu - nema moćnijeg naroda od onog koji poštuje zakone,

ne iz razuma ili straha, već iz strasti - zbog privrženosti i poštovanja prema državi.

Zahvaljujući vam se na pažnji – u ime mojih kolega sudija Ustavnog suda: zamenika predsednika

Bajrama Ljatifija i sudija Selvete Gërxhaliu-Krasniqi, Safeta Hoxhe, Radomira Labana, Remzije Is-

trefi-Peci, Nexhmija Rexhepija i Envera Pecija – zajedno čestitamo i slavimo ovih četrnaest godina

tradicije ustavnog pravosuđa u Republici Kosovo.

Hvala!

Grese Caka-Nimani

Predsednica Ustavnog suda Republike Kosovo

12

Dear participants and guests of the ceremony of marking the 14th anniversary of the establishment

of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Kosovo;

Honorable Deputies, Ministers, leaders of the Judiciary and Independent Institutions;

Honorable President Sejdiu and President Jahjaga;

Honorable Ambassadors and representatives of international institutions;

Honorable former-president of the Court, Mrs. Rama-Hajrizi and former-judges of the Constitution-

al Court;

Honorable mayors, representatives of institutions, civil society and media;

Dear Mr. Fabius, President of the Constitutional Council of France;

Honorable Presidents of the Constitutional and Supreme Courts of Belgium - Mr. Nihoul and Mr.

Lavrysen; of Estonia - Mr. Kõve; the Netherlands - Mrs. De Groot; of Latvia - Mr. Laviņš; of Albania

- Mrs. Zaçaj and Mr. Sadushi and of Turkey - Mr. Zühtü Arslan;

Honorable judges of the Constitutional and Supreme Courts of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Austria,

Bulgaria, Ireland, Croatia, Lithuania, North Macedonia, Portugal and the United States of America

– judge Tunheim;

Honorable representatives of the European Court for Human Rights and the Venice Commission;

Dear participants/Ladies and Gentlemen,

Please allow me to begin by expressing my delight and deep gratitude for your presence. Your pres-

ence in marking this anniversary of the Constitutional Court - honors us. The participation of dele-

gations from all over the world reflects the respect for our Court and the unwavering solidarity and

commitment of the Courts to cooperate in the protection of the common values.

Today, symbolically, we mark the 14th anniversary of the Constitutional Court, established through

a Constitution, which has crowned the sacrifice of entire generations for freedom and independence,

but also the steadfast ideal of a nation for a state that reflects the values enshrined in the common

tradition of democratic states.

This Court, a symbol of an independent constitutional order, has been vested with the task of inter-

preting and protecting this Constitution. The simultaneous establishment of the Republic and its

Constitutional Court, has determined the role of the latter, which goes beyond the classical exercise

Address by the President of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Kosovo, Ms. Gresa Caka-Nimani

13

of its constitutional jurisdiction, having an inevitable role on the shaping and consolidating of Koso-

vo’s state and international identity.

Fourteen years ago, the first generation of Constitutional Court judges, took the responsibility to

interpret a newly adopted Constitution of a newly established Republic.

The dynamic context of a state-building has enabled this Court to have an essential role in determin-

ing the dynamics of democratic development of Kosovo. The Court has struck the balance between

(i) the vigor of a rapid institutional building of a young state; and (ii) the obligation to consolidate a

social and institutional order based on the values that a new Constitution enshrined.

As a result, today - in the first half of its second decade, the Court already has a remarkable history

and a tremendously rich case-law. There are two characteristics that derive from this case-law that

mark the unwavering role of the Constitutional Court in attaining the aspiration that the Constitu-

tion embodies - for a state that stands proudly among the states of the European family.

The first, pertains to the Court’s contribution to the protection and advancement of fundamental

rights and freedoms throughout the consolidation of a state committed to the equality of all before

the law. The Court has served as a bridge between the values reflected in the case-law of the Euro-

pean Court of Human Rights and the rights and freedoms of all the citizens and communities of the

Republic of Kosovo, with no distinction.

Whereas the second, pertains to the valuable contribution of the Constitutional Court in consolidat- ing the principle of separation and balancing of powers in the constitutional order of the Republic of Kosovo. This because, democracy is only complete when the exercise of sovereignty is supported by the rule of law and the latter cannot exist without the necessary separation and interaction between the three independent powers.

Dear participants,

Taking into consideration the context of the state-building of Kosovo, including the challenge but also the advantage of building a new constitutional order, issues pertaining to the separation and interaction of powers, have been subject to the Court’s assessment continuously over the years.

The Court has given its final word on a multitude of issues that involve the interaction between the branches of power, including but not limited to: (i) the procedures for the election and the role of President of the Republic; (ii) the establishment of institutions after the parliamentary elections, including the election of the Government after a vote of no-confidence; (iii) the oversight role of the Assembly in relation to the Government and the independent institutions; and (iv) limitations to the interaction between the local and central power.

This decision-making by the Court, on some occasions, has resulted in signficant changes in the political dynamics – but also the transfer and/or the composition of the executive and legislative branches. All the political forces have honored these decisions, thus reflecting the unwavering com- mitment of the Republic to the state of law.

14

Having said that, the overwhelming case-law of the Court in the context of the separation and bal-

ancing of powers pertains to the limits of exercising the competences of the executive and/or legis-

lative branches in relation tothe judicial branch and/or constitutionally independent institutions.

Taking into account the relatively recent history of the independence of the judicial branch and inde-

pendent institutions, it is the latter that are exposed to a greater risk of possible infringement of their

independence through the exercise of the competences of the other two branches, and this tendency

is certainly not a characteristic of our Republic only.

According to, among others, the Opinions of the Consultative Council of European Judges of the

Council of Europe, during the last decades, the relationship between the three branches of govern-

ment has been transformed (i) resulting into the reduction of the oversight function of the legislative

branch over the executive one; while (ii) the increase in executive power has resulted in an increased

number of disputes in the courts and this, in turn, has resulted in the chalenging of the legitimacy of

the judicial power in the public discourse.

Such a phenomenon, in the democracies with a less consolidated tradition, in defense of the basic

values of democracy, has been counterbalanced by the supranational courts, namely the European

Court of Human Rights and the Court of Justice of the European Union. Whereas in the Republic of

Kosovo, has been counterbalanced by the Constitutional Court.

The consistent persistence in defense of the separation and interaction of branches of power with

an emphasis on the independence of the judicial branch, was maintained by the Court based on the

principles stemming from the Constitution, but also the case-law of the two aforementioned courts.

The jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights, is a constitutional obligation; whereas

the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice, coincides with the constitutional aspiration for member-

ship in the European Union.

Dear participants,

The interaction between the branches of government does necessarily also reflect tension among

them. This tension, which the Consultative Council of European Judges of the Council of Europe

refers to as “creative tension”, reflects the fact that democracy in the Republic of Kosovo functions.

The opposite, respectively, the absence of such tension, would mean that the respective branches are

not exercising their respective interactive and/or oversight functions effectively, thereby infringing

upon the maintenance of the proper constitutional balance.

Having said that, this tension has, at times also been manifested through public attacks against the

Constitutional Court but also other independent institutions. Such a public discourse is not unique

to our Republic either. Its essence, although not articulated as such, reflects the theoretical level dis-

cussion related to the counter-majoritarian difficulty argument which, in essence, entails the dilem-

ma of the lack of legitimacy of the judicial branch and/or the Constitutional Courts - whose power

does not stem directly from the people to review the laws and acts adopted by the elected represen-

tatives of the people.

15

However, in democracies with a more consolidated constitutional tradition, this dilemma has been

overcome and the position/counter-argument has prevailed, according to which the legitimacy of ju-

dicial control in relation to other branches of power, stems from the Constitution... from loyality to it.

Certainly, the constitutional legitimacy is inter-dependent with the functional legitimacy of judges

and prosecutors, who are subject to the constitutional duty of self-restraint, professionalism and

accountability, in excercising their function in defense of the Constitution and/or the law. On the

contrary, the holders of judicial and prosecutorial powers themselves would be the ones to dimin-

ish the authority of an entire branch of power to the detriment of the constitutional balance. These

principles have been consistently emphasized by the Court, including the fact that the separation and

interaction of branches of government does not mean their functioning in isolation, but rather based

on the principle of constitutional loyalty, in support of each other, in order to ensure the proper func-

tioning of constitutional order in a democratic society.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

Surely the public and theoretical debate, including critisim, which is an essential value of our consti-

tutional order, regarding the source of democratic legitimacy of judicial and constitutional review, is

valuable. Having said that, we must also remember that the theory of the separation and interaction

of independent branches of power, is the only one that has stood the test of time and constitutes the

foundation of liberal constitutional democracies.

The latter, for almost three centuries, have remained faithful to the essence of the theory developed

through the rarest minds of philosophical and political thought, including (i) the French thinker

Montesquieu through “The Spirit of the Laws”; and (ii) Alexander Hamilton and James Madison

through the Federalist Papers, according to which, essentially, civil and political liberties are effec-

tive only through a system of separated and controlled branches of powers designed to prevent the

concentration of power and/or the arbitrariness of each of them.

Inspired also by Montesquieu, in one of the Federalist Papers (back in 1788), in a simplified but

magnificent way, the essential question that has challenged and shaped the constitutional designs

for centuries afterwards is reflected, and I quote as follows:

“If men were angels, no government would be necessary. If angels were to govern men, neither external nor internal controls on government would be necessary. In framing a government which is to be administered by men over men, the great difficulty lies in this: you must first enable the government to control the governed; and in the next place oblige it to control itself.”

In the spirit of these concepts, stand among the oldest democratic orders in the World. In the spirit of

these principles, lies the common denominator of the constitutional tradition of democratic states. On

the principles of this heritage, stands the Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo.

It is the duty of the Constitutional Court to remain faithful to these values. The same duty belongs

to all public authorities. The Constitution is also the collective commitment of all public authorities,

in the name of the citizens, for a state that functions in accordance with the values embodied in the

16

first Constitution of this state which begins with the words - “We, the people of Kosovo”. The Court,

always within the limitations stipulated by the Constitution but without taking into account the daily

dynamics and developments, will remain faithful to these principles.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

Fourteen years after its establishment, the Constitutional Court, today stands dignified among the

Constitutional Courts members of the World Conference on Constitutional Justice. The Court is one

of the most active members of the Venice Commission Forum. Its jurisprudence is an additional

guarantee and argument that Kosovo has its place among the member states of the Council of Eu-

rope.

The Court’s achievements, despite the challenges, are a reflection of the steadfast commitment of

all generations of judges of the Constitutional Court. Surely, also of the endless support of peer con-

stitutional courts from around the world, the deep cooperation with which is also reflected by their

large participation in this ceremony, to which, on behalf of the Court, I once again express my deep

gratitude. Your participation honors our Court. Your participation honors the Republic of Kosovo.

Gratitude for cooperation and endless support should also be addressed to the Venice Commission

and the Council of Europe, with whose support, the Court has established an extraordinary coopera-

tion with the European Court of Human Rights. I am deeply convinced that, when our Republic takes

its deserved place as a member of the Council of Europe, the case-law of the Constitutional Court will

withstand the oversight filter of the European Court of Human Rights.

Last, I express gratitude to the Embassies of friendly nations in the Republic of Kosovo and their

agencies for international cooperation, which have generously supported our Court.

Special gratitude to the Unites States of America and the Republic of France, two friends/states

among many present here today, which today are represented by two honorable speakers (i) Federal

Judge Tunheim, who has left his mark in the state-building of Kosovo, including through his support

in the making of our Constitution; and (ii) President Fabius, the extraordinary support of whom has

enriched our Court, including with the richness of the French constitutional tradition.

Dear Friends,

The Republic of Kosovo has been built through stories in which the pain meets the pride and resis-

tance. But, above all, the Republic of Kosovo is a success story. Not only in terms of the historical

state-building journey but also of the development of democracy. This success is necessarily, also a

reflection of the support and strong partnership of friend nations of the Republic of Kosovo.

17

Having said this, democracy is a continuous process, which is subject to the test of commitment… the

unwavering belief and commitment to a common idea that is reflected in the very preamble of the

Constitution - the building of a Republic that is based on the common values of peace-loving nations

in the world. To return to Montesquieu – there is no nation so powerful, as the one that obeys its

laws not from principals of fear or reason, but from passion – from the commitment and respect for

the state.

Thanking you for your attention – on behalf of my colleague judges of the Constitutional Court: Dep-

uty President Bajram Ljatifi and Judges Selvete Gërxhaliu-Krasniqi, Safet Hoxha, Radomir Laban,

Remzije Istrefi-Peci, Nexhmi Rexhepi and Enver Peci - we congratulate and celebrate together these

fourteen years of tradition of constitutional justice in the Republic of Kosovo.

Thank you!

Gresa Caka-Nimani

President of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Kosovo

18

Chers participants de la cérémonie marquant le 14e anniversaire de la création de la Cour Constitu-

tionnelle de la République du Kosovo;

Chers députés, ministres, dirigeants du pouvoir judiciaire et des institutions indépendantes;

Chers Présidents Sejdiu et Jahjaga;

Chers ambassadeurs et représentants des institutions internationales;

Chère ancienne présidente de la Cour, Madame Rama-Hajrizi et anciens juges de la Cour Constitu-

tionnelle;

Chers maires, représentants des institutions, de la société civile et des médias;

Cher Monsieur Fabius, Président du Conseil Constitutionnel de France;

Chers Présidents des Cours Constitutionnelles et Suprêmes de Belgique -M. Nihoul et M. Lavrysen,

d’Estonie - M. Kõve, des Pays-Bas - Mme. De Groot, de Lettonie - M. Laviņš, d’Albanie - Mme Zaçaj

et M.Sadushi; et de Turquie - M. Zühtü Arslan;

Chers Juges des Cours Constitutionnelles et Suprêmes de Bosnie-Herzégovine, d’Autriche, de Bulga-

rie, d’Irlande, de Croatie, de Lituanie, de Macédoine du Nord, du Portugal et des États-Unis d’Amé-

rique, cher juge Tunheim;

Chers représentants de la Cour Européenne des Droits de l’Homme et de la Commission de Venise;

Chers participants/Mesdames et Messieurs,

Permettez-moi d’abord de vous exprimer mon immense plaisir et ma profonde gratitude pour votre

présence. Votre présence à l’occasion de cet anniversaire de la Cour Constitutionnelle nous honore.

La participation de délégations du monde entier reflète le respect pour notre Cour; et la solidarité

ainsi que l’engagement assuré des Cours à coopérer à la protection des valeurs communes.

Aujourd’hui, symboliquement, nous marquons le 14e anniversaire de la Cour Constitutionnelle, éta-

blie par une Constitution qui a couronné le sacrifice de générations entières pour la liberté et l’indé-

pendance, mais aussi l’idéal inébranlable d’un peuple pour un État de droit fondé sur des valeurs qui

reflètent la tradition commune des états démocratiques.

Cette Cour, symbole d’un ordre constitutionnel indépendant est chargée du devoir d’interprétation

et de protection de cette Constitution. La création simultanée de la République et de sa Cour Consti-

tutionnelle a déterminé le rôle de cette dernière qui va au-delà de l’exercice classique de juridiction

Allocution de Mme. Gresa Caka-Nimani, Présidente de la Cour Constitutionnelle de la République du Kosovo

19

constitutionnelle, en y incluant inévitablement la configuration et la consolidation de l’identité na-

tionale et internationale du Kosovo.

Il y a quatorze ans, la première génération des juges de la Cour Constitutionnelle s’engageait à inter-

préter une Constitution nouvellement adoptée d’une République nouvellement créée.

Le contexte dynamique de construction de l’état a permis à cette Cour de jouer un rôle essentiel dans

la détermination de la dynamique du développement démocratique du Kosovo. La Cour a maintenu

l’équilibre entre (i) la précipitation d’une construction institutionnelle rapide d’un nouvel État; et

(ii) l’obligation de consolider un ordre social et institutionnel basé sur les valeurs incluses dans une

nouvelle Constitution.

De ce fait, aujourd’hui, dans la première moitié de sa deuxième décennie, la Cour dispose déjà d’une

histoire extraordinaire et d’une pratique judiciaire particulièrement riche.

Les deux caractéristiques suivantes découlent de cette pratique judiciaire et marquent le rôle assidu

de la Cour Constitutionnelle dans la réalisation de l’aspiration qu’incarne la Constitution -pour un

État qui se maintient digne parmi les États de la famille européenne.

La première est liée à la contribution de la Cour à la protection et à la promotion des droits et libertés

fondamentaux lors de la consolidation d’un État qui s’est engagé pour l’égalité de tous devant la loi.

La Cour a servi de pont entre les valeurs reflétées dans la pratique judiciaire de la Cour Européenne

des Droits de l’Homme et les droits et libertés, de tous les citoyens et de toutes les communautés de

la République, sans aucune distinction.

La seconde concerne la précieuse contribution de la Cour Constitutionnelle à la consolidation du

principe de séparation et d’équilibre des pouvoirs dans l’ordre constitutionnel de la République du

Kosovo. En effet, la démocratie n’est entière que lorsque l’exercice de la souveraineté est soutenu par

l’État de droit et celui-ci ne peut exister sans la séparation et l’interaction nécessaires entre les trois

pouvoirs indépendants.

Chers participants,

Compte tenu du contexte de la construction de l’État du Kosovo, y compris du défi mais aussi de la

priorité de la création d’un nouvel ordre constitutionnel, les questions liées à la séparation et à l’in-

teraction des pouvoirs ont fait l’objet d’une appréciation continue de la Cour au cours des dernières

années.

Elle a exprimé son dernier mot sur une multitude de questions impliquant l’interaction entre les

pouvoirs, y compris, mais sans s’y limiter dans (i) les procédures d’élection et le rôle du Président de

la République; (ii) la constitution des institutions après les élections législatives, y compris le vote

du Gouvernement après la motion de censure; (iii) le rôle de supervision de l’Assemblée à l’égard du

Gouvernement et des institutions indépendantes ; et (iv) les limites de l’interaction entre le pouvoir

local et central.

20

Ces décisions de la Cour ont, dans certains cas, entraîné des changements radicaux dans la dyna-

mique politique, mais aussi le transfert et/ou la composition du pouvoir exécutif et législatif. Toutes

les forces politiques ont respecté ces décisions, reflétant ainsi l’engagement solide de la République

en faveur de l’État de droit.

Cela dit, la pratique judiciaire prédominante de la Cour dans le contexte de la séparation et de l’équi-

libre des pouvoirs est liée aux limites de l’exercice des compétences des pouvoirs exécutifs et/ou

législatifs par rapport au judiciaire et/ou aux institutions constitutionnelles indépendantes.

Compte tenu de l’histoire relativement récente de l’indépendance du pouvoir judiciaire et des insti-

tutions indépendantes, ce sont ces derniers qui sont exposés au plus grand risque de manquement

à leur indépendance par l’exercice des compétences des deux autres pouvoirs, et cette tendance ne

caractérise certainement pas uniquement notre République.

Selon, entre autres, les Avis du Conseil Consultatif des Juges Européens du Conseil de l’Europe, au

cours des dernières décennies, les relations entre les trois pouvoirs se sont transformées, (i) entraî-

nant une réduction de la fonction de contrôle du pouvoir législatif sur le pouvoir exécutif; tandis que

(ii) l’augmentation des compétences exécutives a entraîné une augmentation du nombre de litiges

devant les tribunaux et cela a, d’autre part, abouti à la contestation de la légitimité du pouvoir judi-

ciaire dans le discours public.

Une telle tendance, dans les démocraties de tradition moins consolidée, dans la protection des va-

leurs fondamentales de la démocratie a été contrebalancée par les juridictions à caractère suprana-

tional, à savoir la Cour Européenne des Droits de l’Homme et la Cour de Justice de l’Union Euro-

péenne. Or, dans la République du Kosovo, elle a été contrebalancée par la Cour Constitutionnelle.

La Cour a préservé la stabilité dans la protection de la séparation, de l’indépendance mais aussi de

l’interaction des pouvoirs en mettant l’accent sur l’indépendance du pouvoir judiciaire, en se basant

sur les principes issus de la Constitution, mais aussi de la pratique judiciaire des deux Cours susmen-

tionnées. La pratique judiciaire de la Cour Européenne des Droits de l’Homme est une obligation

constitutionnelle; tandis que la pratique judiciaire de la Cour de Justice coïncide avec l’aspiration

constitutionnelle à l’adhésion à l’Union Européenne.

Chers participants,

L’interaction entre les pouvoirs reflète nécessairement la tension qui les oppose. Cette tension, que

le Conseil Consultatif des Juges Européens du Conseil de l’Europe qualifie de « tension créatrice »,

reflète le fait que la démocratie dans la République du Kosovo fonctionne. Le contraire, respective-

ment l’absence d’une telle tension, signifierait que les pouvoirs ne jouent pas la fonction interactive

et/ou de supervision de manière efficace, nuisant ainsi au maintien du bon équilibre constitutionnel.

Cela dit, cette tension s’est maintes fois manifestée par des attaques publiques contre la Cour Consti-

tutionnelle, mais aussi d’autres institutions indépendantes. Un tel discours public ne caractérise

pas uniquement notre République. Le fond de celui-ci reflète, bien qu’il ne soit pas articulé en tant

que tel, la discussion au niveau théorique liée à l’argument contrebalançant de la majorité, lequel,

21

en substance, soulève le dilemme du manque de légitimité du pouvoir judiciaire et/ou des Cours

Constitutionnelles - dont le pouvoir ne découle pas directement du peuple pour apprécier les lois et

les actes adoptés par les représentants élus du peuple.

Cependant, dans les démocraties de tradition constitutionnelle plus consolidée, ce dilemme est dépassé

et prévaut la position/le contre-argument selon lesquels la légitimité du contrôle judiciaire par rapport

aux deux autres pouvoirs découle de la Constitution... de la loyauté envers elle.

Bien entendu, la légitimité constitutionnelle du contrôle judiciaire est dépendante de la légitimité

fonctionnelle des juges et des procureurs, qui sont soumis à l’obligation constitutionnelle d’imper-

turbabilité, de professionnalisme, de responsabilité, dans l’exercice de leur fonction de protection de

la Constitution et/ou de la loi. Dans le cas contraire, ce sont les détenteurs du pouvoir judiciaire et du

système de poursuite judiciaire eux-mêmes qui enfreindraient l’autorité de tout un pouvoir au détri-

ment de l’équilibre constitutionnel. La Cour a continuellement souligné ces principes, notamment le

fait que la séparation et l’interaction des pouvoirs ne signifient pas leur fonctionnement isolé, mais

fondé sur le principe de loyauté constitutionnelle, en se soutenant mutuellement, pour assurer le bon

fonctionnement de l’ordre constitutionnel dans une société démocratique.

Mesdames et Messieurs,

Bien entendu, le débat public et théorique, comprenant la critique, valeur primordiale de notre ordre

constitutionnel, sur la source de la légitimité démocratique du contrôle judiciaire et constitutionnel

est précieux. Cela dit, il faut également rappeler que la théorie de la séparation et de l’interaction des

pouvoirs indépendants est la seule qui ait résisté à l’épreuve du temps et qui constitue le fondement

des démocraties constitutionnelles libérales.

Celles-ci, depuis près de trois siècles, sont restées fidèles à l’essence de la théorie développée par les es-

prits les plus érudits de la pensée philosophique et politique, parmi lesquels (i) le philosophe français

Montesquieu dans l’Esprit des Lois; et (ii) Alexander Hamilton et James Madison dans les Papiers Fédé-

ralistes selon lesquels les libertés civiles et politiques ne sont efficaces qu’à travers un système de pouvoirs

séparés et contrôlés pour empêcher la concentration du pouvoir et/ou l’arbitraire dans chacun d’eux.

Également inspirée par Montesquieu, dans une des Lettres fédéralistes, (déjà en 1788), se reflète

d›une manière simplifiée mais imposante la question fondamentale qui a remis en question et

façonné les modèles constitutionnels pendant des siècles et je cite comme suit:

“Si les hommes étaient des anges, il n’y aurait besoin d’aucun gouvernement. Si les anges devaient gouverner les hommes, il n’y aurait besoin d’aucun contrôle externe ou interne sur le gouverne- ment. La grande difficulté, s’agissant d’élaborer un gouvernement qui doit être administré par des hommes sur des hommes est la suivante: il faut d’abord habiliter le gouvernement à contrôler les gouvernés et ensuite l’obliger à se contrôler lui-même.”

Les ordres démocratiques parmi les plus anciens du monde reposent sur l’esprit de ces concepts. Le

dénominateur commun de la tradition constitutionnelle des états démocratiques repose sur l’esprit

de ces principes. La Constitution de la République du Kosovo repose sur les principes de cet héritage.

22

Il est du devoir de la Cour Constitutionnelle de rester fidèle à ces valeurs. Le même devoir incombe à

toutes les autorités publiques. La Constitution est aussi l’engagement collectif de toutes les autorités

publiques, au nom des citoyens, pour un État de droit conforme aux valeurs incarnées dans la pre-

mière Constitution de cet État qui commence par l’expression “Nous, peuple du Kosovo”. La Cour,

toujours dans les limites fixées par la Constitution mais sans tenir compte des dynamiques et des

évènements quotidiens, restera fidèle à ces principes.

Mesdames et Messieurs,

Quatorze ans après sa création, la Cour Constitutionnelle demeure aujourd’hui digne parmi les

Cours Constitutionnelles membres de la Conférence Mondiale de la Justice Constitutionnelle. Elle

est l’un des membres les plus actifs du Forum de la Commission de Venise. Sa pratique judiciaire est

une garantie et un argument complémentaires que le Kosovo a sa place parmi les États membres du

Conseil de l’Europe.

Ses réalisations, malgré les défis, reflètent l’engagement inaltérable de toutes les générations de

juges de la Cour Constitutionnelle. Certainement, aussi le soutien sans réserve des Cours Constitu-

tionnelles du monde entier dont la vaste coopération se reflète également dans l’importante partici-

pation à cette cérémonie, pour laquelle, au nom de la Cour, j’exprime une fois de plus ma profonde

gratitude. Votre participation fait honneur à notre Cour. Votre participation honore la République

du Kosovo.

Un remerciement pour leur coopération et leur soutien sans faille doit être adressé à la Commis-

sion de Venise et au Conseil de l’Europe, avec le soutien desquels la Cour a établi une coopération

extraordinaire avec la Cour Européenne des Droits de l’Homme. Je suis profondément convaincue

que, lorsque notre République occupera la place qu’elle mérite en tant que membre du Conseil de

l’Europe, la pratique judiciaire de la Cour Constitutionnelle se mesurera au filtre de surveillance de

la Cour Européenne des Droits de l’Homme.

Enfin, merci aux Ambassades des pays amis de la République du Kosovo et à leurs services de coopé-

ration internationale qui ont soutenu sans réserve notre Cour.

Une gratitude particulière pour les Etats-Unis d’Amérique et la République fançaise, deux états amis,

parmi beaucoup d’autres présents ici aujourd’hui, et qui sont représentés aujourd’hui par deux locu-

teurs très respectables: (i) le juge fédéral Tunheim, qui a laissé son empreinte dans l’ édification du

Kosovo, entre autres par son soutien à la Commission Constitutionnelle pour la rédaction de notre

Constitution; et (ii) le président Fabius dont le soutien sans faille a exalté notre Cour entre autres de

la richesse de la tradition précieuse constitutionnelle française.

23

Chers amis,

La République du Kosovo s’est construite à travers des histoires dans lesquelles la douleur se tisse

avec la fierté et la résistance.

Mais, avant tout, la République du Kosovo est une réussite, non seulement en termes de parcours

historique de construction de l’État, mais aussi de développement de la démocratie. Ce succès reflète

aussi certainement le soutien inéluctable des pays amis de la République du Kosovo.

Cela dit, la démocratie est un processus continuel, soumis à l’épreuve de l’engagement... de la pa-

tience, de la foi imperturbable en une idée commune que décrit le préambule même de la Constitu-

tion – la création d’une République basée sur les valeurs communes des pays épris de paix dans le

monde.

Pour revenir encore une fois à Montesquieu- il n y a pas de peuple plus puissant que celui qui res-

pecte les lois, non par raison ou par peur - mais par passion- par engagement et respect de l’Etat.

En vous remerciant de votre attention, au nom de mes collègues juges de la Cour Constitutionnelle-

le vice-président Bajram Latifi et les juges Selvete Gërxhaliu-Krasniqi, Safet Hoxha, Radomir Laban,

Remzije Istrefi-Peci, Nexhmi Rexhepi et Enver Peci -je vous souhaite nos meilleurs voeux et vous in-

vite à célébrer ensemble ces quatorze années de tradition de justice constitutionnelle en République

du Kosovo.

Je vous remercie!

Gresa Caka-Nimani

Présidente de la Cour Constitutionnelle de la République du Kosovo

24

Faleminderit zonja Kryetare. Është një nder i madh që më është kërkuar të flas sot me rastin e

veçantë të Vitit të 14-të Gjyqësor të Gjykatës Kushtetuese të Republikës së Kosovës. Një mirë-

seardhje e ngrohtë për të gjithë anëtarët dhe ish-anëtarët e Gjykatës Kushtetuese, për ish-Presi-

dentët e Republikës, të nderuar Ambasadorë dhe një mirëseardhje e veçantë për delegacionet dhe

vizitorët ndërkombëtarë këtu me ne. Faleminderit të gjithëve që erdhët.

Sot ne festojmë një arritje të jashtëzakonshme – Kushtetutën e Kosovës dhe Gjykatën që e ka inter-

pretuar me aq besnikëri dhe guxim atë dokument që nga pavarësia në vitin 2008. Ka qenë një nga

privilegjet e mëdha të jetës sime që kam qenë i përfshirë kaq shumë në zhvillimin e sistemit juridik

në Kosovë, këtu në zemër të Evropës.

Vizita ime e parë ishte në dimrin e ftohtë të viteve 1999-2000, kur shkatërrimet mizore dhe çn-

jerëzore të luftës ishin të dukshme kudo. Po, unë solla një çantë gjumi dhe më duhej çdo natë. Detyra

Fjala e z. John R. Tunheim, Gjyqtar Federal i Shteteve të Bashkuara dhe Këshill- tari Kryesor i Shteteve të Bashkuara në mbështetje të procesit të krijimit të Kushtetutës së Republikës

së Kosovës

Obraćanje g. Johna R. Tunheima, saveznog sudije Sjedinjenih Država i glavnog savet- nika Sjedinjenih Država, koji je podržavao proces

donošenja Ustava Republike Kosovo

Address by Mr. John R. Tunheim, United States Federal Judge and the Lead United

States Advisor supporting the constitution-making process of the Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo

Allocution de M. John R. Tunheim, Juge fédéral des États-Unis et conseiller principal des

États-Unis ayant soutenu le processus d’élaboration de la Constitution de la République du Kosovo

Fjala e z. John R. Tunheim, Gjyqtar Federal i Shteteve të Bashkuara dhe Këshilltari Kryesor i Shteteve të Bashkuara në mbështetje të procesit të krijimit të Kushtetutës së Republikës së Kosovës

25

jonë ishte të ndihmonim Kombet e Bashkuara të rifillonte një sistem ligjor që ishte shkatërruar si

shumë institucione. Çuditërisht, një nga shumë pyetjet e vështira ishte se cili ligj duhet të jetë në fuqi

në Kosovë? Disa prej jush do të kujtojnë udhëtimet tona të gjata në tërë territorin dhe programin

“Fillimi i Shpejtë” që rezultoi, i cili ringjalli Kosovën dhe sundimin e ligjit.

Mbikëqyrja e zgjedhjeve të para të lira në vjeshtën e vitit 2000 ishte një përvojë e jashtëzakonshme.

Jam kthyer shumë herë gjatë viteve, duke hartuar kode, duke vlerësuar progresin e gjyqësorit, duke

sjellë gjyqtarë amerikanë të punojnë në sistemin ndërkombëtar të gjyqtarëve, vetëm duke dhënë

këshilla dhe duke punuar në shumë çështje të sundimit të ligjit, të shumta për t’u përmendur sot.

Ndihem se si Kosova është bërë një shtëpi e dytë për mua gjatë këtyre më shumë se pesëdhjetë

vizitave. Është e mrekullueshme të shihet ndryshimi gjatë këtij çerek shekulli progresi.

Ne e filluam krijimin e Kushtetutës së Kosovës me shpresat dhe ëndrrat për një dokument themelor

që do të rivalizonte çdo demokraci perëndimore në mbrojtjen e të drejtave të njeriut, në mbështetjen

e saj për sundimin e ligjit dhe në krijimin e një republike moderne parlamentare. Triumfi përfun-

dimtar i shpresës mbi frikën.

Shkurtimisht, qëllimi ishte të propozohej një kushtetutë moderne që do të ndihmonte në fshirjen

e historisë së fundit të luftës dhe dhunës etnike dhe të mishëronte madhështitë e sundimit të ligjit.

Dhe më e rëndësishmja, qëllimi ishte t’i dëshmohej botës se Kosova ishte e gatshme për pavarësi dhe

mund të ishte një vend i gatshëm për të mbrojtur të gjithë qytetarët e saj.

Zonja Kryetare, e cila në atë kohë ishte këshilltare e lartë në USAID organizoi shumë nga punët e

nevojshme për të zhvilluar një Kushtetutë. Profesorja Warren dhe Profesori Aucoin, të cilët janë këtu

sot, ishin me të vërtetë anëtarë të rëndësishëm të ekipit.

Filluam duke identifikuar kërkesat themelore që priten nga Bashkimi Evropian, nga Komisioni i Ve-

necias dhe nga korniza e mëparshme e Ahtisaarit për paqen që doli nga Bisedimet e Vjenës.

Një Komision Kushtetues shumë-etnik, shumë partiak, i mençur dhe i arsyeshëm, disa prej të cilëve

janë sot këtu, u caktua për të marrë vendime të rëndësishme dhe për të udhëhequr përpjekjet e har-

timit. Znj. Kelmendi dhe z. Kuçi u treguan liderë të shquar. Dhe kjo ishte punë e vështirë.

Edhe pse bota ofron shumë shembuj të mirë, një kushtetutë duhet të përfshijë jo vetëm marrëveshjet

ndërkombëtare, por edhe të pasqyrojë kulturën dhe normat e vendit. Historia është e rëndësishme

dhe njerëzit që do të qeverisen duhet të pranojnë kushtet e qeverisjes. Kjo nuk ishte një detyrë e lehtë

sidomos kur në fazat e hershme nuk mund të konsultohej me publikun.

Një bllokim i parashikueshëm ndodhi në verë, kur anëtarët e Komisionit nuk arritën të pajtohen

lidhur me çështjen e rëndësishme se si të ndahen pushtetet midis një presidenti dhe një kryem-

inistri. Dikush sugjeroi se duhej të sillnim diplomatin veteran Richard Holbrooke për të ndërm-

jetësuar. Por kjo nuk ishte e nevojshme - përkundrazi, me ndihmën e shefes së misionit amerikan,

Tina Kaidanow, Gresa dhe unë kaluam një javë intensive duke negociuar një marrëveshje kritike për

ndarjen e pushtetit midis liderëve politikë që i hapi rrugën komisionit për të hartuar pjesë të Kushte-

tutës së propozuar. Ish-presidenti Sejdiu luajti një rol shumë të rëndësishëm në këtë marrëveshje.

26

Një konferencë e madhe në vjeshtë pranë Mitrovicës nxori në pah detajet dhe ne u siguruam që for-

mulimi përfundimtar të ishte shumë i saktë – në secilën nga gjuhët e Kosovës.

Kushtetuta ishte thelbësore për atë që erdhi më pas, Deklaratën konsekuente të Pavarësisë më 17

shkurt 2008. Kuvendi e ratifikoi shpejt Kushtetutën, pas një ceremonie emocionale festive të nën-

shkrimit gjatë së cilës anëtarët e Komisionit paraqitën rekomandimet e tyre për liderët e Kosovës,

më pak se një vit pasi procesi kishte filluar. Ëndrra e kahershme e pavarësisë u bë realitet dhe një

Kushtetutë vizionare ishte në fuqi për të udhëhequr vendin e ri.

Dua të përshëndes për një moment Kushtetutën e Kosovës sepse është një dokument i jashtëzakon-

shëm që pasqyron idealet kushtetuese të njohura në mbarë botën.

Ajo inkorporon plotësisht dispozitat e tetë pakteve ndërkombëtare për të drejtat e njeriut dhe u jep

mbrojtje dhe të drejta shumë të rëndësishme vetëqeverisëse popullatës joshumicë të Kosovës. Këtu

janë të pranishme konceptet e federalizmit, ndarjes së pushtetit midis qeverisë qendrore dhe rajo-

nale, një vlerë e rëndësishme.

Mbrojtja kushtetuese ndaj trajtimit diskriminues është e gjerë dhe barazia është e garantuar për të

gjithë. Këto mbrojtje duhet të interpretohen në përputhje me vendimet e Gjykatës Evropiane për të

Drejtat e Njeriut. Të drejtat e njeriut janë një nga vlerat më të rëndësishme që vendet duhet të sig-

urojnë në kushtetutat ose dokumentet e tyre themelore – dhe garancitë e barazisë së Kosovës janë po

aq të forta sa të gjitha në botë.

Në mesin e shumë neneve të saj që adresojnë të drejtat e njeriut dhe dinjitetin njerëzor, Kushtetuta

e Kosovës garanton të drejtën për arsimim falas, të drejtën e fortë të privatësisë, lirinë fetare, aka-

demike dhe mediatike dhe të drejtën për punë. Dokumenti përfshin gjithashtu dispozita të rëndë-

sishme dhe specifike kundër torturës ose trajtimit poshtërues. Një dispozitë unike dhe veçanërisht

vizionare kërkon që njësitë qeveritare të marrin parasysh ndikimin mjedisor të të gjitha vendimeve

– më e rëndësishme sot me ndryshimin e klimës mbi ne.

Po aq e rëndësishme në panteonin e madh të vlerave tona të përbashkëta kushtetuese është sundimi

i ligjit. Dhe një nga detyrat më të rëndësishme të një gjykate kushtetuese është të mbrojë sundimin

e ligjit. Gjykata Kushtetuese e Kosovës është plotësisht e autorizuar për të interpretuar Kushtetutën

dhe për t’u siguruar se vendimet e saj janë të detyrueshme për qeverinë dhe gjyqësorin dhe për të

gjithë personat dhe institucionet në Kosovë.

E pranoj plotësisht hartimin e versionit përfundimtar të nenit 116, sepse doja të bëja shumë të qartë

se vendimet e gjykatave kushtetuese janë përfundimtare dhe më tej, se parimi i artikuluar në një

vendim të gjykatës kushtetuese është një precedent për vendimet e ardhshme. Për këtë, nuk duhet të

ketë asnjë dyshim dhe Komisioni u pajtua menjëherë.

Dhe krahas gjykatës, u krijua edhe gjyqësori shumë i pavarur për të zbatuar plotësisht ligjet e vendit. Një

gjyqësor i pavarur është themeli i sundimit të ligjit – pavarësia strukturore dhe vendimtare. Pa një gjyqë-

sor të pavarur, nuk mund të mbahen premtimet për sundim të ligjit.

27

Dhe, falë Kushtetutës, Kosova ka një demokraci parlamentare moderne të stilit evropian me dispozi-

ta që synojnë të shmangin ngërçet e gjata. Një pjesë e gjeniut të shkrimit të kushtetutës është para-

shikimi i problemeve të mundshme që i pengojnë qeverisjes së mirë. Ne po shohim probleme të tilla

në ngecjen aktuale se kush do të bëhet kryetari i ardhshëm në Dhomën tonë të Përfaqësuesve. Nuk

mund të parashikohen plotësisht të gjitha çështjet e ardhshme, por mendoj se Kushtetuta e Kosovës

është afër.

Dhe duke folur për demokracinë, e drejta e votës është e gjerë dhe gjithëpërfshirëse, duke mundësu-

ar pjesëmarrjen e plotë të qytetarëve në procesin e vendimmarrjes përmes zgjedhjeve të lira dhe të

ndershme.

Të integruara në këtë Kushtetutë janë më shumë koncepte të stilit amerikan të ndarjes së pushteteve dhe

kontrolleve dhe ekuilibrave. Këto dispozita i japin secilës degë të qeverisë aftësinë për të kufizuar kom-

petencat e degëve të tjera, duke siguruar llogaridhënie dhe fuqizuar popullsitë e pakicave. Kompetencat

ekzekutive ndahen mes Presidentit dhe Kryeministrit, nuk mund të pezullohet parimi i kontrollit civil të

ushtrisë dhe policisë dhe kompetencat emergjente ndahen. Këto janë ideale klasike që pengojnë përqen-

drimin e pushtetit që shpesh kanë qenë dhe vazhdojnë të jenë shkatërruese për botën tonë.

Po, Kushtetuta e Kosovës është një dokument i jashtëzakonshëm, po aq vizionar sot sa ishte kur u

ratifikua në vitin 2008. Por të mbash një demokraci të prekshme dhe të gjallë është punë e vështirë

– shumë më e vështirë se hartimi i një kushtetute. Vigjilenca kërkohet çdo ditë - pa përjashtim.

Një nga themeluesit e Amerikës, Benjamin Franklin, me daljen e Konventës Kushtetuese në Filadel-

fia në 1787, u pyet se çfarë lloj qeverie kishin krijuar delegatët. Përgjigja e tij? “Një republikë, zotëri,

nëse mund ta mbani atë.” Kjo, miqtë e mi, është sfida e madhe e një demokracie dhe sundimit të

ligjit... ruajtja e saj.

Gjykata Kushtetuese e Kosovës, për mendimin tim, ka bërë punë të jashtëzakonshme në 14 vitet e

saj. Të jesh interpretues origjinal i një Kushtetute – duke vepruar pa precedentë – nuk është e lehtë.

Pavarësisht ndryshimeve të shpeshta në përbërje dhe vonesave fatkeqe në emërimin e anëtarëve të

rinj, Gjykata ka qenë një interpretues besnik dhe i guximshëm i fjalëve të Kushtetutës, një fener i

ndritshëm në rrugën përpara. Dhe me të vërtetë, një ndërtues i respektit publik për sundimin e ligjit

- thelbësor për “mbajtjen e tij”.

Puna e Gjykatës, përmes udhëheqjes së Kryetarit Enver Hasani, Kryetares Arta Rama dhe tani

Kryetares Caka-Nimani, është frymëzuar dhe ka ndihmuar në vendosjen e rrugës së Kosovës drejt

një të ardhmeje solide dhe të sigurt. Gjykata me siguri ka ndihmuar në “mbajtjen” e kësaj republike

sipas fjalëve të Franklin.

Dhe sundimi i ligjit, siç duhet, ka çuar në prosperitet dhe rritje ekonomike. Ka qenë privilegji im të

punoj me Gjykatën në miratimin dhe rishikimet të rregullores së saj të punës dhe në proces, të shikoj

punën e Gjykatës nga afër, duke zgjidhur shumë çështje të vështira me të cilat përballet ky vend ende

shumë i ri.

28

Ne festojmë sot punën e jashtëzakonshme të kësaj Gjykate, ashtu siç festojmë dokumentin vizionar

që për Kosovën është mishërim i shkruar i sundimit të ligjit. E festojmë edhe punën e Komisionit që

udhëhoqi hartimin e kushtetutës. E dini, unë shpesh e mbaj me vete këtë Kushtetutë me madhësi

xhepi. Më kujton se çfarë është e mirë në këtë botë dhe çfarë nevojitet për të luftuar të keqen në kaq

shumë vende.

Dhe shpresoj që në vitet që vijnë kur të shkruhet historia e fillimeve të kësaj republike në zemër të

Evropës, kjo Kushtetutë dhe kjo Gjykatë të konsiderohen si themeli i fortë që e bënë Kosovën një

histori suksesi.

Kosova ka bërë një rrugë të gjatë që nga ai dimër i ftohtë dhe i dëshpëruar i vitit 1999. Një arsye e

madhe për këtë përparim të jashtëzakonshëm ka qenë sundimi i ligjit dhe përkushtimi ndaj të dre-

jtave të njeriut për të gjithë. Premtimet që janë të përcaktuara në Kushtetutë dhe të mundësuara nga

përkushtimi i Gjykatës Kushtetuese. Ato së bashku janë shpirti i Kosovës. Ka shumë më tepër punë

për të bërë, por rruga përpara është e qartë dhe e ndritshme.

Një republikë, zotëri, nëse mund ta ruani. Le ta mbajmë.

Faleminderit shumë!

John R. Tunheim

Gjyqtar Federal i Shteteve të Bashkuara dhe Këshilltari Kryesor i Shteteve të Bashkuara në mbështetje

të procesit të krijimit të Kushtetutës së Republikës së Kosovës

29

Hvala, gospođo predsednice. Velika mi je čast što sam zamoljen da danas govorim povodom 14.

sudske godine Ustavnog suda Republike Kosovo. Srdačna dobrodošlica svim članovima i bivšim

članovima Ustavnog suda, bivšim predsednicima Republike, uvaženim ambasadorima, i posebna dobro-

došlica međunarodnim delegacijama i posetiocima koji su ovde sa nama. Hvala svima što ste došli.

Danas slavimo izuzetno dostignuće — Ustav Kosova i Sud koji je tako verno i hrabro tumačio taj do-

kument od nezavisnosti 2008. godine. Bila je jedna od velikih privilegija u mom životu što sam bio

uključen u razvoj tolikog dela pravnog sistema na Kosovu, ovde u srcu Evrope.

Moja prva poseta je bila hladne zime 1999-2000, kada su okrutna i nehumana ratna razaranja bila oči-

gledna svuda. Da, poneo sam vreću za spavanje i bila mi je potrebna svake noći. Naš zadatak je bio da

pomognemo Ujedinjenim nacijama da ponovo pokrenu pravni sistem koji je bio uništen poput mnogih

institucija. Začudo, jedno od mnogih teških pitanja je bilo koji zakon treba da bude na snazi na Kosovu?

Neki od vas će se setiti naših dugih putovanja širom teritorije i rezultirajućeg programa „Brzi početak“

koji je ponovo oživeo Kosovo i vladavinu zakona.

Nadgledanje prvih slobodnih izbora u jesen 2000. godine bilo je neverovatno iskustvo. Vraćao sam

se mnogo puta tokom godina, praveći nacrte kodeksa, procenjujući napredak pravosuđa, dovodeći

američke sudije da rade u međunarodnom sudijskom sistemu, samo dajući savete i radeći na mnogim

pitanjima vladavine prava koja su previše brojna da bih ih danas pominjao. Osećam se kao da mi je

Kosovo postalo drugi dom tokom ovih više od pedeset poseta. Izvanredno je videti promenu tokom

ovih četvrt veka napretka.

Kreiranje Ustava Kosova smo započeli sa nadama i snovima o temeljnom dokumentu koji bi parirao

svakoj zapadnoj demokratiji u zaštiti ljudskih prava, u podršci vladavini prava i stvaranju moderne

parlamentarne republike. Krajnji trijumf nade nad strahom.

Ukratko, cilj je bio da se predloži moderan ustav koji bi pomogao da se zbriše nedavna istorija rata

i etničkog nasilja i otelotvore veliki ideali vladavine prava. I što je najvažnije, cilj je bio da se svetu

dokaže da je Kosovo spremno za nezavisnost i da može biti zemlja spremna da zaštiti sve svoje

građane.

Obraćanje g. Johna R. Tunheima, saveznog sudije Sjedinjenih Država i glavnog savetnika Sjedinjenih Država, koji je podržavao proces donošenja Ustava Republike Kosovo

30

Gospođa predsednica, koja je tada bila viši savetnik u USAID-u, organizovala je veliki deo posla po-

trebnog za izradu Ustava. Profesor Warren i profesor Aucoin, koji su danas ovde, bili su zaista, zaista

važni članovi tima.

Počeli smo tako što smo identifikovali temeljne zahteve koje očekuju Evropska unija, Venecijanska

komisija i raniji Ahtisarijev okvir za mir koji je proistekao iz pregovora u Beču.

Mudra i razumna višeetička, višestranačka Ustavna komisija, od kojih su neki danas ovde, imeno-

vana je da donosi važne odluke i vodi rad na izradi nacrta. Gospođa Keljmendi i gospodin Kuči su se

pokazali kao izvanredni lideri. A ovo je bio težak posao.

Iako svet pruža mnogo dobrih primera, ustav mora da obuhvata ne samo međunarodne sporazume,

već i da odražava lokalnu kulturu i norme. Istorija je važna i ljudi kojima će se upravljati moraju

prihvatiti uslove upravljanja. Ovo nije bio lak zadatak, posebno kada se u ranim fazama nije mogla

konsultovati javnost.

Do predvidljivog ćorsokaka je došlo leta kada članovi Komisije nisu mogli da se slože oko važnog pitan-

ja kako podeliti ovlašćenja između predsednika i premijera. Neko je sugerisao da moramo da dovede-

mo veterana diplomatu Ričarda Holbruka da posreduje. Ali to nije bilo neophodno — umesto toga, uz

pomoć američke šefice misije Tine Kajdanov, Gresa i ja smo proveli intenzivnu nedelju pregovarajući o

ključnom sporazumu o podeli vlasti među političkim liderima koji je utro put komisiji da izradi delove

predloženog ustava. Bivši predsednik Sejdiu je odigrao veoma važnu ulogu u ovom sporazumu. Velika

jesenja konferencija u blizini Mitrovice razjasnila je detalje i pobrinuli smo se da konačna formulacija

bude veoma precizna — na svakom od kosovskih jezika.

Ustav je bio od suštinskog značaja za ono što je usledilo, posledičnu Deklaraciju nezavisnosti 17.

februara 2008. godine. Skupština je brzo ratifikovala Ustav, nakon emotivne slavljeničke ceremo-

nije potpisivanja tokom koje su članovi Komisije izneli svoje preporuke kosovskim liderima, manje

od godinu dana nakon što je proces započet. Dugogodišnji san o nezavisnosti je postao stvarnost, a

vizionarski Ustav je bio na mestu da vodi novu zemlju.

Želim da na trenutak pozdravim Ustav Kosova, jer je to izuzetan dokument koji odražava ustavne

ideale priznate u celom svetu.

On u potpunosti uključuje odredbe osam međunarodnih konvencija o ljudskim pravima i daje veoma

značajnu zaštitu i prava na samoupravu nevećinskom stanovništvu Kosova. Ovde su prisutni koncepti

federalizma, podela vlasti između centralne i regionalne vlade, što je važna vrednost.

Ustavna zaštita od diskriminatornog tretmana je široka i jednakost je zagarantovana za sve. Ove

zaštite treba tumačiti u skladu sa odlukama Evropskog suda za ljudska prava. Ljudska prava su jed-

na od najvažnijih vrednosti koje zemlje moraju da unesu u svoje ustave ili temeljna dokumenta — a

kosovske garancije jednakosti su jake kao i bilo koje druge u svetu.

Među brojnim članovima koji se bave ljudskim pravima i ljudskim dostojanstvom, Ustav Kosova daje

pravo na besplatno obrazovanje, snažno pravo na privatnost, versku, akademsku i slobodu medija i

pravo na rad. Dokument takođe uključuje značajne i posebne odredbe protiv torture ili ponižavajućeg

31

postupanja. Jedinstvena i posebno vizionarska odredba zahteva od državnih organa da uzmu u obzir

uticaj svih odluka na životnu sredinu – što je danas važnije kada su klimatske promene pred nama.

Jednako važna u velikom panteonu naših zajedničkih ustavnih vrednosti je vladavina prava. A jedan

od najvažnijih zadataka ustavnog suda je zaštita vladavine prava. Ustavni sud Kosova je u potpunosti

ovlašćen da tumači Ustav i da bude uveren da su njegove odluke obavezujuće za vladu i pravosuđe i

za sva lica i institucije na Kosovu.

U potpunosti priznajem izradu konačne verzije člana 116, jer sam želeo da bude jasno da su odluke

ustavnog suda konačne i dalje, da je princip artikulisan u odluci ustavnog suda presedan za buduće

odluke. U to ne bi trebalo biti sumnje i Komisija se spremno složila.

Pored suda, uspostavljeno je veoma nezavisno pravosuđe da u potpunosti sprovodi zakone zemlje.

Nezavisno pravosuđe je sam temelj vladavine prava – kako strukturne nezavisnosti tako i nezavisno-

sti odlučivanja. Bez nezavisnog pravosuđa, obećanja o vladavini prava se ne mogu održati.

A, zahvaljujući Ustavu, Kosovo ima modernu parlamentarnu demokratiju evropskog tipa sa odred-

bama koje nastoje da izbegnu duge zastoje. Deo genijalnosti pisanja ustava je predviđanje potenci-

jalnih problema koji stoje na putu dobrog upravljanja. Takve probleme vidimo u trenutnom sukobu

oko toga ko će postati sledeći predsedavajući u našem Predstavničkom domu. Ne mogu se u pot-

punosti predvideti sva buduća pitanja, ali mislim da je Ustav Kosova blizu.

A kada govorimo o demokratiji, pravo glasa je široko i sveobuhvatno, omogućavajći puno učešće

građana u procesu donošenja odluka putem slobodnih i fer izbora.

U ovaj Ustav su ugrađeni koncepti podele vlasti i kontrole i ravnoteže više u američkom stilu. Ove

odredbe daju svakoj grani vlasti mogućnost da ograniči ovlašćenja drugih grana, osiguravajući odgov-

ornost i osnažujući manjinsko stanovništvo. Izvršna ovlašćenja su podeljena između predsednika i

premijera, princip civilne kontrole vojske i policije ne može se suspendovati, a vanredne nadležnosti

su podeljene. To su klasični ideali koji sprečavaju koncentraciju moći koja je često bila i nastavlja da

bude pogubna za naš svet.

Da, Ustav Kosova je izvanredan dokument, danas vizionarski kao što je bio kada je ratifikovan 2008.

godine. Ali održavanje demokratije živom i živopisnom je težak posao – mnogo teži od izrade ustava.

Oprez je potreban svaki dan - bez izuzetaka.

Jedan od osnivača Amerike, Bendžamin Frenklin, po izlasku sa Ustavne konvencije u Filadelfiji 1787.

godine, upitan je kakvu su vladu delegati stvorili. Njegov odgovor? „Republika, gospodine, ako je

možete održati“. To je, prijatelji moji, veliki izazov demokratije i vladavine prava… održati je.

Ustavni sud Kosova je, po mom mišljenju, uradio izuzetan posao u svojih 14 godina. Biti originalni

tumači Ustava — koji rade bez presedana — nije lako. Uprkos čestim promenama u sastavu i nes-

rećnim kašnjenjima u imenovanju novih članova, Sud je bio veran i hrabar tumač reči Ustava, svetao

svetionik za put koji je pred nama. I zaista, graditelj javnog poštovanja za vladavinu prava – što je od

suštinskog značaja za „održavanje iste”.

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-A vladavina prava, kako i treba, dovela je do prosperiteta i ekonomskog rasta. Bila mi je čast da rad-

im sa Sudom na usvajanju i reviziji njegovog poslovnika i u procesu, da izbliza posmatram rad Suda,

rešavajući mnoga teška pitanja sa kojima se suočava ova još uvek nova zemlja.

Danas slavimo izuzetan rad ovog Suda, kao što slavimo vizionarski dokument koji je za Kosovo pisa-

no oličenje vladavine prava. Slavimo i rad Komisije koja je vodila izradu ustava. Znate, često nosim

sa sobom ovaj džepni Ustav. Podseća me na ono što je dobro na ovom svetu i šta je potrebno za borbu

protiv zla na toliko mesta.

I nadam se da će se u godinama koje dolaze kada se piše istorija o počecima ove republike u srcu

Evrope, ovaj Ustav i ovaj Sud smatrati čvrstim temeljom koji je Kosovo učinio pričom o uspehu.

Kosovo je prešlo dug put od te hladne i očajne zime 1999. godine. Veliki razlog za ovaj izuzetan na-

predak je bila vladavina prava i posvećenost ljudskim pravima za sve. Obećanja koja su upisana u

Ustav i omogućena posvećenošću Ustavnog suda. Zajedno, oni su duša Kosova. Ima još mnogo posla,

ali put pred nama je jasan i svetao.

Republika, gospodine, ako je možete održati. Održimo je.

Mnogo vam hvala!

Johna R. Tunheima

Saveznog Sudije Sjedinjenih Država i glavnog savetnika Sjedinjenih Država, koji je podržavao proces

donošenja Ustava Republike Kosovo

33

Thank you, Madam President. It is a great honor to be asked to speak today on the special occa-

sion of the 14th Judicial Year of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Kosovo. A warm wel-

come to all of the Members and former Members of the Constitutional Court, to former Presidents of

the Republic, Honorable Ambassadors, and a special welcome to the international delegations and

visitors here with us. Thank you all for coming.

Today we celebrate a remarkable achievement — the Kosovo Constitution and the Court that has so

faithfully and courageously interpreted that document since independence in 2008. It has been one

of the great privileges of my life to have been involved in the development of so much of the legal

system in Kosovo, here in the heart of Europe.

My first visit was in cold winter of 1999-2000 when the cruel and inhumane ravages of war were ap-

parent everywhere. Yes, I brought a sleeping bag and needed it every night. Our task was to help the

United Nations re-start a legal system that had been destroyed like so many institutions. Amazingly,

one of the many difficult questions was what law should be in effect in Kosovo? Some of you will

recall our long travels throughout the territory and the resulting “Quick Start” program that reinvig-

orated Kosovo and the rule of law.

Supervising the first free elections in the fall of 2000 was an incredible experience. I have returned

many times over the years, drafting codes, assessing the progress of the judiciary, bringing American

judges to work in the international judge system, just giving advice and working on many rule of law

issues too numerous to mention today. I feel like Kosovo has become a second home to me over these

more than fifty visits. It is remarkable to see the change over this quarter of a century of progress.

We began the creation of the Kosovo Constitution with hopes and dreams of a foundational docu-

ment that would rival any western democracy in its protection of human rights, in its support for the

rule of law and in its creation of a modern parliamentary republic. The ultimate triumph of hope

over fear.

In short, the goal was to propose a modern constitution that would help sweep away the recent his-

tory of war and ethnic violence and embody the grand ideals of the rule of law. And importantly,

the goal was to prove to the world that Kosovo was ready for independence and could be a country

willing to protect all of its citizens.

Address by Mr. John R. Tunheim, United States Federal Judge and the Lead United States Advisor supporting the constitution- making process of the Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo

34

Madame President, who was then a senior advisor at USAID organized much of the work needed to

develop a Constitution. Professor Warren and Professor Aucoin, who are here today, were really,

really important members of the team.

We began by identifying the foundational requirements expected by the European Union, by the

Venice Commission and by the earlier Ahtisaari framework for peace arising out of the Vienna Talks.

A wise and sensible multi-ethic, multi-party Constitutional Commission, some of whom are here to-

day, was appointed to the make the important decisions and lead the drafting efforts. Ms. Kelmendi

and Mr. Kuçi proved to be outstanding leaders. And this was hard work.

Although the world provides many good examples, a constitution must encompass not only interna-

tional agreements, but also reflect local culture and norms. History is important and the people to

be governed must accept the terms of governance. This was not an easy task especially when in the

early stages the public could not be consulted.

A predictable impasse was reached in the summer when members of the Commission could not

agree on the important question of how to divide powers between a President and a Prime Minister.

Someone suggested that we needed to bring in the veteran diplomat Richard Holbrooke to mediate.

But that wasn’t necessary — instead, with the help of American Chief of Mission Tina Kaidanow,

Gresa and I spent an intense week negotiating a critical power sharing agreement among the polit-

ical leaders that paved the way for the commission to draft sections of the proposed constitution.

Former President Sejdiu played a very important role in this agreement. A large fall conference near

Mitrovica hammered out the details and we made sure that the final wording was very precise — in

each of Kosovo’s languages.

The Constitution was essential for what came next, the consequential Declaration of Independence

on February 17, 2008. The Assembly quickly ratified the Constitution, following an emotional cele-

bratory signing ceremony during which Commission members presented their recommendations to

Kosovo’s leaders, less than one year after the process was begun. The long-held dream of indepen-

dence became a reality, and a visionary Constitution was in place to guide the new country.

I want to salute the Kosovo Constitution for a moment because it is a remarkable document that

reflects constitutional ideals recognized throughout the world.

It fully incorporates the provisions of eight international covenants on human rights and grants very

significant protections and self-government rights to Kosovo’s non-majority populations. Concepts

of federalism, the division of power between the central and regional governments are present here,

an important value.

The constitutional protections against discriminatory treatment are extensive and equality is guar-

anteed for all. These protections are to be interpreted consistent with the decisions of the European

Court on Human Rights. Human rights is one of the most important values that countries must en-

shrine in their constitutions or foundational documents — and Kosovo’s guarantees of equality are

as strong as any in the world.

35

Among its many articles addressing human rights and human dignity, the Kosovo Constitution grants

a right to free education, a strong right of privacy, religious, academic and media freedom and a right

to work. The document also includes significant and specific provisions against torture or degrading

treatment. A unique and particularly visionary provision requires governmental entities to consider

the environmental impact of all decisions – more important today with climate change upon us.

Equally important in the grand pantheon of our shared constitutional values is the rule of law. And

one of the most important tasks of a constitutional court is to protect the rule of law. The Kosovo

Constitutional Court is fully empowered to interpret the Constitution and to be assured that its de-

cisions are binding on the government and on the judiciary and on all persons and institutions in

Kosovo.

I fully admit to drafting the final version of Article 116 because I wanted to make very clear that

constitutional court decisions are final and further, that the principle articulated in a constitutional

court decision is a precedent for future decisions. Of this, there should be no doubt and the Com-

mission readily agreed.

And alongside the court, the very independent judiciary was established to fully enforce the laws of

the country. An independent judiciary is the very foundation of the rule of law – both structural and

decisional independence. Without an independent judiciary, the promises of the rule of law cannot

be kept.

And, thanks to the Constitution, Kosovo has a modern European-style parliamentary democracy

with provisions that seek to avoid lengthy impasses. Part of the genius of constitution-writing is

anticipating potential problems that stand in the way of good governance. We are seeing such prob-

lems in the current standoff over who will become the next speaker in our House of Representatives.

One cannot fully anticipate all future issues, but I think the Kosovo Constitution comes close.

And speaking of democracy, the right to vote is broad and all-encompassing, allowing the full partic-

ipation of citizens in the decision-making process through free and fair elections.

Built into this Constitution are more American-style concepts of separation of powers and checks

and balances. These provisions give each branch of government the ability to limit the powers of the

other branches, ensuring accountability and empowering minority populations. Executive powers

are divided between the President and the Prime Minister, the principle of civilian control of mili-

tary and police cannot be suspended, and emergency powers are divided. These are classic ideals

that prevent the concentration of power that often have been and continue to be devastating for our

world.

Yes, the Kosovo Constitution is a remarkable document, as visionary today as it was when it was rat-

ified in 2008. But keeping a democracy vibrant and alive is hard work – much harder than drafting

a constitution. Vigilance is required every single day — no exceptions.

36

One of America’s Founders, Benjamin Franklin, on exiting the Constitutional Convention in Phil-

adelphia in 1787, was asked what sort of government the delegates had created. His answer? “A

republic, sir, if you can keep it.” That, my friends, is the great challenge of a democracy and the rule

of law… keeping it.

The Kosovo Constitutional Court, in my view, has done outstanding work in its 14 years. Being the

original interpreters of a Constitution — operating without precedents — is not easy. Despite fre-

quent changes in composition and unfortunate delays in appointing new members, the Court has

been a faithful and courageous interpreter of the words of the Constitution, a bright beacon for the

path ahead. And truly, a builder of public respect for the rule of law — essential to “keeping it.”

The Court’s work, through the leadership of President Enver Hasani, President Arta Rama and now

President Caka-Nimani, has been inspired and has helped to set Kosovo’s path to a solid and secure

future. The Court has surely helped to “keep” this republic in the words of Franklin.

And the rule of law, as it should, has led to prosperity and economic growth. It has been my privilege to

work with the Court in its adoption and revisions of its rules of procedure and in the process, to watch

the work of the Court from up close, resolving many difficult issues faced by this still very new country.

We celebrate today the exceptional work of this Court, just as we celebrate the visionary document

that for Kosovo is the written embodiment of the rule of law. We celebrate too, the work of the

Commission that guided the drafting of the constitution. You know, I often carry with me this pock-

et-sized Constitution. It reminds me of what is good in this world and what is needed to combat evil

in so many places.

And it is my hope that in the years to come when the history is written of the beginnings of this re-

public in the heart of Europe, that this Constitution and this Court are regarded as the firm founda-

tion that made Kosovo a success story.

Kosovo has come a long way since that cold and desperate winter of 1999. A big reason for this

remarkable progress has been the rule of law and the commitment to human rights for all. The

promises that are enshrined in the Constitution and enabled by the dedication of the Constitutional

Court. Together, they are the soul of Kosovo. There is much more work to do, but the path ahead is

clear and bright.

A republic, sir, if you can keep it. Let’s keep it.

Thank you very much!

John R. Tunheim

United States Federal Judge and the Lead United States Advisor supporting the constitution-making

process of the Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo

37

C’est un grand honneur d’être invité à prendre la parole aujourd’hui à l’occasion spéciale du 14ème

anniversaire judiciaire de la Cour Constitutionnelle de la République du Kosovo. Une bienvenue

à tous les membres et anciens membres de la Cour Constitutionnelle, aux anciens présidents de la

République, aux honorables Ambassadeurs, et une bienvenue particulière aux délégations et visi-

teurs internationaux ici parmi nous. Merci à vous tous d’être venus.

Aujourd’hui, nous célébrons un anniversaire remarquable — celui de la Constitution du Kosovo et la

Cour qui a interprété ce document avec tant de fidélité et de courage depuis l’indépendance en 2008.

Cela a été l’un des grands privilèges de ma vie d’avoir participé à l’élaboration d’une si grande partie

du système juridique au Kosovo, ici au cœur de l’Europe.

Ma première visite a eu lieu au cours de l’hiver rigoureux de 1999-2000, lorsque les ravages cruels et

inhumains de la guerre étaient encore visibles partout. Oui, j’avais apporté un sac de couchage et j’en

avais besoin tous les soirs. Notre tâche était d’aider les Nations Unies à relancer un système juridique

qui avait été détruit, comme tant d’institutions. Étonnamment, l’une des nombreuses questions dif-

ficiles était de savoir quelle loi devait être en vigueur au Kosovo ? Certains d’entre vous se souvien-

dront de nos longs voyages à travers le territoire et du programme « Quick Start » qui en a résulté et

qui a revigoré le Kosovo et l’État de droit.

Superviser les premières élections libres à l’automne 2000 a été une expérience incroyable. J’y

suis revenu à plusieurs reprises au fil des ans, rédigeant des codes, évaluant les progrès du système

judiciaire, faisant travailler des juges américains dans le système judiciaire international, prodi-

guant simplement des conseils et travaillant sur de nombreuses questions d’état de droit, trop

nombreuses pour être mentionnées aujourd’hui. J’ai l’impression que le Kosovo est devenu pour

moi une deuxième maison au fil de ces quelques cinquante visites, si ce n’est plus. Il est remar-

quable de voir le changement au cours de ce quart de siècle de progrès.

Nous avons commencé l’élaboration de la Constitution du Kosovo avec l’espoir et le rêve d’un docu-

ment fondateur qui rivaliserait avec n’importe quelle démocratie occidentale dans sa protection des

droits de l’homme, dans son soutien à l’État de droit et dans sa création d’une république parlemen-

taire moderne. L’ultime triomphe de l’espoir sur la peur.

Allocution de M. John R. Tunheim, Juge fédéral des États-Unis et conseiller principal des États-Unis ayant soutenu le processus d’élaboration de la Constitution de la République du Kosovo

38

En bref, l’objectif était de proposer une constitution moderne qui contribuerait à balayer l’histoire

récente de guerre et de violence ethnique et à incarner les grands idéaux de l’État de droit. Et surtout,

l’objectif était de prouver au monde que le Kosovo était prêt pour l’indépendance et pouvait être un

pays disposé à protéger tous ses citoyens.

Madame la Présidente, qui était alors conseillère principale à l’USAID, a organisé une grande partie

du travail nécessaire à l’élaboration d’une Constitution. Les professeurs Warren et Aucoin, qui sont

ici aujourd’hui, étaient des membres très importants de l’équipe.

Nous avons commencé par identifier les exigences fondamentales attendues par l’Union européenne,

par la Commission de Venise et par le cadre de paix Ahtisaari antérieur, issu des pourparlers de

Vienne.

Une Commission constitutionnelle multipartite, multi-ethnique, sage et sensée, dont certains

membres sont présents ici aujourd’hui, a été nommée pour prendre les décisions importantes et

diriger les efforts de rédaction. Mme. Kelmendi et M. Kuçi se sont révélés être des dirigeants excep-

tionnels. Et c’était un travail dur.

Bien que le monde fournisse de nombreux bons exemples, une constitution doit non seulement en-

glober les accords internationaux, mais également refléter la culture et les normes locales. L’histoire

est importante et les peuples à gouverner doivent accepter les conditions de gouvernance. Cela n’a

pas été une tâche facile, surtout lorsqu’au début le peuple n’a pas pu être consulté.

Une impasse prévisible s’est produite cet été lorsque les membres de la Commission n’ont pas pu

se mettre d’accord sur la question importante de la répartition des pouvoirs entre un président et

un premier ministre. Quelqu’un a suggéré que nous devions faire appel au diplomate chevronné Ri-

chard Holbrooke pour servir de médiateur. Mais ce n’était pas nécessaire : au lieu de cela, avec l’aide

de la chef de mission américaine Tina Kaidanow, Gresa et moi avons passé une semaine intense à

négocier un accord crucial de partage du pouvoir entre les dirigeants politiques qui a ouvert la voie

à la commission pour rédiger des sections du projet de loi Constitution. L’ancien président Sejdiu a

joué un rôle très important dans cet accord. Une grande conférence organisée à l’automne près de

Mitrovica a peaufiné les détails et nous avons veillé à ce que la formulation finale soit très précise –

dans chacune des langues courantes du Kosovo.

La Constitution a été essentielle pour ce qui a suivi, la Déclaration d’indépendance, le 17 février

2008. L’Assemblée a rapidement ratifié la Constitution, à la suite d’une cérémonie de signature

émouvante au cours de laquelle les membres de la Commission ont présenté leurs recommandations

aux dirigeants du Kosovo, moins d’un an après le processus a été entamé. Le rêve d’indépendance

de longue date est devenu réalité et une Constitution visionnaire a été mise en place pour guider le

nouveau pays.

39

Je tiens à saluer un instant la Constitution du Kosovo, car c’est un document remarquable qui reflète

les idéaux constitutionnels reconnus dans le monde entier.

Il intègre pleinement les dispositions de huit pactes internationaux relatifs aux droits de l’homme

et accorde des protections et des droits à l’autonomie gouvernementale très importants aux popula-

tions non majoritaires du Kosovo. Les concepts de fédéralisme, de division du pouvoir entre le gou-

vernement central et les gouvernements régionaux sont ici présents, une valeur importante.

Les protections constitutionnelles contre les traitements discriminatoires sont étendues et l’égalité

est garantie pour tous. Ces protections doivent être interprétées conformément aux décisions de la

Cour européenne des droits de l’homme. Les droits de l’homme sont l’une des valeurs les plus impor-

tantes que les pays doivent consacrer dans leur constitution ou leurs documents fondateurs – et les

garanties d’égalité du Kosovo sont aussi fortes que partout ailleurs dans le monde.

Parmi ses nombreux articles traitant des droits de l’homme et de la dignité humaine, la Constitution

du Kosovo accorde le droit à l’éducation gratuite, un droit fort à la vie privée, la liberté religieuse,

académique et des médias et le droit au travail. Le document comprend également des dispositions

importantes et spécifiques contre la torture ou les traitements dégradants. Une disposition unique

et particulièrement visionnaire exige que les entités gouvernementales prennent en compte l’impact

environnemental de toutes les décisions – plus important aujourd’hui avec le changement clima-

tique à nos portes.

Tout aussi important dans le grand panthéon de nos valeurs constitutionnelles communes, c’est

l’État de droit. Et l’une des tâches les plus importantes d’une Cour constitutionnelle est de proté-

ger l’État de droit. La Cour Constitutionnelle du Kosovo est pleinement habilitée à interpréter la

Constitution et à s’assurer que ses décisions sont contraignantes pour le gouvernement, le pouvoir

judiciaire et toutes les personnes et institutions du Kosovo.

J’admets pleinement avoir rédigé la version finale de l’article 116 parce que je voulais préciser très

clairement que les décisions de la Cour constitutionnelle sont définitives et, en outre, que le principe

énoncé dans une décision de la Cour Constitutionnelle constitue un précédent pour les décisions

futures. Il ne devrait y avoir aucun doute sur ce point et la Commission a accepté sans hésiter.

Et à côté du tribunal, un pouvoir judiciaire indépendant a été créé pour faire pleinement respecter les

lois du pays. Un système judiciaire indépendant est le fondement même de l’État de droit – tant sur

le plan structurel que décisionnel. Sans un système judiciaire indépendant, les promesses de l’État

de droit ne peuvent être tenues.

Et grâce à la Constitution, le Kosovo dispose d’une démocratie parlementaire moderne de type eu-

ropéen, dotée de dispositions visant à éviter de longues impasses. Une partie du génie de la rédac-

tion d’une constitution consiste à anticiper les problèmes potentiels qui font obstacle à la bonne

gouvernance. Nous constatons de tels problèmes dans l’impasse actuelle sur la question de savoir

qui deviendra le prochain président de notre Chambre des représentants. On ne peut pas anticiper

pleinement toutes les questions futures, mais je pense que la Constitution du Kosovo s’en rapproche.

40

Et en parlant de démocratie, le droit de vote est large et global, permettant la pleine participation des

citoyens au processus décisionnel par le biais d’élections libres et équitables.

Cette Constitution intègre des concepts plus américains de séparation des pouvoirs et de freins et

contrepoids. Ces dispositions donnent à chaque branche du gouvernement la possibilité de limiter

les pouvoirs des autres branches, garantissant ainsi la responsabilité et l’autonomisation des popu-

lations minoritaires. Les pouvoirs exécutifs sont partagés entre le Président et le Premier ministre,

le principe du contrôle civil de l’armée et de la police ne peut être suspendu et les pouvoirs d’urgence

sont partagés. Ce sont des idéaux classiques qui empêchent la concentration du pouvoir qui a sou-

vent été et continue d’être dévastatrice pour notre monde.

Oui, la Constitution du Kosovo est un document remarquable, aussi visionnaire aujourd’hui qu’elle

l’était lors de sa ratification en 2008. Mais maintenir une démocratie dynamique et vivante est un

travail difficile – bien plus difficile que de rédiger une constitution. La vigilance est de mise chaque

jour — sans exception.

L’un des fondateurs de l’Amérique, Benjamin Franklin, à sa sortie de la Convention constitutionnelle

de Philadelphie en 1787, fut interrogé sur le genre de gouvernement que les délégués avaient créé. Sa

réponse ? « Une république, monsieur, si vous pouvez la garder ». Voilà, mes amis, le grand défi de

la démocratie et de l’État de droit, ……..le préserver.

La Cour Constitutionnelle du Kosovo, à mon avis, a accompli un travail remarquable au cours de ses

14 années d’existence. Être les premiers interprètes d’une Constitution – opérant sans précédent –

n’est pas facile. Malgré de fréquents changements dans sa composition et des retards regrettables

dans la nomination de nouveaux membres, la Cour a été une interprète fidèle et courageuse des pa-

roles de la Constitution, un phare lumineux pour la voie à suivre. Et véritablement, un bâtisseur du

respect public pour l’État de droit – essentiel pour « le maintenir ».

Le travail de la Cour, sous la direction du Président Enver Hasani, due la Présidente Arta Rama et

désormais de la Présidente Caka-Nimani, a été inspiré et a contribué à ouvrir la voie au Kosovo vers

un avenir solide et sûr. La Cour a sûrement contribué à « garder » cette république, selon les mots

de Franklin.

Et l’État de droit, comme il se doit, a conduit à la prospérité et à la croissance économique. Ce fut

pour moi un privilège de travailler avec la Cour à l’adoption et à la révision de son règlement inté-

rieur et, ce faisant, d’observer de près le travail de la Cour, résolvant de nombreux problèmes diffi-

ciles auxquels est confronté ce pays encore très jeune.

Nous célébrons aujourd’hui le travail exceptionnel de cette Cour, tout comme nous célébrons le do-

cument visionnaire qui, pour le Kosovo, est l’incarnation écrite de l’État de droit. Nous célébrons

également le travail de la Commission qui a guidé la rédaction de la constitution. Vous savez, j’em-

porte souvent avec moi cette Constitution au format de poche. Cela me rappelle ce qui est bon dans

ce monde et ce qui est nécessaire pour combattre le mal dans de nombreux endroits.

41

Et j’espère que dans les années à venir, lorsque l’histoire des débuts de cette république au cœur de

l’Europe sera écrite, cette Constitution et cette Cour seront considérées comme la base solide qui a

fait du Kosovo une réussite.

Le Kosovo a parcouru un long chemin depuis cet hiver froid et désespéré de 1999. Ces progrès re-

marquables s’expliquent en grande partie par l’État de droit et l’engagement en faveur des droits de

l’homme pour tous. Des promesses inscrites dans la Constitution et rendues possibles par le dévoue-

ment de la Cour Constitutionnelle. Ensemble, ils constituent l’âme du Kosovo. Il y a encore beaucoup

de travail à faire, mais le chemin à parcourir est clair et lumineux.

Une république, monsieur, si vous pouvez la maintenir. Gardons-le.

Merci beaucoup!

John R.Tunheim

Juge fédéral des États-Unis et conseiller principal des États-Unis ayant soutenu le processus

d'élaboration de la Constitution de la République du Kosovo

42

Zonja Kryetare e Gjykatës Kushtetuese,

Zonja Zëvendës Kryeministre,

Zonja Ministre e Drejtësisë,

Të nderuar Zotërinj ministra,

Zonja dhe Zotërinj deputetë të Kuvendit të Kosovës,

Të nderuar zotërinj kryetarë të institucioneve të pavarura gjyqësore,

Zotëri Sejdiu, ish President i Republikës,

Zonja Jahjaga, ish Presidente e Republikës,

Të nderuar kryetarë komunash,

Zonja dhe Zotërinj, të ftuar kryetarë të Gjykatave Kushtetuese,

Zonja dhe Zotërinj ambasadorë dhe përfaqësues të organizatave ndërkombëtare,

Zonja dhe Zotërinj, të nderuar kolegë dhe miq.

Ju falënderoj përzemërsisht që më ftuat në manifestimet për të shënuar Vitin e 14-të Gjyqësor të

Gjykatës suaj dhe 15-vjetorin e Kushtetutës suaj.

Duke më mundësuar të flas në ceremoninë e hapjes, ndjej se po dërgoni një shenjë miqësie jo vetëm

për Këshillin Kushtetues Francez, por edhe për institucionet e vendit tim dhe, ndoshta mund të

Fjala kryesore e z. Laurent Fabius, Kryetar i Këshillit Kushtetues të

Republikës së Francës

Uvodno obraćanje g. Laurenta Fabiusa, predsednik Ustavnog saveta

Republike Francuske

Keynote address by Mr. Laurent Fabius, President of the Constitutional Council

of the Republic of France

Discours d’ouverture de M. Laurent Fabius,

Président du Conseil Constitutionnel

de la République française

Fjala kryesore e z. Laurent Fabius, Kryetar i Këshillit Kushtetues të Republikës së Francës

43

them, për Francën. Në këtë rast shoh jehonën e vëllazërisë mes Francës dhe Kosovës, e cila është

shfaqur në shumë mënyra që nga viti 1999, përfshirë këtu edhe në fushën e drejtësisë dhe ndërtimit

të shtetit ligjor.

Sikur të gjithë ju të pranishëm këtu, unë vlerësoj progresin e bërë, arritjet në aspektin e sundimit të

ligjit në një kohë të shkurtër, dhe do të na gjeni pranë jush për të përballuar vështirësitë që mbeten

ende për t’u zgjidhur. Sepse, siç e dimë të gjithë, mbeten shumë vështirësi për t’u zgjidhur. Periudha

aktuale është e rrezikshme. Kjo fjalë duhet përdorur pa ndrojtje të rreme. Duhet të mbizotërojnë ligji

dhe shteti i së drejtës. Edhe vendi im, gjatë historisë së tij, ka kaluar periudha me rreziqe. Kushtetuta

jonë aktuale buron nga njëra prej tyre.

1. Kontrolli kushtetues dhe sovraniteti popullor: shembulli i Francës

Për sa i përket pikërisht përvojës franceze, nuk do të kem kohë të mjaftueshme për të përshkruar

këtu plotësisht rrugëtimin e Këshillit Kushtetues që nga krijimi i tij në vitin 1958.

Megjithatë, dua të theksoj se kjo rrugë e konsiderueshme është shenjëzuar nga vendime që kanë

formësuar jurisprudencën tonë me forcë, por edhe në kërkim të ekuilibrit.

Një nga shenjëzimet kryesore në afirmimin e Këshillit Kushtetues si një Gjykatë Kushtetuese e vërtetë

është vendimi i 16 korrikut 1971 i njohur si “liria e asociimit” me të cilin Këshilli pohoi se i takon atij

të kontrollojë përputhshmërinë e ligjeve me të gjithë elementët që figurojnë në katalogun e të drejtave

themelore të cilave u referohet Kushtetuta franceze, domethënë Deklarata e famshme e të Drejtave të

Njeriut dhe Qytetarit të vitit 1789, Preambula e Kushtetutës së vitit 1946 dhe Karta e Mjedisit të vitit

2004.

Kontrolli i përputhshmërisë së ligjeve me rregullat tona kushtetuese është vendosur më pas vazhdimisht, veçanërisht që nga krijimi nga vetë Konstituenti në vitin 2008 të Çështjes Prioritare të Kushtetutshmërisë, të cilën më pëlqen ta quaj “çështje qytetare”. Kjo çështje përbën një progres demokratik pasi mundëson që çdo palë ndërgjyqëse në një proces gjyqësor t›ia referojë çështjen Këshillit Kushtetues nëpërmjet filtrit të instancave më të larta të drejtësisë civile dhe penale ose të drejtësisë administrative për të kontestuar përputhshmërinë e çdo ligji, pavarësisht nga data e miratimit të tij, me të drejtat dhe liritë që garanton Kushtetuta. Është një sukses i madh.

Afirmimi i Këshillit Kushtetues si Gjykatë Kushtetuese mund të kuptohet edhe nëpërmjet jurispru-

dencës që e ka krijuar dhe nëpërmjet vendimeve “të mëdha” që i ka marrë. Duke kontrolluar ligjet

që i janë paraqitur, Këshilli Kushtetues siguroi respektimin e parimeve të ndryshme: barazinë, laic-

itetin, lirinë e shprehjes, lirinë e ndërgjegjes, të drejtën për grevë, të drejtën e pronës, respektimin

e jetës private, paprekshmërinë e shtëpisë, të drejtën për të pasur një jetë normale familjare, pre-

zumimi i pafajësisë dhe së fundmi vëllazërimin, mbrojtjen e mjedisit dhe brezave të ardhshëm – si

dhe të disa parimeve të tjera kushtetuese.

44

Në kontrollin tonë të përputhshmërisë së ligjit me kërkesat kushtetuese, gjithmonë kemi parasysh

faktin se konstituenti mund të avancojë strukturën e këtyre kërkesave, por dimë gjithashtu se ndë-

rhyrja e tij duhet të konceptohet në përputhje me rregullat e parapara në Kushtetutë, përveç nëse

shfuqizohet.

Sundimi i ligjit sigurisht që mund të evoluojë, por shteti i së drejtës duhet të ruhet absolutisht.

E njëjta gjë vlen edhe për mënyrën se si Këshilli Kushtetues e parasheh artikulimin ndërmjet ligjit

kombëtar dhe ligjit të Bashkimit Evropian. Nga ky këndvështrim, kontrolli ynë kontribuon në rritjen

e mbrojtjes së shtetit të së drejtës që reflekton jo konkurrencën, por komplementaritetin ndërmjet

zyrave kushtetuese në përputhje me kushtet e Traktatit të Bashkimit Evropian. Shtoj se Këshilli

Kushtetues, edhe pse nuk e vlerëson përputhshmërinë e ligjit kombëtar me Konventën Evropiane

për Mbrojtjen e të Drejtave të Njeriut, megjithatë e ka në fokus dialogun me Gjykatën Evropiane të

të Drejtave të Njeriut, veçanërisht në formën e dialogut të praktikave tona gjyqësore, me një perspek-

tivë të përbashkët të mbrojtjes së shtetit të së drejtës.

2. Vlerat e përbashkëta me Kushtetutën e Kosovës

Pas këtij evokimi të shkurtër të akseve kryesore të kontrollit kushtetues të praktikuar në Francë,

dëshiroj të nënvizoj konvergjencat midis të drejtave dhe lirive të mbrojtura nga kushtetutat e dy

vendeve tona dhe të shumë prej të pranishmëve në këtë ceremoni.

Kushtetuta e Kosovës, të cilës ia garantoni respektimin në germë dhe në frymë, ka përfituar nga për-

vojat pozitive dhe negative të vendeve të tjera. Përpiluesëve të saj u është dashur të kenë parasysh

edhe rrethanat që çuan nga lufta e 1999-ës në pavarësinë e vitit 2008. Në veçanti për nga vlerat mbi

të cilat mbështetet, Kushtetuta e Kosovës është posaçërisht moderne. Më befason veçanërisht përf-

shirja në Kushtetutë e teksteve ndërkombëtare në të cilat Republika e Kosovës ende nuk është palë.

Kështu Kushtetuta e Kosovës përmban në nenin 22 të saj tekstet e rëndësishëm të Kombeve të Bash-

kuara, në veçanti Paktin për të Drejtat Civile dhe Politike dhe Konventën Evropiane për të Drejtat

e Njeriut si dhe protokollet e saj. U jep këtyre teksteve një vlerë më të lartë se ligji në hierarkinë e

standardeve dhe ua njeh zbatueshmërinë e drejtpërdrejtë. Kuvendi i Kosovës ka dëshiruar gjithashtu

t’i mbështes progreset normative duke u dhënë të njëjtën vlerë teksteve ndërkombëtare të miratuara

pas vitit 2008.

Në këtë dispozitë e cila mundëson zbatimin e një teksti të cilit Kosova ende nuk mund të anëtarëso-

het, unë shoh ambicien e lavdërueshme për t’iu ofruar qytetarëve tuaj mbrojtjen më të mirë të të

drejtave. Shoh gjithashtu aspiratën legjitime për të qenë në gjendje t’u bashkoheni këtyre instru-

menteve ndërkombëtare. Franca e mbështet këtë dëshirë. Paralelisht, për shumë vite Franca vepron

në mënyrë aktive drejt normalizimit të marrëdhënieve me Serbinë, që, përkundër vështirësive, është

rruga që Republika e Kosovës duhet të ndjek për të gjetur vendin e merituar në bashkësinë ndërkom-

bëtare.

45

Këto tekste, Franca i ka nënshkruar, në fakt, edhe shpesh i ka frymëzuar. Bazamentin që e formojnë e

kemi të përbashkët, ai na bashkon në një projekt demokratik dhe humanist.

Dëshiroj të vë në dukje në veçanti një pikë të përbashkët midis vlerave tona që krijojnë të drejtat

dhe liritë e garantuara nga Kushtetutat tona përkatëse: laiciteti dhe neutraliteti i shtetit në çështjet

e bindjeve fetare. Ky parim i laicitetit është i shënuar në paragrafin e parë të nenit të parë të Kushte-

tutës sonë. Në të thuhet se “Franca është një Republikë e pandashme, laike, demokratike dhe sociale.

Ajo siguron barazi para ligjit për të gjithë qytetarët, pa dallim origjine, race apo feje. Ajo respekton

të gjitha besimet (…)”.

Në fakt, ky parim i laicitetit është i vjetër. Ndarja daton në vitin 1905. Këshilli Kushtetues me një

vendim të datës 21 shkurt 2013 e bëri parimin e laicitetit një nga të drejtat që Kushtetuta garanton

në kuptim të nenit 61§1 të Kushtetutës. Ky vendim ka një rëndësi praktike: komponentët e laicitetit,

domethënë respektimi i të gjitha besimeve, barazia e të gjithë qytetarëve pa dallim feje dhe garantimi

i kultit, tani janë të gjitha të drejta që mund të inicohen nga palët ndërgjyqëse. Laiciteti nuk është më

vetëm një parim për organizimin e marrëdhënieve të kulteve me autoritetet publike, ai është shndër-

ruar tani në burimin ose themelin e të drejtave individuale. Padyshim që mund të kemi një dialog të

frytshëm mbi këtë temë dhe mbi çështjet e zbatimit të saj të cilat mund të shfaqen.

Një tjetër lëmi për të cilën mund të diskutojmë sepse po ecim në të njëjtin drejtim është tema de-

likate e të drejtës për martesë për çiftet e të njëjtës gjini. Kur u miratua, Kushtetuta e Kosovës ishte

për këtë temë një hap përpara në krahasim me dispozitat që ekzistonin në Francë në të njëjtën kohë.

Duke njohur të drejtën e martesës pa e kufizuar atë në çifte të gjinive të ndryshme, Kosova ka vendo-

sur një moment historik të rëndësishëm në një rrugë që ne e kishim kaluar tashmë – në vitin 1999 e

patëm vendosur të drejtën për çiftet e të njëjtës gjini për të hyrë në një partneritet civil të njohur nga

ligji. Nëse mund të shprehem kështu, ju kemi kaluar në këtë rrugë të barazisë dhe dinjitetit, duke

miratuar një ligj në vitin 2013, i cili i jep të gjithëve të drejtën për martesë. Këto dy ligje, ai i vitit

1999 dhe ai i vitit 2013, nuk u miratuan lehtë. Kemi patur debate, disa herë të ashpra, dhe çështja

kaloi në Këshillin Kushtetues. Ai vendosi se zgjedhja e ligjvënësit nuk ishte në kundërshtim me asn-

jë parim kushtetues. E paraqes këtë temë me kujdes, sepse e di që Parlamentit tuaj do t’i paraqitet

një tekst që reformon kodin civil, se ky tekst mund të përfshijë dispozita për martesën dhe se do t’i

takojë Gjykatës Kushtetuese të vlerësojë përputhshmërinë e këtij ligji të ardhshëm me Kushtetutën.

Prandaj nuk do të shkoj përtej përmendjes së përvojës sonë ose praktikës gjyqësore të Gjykatës Ev-

ropiane të të Drejtave të Njeriut. Megjithatë, theksoj – sepse kjo duhet medituar – kontrastin midis

vrullit, për të mos thënë tërbimit, të debateve që u zhvilluan në vitin 2013 në Francë, dhe qetësisë të

rishfaqur që nga miratimi i ligjit. Pse kjo qetësi? Ndoshta sepse të gjithë tani e kanë kuptuar që ky ligj

u solli disa të drejta të reja pa i hequr asnjë të drejtë të gjithëve.

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3. Gjykatat kushtetuese, garantuese të shtetit ligjor

Zonja Kryetare, zonja dhe zotërinj, “Çdo shoqëri në të cilën nuk garantohet siguria e të drejtave dhe

nuk përcaktohet ndarja e pushteteve, nuk ka Kushtetutë”: kështu thuhej, qartë dhe fuqishëm, në

Deklaratën e të Drejtave të Njeriut dhe të Qytetarit më 26 gusht 1789. Më lejoni të përmend një nga

këto aspekte, atë të pavarësisë së drejtësisë.

Zonja Kryetare, organizimi i drejtësisë në institucionet e Republikës së Kosovës e bën gjykatën tuaj

ekuivalente me tre institucionet tona franceze: Këshillin Kushtetues, Këshillin e Shtetit, organ su-

prem i drejtësisë administrative dhe Gjykatën e Kasacionit. Kuptoj ngarkesën e punës dhe veçanër-

isht peshën e përgjegjësive që janë tuajat.

Përtej specifikave organizative të çdo vendi, pavarësia e drejtësisë është në qendër të jurisprudencës

së Gjykatës Evropiane të të Drejtave të Njeriut, e cila i kushton vigjilencën më të madhe mbrojtjes

statutore dhe funksionale të gjyqësorit përballë rreziqeve të ndërhyrjes nga pushteti ekzekutiv. Ga-

rancitë formale dhe mbarëvajtja e procedurave për emërimin e gjyqtarëve dhe prokurorëve janë

në qendër të shtetit ligjor dhe rrjedhimisht funksionimit të duhur të institucioneve. Përzgjedhja e

kujdesshme e gjyqtarëve dhe caktimi në kohë të duhur i autoriteteve përgjegjëse për funksionimin e

duhur të drejtësisë meritojnë vëmendje të vazhdueshme.

Institucionet evropiane, Komisioni i Venecias të cilit i bëj nderime, dhe në mënyrë më të përgjithshme

institucionet e Këshillit të Evropës, të cilët Kosova dëshiron t’u bashkohet, mund t’ju ndihmojnë.

Ndarja e pushteteve për të cilën ju këmbëngulët zonja Kryetare është padyshim thelbësore. Ajo bazo-

het veçanërisht në respektimin (e gjësë së gjykuar) e res judicata. Kryesisht është përgjegjësi e ekze-

kutivit të sigurojë që vendimet e gjykatave të zbatohen në mënyrë efektive, qofshin ato vendime të

shkallës së parë ose, natyrisht, vendime të Gjykatës Kushtetuese. Është një parim konstituiv i shtetit

të së drejtës, është gjithashtu garantimi i sigurisë juridike pa të cilën asnjë ekonomi nuk mund të zh-

villohet në mënyrë të qëndrueshme, asnjë shoqëri nuk mund të lulëzojë vërtetë dhe asnjë demokraci

nuk mund ta meritojë emrin e saj.

Respektimi i res judicata nënkupton edhe sigurimin e efektivitetit të garancive dhe mbrojtjeve të

parashikuara nga tekstet kushtetuese ose legjislative. Kosova garanton në tekste një shkallë të lartë

të mbrojtjes së pakicave ose më mirë të komuniteteve dhe pjesëtarëve të tyre, të cilëve u kushtohet

një kapitull i tërë i Kushtetutës suaj. Këtë mbrojtje duhet ta shohin dhe ta ndjejnë çdo ditë pjesëtarët

e komuniteteve pakicë që jetojnë këtu. Kosova që bashkësia ndërkombëtare (të paktën shumica e

anëtarëve të saj) dëshironte ta shihte të pavarur është një Kosovë multietnike. Mbajtja e gjallë dhe

funksionale e këtij ekuilibri është çelësi i suksesit të këtij projekti dhe Gjykata juaj luan dhe do të

luajë një rol të konsiderueshëm.

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4. Pozicionimi ndërkombëtar i Gjykatës

Jam i vetëdijshëm se si interpretues të fundit të Kushtetutës mund të ndiheni disa herë të vetmuar për-

ballë pritshmërive, kritikave, madje edhe presioneve nga të tjerët. Situata e gjyqtarëve rrallëherë është e

lehtë. Duke iu përgjigjur në masë të madhe ftesës suaj për të kremtuar 15-vjetorin e Kushtetutës, të gjithë

ne, kryetarë dhe anëtarë të Gjykatave të tjera Kushtetuese, deshëm t’ju tregojmë solidaritetin tonë.

Programi i konferencës pas kësaj ceremonie solemne do të jetë një mundësi për shkëmbime mbi

temat që na shqetësojnë të gjithëve. Do të flasim për forcimin e demokracisë dhe shtetit ligjor

nëpërmjet kontrollit kushtetues, për ndërveprimet me gjykatat supranacionale dhe kontrollin e

kushtetutshmërisë së akteve. Mendoj se këto prezantime do të vejnë në pah sesi, përmes zgjidhjeve

ndonjëherë të ndryshme, po punojmë në të njëjtin drejtim.

15 vjet më parë shumë instanca ndërkombëtare e kanë inkurajuar Republikën e re të Kosovës. Gjyka-

ta juaj tani ka fituar vendin e saj dhe respektin që e shoqëron brenda komunitetit tonë të gjykatave.

Ju merrni pjesë në ndërtimin e kuptimit dhe interpretimeve të përbashkëta jo vetëm duke integruar

plotësisht praktikën gjyqësore përkatëse nga gjykatat e tjera, por edhe duke e bërë praktikën tuaj

gjyqësore lehtësisht të qasshme. E vlerësoj veçanërisht faktin që ju e bëni atë në frëngjisht në faqen

tuaj të internetit. Dhe jam i bindur se Gjykata juaj e ka vendin në kuadër të Shoqatës së Gjykatave

Kushtetuese frankofone.

Zonja Kryetare, të nderuar kolegë,

“Kushtetuta”, duke pasur parasysh etimologjinë e saj, është ajo që “na mban të bashkuar”. Në fund të këtij

fjalimi, dua të kujtoj, padyshim sikur ju, bashkësinë e vlerave për të cilat veprojmë dhe të cilat i mbrojmë.

Kujtoj kërkesën tonë të përbashkët për ndarjen e pushteteve, për pavarësi, paanshmëri dhe respektim të

ligjit. Kujtoj dialogun e nevojshëm ndërmjet gjyqtarëve kombëtarë dhe supranacional në veçanti për të

përputhur evoluimin e kërkesave kushtetuese dhe respektimin e rregullave. Më në fund kujtoj solidarite-

tin dhe vëllazërinë e gjykatave kushtetuese.

Zonja Kryetare,

Prandaj besoj se mund të veproj si zëdhënës i të gjitha gjykatave të pranishme këtu, duke ju shprehur

mirënjohjen tonë që na bashkuat këtu dhe duke ju përgëzuar për detyrën e kryer tashmë.

Laurent Fabius

Kryetar i Këshillit Kushtetues të Republikës së Francës

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Gospođo predsednice Ustavnog suda,

Gospođo zamenice premijera,

Gospođo ministarko pravde,

Poštovana gospodo ministri,

Dame i gospodo, poslanici Skupštine Kosova,

Poštovana gospodo, predsednici nezavisnih pravosudnih institucija,

Gospodine Sejdiu, bivši predsedniče Republike,

Gospođo Jahjaga, bivša predsednice Republike,

Poštovani predsednici opština,

Dame i gospodo, pozvani predsednici ustavnih sudova,

Dame i gospodo, ambasadori i predstavnici međunarodnih organizacija,

Dame i gospodo, drage kolege i prijatelji,

Iskreno Vam se zahvaljujem što ste me pozvali na manifestacije povodom 14. sudske godišnjice Suda

i 15. godišnjice Vašeg Ustava.

Omogućujući mi da govorim na ceremoniji otvaranja, osećam da šaljete znak prijateljstva ne samo

francuskom ustavnom savetu, već i institucijama moje zemlje i, mogao bih reći, Francuskoj. U ovom

slučaju vidim eho bratstva između Francuske i Kosova, koje se na mnogo načina javlja od 1999. go-

dine, uključujući i oblast pravosuđa i izgradnje vladavine prava.

Kao i svi prisutni, cenim postignuti napredak, dostignuća u pogledu vladavine prava za kratko vreme

i naći ćete nas pored sebe da se suočimo sa poteškoćama koje još uvek treba da se reše. Jer, kao što

svi znamo, mnoge poteškoće ostaju da se reše. Sadašnji period je opasan. Ovu reč treba koristiti bez

lažne stidljivosti. Zakon i vladavina prava moraju prevladati. Čak je i moja zemlja, kroz svoju istoriju,

prolazila kroz periode opasnosti. Naš sadašnji ustav proističe iz jednog od njih.

1. Ustavna kontrola i narodni suverenitet: primer Francuske

Što se konkretno tiče francuskog iskustva, neću imati dovoljno vremena da ovde u potpunosti opišem put Ustavnog saveta od njegovog stvaranja 1958. godine.

Međutim, želim da istaknem da je ovaj značajan put obeležen odlukama koje su na silu, ali i u potrazi

za ravnotežom, oblikovale našu jurisprudenciju.

Jedan od glavnih znakova u afirmaciji Ustavnog saveta, kao pravog Ustavnog suda, je odluka od

16. jula 1971. godine poznata kao „sloboda udruživanja“, kojom je Savet naglasio da je na njemu da

proverava usklađenost zakona sa svim elementima koji se pojavljuju u katalogu osnovnih prava na

Uvodno obraćanje g. Laurenta Fabiusa, predsednik Ustavnog saveta Republike Francuske

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koje se francuski Ustav poziva, a to su čuvena Deklaracija o pravima čoveka i građanina iz 1789. go-

dine, Preambula ustava iz 1946. godine i Povelja o životnoj sredini iz 2004. godine.

Kontrola usklađenosti zakona sa našim ustavnim pravilima je uspostavljena u kontinuitetu, poseb-

no od kada je sam Ustav 2008. godine kreirao Prioritetno pitanje ustavnosti, koje volim da zovem

„građansko pitanje“. Ovo pitanje predstavlja demokratski napredak, jer omogućava svakom parniča-

ru da predmet uputi Ustavnom savetu kroz filter viših instanci građanskog i krivičnog pravosuđa ili

administrativnog pravosuđa da oceni usklađenost bilo kog zakona, bez obzira na datum njegovog

donošenja, sa pravima i slobodama zagarantovanim Ustavom. To je veliki uspeh.

Afirmacija Ustavnog saveta kao Ustavnog suda može se razumeti i kroz jurisprudenciju koja ga je

stvorila i kroz „velike“ odluke koje je doneo. Proverom zakona koji su mu prezentovani, Ustavni savet

je obezbedio poštovanje različitih načela: ravnopravnosti, sekularizma, slobode izražavanja, slobode

savesti, prava na štrajk, prava na imovinu, poštovanja privatnog života, nepovredivosti doma, pravo

na normalan porodični život, pretpostavku nevinosti i nedavno bratstvo, zaštitu životne sredine i

budućih generacija – kao i neka druga ustavna načela.

U našoj kontroli usklađenosti zakona sa ustavnim zahtevima, uvek uzimamo u obzir činjenicu da

konstituent može unaprediti strukturu ovih zahteva, ali takođe znamo da njegova intervencija mora

biti koncipirana u skladu sa pravilima predviđenim u Ustavu, osim ako se ukine.

Vladavina prava svakako može evoluirati, ali vladavina zakona mora biti apsolutno očuvana.

Isto važi i za način na koji Ustavni savet predviđa artikulaciju između nacionalnog prava i prava Ev-

ropske unije. Sa ove tačke gledišta, naša kontrola doprinosi povećanju zaštite vladavine prava koja

ne odražava konkurenciju, već komplementarnost između ustavnih funkcija u skladu sa odredbama

Ugovora o Evropskoj uniji. Dodajem da se Ustavni savet, iako ne ocenjuje usaglašenost nacionalnog

prava sa Evropskom konvencijom za zaštitu ljudskih prava, ipak fokusira na dijalog sa Evropskim

sudom za ljudska prava, posebno u formi dijaloga naših sudskih praksi, sa zajedničkom perspek-

tivom zaštite vladavine prava.

2. Zajedničke vrednosti sa Ustavom Kosova

Nakon ovog kratkog osvrta na glavne osovine ustavne kontrole praktikovane u Francuskoj, želeo bih

da podvučem konvergencije između prava i sloboda zaštićenih ustavima naše dve zemlje i mnogih

prisutnih na ovoj svečanosti.

Ustav Kosova, za koji garantujete da ćete ga poštovati slovom i duhom, imao je koristi od pozitivnih

i negativnih iskustava drugih zemalja. Njegovi sastavljači su morali da uzmu u obzir i okolnosti koje

su dovele od rata 1999. godine do nezavisnosti 2008. godine. Konkretno, u pogledu vrednosti na ko-

jima se zasniva, Ustav Kosova je posebno moderan. Posebno sam iznenađen uvrštavanjem u Ustav

međunarodnih tekstova u kojima Republika Kosovo još uvek nije strana.

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Dakle, Ustav Kosova u svom članu 22 sadrži važne tekstove Ujedinjenih nacija, posebno Međunarod-

ni pakt o građanskim i političkim pravima i Evropsku konvenciju o ljudskim pravima, kao i njene

protokole. Ovim tekstovima daje veću vrednost od zakona u hijerarhiji standarda i priznaje njihovu

direktnu primenljivost. Skupština Kosova je takođe želela da podrži normativni napredak, dajući istu

vrednost međunarodnim tekstovima odobrenim posle 2008. godine.

U ovoj odredbi, koja omogućava sprovođenje teksta u kojem Kosovo još uvek ne može da postane član, vi-

dim hvale vrednu ambiciju da svojim građanima ponudi najbolju zaštitu prava. Vidim i legitimnu težnju

da se pridruži ovim međunarodnim instrumentima. Francuska podržava ovu želju. Francuska paralelno

već dugi niz godina aktivno radi na normalizaciji odnosa sa Srbijom, što je, uprkos poteškoćama, put ko-

jim Republika Kosovo mora da ide kako bi našla mesto koje joj pripada u međunarodnoj zajednici.

Francuska je potpisala ove tekstove, i u stvari, često ih je inspirisala. Mi delimo osnovu koju oni

formiraju, ona nas ujedinjuje u demokratski i humanistički projekat.

Želeo bih posebno da istaknem zajedničku tačku između naših vrednosti koje stvaraju prava i

slobode zagarantovane našim relevantnim ustavima: sekularizam i neutralnost države u pitanjima

verskog uverenja. Ovo načelo sekularizma je navedeno u prvom stavu prvog člana našeg Ustava. U

njemu se navodi da je „Francuska nedeljiva, sekularna, demokratska i socijalna republika. Osigurava

jednakost pred zakonom za sve građane, bez obzira na poreklo, rasu ili veru. Poštuje sve vere (…)“.

U stvari, ovo načelo sekularizma je staro. Razdvajanje datira još od 1905. godine. Ustavni savet je

odlukom od 21. februara 2013. godine uvrstio načelo sekularizma u jedno od Ustavom zagaranto-

vanih prava u smislu člana 61, stav 1 Ustava. Ova odluka ima praktičan značaj: komponente sekular-

izma, odnosno poštovanje svih vera, jednakost svih građana bez obzira na veroispovest i garancija

bogosluženja, sada su sva prava koja parničari mogu pokrenuti. Sekularizam nije više samo načelo

za organizovanje odnosa kultova sa javnim vlastima, on je sada postao izvor ili temelj individualnih

prava. Svakako možemo imati plodonosan dijalog o ovoj temi i o pitanjima njene implementacije

koja se mogu pojaviti.

Još jedna oblast o kojoj možemo da razgovaramo, jer se krećemo u istom pravcu, je delikatna tema

prava na brak za istopolne parove. Kada je usvojen, Ustav Kosova je po ovom pitanju bio korak na-

pred u odnosu na odredbe koje su postojale u Francuskoj u isto vreme. Priznavanjem prava na brak

bez ograničavanja na parove različitog pola, Kosovo je postavilo važan istorijski momenat na putu

koji smo već prošli – 1999. godine smo ustanovili pravo za istopolne parove da stupe u građansko

partnerstvo koje priznaje zakon. Ako mogu tako da se izrazim, postavili smo vas na ovaj put jedna-

kosti i dostojanstva donošenjem zakona 2013. godine koji svima daje pravo na brak. Ova dva zakona,

onaj iz 1999. godine i onaj iz 2013. godine, nisu lako usvojena. Imali smo rasprave, ponekad žestoke,

i to pitanje je upućeno Ustavnom savetu. On je ocenio da izbor zakonodavca nije u suprotnosti ni sa

jednim ustavnim načelom. Pažljivo iznosim ovu temu, jer znam da će se vašem parlamentu izneti

tekst o reformi građanskog zakonika, da ovaj tekst može da sadrži odredbe o braku i da će na Us-

tavnom sudu biti da oceni usaglašenost ovog budućeg zakona sa Ustavom. Stoga, neću ići dalje od

pominjanja našeg iskustva ili sudske prakse Evropskog suda za ljudska prava. Međutim, naglašavam

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– jer o tome treba razmisliti – kontrast između žestine, da ne kažem besa, rasprava koje su se vodile

2013. godine u Francuskoj, i mira koji se ponovo pojavio od donošenja zakona. Zašto ovaj mir? Mož-

da zato što su sada svi shvatili da je ovaj zakon doneo neka nova prava, a da nije svima oduzeo prava.

3. Ustavni sudovi, garant vladavine prava

Gospođo predsednice, dame i gospodo, „Svako društvo u kome nije zagarantovana sigurnost prava i

nije definisana podela vlasti nema ustav“: to je jasno i snažno rečeno u Deklaraciji o pravima čoveka

i građanina od 26. avgusta 1789. godine. Dozvolite mi da pomenem jedan od ovih aspekata, onaj o

nezavisnosti pravde.

Gospođo predsednice, organizacija pravosuđa u institucijama Republike Kosovo čini vaš sud ekviv-

alentnim sa naše tri francuske institucije: sa Ustavnim savetom, Državnim savetom, vrhovni organ

administrativne pravde, i Kasacionim sudom. Razumem opterećenje posla, a posebno težinu vaših

odgovornosti.

Pored organizacionih specifičnosti svake zemlje, nezavisnost pravosuđa je u središtu jurisprudencije Ev-

ropskog suda za ljudska prava, koji posvećuje najveću pažnju statutarnoj i funkcionalnoj zaštiti pravo-

suđa u suočavanju sa rizicima uplitanja od strane izvršne vlasti. Formalne garancije i nesmetano odvi-

janje procedura za imenovanje sudija i tužilaca su u središtu vladavine prava, a samim tim i pravilnog

funkcionisanja institucija. Pažljiv izbor sudija i blagovremeno imenovanje organa nadležnih za pravilno

funkcionisanje pravosuđa zaslužuju stalnu pažnju.

Evropske institucije, Venecijanska komisija, kojoj odajem počast, i uopšteno institucije Saveta Ev-

rope, kome Kosovo želi da se pridruži, mogu vam pomoći.

Podela vlasti na kojoj ste insistirali, gospođo predsednice, je nesumnjivo suštinska. Ona se posebno

zasniva na poštovanju (već presuđene stvari) res judicata. To je pre svega odgovornost izvršne vlasti

da obezbedi da se odluke sudova efikasno sprovode, bilo da se radi o prvostepenim odlukama ili, nar-

avno, o odlukama Ustavnog suda. To je konstitutivni princip vladavine prava, kao i garancija pravne

sigurnosti bez koje se nijedna ekonomija ne može održivo razvijati, nijedno društvo ne može istinski

cvetati i nijedna demokratija ne može zaslužiti njeno ime.

Poštovanje res judicata takođe znači obezbeđivanje delotvornosti garancija i zaštite predviđenih us-

tavnim ili zakonodavnim tekstovima. Kosovo u tekstovima garantuje visok stepen zaštite manjina,

odnosno zajednica i njihovih pripadnika, kojima je posvećeno jedno celo poglavlje vašeg Ustava.

Ovu zaštitu moraju svakodnevno da vide i osećaju pripadnici manjinskih zajednica koji ovde žive.

Kosovo, koje je međunarodna zajednica (barem većina njenih članica) želela da vidi, je nezavisno

multietničko Kosovo. Održavanje ove ravnoteže u životu i funkcionisanju je ključno za uspeh ovog

projekta i vaš sud igra i igraće značajnu ulogu.

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4. Međunarodno pozicioniranje Suda

Svestan sam da se kao konačni tumač Ustava ponekad možete osećati usamljeno pred očekivanjima,

kritikama, pa čak i pritiscima drugih. Situacija sudija je retko laka. Pošto smo se u velikoj meri odaz-

vali Vašem pozivu za proslavu 15. godišnjice Ustava, svi mi, predsednici i članovi drugih ustavnih

sudova, želeli smo da Vam pokažemo našu solidarnost.

Program konferencije nakon ove svečane ceremonije biće prilika za razmenu tema koje se tiču svih

nas. Govorićemo o jačanju demokratije i vladavine prava kroz ustavnu kontrolu, o interakciji sa nad-

nacionalnim sudovima i kontroli ustavnosti akata. Smatram da će ove prezentacije ukazati na to

kako, kroz ponekad različita rešenja, radimo u istom pravcu.

Pre 15 godina, mnoga međunarodna tela su podsticala novu Republiku Kosovo. Vaš Sud je sada

zaslužio svoje mesto i poštovanje koje ga prati u našoj sudskoj zajednici. Učestvujete u izgradnji za-

jedničkog razumevanja i tumačenja ne samo tako što ćete u potpunosti integrisati relevantnu sudsku

praksu drugih sudova, već i tako što svoju sudsku praksu učinite lako dostupnom. Posebno cenim

činjenicu da to radite na francuskom jeziku na vašoj internet stranici. I uveren sam da Vaš Sud ima

svoje mesto u Asocijaciji frankofonih ustavnih sudova.

Gospođo predsednice, poštovane kolege,

„Ustav“, s obzirom na njegovu etimologiju, je ono što nas „drži zajedno“. Na kraju ovog govora želim

da se setim, sigurno kao i vi, zajednice vrednosti za koju delujemo i koju branimo. Sećam se našeg

zajedničkog zahteva za podelu vlasti, nezavisnost, nepristrasnost i poštovanje zakona. Sećam se neo-

phodnog dijaloga između nacionalnih i nadnacionalnih sudija posebno kako bi se uskladio sa raz-

vojem ustavnih zahteva i poštovanjem pravila. Konačno, sećam se solidarnosti i bratstva ustavnih

sudova.

Gospođo predsednice,

Stoga, verujem da mogu da budem portparol svih sudova koji su ovde prisutni, izražavajući našu

zahvalnost što ste nas okupili ovde i čestitajući vam na već obavljenom zadatku.

Laurenta Fabiusa Predsednik Ustavnog saveta Republike Francuske

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Madam President of the Constitutional Court, Madam Deputy Prime Minister, Madam Minister of Justice, Dear Ministers, Ladies and Gentlemen, deputies of the Assembly of Kosovo, Dear gentlemen, presidents of independent judicial institutions, Mr. Sejdiu, former President of the Republic, Mrs. Jahjaga, former President of the Republic, Dear presidents of municipalities, Ladies and Gentlemen, invited presidents of the Constitutional Courts, Ladies and Gentlemen, ambassadors and representatives of international organizations,

Ladies and Gentlemen, dear colleagues and friends,

I sincerely thank you for inviting me to the manifestations of the 14th judicial anniversary of the Court and the 15th anniversary of your Constitution.

By allowing me to speak at the opening ceremony, I feel that you are sending a sign of friendship not only to the French Constitutional Council, but also to the institutions of my country and, perhaps I might say, to France. In this case, I see the echo of the brotherhood between France and Kosovo, which has appeared in many ways since 1999, including in the field of justice and the building of the rule of law.

As all of you present here, I appreciate the progress made, the achievements in terms of the rule of law in a short time, and you will find us by your side to face the difficulties that still remain to be solved. Be- cause, as we all know, many difficulties remain to be resolved. The current period is dangerous. This word should be used without false shyness. Law and the rule of law must prevail. Even my country, throughout its history, has gone through periods of danger. Our current constitution stems from one of them.

1. Constitutional control and popular sovereignty: the example of France

Precisely regarding the French experience, I will not have enough time to fully describe here the journey of the Constitutional Council since its creation in 1958.

However, I want to emphasize that this significant path has been marked by decisions that have shaped our jurisprudence with force, but also in search of balance.

One of the main signs in the affirmation of the Constitutional Council as a true Constitutional Court is the decision of 16 July 1971 known as “freedom of association” whereby the Council emphasized that it is up to it to check the compatibility of laws with all the elements that appear in the catalog of

Keynote address by Mr. Laurent Fabius, President of the Constitutional Council of the Republic of France

54

fundamental rights to which the French Constitution refers, namely the famous Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen of 1789, the Preamble of the Constitution of 1946 and the Charter for the Environment of 2004.

The control of the compatibility of laws with our constitutional rules has been established continuously, especially since the creation by the Constituent itself in 2008 of the Priority Issue of Constitutionality, which I like to call the “citizen issue”. This case constitutes a democratic progress as it enables any litigant in a trial to refer the case to the Constitutional Council through the filter of higher instances of civil and criminal justice or administrative justice to assess the compatibility of any law, regardless of the date of its adoption, with the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Constitution. It is a great success.

The affirmation of the Constitutional Council as a Constitutional Court can be understood through the case law that it created and through the “big” decisions it rendered. By checking the laws submit- ted before it, the Constitutional Council ensured respect for various principles: equality, secularism, freedom of expression, freedom of conscience, the right to strike, the right to property, respect for private life, the inviolability of the home, the right to have a normal family life, the presumption of innocence and finally fraternity, the protection of the environment and future generations - as well as some other constitutional principles.

In our control of the compatibility of the law with the constitutional requirements, we always take

into account the fact that the constituent can advance the structure of these requirements, but we

also know that its intervention must be conceived in accordance with the rules provided in the Con-

stitution, unless repealed.

The rule of law can certainly evolve, but the rule of law must be absolutely preserved.

The same applies to the way the Constitutional Council envisages the articulation between national law and European Union law. From this point of view, our control contributes to increasing the protection of the rule of law that reflects not competition, but complementarity between constitutional offices in accordance with the terms of the European Union Treaty. I add that the Constitutional Council, although it does not assess the compatibility of the national law with the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights, nevertheless focuses on the dialogue with the European Court of Human Rights, espe- cially in the form of the dialogue of our case laws, with a common perspective of protecting the rule of law.

2. Common values with the Constitution of Kosovo

After this brief evocation of the main axes of constitutional control practiced in France, I would like to underline the convergences between the rights and freedoms protected by the constitutions of our two countries and of many of those present at this ceremony.

The Constitution of Kosovo, to which you guarantee respect in letter and spirit, has benefited from the positive and negative experiences of other countries. Its drafters had to take into account the circum- stances that led from the war of 1999 to the independence of 2008. In particular, in terms of the values on which it rests, the Constitution of Kosovo is particularly modern. I am particularly surprised by the inclusion in the Constitution of international texts to which the Republicof Kosovo is not yet a party.

55

Thus, the Constitution of Kosovo contains in its Article 22 the important texts of the United Nations, in particular the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the European Convention on Human Rights as well as its protocols. It gives these texts a higher value than the law in the hierarchy of stan- dards and recognizes their direct applicability. The Assembly of Kosovo has also wished to support normative progress by giving the same value to international texts approved after 2008.

In this provision which enables the implementation of a text to which Kosovo cannot yet join, I see the commendable ambition to offer your citizens the best protection of rights. I also see the legiti- mate aspiration to be able to join these international instruments. France supports this desire. In a parallel way, for many years France has been actively working towards the normalization of relations with Serbia, which, despite the difficulties, is the path that the Republic of Kosovo must follow in order to find its rightful place in the international community.

France has signed these texts, in fact, it has often inspired them. We share the foundation they form,

it unites us in a democratic and humanistic project.

I would like to point out in particular a common point between our values that create the rights and

freedoms guaranteed by our respective Constitutions: secularism and the neutrality of the state in

matters of religious belief. This principle of secularism is stated in the first paragraph of the first ar-

ticle of our Constitution. It states that “France shall be an indivisible, secular, democratic and social

Republic. It shall ensure the equality of all citizens before the law, without distinction of origin, race

or religion. It shall respect all beliefs (…)”.

In fact, this principle of secularism is old. The separation dates back to 1905. The Constitutional

Council, by a decision dated 21 February 2013, made the principle of secularism one of the rights

guaranteed by the Constitution in terms of Article 61§1 of the Constitution. This decision has prac-

tical significance: the components of secularism, namely the respect of all beliefs, the equality of all

citizens regardless of religion and the guarantee of worship, are now all rights that can be initiated

by litigants. Secularism is no longer just a principle for organizing the relations of cults with public

authorities, it has now become the source or foundation of individual rights. We can undoubtedly

have a fruitful dialogue on this topic and on the implementation issues that may arise.

Another issue we can discuss because we are moving in the same direction is the sensitive topic of the

right to marriage of same-sex couples. When it was adopted, the Constitution of Kosovo was on this sub-

ject a step forward compared to the provisions that existed in France at the same time. By recognizing

the right to marry without limiting it to couples of different sexes, Kosovo has set an important historical

moment on a path that we had already passed - in 1999 we established the right for same-sex couples to

enter into a civil partnership recognized by law. If I may say so, we have put you on this path of equality

and dignity by passing a law in 2013 that gives everyone the right to marry. These two laws, the one of

1999 and the one of 2013, were not easily approved. We had debates, several times severe, and the mat-

ter went to the Constitutional Council. It ruled that the election of the legislator was not contrary to any

constitutional principle. I present this topic carefully, because I know that your Parliament will present

a text reforming the civil code, that this text may include provisions on marriage, and that it will be up to

the Constitutional Court to assess the compatibility of this future law with the Constitution. Therefore, I

56

will not go beyond mentioning our experience or the case law of the European Court of Human Rights.

However, I emphasize - because this should be pondered - the contrast between the vigor, not to say the

fury, of the debates that took place in 2013 in France, and the serenity that has reappeared since the law

was passed. Why this calm? Maybe because everyone has now realized that this law brought some new

rights without taking away any rights from everyone.

3. Constitutional courts, guaranteeing the rule of law

Madam President, ladies and gentlemen, “A society in which the observance of the law is not as-

sured, nor the separation of powers defined, has no constitution at all.”: this was said, clearly and

strongly, in the Declaration of Human and Citizen Rights on 26 August 1789. Let me mention one of

these aspects, that of the independence of justice.

Madam President, the organization of justice in the institutions of the Republic of Kosovo makes

your court equivalent to our three French institutions: the Constitutional Council, the Council of

State, the supreme body of administrative justice and the Court of Cassation. I understand the work-

load and especially the weight of the responsibilities that are yours.

Beyond the organizational specifics of each country, the independence of justice is at the center of the

jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights, which devotes the greatest vigilance to the

statutory and functional protection of the judiciary in the face of the risks of interference from the

executive power. Formal guarantees and the smooth running of the procedures for the appointment

of judges and prosecutors are at the center of the rule of law and therefore the proper functioning of

the institutions. The careful selection of judges and the timely appointment of authorities responsi-

ble for the proper functioning of justice deserve constant attention.

The European institutions, the Venice Commission to which I pay tribute, and more generally the

institutions of the Council of Europe, which Kosovo wants to join, can help you.

Separation of powers, which you insisted on Madam President, is obviously essential. It is based in

particular on the respect of (adjudicated matter) res judicata. It is primarily the executive’s respon-

sibility to ensure that the decisions of the courts are effectively implemented, be they first instance

decisions or, of course, decisions of the Constitutional Court. It is a constitutive principle of the rule

of law, it is also the guaranteeing of legal certainty without which no economy can develop sustain-

ably, no society can truly flourish and no democracy can deserve its name.

Respecting res judicata also means ensuring the effectiveness of guarantees and protections pro-

vided by constitutional or legislative texts. Kosovo guarantees in the texts a high degree of protec-

tion of minorities or rather of communities and their members, to whom a whole chapter of your

Constitution is dedicated. This protection must be seen and felt every day by the members of the

minority communities who live here. The Kosovo, which the international community (at least most

of its members) wanted to see independent, is a multi-ethnic Kosovo. Keeping this balance alive and

functioning is key to the success of this project and your Court plays and will play a significant role.

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4. International positioning of the Court

I am aware that as the ultimate interpreter of the Constitution you can sometimes feel alone in the

face of expectations and even pressure from others. The situation of judges is rarely easy. Having

largely responded to your invitation to celebrate the 15th anniversary of the Constitution, all of us,

presidents and members of other Constitutional Courts, wanted to show you, our solidarity.

The conference program after this solemn ceremony will be an opportunity for exchanges on topics

that concern us all. We will talk about the strengthening of democracy and the rule of law through

constitutional control, about interactions with supranational courts and control of the constitution-

ality of acts. I think that these presentations will highlight how, through sometimes different solu-

tions, we are working in the same direction.

15 years ago, many international instances encouraged the new Republic of Kosovo. Your Court has

now earned its place and the respect that goes with it within our court community. You participate in

building shared understanding and interpretations not only by fully integrating relevant case law of

other courts, but also by making your own case law easily accessible. I especially appreciate the fact

that you do it in French on your website. And I am convinced that your Court has its place within the

Association of Francophone Constitutional Courts.

Madam President, dear colleagues,

“Constitution”, given its etymology, is what “holds us together”. At the end of this speech, I want to

recall, obviously like you, the community of values for which we act and which we protect. I recall

our common demand for independence, impartiality and respect for the law. I recall the necessary

dialogue between national and supranational judges in particular to match the evolution of consti-

tutional requirements and respect for the rules. Finally, I remember the solidarity and brotherhood

of the constitutional courts.

Madam President,

Therefore, I believe that I can act as a spokesperson for all the courts present here, expressing our

gratitude for joining us here and congratulating you on the task already accomplished.

Laurent Fabius

President of the Constitutional Council of the Republic of France

58

Madame la Présidente de la Cour constitutionnelle,

Madame la vice Première Ministre,

Madame la Ministre de la Justice,

Messieurs les Ministres,

Mesdames et Messieurs les Membres de l’Assemblée du Kosovo,

Messieurs les Présidents des institutions judicaires indépendantes,

Monsieur Sedjiu, ancien Président de la République,

Madame Jahjaga, ancienne Présidente de la République,

Messieurs les Maires,

Mesdames et Messieurs les Présidentes et Présidents des Cours constitutionnelles invitées,

Mesdames et Messieurs les Ambassadrices et Ambassadeurs et Représentants des organisations in-

ternationales,

Mesdames et Messieurs, chers collègues et amis.

Je vous remercie chaleureusement de m’avoir invité aux manifestations marquant la 14e année judi-

ciaire de la Cour et les 15 ans de votre Constitution.

En me proposant d’y prendre la parole dans la cérémonie d’ouverture, je ressens que vous adressez

un signe d’amitié non seulement au Conseil constitutionnel français mais aussi aux institutions de

mon pays et, oserai-je dire, à la France. J’y vois l’écho de la fraternité entre la France et le Kosovo,

qui s’est manifestée de bien des manières depuis 1999, y compris dans le domaine de la justice et de

la construction de l’Etat de droit.

Comme chacune et chacun ici, j’apprécie le chemin parcouru, les réalisations en matière d’Etat de

droit en peu de temps et vous nous trouverez à vos côtés pour faire face aux difficultés qui restent

encore à résoudre. Car il reste, chacun en est conscient, de nombreuses difficultés à résoudre. La

période actuelle est dangereuse. Il faut utiliser ce mot sans fausse pudeur. Le droit et l’Etat de droit

doivent prévaloir. Mon pays est également passé, dans son histoire, par des périodes de dangers.

Notre Constitution actuelle est d’ailleurs issue de l’une d’entre elle.

1. Contrôle constitutionnel et souveraineté populaire: l’exemple de la France

S’agissant précisément de l’expérience française, je manquerai de temps pour décrire ici de manière

complète le chemin du Conseil constitutionnel depuis sa création en 1958.

Discours d’ouverture de M. Laurent Fabius, Président du Conseil Constitutionnel de la République française

59

Je veux cependant souligner que ce chemin considérable a été jalonné de décisions qui ont façonné

notre jurisprudence avec force mais aussi dans une recherche d’équilibre.

L’un des jalons principaux de l’affirmation du Conseil constitutionnel en véritable Cour constitution-

nelle est la décision du 16 juillet 1971 dite « liberté d’association » par laquelle le Conseil a affirmé

qu’il lui revient de contrôler la conformité des lois avec l’ensemble des éléments figurant dans le

catalogue des droits fondamentaux auquel se réfère la Constitution française, c’est-à-dire la fameuse

Déclaration des droits de l’homme et du citoyen de 1789, le Préambule de la Constitution de 1946 et

la Charte de l’environnement de 2004.

Le contrôle de la conformité des lois à nos règles constitutionnelles s’est ensuite déployé constam-

ment, notamment depuis la création par le Constituant lui-même en 2008 de la Question Prioritaire

de Constitutionnalité que j’aime à appeler la « question citoyenne ». Celle-ci a constitué un progrès

démocratique puisqu’elle permet à chaque justiciable partie à un procès de saisir le Conseil constitu-

tionnel via le filtre de la des plus hautes instances de la justice civile et pénale ou de la justice admi-

nistrative pour contester la conformité de toute loi, quelle que soit sa date d’adoption, aux droits et

libertés que la Constitution garantit. C’est un grand succès.

L’affirmation du Conseil constitutionnel comme Cour constitutionnelle se lit aussi à travers la jurispru-

dence qu’il a forgée et les « grandes » décisions qu’il a rendues. En contrôlant les lois dont il a été saisi, le

Conseil constitutionnel a veillé au respect de divers principes : égalité, laïcité, liberté d’expression, liberté

de conscience, droit de grève, droit de propriété, respect de la vie privée, inviolabilité du domicile, droit

de mener une vie familiale normale, présomption d’innocence, et récemment fraternité, protection de

l’environnement et des générations futures – ainsi que plusieurs autres principes constitutionnels.

Dans notre contrôle de la conformité de la loi aux exigences constitutionnelles, nous ne perdons ja-

mais de vue que le constituant est susceptible de faire évoluer le corpus de ces exigences, mais nous

savons aussi que son intervention doit elle-même être conçue dans le respect des règles inscrites

dans la Constitution, sauf à la priver de sa force.

L’état de droit peut bien sûr évoluer, mais l’Etat de droit, lui, doit être absolument préservé.

Il en est de même pour la manière dont le Conseil constitutionnel conçoit l’articulation entre le

droit national et le droit de l’Union européenne. De ce point de vue, notre contrôle contribue à une

protection augmentée de l’Etat de droit qui traduit, non pas une concurrence, mais une complémen-

tarité entre les offices constitutionnel conformément aux termes du Traité sur l’Union européenne.

J’ajoute que le Conseil constitutionnel, s’il n’est pas juge de la conformité de la loi nationale à la

Convention européenne de sauvegarde des droits de l’homme, est également très attaché au dialogue

qu’il conduit avec la Cour européenne des droits de l’homme, sous la forme notamment du dialogue

de nos jurisprudences, dans une optique partagée de protection de l’Etat de droit.

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2. Les valeurs partagées avec la Constitution du Kosovo

A l’issue de cette brève évocation des lignes de force du contrôle constitutionnel pratiqué en France,

je souhaiterais souligner les convergences entre les droits et libertés protégées par les constitutions

de nos deux pays et de beaucoup de ceux qui sont présents dans cette cérémonie.

La Constitution kosovare, dont vous garantissez le respect dans la lettre et dans l’esprit, a bénéficié

des expériences positives et négatives d’autres pays. Ses rédacteurs ont aussi eu à prendre en compte

les circonstances qui ont conduit de la guerre de 1999 à l’indépendance de 2008. S’agissant en par-

ticulier des valeurs sur lesquelles elle repose, elle est particulièrement moderne. Je suis notamment

frappé par l’inclusion dans la Constitution de textes internationaux auxquels la république du Koso-

vo n’est pas encore partie.

La Constitution du Kosovo intègre ainsi dans son article 22 les grands textes des Nations unies,

en particulier le Pacte sur les droits civils et politiques et la Convention européenne des droits de

l’Homme ainsi que ses protocoles. Elle donne à ces textes une valeur supérieure à la loi dans la hié-

rarchie des normes et leur reconnait une applicabilité directe. L’Assemblée du Kosovo a également

souhaité accompagner les progrès normatifs en donnant la même valeur à des textes internationaux

adoptés postérieurement à 2008.

Je vois dans cette disposition, qui permet d’appliquer un texte auquel le Kosovo ne peut encore

adhérer, l’ambition louable d’offrir la meilleure protection des droits à vos citoyens. J’y vois aussi

l’aspiration légitime de pouvoir adhérer à ces instruments internationaux. La France soutient ce sou-

hait. En parallèle elle œuvre activement, depuis de nombreuses années, en vue de la normalisation

des relations avec la Serbie qui, malgré les difficultés, est la voie à suivre pour que la République du

Kosovo puisse trouver toute la place qui lui revient dans la communauté internationale.

Ces textes, la France les a elle-même signés, elle les a d’ailleurs souvent inspirés. Ils forment un

socle que nous avons en commun, qui nous arriment ensemble dans un projet démocratique et

humaniste.

Je souhaite relever notamment un point commun entre nos valeurs qui fondent les droits et les li-

bertés garantis par nos Constitutions respectives : celui de la laïcité et de la neutralité de l’Etat en

matière de convictions religieuses. Ce principe de laïcité est inscrit dès le premier alinéa du premier

article de notre Constitution. Il dispose que « la France est une République indivisible, laïque, démo-

cratique et sociale. Elle assure l’égalité devant la loi de tous les citoyens, sans distinction d’origine,

de race ou de religion. Elle respecte toutes les croyances (…) ».

Dans les faits, ce principe de laïcité est ancien. La séparation remonte en effet à 1905. Dans une dé-

cision du 21 février 2013, le Conseil constitutionnel a fait du principe de laïcité l’un des droits que

la Constitution garantit au sens de l’article 61§1 de la Constitution. Cette décision a une portée pra-

tique : les composantes de la laïcité, c’est à dire le respect de toutes les croyances, l’égalité de tous les

citoyens sans distinction de religion et la garantie des cultes, sont désormais autant de droits suscep-

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tibles d’être actionnés par les justiciables. La laïcité n’est plus seulement un principe pour organiser

les rapports des cultes avec les pouvoirs publics, elle est devenue la source ou le fondement de droits

individuels. Sans doute pourrions-nous avoir un dialogue fructueux sur ce sujet et sur les questions

d’application qu’il peut soulever.

Il est un autre domaine dans lequel nous pourrions avoir matière à échanger car nous cheminons dans

la même direction, c’est celui, délicat, du droit au mariage pour les couples de même sexe. Lors de son

adoption, la Constitution du Kosovo était sur ce sujet en avance par rapport aux dispositions existant

en France au même moment. En reconnaissant le droit au mariage sans le limiter aux couples de sexe

différent, le Kosovo a posé un jalon important sur un chemin que nous-mêmes avions déjà emprunté

– nous avions établi en 1999 le droit pour les couples de même sexe d’entrer dans un partenariat civil

reconnu par la loi. Nous vous avons, si je puis dire, rattrapé sur ce chemin d’égalité et de dignité en

adoptant en 2013 une loi qui ouvre à tous le droit au mariage. Ces deux lois, celle de 1999 et celle de

2013 n’ont pas été adoptées facilement. Des débats parfois virulents ont eu lieu et le Conseil constitu-

tionnel a été saisi. Il a jugé que le choix du législateur n’était contraire à aucun principe constitutionnel.

J’évoque ce sujet avec précaution car je sais que votre Parlement devrait être saisi d’un texte portant ré-

forme du code civil, que ce texte pourrait comprendre des dispositions sur ce sujet et qu’il reviendrait à

la Cour constitutionnelle d’apprécier la conformité de cette future loi avec la Constitution. Je me borne

donc à faire mention de notre expérience ou encore de la jurisprudence de la Cour européenne des

droits de l’Homme. Je souligne néanmoins – car ceci doit être médité – le contraste entre la vigueur,

pour ne pas dire la fureur, des débats qui ont eu lieu en 2013 en France, et la sérénité retrouvée depuis

l’adoption de la loi. Pourquoi cette sérénité ? Probablement parce que chacun a désormais compris que

cette loi a apporté un droit nouveau à certains sans enlever aucun droit à tous.

3. Les cours constitutionnelles, garantes de l’Etat de droit

Madame le Présidente, mesdames, messieurs, « Toute société dans laquelle la garantie des droits

n’est pas assurée, ni la séparation des pouvoirs déterminée, n’a point de constitution » : voilà ce que

posait avec clarté et force la Déclaration des droits de l’homme et du citoyen du 26 août 1789. Per-

mettez-moi d’évoquer un de ces aspects, celui de l’indépendance de la justice.

Madame la Présidente, l’organisation de la justice dans les institutions de la République du Kosovo

fait de votre cour l’équivalente de trois de nos institutions françaises : le Conseil constitutionnel,

le Conseil d’Etat, organe suprême de la justice administrative et la Cour de cassation. J’imagine la

charge de travail et surtout le poids des responsabilités qui sont les vôtres.

Au-delà des spécificités d’organisation de chaque pays, l’indépendance de la justice est au cœur de la

jurisprudence de la Cour européenne des droits de l’Homme qui accorde la plus grande vigilance à la

protection statutaire et fonctionnelle du pouvoir judiciaire face aux risques d’ingérence du pouvoir

exécutif. Les garanties formelles et le bon déroulement des procédures de nomination des juges et

des procureurs sont au cœur de l’Etat de droit et par conséquent du bon fonctionnement des insti-

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tutions. La sélection attentive des juges comme la désignation en temps voulu des autorités respon-

sables du bon fonctionnement de la justice méritent une attention toujours renouvelée.

Les institutions européennes, la Commission de Venise à laquelle je rends hommage, plus générale-

ment celles du Conseil de l’Europe, que le Kosovo souhaite rejoindre, sont là pour vous aider.

La séparation des pouvoirs sur laquelle vous avez insisté Madame la Présidente est évidemment

essentielle. Elle repose notamment sur le respect de la chose jugée. Il appartient, principalement à

l’exécutif, de faire en sorte que les décisions de justice soient effectivement appliquées, qu’il s’agisse

de décisions de première instance et, bien entendu, des décisions de la Cour constitutionnelle. C’est

un principe constitutif de l’Etat de droit, c’est aussi l’assurance d’une sécurité juridique sans laquelle

aucune économie ne peut durablement se développer, aucune société ne peut vraiment s’épanouir et

aucune démocratie ne peut mériter son nom.

Le respect de la chose jugée, c’est aussi l’assurance de l’effectivité des garanties et protections que

fournissent les textes constitutionnels ou législatifs. Le Kosovo garantit dans les textes un haut de-

gré de protection aux minorités ou plutôt aux communautés et à leurs membres, à qui un chapitre

entier de votre Constitution est consacré. Cette protection doit être constatée et ressentie chaque

jour par les membres des communautés minoritaires qui vivent ici. Le Kosovo que la communauté

internationale (du moins la majorité de ses membres) a souhaité voir indépendant est un Kosovo

multiethnique. Maintenir vivant et fonctionnel cet équilibre est une clé de la réussite de ce projet et

votre Cour joue et jouera un rôle considérable.

4. Le positionnement international de la Cour

Je n’ignore pas qu’être l’interprète ultime de la Constitution suppose quelques moments de solitude

face aux attentes, aux critiques, voire aux pressions des uns et des autres. La situation des juges est

rarement facile. En répondant nombreux à votre invitation pour célébrer les 15 ans de la Constitu-

tion, nous tous, Présidents et membres des autres Cours constitutionnelles, nous avons souhaité

vous témoigner notre solidarité.

Le programme du colloque à l’issue de cette cérémonie solennelle sera l’occasion d’échanges sur des

sujets qui nous concernent tous. Seront évoqués le renforcement de la démocratie et de l’Etat de

droit par le contrôle constitutionnel, les interactions avec les cours supranationales, le contrôle de

la constitutionnalité des actes. Je pense que ces travaux mettront en lumière combien, par des solu-

tions parfois différentes, nous œuvrons dans le même sens.

De nombreuses instances internationales se sont penchées sur le berceau de la jeune République

du Kosovo il y a 15 ans. Désormais votre Cour a gagné sa place et le respect qui l’accompagne au

sein de notre communauté de juridictions. Vous participez à la construction de compréhensions et

d’interprétations communes non seulement en intégrant pleinement les jurisprudences pertinentes

d’autres Cours, mais aussi en rendant aisément accessible votre propre jurisprudence. Je suis parti-

culièrement sensible à ce que vous le fassiez en français sur votre site. Et je suis persuadé que votre

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Cour a toute sa place au sein de l’Association des cours constitutionnelles francophones.

Madame la Présidente, chers collègues,

Une « Constitution », compte tenu de son étymologie, c’est ce qui « nous tient ensemble ». Au terme

de ce propos, je retiens, sans doute comme vous, la communauté de valeurs qui nous anime et que

nous défendons. Je retiens notre commune exigence de séparation des pouvoirs, d’indépendance,

d’impartialité et de respect du droit. Je retiens le nécessaire dialogue des juges nationaux et supra-

nationaux afin notamment de concilier l’évolution des exigences constitutionnelles et le respect des

règles. Je retiens enfin la solidarité et la confraternité des cours constitutionnelles.

Madame la Présidente, je crois donc pouvoir me faire le porte-parole de toutes les cours ici présentes

en vous exprimant notre gratitude de nous avoir réunis ici et en vous félicitant pour la tâche déjà

accomplie.

Laurent Fabius

Président du Conseil Constitutionnel de la République française

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KONFERENCA NDËRKOMBËTARE “Kontributi i Gjykatave Kushtetuese në mbrojtjen dhe forcimin

e vlerave themelore të demokracisë, sundimit të ligjit dhe të drejtave dhe lirive themelore të njeriut”

Prishtinë, 23 tetor 2023

MEĐUNARODNA KONFERENCIJA “Doprinos ustavnih sudova u zaštiti i jačanju osnovnih vred-

nosti demokratije, vladavine prava i osnovnih ljudskih prava i sloboda”

Priština, 23. Oktobra 2023. godine

INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE “The Contribution of Constitutional Courts in Protecting and Strengthening Fundamental Values of Democracy, Rule of

Law, and Fundamental Human Rights and Freedoms”

Prishtina, 23 October 2023

CONFÉRENCE INTERNATIONALE “La contribution des Cours Constitutionnelles à la protection et au renforcement des valeurs fondamentales de la démocratie,

de l'état de droit et des droits et libertés fondamentaux de l'homme”

Prishtina, 23 octobre 2023

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KONFERENCA NDËRKOMBËTARE “Kontributi i Gjykatave Kushtetuese në mbrojtjen dhe forcimin e vlerave themelore

të demokracisë, sundimit të ligjit dhe të drejtave dhe lirive themelore të njeriut”

Salla “Beethoven” , Hoteli “Emerald”, Prishtinë 24 tetor 2023

AGJENDA 08:30 - 09:00 Regjistrimi

09:00 - 09:15 Fjala përshëndetëse dhe hyrëse nga znj. Gresa Caka-Nimani, Kryetare e Gjykatës Kushtetuese të Republikës së Kosovës

SESIONI I “Roli i Gjykatave Kushtetuese në forcimin e vlerave të demokracisë dhe sun- dimit të ligjit përmes kontrollit abstrakt të kushtetutshmërisë së normave”

Moderatore: znj. Selvete Gërxhaliu-Krasniqi, gjyqtare e Gjykatës Kushtetuese të Republikës së Kosovës

09:15 - 09:25 z. Zühtü Arslan, Kryetar i Gjykatës Kushtetuese të Republikës së Turqisë

“Vlerësimi abstrakt i kushtetutshmërisë në Turqi: Zhvillimet e fundit””

09:25 - 09:35 znj. Holta Zaçaj, Kryetare e Gjykatës Kushtetuese të Republikës së Shqipërisë

“Roli i Gjykatës Kushtetuese si ligjvënës negativ”

09:35 - 09:45 z Aldis Laviņš, Kryetar i Gjykatës Kushtetuese të Letonisë

“Roli i gjykatave kushtetuese në harmonizimin e zbatimit të së drejtës së BE-së dhe asaj ndërkombëtare me identitetin kushtetues”

09:45 - 09:55 z. Georg Lienbacher, Gjyqtar i Gjykatës Kushtetuese të Austrisë

“Roli i Gjykatave Kushtetuese në forcimin e vlerave të demokracisë dhe sundim- it të ligjit nëpërmjet kontrollit abstrakt të kushtetutshmërisë së normave”

09:55 - 10:05 z. José Figueiredo Dias, Gjyqtar i Gjykatës Kushtetuese të Portugalisë

“Roli i Gjykatave Kushtetuese në forcimin e vlerave të demokracisë dhe sundim- it të ligjit përmes kontrollit abstrakt të kushtetutshmërisë së normave – pasqyrë e përgjithshme nga sistemi portugez”

10:05 - 10:15 znj. Marie Baker, Gjyqtare e Gjykatës Supreme të Irlandës

“Gjykatat Supreme si gardiane të Kushtetutës”

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10:15 - 10:25 z. Tom Ginsburg, Profesor i së Drejtës Kushtetuese Krahasuese në Shkollën Ju- ridike të Çikagos

“Kontrolli abstrakt i normave dhe ligjbërja gjyqësore: Efekti në reputacionin gjyqësor”

10:25 - 10:45 Sesioni I: Diskutim i hapur

10:45 - 11:00 Pushimi i kafes

SESIONI II “Roli i Gjykatave Supranacionale në Vendimmarrjen e Gjykatave Kushtetuese: Ndërveprimi me Gjykatën Evropiane për të Drejtat e Njeriut, Gjykatën e Dre- jtësisë së Bashkimit Evropian, Gjykatën Afrikane për të Drejtat e Njeriut dhe Popujve dhe Komisionin e Venecias”

Moderatore: znj. Remzije Istrefi-Peci, gjyqtare në Gjykatën Kushtetuese të Republikës së Kosovës

11:00 - 11:10 z. Pierre Nihoul, Kryetar i Gjykatës Kushtetuese të Belgjikës

“Marrëdhënia ndërmjet Kushtetutës së Belgjikës dhe së Drejtës Ndërkombëtare dhe Evropiane”

11:10 - 11:20 znj. Anna Austin, Juristkonsulte e Gjykatës Evropiane për të Drejtat e Njeriut

“Parimi i subsidiaritetit dhe GJEDNJ: Duke i shërbyer si Diversitetit ashtu edhe Konvergjencës”

11:20 - 11:30 znj. Grainne McMorrow, Përfaqësuese e Komisionit të Venecias

“Roli i Komisionit të Venecias në mbështetjen e demokracisë dhe promovimit të zhvillimit të Gjykatave Kushtetuese ndërkombëtarisht”

11:30 - 11:40 z. Mirsad Ceman, Nënkryetar i Gjykatës Kushtetuese të Bosnjës dhe Hercegovinës

“Ndikimi i praktikës gjyqësore së Gjykatës Evropiane për të Drejtat e Njeriut në praktikën gjyqësore të gjykatave vendore në Bosnje dhe Hercegovinë”

11:40 - 11:50 z. Atanas Semov, gjyqtar i Gjykatës Kushtetuese të Bullgarisë

“Dialogu në mes të gjykatave kushtetuese vendore dhe Gjykatës së Drejtësisë të Bashkimit Evropian si gjykatë kushtetuese e BE-së”

11:50 - 12:00 z. Louis Aucoin, Këshilltar i Jashtëm për Sundimin e Ligjit, Zhvillimin Kushtetues dhe Drejtësinë Tranzicionale (Këshilltar i Qeverisë së Shteteve të Bashkuara gjatë hartimit të Kushtetutës së Republikës së Kosovës)

“Perspektiva Krahasuese për Krijimin e Kushtetutës: Kosova dhe më gjerë”

12:00 - 12:20 Sesioni II: Diskutim i hapur

12:30 - 14:30 Drekë në Hotelin “Emerald”

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SESIONI III “Roli i Gjykatave Kushtetuese në Mbrojtjen e të Drejtave dhe Lirive Themelore të Njeriut përmes Kontrollit Individual të Kushtetutshmërisë së Akteve të Au- toriteteve Publike”

Moderator: z. Nexhmi Rexhepi, gjyqtar i Gjykatës Kushtetuese të Republikës së Kosovës

14:30 - 14:40 znj. Dineke de Groot, Kryetare e Gjykatës Supreme të Holandës

“Roli i Gjykatave Kushtetuese në Mbrojtjen e të Drejtave dhe Lirive Themelore të Njeriut përmes Kontrollit Individual të Kushtetutshmërisë së Akteve të Autoriteteve Publike. Një perspektivë nga nën-niveli i detit deri te Bjeshkët e Nemuna”

14:40 - 14:50 z. Villu Kove, Kryetar i Gjykatës Supreme të Estonisë

“Mundësitë e kufizuara për kontrollin kushtetues individual në sistemin e vlerë- simit të kushtetutshmërisë së Estonisë”

14:50 - 15:00 z. Tomas Davulis, Gjyqtar i Gjykatës Kushtetuese të Lituanisë

“Ndikimi i praktikës gjyqësore të GJED në Jurisprudencën e Gjykatës Kushtetuese të Republikës së Lituanisë”

15:00 - 15:10 z. Claudio Monteiro, Gjyqtar i Gjykatës Supreme Administrative të Portugalisë

“Respektimi dhe kufijtë e kontrollit kushtetues”

15:10 - 15:20 z. Mato Arlović, Gjyqtar i Gjykatës Kushtetuese të Kroacisë

“Gjykata Kushtetuese në mbrojtjen e të drejtave dhe lirive të pakicave kom- bëtare”

15:20 - 15:30 z. Osman Kadriu, gjyqtar i Gjykatës Kushtetuese të Republikës së Maqedonisë së Veriut

“Sundimi i ligjit dhe demokracia”

15:30 - 15:40 znj. Christie Warren, Profesoreshë e Praktikës të së Drejtës Ndërkombëtare dhe Krahasuese (Këshilltare e Qeverisë së Shteteve të Bashkuara gjatë hartimit të Kushtetutës së Republikës së Kosovës)

“Gjykata Kushtetuese e Kosovës në Këndvështrim Krahasues”

15:40 - 15:50 z. Diego Solana, Këshilltar Ndërkombëtar i Fondacionit për të Drejtën Botërore dhe koordinator i Programit të Kongresit Botëror të Drejtësisë

“Roli i Gjykatës Kushtetuese në mbrojtjen e të drejtave dhe lirive përmes masave kufizuese gjatë pandemisë”

15:50 - 16:10 Sesioni III: Diskutim i hapur

16:10 - 16:20 Fjala përmbyllëse e Konferencës

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MEĐUNARODNA KONFERENCIJA “Doprinos ustavnih sudova u zaštiti i jačanju osnovnih vrednosti demokratije, vla-

davine prava i osnovnih ljudskih prava i sloboda”

Sala “Beethoven”, hotel “Emerald”, Priština 24. oktobar 2023.

DNEVNI RED 08:30 - 09:00 Registracija

09:00 - 09:15 Dobrodošlica i uvodna reč gđe Grese Caka-Nimani, predsednica Ustavnog suda Republike Kosovo

SESIJA I “Uloga ustavnih sudova u jačanju vrednosti demokratije i vladavine prava kroz apstraktnu kontrolu ustavnosti normi”

Voditelj: Gđa Selvete Gërxhaliu-Krasniqi, sudija Ustavnog suda Republike Kosovo

09:15 - 09:25 G. Zühtü Arslan, predsednik Ustavnog suda Republike Turske „Apstraktni pregled ustavnosti u Turskoj: nedavna dešavanja“

09:25 - 09:35 Gđa Holta Zaçaj, predsednica Ustavnog suda Republike Albanije „Uloga Ustavnog suda kao negativnog zakonodavca”

09:35 - 09:45 G. Aldis Lavinš, predsednik Ustavnog suda Letonije „Uloga ustavnih sudova u usklađivanju primene prava EU i međunarodnog prava sa ustavnim identitetom“

09:45 - 09:55 Prof. Georg Lienbacher, sudija Ustavnog suda Austrije „Uloga ustavnih sudova u jačanju vrednosti demokratije i vladavine prava kroz apstraktnu kontrolu ustavnosti normi”

09:55 - 10:05 G. José Figueiredo Dias, sudija Ustavnog suda Portugalije „Uloga ustavnih sudova u jačanju vrednosti demokratije i vladavine prava kroz apstraktnu kontrolu ustavnosti normi – pregled portugalskog sistema“

10:05 - 10:15 Gđa. Marie Baker, sudija Vrhovnog suda Irske „Vrhovni sudovi kao čuvari Ustava”

10:15 - 10:25 G. Tom Ginsburg, profesor uporednog ustavnog prava na Pravnom fakultetu u Čikagu „Kontrola apstraktnih normi i sudsko zakonodavstvo: uticaj na ugled sudija”

10:25 - 10:45 Sesija I: Otvorena diskusija

10:45 - 11:00 Pauza za kafu

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SESIJA II “Uloga nadnacionalnih sudova u odlučivanju ustavnih sudova: interakcija sa Evropskim sudom za ljudska prava, Sudom pravde Evropske unije, Afričkim sudom za ljudska i narodna prava i Venecijanskom komisijom”

Voditelj: Gđa Remzije Istrefi-Peci, sudija Ustavnog suda Republike Kosovo

11:00 - 11:10 G. Pierre Nihoul, predsednik Ustavnog suda Belgije „Odnos između belgijskog ustava i međunarodnog i evropskog prava”

11:10 - 11:20 Gđa Anna Austin, pravni konsultant Evropskog suda za ljudska prava „Načelo supsidijarnosti i ESLJP: Služenje i raznolikosti i konvergenciji“

11:20 - 11:30 Gđa Grainne McMorrov, predstavnica Venecijanske komisije „Uloga Venecijanske komisije u podršci demokratiji i promovisanju evolucije i razvoja ustavnih sudova na međunarodnom nivou“

11:30 - 11:40 G. Mirsad Ćeman, potpredsednik Ustavnog suda Bosne i Hercegovine „Uticaj sudske prakse Evropskog suda za ljudska prava na praksu domaćih su- dova u Bosni i Hercegovini“

11:40 - 11:50 G. Atanas Semov, sudija Ustavnog suda Bugarske „Dijalog između lokalnih ustavnih sudova i Suda pravde Evropske unije kao stavnog suda EU“

11:50 - 12:00 G. Louis Aucoin, strani savetnik za vladavinu prava, ustavni razvoj i tranzicionu pra- vdu (savetnik Vlade Sjedinjenih Država tokom izrade Ustava Republike Kosovo) „Komparativne perspektive ustavotvorstva: Kosovo i dalje“

12:00 - 12:20 Sesija II: Otvorena diskusija

12:30 - 14:30 Ručak u hotelu “Emerald”

SESIJA III “Uloga ustavnih sudova u zaštiti osnovnih ljudskih prava i sloboda kroz indi- vidualnu kontrolu ustavnosti akata javnih organa”

Voditelj: G. Nexhmi Rexhepi, sudija Ustavnog suda Republike Kosovo

14:30 - 14:40 Gđa Dineke de Groot, predsednica Vrhovnog suda Holandije „Uloga ustavnih sudova u zaštiti osnovnih ljudskih prava i sloboda kroz indi- vidualnu kontrolu ustavnosti akata javnih organa. Perspektiva od Ispod nivoa mora do Prokletih planina”

14:40 - 14:50 G. Villu Kove, predsednik Vrhovnog suda Estonije „Ograničene mogućnosti za individualnu ustavnu kontrolu u estonskom sistemu ustavnog razmatranja”

14:50 - 15:00 G. Tomas Davulis, sudija Ustavnog suda Litvanije „Uticaj sudske prakse SPEU na sudsku praksu Ustavnog suda Republike Lit- vanije“

15:00 - 15:10 G. Claudio Monteiro, sudija Vrhovnog upravnog suda Portugalije „Poštovanje i granice ustavne kontrole”

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15:10 - 15:20 G. Mato Arlović, sudija Ustavnog suda Hrvatske „Ustavni sud za zaštitu prava i sloboda nacionalnih manjina”

15:20 - 15:30 G. Osman Kadriu, sudija Ustavnog suda Republike Severne Makedonije „Vladavina prava i demokratija“

15:30 - 15:40 Gđa Christie Warren, profesor prakse međunarodnog i uporednog prava (savet- nik Vlade Sjedinjenih Država tokom izrade Ustava Republike Kosovo) “Ustavni sud Kosova u uporednoj perspektivi”

15:40 - 15:50 G. Diego Solana, međunarodni savetnik Svetske pravne fondacije i koordinator programa Svetskog pravnog kongresa „Uloga Ustavnog suda u zaštiti prava i sloboda kroz restriktivne mere tokom pan- demije“

15:50 - 16:10 Sesija III: Otvorena diskusija

16:10 - 16:20 Završna razmatranja konferencije

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INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE “The Contribution of Constitutional Courts in Protecting and Strengthening Fun-

damental Values of Democracy, Rule of Law, and Fundamental Human Rights and

Freedoms”

“Beethoven” Hall, Hotel “Emerald”, Prishtina 24 October 2023

AGENDA 08:30 - 09:00 Registration

09:00 - 09:15 Welcome and Opening Remarks by Ms. Gresa Caka-Nimani, President of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Kosovo

SESSION I “The Role of Constitutional Courts in Strengthening the Values of Democra- cy and Rule of Law through Abstract Control of Constitutionality of Norms”

Moderator: Ms. Selvete Gërxhaliu-Krasniqi, Judge of the Constitutional Court of the Re- public of Kosovo

09:15 - 09:25 Mr. Zühtü Arslan, President of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Türkiye “Abstract Review of Constitutionality in Türkiye: Recent Developments”

09:25 - 09:35 Ms. Holta Zaçaj, President of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Al- bania “The Role of the Constitutional Court as a Negative Lawmaker”

09:35 - 09:45 Mr. Aldis Laviņš, President of the Constitutional Court of Latvia “The Role of Constitutional Courts in Reconciling the Application of EU and International Law with the Constitutional Identity”

09:45 - 09:55 Mr. Georg Lienbacher, Judge of the Constitutional Court of Austria “The Role of Constitutional Courts in Strengthening the Values of Democracy and the Rule of Law through Abstract Control of Constitutionality of Norms”

09:55 - 10:05 Mr. José Figueiredo Dias, Judge of the Constitutional Court of Portugal “The Role of Constitutional Courts in Strengthening the Values of Democra- cy and Rule of Law through Abstract Control of Constitutionality of Norms – An overview of the Portuguese System”

10:05 - 10:15 Ms. Marie Baker, Judge of the Constitutional Court of Ireland “The Supreme Court as Guardians of the Constitution”

10:15 – 10:25 Mr. Tom Ginsburg, Professor of Comparative Constitutional Law at Chicago Law School “Abstract Norm Control and Judicial Lawmaking: The Effect on Judicial Reputation”

10:25 - 10:45 Session I: Open discussion

10:45 - 11:00 Coffee break

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SESSION II “The Role of Supranational Courts in the Decision-Making of Constitutional Courts: the Interaction with the European Court of Human Rights, Court of Justice of the European Union, the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights and the Venice Commission”

Moderator: Ms. Remzije Istrefi-Peci, Judge at the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Kosovo

11:00 - 11:10 Mr. Pierre Nihoul, President of the Constitutional Court of Belgium “The Relationship between the Belgian Constitution and International and European Law”

11:10 - 11:20 Ms. Anna Austin, Juristconsult of the European Court of Human Rights “The Principle of Subsidiarity and the ECHR: Serving both Diversity and Convergence”

11:20 - 11:30 Ms. Grainne McMorrow, Venice Commission Representative “The Role of the Venice Commission in supporting democracy and in promoting the evolution and development of Constitutional Courts internationally”

11:30 - 11:40 Mr. Mirsad Ćeman, Vice-President of the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Hercegovina “The Influence of the Case-law of the European Court of Human Rights on the Case- law of Domestic Courts in Bosnia and Herzegovina”

11:40 - 11:50 Mr. Atanas Semov, Judge of the Constitutional Court of Bulgaria “Dialogue between domestic constitutional courts and the Court of Justice of the European Union as the Constitutional Court of the EU”

11:50 - 12:00 Mr. Louis Aucoin, Foreign Advisor on Rule of Law, Constitutional Develop- ment and Transitional Justice (United States Government Advisor through- out the drafting of the Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo) “Comparative Perspectives on Constitution Making: Kosovo and Beyond”

12:00 - 12:20 Session II: Open discussion

12:30 - 14:30 Lunch at Hotel “Emerald”

SESSION III “The Role of Constitutional Courts in Protecting Fundamental Human Rights and Freedoms through Individual Control of Constitutionality of Acts of Public Authorities”

Moderator: Mr. Nexhmi Rexhepi, Judge of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Kosovo

14:30 - 14:40 Ms. Dineke de Groot, President of the Supreme Court of the Netherlands “The Role of Constitutional Courts in Protecting Fundamental Human Rights and Freedoms through Individual Control of Constitutionality of Acts of Public Authorities. A Perspective from Below Sea Level to the Accursed Mountains”

14:40 - 14:50 Mr. Villu Kove, President of the Supreme Court of Estonia “Limited Possibilities for Individual Constitutional Control in Estonian Con- stitutional Review System”

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14:50 - 15:00 Mr. Tomas Davulis, Judge of the Constitutional Court of Lithuania “Impact of the Case-law of CJEU in the Jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Lithuania”

15:00 - 15:10 Mr. Claudio Monteiro, Judge of the Supreme Administrative Court of Portugal “Deference and the limits of constitutional scrutiny”

15:10 - 15:20 Mr. Mato Arlović, Judge of the Constitutional Court of Croatia “The Constitutional Court in the Protection of Rights and Freedoms of Na- tional Minorities”

15:20 - 15:30 Mr. Osman Kadriu, Judge of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of North Macedonia “The Rule of Law and Democracy”

15:30 - 15:40 Ms. Christie Warren, Professor of the Practice of International and Compar- ative Law (United States Government Advisor throughout the drafting of the Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo) “The Constitutional Court of Kosovo in Comparative Perspective”

15:40 - 15:50 Mr. Diego Solana, International Advisor of the World Law Foundation and coordinator of the Program of the World Law Congress “The role of Constitutional Courts in the protection of human rights and lib- erties through restrictive measures during the pandemic”

15:50 - 16:10 Session III: Open discussion

16:10 - 16:20 Conference Concluding Remarks

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CONFÉRENCE INTERNATIONALE “La contribution des Cours Constitutionnelles à la protection et au renforcement des

valeurs fondamentales de la démocratie, de l’état de droit et des droits et libertés

fondamentaux de l’homme”

Salle “Beethoven”, Hôtel “Emerald”, Prishtina 24 octobre 2023

ORDRE DU JOUR 08:30 - 09:00 Inscription

09:00 - 09:15 Allocution de bienvenue de Mme Gresa Caka-Nimani, Présidente de la Cour Constitutionnelle de la République du Kosovo

SESSION I “Le rôle des Cours Constitutionnelles dans le renforcement des valeurs de la démocratie et de l’état de droit par le contrôle abstrait de la constitutionnalité des normes”

Modératrice: Mme. Selvete Gërxhaliu-Krasniqi, Juge à la Cour constitutionnelle de la Répu- blique du Kosovo

09:15 - 09:25 M. Zühtü Arslan, Président de la Cour Constitutionnelle de la République de Turquie “Résumé de la constitutionnalité en Turquie : Développements récents”

09:25 - 09:35 Mme. Holta Zaçaj, Présidente de la Cour Constitutionnelle de la République d’Albanie “Le rôle de la Cour constitutionnelle en tant que législateur négatif”

09:35 - 09:45 M. Aldis Laviņš, Président de la Cour Constitutionnelle de Lettonie “Le rôle des cours constitutionnelles pour concilier l’application du droit euro- péen et international avec l’identité constitutionnelle ”

09:45 - 09:55 M. Georg Lienbacher, Juge à la Cour Constitutionnelle d’Autriche “Le rôle des Cours constitutionnelles dans le renforcement des valeurs de la démocratie et de l’État de droit à travers le contrôle abstrait de la constitution- nalité des normes ”

09:55 - 10:05 M. José Figueiredo Dias, Juge à la Cour Constitutionnelle du Portugal “Le rôle des cours constitutionnelles dans le renforcement des valeurs de la démocratie et de l’État de droit par le contrôle abstrait de la constitutionnalité des normes – Aperçu du système portugais”

10:05 - 10:15 Mme. Marie Baker, Juge à la Cour Suprême d’Irlande “Les Cours suprêmes, gardiennes de la Constitution”

10:15 - 10:25 M. Tom Ginsburg, Professeur de droit constitutionnel comparé à la Chicago Law School “Contrôle abstrait des normes et législation judiciaire : l’effet sur la réputation judiciaire”

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10:25 - 10:45 Session I: Discussion ouverte

10:45 - 11:00 Pause café

SESSION II “Le rôle des Juridictions Supranationales dans le processus décisionnel des Cours Constitutionnelles : Interaction avec la Cour Européenne des Droits de l’Homme, la Cour de Justice de l’Union Européenne, la Cour Africaine des Droits de l’Homme et des Peuples et la Commission de Venise”

Modératrice: Mme. Remzije Istrefi-Peci, Juge à la Cour constitutionnelle de la République du Kosovo

11:00 - 11:10 M. Pierre Nihoul, Président de la Cour constitutionnelle de Belgique “La relation entre la Constitution belge et le droit international et européen”

11:10 - 11:20 Mme. Anna Austin, Juriste consultante de la Cour Européenne des Droits de l’Homme “Le principe de subsidiarité et la CEDH : au service de la diversité et de la convergence ”

11:20 - 11:30 Mme. Grainne McMorrow, Représentante de la Commission de Venise “Le rôle de la Commission de Venise dans le soutien à la démocratie et dans la promotion de l’évolution et du développement des cours constitutionnelles à l’échelle internationale ”

11:30 - 11:40 M. Mirsad Ceman, Vice-président de la Cour Constitutionnelle de Bosnie-Her- zégovine “L’influence de la jurisprudence de la Cour européenne des droits de l’homme sur la jurisprudence des tribunaux internes de Bosnie-Herzégovine”

11:40 - 11:50 M. Atanas Semov, juge à la Cour Constitutionnelle de Bulgarie “Dialogue entre les cours constitutionnelles locales et la Cour de justice de l’Union européenne en tant que cour constitutionnelle de l’UE”

11:50 - 12:00 M. Louis Aucoin, Conseiller externe pour l’État de Droit, le Développement Constitutionnel et la Justice Transitionnelle (Conseiller du gouvernement des États-Unis lors de la rédaction de la Constitution de la République du Kosovo) “Perspectives comparatives sur l’élaboration de la Constitution : le Kosovo et au-delà ”

12:00 - 12:20 Session II: Discussion ouverte

12:30 - 14:30 Déjeuner à l’ Hôtel “Emerald”

SESSION III “Le rôle des Cours Constitutionnelles dans la Protection des Droits et Libertés Fondamentaux de l’Homme par le Contrôle Individuel de la Constitutionnalité des Actes des Autorités Publiques ”

Modérateur: M. Nexhmi Rexhepi, Juge à la Cour constitutionnelle de la République du Kosovo

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14:30 - 14:40 Mme. Dineke de Groot, Présidente de la Cour Suprême des Pays-Bas “Le rôle des Cours Constitutionnelles dans la Protection des Droits et Libertés Fondamentaux de l’Homme à travers le Contrôle Individuel de la Constitution- nalité des Actes des Autorités Publiques. Une perspective du niveau sous-marin jusqu’aux Montagnes Maudites”

14:40 - 14:50 M. Villu Kove, Président de la Cour Suprême d’Estonie “Possibilités limitées de contrôle constitutionnel individuel dans le système es- tonien d’appréciation de la constitutionnalité”

14:50 - 15:00 M. Tomas Davulis, Juge à la Cour constitutionnelle de Lituanie “Impact de la jurisprudence de la CJUE sur la jurisprudence de la Cour consti- tutionnelle de la République de Lituanie”

15:00 - 15:10 M. Claudio Monteiro, Juge à la Cour Administrative Suprême du Portugal “Déférence et limites du contrôle constitutionnel ”

15:10 - 15:20 M. Mato Arlović, Juge à la Cour Constitutionnelle de Croatie “La Cour constitutionnelle dans la protection des droits et libertés des minori- tés nationales ”

15:20 - 15:30 M. Osman Kadriu, Juge à la Cour constitutionnelle de la République de Macé- doine du Nord “L’État de droit et la démocratie ”

15:30 - 15:40 Mme. Christie Warren, Professeure de Pratique du Droit International et Com- paré (Conseillère du Gouvernement des États-Unis lors de la rédaction de la Constitution de la République du Kosovo) “La Cour Constitutionnelle du Kosovo dans une perspective comparée”

15:40 - 15:50 M. Diego Solana, Conseiller international de la World Law Foundation et coor- dinateur du programme du World Law Congress “Le rôle de la Cour Constitutionnelle dans la protection des droits et libertés par des mesures restrictives pendant la pandémie”

15:50 - 16:10 Session III: Discussion ouverte

16:10 - 16:30 Remarques finales de la conference

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81

Të nderuar delegacione të Gjykatave Kushtetuese e Supreme nga mbarë Bota;

Të nderuar udhëheqës e përfaqësues të institucioneve të Republikës së Kosovës;

Të nderuar Ambasadorë e përfaqësues të institucioneve ndërkombëtare;

Gjyqtarë, prokurorë, avokatë, dekanë e profesor universitar e anëtarë të shoqërisë civile

Të nderuar pjesëmarrës;

Zonja e Zotërinjë,

Mirë se erdhët në Konferencën Ndërkombëtare të organizuar me rastin e shënimit të katërmbëdh-

jetë vjetorit të themelimit të Gjykatës Kushtetuese të Republikës së Kosovës.

Në shënimin e këtij përvjetori – Gjykata ka zgjedhur që konferencën e sotme ndërkombëtare të foku-

soj në rolin e Gjykatave Kushtetuese në mbrojtjen dhe fuqizimin e vlerave themelore të demokracisë,

sundimit të ligjit dhe të drejtave dhe lirive themelore. Kjo është bërë për dy qëllime.

Së pari, për të nënvizuar rëndësinë e bashkëpunimit të Gjykatave Kushtetuese dhe rolin thelbësor të

Gjykatave Supranacionale, përfshirë Gjykatën Evropiane për të Drejtat e Njeriut - në mbështetje të dre-

jtësisë kushtetuese në demokracitë me traditë më pak të konsoliduar, përfshirë rëndësinë e krijimit të një

sistemi uniform të mbrojtjes së vlerave dhe të drejtave universale në kontinentit evropian.

Gjykata jonë Kushtetuese - më e reja në këtë kontinent – reflekton shembull të mirë të këtij bash-

këpunimi.

Fjala përshëndetëse dhe hyrëse nga znj. Gresa Caka-Nimani, Kryetare e Gjykatës Kushtetuese

të Republikës së Kosovës

Dobrodošlica i uvodna reč gđe Grese Caka-Nimani, predsednica Ustavnog

suda Republike Kosovo

Welcome and Opening Remarks by Ms. Gresa Caka-Nimani, President of the

Constitutional Court of the Republic of Kosovo

Allocution de bienvenue de Mme Gresa Caka-Nimani, Présidente de la Cour

Constitutionnelle de la République du Kosovo

Fjala përshëndetëse dhe hyrëse nga znj. Gresa Caka-Nimani, Kryetare e Gjykatës Kushtetuese të Republikës së Kosovës

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Në këtë kontekst, kujtoj që rrugëtimi i ndërtimit gradual të drejtësisë kushtetuese në Kosovë, nuk

ka qenë pa sfida. Të njëjtat duhet të trajtohen në kontekstin historiko-politik të shtet-bërjes dhe

shtet-ndërtimit të Kosovës, përfshirë në kontekst të ushtrimit të funksionit kushtetues të interpreti-

mit të një Kushtetute të re, nga një Gjykatë Kushtetuese që nuk kishte përparësinë dhe/ose lehtësinë

e pasurisë së traditës paraprake të drejtësisë kushtetuese.

Viti 2008 shënon një kthesë historike për Republikën e Kosovës – miratimin e një rendi të ri kushtetues që dallon thelbësisht nga tri rendet paraprake kushtetuese. Prandaj, ndërtimi i drejtësisë kushtetuese në Republikën e Kosovës, nuk ka pasur referencë në traditën kushtetuese të së kaluarës, por aspiratën e të ardhmes - në bashkëpunim të thellë me Gjykatat Kushtetuese, Gjykatën Evropiane për të Drejtat e Njeriut dhe Komisionin e Venecias, duke reflektuar kështu, në vendimmarrjen e saj, emëruesin e përbashkët të vlerave që ngërthen drejtësia kushtetuese evropiane dhe praktika gjyqësore në inter- pretimin e Konventës Evropiane për të Drejtat e Njeriut.

Në qasje e tillë që ngërthen praktika gjyqësore e Gjykatës tonë nënvizon rëndësinë e partneritetit në

mes Gjykatave Kushtetuese. Për më tepër, është argument i mjaftueshëm që Gjykata Kushtetuese

e Kosovës e meriton vendin në mes Gjykatave Kushtetuese anëtare të Konferencës Evropiane dhe

Asociacionit Frankofon të Gjykatave Kushtetuese. Tentativat e parreshtura të Gjykatës tonë për tu

anëtarësuar në këto dy forume të Gjykatave Kushtetuese simotra, uroj të kurorëzohen suksesshëm

përgjatë vitit 2024 - edhe me mbështetjen e Gjykatave Kushtetuese të pranishme sot këtu.

Qëllimi i deklaruar i tyre drejt avancimit të bashkëpunimit në kontekst të drejtësisë kushtetuese,

humb kuptimin nëse në forumet përkatëse vendimmarrëse, mbizotërojnë argumentet e pakicës lid-

hur me identitetin shtetëror të Kosovës dhe të cilat do të duhej të ishin përmbyllur përfundimisht në

vitin 2010 - me Opinionin e Gjykatës Ndërkombëtare të Drejtësisë, lidhur me përputhshmërinë me

të drejtën ndërkombëtare të shpalljes së pavarësisë së Kosovës.

Dhe kjo më shpien në qëllimin e dytë të kësaj konference - që vë theks në rolin që kanë Gjykatat

Kushtetuese në mbrojtjen dhe avancimin e vlerave të demokracisë liberale... si sistemi i vetëm që

siguron që liria individuale është e kuptimplotë .... si sistemi i vetëm përmes të cilit sigurohet dhe

mirëmbahet paqja.

Në një rend botërorë të karakterizuar nga sovranitete të kushtëzuara dhe të trazuar tashmë prej zhvil-

limeve të shumta, përfshirë ato që ndërlidhen me (i) luftimin e pandemive; (ii) përshtatjen me rritjen

e hovshme të përdorimit të teknologjisë informative e intelegjencës artificale; (iii) modelet populiste të

qeverisjes në rritje; e (iv) deri te agresioni i pashembullt në Ukrainë – trashëgimia e përbashkët evropiane

mund të mbrohet dhe kultivohet vetëm përmes përkushtimit për solidaritet dhe bashkëpunim të thellë

ndërshtetëror.

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Gjykatat Kushtetuese - si guardian Kushtetutash - zënë vend qendror në adresimin e sfidave të këtij

shekulli. Shkëmbimi i përvojave na mundëson që të avancojmë traditën e drejtësisë kushtetuese,

duke kundër-balancuar çdo forcë e dukuri që rrezikon të cenojë vlerat tona të përbashkëta – lirinë,

paqen dhe demokracinë.

Marrë parasysh sfidat me të cilat ballafaqohet drejtësia kushtetuese dhe ato fusha të së drejtës, e të

cilat përbëjnë thelbin e mbajtjes së ekuilibrit të duhur në mes vendimmarrjes së autoriteteve publike

dhe ndikimit respektiv në të drejta dhe liri themelore, kemi zgjedhur që përgjatë kësaj konference, të

fokusohemi në ushtrimin e kontrollin abstrakt dhe konkret të kushtetutshmërisë, përfshirë përmes

bashkëpunimit me gjykatat me karakter supranacional, të organizuar në tri panele, e që do të ud-

hëhiqen nga gjyqtarët e Gjykatës Kushtetuese, përkatësisht gjyqtarët Selvete Gërxhaliu-Krasniqi,

Remzije Istrefi-Peci dhe Nexhmi Rexhepi – duke pasur mundësinë të shkëmbejmë përvoja në shër-

bim të avancimit të praktikave tona dhe thellimit të sinergjive në kontekst të drejtësisë kushtetuese.

Të nderuar miq,

Në këtë sallë sot, janë të pranishme disa nga mendjet më të ndritura të drejtësisë kushtetuese në

botë. Hapësira gjeografike që pjesëmarrësit sot reflektojnë, na mundëson që të krijojmë një hartë

gjithëpërfshirëse të të arriturave, sfidave dhe inovacioneve të Gjykatave Kushtetuese nga mbarë bota.

Solidariteti dhe partneriteti në mes Gjykatave Kushtetuese është frymëzues. I njëjti gjithashtu

lartëson Gjykatën tonë. Për më tepër na mundëson që në kryeqytetin e bukur të Prishtinës - të lun-

drojmë së bashku nëpër mrekullitë që ngërthen drejtësia kushtetuese.

Duke shprehur edhe një herë mirënjohjen e thellë për prezencën tuaj e me pasionin e kureshtjen e

pareshtur për të dëgjuar diskutimet e sotme, hap konferencën dhe punimet e saj.

Faleminderit për vëmendjen!

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Uvažene delegacije ustavnih i vrhovnih sudova iz celog sveta;

Uvaženi rukovodioci i predstavnici institucija Republike Kosovo;

Uvaženi ambasadori i predstavnici međunarodnih institucija;

Sudije, tužioci, advokati, dekani i univerzitetski profesori i članovi civilnog društva;

Poštovani učesnici,

Dame i gospodo,

Dobrodošli na Međunarodnu konferenciju organizovanu povodom obeležavanja četrnaestogodišn-

jice osnivanja Ustavnog suda Republike Kosovo.

Obeležavajući ovu godišnjicu, Sud se odlučio da današnju međunarodnu konferenciju usredsredi na

ulogu ustavnih sudova u zaštiti i jačanju osnovnih vrednosti demokratije, vladavine prava i osnovnih

prava i sloboda. To je učinjeno iz dva razloga.

Prvo, kako bi se istakla važnost saradnje ustavnih sudova i suštinska uloga nadnacionalnih sudova,

uključujući i Evropski sud za ljudska prava, u podršci ustavnoj pravdi u demokratijama sa manje

konsolidovanom tradicijom, uključujući i važnost uspostavljanja jedinstvenog sistema zaštite uni-

verzalnih vrednosti i prava na evropskom kontinentu.

Naš Ustavni sud - kao najmlađi na ovom kontinentu - predstavlja dobar primer te saradnje.

U tom kontekstu, pamtim da put postepene izgradnje ustavnog pravosuđa na Kosovu nije tekao bez

izazova. Ove izazove treba tumačiti u istorijsko-političkom kontekstu osnivanja i izgradnje države

Kosovo, uključujući i u kontekstu vršenja ustavne funkcije tumačenja novog Ustava od strane Ustav-

nog suda koji nije imao pogodnost i/ili olakšicu bogatstva prethodne tradicije ustavnog pravosuđa.

2008. godina označava istorijsku prekretnicu za Republiku Kosovo - usva- janje novog ustavnog poretka koji se suštinski razlikuje od prethodna tri us- tavna poretka. To znači da izgradnja ustavnog pravosuđa u Republici Koso- vo nije imala kao referencu ustavnu tradiciju iz prošlosti, već stremljenje budućnosti - u dubokoj saradnji sa ustavnim sudovima, Evropskim sudom za ljudska prava i Venecijanskom komisijom, čime, u svom odlučivanju, odražava zajednički imenitelj vrednosti sadržanih u evropskom ustavnom pravosuđu i sudskoj praksi u tumačenju Evropske konvencije o ljudskim pravima.

Dobrodošlica i uvodna reč gđe Grese Caka-Nimani, predsednica Ustavnog suda Republike Kosovo

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Ovakav pristup sadržan u sudskoj praksi našeg Suda ističe važnost partnerstva između ustavnih sudova.

Povrh svega, dovoljan je argument da Ustavni sud Kosova zaslužuje svoje mesto među ustavnim sudovi-

ma koji su članovi Evropske konferencije i Udruženja ustavnih sudova frankofonije. Nadam se da će

neprestani pokušaji našeg Suda da se učlani u ova dva foruma sestrinskih ustavnih sudova, 2024. godine

biti uspešno krunisani - i uz podršku ustavnih sudova koji su ovde danas prisutni.

Njihov deklarisani cilj u pogledu unapređenja saradnje u kontekstu ustavnog pravosuđa, gubi smisao

ukoliko u relevantnim forumima koji odlučuju, preovladavaju argumenti manjine po pitanju držav-

nog identiteta Kosova, koji su morali da budu konačno zaključeni 2010. godine - mišljenjem Međun-

arodnog suda pravde o usklađenosti proglašenja nezavisnosti Kosova sa međunarodnim pravom.

A ovo me vodi do drugog cilja ove konferencije - koji stavlja naglasak na ulogu koju imaju ustavni

sudovi u zaštiti i unapređenju vrednosti liberalne demokratije … kao jedinog sistema koji osigurava

da individualna sloboda bude smislena … kao jedinog sistema kojim se osigurava i održava mir.

U svetskom poretku koji karakterišu uslovne suverenosti i koji je već poremećen brojnim dešavanji-

ma, uključujući i ona koja su povezana sa (i) borbom protiv pandemija; (ii) prilagođavanjem naglom

porastu korišćenja informacionih tehnologija i veštačke inteligencije; (iii) populističkim modelima

vladanja koji su u usponu; i (iv) neviđenom agresijom na Ukrajinu - zajedničko evropsko nasleđe se

može zaštititi i negovati samo kroz posvećenost dubokoj međudržavnoj solidarnosti i saradnji.

Ustavni sudovi - kao čuvari ustava - zauzimaju centralno mesto u suočavanju sa izazovima ovog veka.

Razmena iskustava nam omogućava da unapredimo tradiciju ustavnog pravosuđa, stvarajući protivtežu

svakoj sili i pojavi koja preti da potkopa naše zajedničke vrednosti – slobodu, mir i demokratiju.

Imajući u vidu izazove sa kojima se suočava ustavno pravosuđe i one oblasti prava koje čine suštinu

održavanja pravilne ravnoteže između odlučivanja javnih organa vlasti i odgovarajućeg uticaja na

osnovna prava i slobode, izabrali smo da se tokom ove konferencije usredsredimo na vršenje ap-

straktne i konkretne kontrole ustavnosti, uključujući i kroz saradnju sa sudovima nadnacionalnog

karaktera, organizovani u tri panela koja će voditi sudije Ustavnog suda, odnosno sudije Selvete

Gërxhaliu-Krasniqi, Remzije Istrefi-Peci i Nexhmi Rexhepi – imajući priliku da razmenimo iskustva

u službi unapređenja naših praksi i produbljivanja sinergija u kontekstu ustavnog pravosuđa.

Uvaženi prijatelji,

U ovoj su sali danas prisutni neki od najsvetlijih umova ustavnog pravosuđa u svetu. Geografski

prostor koji učesnici danas reflektuju omogućava nam da napravimo sveobuhvatnu mapu dostig-

nuća, izazova i inovacija ustavnih sudova iz celog sveta.

Solidarnost i partnerstvo među ustavnim sudovima su inspirativni. Isto tako i nadahnjuju naš Sud.

Povrh svega, omogućavaju nam da u našoj lepoj prestonici, Prištini, zajedno krstarimo kroz magiju

koju nosi ustavno pravosuđe.

Izražavajući još jednom svoju duboku zahvalnost na vašem prisustvu, sa neutaživim žarom i ra-

doznalošću da saslušam današnje diskusije, otvaram konferenciju i njen rad.

Hvala na pažnji!

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Honorable delegations of the Constitutional and Supreme Courts from around the World;

Dear leaders and representatives of the institutions of the Republic of Kosovo;

Honorable Ambassadors and representatives of international institutions;

Judges, prosecutors, lawyers, deans and professors of universities and members of the civil society;

Dear participants;

Ladies and Gentlemen,

Welcome to the International Conference organized on the occasion of marking the fourteenth anni-

versary of the establishment of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Kosovo.

In marking this anniversary - the Court has chosen for today’s international conference to focus

on the role of the Constitutional Courts in protecting and strengthening the fundamental values of

democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights and freedoms. This was done for two purposes.

First, to underline the importance of the cooperation of Constitutional Courts and the essential role

of Supranational Courts, including the European Court of Human Rights - in supporting constitu-

tional justice in democracies with a less consolidated tradition, including the importance of creating

a uniform system of the protection of universal values and rights on the European continent.

Our Constitutional Court - the youngest on this continent - reflects a good example of this cooperation.

In this context - I would remind that the journey of gradual building of constitutional justice in Koso-

vo, has not been without challenges. These challenges should be treated in the historical-political

context of the state-making and state-building of Kosovo, including in the context of exercising the

constitutional function of interpreting a new Constitution by a Constitutional Court that did not have

the advantage and/or ease of the richness of the prior tradition of constitutional justice.

The year 2008 marks a historical turning point for the Republic of Kosovo - the adoption of a new constitutional order that is fundamentally differ- ent from the three previous constitutional orders. Therefore, the building of constitutional justice in the Republic of Kosovo had no reference to the constitutional tradition of the past, but the aspiration of the future - in close cooperation with the Constitutional Courts, the European Court of Human Rights and the Venice Commission, thus reflecting in its decision-making, the common denominator of the values entailed by the European constitu- tional justice and case-law in the interpretation of the European Convention on Human Rights.

Welcome and Opening Remarks by Ms. Gresa Caka-Nimani, President of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Kosovo

87

Such an approach held in the case law of our Court underlines the importance of partnership be-

tween the Constitutional Courts. Moreover, it is a sufficient argument that the Constitutional Court

of Kosovo deserves its place among the Constitutional Courts members of the European Conference

and the Association of Francophone Constitutional Courts. The relentless efforts of our Court to be-

come member of these two forums of sister Constitutional Courts, I wish to be crowned with success

during 2024 and with the support of the Constitutional Courts present here today.

Their stated goal towards the advancement of cooperation in the context of the constitutional justice,

loses its meaning if in the relevant decision-making forums the arguments of the minority regarding

the state identity of Kosovo prevail and which would have been concluded finally in 2010 - with the

Opinion of the International Court of Justice regarding the compatibility with international law of

Kosovo’s declaration of independence.

And this leads me to the second purpose of this conference - which emphasizes the role that the

Constitutional Courts have in protecting and advancing the values of liberal democracy… as the only

system that ensures that individual freedom is meaningful ...as the only system through which peace

is secured and maintained.

In a world order characterized by conditional sovereignties and already troubled by numerous de-

velopments, including those related to (i) the fight against pandemics; (ii) adaptation to the rapid

increase in the use of information technology and artificial intelligence; (iii) populist models of gov-

ernance on the rise; and (iv) to the unprecedented aggression in Ukraine - the common European

heritage can only be protected and cultivated through a commitment to interstate solidarity and

deep cooperation.

Constitutional Courts - as guardians of Constitutions - occupy a central place in addressing the chal-

lenges of this century. Exchanging experiences enables us to advance the tradition of constitutional

justice - counterbalancing any force and occurrence that threatens to undermine our common values

- freedom, peace and democracy.

In view of the challenges faced by constitutional justice and those areas of law that constitute the es-

sence of maintaining the right balance between the decision-making of public authorities and the re-

spective influence on fundamental rights and freedoms, we have chosen that throughout this confer-

ence, we focus on the exercise of abstract and concrete control of constitutionality, including through

cooperation with supranational courts, organized in three panels, which will be presided over by

judges of the Constitutional Court, namely judges Selvete Gërxaliu-Krasniqi, Remzije Istrefi - Peci

and Nexhmi Rexhepi - having the opportunity to exchange experiences in the service of advancing

our practices and deepening the synergies in the context of constitutional justice.

88

Dear friends,

In this room today we have here present some of the brightest minds of constitutional justice in the

world. The geographical space that the participants today reflect enables us to create a comprehen-

sive map of the achievements, challenges and innovations of the Constitutional Courts from around

the world.

Solidarity and partnership between the Constitutional Courts is inspiring. The latter also elevates

our Court. Moreover, it enables us that in the beautiful capital of Prishtina - to navigate together

through the wonders that the constitutional justice holds.

Expressing once more the deep gratitude for your presence and with unrelenting passion and curios-

ity to listen to today’s discussions, I hereby open the conference and its proceedings.

Thank you for your attention!

89

Chères délégations des Cours Constitutionnelles et Suprêmes du monde entier ;

Chers dirigeants et représentants des institutions de la République du Kosovo ;

Chers Ambassadeurs et représentants des institutions internationales ;

Juges, procureurs, avocats, doyens et professeurs universitaires et membres de la société civile

Chers participants,

Mesdames et Messieurs,

Bienvenue à la Conférence Internationale organisée à l’occasion du quatorzième anniversaire de la

création de la Cour Constitutionnelle de la République du Kosovo.

À l›occasion de cet anniversaire, la Cour a choisi de concentrer la conférence internationale

d›aujourd›hui sur le rôle des Cours Constitutionnelles dans la protection et la promotion des valeurs

fondamentales de la démocratie, de l›État de droit et des droits et libertés fondamentaux. Et ceci à

deux fins.

Tout d’abord pour souligner l’importance de la coopération des Cours Constitutionnelles et le rôle

essentiel des Cours Supranationales, telles que la Cour Européenne des Droits de l’Homme - dans

le soutien de la justice constitutionnelle dans les démocraties ayant une tradition moins consolidée,

ainsi que l’importance de créer un système uniforme de protection des valeurs et des droits univer-

sels sur le continent européen.

Notre Cour Constitutionnelle – la plus jeune sur notre continent – reflète un bon exemple de cette

coopération.

Dans ce contexte, je rappelle que la construction progressive de la justice constitutionnelle au Kosovo

ne s’est pas faite sans difficultés. On devrait abordé ces faits dans le contexte historique et politique

de la création et de l’ édification de l’État du Kosovo, ainsi que dans le contexte de l’exercice de la

fonction constitutionnelle d’interprétation d’une nouvelle Constitution, par une Cour Constitution-

nelle qui n’avait pas l’avantage et/ou la facilité de tirer profit de la richesse d’une tradition antérieure

de justice constitutionnelle.

Allocution de bienvenue de Mme Gresa Caka-Nimani, Présidente de la Cour Constitutionnelle de la République du Kosovo

90

L’année 2008 marque un tournant historique pour la République du Kosovo – l’adoption d’un nouvel ordre constitutionnel fondamentalement différent des trois ordres constitutionnels précédents. Par conséquent, la création de la justice constitutionnelle dans la République du Kosovo n’a fait aucune référence à la tradition constitutionnelle du passé mais s’est tournée vers l’avenir - en étroite coopération avec les Cours Constitutionnelles, la Cour Européenne des Droits de l’Homme et la Commission de Venise, reflétant ainsi, dans ses décisions, le dénominateur commun des valeurs que com- prennent la justice constitutionnelle européenne et la pratique judiciaire dans l’interprétation de la Convention Européenne des Droits de l’Homme.

Une telle approche incluse dans la pratique judiciaire de notre Cour souligne l’importance du parte-

nariat entre les Cours Constitutionnelles. De plus, c’est aussi un argument suffisant pour que la Cour

Constitutionnelle du Kosovo ait sa place méritée parmi les Cours Constitutionnelles membres de la

Conférence Européenne et de l’Association Francophone des Cours Constitutionnelles. Je souhaite

que les tentatives répétées de notre Cour pour rejoindre ces deux forums de Cours Constitutionnelles

soient couronnées de succès en 2024 - avec également le soutien des Cours Constitutionnelles pré-

sentes ici aujourd’hui.

Leur but clair de faire progresser la coopération dans le contexte de la justice constitutionnelle perd

son sens si dans les instances décisionnelles pertinentes les arguments de la minorité concernant

l’identité étatique du Kosovo et qui auraient dû être définitivement clos en 2010 - avec l’ Avis de la

Cour Internationale de Justice concernant la compatibilité de la Déclaration d’indépendance du Ko-

sovo avec le Droit international - l’emportent.

Et cela me conduit au deuxième objectif de cette conférence - qui met l’accent sur le rôle que jouent

les Cours Constitutionnelles dans la protection et la promotion des valeurs de la démocratie libérale

...comme seul système qui garantit que la liberté individuelle ait un sens ... comme seul système qui

permet de garantir et de maintenir la paix.

Dans un ordre mondial caractérisé par des souverainetés conditionnelles et déjà troublé par de nom-

breux développements, dont ceux liés (i) à la lutte contre les pandémies ; (ii) à l’adaptation à l’aug-

mentation rapide de l’utilisation des technologies de l’information et de l’intelligence artificielle, (iii)

à la montée en puissance des modèles de gouvernement populistes ; (iv) à l’agression sans précédent

en Ukraine - le patrimoine européen commun ne peut être protégé et conservé que par un engage-

ment en faveur d’une solidarité et d’une coopération interétatiques profondes.

91

Les Cours Constitutionnelles – en tant que gardiennes des Constitutions – occupent une place cen-

trale pour relever les défis de ce siècle. L’échange d’expériences nous permet de faire progresser la

tradition de la justice constitutionnelle, en contrebalançant toute force et tout phénomène qui me-

nace de porter atteinte à nos valeurs communes - la liberté, la paix et la démocratie.

Compte tenu des défis auxquels sont confrontés la justice constitutionnelle et les domaines de la

justice, et qui constituent l’essence du maintien d’un juste équilibre entre la prise de décision des

autorités publiques et leur impact respectif sur les droits et libertés fondamentaux, nous avons choisi

de nous concentrer tout au long de ce colloque sur l’exercice d’un contrôle abstrait et concret de la

constitutionnalité, notamment par la coopération avec les tribunaux à caractère supranational, or-

ganisé en trois panels qui seront dirigés par des juges de la Cour Constitutionnelle, à savoir les juges

Selvete Gërxhaliu-Krasniqi, Remzije Istrefi-Peci et Nexhmi Rexhepi - avec l’opportunité d’échanger

des expériences au service du développement de nos pratiques et de l’approfondissement des syner-

gies dans le contexte de la justice constitutionnelle.

Chers amis,

Aujourd’hui, dans cette salle, sont présents certains des esprits les plus brillants de la justice consti-

tutionnelle mondiale. L’espace géographique que reflètent les participants aujourd’hui nous permet

de créer un aperçu général des réalisations, des défis et des innovations des Cours Constitutionnelles

du monde entier.

La solidarité et le partenariat entre les Cours constitutionnelles nous inspirent. Cela exalte égale-

ment notre Cour. De plus, cela nous permet de naviguer ensemble dans la belle capitale de Prishtina

- à travers les merveilles que consacre la justice constitutionnelle.

Pour conclure, avec une profonde gratitude pour votre présence, curieuse d’ écouter avec passion les

discussions d’aujourd’hui, je déclare ouverts la conférence et ses travaux.

Merci pour votre attention!

92

Honourable President of the Constitutional

Court of Kosovo,

Distinguished Presidents and Justices,

Ladies and Gentlemen,

It is a great pleasure to be here and to address

such eminent participants. I would like to thank

the President Gresa Caka-Nimani for kindly

inviting us to this well-organised international

conference.

I would also like to congratulate the

14th anniversary of the Constitutional Court of

Kosovo.

In my brief speech I shall talk about the role of

the Constitutional Court of Türkiye (the Court)

1 A.V.Dicey, Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution (1885), (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1982), p. 120.

in protecting and strengthening the value of the

rule of law through its review of presidential de-

crees.

First of all, let me start by recalling a simple fact

as to the nature of constitutions. They are the

basic documents that aim to guarantee, among

others, the principle of the rule of law. This con-

stitutional principle is generally defined as “the absolute supremacy or predominance of regu- lar law as opposed to the influence of arbitrary power”.1

Article 2 of the Turkish Constitution clearly

stipulates that the Republic of Türkiye is a dem-

ocratic state governed by the rule of law. There-

fore, it wouldn’t be wrong to say that the rule of

Contribution by Mr. Zühtü Arslan, President of the Constitutional Court of Türkiye

CONTRIBUTION BY MR. ZÜHTÜ ARSLAN, PRESIDENT OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT OF TÜRKIYE

Constitutional Court of the Republic of Türkiye

93

law is the distinctive characteristic of the con-

stitutional order.

In this regard, the Constitutional Court has fre-

quently invoked the principle of the rule of law

as a yardstick to control the constitutionality of

laws and presidential decrees. The Court has

regarded the rule of law as “a principle that is to be taken into consideration in the interpre- tation and application of all provisions of the Constitution”.2

Distinguished Participants,

The Turkish Constitutional Court was estab-

lished in 1962, and its powers were greatly

expanded by the constitutional amendments

of 2010 and 2017. The former amendment in-

troduced the individual application, otherwise

known as the constitutional complaint mech-

anism, while the latter amendment replaced

the parliamentary system with the presidential

government. The Constitutional amendment

of 2017 granted the President of the Republic

the authority to directly issue “presidential de- crees” on certain matters related to the execu-

tive power.

It is safe to argue that the individual application

system generated a paradigm shift in constitu-

tional jurisdiction of Türkiye, which has clear

implications for the task of norm review includ-

ing the constitutionality review of presidential

decrees.

With the introduction of the individual appli-

cation mechanism, the Court has adopted a

rights-based legal paradigm which attaches cer-

tain priorities to the protection of fundamental

2 Mehmet Güçlü and Ramazan Erdem, no. 2015/7942, 28 May 2019, § 50; Cihangir Akyol [Plenary], no. 2021/33759, 23 February 2023, § 46).

3 Ömer Faruk Gergerlioğlu [Plenary], no. 2019/10634, 1 July 2021, § 50; and Ali Kuş [Plenary], no. 2017/27822, 10 February 2022, § 50

rights and freedoms vis-a-vis the other social

and political interests.

In its several judgments, the Court has declared

that the rights-based paradigm should prevail

over constitutional jurisdiction. For the Court,

the constitutional provisions “may fully and properly fulfil their functions only when they are interpreted through a rights-based ap- proach.” Therefore, the public authorities can

and indeed must “interpret constitutional pro- visions in favour of freedoms”.3

On the other hand, constitu- tional amendments enacted in 2017 granted the Constitution- al Court the power to review presidential decrees. With this competence, the Court has be- come the “negative rule mak- er” in the field of executive in a similar vein to its role as “the negative legislator” with re- spect to the laws passed by the Parliament.

Over the past three years, the Constitutional

Court has established the framework and the

method for the judicial review of presidential

decrees. Unlike the laws, the subject matters to

be regulated through presidential decrees are

delimited by the Constitution. These limita-

tions, which are imposed on the competence ra- tione materiae, are laid down in the first four

94

sentences of paragraph 17 of Article 104 of the

Constitution.

Again, unlike the laws, presidential decrees are

subject to review by the Court in two separate

stages. At the first stage, the Court reviews the

competence ratione materiae of the presiden-

tial decree in question. If the Court finds no vio-

lation of limitation clauses, it examines whether

the content or substance of the presidential de-

cree is compatible with the Constitution.4

Ladies and Gentlemen,

Let me briefly address four constitutional lim-

itations imposed on presidential decrees. First

of all, the President may issue presidential de-

crees on the matters regarding executive pow- er. In other words, the matters falling outside

the realm of the executive power shall not be reg-

ulated by the President. The Court, for instance,

annulled presidential decrees that amended the

laws passed by the Parliament, simply because

amendment of a statutory provision entailed

the exercise of legislative power.5

Secondly, the Constitution creates a kind

of “forbidden zone” for presidential decrees.

Accordingly, the constitutional rights and

liberties, such as the right to property, the right

to privacy, and the protection of personal data,

fall within the “forbidden zone” that cannot be

regulated by presidential decrees. In this regard,

the Court reviewed the constitutionality of a

provision which granted the Financial Crimes

Investigation Board (MASAK) “the power to request every kind of information and docu-

4 See the Court’s decision, no. E. 2019/31, K.2020/5, 23 January 2020, §§ 8-13. 5 See the Court’s decision, no. E.2018/155, K.2020/27, 11 June 2020, § 23. 6 See the Court’s decision, no. E.2019/96, K. 2022/17, 24 February 2022, § 74. 7 See the Court’s decision, no. E.2022/36, K.2023/84, 4 May 2023, § 28 8 See the Court’s decision, no. E.2021/99, K.2022/119, 13 October 2022, §§ 21-22; no. E.2020/89, K.2023/85, 4 May 2023, §§ 13-14.

ment”. The incumbent provision was declared

unconstitutional on the grounds that it inter-

fered with the right to protect personal data

safeguarded by Article 20 of the Constitution.6

Thirdly, the President may not issue presidential decrees on the matters which are prescribed in the Constitution to be regulated exclusively by law. To illustrate, the Court annulled a number of presidential decrees concern- ing the appointment, qualifica- tions and personal rights of the public officials, which must be regulated by law in accordance with Article 128 of the Constitu- tion.7

Finally, the fourth sentence of the paragraph 17

provides that no presidential decree may be is-

sued concerning the matters which have been explicitly regulated by law. This entails that the

Constitutional Court shall declare any provision

of a presidential decree as unconstitutional, if

its subject matter is already regulated by an act

of Parliament.8

The second stage is for the Constitutional Court

to review the constitutionality of the contents of

presidential decrees. In its substantial judicial

95

review, the Court has predominantly invoked

Article 2 of the Constitution and referred to its

well-established definition of the rule of law.

According to the Court, the rule of law requires

a state that respects human rights, ensures the

supremacy of the law on all state organs, deems

itself bound by the Constitution and the laws

and is subject to judicial review.9

The Court has underlined two important ele-

ments of the rule, namely the principles of legal

certainty and of the legal security. The principle

of legal certainty requires that the legal regula-

tions must be absolutely clear, comprehensible

and applicable to both individuals and public

authorities. This clarity is necessary to avoid ar-

bitrary state actions.10

Likewise, the principle of legal security requires

public authorities to act in a foreseeable man-

ner. It prevents the state from enacting incon-

sistent and contradictory legal provisions. The

Constitutional Court annulled the presidential

decrees that were contrary to the principles of

legal certainty and security.11

To sum up, the Constitutional Court upholds the

rule of law through constitutional review of pres-

idential decrees. The Court primarily controls the

limitations imposed on the competence of the

President to issue decrees, and then substantially

examines whether they are in compliance with the

requirements of the rule of law.

9 See the Court’s decision, no.E.2019/31, K.2020/5, 23 January 2020, § 37; and also, no. E.2022/113, K.2023/112, 22 June 2023, § 27.

10 See the Court’s decision, E.2022/113, K.2023/112, 22 June 2023, § 28; and also, no. E.2020/29, K.2022/155, 13 December 2022, § 38.

11 See, for instance, the Court’s decision, no. E.2019/111, K.2023/63, 05 April 2023, § 151. 12 For the text of “Bali Declaration” see 2022_10_06_WCCJ5_Bali_Communique-E.pdf (mkri.id). Retrieved on 18th October

2023.

Dear Participants,

In concluding my remarks, I must note that by upholding the rule of law the Constitutional Court has significantly contributed to further- ing the public confidence towards law and judi- ciary as well as strengthening the legitimacy of public institutions.

These are, in fact, the main functions that are expected from the constitutional courts. In- deed, the “Bali Declaration” adopted last year at the 5th Congress of the World Conference on Constitutional Justice made it clear that “by guaranteeing the respect for the rule of law, the constitutional court furthers the trust indi- viduals place in the virtues of the law and the courts”. It also emphasised that by “ensuring that state actors respect the Constitution, the constitutional court helps to strengthen the le- gitimacy of institutions”.12

We all know that a well-ordered constitutional democracy is inconceivable without public confi- dence in law and courts as well as a strong legiti- macy of the state institutions. Therefore, the con- stitutional courts, with their task of maintaining the rule of law, have become almost indispensable for today’s constitutional democracies.

Let me end my speech by wishing that our courts will continue to effectively protect the basic constitutional values, most notably hu- man rights, democracy and the rule of law.

Thank you for your attention.

96

Të nderuar kolegë e të ftuar, 1

Më lejoni fillimisht që edhe në emër të Gjykatës

Kushtetuese të Shqipërisë të përgëzoj Kryetar-

en dhe Gjyqtaret e Gjykatës Kushtetuese të

Kosovës për këtë organizim të shkëlqyer, si dhe

të shpreh kënaqësinë dhe vlerësimin për mar-

rëdhëniet e shkëlqyera dhe bashkëpunimin e

veçante mes dy gjykatave tona.

Roli i Gjykatave Kushtetuese

Roli më i rëndësishëm dhe i përbashkët i

Gjykatave Kushtetuese është zhvilluar në lidh-

je me legjislacionin, gjatë kontrollit abstrakt të

pajtueshmërisë së tij me normat dhe parimet

kushtetuese. Pushteti për të eliminuar nga

rendi juridik dispozitat ligjore që nuk janë të

pajtueshme me Kushtetutën përcakton edhe

1 Contribution as originally delivered in Albanian.

pozicionin e kësaj gjykate si ligjvënës nega-

tiv (në kuptimin kelsenian) duke i njohur lig-

jvënësit pozitiv (Parlamentit) detyrat e tjera që

kanë të bëjnë me vënien në zbatim të parimeve

kushtetuese, duke pajtuar legjislacionin me to

e duke vepruar në përputhje me vendimin e

Gjykatës.

Megjithatë, edhe për shkak të rolit në rritje të

gjykatave kushtetuese jo vetëm si garante të su-

premacisë së Kushtetutës, por si interpretueset

përfundimtare të normës kushtetues përmes

vendimeve që kanë efekte detyruese për gjykatat

e zakonshme, institucionet publike dhe indi-

vidët, është fakt se binomi jokushtetutshmëri- pavlefshmëri/nulitet që konfirmoi veprimtarinë

fillestare si “ligjvënës negativ” është kapërcyer.

Gjatë kësaj periudhe kompetencat e gjykatave

kushtetuese janë zgjeruar në mënyrë progresive,

duke marrë një rol më aktiv në interpretimin e

Fjala e znj. Holta Zaçaj, Kryetare e Gjykatës Kushtetuese të Republikës së Shqipërisë1

GJYKATA KUSHTETUESE DHE POZICIONI I SAJ SI LIGJVËNËS NEGATIV

97

Kushtetutës, dhe të vetë ligjeve të miratuara në

bazë dhe zbatim të kësaj të fundit, në mënyrë që

jo vetëm t`i shfuqizojë ose moszbatojë ato kur

janë jokushtetuese, por me qëllimin e mbrojtjes

së veprimtarisë së ligjvënësit dhe të akteve

normative të miratuara prej tij, t`i interpretojë

ato, nëse është e mundur, duke i dhënë kuptimin

që është në harmoni me Kushtetutën.

Ligjvënësi si interpretues i normës kushtetuese

Bazuar në parimin e prezumimit të kushte-

tutshmërisë së ligjit, në jurisprudencën e saj

Gjykata ka mbajtur qëndrimin ne jurispru-

dencën e saj se ajo nuk ka autoritet të kontrol-

lojë synimet dhe drejtësinë e zgjidhjeve të apli-

kuara nga ana e ligjvënësit. Kjo do të thotë se,

lidhur me jokushtetutshmërinë e pretenduar

duhet të parashtrohen argumente bindëse për

t’i dhënë mundësi asaj që të vlerësojë nëse zg-

jidhjet ligjore të aplikuara shkelin normat dhe

vlerat kushtetuese. Kuvendi, si organi më i lartë

përfaqësues dhe mbartës i sovranitetit të pop-

ullit, është padyshim organi qendror dhe më i

rëndësishëm i pushtetit shtetëror dhe në ush-

trimin e këtij funksioni ai shfaqet edhe si inter-

pretues i normës kushtetuese pasi në kuadër të

zbatimit të politikave të caktuara në procesin e

hartimit dhe miratimit të ligjeve duhet të ketë

parasysh se ato nuk duhet të vijnë në kundërsh-

tim me dispozitat e Kushtetutës.2

2 Vendimi nr. 29, datë 31.05.2010. 3 Vendimi nr. 75, datë 19.04.2002.

Gjykata në rolin kontrollues duke ruajtur funksionin si ligjvënës negativ

Gjykata Kushtetuese, në mënyrë të vazh-

dueshme, ka theksuar në jurisprudencën e saj

pozicionin si ligjvënës negativ.

P.sh në çështjen me objekt interpretimin e

shprehjes “akte e sjellje që diskreditojnë rëndë pozitën dhe figurën” në disa nene të Kushtetutës,

Gjykata është shprehur se për interpretimin e

këtyre normave ajo nuk merr përsipër të kryejë

rolin e legjislatorit pozitiv, duke parashikuar një

për një të gjitha rastet që mund të përfshihen

në këto shkaqe kushtetuese, sepse do të ishte e

pamundur një gjë e tillë ndërkohë që Kushtetuta,

ligjet, apo edhe vendimet gjyqësore nuk mund

të kodifikojnë me saktësi akte e sjellje të tilla.

Në kushtet kur në Kushtetutë, apo edhe në ligjet

e tjera elementet thelbësore të një procedure

nuk gjejnë rregullim të hollësishëm, ato nuk

mund të plotësohen nëpërmjet vendimit të saj

interpretues, pasi interpretimi si funksion dhe

si metodë, ka vend për një normë ekzistuese

kur ka paqartësi në kuptimin e saj dhe jo për të

plotësuar boshllëkun, sepse përndryshe Gjykata

Kushtetuese do të vihej në pozicionin e gabuar

të krijuesit të normës juridike, funksion i cili i

përket organit ligjvënës.3

Në vitin 2010, Presidenti i Republikës, në

përmbushje të kompetencës për emërim-

in e gjyqtarëve i dërgoi Kuvendit dekretet për

plotësimin e disa vendeve vakante. Kuvendi,

duke pretenduar paqartësi për çështje si krit-

eret që duhet të plotësojnë kandidaturat, iu

98

drejtua juridiksionit kushtetues me kërkesë

për interpretimin e disa normave kushtetuese.

Gjykata në këtë rast ritheksoi rolin e saj si lig-

jvënës negativ, duke vlerësuar se Presidenti

dhe Kuvendi, gjatë ushtrimit të kompetencave

të tyre kushtetuese janë interpretuesit e parë të

normës kushtetuese, çka do të thotë se u takon

atyre dhe jo Gjykatës Kushtetuese përcaktimi i

kritereve që duhet të plotësojë një kandidaturë,

pasi a contrario, kjo Gjykatë do të ndërhynte në

ushtrimin e kompetencave kushtetuese të secil-

it prej këtyre organeve, duke cenuar parimin e

ndarjes dhe balancimit të pushteteve.4

Zhvillimi dhe ridimensionimi i rolit të Gjykatës përmes interpretimit pajtues

Megjithatë Gjykatat Kushtetuese me kohën i

janë larguar modelit kelzenian duke zhvillu-

ar mjete dhe instrumente juridike kushtetuese

që shkojnë përtej modelit të ligjvënësit negativ

dhe i lejojnë Gjykatës, në një masë të konsider-

ueshme, të vendosë rregulla që mbyllin drejt-

përsëdrejti boshllëqet e krijuara nga vendimet e

saj për shfuqizimin e dispozitave ligjore.

Ideja për ta ruajtur ligjin i ka krijuar mundësinë

Gjykatës Kushtetuese të shmangë shfuqizimin

e tij për të mos krijuar boshllëqe ligjore, duke

përzgjedhur një interpretim që i jep ligjit një

kuptim të pajtueshëm me Kushtetutën. Kjo ka

çuar gjykatat kushtetuese të vlerësojnë se kur

një ligj mund të interpretohet në përputhje me

Kushtetutën, duhen bërë të gjitha përpjekjet

4 Vendimi nr. 24, datë 09.06.2011. 5 Po aty. 6 Vendimet nr. 29, datë 31.05.2010; nr. 30, datë 17.06.2010; nr. 33, datë 24.06.2010; nr. 5 datë 16.02.2012; nr.2, datë 18.01.2017; nr. 34 datë 10.04.2017.

për të ruajtur vlefshmërinë e tij dhe duke zgjed-

hur këtë mënyrë interpretimi me qëllim që të

rrëzojë çdo qëndrim tjetër që mund të çojë në

deklarimin jokushtetues të ligjit.

E ndikuar nga zhvillimet jurisprudenciale të

gjykatave kushtetuese të vendeve të tjera evropi-

ane, Gjykata jonë Kushtetuese gjatë viteve të fun-

dit ka aplikuar gjerësisht metodën e interpretimit

pajtues të ligjit të kundërshtuar me Kushtetutën,

duke vlerësuar se ky interpretim është i mundur

kur një ligj apo dispozitë ligjore mund të inter-

pretohet në më shumë se një mënyrë, njëra nga të

cilat është në pajtim me Kushtetutën.5:

Gjykate është shprehur p.sh se “Metoda e interpretim- it pajtues kërkon efektet kushtetuese të rezultateve të ndryshme dhe përzgjedh re- zultatin që është në pajtim me vlerat kushtetuese. Bazuar në këtë metodë interpretimi, Gjykata ka arritur në përfun- dimin se një ligj i kundërshtu- ar është kushtetues, me kusht që normat e tij të interpreto- hen në atë mënyrë siç ka bërë Gjykata në vendimin e saj”.6

Në vlerësimin e Gjykatës “ një rregullim i pa- saktë i normës ligjore, që i lë shteg zbatuesit t’i japë asaj kuptime të ndryshme dhe që sjell pasoja, nuk shkon në përputhje me qëllimin,

99

stabilitetin, besueshmërinë dhe efektivitetin që synon vetë norma”.7

Gjykata si konstatuese e ometimit dhe jo si plotësuese e tij

Një rol të rëndësishëm ka Gjykata Kushtetuese

si në drejtim të ometimit legjislativ/normativ,

që shkaktohet nga mungesa fillestare e parashi-

kimit legjislativ, ashtu edhe atij juridik, ose të

shkaktuar për shkak të shfuqizimit të ligjit nga

Gjykata ose vetë ligjvënësi.

Gjykata Kushtetuese, në disa raste, edhe kur ka

vendosur të shfuqizojë dispozitën ligjore/pjesë

të saj, në përfundim ka theksuar edhe se ky

shfuqizim nuk krijon boshllëk ligjor, ndaj nuk

lind nevoja që organi ligjvënës të bëjë ndonjë

plotësim.8 Po kështu, një mjet tjetër që për-

dor Gjykata është shtyrja në kohë e efekteve të

vendimit, edhe pse kjo lejon vazhdimin e efek-

teve juridike të ligjit ekzistues, për t`i dhënë

kohë ligjvënësit që të reagojë dhe për të evituar

cenimin e të drejtave kushtetuese për shkak të

boshllëkut ligjor9.

Në lidhje me boshllëkun e shkaktuar nga

mungesa e veprimit të ligjvënësit, ligji organ-

ik i gjykatës10 në përputhje me nenin 132 të

Kushtetutës, parashikon se kur gjatë shqyrtimit

të çështjes konstatohet se ka boshllëk ligjor nga

i cili kanë ardhur pasoja negative në të drejtat

dhe liritë themelore të individit, Gjykata, veç

të tjerash, vendos detyrimin e ligjvënësit për

7 Vendimi nr. 43, datë 26.06.2015. 8 Vendimi nr. 15, datë 17.04.2003. 9 Vendimet nr. 1, date 12.01.2011; nr. 3, datë 05.02.1010; nr. 12, datë 14.04.2010. 10 Neni 76, pika 5, i ligjit nr. 8577, datë 10.02.2000 “Për organizimin dhe funksionimin e Gjykatës Kushtetuese të Republikës

së Shqipërisë”. 11 Vendimi nr. 38, datë 09.12.2022. 12 Vendimi nr. 4, datë 15.02.2021.

të plotësuar kuadrin ligjor brenda një afati të

caktuar. Në këtë rast kompetencë e Gjykatës nuk

është formulimi pozitiv i normës që mungon,

por vetëm konstatimi se ometimi ekziston

dhe ka pasoja kushtetuese, pra se mosveprimi

i vetë ligjvënësit që e ka shkaktuar atë është

jokushtetues.

Në çështjen e vënë në lëvizje nga një organi-

zatë, për konstatimin e cenimit të së drejtës

kushtetuese të votës së emigrantëve në zgjedhjet

e përgjithshme të vitit 2021, Gjykata konstatoi se

për shkak të mosmiratimit të akteve nënligjore

nga KQZ-ja, ditën e zgjedhjeve u kufizua e drej-

ta aktive e votës për shqiptarët me banim jashtë

territorit të Shqipërisë. Për rrjedhojë, e drejta

kushtetuese e votës e kësaj kategorie për shkak

të boshllëkut ligjor mbeti thjesht një parashikim

deklarativ, i pazbatueshëm efektivisht në prak-

tikë, duke mbetur në thelbin e saj iluzive.11

Shembull tjetër vjen në rastin e ligjit për pro-

cesin e trajtimit të pronave12, një histori kjo që

ë ka shoqëruar Shqipërinë që prej ndryshimit

të regjimit, dhe ku janë prodhuar një sërë ak-

tesh ligjore që kanë pësuar ndryshime të vazh-

dueshme në kohë si pasojë edhe e ndërhyrjes

së Gjykatës Kushtetuese ashtu edhe të GJED-

NJ-së, Gjykata konstatoi kufizimin e së drejtës

së pronës private edhe për shkak të mungesës

së rregullimit ligjor për situatën e ndryshimit që

ka pësuar zëri kadastral i pronës ndër vite. Nga

ky boshllëk ligjor kanë ardhur pasoja negative

në të drejtën e pronës, duke i mohuar kompen-

simin e drejtë kësaj kategorie subjektesh.

100

Për rrjedhojë, në të dyja këto raste, Gjykata i la

kohë ligjvënësit për të miratuar rregullat e reja

ligjore në përputhje me vendimin e saj.

Në konkluzion duhet thënë se kur ushtron

kontroll kushtetutshmërie Gjykata nuk kufizohet

domosdoshmërish tek norma ligjore ekzistuese,

por ajo mund të ushtrojë ndikim juridik në kri-

jimin dhe në përmbajtjen e normave ligjore të

ardhshme. Megjithatë ushtrimi kësaj veprim-

tarie kërkon veprimin dhe zgjidhjen nga organi

kompetent përmes miratimit, nëse është nevoja

e strategjive për të adresuar çështjet që ka evi-

dentuar Gjykata Kushtetuese.

Edhe pse këto teknika të ndërhyrjes nuk synojnë

të ndërhyjnë në prerogativat e ligjvënësit, instru-

mentet në dispozicion të gjykatave kushtetuese

dhe zgjedhja për ta karakterizuar Kushtetutën si

një dokument të parimeve dhe vlerave që hap një

gamë të gjerë mundësish në mbrojtjen e të dre-

jtave të lirive themelore duket sikur e ka superu-

ar konceptin e gjykatës kushtetuese si ligjvënës

negativ.

Faleminderit!

101

Distinguished Colleagues!

On behalf of the Latvian Constitutional Court,

I am honoured to congratulate your highly re-

spected Court on anniversary of the establish-

ment!

I would like to start my short presentation by

empathising that at the end of last year, Koso-

vo submitted an application for the European

Union membership. This is a very inspiring mile-

stone for us, because the Constitutional Court of

Latvia is strongly supporting the path of Kosovo

to the European Union. We are committed to in-

tensify our mutual dialogue to foster integration

of the legal system of Kosovo in a united Europe-

an legal space.

Therefore, today, in the session on the role of

Constitutional Courts in strengthening the val-

ues of democracy and rule of law, I would like to

focus on how to protect these values in practice,

being a part of a united European family. The

subjects of abstract constitutional control sub-

mit an application to the Constitutional Court to

safeguard public interests, and that is why courts

often examine so-called “values cases” within the

framework of such a mechanism.

It is well known that European Union is based

on values of respect for human dignity, freedom,

democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect

for human rights. In a similar way, the European

Court of Human Rights has referred to “values of

Contribution by Mr. Aldis Laviņš, President of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Latvia

THE ROLE OF CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS IN RECONCILING THE APPLICATION OF EUROPEAN UNION AND INTERNATIONAL LAW WITH THE CONSTITUTIONAL IDENTITY

102

equality, diversity and pluralism” that underly

the Convention system. It appears safe to say,

that the values underlying both European sys-

tems – the European Union and the Council of

Europe – are similar, if not identical.

At the same time the European Court of Human Rights accepts national particularities and al- lows for margin of appreciation in complying with the Conven- tion rights, and the European Union even protects national identities in Article 4(2) of the Treaty on European Union. As the Priest at St. Teresa’s Cathe- dral said yesterday, “If roots are denied, we are no one”. That’s why European common values also emphasize the importance of Member State’s origins and heritage in shaping their iden- tity.

It is self-evident that there should not exist a

conflict between the shared European values

and profound constitutional identities of Mem-

ber States. In the last decade, there have been

extensive discussions in Latvia about the core of

the Constitution. Thus, it is recognized in Lat-

via that there are general constitutional values,

such as the rule of law, protection of the national

language, protection of the fundamental rights

among others. These values allow the Republic

of Latvia to exist as a nation. Thus, not every-

thing provided under the Constitution would

automatically or instantly become the national

constitutional identity. I will not elaborate on

this issue due to time limit, instead I will pro-

vide you with a recent example how to reconcile

constitutional identities of Member States with

the shared European values!

In a recent preliminary procedure (so-called

Cilēvičs e.a. case) the Latvian Constitutional

court asked the European Court of Justice,

whether the protection of the State

language, which in Latvia is understood as a

manifestation of national identity, may justify

restriction on the freedom of establishment

within the European Union Member States.

The case concerned a very strict limitation

upon the higher education institutions to offer

courses of study in foreign languages. In the

application, submitted by twenty members of

the Parliament, it was held that the contested

provisions restrict the fundamental rights to

private property – as they entail restrictions

on the freedom of establishment of citizens

and companies originating from Member

States of the European Union. Contested

provisions make it more difficult for certain

undertakings established abroad to relocate to

Latvia or to open some other place of business

in Latvia. Applicants correctly point out, in so

far as educational courses have to be provided

(almost exclusively) in Latvian, many foreign

higher education institutions will be unable

to use a (probably significant) part of their

administrative and teaching staff in Latvia.

The Court of Justice ruled, that European Union

law must be interpreted as not precluding leg-

islation of a Member State which, in principle,

obliges higher education institutions to provide

teaching solely in the official language of that

Member State, in so far as such legislation is

justified on grounds related to the protection

103

of its national identity, and provided that it is

necessary and proportionate to the protection

of the pursued aim of national identity.

Thus, the Court of Justice in principle con-

firmed that the protection of the national lan-

guage may be based on a system of protection

which is different from that adopted by other

Member States. Taking this into account, the

Constitutional Court concluded that the bene-

fit of Latvian society from the restriction of the

fundamental rights of foreign entrepreneur out-

weighs the adverse consequences that private

higher education institutions incur due to the

restriction of their fundamental right, namely,

the right to conduct commercial activity.

Thus, we are allowed to be assured that in their

absolute majority the value cases allow to con-

ciliate the national constitutional identity with

the supra-national obligations.

Dear Colleagues!

Constitutional identities and shared European

values are the “immutable cores” of the three

legal systems, which unite us in protecting De-

mocracy and Rule of Law, not divide us!

104

I. The current events and disputes in various

countries in Europe and around the world are

calling to our attention the fundamental pillars

of our society with the utmost clarity. What is

the position of the citizen in the polity and po-

litical community? And in which way has the

power of state to be limited in respect of the

individual? We have answered these questions

by stating that freedom of the individual is in

principle unlimited, while power of the state

may only be excersised on basis of legal provi-

sions that have come about in a democratically

legitimised process. Therefore, any state inter-

vention can ultimately be linked back to the will

of the people as manifested in the law, which is

conveyed in the law by the directly democrati-

cally legitimised parliament.

The free democratic constitutional state there-

fore consists of a democratically legitimised le-

gal system, fundamental rights and freedoms,

and a system of institutions for legal protection,

primarily in the form of independent and im-

partial courts, which ensure compliance with

the legal system both in the relationship be-

tween the state and its citizens and in the rela-

tionship between citizens themselves.

The democratic state under the rule of law is

perfected in the constitutional state, which

guarantees and safeguards the supremacy of

the constitution and thus secures and stabilises

the entire structure of the constitutional state.

Contribution by Mr. Georg Lienbacher, Judge of the Constitutional Court of Austria

THE ROLE OF CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS IN STRENGTHENING THE VALUES OF DEMOCRACY AND RULE OF LAW THROUGH ABSTRACT CONTROL OF CONSTITUTIONALITY OF NORMS

105

Every state action must find its basis in the con-

stitution and has to be in conformity with it. In

particular this also means, that laws and stat-

utes are reviewed on the basis of the constitu-

tion and, in case of contradicition, are annulled

by a (Constitutional) Court. This is the only way

to ensure a legal system free of contradictions,

which will ultimately be accepted by the people.

II. The effectiveness and poten- cy of the constitution depends on its enforcement. The accep- tance of the constitution and thus the acceptance of the en- tire legal system is also relat- ed to its enforcement. In mod- ern democratic constitutional states, enforcement of the con- stitution is ensured by special- ised Constitutional Courts. It is the (supreme) “guardian of the constitution”.

The concept of constitutional review by a spe-

cialized court was significantly developed by

Hans Kelsen and first implemented by the Aus-

trian Constitutional Court in 1920. In terms of

the rule of law, Kelsen started from the funda-

mental consideration that constitutional dis-

putes, i.e. disputes over the interpretation and

application of the Constitution, are not only

political but also legal conflicts. As legal con-

flicts, they can and must be decided by an in-

dependent and impartial court. Back then the

idea that this also covered parliamentary acts,

i.e. laws and statutes that were repealed by the

Consitutional Court if they were unconstitu-

tional, was revolutionary. This competence to

anull laws and statutes in particular was mon-

oplised at the onstitutional Court.

In this way, however, a Constitutional Court in-

directly becomes a player in the political field

and, passively, inevitably and unavoidably,

a political actor, not because it acts political-

ly itself, but because it effects political activity

through its constitutional decisions. It is there-

fore a “borderline organ” between law and pol-

itics. The Constitutional Court must question

the constitutionality of political concepts that

have been passed into law. In the event of con-

tradiction, it must repeal the laws and statutes.

The decisions of a Constitutional Court affect

public life society and the structure of the state

more directly and lastingly than the decisions of

other courts, because they have general effects,

above all in the proceedings for reviewing laws,

statutes and ordinances, which often even have

direct consequences for all people or affect the

interaction of state bodies. For this reason, deci-

sions of Constitutional Courts, especially those

that abolish statutory laws, are often of eminent

political importance, even if they “merely” in-

volve the resolution of (constitutional) legal is-

sues. This has become very clear in the recent

decisions of the Austrian Constitutional Court

on pandemic control measures, assisted suicide,

the wearing of the Islamic headscarf or same sex

marriage as examples. In addition, decisions re-

lating to state organisation have this character.

If I may again mention an Austrian example,

the annulment of the 2016 federal presidential

election caused a strong interest and stir.

III. As independent and impartial courts,

Constitutional Courts resolve constitutional

questions referred to them by interpreting and

applying constitutional law. Although their de-

106

cisions may have major political impact, their

activities remain jurisdiction. A law or statute

that violates the constitution must be abolished

by the Constitutional Courts as unconstitution-

al, regardless of considerations of political ex-

pediency. The supremacy of the Constitution is

guaranteed and thus enforced.

On an abstract level, this seems trivial; in prac-

tice it remains a challenge. The constitution is

more open to interpretation than any other le-

gal provisions. As an example, I cite a sentence

from the Austrian Federal Constitution: “All

citizens are equal under the law.” What has the

jurisprudence of the Austrian Constitutional

Court made of this? In its decision on assisted

suicide, the Constitutional Court derived the

fundamental right to free self-determination

from the principle of equality in conjunction

with the right to private life (Art. 8 ECHR) and

the right to life (Art. 2 ECHR). This right to

free self-determination includes both the right

to decide how to live and the right to die with

dignity. A prohibition under criminal law of

any assistance in suicide, irrespective of specif-

ic circumstances, contradicts this right to free

self-determination. The statutory provision in

question was therefore repealed.

In its decision on the Islamic headscarf ban in

elementary schools, the Austrian Constitutional

Court derived the requirement of religious and

ideological neutrality of the state from the prin-

ciple of equality in conjunction with freedom of

religion (Art. 9 ECHR). A legal rule that singels

out a certain religious or ideological conviction

by specifically privileging or discriminating

against it, requires an objective justification

with regards to the requirement of religious and

ideological neutrality. No justification in re-

spect of these principles could be identified for

the ban on Islamic headscarves for schoolgirls

at elementary school. The law was repealed.

The two decisions serve as an example of how

the decisions of Constitutional Courts have on

the one hand far-reaching political implica-

tions. On the other hand, Constitutional Courts

are constantly forced to develop considerable

legal or, better, constitutional innovation when

applying constitutional standards of review.

The fact that the Austrian constitutional system

contains a fundamental right to free self-deter-

mination and a requirement of religious and

ideological neutrality was, at least until these

exemplary decisions, not commonly known

among legal circles.

Generally speaking, Constitutional Courts are

faced with the question of whether they should

be more restrained in their jurisprudence,

i.e. whether they should emphasize “judicial

self-restraint”, or whether they should practice

“judicial activism”. In the European Constitu-

tional Court network, the answer to this ques-

tion is to some extent taken out of the hands of

the Constitutional Courts. Not least because of

the “living instrument” approach of the ECtHR

(European Court of Human Rights) in apply-

ing the ECHR (European Convention of Hu-

man Rights), the member states of the Council

of Europe and thus many of the Constitutional

Courts represented here today are called upon

to understand and interpret fundamental rights

in the light of current social conditions in a law

developing manner.

IV. With the examples mentioned, I want to

emphasise and underline that Constitutional

Courts and thus judges of the Constitutional

Court bear a very special responsibility for the

polity and society.

107

The ideal judge of the Constitutional Court ful-

fills his or her responsible and challenging task

of clarifying constitutional issues by maintain-

ing a distance from party-political social or per-

sonal interests and by deciding without preju-

dice on the basis of the constitution. In abstract,

this seems completely uncontroversial, but in

practice it can be difficult. As judges of the Con-

stitutional Court, we must try every day again to

live up to this ideal. But that is not enough! We

must also make it visible to the outside world

that we are fulfilling this ideal. The great diffi-

culty is not only to show the professional world

that we are a court that decides in accordance

with applicable (constitutional) law, we also

have to explain this to the society. We are not to

be categorised as political actors; we are judges

who must decide constitutional disputes, irre-

spective of their political impact. Depending on

the success of our efforts to communicate our

judicial activities to the general public, accep-

tance of our activities will grow and we will be

understood independently and separately from

political activities by other supreme bodies in

the state.

Acceptance in society is the greatest asset of Constitution- al Courts and thus the greatest asset concerning the control of abstract legislation. Ultimate- ly, this acceptance protects Constitutional Courts from in- terference by politicians who disagree with decisions of the Constituional Court.

From an Austrian perspective, I can report that

we are confronted with constitutional politi-

cal discussions at regular intervals, especially

after attention-getting decisions. In these dis-

cussions, people sometimes consider how to

“tame” the Constitutional Court. These discus-

sions proceed comparatively innocuously. More

recently, in response to politically unpleasant

decisions, there has been a debate about pub-

lishing dissenting oppinions. Politicians in-

tended to obtain knowledge of voting behaviour

and the decision making process within the

court, in order to break through the secrecy of

deliberations and votes and to eliminate the

uniform appearance of the Constitutional Court

to the outside world. Yes, there have even been

considerations to publish the voting behavior

of the single judges. All this would significantly

impair and fundamentally change the culture of

deliberation that has existed for 103 years and

thus would make the work of the Constitution-

al Court more difficult. This also endangers the

constitutional control of abstract legislation

since this is particularly central in such discus-

sions.

In the past, as is so often the case after such

political considerations, the public debate has

shown, that society’s acceptance of the Consti-

tutional Court is very high. The political propos-

als have been heavily criticised in public. The

propsed amendments were not well received

and have only recently been dismissed. Howev-

er, with a view to other European Constitutional

Courts, such discussions do not always proceed

in such an innocuous manner. We must note

that the free democratic state under the rule of

law is now being challenged in particular by re-

structuring of Constitutional Courts and by re-

strictions on competences in certain countries,

108

to an extent that we would have never thought

possible in Europe.

V. It is not just a matter of constitutional juris-

diction, but of very fundamental issues:

If, in context of preliminary ruling proceedings

at the ECJ, it has to be clarified as a preliminary

question whether a national court has the status

of a court at all, serious legal issues in regard of

the rule of law are evident. Additionally, these

issues jeopardises the control of abstract legis-

lation. By trying to classify this in legal terms,

we are dealing with a fundamental right, the

right to the legal judge as down by law. On an

European Union level, this right is derived from

Article 47 section 2 of the CFR, the right to a tri-

bunal previously established by law, and Arti-

cle 6 section 1 of the ECHR. Of course, this also

applies to all member states of the Council of

Europe on basis of the ECtHR.

The ECJ and the ECtHR assume a violation of

these provisions, when there is a flagrant vio-

lation of legal provisions governing the courts

and if this violation fundamentally impairs the

protective purpose of the right to a tribunal es-

tabilshed by law. This is the case, when there

is any appearance of arbitrariness or if there

are circumstances that give rise to a reasonable

doubt in the minds of individuals as to the in-

dependence and the impartiality of the court.

Above all, the appearance that other state au-

thorities exert undue influence on the composi-

tion and jurisdiction of the court violates Article

47 of the charter.

The before mentioned provisions of the CFR

and the ECHR are violated by a court’s decision,

if there were flagrant errors in the appointment

procedure of the deciding judges. As soon as

the irregularity is of such gravity that it creates

a real risk that other branches of the State could

exercise undue discretion undermining the in-

tegrity of the outcome of the appointment pro-

cess, such a violence will be assumed. Thus, the

ECtHR has found a violation of the right to the

judicial body by a decision of the Polish Consti-

tutional Court. This decision involved a mem-

ber who had been unlawfully appointed.

However, the fundamental requirements for ju-

dicial independence, which are derived directly

from Art. 47 CFR and Art. 6 ECHR as well as

from Art. 19 TEU, do not only focus on the ap-

pointment process. It is also decisive whether

domestic law complies with EU law. To the ex-

tent that such an error affects the national ap-

pointment procedure, it also affects the specific

decision, which thus becomes unlawful. This

applies in particular to the procedure of ab-

stract judicial review of statutes and laws. This

protects aspects of the rule of law such as the

independence of the judiciary and, above all, of

constitutional jurisdiction, which always seem

to come under particular pressure in current

threats to the rule of law. This also gives special

legitimacy to the repeal of law in the procedure

of abstract judicial review of statutes and laws.

In Austria, these guarantees are known as an independent fundamental right to the lawful judge, which was introduced during the monarchy in 1867 to combat illiberal monarchical tendencies in the state system. In 1920, it was incorporated into the Federal Constitution.

109

VI. Given the many discussions on legal policy

and also the increasing threats to constitutional

jurisdiction, let me conclude with a thought that

is important to me.

Constitutional Courts can contribute a lot to

protect themselves from threats to the rule of

law and thus to preserve their function for the

free democratic rule of law and in particular

for the abstract judicial review of statutes and

laws. Firstly, I would like to return to the issue

of acceptance. Broad acceptance in society is

probably the largest capital of the Constitution-

al Courts against political interests to impair

and restrict their work. Constitutional Courts

must also acquire this capital. At the top of the

list stands consistent and consequent jurispru-

dence that does not appear to be influenced

by opinions among the population or political

forces. We have to make it visible to the outside

world that we are committed only to the con-

stitution and that other influences will bounce

off. This also means explaining the case law in a

generally understandable way, at least in those

cases that cause public stir or that cause partic-

ular political excitement. In Austria, for exam-

ple, we have started to accompany such cases

with press releases after the parties have been

notified. In these press releases the result of

the decision and the reasoning is explained in

generally understandable language. Especial-

ly in the case of legislative repeals, this plays a

significant role. This also has the effect of pre-

venting the press from reporting incorrectly as

of a result of not understanding the decision.

We have learned that publishing all decisions

anonymously is not enough to create transpar-

ency and understandability. More generally, we

also have to explain to society what we do, how

we are organised and how we make decisions.

In Austria, we also have introduced open house

days and opened the Constitutional Court for

interested members of the public. We try to give

tours of the court to groups that show interest

and explain what our job is. With the media

presence in important cases and the thus visible

places where the decisions are announced, the

interest in being able to see the premises that

are visible in the media in reality has increased

significantly. We use this interest to provide as

much information about us as possible. The vis-

itors are interested!

In addition to such activities at a national level,

I believe that it is highly necessary for Constitu-

tional Courts to support each other and to coop-

erate in a supportive manner, especially when

threats to the rule of law arise. Informal meet-

ings on multilateral level, such as those that ex-

ist in certain areas, e.g. the six-member meeting

between the ECtHR, the ECJ, the BVerfG (Ger-

man Constotutional Court), the VfGH (Austrian

Constitutional Court), the Liechtenstein StGH

(Constitutional Court of Liechtenstein) and

Swiss Federal Court every two years, which al-

low a trustful exchange. However, there are also

formal associations on European and interna-

tional level that offer a range of possibilities.

From Austria’s point of view, bilateral contacts

in particular have become very important. We

conduct such in large numbers. We have to use

them to support each other and expand the pos-

sibilites. Last but not least, the legal protection

mechanism of European Union law for Consti-

tutional Courts of states belonging to the EU is

also of major importance.

VII. I am not only a constitutional judge, but

also a legal researcher. As a researcher, one is

required throughout one’s life to question ev-

erything critically. I ask you to forgive me for

110

not being able to put aside this critical attitude

at this conference as well.

It is of high importance to me to support the

idea of the constitutional jurisdiction and es-

pecially the abstract judicial review of statutes

and laws of the Consitutinoal Courts. By do-

ing so I want to contribute to the stability of

the Constitutional Courts and thus also of the

Kosovar Consititutional Court and a free dem-

ocratic constitutional state as a whole. All the

more I would like to thank you for the invitation

and wish especially the Kosovar Constitutional

Court that its contribution to the support and in

the development of a free democratic constitu-

tional state, especially in regard to the abstract

judicial review of statutes and laws, is indis-

pensable and remains indispensable.

111

My presentation is an overview of the Por-

tuguese system from the perspective of

the specific theme of our session. It is divided

into five parts, focusing especially on the last

one.

Part I. The Constitution of the Portuguese Republic of 1976

Portugal, unlike Kosovo, is an old country. It

dates back to 1143, when our first king, D. Afon-

so Henriques, and Afonso VII of Leon and Cas-

tile (now Spain) signed the Treaty of Zamora,

although papal recognition only arrived in 1179,

with the bull Manifestis Probatum. However,

although we are an old country, our current

Constitution is quite recent, at least compared

to those of many European countries.

After a 48-year dictatorship, a revolution estab-

lished a democratic regime in Portugal on 25th

April 1974 (the “Revolution of Carnations”, as it

is still called). One year later, following the first

free elections in our country, a constituent as-

sembly was elected with the mandate to draft a

new democratic constitution, which came into

force a year later, in 1976.

Contrbituion by Mr. José Figueiredo Dias, Judge at the Constitutional Tribunal of Portugal

THE ROLE OF CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS IN STRENGTHENING THE VALUES OF DEMOCRACY AND THE RULE OF LAW THROUGH ABSTRACT CONTROL OF THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF NORMS - AN OVERVIEW OF THE PORTUGUESE SYSTEM

112

Part II. The Portuguese Constitutional Court

The first constitutional amendment took place

six years later. At the time, there was the Coun-

cil of the Revolution, a military institution, in

which a body called the Constitutional Commis-

sion acted as the supreme judicial body in mat-

ters of constitutional review. The Constitutional

Commission was extinguished with this amend-

ment and the Constitutional Court was created,

becoming responsible in the last instance for

reviewing the constitutionality of laws in Por-

tugal. The Court began its activity in April 1983,

having celebrated this year its fortieth anniver-

sary.

Part III. The democratic principle and the rule of law

I would now like to emphasize the democrat-

ic principle and the rule of law as part of the

basic principles, or fundamental axes, of the

Portuguese Constitution. There is an intrinsic

and express constitutional connection between

these two principles: the Constitution refers to

a “democratic rule of law”.

The democratic principle is referred mul-

tiple times in the Constitution, in which it is

stated, for example, that the Portuguese Re-

public is based on “the will of the people” (Ar-

ticle 1); that “[t]he Portuguese Republic is a

democratic state based on the rule of law, the

sovereignty of the people, plural democratic

expression and political organisation” (Article

2); that sovereignty “lies with the people” (Ar-

ticle 3); and that it is the fundamental task of

the State to guarantee “respect for the princi-

ples of a democratic state based on the rule of

law” (Article 9).

Among the constituent elements of the demo-

cratic principle in the Portuguese Constitution

are the principle of the sovereignty of the peo-

ple, the principle of representation, the prin-

ciple of separation of powers, the principle of

suffrage, and the principle of proportional rep-

resentation.

The rule of law is referred in Article 2 and

Article 9(b), which state that Portugal is a dem-

ocratic state based on the rule of law. There

are three material assumptions inherent to the

principle: legality, constitutionality, and funda-

mental rights and freedoms, which are a cor-

nerstone of the Portuguese Constitution.

Some of the sub-principles that make the rule of law possible are:

• the principle of the constitutional state,

which implies the need for constitution-

al review (Articles 277 and following);

• the principle of the independence of

the courts and access to the law and the

courts;

• the principle of legality of administra-

tion (i.e. the subjection of the Adminis-

tration to the law);

• the principle of protection of legitimate

expectations;

• the principle of legal security;

• the principle of proportionality;

• procedural guarantees, especially in

criminal proceedings (Article 32).

113

Part IV. Constitutional review in the Portuguese Constitution

Since the Constitution is the basic law of the

country, the entire legal order must be in accor-

dance with it (a corollary of the Constitution as

the Basic Law of a country). Thus, it is necessary

to ensure that the Constitution is respected by

lower-ranking legal provisions.

In this framework, the Constitutional Court ap-

pears as the main actor of constitutional justice,

with powers to decide, without the possibility of

appeal, on questions of constitutionality.

There are four types of constitutional review

laid down in the Constitution: anticipatory ab-

stract review; successive abstract review; con-

crete review; and unconstitutionality by omis-

sion. Only the second one interests us for the

purposes of this panel, so I will only talk about

successive abstract review.

Part V. Abstract review of the constitutionality of norms in the Portuguese Constitution

In the last but most important part, I will very

briefly address 7 aspects of this type of consti-

tutional review:

1. One caveat: I will limit myself to dis-

cussing what we call “positive unconstitu-

tionality”. In Portugal, we also have unconsti-

tutionality by omission, which is a very original

modality in terms of comparative law, but of

little practical relevance. The Constitutional

Court, in this case, verifies the non-compliance

with the Constitution resulting from the lack of

adoption of necessary legislative measures by

the competent legislative bodies.

2. Competent body: successive abstract

review is a concentrated review, which

means it is reserved to the Constitutional Court.

All Portuguese courts are competent to carry

out concrete review regarding any questions of

constitutionality raised in a specific case, with

the possibility of appeal to the Constitutional

Court, but only the Constitutional Court has the

authority to deem a norm unconstitutional with

general binding force.

3. Initiative / standing: abstract consti-

tutional review may only be requested by

certain public entities, and it is not open to most

citizens. These entities are the President of the

Republic, the Speaker of Parliament, the Prime

Minister, the Ombudsperson, the Attorney Gen-

eral, one tenth of the Members of Parliament,

and regional authorities (regarding legal provi-

sions that affect the Autonomous Regions).

4. Object: successive abstract review is in-

dependent of any specific dispute pend-

ing a court decision. It scrutinizes legal provi-

sions in force, whose formation process has

already been completed, including their official

publication.

All legal provisions are covered, notably con-

stitutional review laws, legislative acts (includ-

ing laws of Parliament, Government decrees

and legislative decrees of the autonomous re-

gions), international conventions, legal provi-

sions issued by international organizations of

which Portugal is a member, normative reso-

lutions of Parliament, and regulations of the

Administration. Political acts, administrative

acts, and judicial acts and judicial decisions

are excluded.

114

5. Effects of a declaration of uncon- stitutionality: a declaration of uncon-

stitutionality has generally binding force and

entails the retroactive invalidation of the legal

norm. This means that the legal norm does not

produce any effects from the beginning and

cannot continue to be applied by any court or

authority.

The general binding force of the declaration of

unconstitutionality means that the declaration

is binding on all constitutional bodies, courts

and administrative authorities; we say it has

the force of law, meaning that the judgment has

normative value, to the extent that it eliminates

the rule from the legal system.

6. Inexistence of unconstitutionality (denial of the request for a declaration of

unconstitutionality): the Constitutional Court

never judges a legal provision constitutional.

Rather, in a negative decision, there is a judg-

ment of non-unconstitutionality. These deci-

sions do not, however, have general binding

effects.

7. The importance of the request prin- ciple: the Constitutional Court always

acts at the request of entities with legal standing

and not on the initiative of any of its Justices.

The request delimits the scope of the Court’s

jurisdiction to the provisions in question. How-

ever, Justices are not limited by the cause of

action, and may deem the provision unconsti-

tutional on different grounds.

I will finish by underlying the importance of

successive abstract review in the Court’s activ-

ity, not only statistically, but especially in terms

of its public repercussion and effects.

115

In 2024, the Irish Supreme Court will celebrate its centenary marking its status as one of the

great old ladies of Supreme Courts. Indeed, we also see ourselves as one of the great old ladies of constitutional courts in Europe. The Irish Consti- tution (or Bunreacht na hÉireann) was adopted in 1937 but the first constitution of the independent Irish State was adopted in 1922. This predated the establishment of the Supreme Court but the basic structure of the Court is fundamentally the same as that envisioned 102 years ago when our first Constitution was adopted. (See Gerard Hogan, The Origins of the Irish Constitution, 1928-1941 (Royal Irish Academy 2012)). 1

The framers of our Constitution, perhaps ob- viously given the date of its adoption, did not have the benefit the drafters of the Kosovan Constitution had, with the insight and guidance

1 Judge of the Irish Supreme Court. This is an amended draft of the paper originally presented orally at the conference marking the 14th Judicial Year of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Kosovo.

of, for example, the Venice Commission or the European Court of Human Rights. We largely derived the principles that underlie our Consti- tution from two broad traditions; republican- ism rooted in the Ancient Greek concept of the Republic and the threads of liberalism flowing from the Enlightenment. (See generally Tom Hickey and Eoin Carolan, The political theory of the Irish Constitution: Republicanism and the basic law (Manchester University Press 2015) and Eoin Daly, ‘Republican themes in the Irish constitutional tradition’ (2016) 41(2) Études Irlandaises 163). This is apparent from the text which stresses popular sovereignty, the democratic nature of the State, the dignity of the individual, fundamental freedoms, and the power to strike down legislation for inter alia exceeding the threshold of permissible inter-

Contribution by Ms. Marie Baker1, Judge of the Supreme Court of Ireland

THE IRISH SUPREME COURT AS GUARDIAN OF THE CONSTITUTION: RESTRAINT, LEGITIMACY, AND COURAGE

THE SUPREME COURT of IRELAND CÚIRT UACHTARACH NA HÉIREANN

116

ference with these fundamental freedoms. It protects, as you would imagine, a right to life, property, freedom of expression, bodily integri- ty, and enshrines an equality guarantee.

Naturally, all courts in the Irish legal system are bound to act in accordance with the Constitu- tion and within the confines of the judicial role for which it provides. However, there is a funda- mental difference between the roles of the Su- perior Courts, namely the High Court, Court of Appeal, and unsurprisingly the Supreme Court) and that of the lower courts of local and limited jurisdiction. The Superior Courts alone have the power to interpret the Constitution, to decide whether legislation is compliant with the Con- stitution and therefore whether the legislation must be declared repugnant and struck down. This judicial review power is expressly provided for in Article 34.1.2° of the Constitution.

We did have what was described as quite an active Supreme Court over the years but more recently we have shown to a large extent a degree of re- straint. This has mirrored the transition of the Su- preme Court from a general to a selective appellate court hearing cases only on issues of general public importance and/or in the interests of justice. Our jurisdiction has a unique feature, which may seem quite mundane in jurisdictions with dedicated constitutional courts, in that Article 26 of the Con- stitution allows the President to refer a Bill to the Supreme Court prior to signing it into law where the President is satisfied a constitutional question is raised by the legislation. It is an infrequently utilised power, and there have been only 15 refer- ences since the adoption of the 1937 Constitution. We received such a reference just over a week ago, which marks the first since 2005. It is also unique- ly stressful as this procedure requires that a final judgment be handed down in 60 days from the

2 For final judgment see Re Article 26 of the Constitution and the Judicial Appointments Commission Bill 2022 [2023] IESC 34 (Summary).

date of the reference. It comes to our Court with some drama, alongside significant political and le- gal importance, as the draft legislation which has been passed by both houses of parliament is deliv- ered to us by motorbike. Ironically, the legislation now in question is for the appointment of judges. This is a somewhat awkward position for us par- ticularly as the defence of the proposed reforms is to remove the appearance that political prefer- ences might play a role in judicial appointments. It is also particularly high-profile due to the antici- pated legal issues particularly the expectation that we will be asked to pronounce the meaning of the separation of powers between the legislature and executive of the State.2

This casts a spotlight on our practice of restraint and reminds us of one of our greatest challenges as a Court, building and maintaining our legiti- macy. We may be the old lady of constitutional courts, but we are aware of the cold winds blow- ing around us. It is undoubtedly the case that the people of Ireland hold the Constitution in high regard. This is reflected, not only in its frequent invocation before the courts, but further in its symbolic display at political protests. There is a broad consensus of respect for the courts, but this is regularly tested and there is, as in most of Europe, a growing discontent with the perceived status quo, the influence on public opinion by misinformation, and broader trends with which we are all too familiar. We are acutely aware of the requirement to maintain our legitimacy, and we have done this over the last number of years particularly through a conversation surrounding constitutional interpretation focusing on rights which form part of our constitutional law which can be said to be either express or derived from the Constitution itself.

117

In the 1980s, the Supreme Court was described as activist and understood to be inspired by the Unit- ed States Supreme Court under the leadership of Chief Justice Earl Warren (1953 – 1969). In that era, the Court delivered a series of decisions seen as expansionary and quite bold. The outcomes of the interpretative process surrounding the text of the Constitution often took the public by sur- prise and have been the subject of fierce contin- ued debate by academics. There was a sense that the judges of the Court, when asked if a particu- lar right could be inferred from the constitutional text or broader Irish constitutional order, would consider if the subject of a proposed right merit- ed protection before turning to produce analysis which defended their conclusion. This critique certainly does not hold today, we are conscious of difficulties the interpretative process can play for us and now firmly ground our analysis with- in the constitutional text (See Chief Justice Donal O’Donnell, ‘The Sleep of Reason’ (2017) 40 Dub- lin University Law Journal 191, and for an outside perspective Tom Hickey, ‘How to Adjudicate a Rights Case in Irish Constitutional Law’ (2023) 5 Irish Supreme Court Review). Through careful consideration of the text, its principles, its values, and the structure of the constitutional order it en- visages, we have moved from the idea of imply- ing rights towards that of deriving rights. While international instruments are useful, this move to ground our practice centrally on the constitution- al text has been an asset to the Court, particularly considering the building of legitimacy (See James Rooney, ‘International Law as a Source of Unenu- merated Rights: Lessons from the Natural Law’ (2019) 42 Dublin University Law Journal 141).

This came to its height when Friends of the Irish Environment challenged the Climate Mitiga- tion Plan 2017 adopted by the Irish government (Friends of the Irish Environment v Govern- ment of Ireland [2020] IESC 49). They pursued

two primary arguments, (1) that the Plan failed to adequately vindicate rights guaranteed by the Constitution and the European Convention of Human Rights and (2) that the Plan was ultra vires the Climate Action and Low Carbon De- velopment Act 2015. The Plan was struck down but on analysis of the legislative framework un- der which it was adopted, as it was held not to be sufficiently specific to meet the requirements of the Act or substantiate the methods through which the State would transition to a low carbon and climate resilient economy by 2050. In the course of the judgment, we expressed the view that we did not think that there existed in Irish law a constitutional right to a clean environment, but that the right to life, health, and property may allow some ideas of environmental protec- tion to emerge from the Constitution. This was a highly restrained approach, and ultimately the correct approach as recourse to the Constitution was not required for the resolution of the dispute. Similarly, we were asked a number of years ago to legitimise the right of a woman with multiple sclerosis to be assisted in her suicide (Fleming v Ireland [2013] IESC 19). We rejected this on the basis that it is not possible to derive a right to assisted suicide from the existing Constitution, partly because of the right to life but more im- portantly because without a structured legislative framework within which assisted suicide could happen, it would be wrong for the Court to de- clare a general right. Restraint is evidently a core feature of the functioning of our Court and one which, alongside our commitment to the provi- sion of the reasons and reasoning of the Court in extensive written judgments, has been central to the maintenance of our legitimacy.

Finally, we are concerned to show that our Court ultimately has courage. That courage matters when it comes to making decisions that appear to cut against the preferences of government. A

118

recent example concerns the constitutionality of the Comprehensive Trade and Economic Agree- ment (Costello v Ireland [2022] IESC 44). We said it breached the constitutional identity of the Irish courts if a foreign arbitration body could decide on the meaning of Irish law and that its ratification in its current form was unaccept- able. Notwithstanding its dissatisfaction with this, government accepted and respected the decision. A further recent judgment which was certainly unpopular with government concerned the composition of our second house of parlia- ment, the Seanad, which is not elected on univer- sal suffrage but rather by institutional, vocation- al, and university panels (Heneghan v Minister for Housing [2023] IESC 7). 43 years ago, the Irish people indicated in a referendum that the composition of the electorate for the election of the university panels should be changed and yet nothing followed this. Many bodies were estab- lished to consider how a new form of university panel would evolve, many discussions were had, but still nothing happened. The Court declared unconstitutional the legislation underlying the current Senate representation. We were then asked by the Attorney General to grant a five year stay on that declaration, which would have meant the end of the current parliament and that any legislative change would happen in the term of a new legislature. This would have passed the admittedly prickly problem to the next admin- istration and was rejected, although a stay was placed on the declaration of unconstitutionality (Heneghan v Minister for Housing [2023] IESC 18). We recognised on one hand that it would be wrong for us to allow an unconstitutional stat- ute to exist on the statute book. We further rec- ognised that if we struck it down immediately without some stay, there would be no possibil- ity of ever fixing the problem as we would not have a legislature capable of passing legislation in accordance with the Constitution. During that

judgment, the Chief Justice gave a short com- ment on which it is fitting to close:

It would be a mistake to think that, in any human system of judging, that there are not many factors which are capa- ble of affecting judges who can- not reach their decisions in the abstract. However, it would be an error of even greater pro- portions to assume that these considerations control courts’ decision-making. It would be wrong to refrain from mak- ing a finding of constitution- ality because the result would be inconvenient or worse, and equally incorrect, to find some- thing unconstitutional, which was not. In truth, courts should attempt to address all cases on their merits, and the only rele- vant consideration is whether the test to be adopted and ap- plied, make that already diffi- cult task easier, or more diffi- cult.

This shows the difficulties that courts, par- ticularly younger courts like the Constitu- tional Court of Kosovo, will come up against when faced with pressure and criticism. The indispensable need for courage cannot be un- derstated. The respect we have garnered and maintained as a Court from the public and gov- ernment flows from this courage particularly against a backdrop of restraint and continued regard for legitimacy. I have witnessed an abun- dance of such courage in my time in Kosovo and been reminded that we cannot forget it.

119

I. INTRODUCTION

Reputation is crucial in many arenas, and judg-

ing is no exception. A judge with a good reputa-

tion will enjoy the esteem of his friends and col-

leagues and may have chances for advancement

to higher courts. A judiciary that operates effec-

tively will earn respect within its own political

system and internationally, and may become a

model for other countries, providing opportu-

nities for travel and exchange for judges. A ju-

diciary with a poor reputation, in contrast, will

find itself starved of both resources and respect.

Despite the sense that reputation is important,

we know very little about how judicial reputa-

tion is produced. We understand that some

judges and judiciaries are viewed as successful

and others are not, but we do not really have

any theories about how reputation is developed

and sustained. In this excerpt we provide a the-

ory of judicial reputation, and provide evidence

of the institutional consequences from a range

of legal systems.

Reputation is the stock of judgments about per-

formance, which is produced by those who have

accurate information. Judicial reputation plays

two important roles. First, it conveys informa-

tion to the uninformed general public about the

quality of the judiciary (more generally, about

the legal system) as perceived by the relevant

audiences. Second, reputation fosters esteem

for the profession and for the individual judge,

both self-esteem and esteem in the eyes of oth-

ers. A judiciary with high esteem is likely to be

able to garner more material resources and to

be more insulated from other political actors

who might expropriate such resources.

Contribution by Mr. Tom Ginsburg, Professor of Comparative Constitutional Law at Chicago University Law School

JUDICIAL REPUTATION (drawn from Nuno Garoupa and Tom Ginsburg, Judicial Reputation (University of Chicago Press, 2015) and used with permission)

120

The reputation of the judiciary, individually or

as a whole, determines its status in any given

society and its ability to compete effectively

for resources within the government. We do

not specify a universal reputation function for

judges, and recognize that judges in different

systems will seek reputations for different qual-

ities—such as predictability, wisdom, and effi-

ciency—that might not be valued in other sys-

tems. Whatever the definition of judicial quality

in a particular legal system, reputation emerges

as a relevant factor and plays an important role.

We argue that reputation can be divided into

individual and collective components. Individ-

ual reputation provides information about indi-

vidual performance whereas collective reputa-

tion provides information about the quality of

the judiciary in general. At the same time, each

member of an institution cares about his indi-

vidual reputation, but also about the reputation

of the group as a whole. Collective reputation

determines the status of the judiciary, but indi-

vidual reputation influences the judge’s relative

perception vis-à-vis their fellow judges.

The bifurcated nature of reputation between

individual and group components creates in-

teresting institutional challenges, which we

analyze below using the concept of “team pro-

duction.”1 If judicial performance were pure-

ly the result of individual effort and the quality

of the judiciary could be easily disaggregated

into its individual components, individual rep-

utation should prevail as the most important

mechanism to provide information. But cru-

cially, it is often difficult to monitor or differ-

1 The foundational papers on team production include Alchian AA and Demsetz H 1972 ‘Production, Information Costs and Economic Organization’ 62 American Economic Review 777; Holmstrom B 1982 Moral Hazard in Teams 13 Bell Journal of Economics 324; Aoki M 1994 ‘The Contingent Governance of Teams: Analysis of Institutional Complementarities 35 Inter- national Economic Review 657; Rajan RG and Zingales L 1998 ‘Power in the Theory of the Firm’ 113 Quarterly Journal of Economics 387.

entiate the separate individual contributions to

the production of justice or judicial decisions;

we do not know what each individual judge

contributed to a collective decision. Because of

this we also need information about the aggre-

gate performance of the judiciary; the whole is

more than the sum of individual contributions.

Consequently, an important task of institution-

al design is to incentivize the optimal balance

of investments into the different components

of reputation, to match the needs of any given

society.

We also argue that different legal systems con-

figure institutions in different ways in order to

address the problem of information and repu-

tation. The classical understandings of the com-

mon law and civil law judiciaries can be seen

as sets of linked institutions that are mutually

reinforcing in addressing the problems of in-

formation and reputation. We describe these

institutions from the perspective of informa-

tion and reputation, and explain how they in-

ter-relate. Judiciaries that emphasize collective

reputation utilize institutions to limit publicly

available information about the performance

of the individual judge. Those that emphasize

individual reputation, on the other hand, facili-

tate the disclosure of such information. In both

cases the disclosure or non-disclosure of private

information about individual performance re-

inforces the kind of reputation that prevails in

the judicial system.

121

II. PRODUCING REPUTATION

Reputation can be divided into two components,

individual and collective. Individual reputation

is related to the name recognition of each judge.

Collective reputation is linked to the perceived

role of the judiciary in any given society.2 Each

and every judge is affected by individual and by

collective reputation and consequently cares

about both. Nevertheless, depending on incen-

tives and the institutional framework, judges

might be more concerned with one or the other

in different societies.

Individual reputation-building is fundamen-

tally an activity that each judge must accom-

plish on his or her own, while collective repu-

tation-building is the product of team-work.

Furthermore, it is not always the case that ef-

fort allocated to individual reputation building

enhances collective reputation and vice-versa.

In fact, in some circumstances these two goals

may conflict. For example, individual reputa-

tion might encourage each judge to differentiate

herself from other judges; excessive differenti-

ation across the bench might seriously under-

mine collective reputation. High variance in

the performance of individual judges can hurt

the reputation of the judiciary as a whole.

In our view, judges allocate effort between

building individual and collective reputations

in response to the institutional environment.

This means that a judge might have to decide

2 Collective reputation has been discussed in the sociological and business literature on organizations. See Tom J. Brown, et al., Identity, Intended Image, Construed Image and Reputation: An Interdisciplinary Framework and Suggested Terminology, Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science 34: 99-109 (2006); Peter A. Dacin and Tom J. Brown, Corporate Identity and Corporate Associations: A Framework for Future Research, Corporate Reputation Review 5:254-63 (2002); Susanne Scott andn Vicki R. Lane, A Stakeholder Approach to Organizational Identity, Academy of Management Review 25:43-62 (2000); Violina Rindova, The Image Cascade and the Formation of Corporate Reputations, Corporate Reputation Review 1: 188-94 (1997).

between advancing his or her own preferences

(hence building individual reputation) or con-

forming with the general preferences of his or

her colleagues (hence promoting a collective

reputation for consensus). In many circum-

stances, a particular action can enhance both

individual and collective reputation at the same

time. But in other circumstances, by investing

more in building individual reputation, a judge

contributes less to building collective reputa-

tion. This presents each judge with a choice as

to which type of reputation to invest in. Choices

are influenced by incentives, which in turn are

established by different actors. These actors

can be considered principals on whose behalf

the judiciary works.

Collective reputation is essentially determined

by external mechanisms. It reflects the views

of society or public opinion in general toward

the judiciary, but also the interests of the rel-

evant particular constituencies with special

power over the courts. These constituencies

might include the bar, other branches of gov-

ernment, political parties and others, depend-

ing on the institutional environment of courts.

Collective reputation shapes the social and po-

litical influence of the judiciary as a whole, and

consequently has monetary and non-monetary

implications for the welfare of the judges. For

example, collective reputation may impact the

overall judicial budget, salaries, pensions, and

other perks available to the judiciary, as well the

level of social prestige and overall working con-

ditions in the courts. In other words, collective

122

reputation determines the size of the pie to be

divided among individual judges.

Individual reputation is established by external

mechanisms (such as academic commentators,

the bar and political actors) but also by internal

mechanisms (such as peer evaluation by other

judges). Individual reputation, as established

by these internal mechanisms, determines the

share each judge gets of the pie while the out-

side appraisal by relevant external constituen-

cies determines potential supplementary pay-

offs obtained individually. The balance between

external and internal mechanisms shapes indi-

vidual reputation building.3

A legal system that relies exclusively on collec-

tive judicial reputation will produce incentives

for individual judges to expend less effort than

they could. A legal system that only relies on

individual reputation promotes information

about individual judges but treats collective

reputation as a mere aggregation of individual

reputations. This is a legal system that incentiv-

izes judges to work hard, but they may reduce

the appropriate investment in the non-separa-

ble component of judicial production. Consider

seriatim opinions, used in the British House of

Lords before the creation of the United Kingdom

Supreme Court, and also used on the U.S. Su-

preme Court before John Marshall. Each judge

would speak in sequence, and observers would

3 For the general public, see for example Caldeira GA 1986 ‘Neither the Purse nor the Sword: Confidence in the Supreme Court’ 80 American Political Science Review 1210 and Caldeira GA and Gibson JL 1992 ‘The Etiology of Public Support for the Sup- reme Court’ 36 American Journal of Political Science 635; for administrative bodies and government audiences, see W. N. Eskridge WN 1993 ‘The Judicial Review Game’ 88 Northwestern University Law Review 382; Eskridge WN and Ferejohn JA 1992 ‘The Article I, Section 7 Game’ 80 Georgetown Law Journal 523; and Ferejohn JA and Weingast BR 1992 ‘A Positive Theory of Statutory Interpretation’ 12 International Review of Law and Economics 263; for the larger law school audience, see Schauer above note 7. For an interesting example see Marites Dañguilan Vitug, Shadow of Doubt: Probing the Supreme Court 19 (Newsbreak Public Trust Media Group 2010) (describing Philippine Supreme Court justices viewing themselves as both individual operators and a collectivity.)

4 Elaine Mak, Judicial Decision-making in a Globalized World (2013). 5 See, e.g., Posner RA 1993 Cardozo: A Study in Reputation University Of Chicago Press.

have to pay close attention to figure out the out-

come of the case. The collective jurisprudence

suffered, even if each judge was able to cultivate

his or her individual reputation freely. (British

judges report greater collective effort after the

establishment of the Supreme Court.)4

III. COMPARATIVE INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS

In every legal system, both individual and col-

lective judicial reputation is important. Howev-

er the relative degree of importance varies not

only across legal families, but even within the

same legal family. If we look at the U.S. feder-

al judiciary, for example, individual reputation

seems to matter a great deal. The Supreme

Court is identified with the name of the Chief

Justice (such as Warren, Rehnquist or Rob-

erts) and the great judges of the past are heroes.

Newspapers frequently discuss how individual

justices vote in particular cases and quote from

dissents. Federal judges give talks to the pub-

lic and write books advancing their views on

important issues, and the appointment mech-

anism includes Senate confirmation hearings

in which individual candidates to the federal

courts have to expose their views. Academics

study the judicial contribution of individual

justices in detail,5 and they are the subjects of

123

popular biographies.6 This pattern of serious

assessment of individual performance is not

found in the United Kingdom. Most judges of

the Supreme Court are not well known, and

tend only to appear in the public discussion

when they engage in extrajudicial tasks such as

leading commissions of inquiry.

In this sense, the United Kingdom judiciary is

more akin to those of France, Japan and Ger-

many, where most people have no idea of the

identity of the Chief Justice, much less the other

justices of the Supreme Court.7 Newspapers in

these countries very rarely report on dissenting

views; justices usually avoid exposure and con-

tact with public opinion in general; and very few

judges get to be known by the public in gener-

al.8 If justice is blind, judges are anonymous.

In these legal systems, information about indi-

vidual performance seems to be intentionally

underplayed, if not systematically hidden from

the general public.9

In short, in some legal systems collective reputa-

tion prevails over individual reputation whereas

6 See, e.g., Foskett K 2005 Judging Thomas: The Life and Times of Clarence Thomas William Morrow. 7 Richard Posner, Law and Legal Theory in England and America (Oxford University Press, 1998). 8 For example, Sophie Boyron identifies a major concern in France with the “esprit de corps” of the judiciary, a professional cul- ture driven by early socialization in the Grande École, then reinforced by collective decision-making with a profound distrust for the individual judge and further enhanced by judicial trade unions that effectively impose judicial collective bargaining. She also argues that in France judicial accountability is collective. See Boyron S 2006 ‘The Independence of the Judiciary: A Question of Identity’ in Canivet G, Andenas M and Fairgrieve D eds 2006 Independence, Accountability and the Judiciary. Another comparativist, Basil Markesinis, argues that French judges are trained to keep their ideas to themselves, see Mar- kesinis BS 1994 ‘A Matter of Style’ 10 The Law Quarterly Review 607. In her book, Eva Steiner proposes that the French judiciary is educated and trained as a unit to adhere to a collegial form promoted by French courts, see Steiner E 2002 French Legal Method Oxford University Press.

9 See, among others, van Caenegem RC 2002 European Law in the Past and the Future: Unity and Diver- sity over Two Millennia Cambridge University Press (arguing that, while in Britain the bench is paramount and the judges have a highly personal role, in the Continent courts are faceless and the judges are described as fungible persons) and Van Caenegem RC 1987 Judges, Legislators and Professors: Chapters in European Legal His- tory, Cambridge University Press (asserting that the legal system is dominated by judges in common and by law professors in civil law). A tendency toward bureaucratization seems to be detected in the United States by Fiss O 1983 ‘The Bureaucrati- zation of the Judiciary’, 92 Yale Law Journal 1442.

10 See Merryman JH and Pérez-Perdomo R 2007 The Civil Law Tradition 3rd edition (observing the pressure for con- sensus in civil law jurisdictions due to legal tradition). See also Merryman JH 1988 ‘How Others do It: The French and the German Judiciaries’ 61 Southern California Law Review 1865.

11 Nicholas Georgakapolous N 2000 ‘Independence in the Career and Recognition Judiciary’ 7 University of Chicago Law School Roundtable 205.

in other legal systems the reverse occurs; some

legal systems pursue individual performance

whereas others prefer to limit information about

individual performance and rely more on collec-

tive assessment.10 This section discusses some of

the different institutional structures that condi-

tion the development of judicial reputation. We

do not provide a theory of why these institutional

structures exist, but rather focus in this chapter

on the contribution of institutional structure to

disclosure of information and reputation build-

ing. For example, we do not discuss the rationale

for the existence of an appeal system, but rather

examine how the different designs of an appeal

system generate information on individual or col-

lective performance, contributing to the different

forms of reputation.

A. Career vs. Recognition Judiciary

One way of contrasting different types of ju-

dicial structures is to distinguish the “career”

from “recognition” judiciaries.11 The career

system involves judges entering a judicial bu-

124

reaucracy at a young age, and spending an en-

tire career as a judge.12 The recognition system

appoints judges later in life, usually after the

candidate has established themselves as an ex-

cellent candidate. It involves fewer opportuni-

ties for promotion. The appointment is based

on the individual reputation of the candidate, as

assessed by the relevant constituency, by some

mechanism external to the judiciary. For exam-

ple, in the United States, the President appoints

federal judges, with the advice and consent of

the Senate, after the candidates have developed

a stellar reputation in other spheres. In some

American states and in the Supreme Court of

Bolivia, judges run in judicial elections in which

each candidate has to present a distinctive plat-

form.13 The external appointment process in-

volving ex ante screening helps to compensate

for the absence of a vertical hierarchy in the ju-

diciary, which decreases the incentives to com-

ply with rigid professional norms. The appoint-

ment system by external principals dilutes the

collective identity of the judiciary but enhances

the individual reputation of the judge who has

been screened. Thus, in recognition judiciaries,

individual reputation as perceived by external

audiences is the dominant factor in judicial ap-

pointments.

In contrast, a career judiciary is selected and

promoted based on internal judicial assess-

ments of individual merit. Relatively little infor-

12 For example, the judiciary in the UK has been presented as a career judiciary, where barristers are regarded as a first step into the judiciary, in a system more similar to the Continent than to United States. See for example, Posner R 1996 Law and Legal Theory in England and the United States Oxford University Press(discussing the British career judiciary in chapter 1).

13 On judicial elections, see, e.g., Webster P 1995 ‘Selection and Retention of Judges: Is There one Best Method?’ 23 Florida Sta- te University Law Review 1; Hanssen FA 2004 ‘Learning About Judicial Independence: Institutional Change in State Courts’ 33 Journal of Legal Studies 431 at 462; Epstein L, Knight J and Shvestova O 2002 ‘Selecting Selection Systems’ in Burbank SB and Friedman B eds 2002 Judicial Independence at the Crossroads: An Interdisciplinary Approach Sage Publications, Inc at 191–226 (S.

14 See generally Ramseyer JM and Rasmusen E 2003 Measuring Judicial Independence, University Of Chicago Press (focusing on Japan).

mation is available to the public about judges,

but the judiciary itself develops and uses inter-

nal performance measures to make promotion

decisions. Compliance with internal mecha-

nisms makes collective reputation much more

important. The credibility of a given judge does

not depend on her individual merits but on the

reputation of the entire judiciary. Any concerns

about judicial appointment or promotion will

not tend to be directed at any particular judge,

but the entire profession. Consequently, collec-

tive reputation building is very important for

career judges.14 Such systems tend to empha-

size the anonymity of the law, and the myth that

there is a single correct answer for legal ques-

tions that in principle is invariant to the indi-

vidual judge making the decision.

Yet external audiences have gained importance

in many civil law countries in recent decades.

Some of this development is due to exogenous

factors that have changed the general public

perception of the judiciary and have provided

for new kinds of incentives. Greater media ac-

cessibility is a global phenomenon that has ef-

fects on many institutions. External audiences

may also become more important because fac-

tors endogenous to the legal system, such as the

introduction of a Constitutional Court very dif-

ferent in function and nature from the tradition-

al judiciary. The interaction between new con-

stitutional courts and the traditional judiciary

125

and other branches of government has dramati-

cally changed the balance between internal and

external audiences in many countries, and we

wrestle with this in Chapter Five.

B. Individual Opinions/Dissents/Voting

When the Supreme Court of Mexico held a

public session announcing its 2008 decision

upholding Mexico City’s statute legalizing

abortion, it attracted significant attention both

inside the country and abroad. The Court’s 15

justices justified their decision in a complicat-

ed set of orally delivered opinions, with the

final vote to uphold decided by a single vote.

When the final written decision was released

some months later in February 2009, the eight

justices in the majority issued a majority de-

cision along with seven concurrences; there

were also three dissents. Two years later, the

Court returned to the abortion issue to consid-

er two new state statutes criminalizing abor-

tion (passed in a backlash to the earlier ruling).

The divided court could not come to a majori-

ty opinion and so the challenge to the statutes

failed, leaving abortion illegal in some states,

but a flurry of separate opinions accompanied

the short procedural notice announcing the

failure. Commentators have criticized the di-

vided jurisprudence as incoherent.15

15 Francisca Pou Giménez, Constitutional Change and the Supreme Court Institutional Architecture: Decisional Indeterminacy as an Obstacle to Legitimacy, paper presented at CIDE Conference, Mexico City, March 11, 2013.

16 See evidence by Taha AE 2004 ‘Publish or Paris? Evidence of How Judges Allocate their Time’ 6 American Law and Econo- mics Review 1.

17 Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Remarks on Writing Separately, 65 Wash. L.Rev. 133, 139 (1990) 18 Mark Graber, A New Introduction to American Constitutionalism 91 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013). 19 See discussion about the quality of opinion writing by Nugent DC 1994 ‘Judicial Bias’ 42 Cleveland State Law Review 4 and

Miller GP 2004 ‘Bad Judges’ 83 Texas Law Review 431. 20 For the US, see the evidence provided by Sunstein CR, Schkade D, Ellman LM, and Sawicki A 2006 Are Judges Political? An

Empirical Analysis of the Federal Judiciary Brookings Institution Press (discussing these issues in chapter 5). See generally, Stack KR 1996 ‘Note: The Practice of Dissent in the Supreme Court’ 105 Yale Law Journal 2235 and George TE 1998 ‘Deve- loping a Positive Theory of Decisionmaking on U.S. Courts of Appeal’ 58 Ohio State Law Journal 1635.

The availability of information on the particu-

lar judges—whether in the form of individual

opinions, the possibility of dissent by judges, or

the availability of judicial votes in a transparent

and verifiable way that is visible to laymen—

has two important consequences. First, it helps

each judge to establish an individual reputa-

tion.16 As Justice Ginsburg wrote in 1990, put-

ting a name on an opinion “serves to hold the

individual judge accountable” by putting the

judge’s reputation on the line.17 Some judges

relish this opportunity: Justice William Rehn-

quist was known as the “Lone Ranger” during

the period in which he was the most conserva-

tive member of the Burger Court, because he

wrote so many dissenting opinions.18 Eventually

judges may come to create informal coalitions

with like-minded judges, allowing outsiders to

assign labels to specific judges as liberal, con-

servative, originalist or activist. Second, in-

dividual opinions and dissent help undercut

the idea of a homogeneous, uniform, bureau-

cratic, judiciary. Both aspects favor individu-

al over collective reputation building.19 This is

enhanced when the judiciary is faced with big

public policy decisions that are controversial or

at the center of intense debate across a society,

such as those involving abortion, gay marriage,

segregation, or the welfare state.20 Dissents in

such cases may play the special function of al-

126

lowing the judiciary to signal to the losers that

there is hope for the future.

When individual opinions cannot be recorded

and dissent is not allowed, the judiciary is seen

as a homogeneous body, faceless and bureau-

cratic, in which discussion and diversity are re-

placed with compromise and uniformity.21 The

content of decisions hurts or enhances the repu-

tation of the judiciary as a whole and not that of

a particular judge. Peer pressure may be more

important since decisions must be reached by

consensus, resulting eventually in complex

language to disguise divergences in the bench

and further reducing the ability of the public to

scrutinize opinions. Perhaps the paradigm of

this approach is that of France, in which public

judicial opinions are formulaic and sparse.22

Beyond individual opinions, oral proceedings

also offer opportunities for the cultivation of

individual reputation. Oral proceedings al-

low judges not only to reveal their legal skills,

but also their individual positions and make

specific contributions to the decision taken by

the court. They can also communicate to the

21 For the French case, see Steiner E 2002 French Legal Method Oxford University Press. She traces the historical rea- sons for the inexistence of dissenting opinions and the doctrine supporting such choice. Historically, the absence of dissenting opinions is based on the secrecy rules introduced by Philippe VI (1328-1350) and Charles VII (1422-1461) to protect judges. This rule was abandoned in 1789 but reinstated in 1795. It has now a statutory basis in Art. 448 of the Code of Civil Procedure and Art. 355 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The doctrinal justification is that dissenting opinions are seen as undermining legitimacy of the court and the stability of law (since may lead to subsequent changes of the case law).

22 See William D. Popkin, Evolution of the Judicial Opinion: Institutional and Individual Styles 38-39 (2007); see also Mitchell Lasser 2004. Judicial Deliberations: A Comparative Analysis of Judicial Transparency and Legitimacy, who makes the point that by signing a decision, the judges assume individual responsibility, a principle disliked by the French. Such rejection of individual judicial responsibility is embodied by the Law on Judicial Organization from 1790 which restricted the high courts (the Parlement) from passing regulations or suspending royal legislation by re- fusal to record them in the official registry (essentially exercising a veto). However, Professor Lasser argues that American legal scholarship has misunderstood the bifurcated system existent in France. The idea that French judges have no individual responsibility on shaping doctrines and developing law is misplaced. They do, but not publicly. There is a bifurcation of legal reasoning and policy analysis into two argumentative dimensions: the rapports by the reporting judge and the conclusions of the advocate general, on one side, and the projets d’arrêt prepared by the reporting judge, on the other side.

23 See Dan Simon and Nicholas Scurich, Lay Judgments of Judicial Decision-Making (cited above). 24 Barnes, J. 2006. “The Continuing Debate About “Plain Language” Legislation: A Law Reform Conundrum” Statute Law

Review 27: 83-132. 25 Peter McCormick, Supreme at Last: The Evolution of the Supreme Court of Canada 143 (Toronto 2000)

specialist audience of lawyers, distinguishing

themselves from their colleagues. And for both

written and oral proceedings, judges’ language

and tone may be important. An authoritative

tone signals that the law is determinant. But

recent psychological research has shown that a

more exploratory tone is likely to be more per-

suasive to laypeople who disagree with the out-

come of a given decision.23

Besides tone, complexity is another dimension

on which opinions can vary, and might affect

judicial reputation. Opinions that are too tech-

nical will not be intelligible to ordinary citizens,

who will instead have to rely on experts or the

media to digest them. One might expect that

judges too focused on impressing other judges

would write in overly complex language, and

thus hurt their reputation with outsiders. But

the so-called plain language movement, which

seeks to enhance ease of communication, has

some advocates in law.24 For example, in the

1990s, the Supreme Court of Canada tried to

write in less technical terms to be understood

by the “educated public”.25

127

These aspects of institutional design do not map

neatly onto the civil-common law distinction.

Many constitutional courts in civil law jurisdic-

tions now allow for separate opinions. The Con-

stitutional Court under the 1997 Constitution of

Thailand required each justice to issue a sepa-

rate opinion, a fact that no doubt contributed

to a non-transparent and sometimes confused

jurisprudence. Similarly, the Supreme Court of

Mexico has moved toward oral and public pro-

ceedings in recent years.

Individual opinions will be associated with a

relatively flat organizational structure, in which

superior judges have little control over inferi-

ors. Collective opinions will be associated with

the suppression of individual reputation and the

institution of hierarchical controls to overcome

collective action problems in the production of

collective reputation.26 Small wonder, then, that

judges who support the institution of dissent

have criticized the alternative model as sup-

pressing individual conscience. Justice William

Brennan, for example, critiqued Chief Justice

Marshall (who strongly pushed for unanimous

judicial opinions of the court as a whole) as try-

ing to “shut down the marketplace of ideas.”27

26 There is actually some evidence that judges believe this to be so. William D. Popkin, Evolution of the Judicial Opinion: Institutional and Individual Styles, 122-26

27 Brennan Jr WJ 1986 ‘In Defense of Dissents’ 37 Hastings Law Journal 427 at 438; see also Ginsburg RB 1992 ‘Speaking in a Judicial Voice’ 67 New York University Law Review 1185 (1992); Ginsburg RB 1990 ‘Remarks on Writing Separately’ 65 Washington Law Review 133.

28 Ira P. Robbins, ‘Hiding Behind the Cloak of Invisibility’ Tulane Law Review 86: 1197-1242 (2012). Another study of the state of Texas found that 40% of opinions of the Supreme Court over a ten year period were issued per curiam. William Li, et al., “Using Algorithmic Attribution Techniques to Determine Authorship in Unsigned Judicial Opinions,” Stanford Technology Law Review 16: 503—(2013). This may suggest that state courts in the United States are a kind of hybrid, along the lines of the examples we discuss in the next chapter.

29 Jeffrey Rosen, Roberts’ Rules, The Atlantic Jan. 1, 2007, available at http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archi- ve/2007/01/robertss-rules/305559/ (last checked June 17, 2014); Lee Epstein, William Landes and Richard Posner, The Behavior of Federal Judges 137 (2013).

30 See generally Linda Greenhouse, Chief Justice Roberts in His Own Voide: The Chief Justice’s Self-Assignment of Majority Opinions. Judicature 97: 90- __ (2013); Elliot Slotnick, Who Speaks for the Court? Majority Opinion Assignment from Taft to Burger. American Political Science Review 23: 60- (February 1979); Saul Brenner, The Chief Justices’ Self Assignment of Majority Opinions in Salient Cases. Social Science Journal 30: 143-__ (1978).

Of course, even within systems that encourage

individual opinions, they may not actually be

required. Under Chief Justice John Roberts,

the US Supreme Court has issued an increas-

ing number of per curiam opinions that do not

identify the individual author. Indeed by one

account, almost 9% of opinions were issued in

this way during the first six years of Roberts’

tenure.28 This may reflect Roberts’ oft-stated de-

sire to enhance consensus on the court, though

some such opinions actually include dissents.

Roberts himself is rarely in dissent, and has ar-

gued that it is important to advance “the notion

that we are a Court -- not simply an assemblage

of individual justices.”29

Like other Chief Justices, Roberts has also been

known to use the power of assigning a majority

opinion to himself in important cases, and the as-

signment power can be an important tool in con-

structing both individual and collective reputation

of the court.30 Justice John Paul Stevens thought

that Chief Justice Warren Burger would assign

First Amendment cases to Byron White when the

opinion was likely to be criticized in the press, but

keep the case for himself when the opinion was

likely to be praised. “That practice,” he notes “con-

128

tributed to Byron’s reputation in the press as an

enemy of the First Amendment.”31

C. Publicity

Publicity is another important element of the

institutional structure that will facilitate—or re-

tard the development of reputation. The Mex-

ican Supreme Court took a decision to open up

its proceedings to the public, and, as Profes-

sor Jeffrey Staton has shown, this decision has

served as part of a strategy of cultivating reputa-

tion in a new, democratic era. Indeed, the Court

launched its own television station in 2006. The

Court also has a somewhat unusual practice of

announcing its decision orally at a public hear-

ing, but not releasing the written decision for

many months thereafter. In the abortion case

mentioned earlier, the written decision was not

issued for six months. This has led to significant

problems as justices try to reconstruct their rea-

soning, and it has hindered the development of

a coherent jurisprudence.32

Publicity is helpful for the cultivation of repu-

tation, and can be used strategically by courts.

But if the courts do not communicate clearly

in an increasingly dense media environment,

they will find that publicity may actually harm

the reputation of the court as a whole. Further-

more, appearances on television may encourage

individual justices to seek to distinguish them-

selves, leading to a more incoherent jurispru-

dence and harming collective reputation.

Access to the public comes in many forms. The

Mexican Supreme Court has a long tradition

of informal meetings with litigants and other

31 John Paul Stevens, Five Chiefs: A Supreme Court Memoir (2011) p. 235. 32 Gimenez, supra n.__ 33 Shavell S 1995 ‘The Appeals Process as a Means of Error Correction’ 24 Journal of Legal Studies 379.

interested parties in camera, even concerning

pending cases. These sessions allow the judges

to hear privately about aspects of the cases con-

sidered to be important, but also communicate

the image of a court that values private access.

While other courts might view this practice as

highly problematic and compromising the ap-

pearance of impropriety, they seem to be viewed

as a necessary way of transmitting information

to the litigants, and thus helping the legitimacy

of the court in this particular case.

D. Appeals

The appeal system and the nature of the rela-

tionship between superior and inferior courts

play an important role in shaping incentives

to invest in individual versus collective repu-

tation building. A generous appeal system that

essentially allows superior courts to review and

evaluate the decisions taken by inferior courts

induces compliance by junior judges and favor

homogeneity and uniformity in decision-mak-

ing.33 An appeal system that imposes few con-

straints on junior judges gives them more

discretion and naturally generates more hetero-

geneity in decision-making, which favors indi-

vidual reputation. At the same time, an appeal

system that permits conflicts of jurisdiction and

law across courts, such as the American system

which allows for the possibility of circuit splits,

disfavors collective reputation and pushes to-

ward investment in individual reputation. An

appeal system that effectively internalizes po-

tential conflicts and therefore reduces discrep-

ancies in courts’ decisions contributes decisive-

ly to collective reputation.

129

A crucial dimension on which appeals systems

differ is the question of de novo review. In com-

mon law jurisdictions, appeals courts generally

only hear questions of law, leaving the factual

record to be developed at the trial level. This is

often explained as originating in the institution

of the jury, which finds facts and would have to

be reconvened or reproduced to have de novo

review. In contrast, civil law jurisdictions have

de novo review of facts at the higher levels. This

involves replication, but also allows fuller mon-

itoring of junior instances to ensure quality.

Our interpretation is that de novo review is a

device to ensure collective reputation, while the

lack of such review encourages individual judg-

es to develop novel interpretations of law and to

use their fact-finding power toward reputation-

al development.

E. Citations

The use of citations in decisions reflects the im-

portance of individual opinions, and hence gen-

erally contributes to enhancing individual rep-

utation.34 Citations presuppose that some cases

and court decisions are path-breaking, not just

because the object of the action is extremely rel-

evant, but because the doctrine and legal inter-

pretation offered by a given judge is worthy of

consideration. Controversial decisions attract

attention and generate debate even when they

are not good law. Obviously this means that in-

dividual judges can seek to be identified for a

34 See Choi S and Gulati M 2007 ‘Ranking Judges According To Citation Bias (As A Means To Reduce Bias)’ 82 Notre Dame Law Review 1279; see also Posner R 2000 ‘An Economic Analysis of the Use of Citations in the Law’ 2 American Law and Economics Review 381; Landes WM, Lawrence Lessig L and Solimine ME 1998 ‘Judicial Influence: A Citation Analysis of Federal Courts of Appeals Judges’ 27 Journal of Legal Studies 271, and Choi S and Gulati M 2004 ‘A Tournament of Judges?’ 92 California Law Review 299; Stephen Choi and Mitu Gulati, Bias in Judicial Citations: A Window into the Behavior of Judges, 37 J. Legal Studies 87, 92-93 (2008).

35 See among others, Tonja Jacobi, 2008 ‘The Judicial Signaling Game; How Judges Shape their Dockets’ 16 Supreme Court Economic Review 1.

36 That is, “better” judges do not get “better” cases whatever “better” might mean in this context.

famous case or may come to be associated with

a notorious decision. The widespread use of ci-

tations in Anglo-American jurisprudence clear-

ly favors individual reputation building, partic-

ularly when combined with the institution of

individual named opinions. But many systems

do not cite extensively to other cases. These

systems treat the law as a collective, uniformly

determined product.

F. Case Selection

The degree to which the judiciary controls the

dockets of courts plays an important role in the

process of establishing reputation.35 The con-

trol of dockets can operate at what we might call

the retail level, that is, in choosing particular

cases, and at the wholesale level through stand-

ing and justiciability doctrines that narrow or

expand the scope of judicial review. When judg-

es cannot, in most cases, effectively influence

the cases they hear, collective reputation oper-

ates as a type of insurance, since some judges

will randomly be assigned cases that are more

suited for enhancing individual reputation

than others through a mechanism that does not

take into account different skill levels across

the bench.36 In other words, collective reputa-

tion reduces the potential reputational damage

from being assigned cases that are detrimental

to a particular judge in terms of preferences or

skills. The doctrine of a right to a “lawful judge”

originating in the German legal tradition, es-

130

sentially requires random assignment of cases

and so achieves this function.

When dockets are effectively controlled by the

judiciary itself or a senior jud, case assignment is

not longer truly random. Individual reputation

becomes an asset in such a system in two com-

plementary ways. First, reputation allows indi-

vidual judges to become favored (or disfavored)

in the distribution of cases to be reviewed by the

courts relative to other colleagues. Second, rep-

utation allows further enhancement of individ-

ual reputation, by allowing judges to pick cases

that are more appropriate for the relevant con-

stituencies. Case selection is a strategic variable

in preparing the setting for reputation building.

We note that some courts, especially in South

Asia, have occasionally taken cases without

even having a formal claim filed before them.

The Supreme Court of Pakistan, for example,

is allowed to take action under its own initia-

tive to protect fundamental rights under Article

184(3) of the country’s constitution. In recent

years it has used the so-called suo moto power

to demand that the government deal with the

high murder rate in Karachi, deaths in Lahore

caused by substandard medicine, and many

other issues. These cases allow the court to in-

teract directly with the public and be seen as a

responsive actor in a country that is sorely lack-

ing them.

One interesting example of docket control in

the civil law tradition is the institution of the

so-called investigating judge. These are career

judges who, in some countries, are not involved

in deciding or deliberating on cases, but instead

supervise the investigation and gathering of ev-

idence. In some countries, individual investi-

37 David Kosar, The Least Accountable Branch, JSD Dissertation, NYU Law School 2013.

gating judges have become very prominent. The

Spanish judge Baltasar Garzón, for example,

became a kind of international superstar for

his indictment of Chilean General Augusto Pi-

nochet in 1999, leading to a very important de-

cision by the British House of Lords on the in-

ternational immunity of ex-presidents. Garzon

had done a stint in electoral politics, and was an

example of what David Kosar has called a “su-

perjudge”—someone who has moved from the

judiciary to politics and then back.37 After the

Pinochet indictment Garzon also opened cases

against the Argentine junta, sought to inter-

view Henry Kissinger in relation to a case, and

considered whether to open up a case against

George Bush and several members of his ad-

ministration. Garzón’s cultivation of his indi-

vidual reputation ultimately led to his suspen-

sion from the judiciary in 2012, after he opened

an inquiry into crimes against humanity during

the Spanish civil war that had been explicitly

subject to an amnesty in 1977. He was ultimate-

ly put on trial for violating Spanish law by using

an illegal wiretap in an overly vigorous corrup-

tion investigation, and suspended for 11 years.

G. The Interdependence of Institutional Choices

The above institutions are conceptually distinct

from each other. Crucially, however, they are

reinforcing in terms of reputation and provi-

sion of information about performance. The

common law tendency toward a “recognition”

judiciary relies on judges who are selected be-

cause their earlier investments in reputation

allow ex ante screening for quality and effort.

Such judges can be trusted to write high quali-

ty individual opinions. In contrast, the “career”

131

system associated with the civil law hires judges

at a young age, and therefore cannot trust them

to adequately invest in individual reputation

without extensive monitoring. Hence there is

an implicit logic to anonymous, collective opin-

ions, and less of a culture of citation. Branding

is frowned upon.

The career system also requires many more

judges, because monitoring output at the lowest

level requires an intermediate supervisory level

(itself an autonomous body or a different layer

of a more hierarchical judicial system). Appeal

is essential to maintain quality and discourage

shirking. Appeals are de novo, in order to en-

sure that individual judges do not harm the col-

lective reputation of the judiciary. We thus ob-

serve much larger judiciaries to accomplish de novo review. This reinforces the notion of team

rather than individual production, and reduc-

es the amount of effort required by any single

judge to produce reputation.

We also see differences in the discretion over

dockets in the two systems. The judges in rec-

ognition systems have a variety of devices to ex-

ercise docket control, particularly at the senior

levels. This allows the judiciary to control its

policy-making role. In contrast, career judges

38 Merryman and Pérez-Perdomo above n 34.

are viewed as relatively low level functionaries

without individual discretion.

It is interesting to think about the ideology of

the common law and civil law as reinforcing

these institutional features. It is generally un-

derstood that the civil law tradition conceives

of “the law” as a unified coherent whole, with

pre-existing answers to legal questions that

are identifiable through the exercise of legal

science.38 This idea de-emphasizes the role of

the individual judge in crafting the law, and in

principle different judges are not thought to be

able to arrive at different answers to legal ques-

tions. In contrast, common law judiciaries tend

to see law as more akin to policy. Policy matters

are those which in principle reasonable minds

can disagree. This is not to suggest that law is

infinitely plastic, but rather that for hard legal

questions (of the type most likely to be litigat-

ed) different judges may come up with different

answers. Seeing law as policy means that we

need to identify the particular reasoning and

to associate it with an individual judge. These

different conceptions of the law obviously track

the distinction between collective and individu-

al reputation.

132

133

134

135

I) La Constitution belge ne contient pas une

disposition générale et expresse relative à la re-

lation entre la Constitution et le droit interna-

tional . Il n’y a qu’une exception à cette règle, à

savoir l’article 34 de la Constitution.1

Cet article dispose: “L’exercice de pouvoirs dé-

terminés peut être attribué par un traité ou par

une loi à des institutions de droit international

public”.

Cette disposition a été insérée dans la Constitu-

tion en 1970 afin de justifier la participation de

la Belgique et le transfert de compétences aux

Communautés européennes et à la Convention

européenne des droits de l’ homme.

1 Contribution as originally delivered in French.

II) En ce qui concerne la relation entre le droit

international et la loi, la Cour de cassation a

comblé cette lacune.

Dans un arrêt du 27 mai 1971 (Franco- Suisse

Le Ski), la Cour de cassation a reconnu la pri-

mauté d’une norme de droit international qui a

des effets directs dans l’ordre juridique interne

sur la loi. D’après la Cour de cassation, “la pré-

éminence de la norme de droit international ré-

sulte de la nature même du droit international

conventionnel”. Il s’agissait d’un point de vue

moniste dans le prolongement de la jurispru-

dence de la Cour de justice.

La conséquence de cette jurisprudence est un

contrôle diffus : chaque juge ordinaire ou admi-

nistratif a le devoir d’écarter l’application des

dispositions législatives contraires à une norme

Contribution de M. Pierre Nihoul, Président de la Cour Constitutionnelle de Belgique1

LA RELATION ENTRE LA CONSTITUTION BELGE ET LE DROIT INTERNATIONAL ET

136

de droit international qui a des effets directs

dans l’ordre juridique interne.

III) Par contre, pour le contrôle de constitu-

tionnalité des normes législatives, le Consti-

tuant a choisi en 1980 en faveur d’un contrôle

centralisé par la Cour constitutionnelle .

Cette Cour, instituée en dehors du pouvoir ju-

diciaire, est exclusivement compétente pour

juger la constitutionnalité des normes législa-

tives, statuant soit sur un recours en annulation

introduit par le gouvernement ou le parlement

de l’Etat fédéral ou d’une entité fédérée ou par

toute personne justifiant d’un intérêt, soit sur

une question préjudicielle à poser obligatoire-

ment par chaque juge ordinaire ou administra-

tif.

IV) La Cour constitutionnelle est donc investi

du pouvoir exclusif du contrôle de constitution-

nalité. Par contre, elle n’est pas habilitée à exer-

cer un contrôle direct de la législation au regard

du droit international et européen. Le contrôle

de conventionnalité lui échappe donc en prin-

cipe.

Néanmoins, la Cour a développé deux tech-

niques afin de contrôler la législation au regard

des normes internationales et européennes. Ce

contrôle est qualifié d’ « indirect ».

A) La première technique repose sur les articles

10 et 11 de la Constitution qui interdisent toute

discrimination, quelle qu’en soit l’origine.

A partir de 1989/1990, la Cour a jugé que le

principe constitutionnel d’égalité et de non-dis-

crimination est applicable à l’égard de tous les

droits et de toutes les libertés, c’est-à-dire non

seulement ceux inscrits dans la Constitution,

mais aussi ceux resultant des conventions in-

ternationales liant la Belgique et des principes

généraux du droit.

Le raisonnement à l’origine de cette doctrine

est qu’il y a violation des articles 10 et 11 de la

Constitution, et donc discrimination, lorsqu’un

droit ou une liberté est retirée à une catégorie

de personnes, alors que ce droit ou cette liberté

reste valable pour toutes les autres personnes.

Le résultat de cette jurisprudence est que la

Cour lit le principe constitutionnel d’égalité et

de non-discrimination en combinaison avec

les droits et libertés garantis par les traités, en

particulier la Convention européenne des droits

de l’homme, les Pactes des Nations Unies et la

Charte des droits fondamentaux de l’Union eu-

ropéenne.

B) La seconde technique est développée par la

Cour après l’extension de ses compétences en

2003, à savoir un contrôle des normes légis-

latives au regard du Titre II de la Constitution

relatif à (presque) tous les droits et libertés fon-

damentaux.

Dans un arrêt de principe (n°136/2004, du 22 juillet 2004), la Cour a constaté que de nom- breux droits fondamentaux garantis par le Titre II de la Constitution ont un équivalent dans un traité international liant la Belgique. Dans ce cas, les garanties constitutionnelles et les garanties conventionnelles constituent un en- semble indissociable. Il s’ensuit que, lorsqu’est alleguée la violation d’une disposition du Titre II de la Constitution, la Cour tient compte, dans son examen, des dispositions de droit interna- tional ou européen qui garantissent des droits ou libertés analogues.

La Cour ne limite pas ces deux doctrines aux dis-

positions du droit international ou de l’Union

européenne ayant un effet direct. Sont égale-

137

ment prises en considération les dispositions qui

ne sont pas inconditionnelles, claires et précises,

les dispositions qui sont conditionnelles et qui

laissent aux parties ou aux États membres une

grande latitude dans leur application, car elles

sont contraignantes pour la Belgique. Bien en-

tendu, les dispositions qui n’ont pas d’effet direct

laissent une plus grande marge de manœuvre au

législateur et seront plutôt rarement violées.

V) Les deux techniques précitées présentent

plusieurs avantages :

1. Elles ont permis à la Cour constitutionnelle

de tenir compte de la jurisprudence de la

Cour européenne des droits de l’homme et de la

Cour de justice dont les arrêts sont abondam-

ment mentionnés et /ou cités.

2. De cette manière, la Cour constitutionnelle a

pu donner aux garanties constitutionnelles

dont la plupart ne sont pas modifiées depuis 1831,

une interpretation évolutive et contemporaine.

3. La certitude que le principe de la primau-

té de la protection la plus étendue soit

respecté, que cette protection figure dans la

Constitution ou dans les normes de droit inter-

national ou européen.

4. La prévention de conflits entre la juris-

prudence constitutionnelle et la jurispru-

dence supranationale.

VI) Le contentieux de la protection des droits

fondamentaux représente plus de 90% des dos-

siers pendants devant la Cour.

De manière générale, la Cour a tendance à s’ins-

crire dans une conception universaliste, et donc

non relative, des droits de l’homme. Elle utilise

toutes les sources internationales des droits de

l’homme ratifiées par la Belgique, qu’elles soient

européennes ou mondiales. La juridiction de la

Cour constitutionnelle est évidemment limitée

à la Belgique et aux situations juridiques qui

peuvent y être rattachées. Dans ce champ, la

Cour interprète et applique les droits de l’homme

de manière uniforme, sans particularisme régio-

nal et sans faire de distinction en fonction de la

nationalité de la personne en cause.

VII) Les deux contrôles mentionnés, à savoir,

d’une part, le contrôle centralisé de constitu-

tionnalité des normes législatives par la Cour

constitutionnelle et, d’autre part, le contrôle dif-

fus de conventionnalité des normes législatives

par chaque juge ordinaire et administratif, a

donné lieu à la problématique du “ concours des

droits fondamentaux” : un juge, devant lequel

une partie soulève qu’une disposition législative

viole un droit fondamental garanti tant par la

Constitution que par une disposition conven-

tionnelle analogue, doit-il poser une question

préjudicielle à la Cour constitutionnelle, en

application de la jurisprudence de celle-ci, ou

peut-il lui-même contrôler la compatibilité de

la norme législative avec la disposition conven-

tionnelle, en application de la jurisprudence de

la Cour de cassation?

Le législateur spécial a résolu la question en

2009 en accordant une priorité de contrôle à

la Cour constitutionnelle : hormis quelques ex-

ceptions (de l’acte clair ou de l’acte éclairé), le

juge ordinaire ou administratif est tenu de po-

ser une question préjudicielle à la Cour consti-

tutionnelle sur la constitutionnalité de la norme

législative, et après une réponse négative à cette

question, le juge est compétent pour contrôler

la compatibilité de la norme législative avec la

disposition conventionnelle.

138

Le législateur français s’est basé sur cette legis-

lation(belge) pour résoudre le même problème.

Cette législation française a donné lieu à l’arrêt

célèbre MELKI et ABDELI de la Cour de jus-

tice du 22 juin 2010. Dans cet arrêt, la Cour

de justice a dit pour droit que la procédure est

conforme au droit européen , pour autant que

le juge a quo puisse poser une question préjudi-

cielle à la Cour de justice à chaque moment de

la procedure et, surtout, qu’il reste compétent

pour contrôler la compatibilité de la disposition

législative avec le droit européen. On remarque

que la Cour de justice a tenté de concilier les

compétences des Cours constitutionnelles avec

le principe supérieur de l’unité et de la primauté

du droit européen.

Bien que la législation belge relative au concours

des droits fondamentaux ait été estimée com-

patible avec l’arrêt précité, l’article concerné

- l’article 26, §4, de la loi spéciale sur la Cour

constitutionnelle- a été modifié en 2014 pour

prévoir notamment expressément la possibilité

de questions préjudicielles parallèles à la Cour

de justice et à la Cour constitutionnelle.

VIII) Bien que la Cour constitutionnelle belge soit

bienveillante envers le droit européen, elle a des

doutes sur la jurisprudence de la Cour de justice

dans l’arrêt Melloni du 26 février 2013. Dans cet

arrêt, la Cour de justice a dit pour droit que l’ar-

ticle 53 de la Charte des droits fondamentaux de

l’Union européenne n’autorise pas de manière gé-

nérale un Etat membre à appliquer le standard de

protection des droits fondamentaux garanti par sa

Constitution lorsqu’il est plus élevé que celui dé-

coule de la Charte et à l’opposer à l’application de

dispositions du droit de l’Union. D’après la Cour

de justice, un standard national de protection des

droits fondamentaux, même plus étendu, ne peut

pas compromettre le niveau de protection prévu

par la Charte, telle qu’interprétée par la Cour, “ni

la primauté, l’unité et l’effectivité du droit de l’

Union”.

Lors de nos visites à d’autres Cours constitutionnelles, nous avons senti une grande préoc- cupation et même un méconten- tement sur cette jurisprudence. C’est compréhensible à la lu- mière de leur tâche, la protection des droits fondamentaux garan- tis par la Constitution.

Parce qu’en règle le niveau de protection offert

par les instruments européens est plus élevé que

celui garanti par la Constitution belge, la situa-

tion qui s’est présentée dans l’arrêt Melloni a peu

de chances d’exister en droit belge. Et si la Cour

constitutionnelle est confrontée un jour à cette si-

tuation, elle posera sans nul doute des questions

préjudicielles à la Cour de justice avant de statuer.

IX) Qu’en est-il de ce qu’il est convenu d’appe-

ler « l’exception de l’identité nationale »?

La construction de l’Union européenne et l’in-

tégration toujours plus poussée des législa-

tions des différents Etats membres entraîne un

phénomène d’universalisation - à l’échelle de

l’Union européenne - des standards du contrôle

des droits fondamentaux. Face à ce phénomène,

plusieurs juridictions constitutionnelles en Eu-

rope mobilisent, pour se prémunir contre une

atteinte jugée trop importante à la souveraineté

nationale et aux valeurs que celle-ci entend pro-

téger, le concept d’ « identité nationale ».

139

La Cour constitutionnelle belge a fait référence à la

notion d’identité dans l’arrêt n°62/2016, en consi-

dérant que la disposition constitutionnelle qui au-

torise le transfert de pouvoirs déterminés à des

institutions de droit international public et, no-

tamment, aux institutions de l’Union européenne,

« n’autorise en aucun cas qu’il soit porté une at-

teinte discriminatoire à l’identité nationale inhé-

rente aux structures fondamentales, politiques et

constitutionnelles ou aux valeurs fondamentales

de la protection que la Constitution confère aux

sujets de droit ». Cette incise n’a cependant pas

été suivie d’effet concret. On pourrait peut-être y

voir un indice de ce que la Cour pourrait, un jour

à l’avenir, décider qu’un droit fondamental recon-

nu par la Constitution belge doit être interprété de

manière particulière dans l’ordre constitutionnel

belge, ce qui tendrait à rompre le caractère uni-

versel du droit en question. Ceci n’est toutefois

qu’une supposition et une hypothèse, rien ne per-

met d’affirmer à l’heure actuelle que la Cour s’en-

gagera dans cette voie.

Par ailleurs, en reprenant mot pour mot la for-

mule prévue par l’article 4 du TFUE, la Cour

constitutionnelle belge inscrit cette exception

dans le cadre du droit de l’Union européenne.

Elle permet également à la Cour de poser dans

ce cadre une question préjudicielle à la Cour de

justice, ce qui ouvre un dialogue entre juges.

X) Cette dernière attitude suivrait la tendance

de la Cour constitutionnelle belge à poser régu-

lièrement des questions préjudicielles à la Cour

de justice.

Jusqu’à présent, la Cour constitutionnelle a

posé 138 questions préjudicielles dans 40 ar-

rêts de renvoi rendus pour la plupart les quinze

dernières années. L’explication de ce grand

nombre de questions préjudicielles tient au fait

que la Cour constitutionnelle utilise le droit eu-

ropéen comme norme de référence indirecte et

à l’occasion de son contrôle, elle est parfois te-

nue de poser les questions d’interprétation ou

de validité soulevées par les parties.

De cette façon, elle prévient aussi des violations du droit européen dans l’ordre juri- dique interne et des condam- nations par la Cour de justice. Une interprétation rendue par la Cour de justice est d’ailleurs contraignante pour tous les Etats membres.

XI .Il est temps de conclure.

Formellement, la Cour constitutionnelle utilise

encore apparemment des concepts hiérarchiques

en ce qui concerne la relation entre, d’une part, la

Constitution et, d’autre part, les traités et le droit

européen dérivé. A y regarder de plus près, la

Cour tient explicitement compte de la spécificité

des traités faisant ainsi preuve d’une prudence ex-

trême dans l’exercice de son contrôle et elle situe

le fondement de la “primauté “du droit européen

dérivé dans l’article 34 de la Constitution.

La jurisprudence de la Cour constitutionnelle

s’inscrit plutôt dans le dialogue des juges. La

lecture des droits fondamentaux garantis par la

Constitution en combinaison avec des normes

internationales et européennes analogues et le

dialogue préjudiciel avec la Cour de justice en

témoignent. En conciliant ainsi le droit consti-

tutionnel et le droit européen, la Cour constitu-

tionnelle évite des conflits entre les hautes juri-

dictions et favorise la sécurité juridique.

140

The1principle of subsidiarity is the most im-

portant element defining the respective

roles and responsibilities of the Strasbourg

Court (ECtHR) and the national superior, in-

cluding constitutional, courts2.

This notion was articulated in the case-law as

early as the late 1960s3 and it is one which has

considerably evolved over the years along with

the Convention system. In fact, defining and

optimising subsidiarity, in light of our joint re-

sponsibility for ensuring human rights protec-

1 Speaking Notes. Any opinions expressed are the speaker’s own, and do not bind the ECtHR 2 Article 19 of the Convention explains that the Court is established to “ensure the observance of the engagements undertaken by” the States.

3 Case “relating to certain aspects of the laws on the use of languages in education in Belgium”, 1968. 4 With the entry into force of Protocol No. 15 in August 2021

tion in Europe, was an overarching theme of the

decade long “Interlaken” Convention reform

process, cumulating in the recent amendment

of the Convention’s preamble to reference this

notion4. One of the priorities for the future is to

reinforce the elements of this subsidiary system,

it being considered that the future effectiveness,

and sustainability, of the Convention system

depends, in large part, on the relationship be-

tween the Strasbourg Court and the national

superior, notably constitutional, jurisdictions.

Contribution by Ms. Anna Austin1, Jurisconsult of the European Court of Human Rights

THE ROLE OF SUPRANATIONAL COURTS IN THE DECISION-MAKING OF CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS: INTERACTION WITH THE ECtHR AND THE SUBSIDIARITY PRINCIPLE

141

Convention subsidiarity comprises two mirror-

ing obligations: on the one hand, an obligation on

States to embed the Convention guarantees and

create remedies by which those guarantees can be

tested nationally and, on the other, a correspond-

ing obligation on the Court to allow the national

authorities to have the fullest opportunity to first

consider a Convention complaint and to accord

that domestic assessment importance in its own

deliberations. It is this interaction - between dil-

igence at national level and a corresponding ap-

preciation thereof at the level of the ECtHR - that

makes up the heart of the subsidiarity principle.

The message I hope to convey by this short inter-

vention is that reinforcing subsidiarity is not in-

tended to limit or weaken human rights protec-

tion, but rather to emphasise the respective roles

and responsibilities of national and supranational

authorities in that regard.

So what are the principal tools by which this sub-

sidiary mechanism is constructed and operated?

I. Operational/procedural subsidiarity

One of the key manifestations of subsidiarity is

in Convention processes and procedures.

A. Obligation on the applicants to ex- haust domestic remedies

The first is to be found in the Convention re-

quirement that all applicants exhaust all effec-

5 The obligation to exhaust domestic remedies forms part of customary international law (Interhandel case (Switzerland v. Uni- ted States of America)). It is also to be found in other international human-rights treaties: the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Article 41(1) (c)) and the Optional Protocol thereto (Articles 2 and 5 (2) (b)); the American Convention on Human Rights (Article 46); and the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (Articles 50 and 56 (5)).

6 Al-Skeini and Others v. the United Kingdom [GC], § 99. 7 For example, Burden v. the United Kingdom [GC], § 42. 8 Fu Quan, s.r.o. v. the Czech Republic [GC]; and Grosam v. the Czech Republic [GC]. 9 A, B and C v. Ireland, § 142, 2010. 10 Uzun v. Turkey (dec.), §§ 42-51 and the references cited therein.

tive domestic remedies prior to coming to the

Court and in the corresponding obligation on

States to provide access to such remedies (Ar-

ticles 13 and 35 of the Convention)5. National

courts thereby first have the opportunity to de-

termine Convention compatibility6 and, there-

after, the Court can have the benefit of, and rely

upon, the views of the national courts, the latter

being in direct and continuous contact with the

vital forces of their countries7.

This is the most indispensable part of the func-

tioning of the subsidiary system of protection.

This year’s Grand Chamber judgments against

the Czech Republic8 indicate the importance

the Court attaches thereto as it took the time

to redefine and reinforce the obligations on an

applicant to ensure that the applicant raises be-

fore the national courts, not only the impugned

facts, but the precise legal arguments which it

is intended to later invoke before the ECtHR.

A word about the effectiveness of constitution-

al remedies. As a general rule, in a legal system

providing constitutional protection for funda-

mental rights, an individual must test the ex-

tent of that protection and allow the constitu-

tional court to develop those rights by way of

interpretation9. However, the requirement to

exhaust the constitutional remedy will depend

on the State’s legal system, the scope of the

constitutional court’s jurisdiction and the com-

plaint made10. The Court also takes into account

142

whether the constitutional remedy has evolved

in time towards effectiveness11 and whether

such an effective remedy remains so if exces-

sively lengthy12. Finally, applicants were ab-

solved from exhausting the constitutional rem-

edy in recent cases against Poland13 since the

Strasbourg Court found that the constitutional

court could not be considered independent or

rule-of-law compliant following recent reforms

of the judiciary in Poland14.

B. The Strasbourg Court’s process-based review

Subsidiarity has found further procedural ex-

pression in recent years through the greater em-

phasis placed by the Strasbourg Court, in cer-

tain areas of the case-law, on the quality of the

national legal framework and decision-making

process (“process-based review”).

In the first place, where a national court has

analysed in a comprehensive and convincing

manner the contested legal measure on the

basis of the relevant human rights standards

and case-law, providing relevant and suffi-

11 Riđić and Others v. Serbia, §§ 68-74, 2014, as regards the non-enforcement of judgments rendered in respect of socially/State owned companies.

12 Story and Others v. Malta, §§ 82-85, 2015. 13 Inter alia, Advance Pharma sp. z o.o v. Poland, § 319, 2022; and Juszczyszyn v. Poland, §§ 149-153, 2022. 14 The Court referred to and relied upon, inter alia, judgments of the CJEU in this regard including A.K. and

Others (Independence of the Disciplinary Chamber of the Supreme Court), C-585/18, C-624/18 and C-625/18, EU:C:2019:982; and Commission v. Poland (Disciplinary regime for judges), C-791/19, EU:C:2021:596.

15See the emphasis on process and reasoning as regards for example Article 8 in Von Hannover v. Germany (no. 2) [GC] (pri- vacy), as applied in Ndidi v. the United Kingdom (immigration). 16 Animal Defenders International v. the United Kingdom [GC], § 116, and, more recently, Satakunnan Markkinapörssi Oy

and Satamedia Oy v. Finland [GC], §§ 192-195; Garib v. the Netherlands [GC], § 138; and Correia de Matos v. Portugal [GC], §§ 115-117.

17 In this regard see, for example, the general principles and methodology set out in: Ibrahim v. the United Kingdom (re- spect for an accused’s right of access to a lawyer under Article 6 §§ 1 and 3 (c) and provision of a non-exhaustive list of factors to be taken into account as appropriate when assessing the impact of a restriction on access to a lawyer on the fairness of the proceedings); Schatschaschwili v. Germany [GC] and Al-Khawaja and Tahery v. the United Kingdom [GC] (fairness of proceedings under Article 6 following the admission to evidence of the statements of absent witnesses and the provision of a three step test for domestic courts); and Üner v. the Netherlands [GC] (criteria to be considered when balancing public and private interests with a view to a decision on the expulsion of a family member); and Halet v. Luxembourg [GC] (protection of whistle-blowers under Article 10).

cient reasons for their decisions, the ECtHR

would need “strong reasons” to substitute its

own different analysis for that of the national

judges15.

Secondly, this judicial re- straint by the Strasbourg Court extends beyond the national courts: significant weight and leeway is also accorded to a State’s view as to the necessity of a legislative provision if it is adopted following an exacting human rights review16.

Thirdly, the case-law also reflects attempts,

where possible and suitable, to provide national

courts with what could be considered an “ana-

lytical framework” to facilitate the application

of Convention case-law in domestic proceed-

ings17. Concretely this translates into the artic-

ulation of tests, with the relevant criteria and

143

presumptions, to be applied by national courts

to ensure a useful Convention analysis.

These trends towards a process-based review

have been described by President Spano as a

manifestation of the Court’s commitment to the

age of subsidiarity, where the primary responsi-

bility for protecting Convention rights lies with

the national authorities, particularly the na-

tional superior courts18.

II. Substantive subsidiarity

A. Margin of appreciation

The substantive manifestations of subsidiarity

are equally critical and the most crucial is the

acknowledgement that the States enjoy a mar-

gin of appreciation in how they implement the

Convention, depending on and tailored to, the

circumstances of the case and the rights and

freedoms at issue. In this sense, the margin of

appreciation has a normative function allowing

the Court to manage the delicate task of accom-

modating diversity, pluralism and flexibility

within the Convention framework: the idea is

not to impose a uniform Europe-wide interpre-

tation, but rather to take into account, in so far

as possible, local contexts, history, values and

needs and to measure those elements against,

notably, the prevailing European consensus19.

A useful example of this function - striking a

balance between common minimum standards,

on the one hand, and the State specific needs

and sensitivities, on the other - is the case of A,

18 See R. Spano, “Universality or Diversity of Human Rights? Strasbourg in the age of subsidiarity”, Human Rights Law Review (2014) 14 (3), p. 487-502.

19 The existence of a consensus has long played a role in the evolution of Convention protection: either to justify (Goodwin v. the United Kingdom) or refuse (Odièvre v. France [GC]) such developments.

B and C v. Ireland (2010). The relevant con-

stitutional provision at issue acknowledged

the equal right to life of the unborn and of the

mother.

Two applicants complained under Article 8

that they had no right to choose an abortion

for their well-being. While a broad margin of

appreciation was, in principle, to be accorded

to the Irish State in balancing such competing

rights, the margin would normally be signifi-

cantly narrowed by what was at the time an

overwhelming European consensus towards

broader access to abortion than available in Ire-

land at the time. However, in the end it was not

found that this clear consensus decisively nar-

rowed the broad margin of appreciation of the

State since the question at the heart of the issue

(when life began) was undecided (whether from

a legal, philosophical, scientific, religious point

of view): the margin of appreciation of the State

remained broad. The absence of the possibility

of abortion for well-being reasons fell therefore

within the State’s margin of appreciation lead-

ing to a finding of no violation as regards those

two applicants.

A third applicant in that case argued that her

pregnancy constituted a risk to her life. While

the constitution accorded her a theoretical right

to seek an abortion, there was no legislative

framework in place to implement the constitu-

tional provision and, in particular, to determine

how that broadly expressed equal constitution-

al right to life of the mother could be measured

or determined as requiring access to a legal

abortion in a legally binding manner in a giv-

144

en case. The lack of legislative implementation

meant that this applicant’s right to protect her

life remained a theoretical one. Importantly,

the Supreme Court had previously acknowl-

edged that it was not the appropriate forum for

this primarily medical determination and that

it was inappropriate to require women to take

on such complex constitutional litigation when

their underlying constitutional right to an abor-

tion, in the case of a qualifying risk to life, was

not disputed: it called for legislative implemen-

tation of the constitutional provision. It was this

position of the Supreme Court, together with

the lack of an explanation for the failure to leg-

islate, that allowed the Court to find that there

had been a failure to secure to that applicant ef-

fective respect for her private life.

This judgment is a useful example, of how the

Court uses its subsidiarity tool box (margin of

appreciation, consensus, dialoguing with con-

stitutional courts) to find balance in a sensitive

context: finding a violation in relation to one

applicant (by essentially reflecting the existing

demands of the Supreme Court) and, on the

more sensitive question of extending access to

abortion beyond the Constitutional provision,

the ECtHR gave the respondent State space to

seek to resolve domestically a matter which had

been a highly divisive issue for decades20.

B. Fourth Instance doctrine

Secondly, this substantive subsidiarity finds

everyday expression in its fourth-instance doc-

trine. It is not the function of the Strasbourg

20 A referendum in 2018 allowed for terminations in the first 12 weeks of pregnancy and the implementing legislation was pas- sed soon thereafter.

21 Kemmache v. France (no. 3). 22 Solska and Rybicka v. Poland, §§ 112-129, and further references therein. 23 Fu Quan v. the Czech Republic [GC], § 120.

Court to take the place of national courts, re-

assessing facts and interpreting national law.

Its role is rather to ensure that those decisions

are not flawed for arbitrariness or otherwise

manifestly unreasonable. If it were otherwise

the Court would be acting as an additional or

“fourth” instance which would be to disregard

the limits imposed on its action21. A typical ex-

ample would be an applicant who complains

about a wrongful conviction rather than about

any procedural defect in the proceedings lead-

ing to that outcome, which defect could be such

as to lead to a finding that those proceedings are

unfair in terms of Article 6 of the Convention.

Moreover, even if the Conven- tion provision itself requires that the State act “in accordance with the law”, it is considered to be firstly for the national au- thorities (notably the courts) to interpret and apply domestic law: the Court’s focus is rather on the accessibility and foresee- ability of that provision, on the protection it offers against arbi- trariness and on the safeguards for which it provides22. The Court’s role is therefore con- fined to ascertaining whether the effects of such an interpre- tation are compatible with the Convention23.

145

III. Importance of dialogue, the supranational and national courts

A. Dialogue through jurisprudence

The dialogue with which the Strasbourg Court is

primarily concerned is the choices it makes in the

text and reasoning of its judgments. This form of

judicial dialogue can determine how the Court

makes the principle of subsidiarity work in prac-

tice so as to enable the domestic courts to deal

more effectively with Convention issues arising

before them. The ultimate goal is, of course, to en-

sure that issues are dealt with nationally and that

applications are not lodged in Strasbourg.

The most frequently cited example of express or

deliberate dialogue is probably R v. Horncastle and others and Al-Khawaja and Tahery v. the United Kingdom concerning the compatibility

with Article 6 of the use of statements of a wit-

ness who was not called to give evidence. The

former decision of the UK Supreme Court inter-

vened after a 7 judge Chamber of the Strasbourg

Court had found a violation of Article 6 of the

Convention but before the Grand Chamber, to

which Al-Khawaja had been referred, handed

down its judgment. The Grand Chamber con-

cluded that, contrary to the conclusion reached

by the Chamber, there had been no violation of

Article 6 § 1 of the Convention.

B. Networking and knowledge sharing

Successive Presidents and Judges of this Court have placed considerable value on close dialogue with national superior courts to enhance the shared implementation of the Convention, rein-

24 Constitutional Court of Türkiye, Supreme Court of Cyprus, Kuria of Hungary, Supreme Administrative Court of Lithuania, Sup- reme Court of Ireland, the Superior Council of the Magistracy/High Court of Cassation and Justice/Bucharest Court of Appeal of Romania and, last week, the Supreme Court of Azerbaijan, the Constitutional Court of Latvia and the Supreme Court of Slovenia.

force the subsidiary nature of the Strasbourg su- pervisory mechanism and underscore the prima- ry role of national courts. Every year the Court is pleased to welcome numerous visits from courts across the Council of Europe legal space.

In 2015 the Court decided to put structure on this dialogue, creating the Superior Courts Net- work (SCN) to ensure effective and structured exchanges on Convention case law and to pro- vide concrete operational support to superior courts, including tailor-made to their needs. This space has also become a place of informal and ad hoc exchanges between national courts, also a favoured means of mutual support and problem-solving. Currently the largest network of superior courts in the world, it boasts 104 member superior courts from 45 States.

The creation of the Court’s Knowledge Sharing platform, providing up-to-date case-law analysis on all principal Convention subjects, has been a paradigm change in terms of access to the ex- tensive ECHR case-law within the Court. It was quickly opened on a privileged basis to the superi- or courts and, subsequently, fully externalized to all external actors. This platform, of itself, goes a long way to supporting the role of key Convention actors in fulfilling their shared responsibility for the implementation of the Convention .

The most recent addition to the SCN projects, the Visiting Professionals Scheme, allows superior courts to visit Strasbourg and to hear from ECtHR staff on matters of know-how on subjects chosen by them including on case-processing, document management, knowledge management and the related IT tools. In the six short months since the launch of this Scheme, requests from national

courts have been constant24.

146

C. Protocol No. 16 to the Convention

The third manner in which the ECtHR dia-

logues with superior courts is through Protocol

No. 16 to the Convention which allows, since it’s

entry into force in 2018, the “highest courts”

of a Contracting State to request an advisory

opinion of the Strasbourg Court on a matter

concerning “issues of principle relating to the

interpretation or application of the rights and

freedoms defined in the Convention or its Pro-

tocols” which have arisen in a pending case be-

fore the requesting court. This extension of the

Court’s advisory jurisdiction is, according to the

preamble of Protocol No. 16, to enhance the in-

teraction between the Court and higher nation-

al courts with a view to reinforcing the imple-

mentation of the ECHR in accordance with the

principle of subsidiarity.

So Advisory opinions can thus provide interpretative assis- tance to Member States, so as to avoid future violations, fa- cilitate the correct interpreta- tion of the Convention within national legal orders and, in this context, enhance judicial dialogue25.

25 To date the Court has received eight requests pursuant to Protocol No. 16: six opinions have been delivered, one request was declined and one is pending.

IV. Conclusion

Optimising subsidiarity, to ensure a shared re-

sponsibility for ensuring human rights protec-

tion within the Convention system, remains

the abiding theme in the Convention system

and the focus of the Court’s relationship with

the national superior, notably constitutional,

courts. If historically the relationship with na-

tional courts may have been perceived as a hier-

archical one, that model is no longer accurate as

I hope the above-outline has illustrated.

To return therefore to the mirrored roles and

responsibilities referred to at the outset, the

subsidiary system means that, for the ECtHR to

take a step back in any concrete case, the na-

tional authorities have to step in and to step

up their human rights scrutiny. The subsidiary

principle therefore does not therefore lower the

standard of human rights protection and it is

not a question of deference by the supranation-

al court. Rather, the message is that a thorough

quality control of Convention compatibility has

to take place, either at national or supranation-

al level. The principle of subsidiarity operates

to calibrate within this process the interrelated

roles and responsibilities of both the national

superior (constitutional) court and the supra-

national court.

147

Good morning, everyone. I must say at the

outset, it is indeed a great honor for me to

be here this morning deputizing for Madame

Claire Bazy -Malourie, the President of the

Council of Europe Venice Commission for De-

mocracy Through Law. We are an organisation,

which I hope that you all have a familiarity with

and perhaps a significant participation in. Can

I first say President Gresa Caka Nimani, now

grateful I am for this kind invitation to the Ven-

ice Commission to attend the 14th anniversary of

the establishment of your Constitutional Court,

an exemplary court, a beacon of aspiration for

many other countries in how you function and

operate. And I say that without any reservation,

and acknowledge the recognition that the Ven-

ice Commission has for the efforts you and your

highest Calibre fellow Judges have put into the

development of your Constitutional Courts over

the last 14 years . It is very important that the

establishment of a Constitutional court attracts

the first and most significant commitment for

any country, emerging or not, because we rely on

an effective, functioning Constitutional Court to

protect citizens, and trickle down best practice

to the lower courts beneath it, in order to have a

functioning Judicial system to support Democ-

racy. I’d like to just take a minute of my time

albeit I have no idea how I can cover the ground

adequately regarding the Venice Commission

Contribution by Ms. Grainne McMorrow, Representative of the Venice Commission

THE ROLE OF THE VENICE COMMISSION IN SUPPORTING DEMOCRACY AND PROMOTING THE DEVELOPMENT OF CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS INTERNATIONALLY

148

and its work over 33 years in the 10 minutes al-

located. But can I please firstly acknowledge the

really important contribution that the Kosovan

members of the Venice Commission, your em-

inent Professors Qerim Qerimi and Professor

Istrefi, and all their predecessors, including for-

mer President of the Constitutional Court Arta

Rama-Hajrizi, because their contribution to the

working of the Venice Commission has been ex-

tremely significant and valuable.

The Venice Commission is an

advisory body of the Council of

Europe on legal and constitu-

tional matters, and its primary

role is to provide legal advice to

its member States and in par-

ticular to assist States wishing

to bring their legal and institu-

tional structures in line with

the European Convention and

legal standards and utilizes its

international experience in the

fields of democracy, human

rights and the rule of law. It

also contributes to the dissem-

ination and consolidation of a

common constitutional heri-

tage and provides emergency

constitutional aid to states in

transition.

Now a few, brief summary of facts regarding the

Venice Commission. I am sharing for your kind

attention also an overhead image that summa-

rizes our work. I encourage you all to explore

our website and avail of the resources available

there in terms of perhaps useful Opinions on

complex areas of law encountered by States. We

were founded after a proposal by an Italian Pro-

fessor Pergola who was then Minister for Com-

munity Policy in 1990 in Italy who believed very

strongly that sustainable democracies could

only be built on a constitutional framework

based on the rule of law. He felt that we had a

unique resource, a pool of international legal

expertise we could call upon to assist countries

with their transition to democracy and so his

proposal gathered momentum and support,

which resulted in the setting up of the Venice

Commission. In fact, he took office as the first

President of the Venice Commission. So we are

now 33 years in existence, and we have issued

to date 13 opinions that concern Kosovo on

a wide range of issues. We have 61 members

now of which, 15 are non - Council of Europe

members and we also have four observer coun-

tries. We have adopted 1,110 country specific

opinions and general reports and we have or-

ganized over 100 international conferences. We

work very closely with the EU, PACE, European

Commission and with the OSCE or ODHIR and

other organizations working in this arena. We

also provide training in human rights, rule of

law, good governance and electoral administra-

tion and justice. We are a resource for countries

and we are a resource that is available to all of

you, and we hope that your participation will

enhance how good a resource that can be.

And in that regard, I’d like to just take a moment

to pay tribute, to everyone in this room making

a contribution to the betterment of our society,

to the enhancement and protection of human

rights internationally, to protecting Democracy

and the Rule of Law, to ensuring that Consti-

tutions deliver essential rights and protections

149

to all citizens and you deserve great credit for

your efforts in that regard. You are here to par-

ticipate in this important event here in Pristina

primarily for that purpose. The achievements in

Kosova towards our shared goals are exception-

al, whilst recognizing as they do, that there is

more to achieve. The Venice Commission for its

part acknowledges that it is enormously hum-

bling to be entrusted with the ability to advise a

country on a dilemma it faces regarding its leg-

islation or its constitution. We express our grat-

itude for your trust in us. We always respect the

traditions and heritage of each respective coun-

try we work with. We do not go blindly there

and simply, project rigid opinion. Our process

of engagement is that we brief ourselves care-

fully and examine the history of that country,

its circumstances and pressures, its political

situation, and then we go on visiting mission to

the country concerned, where we meet all stake-

holders, including everyone from the President

down, to the politicians in Government and in

Opposition, to those central to the Administra-

tion of Justice , The chief Justice , Judges, Pros-

ecutors , and also those who lead civil society

Organisations. We listen and our opinions are

based on that process. Who are the members of

the Venice Commission? Well, we are a group of

lawyers predominantly, but some of our mem-

bers have been Prime Ministers or Ministers of

Justice of their countries. We include amongst

our members some of the most eminent inter-

national law professors. There are a few like

myself who have been practicing lawyers before

the courts. We value those who are determined

to make a contribution to the betterment of all

of societies and something in this reminds me

of, if you’ll forgive me for quoting a historic

Economist and Philosopher, Edmund Burke,

when he said that in order for evil to thrive, it

is only necessary that people, good people, do

nothing, Well, we are not content with doing

nothing and collectively we have something to

offer each other. It is important to realise that

you must never stop learning. There is much to

learn from countries in transition, countries at

early or different stages in their evolution, who

are emerging perhaps from conflict and taking

the first steps towards independence. It’s very

important that we respect both the traditions

and history of the countries that we visit. We

are asked to provide Legal Opinions on specif-

ic issues and as Rapporteurs selected by the

Venice Commission, we are usually a group of

3/4 Members or Experts , we then determine

how best to approach our opinions with regard

to their legislation and their constitutions. We

each individually and independently prepare a

provisional Opinion on the question asked and

then collaborate in finalizing a joint Opinion

which is then circulated to Members and the

State concerned for discussion before being

presented to the Venice Commission Plenary

Session where it is voted on. The Venice Com-

mission approaches the questions it is asked

to advise on with openness and empathy. We

listen. We focus on ways to create avenues for

dialogue and positive progression within the

country concerned and to deliver the best legal

advice on the topic it has been asked to advise

upon.

Many of our eminent speakers today have al-

ready spoken about the pressures, about the

necessity to protect the independence of the ju-

diciary, to protect separation of powers. Politi-

cians live and work in a complex arena, they are

the legislators, primarily, but their pressures are

very different and the vagaries of political life,

the need to be re-elected can potentially com-

150

promise best endeavours, and the disturbing

rise of populism can potentially add pressures

to their work. We must stand in our constitu-

tional courts and at the Venice Commission,

above and beyond that, in order to protect the

integrity of a Constitution that serves all of the

people.

I was very touched by the remarks of Professor

Ginsburg about how we at the Venice Commis-

sion are the least offensive interlocutor and in-

fluencer for good , in the context of of all such

entities effecting positive change, because we

neither wield “the purse nor the sword “ and

that resonated strongly with me . We have is-

sued to date, 1,110 opinions, which are country

specific. We have no mandate to enforce imple-

mentation. But pretty much always our opin-

ions are implemented. We function below the

radar. We’re not a hugely public organization.

We tend not to make pronouncements. Ours is

a more personal engagement with the individu-

al countries who seek our assistance. Now I will

seek guidance from learned moderator because

I could go on beyond my time allocation.

Personally, I am passionate about the value of

the Venice Commission. I am passionate about

the fact that 61 countries nominate two mem-

bers who attend the Commission and offer their

services and expertise, free of charge. This is

an unpaid role where we agree to become rap-

porteurs on opinions for specific countries on

specific areas of law, largely constitutional law,

where we have expertise, but also on any issues

concerning the structure of the courts, elec-

tions, human rights, separation of powers, im-

partiality - values that we all need to share if we

are going to live in better societies.

So there you have a very short outline of our

Venice Commission work and I hope we can

inspire some confidence in your countries if

they have not yet sought our assistance. If I can

please ask you to consider requesting opinions

from us because we are really there to help,

without agendas, or bias whatsoever and we

would like to assist where possible.

Perhaps I’ll leave it there, but please do not hes-

itate to approach me with any questions you

have regarding the Venice Commission, and

remember that we are happy to assist in any

respect regarding your concerns around legis-

lation or constitutions. Thank you very much.

151

1. Uvod

Evropska konvencija o zaštiti ljudskih prava i

osnovnih sloboda (Evropska konvencija) kao

najznačajniji međunarodni ugovor iz oblasti

zaštite ljudskih prava i sloboda sastavni je dio

unutrašnjeg pravnog poretka Bosne i Herce-

govine, direktno je primjenjiva i, shodno Us-

tavu Bosne i Hercegovine, ima supremaciju

nad svim drugim zakonima. Ovaj specifični

ustavni status Evropske konvencije postoji od

stupanja na snagu Ustava Bosne i Hercegovine

iz 1995. godine, dakle i prije nego što je Evrops-

ka konvencija ratifikovana 2002. godine. Dak- le, Evropska konvencija se u Bosni i Hercego-

1 Contribution as originally delivered in Bosnian.

vini primjenjuje kao „domaće pravo“ ali i kao međunarodno ratifikovani ugovor.1

Zaštita osnovnih prava garantiranih Ustavom

Bosne i Hercegovine i Evropskom konvenci-

jom osigurana je prema članu VI.3.b) Ustava

Bosne i Hercegovine, apelacionom nadležnošću

Ustavnog suda Bosne i Hercegovine (Ustav-

ni sud) prema kojoj „Ustavni sud ima također

apelacionu nadležnost za pitanja iz Ustava koja

se pojave na temelju presude bilo kojeg drugog

suda u Bosni i Hercegovini“, što podrazumije-

va mogućnosti preispitivanja sudskih odluka na

osnovu individualne apelacije („ustavne tužbe“ kako se u nekim sistemima naziva) ukoliko su

povrijeđena Ustavom zagarantovana prava i

Doprinos od G. Mirsad Ćeman, potpredsednik Ustavnog suda Bosne i Hercegovine1

UTICAJ SUDSKE PRAKSE EVROPSKOG SUDA ZA LJUDSKA PRAVA NA PRAKSU DOMAĆIH SUDOVA U BOSNI I HERCEGOVINI

152

slobode. Apelaciona nadležnost predstavlja jed-

nu od važnijih i najčešće korištenih nadležnosti

Ustavnog suda koja se sastoji od zaštite ustavnih

prava i sloboda pojedinaca, uključujući i prava

i slobode iz Evropske konvencije i Protokola uz

Evropsku konvenciju. Apelacija je ustvari po-

sljednja prilika da se unutar pravnog sistema

Bosne i Hercegovine, odnosno na domaćem

nivou, ispravi kršenje ljudskih prava i sloboda

što je zapravo krajnji cilj svih mehanizama za

zaštitu ljudskih prava.Vršenjem ove nadležnos-

ti Ustavni sud postaje najjači domaći mehani-

zam zaštite ljudskih prava i osnovnih sloboda.

U Bosni Hercegovini Evropska konvencija se ci-

tira i primjenjuje gotovo svakodnevno a Ustavni

sud svoju praksu zasniva na dosljednoj primjeni

konvencijskih standarda i na praksi Evropskog

suda za ljudska prava (Evropski sud), kao ov-

laštenog tumača Evropske konvencije. Snažna

volja, spremnost i odlučnost Ustavnog suda da

se preuzmu evropski standardi kroz dosljedno

poštivanje prakse Evropskog suda vidljiva je već

od prvih godina rada Ustavnog suda, počev od

1997.godine2.

2. Praksa Evropskog suda za ljudska prava i njena primje- na u praksi Ustavnog suda

Mnogo je primjera u kojima se Ustavni sud poz-

vao na praksu Evropskog suda i svaki je značajan

u kontekstu različitih pitanja postavljenih pred

2 Ustavni sud BiH je ustanovljen članom VI Ustava Bosne i Hercegovine koji je Aneks 4 Općeg okvirnog sporazuma za mir u Bosni i Hercegovini (tzv. Dejtonski odnosno Pariški mirovni sporazum od 14.decembra 1995.godine).Inače, tradicija ustavnog sudovanja u Bosni i Hercegovini datira još od 1964.godine kada je osnovan prvi Ustavni sud Bosne i Hercegovine.

3 Evropski sud za ljudska prava, Niemietz protiv Njemačke, aplikacija broj 13710/88, 16.12.1992. godine 4 Evropski sud za ljudska prava, Unterpertinger protiv Austrije, 9120/80, 24.11.1986. godine 5 Evropski sud za ljudska prava, Hornsby protiv Grčke, 18357/91, 19.3.1997. godine 6 Evropski sud za ljudska prava, Dragojević protiv Hrvatske, 68955/11, 15.1.2015. godine 7 Evropski sud za ljudska prava, Mathieu-Mohin i Clerfayt protiv Belgije, 9267/81, 2.3.1987. godine

Ustavnim sudom. Kada je riječ o poštivanju

prava na lični i porodični život, ili miješanja u

prava na dom iz člana 8. Evropske konvenci-

je, veliki je broj odluka u kojima je Ustavni sud

Bosne i Hercegovine koristio stavove Evrops-

kog suda zauzete u predmetu Niemietz pro- tiv Njemačke3. U kontekstu prava na ličnu

slobodu i sigurnost iz člana 5. Evropske kon-

vencije jedna od presuda koja se može izdvojiti

je presuda u predmetu Winterwerp protiv Nizozemske (od 24. oktobra 1979. godine).

Presuda u predmetu Unterpertinger protiv Austrije4 je bila od velike pomoći u kontekstu

garancija iz člana 6. stav 3. tačka d). U predme-

tima koji se odnose na pitanja izvršenja pravos-

nažnih presuda (u kontekstu prava na pravično

suđenje, član 6. Evropske konvencije), Ustavni

sud često koristi stavove Evropskog suda zauze-

te u presudi Hornsby protiv Grčke5. Kada

govorimo o pravu na pravično suđenje mora-

mo spomenuti i primjenu u praksi Ustavnog

suda principa koje je Evropski sud definisao u

predmetu Dragojević protiv Hrvatske6 koji se

odnosio na pitanje posebnih istražnih radnji.

U kontekstu prava koja garantira član 3. Proto-

kola broj 1, u predmetima koji pokreću pitanja

koja se odnose na izbore, značajni su stavovi iz

presude Mathieu-Mohin i Clerfayt protiv Belgije7.

Iz grupe predmeta koje su se odnosile na azil

i ostala prava stranaca, odnosno mjere prema

stranicima, treba spomenuti odluku Ustavnog

suda u predmetu gdje je osporenim presudama

153

redovnog suda, rješenjima Ministarstva sigur-

nosti i Službe za poslove sa strancima apelant

stavljen pod nadzor, te je i produženo njegovo

stavljanje pod nadzor u Imigracionom centru,

a na osnovu člana 99. stav 2. tačka b) Zakona o

kretanju i boravku stranaca i azilu8. U obraz-

loženju osporenih odluka je navedeno da je

nakon provedenog postupka utvrđeno da ape-

lantovo prisustvo i dalje predstavlja prijetnju

javnom redu i nacionalnoj sigurnosti Bosne i

Hercegovine, te da je apelantu oduzeto pravo na

boravak, odbijen zahtjev za međunarodnu zašti-

tu i izrečena mjera protjerivanja na period od

pet godina, pa da je i radi izvršenja ovih odluka

neophodan daljnji apelantov boravak pod nad-

zorom u Imigracionom centru. U odluci u na-

vedenom predmetu Ustavni sud se osvrnuo na

praksu Evropskog suda u predmetu Al-Ham- dani protiv Bosne i Hercegovine9. Naime,

razmatrajući pitanje kršenja prava na slobodu

i sigurnost ličnosti u odnosu na tog aplikan-

ta, Evropski sud je, između ostalog, naveo da

je aplikant stavljen pod nadzor 23. juna 2009.

godine jer su nadležni organi utvrdili da pred-

stavlja prijetnju nacionalnoj sigurnosti, dakle, u

vrijeme kada postupak protjerivanja aplikanta

još uvijek nije bio pokrenut. S tim u vezi, Ev-

ropski sud je zaključio da apelantovo zadržavan-

je pod nadzorom u periodu od 23. juna 2009.

godine pa do pokretanja postupka deportacije

8. novembra 2010. godine nije opravdano sa

aspekta člana 5. stav 1. točka f) Evropske kon-

vencije budući da je zadržavanje pod nadzo-

rom opravdano jedino u slučaju dok traje pos-

tupak protjerivanja. Međutim, Evropski sud je u istom predmetu zaključio da nema kršenja navedenog člana Evropske kon-

8 Ustavni sud Bosne i Hercegovine, Odluka broj AP 4518/10, 13.6.2012. godine 9 Evropski sud za ljudska prava, Al-Hamdani protiv Bosne i Hercegovine, 31098/10, 7.2.2012. godine

vencije zbog zadržavanja aplikanta pod nadzorom u periodu nakon pokretanja postupka deportacije, te je odbio navode o kršenju prava iz tog člana. U konkret-

nom slučaju apelant je stavljen pod nadzor 30.

juna 2010. godine na period od 30 dana (do 30.

jula 2010. godine) zbog toga što je utvrđeno da

predstavlja prijetnju nacionalnoj sigurnosti, te

da je nakon toga nadzor nad apelantom pro-

dužavan također na periode od 30 dana, a zad-

nji put, prema rješenjima obuhvaćenim apelaci-

jom, rješenjem od 30. decembra 2011. godine.

Ustavni sud je utvrdio da apelant nije osporio

sva rješenja Službe, Ministarstva i Suda BiH već

je kao prvo osporeno rješenje označio rješenje

Službe o produženju nadzora od 20. augusta

2010. godine (kojim mu je produžen nadzor u

periodu od 31. augusta do 30. septembra 2010.

godine), te rješenje Službe od 22. septembra

2010. godine (kojim mu je produžen nadzor od

1. do 31. oktobra 2010. godine). Osim toga, Us-

tavni sud zapaža da je postupak protjerivanja

pokrenut 6. oktobra 2010. godine nakon što je

istekao rok za dobrovoljno napuštanje teritorije

BiH, koji je apelantu ostavljen rješenjem o otka-

zivanju stalnog boravka, a da je rješenje o prot-

jerivanju doneseno 15. oktobra 2010. godine. Imajući u vidu navedeno, te slijedeći na- vedeni stav Evropskog suda u predmetu Al-Hamdani, Ustavni sud je utvrdio da se u okolnostima konkretnog predme- ta period apelantovog zadržavanja pod nadzorom po osporenim rješenjima po kojima je apelantu nadzor produžen u periodu od 31. augusta do 30. septem- bra 2010. godine, odnosno od 1. oktobra do 31. oktobra 2010. godine, a koji se

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odnosi na period prije pokretanja pos- tupka apelantovog protjerivanja 6. ok- tobra 2010. godine, ne bi mogao smatra- ti opravdanim u smislu odredbi člana 5. stav 1. točka f) Evropske konvencije, te da u tom periodu postoji kršenje ovog apelantovog prava.

Prema praksi Evropskog suda iz presude

Pellegrin protiv Francuske sporovi koji

pokrenu javni službenici čiji posao ukazuje

na specifične aktivnosti javnih službi i ako su

ti službenici odgovorni za zaštitu općih inte-

resa države ili drugih javnih vlasti (pripadni-

ci oružanih snaga, policije i drugih snaga za

održavanje reda, nositelji pravosudnih dužno-

sti, carinski službenici, diplomatsko osoblje i

dr.) isključeni su iz djelokruga člana 6. stav 1.

Evropske konvencije.10 Ovu praksu slijedio je i

Ustavni sud.11 Međutim, Evropski sud za ljudska prava u predmetu Vilho Eske- linen i dr. protiv Finske12 preispitao je svoju raniju praksu, te zaključio da je za isključivanje državnih službenika iz zaštite predviđene članom 6. stav 1. Ev- ropske konvencije neophodno kumula- tivno ispunjenje dva uvjeta. «Prvo, država,

u domaćem pravu, mora izričito isključiti

pristup sudu za određenu poziciju ili kategoriju

osoblja. Drugo, isključivanje mora biti opra-

vdano i zasnovano na objektivnim razlozima

interesa države» te da «ništa ne opravdava iskl-

jučivanje običnih radnih sporova iz garancija na

osnovu člana 6. – onih koji se odnose na plaću,

nadoknadu drugih prava tog tipa – na osnovu

10 Evropski sud za ljudska prava, Pellegrini protiv Francuske, 28541/95, 8.12.1999. godine, st. 64. do 67. 11 Ustavni sud Bosne i Hercegovine, Odluka broj AP 1766/15 od 16.1.2007. godine 12 Evropski sud za ljudska prava, Vilho Eskelinen i dr. protiv Finske, 63235/00, 19.4.2007. godine, st. 42. do 62. 13 Ustavni sud Bosne i Hercegovine, Odluka broj AP 2231/06 od 23. i 24.11.2007. godine, st. 10-13 14 Ustavni sud Bosne i Hercegovine, Odluka broj U 68/02 od 25.6.2004. godine

posebne prirode odnosa između određenih

državnih službenika i države. U stvari, postoji

presumpcija da se član 6. primjenjuje“. Ovakvu

praksu je u cijelosti prihvatio i Ustavni sud.13

Ovo su samo neki, ilustrativni primjeri, s obzirom da svaka odluka Ustavnog suda sadrži citate presuda Evropskog suda i teško ih je a nije ni potrebno sve ih spomenuti.

Kao što se može vidjeti, utjecaj prakse Ev-

ropskog suda je značajan za rad Ustavnog suda.

Međutim, u procesu rješavanja predmeta iz svo-

je nadležnosti Ustavni sud Bosne i Hercegovine

često istražuje i druge izvore prakse pa tako, u

skladu s potrebama predmeta o kojima Ustavni

sud odlučuje, istražuje i praksu drugih sudova,

npr. Evropskog suda pravde.

Praksa Evropskog suda pravde u odno-

su na praksu Evropskog suda za ljudska prava

nije tako često zastupljena, ali je značajna. U

praksi Ustavnog suda postoji nekoliko odluka u

kojima je od velikog značaja bila odluka Schul Europskog suda pravde U jednoj od odluka

Ustavnog suda14 je navedeno: Ustavni sud primjećuje da je materijalni sadržaj je- dinstvenog tržišta jasno definirao Ev- ropski sud pravde, dajući evropskim zemljama smjernice u ustavnopravnom razvoju ovog važnog aspekta. Prema

155

tome, pozivanje na praksu Evropskog suda pravde je od izuzetne važnosti. U skladu s tom sudskom praksom, ma- terijalni pojam «jedinstvenog tržišta» nalaže da se, ukidanjem svih tehničkih, administrativnih i drugih mjera, ost- vari unutrašnje tržište u Bosni i Herce- govini 15.

U predmetu u kojem se Ustavni sud bavio pi-

tanjem propisivanja monopolskog položaja

kolektivne organizacije za ostvarivanja autorskog i srodnih prava16 u prilog zakl-

jučku da monopolski položaj kolektivnih orga-

nizacija nije per se nedopušten Ustavni sud je

ukazao na relevantne dijelove odluke Evropsk-

og suda pravde u predmetu broj C-351/12 koji

se također bavio pitanjem zakonom propisa-

nog monopola. Evropski sud pravde je u ovom

predmetu, između ostalog, istakao da činjenica

da je država članica društvu za kolektivno ost-

varivanje […] dodijelila monopol na području te

države članice radi ostvarivanja autorskih pra-

va u vezi s jednom kategorijom zaštićenih djela

nije sama po sebi protivna članu 102. Ugovora o

funkcionisanju Evropske unije.

Ustavni sud se, kao i mnogi sudovi u regiji i

šire, u nekoliko predmeta bavio ispitivanjem

odluka donesenih u postupcima u kojima su

se pokrenula pitanja ništavosti ugovora o kreditu prema kursu švicarskog franka (CHF). U jednom od takvih predmeta17 imajući

u vidu apelacione navode kojima je, između os-

talog, ukazano na nedostatak bitnih elemenata

ugovora u vrijeme njegovog zaključenja i stav iz

osporene presude iz kog proizlazi da je apelanti-

ca na jasan i potpuno razumljiv način (u pisanoj

15 Evropski sud pravde, Schul, predmet broj 15/81, Zbirka 1982, str. 1431, stav 33 16 Ustavni sud Bosne i Hercegovine, Odluka broj U-18/14 od 9.7.2015. godine 17 Ustavni sud Bosne i Hercegovine, Odluka broj AP-5328/15 od 13.3.2018. godine

formi) bila obaviještena o bitnim elementima

ugovora, Ustavni sud je napomenuo da je pri

razmatranju okolnosti konkretnog slučaja imao

u vidu Direktivu Vijeća Evropske zajednice broj

93/13/EEZ od 5. aprila 1993. godine („Službeni

list Evropskih zajednica“ broj 95/29,) na temel-

ju koje je Evropski sud pravde donio presudu u

predmetu broj C-186/16 od 20. septembra 2017.

godine povodom zahtjeva za prethodnu odluku

koju je uputio Žalbeni sud u Oradei - Rumuni-

ja, u okviru spora između Ruxandre Paule Ad-

riciuc i 68 drugih lica, s jedne strane, i Banca

Romaneasca SA u vezi s nepoštenim odred- bama iz ugovora o kreditu prema koji- ma su korisnici kredita bili dužni vraća- ti mjesečne rate kredita u švajcarskim francima. Posljedica toga je bila da su tečajni

rizik koji podrazumijeva da se rata povećava u

slučaju pada tečaja rumunskog leja u odnosu

na CHF u potpunosti snosili oni. Ustavni sud

je podsjetio da je nadležnost Evropskog suda

pravde originalna a to znači da se pred tim su-

dom rješavaju predmeti koji za stranku još nisu

izgubljeni pred nacionalnim sudovima, te, s tim

u vezi, podsjetio na obavezu država članica Ev-

ropske unije da poštuju i provode odluke Ev-

ropskog suda pravde. U tom kontekstu, imajući

u vidu da je vladavina prava osnovni princip na

čijem ostvarenju rade svi nacionalni sudovi, pa

tako i pravosuđe u Bosni i Hercegovini, Ustavni

sud je istakao da, iako Bosna i Hercegovina nije

članica Evropske unije i nema direktnu obav-

ezu da provodi odluke Evropskog suda pravde

kao što imaju države članice, ona može tumačiti

domaće zakonodavstvo u duhu pravnog kon-

cepta kakav podržava Evropska unija, tim pri-

je što Ustav Bosne i Hercegovine u članu II/1.

156

propisuje najviše standarde zaštite ljudskih

prava u poređenju sa minimalnim standardima

koje nameće Evropska konvencija.

3. Predmeti protiv Bosne i Hercegovine pred Evropskim sudom za ljudska prava

Kada je riječ o predmetima Evropskog suda

protiv Bosne i Hercegovine u mnogim od pod-

nesenih aplikacija aplikanti su prethodno vodi-

li postupke pred Ustavnim sudom. U brojnim

presudama u predmetima koji su se ticali neiz-

vršavanja pravosnažnih odluka (npr. ratna šteta) Evropski sud je kao i Ustavni sud utvr-

dio kršenje prava iz Evropske konvencije (pre-

sude Janjić i dr. protiv Bosne i Hercegovine,

Milinković protiv Bosne i Hercegovine, Miškov-

ić protiv Bosne i Hercegovine itd). Isti je slučaj i

sa aplikacijama u kojima se radilo o lišavanju slobode lica sa duševnim smetnjama u

Zavod za zbrinjavanje mentalno invalidnih lica

bez odluke nadležnog građanskog suda (pre-

suda Hadžimejlić protiv Bosne i Hercegovine).

Evropski sud je u ovom predmetu istakao da su

odluke Ustavnog suda zaista priznale navodnu

povredu Evropske konvencije u predmetima

aplikanata ali da nadležne vlasti nisu otklonile

navedene nedostatke. Ustavni sud je sto- ga pored utvrđivanja povrede prava naložio nadležnim vlastima poduziman- je i konkretizaciju generalnih mjera kako bi se stanje ne samo u konkretnim slučajevima nego i općenito poravilo.

Uz utvrđivanje povrede prava iz Evropske kon-

vencije i Ustava Bosne i Hercegovine određene

generalne mjere Ustavni sud je naložio i u

odlukama koje su se ticale zakonitosti lišavanja

18 Evropski sud za ljudska prava, Veliko vijeće, Maktouf i Damjanović protiv BiH, 2312/08 i 34179/08, 18.7.2013. godine

slobode lica koja su krivično djelo učinila u stanju neuračunljivosti, ali kao i u pre-

thodnom slučaju te mjere u trenutku donošenja

odluke Evropskog suda po aplikacijama nekih

od lica koja su se prethodno obraćala Ustav-

nom sudu još uvijek nisu bile implementirane

(presuda Halilović protiv Bosne i Hercegov-

ine). Naime, iako je Zakon o krivičnom postup-

ku izmijenjen, lica koja su smještena u Foren-

zičko-psihijatrijskom odjelu zatvora u Zenici

još uvijek su čekala na premještaj u zdravstvenu

ustanovu.

Radi potpunijeg sagledavanja ovoga odnosa (Ustavni sud BiH i ESLJP) mora- ju se navesti, barem kroz nekoliko prim- jera, karakteristični predmeti u koji- ma je došlo do potpunog mimoilaženja stavova Ustavnog suda i Evropskog suda.

U predmetu Maktouf i Damjanović18

pritužbe aplikanata su se odnosile na krivični

postupak pred Sudom Bosne i Hercegovine

u kojem su proglašeni odgovornim i kažnjeni

prema odredbama Krivičnog zakona Bosne i

Hercegovine iz 2003. godine (KZ BiH) za zlo-

čine protiv civilnog stanovništva koje su počinili

tokom rata od 1992 do 1995. godine. Oni su se

žalili da je odbijanjem Suda BiH da primijeni

Krivični zakon Socijalističke Federativne Re-

publike Jugoslavije iz 1976. godine (KZ SFRJ),

koji je bio na snazi u vrijeme počinjenja ratnih

zločina, povrijeđeno pravilo zabrane retroaktiv-

nog kažnjavanja sadržanog u članu 7. Evropske

konvencije. Prema tom zakonu (KZ SFRJ), ratni

zločini i genocid su se kažnjavali kaznom zatvo-

ra u trajanju od najmanje pet godina do najviše

15 godina ili, u najtežim slučajevima, smrtnom

kaznom, koja je mogla biti promijenjena u kaz-

nu dugotrajnog zatvora u trajanju od 20 godina.

157

Sudovi na nivou entiteta su na predmete ratnih

zločina generalno primjenjivali ovaj zakon, a

pošto se nakon stupanja na snagu Dejtonskog

mirovnog sporazuma iz 1995. godine smrtna ka-

zna nije više mogla primjenjivati u Bosni i Her-

cegovini, ti sudovi su za ratne zločine izricali ka-

zne zatvora u trajanju do 15 godina. Taj pravni

okvir je promijenjen 2003. godine, kada je Ured

Visokog predstavnika u Bosni i Hercegovini

(OHR) nametnuo Krivični zakon na državnom

nivou (KZ BiH), koji propisuje kazne zatvora za

ratne zločine, genocid i zločine protiv čovječno-

sti u trajanju od najmanje 10 godina (5 godi-

na u slučaju postojanja posebno olakšavajućih

okolnosti) do najviše 45 godina. Ovaj zakon se

primjenjivao u najvećem broju predmeta koje

je rješavao Odjel za ratne zločine Suda Bosne i

Hercegovine. Za razliku od Ustavnog suda, koji

je o apelaciji Maktoufa odlučivao 2007. godine

te zaključio da nije došlo do povrede Evropske

konvencije, Evropski sud je presudom iz 2013.

godine utvrdio povredu člana 7. Evropske kon-

vencije zbog retroaktivne primjene prava.

U predmetu Muslija protiv Bosne i Herce- govine19 aplikant je prethodno podnio apel-

aciju Ustavnom sudu žaleći se da mu je suđeno

dva puta, te da je dva puta kažnjen za isto djelo

u vezi s istim događajem (u krivičnom i prekrša-

jnom postupku). Ustavni sud je apelaciju odbio

smatrajući da iako su obje odluke donesene po-

vodom istog incidenta, djela su različita prema

svojoj prirodi i namjeri. Međutim, Evropski

sud je utvrdio da se postupak koji je pokrenut

protiv aplikanta na osnovu Krivičnog zakona

Federacije Bosne i Hercegovine, u suštini odno-

sio, na isto djelo za koje je aplikant već bio pra-

19 Evropski sud za ljudska prava, Muslija protiv BiH, 32042/11, 14.1.2014. godine, 20 Evropski sud za ljudska prava, Veliko vijeće, Sejdić i Finci protiv Bosne i Hercegovine: aplikacije br. 27996/06 i 34836/06,

22. decembar 2009. godine. 21 Evropski sud za ljudska prava, Pilav protiv BiH, 41939/07, 9.6.2016. godine

vosnažno osuđen na osnovu Zakona o javnom

redu Zeničko-dobojskog kantona, te je utvrdio

povredu člana 4. Protokola broj 7 uz Evropsku

konvenciju.

Odluka u jednom predmetu protiv Bosne i Her-

cegovine izuzetno je važna. Radi se o pred- metu Sejdić i Finci protiv Bosne i Herce- govine20 u kojem je Evropski sud po prvi put donio presudu prema Protokolu broj 12, odredbi koja garantuje jedna- ko postupanje u pogledu svih zakonskih prava. Apelanti u ovom predmetu optužili su

Bosnu i Hercegovinu za sistematsko lišavanje

njihovih građanskih prava, jer im je onemo-

gućeno da se kandiduju za najviša mjesta u

državnim organima vlasti. Prema Ustavu Bosne

i Hercegovine, ta mjesta su bila predviđena za

„konstitutivne narode“ koji se izjašnjavaju kao

Srbi, Hrvati i Bošnjaci, a „Ostali“ među koje su

spadali aplikanti u ovom predmetu (kao pripad-

nici romske i jevrejske manjine) su neprihvat-

ljivi. Evropski sud je utvrdio da Ustav Bosne i

Hercegovine krši Evropsku konvenciju. Kasnije

su uslijedili i drugi predmeti koji su pokretali

slična pitanja.

Takav je i predmet Pilav protiv Bosne i Her- cegovine21 koji se odnosio na pitanje kandida-

ture za člana Predsjedništva Bosne i Hercegovine

i pokretao je također pitanja po članu 1. Protokola

broj 12. uz Evropsku konvenciju. Ustavni sud je 29. septembra 2006. godine utvrdio da nije došlo do povrede navedene odredbe dok je Evropski sud u presudi od 9. juna 2016. godine utvrdio kršenje. Odluke Ev-

ropskog suda u ovim predmetima još uvijek nisu

158

izvršene, odnosno do izmjena Ustava Bosne i Her-

cegovine još uvijek nije došlo. U jednoj od odluka

Ustavnog suda koja je donesena nakon usvajanja

predmetnih odluka Evropskog suda i u fazi čekan-

ja na njihovo izvršenje Ustavni sud je istakao da Bosna i Hercegovina, odnosno njene nadležne vlasti imaju obavezu da usklade Ustav Bosne i Hercegovine i Izborni za- kon već po tri presude Evropskog suda, a Ustavni sud, ni dalje ne može predvidjeti obim tih izmjena. Ustavni sud je naročito naglasio da nema ni ustavotvornu ni za- konodavnu nadležnost, pa ne može svo- jim djelovanjem zamijeniti institucije, najprije Parlamentarnu skupštinu Bosne i Hercegovine koja ima nadležnost da, u propisanoj proceduri, mijenja Ustav Bosne i

Hercegovine, odnosno da zamijeni institucije koje

imaju obavezu preduzeti odgovarajuće mjere radi

provođenja odluka Evropskog suda u navedenim

predmetima22.

Aplikanti u predmetu Avdić i ostali pro- tiv Bosne i Hercegovine23 su se pred Ev-

ropskim sudom žalili da im je odbijanjem us-

tavnih apelacija iz razloga nepostizanja većine

glasova Ustavnog suda osporen pristup sudu.

Naime, Ustavni sud je u „vijeću od osam sudija“ (kako to navodi Evropski sud)24 odbio apelaciju aplikanta budući da se vijeće nije moglo složiti niti o jednom

22 Ustavni sud Bosne i Hercegovine, Odluka broj AP 3464/18 od 17.7.2018. godine 23 Evropski sud za ljudska prava, Avdić i ostali protiv BiH, 28357/11 31549/11 39295/11, 19.11.2013. godine 24 Zapravo, odluka je donesena na Plenarnoj sjednici na kojoj je prisustvovalo osam od ukupno devet sudija jer u tom periodu

jedno sudijsko mjesto nije bilo popunjeno 25 Ranija odredba Pravila je glasila: Izuzetno, kada u plenarnoj sjednici u donošenju odluke učestvuje manje od ukupnog broja

od devet sudija, i to zbog razloga navedenih u članu 93. stav 1. ili članu 90. stav 6. ovih pravila, kao i kada nisu izabrane sve sudije, ili kada je sudija/sudije u dužem periodu, zbog bolesti, spriječen da vrši svoju funkciju, ukoliko najmanje pet sudija ne glasa identično o prijedlogu odluke o zahtjevu/apelaciji, smatra se da je donesena odluka kojom se zahtjev/apelacija odbija. (član 40.3. Pravila («Službeni glasnik Bosne i Hercegovine» br. 60/05, 64/08 i 51/09))

26 Evropski sud za ljudska prava, Hamidović protiv Bosne i Hercegovine, 57792/15, 5.12.2017. godine; Ustavni sud Bosne i Her- cegovine, Odluka broj AP 3947/12, 9.7.2015. godine

prijedlogu odluke u većini koju čini pet sudija. Evropski sud je utvrdio povredu prava na pristup sudu u smislu člana 6. Evropske konvencije. Ova odluka Evrops-

kog suda je uticala na izmjenu Pravila Usta-

vnog suda prema kojima je sada predviđeno da

„Izuzetno, kada u plenarnoj sjednici u donošen-

ju odluke učestvuje manje od ukupnog broja od

devet sudija, i to zbog razloga navedenih u čla-

nu 90. stav (1) ili članu 98. ovih pravila, kao i

kada nisu izabrane sve sudije, ili kada je sudija/

sudije u dužem periodu, zbog bolesti, spriječen

vršiti svoju funkciju, ukoliko najmanje pet sudi-

ja ne glasa identično o prijedlogu odluke o zaht-

jevu/apelaciji, u slučaju iz člana 98. odlučivanje

o toj odluci će se odgoditi za jednu od narednih

sjednica ali ne duže od šest mjeseci, a ako se

ista situacija nakon isteka tog roka ponovi, glas

predsjednika Ustavnoga suda, odnosno sudije

koji ga zamjenjuje, računa se dvostruko (član

42.5. Pravila)25

U jednom od predmeta kojim se bavio i Ustav-

ni sud i Evropski sud apelant/aplikant kažnjen

je zbog odbijanja da skine (prema njegovom uvjerenju) vjerski simbol (kapu) u sudni-

ci26. Za razliku od Ustavnog suda koji je sma-

trao da ograničenje u konkretnom slučaju nije

predstavljalo preveliki teret za apelanta, te da je

mjera koju je preduzeo redovni sud slijedila le-

gitimne ciljeve, u smislu člana 9. stav 2. Evrops-

159

ke konvencije, i da u konkretnom slučaju postoji

razuman odnos proporcionalnosti između ogra-

ničenja i legitimnog cilja kojem se teži Evropski

sud je utvrdio da aplikantovo kažnjavanje zbog

nepoštivanja suda samo na osnovu njegovog

odbijanja da skine kapu, nije bilo neophodno u

demokratskom društvu, te da su domaći organi

vlasti prekoračili široko polje slobodne procjene

koje im je dato. Evropski sud je utvrdio da je

došlo do povrede člana 9. Evropske konvencije.

Zanimljiva je i najnovija odluka Evropskog suda

u predmetu Kovačević protiv Bosne i Hercego-

vine kojom je utvrđena povreda nekih aplikan-

tovih prava (aktivno biračko pravo s obzirom

na mjesto prebivališta i etničko ne/određenje) s

obzirom da se aplikant ne izjašnjava kao pripa-

dnik niti jednog od tzv. „konstitutivnih naroda

u Bosni Hercegovini (Bošnjaci, Hrvati, Srbi)27.

4. Direktnu primjena Konvencije u postupcima pred domaćim sudovima

Ustavni sud često ukazuje da prema članu II/2.

Ustava Bosne i Hercegovine odredbe Evropske

konvencije imaju supremaciju nad ostalim zakonima28, dok prema članu II/6. Ustava

Bosne i Hercegovine svi sudovi i drugi organi

vlasti imaju obavezu «da primjenjuju ljudska

prava i osnovne slobode na koje je ukazano u

stavu 2.»

Ustavni sud je u nizu slučajeva ukazao kako

su redovni sudovi ispunili svoju zadaću u

smislu navedenih odredbi. Ovi slučajevi su se

27 Evropski sud za ljudska prava, Kovačević protiv Bosne i Hercegovine, predmet br. 43651/22 objavljeno 29.08.2023.godine (u vrijeme pisanja ovoga rada nije poznato da li će biti podnesen zahtjev da o ovome predmetu odlučuje Veliko vijeće ESLJP

28 Prema praksi odnosno stavu Ustavnog suda supremacija se odnosi na zakone ali ne i Ustav. U stručnoj i široj javnosti, među- tim, ima kritičara ovakvoga stava koji smatraju da se supremacija odnosi i na Ustav Bosne i Hercegovine

29 Ustavni sud Bosne i Hercegovine, Odluka broj AP 3864/17, 27.2.2018. godine

uglavnom odnosili na direktnu primjenu člana

8. Evropske konvencije.

U jednom od predmeta Ustavni sud je ista- kao da je Vrhovni sud u osporenoj pre- sudi direktno primijenio odredbe člana 8. Evropske konvencije, te slijedom toga

preinačio drugostepenu presudu na način da

je potvrđena prvostepena presuda u dijelu u

kojem se tužiocu priznaje pravo trajnog i nesmetanog korištenja predmetnog sta- na. Ustavni sud je naglasio da je Vrhovni sud

u obrazloženju osporene odluke dao detaljne i

jasne razloge kojima se rukovodio pri izvođen-

ju zaključka da «predmetni stan» predstavl-

ja tužiočev «dom» u smislu člana 8. Evropske

konvencije, slijedom čega je i odlučio kao u izre-

ci presude.29

Primjer direktne primjene člana 8. Evropske konvencije je još jedan predmetu

koji se bavio pitanjem prava na „dom“. U ovom

slučaju Vrhovni sud je u osporenoj presu- di direktno primijenio odredbe člana 8. Evropske konvencije umjesto odredbi Za- kona o vlasničkopravnim odnosima i na

osnovu navedenih odredbi Evropske konvencije

preinačio presude nižestepenih sudova tako što

je odbio tužbeni zahtjev apelantica da im tužena

preda predmetni stan u posjed. U osporenoj odluci Vrhovni sud je obrazložio da se predmetni stan ima smatrati tužiteljici- nim „domom“ u smislu člana 8. Evrops- ke konvencije jer je prema činjeničnom

utvrđenju nižestepenih sudova tužiteljica u

predmetni stan uselila zakonito kao vanbračna

160

supruga L.M – pravnog prednika apelantica i

da je u vanbračnoj zajednici s L.M. živjela od

1998. godine do njegove smrti 2005. godine i da

je u tom stanu nastavila živjeti i nakon njegove

smrti i tu ostvarivati svoje osnovne stambene

i životne potrebe. Vrhovni sud je pri tome naglasio da je dom faktičko stanje koje ne zahtijeva postojanje pravnog osno- va te se u vezi s tim pozvao na Odluku Ustavnog suda broj AP 663/04 u kojoj je Ustavni sud upravo i konstatirao da je „dom“ faktičko stanje koje ne zahtijeva postojanje pravnog osnova. Ustavni sud

je naglasio da iz obrazloženja osporene presude

Vrhovnog suda proizlazi da je Vrhovni sud zapravo ocijenio da je tužiteljicino pra- vo na „dom“ u smislu člana 8. Evropske konvencije, koje je tužiteljica ostvarila živeći u predmetnom stanu u periodu dužem od osam godina, u konkretnom slučaju značajnije od prava na imovinu apelantica iz člana II/3.k) Ustava Bosne i Hercegovine i člana 1. Protokola broj 1 uz Evropsku konvenciju, koje stan nisu koristile za stanovanje, odnosno koje već imaju svoj dom. Shodno navedenom,

Ustavni sud je zaključio da je u konkretnom

slučaju osporena odluka donesena u skla- du s javnim interesom, a to je zaštita prava

i sloboda drugih, odnosno u ovom slučaju tuži-

teljicinog prava na „dom“ i da je u konkretnom

slučaju uspostavljena pravična ravnoteža

između zaštite prava apelantica na imovinu i

općeg interesa jer u ovoj situaciji na apelantice

nije stavljen neprimjeren teret radi ostvarivanja

zakonitog cilja, pogotovo imajući u vidu činje-

nicu da se u konkretnom slučaju radilo o tuži-

30 Ustavni sud Bosne i Hercegovine, Odluka broj AP 1522/15, 17.1.2018. godine 31 Ustavni sud Bosne i Hercegovine, Odluk broj AP 1371/12, 10.11.2015. godine

teljicinom pravu koje se nije moglo prenijeti na

drugu osobu i koja je preko osam godina živjela

u predmetnom stanu i još uvijek živi i koristi

predmetni stan kao svoj dom.30

Vrhovni sud se na stav Ustavnog suda o domu

kao faktičkom stanju pozvao u još jednom slučaju u kojem je također direktno pri- mijenio Evropsku konvenciju. U ovom

slučaju Ustavni sud je naglasio da je Vrhovni

sud obrazložio da odluke nižestepenih sudova,

kojima je usvojen tužbeni zahtjev apelantica

koje su vlasnice predmetnog stana, ali ga nika-

da nisu koristile za stanovanje, odnosno imaju

svoj dom, predstavljaju miješanje u pravo tuže-

ne na dom koje ne ispunjava kriterije opravda-

nosti i neophodnosti u demokratskom društvu

u skladu s nekim od ciljeva iz člana 8. stav 2.

Evropske konvencije jer prava apelantica, kao vlasnika stana, ne bi trebala pre- vagnuti nad interesom tužene koja bi u 82. godini trebala napustiti stan s kojim je ostvarila dovoljno jaku vezu da bi se mogao smatrati njezinim domom. Usta-

vni sud je zaključio da je Vrhovni sud dao jasno

i argumentirano obrazloženje za svoju odluku

da umjesto odredaba Zakona o vlasnič- ko-pravnim odnosima u konkretnom slučaju direktno primijeni odredbe čla- na 8. Evropske konvencije, za što je imao ovlaštenje u odredbama čl. II/2. i II/6. Ustava Bosne i Hercegovine, kao

i da primjenom navedenih odredbi Evropske

konvencije preinači nižestepene presude i odbi-

je tužbeni zahtjev apelantica za predaju u pos-

jed predmetnog stana.31

U kontekstu utvrđivanja da li određeni stan

predstavlja nečiji dom treba spomenuti i pred-

161

met Ustavnog suda u kojem su upravni orga- ni i Kantonalni sud proveli postupak, izveli

dokaze i primijenili važeće materijalno-pravne

propise Zakona o stambenim odnosma i Zakona

o prestanku primjene Zakona o napuštenim sta-

novima, kao i da su direktno primijenili odredbe

Evropske konvencije (član 8.) u smislu utvrđi-

vanja da li predmetni stan predstavlja apelantov

dom, te odbili apelantov zahtjev za povrat stana

kao neosnovan. U vezi s ovim Ustavni sud je naglasio da su u suštini i organi uprave i Kantonalni sud došli do zaključka da predmetni stan ne predstavlja apelantov dom, s tim što su organi uprave taj zakl- jučak temeljili na utvrđenju da apelant nije faktički ušao u posjed stana, a Kan- tonalni sud je zaključio da su postojale objektivne okolnosti zbog kojih apelant predmetni stan nije mogao koristiti, ali da je kod apelanta postojala objektivna namjera i stav da predmetni stan koristi kao svoj dom, kao i opravdano očekivan- je da će riješiti svoje stambeno pitanje. Međutim, Kantonalni sud je u svojoj odluci kao

konačnoj u konkretnoj upravnoj stvari, polazeći

od činjeničnog utvrđenja da je apelant sa svo- jom suprugom riješio stambeno pitanje na način da je otkupio i postao suvlasnik drugog stana, u kojem sa svojom poro- dicom živi od 2001. godine, zaključio da apelantov povratak u predmetni stan nije stvaran i s namjerom da u njemu živi budući da ima drugi dom. Ustavni

sud je zaključio da su organi uprave i Kantonal-

ni sud uzeli u obzir apelantove navode i tvrdnje,

pri čemu su u obrazloženju dali jasne razloge za

svoje odluke uz pozivanje na relevantne odredbe

32 Ustavni sud Bosne i Hercegovine, Odluka broj AP-3681/14, 22.3.2017. godine 33 Ustavni sud Bosne i Hercegovine, Odluka broj U-4/04, 31.3.2006. godine 34 Ustavni sud Bosne i Hercegovine, Odluka broj U-9/09, 26.11.2010. godine

važećih materijalno-pravnih propisa i Evropske

konvencije.32

5. Mišljenja Evropske komisi- je za demokraciju putem pra- va (Venecijanska komisija) dato u svojstvu amicus curiae

U skladu sa članom 16. stav 3. Pravila Ustavnog

suda, Ustavni sud, odnosno sudija izvjestilac,

može zatražiti i od drugih organa i organizacija

stručno pisano mišljenje. Na adresu Vene-

cijanske komisije Ustavni sud je do sada uputio

nekoliko ovakvih poziva. Takva mogućnost je

predviđena i regulativom prema kojoj radiVe-

necijanska komisija.

Prvi put je to učinio u predmetu u kojem se

bavio ocjenom ustavnosti Zakona o grbu i zastavi Federacije BiH i Zakona o up- otrebi zastave, grba i himne Republike Srpske33. U ovom predmetu Ured Visokog

komesara za ljudska prava, Ured OSCE-a u Bos-

ni i Hercegovini i Venecijanska komisija su, kao

amicus curiae pred Ustavnim sudom dostavili

svoje zajedničko mišljenje.

U toku 2010. godine Venecijanska komisija je Ustavnom sudu do- stavila mišljenje u svojstvu amicus curiae u predmetu ocjene ustavno- sti Izbornog zakona BiH i Statuta grada Mostara34.

162

Ustavni sud je 2012. godine odlučivao o ocjeni

ustavnosti Zakona o statusu državne imov- ine koja se nalazi na teritoriji Republike Srpske i pod zabranom je raspolaganja imajuću,

između ostalog, u vidu i amicus curiae mišljenje

Venecijanske komisije dato u ovom predmetu35.

U odluci od 26. novembra 2015. godine36 Us-

tavni sud je smatrao da izbor 9. januara kao datuma obilježavanja praznika Dan Republike Srpske nema simboliku kolektiv-

nog zajedničkog sjećanja koje može doprinijeti

jačanju kolektivnog identiteta kao vrijednos-

tima koje imaju poseban značaj u multietnič-

kom društvu koje se zasniva na uvažavanju i

poštivanju različitosti kao osnovnih vrijednosti

modernog demokratskog društva. U tom smis-

lu, kako je istakao Ustavni sud, izbor 9. januara

za obilježavanje Dana Republike kao jednog od

praznika entiteta koji predstavlja ustavnu kat-

egoriju i kao takav mora predstavljati i sve građane Republike Srpske kojima i sam

Ustav Republike Srpske priznaje jednaka prava

nije u skladu s ustavnom obavezom o nediskrim-

inaciji u smislu prava grupa, jer uspostavlja povlašteni položaj samo jednog, srpskog naroda, čiji su predstavnici 9. januara 1992.

godine, bez učešća predstavnika Bošnjaka, Hr-

vata i Ostalih, donijeli Deklaraciju o proglašen-

ju Republike srpskog naroda Bosne i Hercegov-

ine, kao jednostrani akt. Kao takav, prema

mišljenju Ustavnog suda, te prema stavu Vene-

cijanske komisije [datom u svojstvu amic- us curiae], ne može se smatrati saglasnim s

osnovnim vrijednostima izjavljenim u Ustavu

Republike Srpske, tj. s poštovanjem ljudskog

dostojanstva, slobode i jednakosti, nacionalne

ravnopravnosti, s demokratskim institucijama,

35 Ustavni sud Bosne i Hercegovine, Odluka broj U-1/11, 13.7.2012. godine 36 Ustavni sud Bosne i Hercegovine, Odluka broj U-3/13 37 Ustavni sud Bosne i Hercegovine, Odluka broj U-15/20, 13.7.2023. godine

vladavinom prava, socijalnom pravdom, plu-

ralističkim društvom, garantiranjem i zaštitom

ljudskih sloboda i prava, kao i prava manjinskih

grupa u skladu s međunarodnim standardima,

zabranom diskriminacije (Preambula).

Venecijanska komisija je 17. oktobra 2016.

godine dostavila Ustavnom sudu „Nacrt podnes-

ka amicus curiae za Ustavni sud o načinu izbo-

ra delegata u Dom naroda Parlamenta Federacije

Bosne i Hercegovine“ za potrebe predmeta broj

U-23/14 o kojem je Ustavni sud donio odluku na

sjednici održanoj 1. decembra 2016. godine.

Mišljenje Venecijanske komisije dato u pred-

metu kojim se pokretalo pitanje ocjene ustav-

nosti Zakona o Sudu BiH nije našlo svo-

je mjesto u konačnoj odluci Ustavnog suda u

ovom predmetu jer je u međuvremenu podnos-

ilac zahtjeva odustao od zahtjeva te je Ustavni

sud donio odluku o obustavi postupka.37

Z a k lj u č a k

Promocija, zaštita i efektivno ostvarenje ljud-

skih prava i osnovnih sloboda u funkciji su

izgradnje demokratskog društva općenito. U

tom smislu Ustavni sud ima izuzetno značajnu

ulogu, prije svega kao institucija koja garantuje

zaštitu ljudskih prava i temeljnih sloboda na na-

jvišem nivou.

Slijedeći praksu Evropskog suda za ljudska pra-

va Ustavni sud Bosne i Hercegovine je, u ok-

viru nadležnosti definiranih Ustavom Bosne i

Hercegovine, postao institucionalni zaštitnik

prava i sloboda odnosno standarda iz Evropske

konvencije o ljudskim pravima i temeljnim slo-

bodama u cijeloj Bosni i Hercegovini.

163

Honourable President and members of the Con-

stitutional Court of Kosovo,

Honourable colleagues,

Above all I would like to congratulate you on or-

ganizing such a good international conference

to celebrate the 14th anniversary of your court.

I’ll be happy to welcome a lot of the colleagues

present here in three days’ time in Sofia for the

first Forum of Balkan Constitutional Courts

because we are all convinced that dialogue be-

tween constitutional courts is of great impor-

tance.

And with your permission, I’ll continue in

French, because French is the language of the

Court of Justice of the European Union. I’ll con-

tinue in French not only to prove that there are

a lot of Francophones in the Balkans. In the Bal-

kans, there are many French-speaking people. I

would like to discuss a complicated issue, which

is dialogue, or should I say the lack of dialogue

between the EU constitutional jurisdiction and

national constitutional jurisdictions.

Bulgaria joined the EU about 17 years ago. The

Bulgarian Constitutional Court was established

more than thirty years ago but has not yet ap-

proached the Court of Justice with a request for

a preliminary ruling. We have not had a case for

such a request yet.

The Constitutional Court of Bulgaria has nev-

ertheless taken another action to nourish the

dialogue between the jurisdictions. Our court is

Contribution by Mr. Atanas Semov, Judge of the Constitutional Court of Bulgaria

DIALOGUE BETWEEN CONSTITUTIONAL JURISDICTIONS IS AS CRUCIAL AS WITH THE EU CONSTITUTIONAL JURISDICTION

164

the only constitutional jurisdiction in Europe

whose Internal Rules (art. 18, para 3) oblige the

supreme jurisdictions to submit questions to

the Constitutional Court so as to verify whether

the procedure pending before it falls within the

scope of EU law and to clarify the applicable law

and the consequences of the applicability of EU

law. The Constitutional Court of Bulgaria has

thus clearly stipulated that it is a prerogative of

ordinary jurisdictions as EU law judges.

If we are dealing with EU law and an interpre-

tation is requested from the Luxembourg Court,

then the jurisdiction should request it without

having to go through the Constitutional Court.

Of course, my 5 minutes here are too short to

elaborate on this topic.

I have published a book about the protection of national con- stitutional identity in EU. I see here ample room for coop- eration, for broadening dia- logue between Constitutional Courts. And also for dialogue with the Luxembourg Court.

The Constitutional Court of Bulgaria did some-

thing else in one of its decisions, as recently as

in 2021. It ruled that any national jurisdiction

is obliged to verify ex officio whether the case

falls within the scope of EU law and should ver-

ify all consequences: whether there are self-ex-

ecuting EU norms to be applied to the matter;

if not, what referring EU norms are to be taken

into consideration for the purposes of a consis-

tent interpretation of the domestic norms that

should be applied; whether there is a conflict

between the national law and EU law and to

disapply the implemented conflicting domestic

norms.

And it is very important that immediately after

that the Supreme Administrative Court of Bul-

garia confirmed this formula by saying that na-

tional jurisdictions are obliged to verify wheth-

er the matter falls within the scope of EU law

and what the consequences are. And to do so

sua sponte and without waiting for or relying on

the initiative of the parties to the case pending

before it. So this is quite positive.

We tend often to forget about the consistent

interpretation of all domestic norms that fall

within the scope of EU law. The Bulgarian Con-

stitutional Court has not yet directly addressed

the Luxembourg Court, but it requests and

applies an interpretation of any domestic rule

that is consistent with EU law – and with CJEU

case-law.

I am aware that rushing ahead of a lunch break

is an impossible task. So I will wrap up my

presentation making two important points:

strengthening dialogue between constitutional

jurisdictions, on the one hand, and, on the oth-

er, between them and the EU jurisdiction. I am

convinced that the EU is a very important orga-

nization for us all. And we should defend it lest

it be transformed into a federation.

We don’t need United States of Europe. We

need States united within Europe.

Thank you.

165

First and foremost, I would like to convey

heartfelt thanks to my friend and colleague

Mme. President Justice Gresa Çaka for organiz-

ing this wonderful event and including me in it.

I also share the fondest memories of our work

together throughout 2007 and 2008 on the in-

dependence Constitution that we are celebrat-

ing today.

I also want to share with you some of my re-

flections on the Kosovo constitution-making

process drawing off of my own knowledge of

the history of constitution-making in recent de-

cades. I was the co-editor of Framing the State in Times of Transition that included the study

of 19 constitutional processes of the twenti-

eth century. The volume placed a great deal of

emphasis on public participation in constitu-

tion-making processes.

Today, I would like to offer a brief historical per-

spective in order to place the process in Kosovo

in historical perspective.

During the post-colonial phase of constitu-

tion-making the activity was perceived prin-

cipally as an elite affair that took place behind

closed doors with local and often internation-

al elites dominating the process. Constitu-

tion-making in this period focused exclusively

on the task of drafting the document and in

former colonies often foreign advisors from

the former colonies wrote the text. The Direc-

tor of the Constitution Commission in Eritrea

offered a frank assessment of this process, stat-

ing: “these texts were often shoved down the

throats of local actors who were considered by

the foreign actors as incapable of creating such

an important charter on their own.” This expe-

Contribtuion by Mr. Louis Aucoin, Foreign Advisor on Rule of Law, Constitutional Development and Transitional Justice (United States Government Advisor throughout the drafting of the Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo)

COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES ON CONSTITUTION-MAKING: KOSOVO AND BEYOND

166

rience resulted in the development of enormous

mistrust of foreign actors participating in such

an exercise.

I witnessed this myself in 1993 in Cambodia

where I worked as a foreign advisor invited by

USAID. I tried to work with the drafting com-

mittee that the Cambodians had recently creat-

ed. I worked hard to overcome their mistrust of

a foreign expert and managed to assure them

that I intended to act exclusively as a resource

in order to assist them in their central role as

drafters. However, although the drafting com-

mittee came to work very collaboratively with

me and other foreign advisors, almost all of our

collaborative effort was almost totally ignored

because, unbeknownst to us, King Sihanouk

had hired a French law professor to draft a text

for him. When the Constituent Assembly be-

came involved, the King’s Draft became almost

the exclusive focus of debate, ignoring the at-

tempts by local NGOs, women’s groups, human

rights groups, and others to have their say in the

process.

Interestingly in the same year, 1993, as South

Africa emerged from apartheid, it chose to de-

velop a new constitution in a new and innova-

tive way. In the beginning of the process, it to-

tally rejected all foreign participation and drew

heavily off of the contributions and suggestions

of its own citizens. In addition, it established an

interim constitution that provided guidance on

how the process of developing the final consti-

tution would occur. Most importantly, it estab-

lished guiding principles that would direct the

process and the substance of the final constitu-

tion.

This process inspired the world and ushered in

a new era of constitution-making which the lit-

erature on the subject has referred to as “new

constitutionalism.” It is a new version of con-

stitution making which places a great deal of

emphasis on the process of constitution making

and even considers the process to be more im-

portant than the substance. The theory behind

new constitutionalism is that by involving all

sectors of the society, including women and mi-

norities, the ultimate text will benefit from en-

hanced buy-in by the local population. The goal,

of course, is to establish a charter that will enjoy

legitimacy and stability in the long run.

As a result, anyone who analyzes the literature

on this topic will see that there is a sort of ideal

process that emerges from experts’ reflections

on the subject. What I would like to do now is

to provide a thumbnail sketch of this model of

constitution making and assess the way that

Kosovo’s process in 2007-2008 conformed to

this emerging model.

A. Phased process

The good practice of constitution making that

has emerged in the last several decades is that

of providing for constitution making in phases.

This of course is a far cry from the older and

more stereotypical notion of constitution mak-

ing as a relatively discrete event where elites

sit around a table typically behind closed doors

where they focus primarily on drafting.

B. Interim Arrangements

As was the case in South Africa, new constitu-

tionalism suggests that it is important to start

with an interim arrangement that provides

some guidance on the process and includes the

principles that should guide the process and

be included in the final text. This is certainly

a far cry from the older method. Now there is

as much or even more emphasis on the process

167

than the substance of the making of the consti-

tution. This design is to ensure transparency

and inclusion so that the end result will be the

culmination of an organic process involving the

society at large and not just the elites. It should

ideally then be designed and implemented by

local actors.

In the case of Kosovo, there were a few elements

that served to provide for interim arrangements

leading up to the development of the constitu-

tion in the end. First, there was the Constitu-

tional Framework that was developed when

Kosovo was under international administra-

tion. While this was developed primarily by in-

ternational actors, there was local involvement.

Perhaps more importantly there was the Set-

tlement Agreement spearheaded by President

Marti Ahtisaari of Finland that was the result

of protracted negotiations that closely involved

local actors whose consent and approval was

consistently required.

The guiding principles that formed the foundation of that settlement and that guided the process were binding norms of international law that focused on human rights and the pro- tection of local minorities.

Article 10 of the Settlement agreement required

transparency by stipulating that the public be

kept informed throughout the process of the de-

velopment of the constitution. While this provi-

sion could have provided for more detail on the

role of the general public, it was interpreted as

requiring the direct involvement of the public,

and that is what actually happened during the

process.

Justice Gresa Caka in her recent book chapter

on “Kosovo’s Independence Constitution” re-

ferred to this phenomenon as internationalized

“pouvoir constituant” indicating that while in-

ternational actors and international law guided

the process, it was nevertheless a process based

upon the consent of the population that the fi-

nal text would govern–“a constitution that was

compatible with the will of the people.”

C. Phased public involvement

Of course, the involvement of the public at large

is at the heart of new constitutionalism. More-

over, experience has shown that public partici-

pation itself should ideally also be conducted in

phases. The first phase should ideally be devot-

ed to educating the population on the constitu-

tional questions that will be submitted to them

for their input in a later phase. This should be

done so as to improve the quality of the re-

sponses to the consultations that will occur in

the second phase.

In Kosovo, in 2008, the Constitutional Com-

mission was not afforded the luxury of the time

needed to separate education and consultation

into two discrete phases. However, the Com-

mission responded to the resulting challenge by

doubling down on the intensity of their efforts.

Throughout February and March of 2008, the

Commission engaged in intense efforts aimed

at involving and including the population. The

draft of the Constitution was made widely avail-

able on their website, and they participated

in TV and radio discussions and roundtables

throughout the country. They set up a mecha-

nism for receipt of public comments and letters

through their website. Thousands of comments

168

were received and considered. I recall in this

connection the extraordinary effort of Mme.

President Gresa Çaka who worked tirelessly in

the final days of the process to ensure that the

public input was taken into consideration. In

the case of Kosovo, this exercise was highly suc-

cessful in that 35% of the public comments were

at least partially if not totally incorporated into

the final text.

Conclusion

Since 2008 much has been written on the ef-

fect of public participation in constitution-mak-

ing and on the process generally. While there

doesn’t seem to be a consensus on its effect

generally, there can be no doubt that when the

people see such a significant inclusion of their

intent and desire in the final result, there will

of necessity be an enhanced sense of buy-in by

the population. Moreover, given the fact that

the people of Kosovo will always associate their

constitution as the final result of their decades

long struggle for independence, taken together,

these factors are very likely in my view to con-

tribute to the long-term legitimacy of the Con-

stitution and the stability of the country overall.

169

170

171

1. Celebrating the 14th Judicial Year of Kosovo’s Constitutional Court

Ms President of the Constitutional Court, Excel-

lencies, Ladies and Gentlemen,

Thank you for organising this interesting inter-

national conference and for the warm welcome

and hospitality. I would like to congratulate

you, the members of the Constitutional Court

and the people of the Republic of Kosovo on the

opening of the 14th Judicial Year of the Consti-

tutional Court of the Republic of Kosovo. In the

invitation, this was called a moment to reflect

on 14 years of history and to welcome represen-

tatives of fellow courts to your beloved country.

The title of my contribution to Session III on

the role of constitutional courts in protecting

fundamental rights and freedoms through in-

dividual control of constitutionality of acts of

public authorities’ is: ‘A perspective from below

Contribution by Ms. Dineke de Groot, President of the Supreme Court of the Netherlands

THE CONTRIBUTION OF CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS IN PROTECTING AND STRENGTHENING FUNDAMENTAL VALUES OF DEMOCRACY, RULE OF LAW, AND FUNDAMENTAL HUMAN RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS A PERSPECTIVE FROM BELOW SEA LEVEL TO THE ACCURSED MOUNTAINS

172

sea level to the Accursed Mountains’. Why this

title? That requires some explanation.

On 12 May 2022, Kosovo applied for the mem-

bership of the Council of Europe. The Council of

Europe says on its website that it has been sup-

porting Kosovo since 1999, in full compliance

with the United Nations Security Council Reso-

lution 1244. On the same website, the Council of

Europe mentions that it supports the Constitu-

tional Court of Kosovo in applying and dissemi-

nating European human rights standards. Thus,

the preparation of the national implementation

of the European Convention on Human Rights

in Kosovo is well underway. When Kosovo will

be a member of the Council of Europe, Koso-

vo is expected to ratify the European Conven-

tion on Human Rights (ECHR) at the earliest

opportunity. The effects of the entry into force

of the ECHR for Kosovo can be viewed with

confidence, as it is already common for parties

to invoke provisions of the ECHR, and for the

Constitutional Court to consider those provi-

sions when interpreting and applying national

constitutional law. The Constitutional Court

makes its decisions available on its website in

several languages. Therefore, also the interna-

tional community is allowed to learn about this

practice. The clear way in which the decisions

of the Constitutional Court of Kosovo deal with

the ECHR, only 14 years after this court was

founded, is in my view admirable.

The Netherlands acceded to the Convention at

the very beginning. The ratification took place

in 1954. At that time, the impression prevailed

that the ECHR would not have much impact

on national law, since infringements of funda-

mental rights and freedoms were deemed to

be almost absent in the Netherlands. However,

parties and lawyers started early on to invoke

provisions of the ECHR before Dutch courts

and, afterwards, filing complaints in Strasbourg

against the Netherlands. In the following de-

cades, the ECHR, and its dynamic interpreta-

tion by the ECtHR, had more influence on na-

tional law than initially expected. The search

engine HUDOC lists settled complaints against

the Netherlands from the early 1960s onwards.

A private initiative, the Dutch Lawyers Com-

mittee for Human Rights, which was founded

in 1974 as the Dutch section of the International

Commission of Jurists (ICJ), has grown into an

authoritative organisation. It successfully pro-

motes the professional knowledge and aware-

ness of human rights and freedoms in the Neth-

erlands.

Nowadays, it is obvious in the Netherlands that courts, when interpreting and applying na- tional law, also consider the ECHR, the Protocols thereto and the ECtHR case-law. Na- tional law must be interpret- ed and applied in accordance with this hermeneutical can- on. When this is not possible, infringements of the ECHR must be avoided, for instance by disapplying a provision of national legislation. This is governed by the Constitution of the Netherlands.

As it is, both our courts, the Constitutional

Court of Kosovo and the Supreme Court of the

Netherlands, are committed to interpret and

173

apply national (constitutional) law in accor-

dance with the ECHR. It is no longer a moot

point that courts have an important role to play

in protecting fundamental rights and freedoms