Interference to RNSS reception

Annex 1

Example of interference situation in Estonia

1. Reports sent by airplanes in Estonian airspace (Time, Flight call sign,

Waypoint names, Flight level):

Date 07.02.2025 08.02.2025 09.02.2025

Flight data 1001 ESSKI KUNUX F170 1157 BTI3KL GIGDI F300 1157 FIN5PA ARSAM F195 1257 FIN1048 RIPEX F150 1327 TDR2000 KEMET F330 1553 PIA781 NOTAR F340 2035 FIN4NC KEXLE F240 2302 LOT7TE SOKVA F290

0529 BTI30W KUNUX F250 0840 CSG2579 RESMO F340 0921 UAE63Q MOTAR F360 1249 BTI60W KEMET F310

0146 CSN451 RESMO F340 0428 SWR1317 GIGDI F150 0542 BTI30W KUNUX F250 0641 BTI7HW NEKAX F130

2. Summary of reports sent by airplanes:

3. Monitoring results:

Monitoring station in Narva (59°22'50 N, 028°11'27 E) region near the border with

Russian Federation detected two sources of interference with bearings 26° - 27° and

70° - 72°. The sources of interference are located in Russian Federation in Leningrad

Region.

Annex 1

4. Spectrum screenshots of interferring signal (dBuV/m) on 08.02.2025 and

09.02.2025 respectivly, center frequencies of interfering signals are 1575,4

MHz, 1561,0 MHz and 1602,0 MHz:

Annex 2

1

Information on GNSS interference in Lithuania

Fig. 1 Distribution of affected aircrafts in western part of Lithuania (15 September 2024 – 18

February 2025).

Fig. 2. 2024-2025 affected aircrafts in whole Lithuania airspace, unique ICAO IDs per month

counted.

Annex 2

2

1 vieta

2 vieta

3 vieta

Fig. 3. 2025 January 27 detected GPS L1 interfering emission from territory of Russia

(Kaliningrad).

Fig. 4. 2025 January 27 detected wideband interfering emission from territory of Russia

(Kaliningrad), affecting all GNSS bands.

Fig. 5. Interfering emission in GPS L1, GALILEO E1 and GLONASS G1 frequency bands

from territory of Russia (Kaliningrad) detected on 2024 October 16, 2024, November 4 and

2025 January 27.

Annex 3

Latvian submits information collected starting from September 2024 to January 2025

on RNSS interference cases.

RNSS quality data from aircrafts are depicted in the images below. All flights (within

the shaded area) during each month are considered, and the GNSS accuracy

outside the normal range is calculated as a percentage -

Green colour - the error exceeds the norm between 0% and 2%

Yellow colour – the error exceeds the norm between 2% and 10%

Red colour – the error exceeds the norm by more than 10%

The numbers of affected flights are depicted in the table Nb1. The flights included in

the table correspond to the images shown below. The table of affected flights

includes only those flights whose number of GNSS quality errors during the flight

over the displayed area are >10.

The month The number of affected flights

September 2024 4624

October 2024 5393

November 2024 5830

December 2024 7523

January 2025 7369

Table Nb1

September 2024

October 2024

November 2024

Annex 3

Decembre 2024

January 2025

Endla 10a / 10122 Tallinn / ESTONIA

Phone: +372 667 2000 / Fax: +372 667 2001 / E-mail: [email protected] / http://www.ttja.ee

Mr Mario Maniewicz

Radiocommunication Bureau

International Telecommunication

Union

Place des Nations

CH-1211, Geneva 20

Our Ref: 19.02.2025 No 17-5/2025/0199

Interference to RNSS reception

Dear Mr Maniewicz

Please find attached submission of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania on continuing interference to

RNSS reception.

Yours sincerely,

Erko Kulu

talituse juhataja

Arvo Rammus

+372 667 2071 [email protected]

1

Submission from Estonia, Latvia

and Lithuania concerning interference

to RNSS services

Dear Mr Maniewicz

Recognizing the efforts already done by the Bureau on solving the interference to RNSS, referring to

resolves to urge administrations 3 of Resolution 676 (WRC-676) and RR No 15.41 Estonian, Latvian

and Lithuanian Administrations would like to inform You about continuing interference to RNSS

services.

Lithuania has made repeated efforts to contact the authority of Russian Federation (recorded in SIRRS

Case ID No. ITU2024-67625). No communication was received.

Estonia has made repeated efforts to contact the authority of Russian Federation (recorded in SIRRS

Case ID No. ITU2024-67597, ITU2024-69915 and ITU2024-70134). Only acknowledgements

according to RR 15.35 have been received without any other actions.

Latvia for the first time addresses BR and provides information about the degradation of the RNSS

signal quality of flight traffic.

Kindly be informed, that despite all efforts regarding the harmful interference affecting RNSS services,

the issue remains unresolved. The ongoing harmful interference has not ceased and continues with

significant implications for safety, communication, and economic operations in Lithuania, Latvia and

Estonia.

Main victims of interference are airplanes flying in the airspace of our countries near the border with

Russian Federation.

Estonia is constantly monitoring interference and we are aloso receiving interference reports from

Estonian Air Navigation Services. On the basis of this information we have detected areas of

interference sources in the teritory of Russian Federation in Leningrad region. Example of results can

be found in Annex 1.

Lithuania reported in letter (54.1Mr)1B-2909 dated 7th of November, 2024, the recurring interference

cases in the airspace over the territory of Lithuania during the time period starting from September

2024 have increased and still persist, threatening the reliability of a safety service like radionavigation-

satellite service (RNSS), which affects the operation of aircrafts RNSS stations receiving GPS L1

signals at 1 575.42 MHz predominantly in heights above 10 000 feets above ground (Annex 2, Fig 1,

Fig. 2).

Monitoring activities have also detected sources of interfering signals in the GLONASS L1, GALILEO

G1, GPS L2, GPS L5 frequency bands. The continuity of interfering signals received indicate they

could be transmitted deliberately for jamming and spoofing purposes. Monitoring data assessment

2

indicate the sources of all interfering signals originate in the territory of the Kaliningrad region of

Russian Federation (Annex 2, Fig. 3-5).

This, in addition to Article 45 of CS breaches also Article 47 of CS: Member States agree to take the

steps required to prevent the transmission or circulation of false or deceptive distress, urgency, safety

or identification signals, and to collaborate in locating and identifying stations under their jurisdiction

transmitting such signals.

Latvia is continuously monitoring the quality of the RNSS signal for air traffic, accumulating

information on the impact on the quality in the coverage areas of the sensors located in country

territory. The accumulated information since September 2024 shows a significant degradation in the

quality of the RNSS signal of flight traffic. Additional information is available in Annex 3

Administrations submitting this document would like to ask the Bureau to continue efforts in

accordance with the provisions of Section I of Article 13.

We are on your disposal if any additional information is needed.

We kindly ask you to bring this issue to the attention of Radio Regulations Board at the forthcoming

meeting, taking place 17-21 of March 2025 in Geneva.

Erko Kulu

Head of Frequency Management Division

Estonian Consumer Protection and Technical Regulatory Aurhority

Jana Lusvere

Deputy Director of Electronic Communications Department

Ministry of Transport of Republic of Latvia

Darius Kuliešius

Deputy Chair of Council of Communications Regulatory Authority of the Republic of Lithuania