Väljaminev kiri

Page 1 of 11

PUBLIC

OPINION No 02/2025

OF THE EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY

FOR THE COOPERATION OF ENERGY REGULATORS

of 9 April 2025

relating to the curtailment of financial transmission rights and

interpretation of force majeure

THE EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR THE COOPERATION OF ENERGY

REGULATORS,

Having regard to Regulation (EU) 2019/942 of the European Parliament and of the Council of

5 June 2019 establishing a European Union Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators1,

and, in particular, Article 6(7) thereof,

Having regard to the outcome of the consultation with the European Commission, pursuant to

Article 6(7) of Regulation (EU) 2019/942,

Having regard to the outcome of the consultation with ACER’s Electricity Working Group

(‘AEWG’),

Having regard to the favourable opinion of the Board of Regulators of 2 April 2025, delivered

pursuant to Article 22(5)(a) of Regulation (EU) 2019/942,

Whereas:

1. INTRODUCTION

(1) By email of 28 January 2025, the regulatory authority of Estonia, Konkurentsiamet,

requested ACER to provide an opinion, pursuant to Article 6(7) of Regulation (EU)

2019/942, with regard to difficulties in the application of Commission Regulation

(EU) 2016/1719 of 26 September 2016 establishing a guideline on forward capacity

allocation2 (the ‘FCA Regulation’).

(2) The difficulties with the application of the FCA Regulation relate to an incident on

the Finnish-Estonian (‘FI-EE’) bidding zone border on 25 December 2024, when the

1 OJ L158, 14.6.2019, p. 22. 2 OJ L 259, 27.9.2016, p. 42.

PUBLIC

Opinion No 02/2025

Page 2 of 11

submarine HVDC cable Estlink2 was damaged by a ship’s anchor. This incident

prompted the transmission system operators (‘TSOs’) of Estonia, Elering AS, and

Finland, Fingrid Oyj, to declare an event of force majeure and curtail the allocated

long-term transmission rights (‘LTTRs’) on that bidding zone border. Following this

curtailment, Estonian market participants filed complaints against the TSOs’ invoking

of force majeure. When processing these complaints and investigating whether a

violation in the activities of Elering AS occurred, the Estonian regulatory authority,

Konkurentsiamet, encountered difficulties with the application of the requirements

under Title II, Chapter 6 of the FCA Regulation and provisions in the harmonised

allocation rules (HAR) adopted in accordance with Articles 51 and 52 of the FCA

Regulation.

2. LEGAL CONTEXT

(3) The FCA Regulation lays down rules on the firmness of allocated cross-zonal capacity

in the forward markets.

(4) Article 53 of the FCA Regulation states under paragraph (1) that ‘All TSOs shall be

entitled to curtail long-term transmission rights to ensure operation remains within

operational security limits prior to the day-ahead firmness deadline. …’ Paragraph (2)

of the same article further clarifies that ‘The concerned TSOs on the bidding zone

border where long-term transmission rights have been curtailed shall compensate the

holders of curtailed long-term transmission rights with the market spread.’

(5) Article 56 of the FCA Regulation states under paragraph (1) that ‘In the event of force

majeure, TSOs may curtail long-term transmission rights. …’ Paragraph (3) of that

article specifies that ‘In the event of curtailment due to force majeure the concerned

holders of long-term transmission rights shall receive compensation for the period of

that force majeure by the TSO which invoked the force majeure. In this case, the

compensation shall be equal to the amount initially paid for the concerned long-term

transmission right during the forward allocation process.’ Paragraph 4 of the same

article states that ‘The TSO which invokes a force majeure shall make every possible

effort to limit the consequences and duration of the force majeure.’

(6) Article 54 of the FCA Regulation addresses the possible definitions of caps for the

compensation of curtailed LTTRs. More specifically, paragraph (1) of that article

states that ‘The concerned TSOs on a bidding zone border may propose a cap on the

total compensation to be paid to all holders of curtailed long-term transmission rights

in the relevant calendar year or the relevant calendar month in case of Direct Current

interconnectors.’ Paragraph (2) of the same article states that ‘The cap shall not be

lower than the total amount of congestion income collected by the concerned TSOs on

the bidding zone border in the relevant calendar year. In case of Direct Current

interconnectors, TSOs may propose a cap not lower than the total congestion income

collected by the concerned TSOs on the bidding zone border in the relevant calendar

month.’

(7) Pursuant to Article 52(2)(k) of the FCA Regulation, the HAR ‘shall follow the

principles of non-discrimination and transparency and at least contain the provisions

PUBLIC

Opinion No 02/2025

Page 3 of 11

on firmness and compensation rules pursuant to Article 53 and Article 55.’ ACER

Decision no. 18/20233 approved the latest version of the HAR as set out in Annex I of

that decision. Article 2(2)(u) of the HAR , defines force majeure in line with Article

2(45) of the CACM Regulation, which is also applicable for the FCA Regulation

pursuant to its Article 2, as follows:

‘force majeure’ means any unforeseeable or unusual event or situation

beyond the reasonable control of a party and/or the relevant TSOs, and

not due to a fault of the party and/or the relevant TSOs, which cannot

be avoided or overcome with reasonable foresight and diligence, which

cannot be solved by measures which are from a technical, financial or

economic point of view reasonably possible for the party and/or the

relevant TSOs, which has actually happened and is objectively

verifiable, and which makes it impossible for the party and/or the

relevant TSOs to fulfil, temporarily or permanently, its obligations’.

3. DIFFICULTIES WITH THE APPLICATION OF THE FCA REGULATION

(8) The difficulties described by Konkurentsiamet can be summarised as follows:

(9) The FI-EE bidding zone border comprises two HVDC cables:

˗ Estlink1 with 358 MW capacity, and

˗ Estlink2 with 658 MW capacity.

(10) As defined in the methodology for the regional design of LTTRs for the Baltic

capacity calculation region (‘CCR’) in accordance with Article 31 of the FCA

Regulation, LTTRs are issued for the monthly and yearly timeframe in the form of

financial transmission rights (‘FTRs’) options on the FI-EE bidding zone border.

(11) On 25 December 2024, a ship’s anchor damaged the submarine HVDC cable Estlink2

on the FI-EE bidding zone border.

(12) At the time of the incident, the FTRs which were allocated via the single allocation

platform for the FI-EE bidding zone border accounted for:

˗ 350 MW from the yearly allocations for 2024 and 2025, and

˗ further 300 MW provided by TSOs for the monthly allocation for December 2024

and January 2025.

3 ACER Decision 18/2023 on Harmonised Allocation Rules Amendment.

PUBLIC

Opinion No 02/2025

Page 4 of 11

(13) As specified in the unavailability notice 4 , the Estlink2 cable is expected to be

unavailable until end of July 2025. Until then the available interconnector capacity on

the FI-EE bidding zone border will be limited to 358 MW.

(14) From 26 December 2024 5 until 30 January 2025, the single allocation platform

published daily messages for the curtailment of FTRs on the FI-EE bidding zone

border from 650 MW allocated to between 337 and 342 MW due to force majeure for

the period from 27 December 2024 until 31 January 2025.

(15) Following the curtailment by the TSOs due to force majeure, Estonian market

participants filed complaints with Konkurentsiamet against the TSO’s decision to

invoke force majeure as ground for the curtailment of FTRs, since in the view of these

market participants the required preconditions for a force majeure event had not been

met.

(16) Konkurentsiamet explained to ACER that they are processing the complaints and, as

a result of these proceedings, if the Konkurentsiamet identifies a violation in the

activities of the TSO, Konkurentsiamet has the right to issue a precept to the TSO to

eliminate the violation. Konkurentsiamet further clarified that, since in this case the

complainants also aim to obtain certain financial compensation from the TSO, the

respective claims are subject to resolution through negotiations between the parties

and, if no agreement is reached, to a ruling in civil court proceedings.

(17) When processing the market participants’ complaints, Konkurentsiamet encountered

difficulties with the application of Articles 52, 53, and 56 of the FCA Regulation, as

well as Articles 2(2), 56, 57, 59, and 60 of the HAR. In this context, it is not clear to

Konkurentsiamet whether the TSOs’ obligation towards allocated FTRs is physical or

financial, and what TSOs should take into consideration when curtailing already

allocated FTRs and invoking force majeure as a reason for this FTRs’ curtailment.

4. THE REQUEST

(18) Konkurentsiamet requested ACER’s opinion on the abovementioned difficulties with

the application of Articles 52, 53, and 56 of the FCA Regulation, as well as Articles

2(2), 56, 57, 59, and 60 of the HAR and specifically asked the following questions:

(19) Question 1: Should the amounts of already allocated FTRs be directly dependent from

the value of net transfer capacity between the bidding zones, considering the particular

situation and the definition of operational security limits in Commission Regulation

(EU) 2017/1485 of 2 August 2017 establishing a guideline on electricity transmission

system operation6? Also, if the TSOs are not deliberately limiting net transfer capacity

(of cross-border connection) to ensure the system operates within security limits from

4 https://umm.nordpoolgroup.com/#/messages/79210ee1-3395-4f75-a972-7b03888b107a/5 5 https://www.jao.eu/news/capacity-curtailment-fi-ee-border-delivery-period-2 6 OJ L 220, 25.8.2017, p. 1.

PUBLIC

Opinion No 02/2025

Page 5 of 11

a physical characteristics perspective, but a certain amount of cross-border net transfer

capacity is unavailable due to reasons beyond the TSOs’ control, particularly due to

the occurrence of “an unforeseeable or unusual event or situation beyond the

reasonable control of the relevant TSOs, which cannot be avoided”, then, in such a

case, are the TSOs even permitted to invoke the clause "to ensure operation remains

within operational security limits" for curtailing FTRs?

(20) Question 2: If the value of net transfer capacity between bidding zones were to

significantly decrease due to occurrence of “an unforeseeable or unusual event or

situation beyond the reasonable control of the relevant TSOs, which cannot be

avoided”, would then occurrence of such an event provide sufficient cause for TSOs

for curtailing the amounts of already allocated FTRs with reference to a force majeure

event?

(21) Question 3: Alternatively, if the FTRs are purely financial instruments, can then mere

occurrence of “an unforeseeable or unusual event or situation beyond the reasonable

control of the relevant TSOs, which cannot be avoided”, which results in significant

reduction of net transfer capacity between bidding zones, provide sufficient cause for

TSOs to curtail already allocated FTRs with reference to a force majeure event, unless

the TSOs have exhausted a cap on compensations which is applicable in accordance

with Article 59 (3) of the HAR?

5. PROCEDURE

(22) On 28 January 2025, ACER received the request of Konkurentsiamet for an opinion,

according to Article 6(7) of Regulation (EU) 2019/942, on the application of the FCA

Regulation concerning the curtailment of LTTRs on the FI-EE bidding zone border

and the interpretation of force majeure provisions.

(23) Between 28 January 2025 and 18 March 2025, ACER engaged in discussions with the

European Commission and the regulatory authorities. These interactions focused in

particular on:

(a) Possibilities for curtailing LTTRs on the FI-EE bidding zone border and

requirements for invoking force majeure; and

(b) Clarifications concerning the specific case for which Konkurentsiamet requests

ACER’s opinion.

(24) On 10 March 2025, the draft of an opinion replying to the present request of

Konkurentsiamet was submitted to the AEWG for consultation. In its advice of 18

March 2025, the AEWG broadly endorsed the draft ACER opinion and invited ACER

to:

˗ to clarify the reasoning regarding ACER’s competency in this case and the

necessity to issue an opinion,

˗ to reflect in more detail the relation between FTRs and the compensation cap, and

PUBLIC

Opinion No 02/2025

Page 6 of 11

˗ to clearly differentiate between specific findings related to the respective FI-EE

case and general conclusions.

(25) The AEWG advice also included individual comments from the regulatory authorities

of Finland, Austria, France and Germany concerning:

˗ the mandate for regulatory authorities or ACER to assess whether an event

qualifies as force majeure;

˗ the suggestion to clarify whether the event qualifies as force majeure or not and

an opinion for a possible conclusion;

˗ views on what could be considered as a TSOs’ impossibility to fulfil the financial

obligation to remunerate FTRs with the day-ahead market spread;

˗ application of the cap in the event of force majeure; and

˗ the possibility for TSOs to curtail FTRs on the FI-EE bidding zone border to

ensure operation remains within operational security limits based on Article 57(7)

of the HAR and the regional HAR annex for the Baltic CCR .

(26) ACER consulted with the European Commission based on draft opinion as submitted

for AEWG’s advice in accordance with the requirement pursuant to Article 6(7) of

Regulation (EU) 2019/942.

(27) On 2 April 2025 ACER’s BoR issued a favourable opinion pursuant to Article 22(5)(a)

of Regulation (EU) 2019/942.

6. ASSESSMENT

ACER’s competence to deliver this opinion

(28) According to Article 6(7) of Regulation (EU) 2019/942 where, in a specific case, a

regulatory authority encounters difficulties with the application of the network codes

and guidelines referred to in Regulation (EU) 2019/943, it may request ACER to

provide an opinion. ACER shall deliver its opinion, after consulting the Commission,

within three months of the date of receipt of such a request.

(29) From the information provided by Konkurentsiamet (see Rectial (16)) it is apparent

that Konkurentsiamet is not assessing whether the event qualifies as force majeure

following a request from the TSO under Article 56(5) of the FCA Regulation . Instead,

ACER understands that Konkurentsiamet is processing a specific case, due to

complaints raised by market participants, which falls under their duties as a regulatory

authority to ensure the compliance of their TSO with the FCA Regulation in

accordance with Article 59(1)(b) of Directive (EU) 2019/944.

(30) ACER therefore understands that Konkurentsiamet is entitled to request ACER to

provide an opinion under Article 6(7) of Regulation 2019/942 on the application of

the FCA Regulation and the HAR as adopted in accordance with Articles 51 and 52

of the FCA Regulation, and that ACER is therefore required to provide such opinion.

PUBLIC

Opinion No 02/2025

Page 7 of 11

(31) For the avoidance of doubt, ACER would like to clarify that with this opinion ACER

is only providing answers to the questions raised by the Konkurentsiamet’s on the

difficulties with applying the requirements of the FCA Regulation for their specific

case, but does not provide an assessment of the actions taken by TSOs or a conclusion

on whether the relevant event qualifies as force majeure or not. Considering the

feedback received in the AEWG advice and to more clearly limit the opinion to the

questions raised by Konkurentsiamet, ACER deleted parts of Recital (49) from the

draft opinion shared with AEWG for advice.

Curtailment to ensure operational security (Question 1)

(32) The amount of cross-zonal capacity to be allocated in the long-term timeframe as

LTTRs should be limited by the amount calculated in accordance with the capacity

calculation methodology pursuant to Article 10 of the FCA Regulation and further

defined by the methodology for splitting of long-term cross-zonal capacity in

accordance with Article 16 of the FCA Regulation. After this cross-zonal capacity has

been allocated via the single allocation platform, the firmness provisions defined

under Title II, Chapter 6 of the FCA Regulation apply. Following an unplanned

outage, Article 53(1) of the FCA Regulation allows TSOs to curtail LTTRs in order

to ensure operation remains within operational security limits.

(33) In case LTTRs are curtailed to ensure operational security according to Article 53(1)

of the FCA Regulation specific compensation rules, including any defined cap, under

Articles 53 and 54 of the FCA Regulation and as further specified in the HAR would

become applicable. A precondition for applying these compensation rules and any

defined cap is thus that the LTTRs have been curtailed. ACER therefore understands

that the conditions for curtailment must be met in the first place, and any right for

TSOs to curtail LTTRs cannot be inferred from the introduction of a cap on the FI-EE

bidding zone border. Furthermore, in ACER’s view, curtailment cannot be based on

Article 57(7) of the HAR, as this provision merely clarifies that the compensation

rules for curtailed LTTRs apply if offered day-ahead cross zonal capacities are lower

than allocated LTTRs. Besides curtailment for operational security reasons, the FCA

Regulation only allows for curtailment prior to the day-ahead firmness deadline in

case of force majeure pursuant to Article 56(1) of the FCA Regulation, but not for any

other reasons.

(34) For long-term cross-zonal capacity allocation which takes place after an unplanned

outage, the outage should be considered in the capacity calculation process and

subsequently limits the amount of LTTRs allocated to the available cross-zonal

capacity on the relevant bidding zone border (e.g. as done when allocating LTTRs on

the FI-EE bidding zone border for February 2025).

(35) The LTTRs on the FI-EE bidding zone border are allocated in the form of financial

transmission rights options (FTR options). In accordance with Article 33 of the FCA

Regulation, such FTR options cannot be physically nominated by the LTTR holders,

but the holders are only entitled to obtain financial remuneration from TSOs equal to

the day-ahead market spread pursuant to Article 35 of the FCA Regulation. Therefore,

ACER understands that the TSOs’ obligations from FTRs are only of financial and

PUBLIC

Opinion No 02/2025

Page 8 of 11

not of a physical nature. This means that in principle an allocation of FTRs lead to the

financial obligation for the TSOs to remunerate the FTR holders with the day-ahead

market spread, but the FTR holder does not have a possibility to use the FTRs in a

way which could impact a TSOs’ physical operation of the transmission grid.

Considering this lack of physical attributes of the FTR options on the FI-EE bidding

zone border, by default those FTR options cannot have a physical impact which could

endanger operational security limits.

(36) Further, ACER understands that the allocation of FTRs on the FI-EE bidding zone

border has no possible physical impact through the day-ahead capacity calculation

process since the day-ahead capacity calculation methodology pursuant to Article

20(2) of Commission Regulation (EU) 2015/1222 of 24 July 2015 establishing a

guideline on capacity allocation and congestion management7 (‘CACM Regulation’)

for the Baltic CCR does not consider previously allocated LTTRs in any way. The

day-ahead capacity calculation process, where an outage is taken into consideration,

may result in coordinated net transmission capacity values for the relevant bidding

zone border lower than allocated in the long-term timeframe. Regardless of the

outcome of the capacity calculation, the firmness of LTTRs is subject to the

requirements defined under Title II, Chapter 6 of the FCA Regulation. Hence, as stated

in Rectial (32), LTTRs may only be curtailed prior to the day-ahead firmness deadline

to ensure operational security (Article 53(1) of the FCA Regulation) or in the case of

force majeure (Article 56(1) of the FCA Regulation).

(37) ACER did not identify a possible physical impact of FTR options on the FI-EE

bidding zone border due to the purely financial nature of FTRs or any other possible

physical impacts from FTRs for this bidding zone border on the operation of the

transmission grid. Therefore, ACER is of the opinion that FTRs on the FI-EE bidding

zone border should not be curtailed for the purpose of ensuring that operation remains

within operational security limits prior to the day-ahead firmness deadline in

accordance with Article 53 of the FCA Regulation.

Conditions for invoking force majeure (Question 2)

(38) Article 56(1) of the FCA Regulation provides that the TSOs may curtail LTTRs in the

event of force majeure. Article 2 of the FCA Regulation provides that the definitions

of the CACM Regulation are also applicable for the purpose of the FCA Regulation.

Article 2(45) of the CACM Regulation contains a definition of force majeure which

corresponds in essence to the definition included in Article 2(2)(u) of the HAR.

(39) In its request for an opinion, Konkurentsiamet referred to the definition of force

majeure in Article 2(2)(u) of HAR, broken down into five sub-conditions:

7 OJ L 197, 25.7.2015, p. 24

PUBLIC

Opinion No 02/2025

Page 9 of 11

(a) any unforeseeable or unusual event or situation beyond the reasonable control

of a party and/or the relevant TSOs, and not due to a fault of the party and/or

the relevant TSOs,

(b) which cannot be avoided or overcome with reasonable foresight and diligence,

(c) which cannot be solved by measures which are from a technical, financial or

economic point of view reasonably possible for the party and/or the relevant

TSOs,

(d) which has actually happened and is objectively verifiable, and

(e) which makes it impossible for the party and/or the relevant TSOs to fulfil,

temporarily or permanently, its obligations.

(40) Konkurentsiamet’s question 2 (see Recital (18)) asks whether the fulfilment of the

first two criteria in the force majeure definition (i.e. Recital (39)(a) and (b)) provides

already sufficient cause for a TSO to invoke force majeure.

(41) In this regard, ACER understands that the concept of force majeure and its meaning

must be determined by reference to the legal context in which it is to operate and that

force majeure constitutes an exemption situation and therefore should be applied

restrictively. The definition of force majeure provided in Article 2(2)(u) of the HAR

sets out the distinct cumulative conditions that each must be satisfied for an event to

qualify as force majeure. Thus, each condition needs to be assessed and if any of the

five conditions are not met, the event cannot be classified as force majeure.

(42) Therefore, based on the force majeure definition, ACER understands that when TSOs

invoke force majeure, they must demonstrate that the relevant situation fulfils all

conditions. This also includes the requirement, as specifically pointed to by

Konkurentsiamet, that the situation is making it impossible for the TSO to fulfil

temporarily or permanently, its obligations.

(43) Konkurentsiamet described the event as the submarine cable Estlink2 being damaged

by a ship’s anchor resulting in its operational failure. In general, such event is

impacting the TSOs’ physical operation of the transmission grid, which needs to be

done in accordance with the relevant requirements for maintaining operational

security. Furthermore, this event limited the available cross-zonal capacity to be

allocated in the day-ahead timeframe and therefore reduced the day-ahead congestion

income generated at that bidding zone border. The remuneration of LTTRs on that

bidding zone border relates to the day-ahead market spread on the relevant bidding

zone border, which is also reflected in the day-ahead congestion income on that

bidding zone border. Day-ahead congestion income of a bidding zone border can

therefore be directly used by TSOs to remunerate LTTRs. If TSOs allocated a higher

amount of cross-zonal capacity in the long-term timeframe than what they have

available in the day-ahead timeframe, revenue adequacy for remunerating LTTRs with

generated day-ahead congestion income can no longer be provided (e.g. TSOs will

face a financial loss for the cross-zonal capacity volumes which are not available in

day-ahead if the day-ahead market spread is higher than the LTTR price).

PUBLIC

Opinion No 02/2025

Page 10 of 11

(44) While the TSOs’ obligations from FTR options on the FI-EE bidding zone border do

relate to the event in a financial sense, the conclusions in section 6.16.2 above clarify

that the allocated FTR options on the FI-EE bidding zone border do not imply a

possible physical impact on the TSOs’ operation. The relevant obligation for TSOs

related to FTR options on the FI-EE bidding zone border and the definition of force

majeure in Article 2(2)(u) of the HAR is thus the obligation to remunerate the FTR

holders with the market spread in accordance with Article 35(3)(a) of the FCA

Regulation. In this regard it is to note that, as stated in Article 56 of the HAR, in case

of curtailment of the FTRs due to force majeure before the day-ahead firmness

deadline the holders of those FTRs lose their right to receive such remuneration.

Instead, the FTR holders are entitled to receive reimbursement in accordance with

Article 56(3) of the FCA Regulation and Article 60 of the HAR.

(45) Therefore, the situation of reduced available cross-zonal capacity on the FI-EE

bidding zone border and already allocated FTRs on that bidding zone border impacts

only the TSOs’ financial ability to remunerate the holders of FTRs. In such case, for

invoking force majeure as a justification to curtail FTRs, TSOs would need to consider

whether the event has a financial impact that makes it impossible for the TSOs to

temporarily or permanently fulfil their obligations.

Consideration of the cap on the compensation of LTTRs in the event of force

majeure (Question 3)

(46) The cap for the compensation of LTTRs in accordance with Article 54 of the FCA

Regulation may be used to limit the total compensation to be paid to all holders of

curtailed LTTRs to the total congestion income collected by the TSO on the relevant

bidding zone border.

(47) Article 59 of the HAR further specifies that such cap should consider the congestion

income of the long-term, day-ahead and intraday timeframes and the remuneration of

LTTRs under normal circumstances as well as compensation of curtailed LTTRs. As

specified in Article 59(3) of the HAR and Article 4(2) of the regional HAR annex for

the Baltic CCR pursuant to Article 52 of the FCA Regulation, a monthly cap for the

compensation of curtailed LTTRs is established for the FI-EE bidding zone border.

(48) The cap under Article 59 of the HAR relates to compensation for curtailments to

ensure that operation remains within operational security limits. Further, as specified

under Article 60 of the HAR, reimbursement for curtailments due to force majeure

before the day ahead firmness deadline does not consider the cap but should be

calculated based on the marginal price from the initial LTTR auction or the weighted

average of marginal prices of all the auctions. Considering that, as concluded in

Section 6.2, the curtailment for maintaining operational security does not seem

feasible for FTRs on the FI-EE bidding zone border, the cap would not become

effective.

(49) However, in ACER’s opinion, the status of a cap as defined pursuant to Article 54 of

the FCA Regulation could still serve as one of several factors that could be taken into

PUBLIC

Opinion No 02/2025

Page 11 of 11

account for considering the TSOs’ financial means to fulfil its obligation of

remunerating FTR options for the FI-EE bidding zone border,

HAS ADOPTED THIS OPINION:

Regulation (EU) 2016/1719 can be interpreted to the following effect:

1. TSOs may curtail long-term transmission rights pursuant to Article 53(1) of

Regulation (EU) 2016/1719, only if the allocated long-term transmission rights would

endanger that operation of the transmission grid remains within operational security

limits prior to the day-ahead firmness deadline. Since financial transmission rights on

the FI-EE bidding zone border cannot have an impact on operational security, they

should not be curtailed pursuant to Article 53(1) of Regulation (EU) 2016/1719.

2. TSOs should not invoke force majeure unless all conditions specified in the definition

of force majeure pursuant to Article 2(2)(u) of the harmonised allocation rules

pursuant to Article 51 of Regulation (EU) 2016/1719 are met.

3. The cap on the total compensation to be paid to all holders of curtailed long-term

transmission rights applies only to the compensation for curtailments to ensure that

operation remains within operational security limits before the day ahead firmness

deadline in accordance with Article 59 of the harmonised allocation rules pursuant to

Article 51 of Regulation (EU) 2016/1719. This cap does not apply to curtailments due

to force majeure before the day ahead firmness deadline in accordance with Article

60 of the harmonised allocation rules pursuant to Article 51 of Regulation (EU)

2016/1719. Since financial transmission rights on the FI-EE bidding zone border

should not be curtailed for operational security reasons in accordance with Article

53(1) of Regulation (EU) 2016/1719, a cap should not be applicable for that bidding

zone border.

This Opinion is addressed to the regulatory authority of Estonia, Konkurentsiamet.

Done at Ljubljana, on 9 April 2025.

- SIGNED -

Fоr the Agency

The Director

C. ZINGLERSEN

1

ACER Decision on the firmness and remuneration costs sharing methodology

(FRC): Annex I

ACER’s preliminary position on the TSOs’ proposal for

amendments to:

Methodology for sharing costs incurred to

ensure firmness and remuneration of

long-term transmission rights (FRC)

in accordance with Article 61 of Commission Regulation (EU)

2016/1719 establishing a guideline on forward capacity allocation

22 March 2023

ACER Decision on the firmness and remuneration costs sharing methodology (FRC): Annex I

2

Contents

Whereas .............................................................................................................................................. 3

TITLE 1 General provisions .............................................................................................................. 6

Subject matter and scope .......................................................................................................... 6

Definitions and interpretation ................................................................................................... 6

TITLE 2 Sharing of remuneration costs ............................................................................................ 7

Sharing of remuneration costs of eligible LTTRs among BZBs of a CCR applying long-term

cNTC-based allocation ................................................................................................................................. 7

Sharing of remuneration costs of eligible LTTRs among BZBs of a CCR applying long-term

flow-based capacity allocation ..................................................................................................................... 8

Sharing of remuneration costs of eligible LTTRs among TSOs on a BZB .............................. 9

TITLE 3 Sharing of compensation costs ........................................................................................... 9

Sharing of compensation costs due to curtailment of LTTRs .................................................. 9

TITLE 4 FINAL PROVISIONS .......................................................................................................... 9

Publication, implementation and revision of the FRC methodology ....................................... 9

Language ................................................................................................................................ 10

ANNEX 1 ......................................................................................................................................... 11

ACER Decision on the firmness and remuneration costs sharing methodology (FRC): Annex I

3

Whereas

(1) This document sets out the methodology for sharing costs incurred to ensure firmness and remuneration

of long-term transmission rights (‘FRC methodology’), developed by all Transmission System

Operators (‘all TSOs) pursuant to Article 61 of Commission Regulation (EU) 2016/1719 establishing a

guideline on forward capacity allocation (‘FCA Regulation’).

(2) On 23 April 2020, all TSOs submitted to ACER their proposed methodology for sharing costs incurred

to ensure firmness and remuneration of long-term transmission rights (‘LTTRs’) in accordance with

Article 61 of the FCA Regulation. On 23 October 2020, ACER approved the TSOs’ proposal with

amendments.1 Following an appeal and remittal of the decision by ACER’s Board of Appeal, 2 ACER

replaced the contested decision with Decision 12/2021.

(3) In a letter dated 12 July 2021, ACER requested all TSOs under Article 4(12) of the FCA Regulation, to

submit, as soon as possible, and no later than 1 June 2022, their proposals for amendments of the four

methodologies listed in Article 4(6), points (c), (d), (e) and (g) of the FCA Regulation for ACER’s

approval. Amending these methodologies, including the FRC methodology, was necessary to allow for

a timely implementation of the long-term flow-based auctions in the Core and Nordic capacity

calculation regions. The European Network of Transmission System Operators for Electricity (‘ENTSO-

E’) asked ACER, on behalf of all TSOs, to postpone the submission date for the relevant proposals, to

which ACER agreed in a letter dated 26 January 2022. The new submission date for the proposed

amendments to the FRC methodology was 1 October 2022.

(4) On 28 September 2022, ENTSO-E, on behalf of all TSOs, submitted for ACER’s approval their proposal

for amendment of the FRC methodology. This document is based on all TSOs’ amendment proposal of

28 September 2022, as amended and approved by ACER.

(5) The FRC methodology applies to all TSOs, with the exception of the following categories of TSOs:

a) TSOs active only on bidding zone borders where regulatory authorities decided that long-term

transmission rights shall not be issued by the respective TSOs or that other long-term cross-zonal

hedging products shall be made available by the respective TSOs, according to Article 30(7) of

FCA Regulation; and,

b) TSOs not commercializing their transmission capacity on the single day-ahead market or the

long-term market.

(6) The FRC methodology takes into account the objectives and principles set out in Regulation (EU)

2019/943 on the internal market for electricity (‘Regulation (EU) 2019/943’).

(7) The FRC methodology takes into account and is consistent with the methodology for sharing the costs

of redispatching and countertrading in single day-ahead and intraday coupling adopted under Article 74

of Commission Regulation (EU) 2015/1222 establishing a guideline on capacity allocation and

congestion management (‘CACM Regulation’).

(8) The FRC methodology is also consistent with the methodologies for sharing congestion income under

Article 57 of the FCA Regulation and Article 73 of the (‘FCA CIDM’ and ‘CACM CIDM’,

1 Decision 25/2020 (contested decision) of 23 October 2020. 2 Decision A-009-2020 of 19 April 2021.

ACER Decision on the firmness and remuneration costs sharing methodology (FRC): Annex I

4

respectively). All three methodologies consider the distribution of day-ahead congestion income in

accordance with Article 73 of the CACM Regulation.

(9) The FRC methodology takes into account the objectives and principles set out in the FCA Regulation,

and is consistent with other methodologies based on the FCA Regulation.

(10) The FCA Regulation aims to coordinate and harmonise forward capacity calculation and allocation in

the long-term capacity markets. It sets requirements for the TSOs to cooperate on a pan-European level,

within capacity calculation regions (‘CCRs’) and across bidding zone borders. Chapter 5 of the FCA

Regulation provides for establishing European harmonised allocation rules for long-term transmission

rights, including regional and bidding zone border specific requirements (‘HAR’). Minimum content

requirements for the HAR are specified in Article 52(2) of the FCA Regulation. In addition, Article 49

and Article 59 of the FCA Regulation provide for the establishment, functioning and cost sharing of the

Single Allocation Platform for long-term capacity allocation (‘SAP’). The FCA Regulation also sets out

rules for establishing capacity calculation methodologies based on either the flow-based approach (‘FB

approach’) or the coordinated net transmission capacity approach (‘cNTC approach’). The FRC

methodology covers sharing of LTTR’s firmness and remuneration costs under both approaches.

(11) Sharing of congestion income pursuant to the CACM CIDM and the FCA CIDM applies at the CCR

level. Therefore, sharing of costs incurred to ensure firmness and remuneration of LTTRs must be

carried out at the same geographical level, i.e. at the level of CCR. Furthermore, in each market time

unit (‘MTU’) as used for the day-ahead capacity calculation, the final congestion income distributed to

each TSO according to the CACM CIDM may not become negative. This is to ensure revenue adequacy

of each TSO, as stipulated in the CACM CIDM.

(12) Congestion income shared pursuant to the FCA CIDM and the CACM CIDM also includes congestion

income generated by the allocation of LTTRs. Most of the LTTRs is subject to remuneration (i.e. the

non-nominated physical transmission rights or the financial transmission rights) and the TSOs have the

obligation to remunerate the holders of those rights in accordance with Article 35 of the FCA Regulation.

Thus, in a situation where LTTRs have been issued in a CCR, the costs of remuneration of those LTTRs

should be borne by the same TSOs which receive the congestion income in the day-ahead timeframe

that is generated by the capacity corresponding to those LTTRs.

(13) The remuneration of LTTRs is in the scope of the FRC methodology and includes situations where the

remuneration of LTTRs exceeds the total congestion income generated in a respective MTU by day-

ahead and long-term capacity allocation at the level of a bidding zone border pursuant to the CACM

CIDM and the FCA CIDM.

(14) The following recitals provide a description of the expected impact of the FRC methodology on the

objectives of the FCA Regulation, as required by Article 4(8) of the FCA Regulation. These objectives

are listed in Article 3, points (a)-(g), of the FCA Regulation.

(15) According to Article 3(a), the FCA Regulation aims at promoting effective long-term cross-zonal trade

with long-term cross-zonal hedging opportunities for market participants. The FRC methodology serves

this objective as it lays down objective criteria and solutions for the sharing of costs to be applied by all

involved TSOs, thus creating a solid basis for European cost sharing principles applied at the CCR level.

(16) According to Article 3(b), the FCA Regulation aims at optimising the allocation of long-term cross-

zonal capacity. The FRC methodology is consistent with this objective because it takes into account the

results of the long-term capacity calculation methodology in accordance with Article 10 of the FCA

ACER Decision on the firmness and remuneration costs sharing methodology (FRC): Annex I

5

Regulation and Article 21 of the CACM Regulation, including the provisions and limitations related to

secure system operation.

(17) According to Article 3(c) and Article 3(e), the FCA Regulation aims at providing non-discriminatory

access to long-term cross-zonal capacity and respecting the need for a fair and orderly forward capacity

allocation and orderly price formation. The FRC methodology also promotes these objectives because

it ensures full remuneration and firmness of LTTRs as required by the FCA Regulation. Consequently,

it is compliant with the HAR.

(18) According to Article 3(d), the FCA Regulation aims at ensuring fair and non-discriminatory treatment

of TSOs, ACER, regulatory authorities and market participants. The FRC methodology ensures fair and

non-discriminatory treatment of all affected parties, because it sets out cost sharing keys that are based

on objective and fair principles. The process of developing the FRC methodology is transparent and

allows for equal involvement of the TSOs, ACER, regulatory authorities and market participants.

(19) According to Article 3(f), the FCA Regulation aims at ensuring and enhancing the transparency and

reliability of information on forward capacity allocation. The FRC methodology is in line with this

objective as it provides clear rules and a solid basis for cost sharing in a transparent and reliable way.

The FRC methodology will also be published by the TSOs.

(20) According to Article 3(g), the FCA Regulation aims at contributing to the efficient long-term operation

and development of the electricity transmission system and electricity sector in the Union. The FRC

methodology is consistent with this objective, because it maintains and guarantees the remuneration and

firmness principles established by the FCA Regulation, which facilitate efficient cross-zonal hedging

that is needed for efficient market functioning and price signals.

(21) In conclusion, the FRC methodology contributes to the objectives of forward capacity allocation listed

in Article 3 of the FCA Regulation.

ACER Decision on the firmness and remuneration costs sharing methodology (FRC): Annex I

6

TITLE 1

GENERAL PROVISIONS

Subject matter and scope

1. The FRC methodology determines sharing of the costs incurred to ensure firmness and remuneration of

eligible LTTRs on all bidding zone borders (‘BZBs’) where LTTRs are allocated, in accordance with

Article 61 of the FCA Regulation.

2. The FRC methodology shall apply to the TSOs listed in Annex 1 (hereafter referred to as ‘TSOs’).

3. Where cost sharing considers transmission assets owned by legal entities other than TSOs, these parties

shall be treated in a transparent and non-discriminatory way. The TSOs operating these assets shall

conclude the necessary agreements compliant with the FRC methodology with the relevant transmission

asset owners to contribute to sharing costs incurred to ensure firmness and remuneration of LTTRs on

the operated assets.

4. If costly remedial actions are used to ensure firmness of capacity allocated in the form of LTTRs, the

methodology for redispatching and countertrading pursuant to Article 74(1) of the CACM Regulation

shall apply.

5. Imbalance costs associated with compensating market participants do not occur when LTTRs have been

curtailed before the day-ahead firmness deadline and the holders of curtailed LTTRs are compensated

pursuant to Article 53(2) of the FCA Regulation. Sharing rules for the compensation of costs due to

curtailment of LTTRs are described in Article 6.

Definitions and interpretation

1. For the purpose of the FRC methodology, the definitions in Article 2 of the FCA Regulation, Article 2

of the CACM Regulation, Article 2 of the HAR, Article 2 of the SAP methodology, Article 2 of the

CACM CIDM, Article 2 of Regulation (EU) 2019/943 and Article 2 of Directive (EU) 2019/944 shall

apply.

2. In addition, the following definitions shall apply:

a) ‘eligible LTTRs’ means either non-nominated physical transmission rights or financial

transmission rights; and

b) ‘bidding zone border’ or ‘BZB’ means one or several interconnectors between two bidding zones

having a direct network connection (regardless of whether the interconnector is owned by a TSO

or by another legal entity).

3. In this FRC methodology, unless the context clearly indicates otherwise:

a) the singular also includes the plural and vice versa;

b) the table of contents and headings are inserted for convenience only and do not affect the

interpretation of the FRC methodology; and

c) any reference to legislation, regulation, directive, order, instrument, code or any other enactment

shall include any modification, extension or re-enactment of it then in force.

ACER Decision on the firmness and remuneration costs sharing methodology (FRC): Annex I

7

TITLE 2

SHARING OF REMUNERATION COSTS

Sharing of remuneration costs of eligible LTTRs among BZBs of a CCR applying long-term cNTC-based allocation

1. The TSOs shall pay the remuneration costs of eligible LTTRs to the LTTR holders on a given BZB and

MTU, in case the price difference is positive in the direction of the LTTR, in accordance with Article 35

of the FCA Regulation and the HAR. The remuneration costs of eligible LTTRs in the CCRs which apply

cNTC approach for long-term capacity allocation shall be covered in four consecutive steps determined

in paragraphs (2) to (5) below.

2. In the first step, the remuneration costs of eligible LTTRs on a given BZB and MTU shall be covered by

the day-ahead congestion income1 assigned to that BZB and MTU. If the resulting day-ahead congestion

income on a given BZB and MTU remains positive after this step, it constitutes the ’remaining income’

for the purpose of paragraph (3).

3. In the second step, the remuneration costs of eligible LTTRs on a given BZB and MTU that were not

covered by the day-ahead congestion income pursuant to paragraph (2) shall be covered as follows:

a) In CCRs which apply the flow-based approach for the day-ahead capacity allocation and cNTC-

based approach for the long-term capacity allocation, the remuneration costs on a given BZB and

MTU, which were not covered by the day-ahead congestion income pursuant to paragraph (3),

shall be covered by all BZBs in the respective CCR with the use of the remaining income and in

proportion to the remaining income on these BZBs. If the costs to be shared in such a way exceed

the total remaining income on all BZBs in a CCR, these shared costs on a given BZB and MTU

shall be decreased proportionally to match the total remaining income on all BZBs of the CCR;

b) In CCRs which apply cNTC approach for both day-ahead and long-term capacity allocation, the

remuneration costs on an interdependent BZB and MTU, which were not covered by the day-

ahead congestion income pursuant to paragraph (3), shall be covered by all interdependent BZBs

in the respective CCR with the use of the remaining income and in proportion to the remaining

income on these interdependent BZBs. If the costs to be shared in such a way exceed the total

remaining income on all interdependent BZBs in a CCR, these shared costs on a given

interdependent BZB and MTU shall be decreased proportionally to match the total remaining

income on all interdependent BZBs in the CCR. The list of interdependent BZBs and the TSOs

(or related parties) of those BZBs for each CCR applying the cNTC approach in the day-ahead

capacity calculation shall be published in a common document by ENTSO-E on its web page for

information purposes. The document shall be updated and published promptly as soon as any

changes occur. Each publication shall be announced in an ENTSO-E’s newsletter and on the

website of the SAP.

In this step, the BZBs which do not issue LTTRs shall not be considered in sharing of the remuneration

costs. Day-ahead congestion income for that MTU which remains after this step shall be distributed in

accordance with Article 73 of CACM Regulation.

1 Including the income resulting from day-ahead fallback procedures.

ACER Decision on the firmness and remuneration costs sharing methodology (FRC): Annex I

8

4. In the third step, the remuneration costs of eligible LTTRs on a given BZB and MTU that were not

covered pursuant to paragraphs (2) and (3) shall be covered by the long-term congestion income

generated on that BZB and MTU. The costs of LTTRs which are returned and remunerated in accordance

with Article 43 of the FCA Regulation shall be considered as negative congestion income. Long-term

congestion income on that BZB and MTU that remains after this step shall be distributed in accordance

with Article 57 of FCA Regulation.

5. In the fourth step, the remuneration costs of eligible LTTRs on a given BZB and MTU that were not

covered pursuant to paragraphs (2) to (4) shall be covered by any other congestion income (e.g. from

other MTUs, intraday timeframe etc.) assigned to the TSOs on that BZB and, eventually, by any other

financial resources of a TSO responsible for that BZB, in accordance with Article 5.

6. In case that the single day-ahead coupling process is unable to produce results for at least one BZB, i.e.

the fallback procedures are triggered, as approved in accordance with Article 44 of the CACM

Regulation, the second step described in paragraph (3) does not apply on the decoupled BZBs.

Sharing of remuneration costs of eligible LTTRs among BZBs of a CCR applying long-term flow-based capacity allocation

1. The TSOs shall pay the remuneration costs of eligible LTTRs to the LTTR holders on a given BZB and

MTU, in case the price difference is positive in the direction of the LTTR, in accordance with Article 35

of the FCA Regulation and the HAR. These remuneration costs of eligible LTTRs in the CCRs which

apply flow-based approach for long-term capacity allocation shall be covered in three consecutive steps

determined in paragraphs (2) to (4) below.

2. In the first step, the remuneration costs of eligible LTTRs of a given CCR and MTU shall be aggregated

at the CCR level. The day-ahead congestion income generated in that CCR and MTU shall as well be

aggregated at CCR level. The aggregated remuneration costs of eligible LTTRs of the given CCR and

MTU shall be covered by the day-ahead congestion income generated in that CCR and MTU. Any

aggregated day-ahead congestion income in that CCR and MTU that remains after this step shall be

distributed in accordance with Article 73 of CACM Regulation.

3. In the second step, any aggregated remuneration costs of eligible LTTRs in a given CCR and MTU

remaining after the first step shall be covered by the aggregated long-term congestion income generated

in that CCR and MTU. The costs of LTTRs which are returned and remunerated in accordance with

Article 43 of the FCA Regulation shall be considered as negative congestion income in the aggregated

long-term congestion income generated in that CCR and MTU. Any aggregated long-term congestion

income in that CCR and MTU that remains after this step shall be distributed in accordance with Article

57 of FCA Regulation.

4. In the third step, any aggregated remuneration costs of eligible LTTRs in a given CCR and MTU

remaining after the second step shall be allocated to individual bidding zone borders. This allocation is

proportional to the distribution of day-ahead gross congestion income to the BZBs of that CCR and MTU

in accordance with Article 73 of CACM Regulation. Those remaining costs allocated to individual BZBs

shall be covered by any other congestion income assigned to the TSOs on that BZB and, eventually, by

any other financial resources of the TSOs responsible for that BZB.

5. In the CCRs where LTTRs are not issued at all BZBs, the aggregation of congestion income pursuant to

paragraphs (2) and (3) shall not consider those BZBs which do not issue LTTRs. In CCRs where LTTRs

are issued on all BZBs, the aggregation of congestion income pursuant to paragraphs (2) and (3) shall

ACER Decision on the firmness and remuneration costs sharing methodology (FRC): Annex I

9

consider all BZBs, including external borders for which external flows can re-enter the relevant CCR

within the same slack hub.

6. In case that single day-ahead coupling process is unable to produce results for at least one BZB, i.e. the

fallback procedures are triggered, as approved in accordance with Article 44 of the CACM Regulation,

the remuneration costs of eligible LTTRs of that BZB shall be assigned to the affected BZB only, and

remuneration costs shall be covered by any other congestion income assigned to the TSOs on that BZB

and, eventually, by any other financial resources of the TSOs responsible for that BZB. Any aggregation

step as described in paragraphs (2) to (4) is not applicable in this case.

Sharing of remuneration costs of eligible LTTRs among TSOs on a BZB

Costs of remuneration of LTTRs resulting from Article 3 or Article 4(5) attributed to a particular BZB shall

be shared among the TSOs on that BZB according to the sharing keys defined in the FCA CIDM for that

BZB.

TITLE 3

SHARING OF COMPENSATION COSTS

Sharing of compensation costs due to curtailment of LTTRs

1. In case the curtailment of LTTRs occurs to ensure that the operation remains within operational security

limits prior to the day-ahead firmness deadline, the compensation costs arising from the application of

that curtailment shall be shared at the BZB level by the same sharing key as defined in Article 5 unless

involved parties, as referred to in Article 1(2), have made specific cost sharing arrangements.

2. In case curtailment of LTTRs occurs due to force majeure or an emergency situation after the day-ahead

firmness deadline, the compensation costs arising from the application of that curtailment shall be shared

according to the provisions set out in Article 72 of the CACM Regulation.

3. Compensation costs resulting from the curtailment of LTTRs can be subject to a cap applied to the

compensations on a specific BZB, as specified in the relevant annexes to the HAR for LTTRs.

TITLE 4

FINAL PROVISIONS

Publication, implementation and revision of the FRC methodology

1. The TSOs shall publish the FRC methodology without undue delay after a decision has been taken by

ACER in accordance with Article 5(2)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2019/942.

2. The TSOs of each CCR shall implement the FRC methodology at the date of implementation of the long-

term capacity calculation methodology within their respective CCR in accordance with Article 10 of the

FCA Regulation and the FCA CIDM.

3. This FRC methodology shall be revised and amended when the FCA CIDM is changed, where this is

necessary for consistency according to Article 61(3) of the FCA Regulation.

ACER Decision on the firmness and remuneration costs sharing methodology (FRC): Annex I

10

4. Notwithstanding paragraph (3), if congestion income assigned to the BZB according to the FCA CIDM

is not be calculated in accordance with the CACM CIDM, the FRC methodology shall be adapted

accordingly.

Language

The reference language for this FRC methodology shall be English. For the avoidance of doubt, where TSOs

need to translate the FRC methodology into their national language(s), in the event of inconsistencies between

the English version published by TSOs in accordance with Article 4(13) of the FCA Regulation and any

version in another language, the relevant TSOs shall, in accordance with national legislation, provide the

relevant regulatory authorities with an updated translation of the FRC methodology.

ACER Decision on the firmness and remuneration costs sharing methodology (FRC): Annex I

11

ANNEX 1

List of TSOs subject to the FRC methodology:

1. 50Hertz - 50Hertz Transmission GmbH

2. Amprion - Amprion GmbH

3. APG - Austrian Power Grid AG

4. BCAB - Baltic Cable AB

5. ČEPS - ČEPS a.s.

6. EirGrid - EirGrid plc

7. Elering - Elering AS

8. ELES - ELES, d.o.o.

9. Elia - Elia Transmission Belgium S.A.

10. Energinet - Energinet

11. ESO – Electroenergien Sistemen Operator EAD

12. Fingrid - Fingrid OyJ

13. HOPS d.d. - Croatian Transmission System Operator Plc

14. IPTO - Independent Power Transmission Operator S.A.

15. MAVIR ZRt. - MAVIR Magyar Villamosenergia-ipari Átviteli Rendszerirányító Zártkörűen

Működő Részvénytársaság ZRt.

16. PSE - Polskie Sieci Elektroenergetyczne S.A.

17. REE - Red Eléctrica de España S.A.

18. REN - Rede Eléctrica Nacional, S.A.

19. RTE - Réseau de Transport d'Electricité S.A.

20. SEPS - Slovenská elektrizačná prenosovú sústava, a.s.

21. SONI - System Operator for Northern Ireland Ltd

22. TenneT GER - TenneT TSO GmbH

23. TenneT TSO - TenneT TSO B.V.

24. Terna - Terna S.p.A.

25. Transelectrica - Compania Nationala de Transport al Energiei Electrice S.A.

26. TransnetBW - TransnetBW GmbH

Tatari 39 / 10134 Tallinn / 667 2400 / [email protected] / Registrikood 70000303

Viljar Kirikal

AS Alexela

Teie: 05.09.2025

Meie: 12.09.2025 nr 1-6/2025-081-6

Kiri edastatud digitaalselt aadressil: [email protected]

Teabenõude osalisest täitmisest ja ärisaladuse eemaldamisest

Lugupeetud Viljar Kirikal

05.09.2025 registreeriti Konkurentsiametis Teie teabenõue, mille kohaselt soovisite, et amet

väljastaks Teile Konkurentsiameti ja Elering AS-i, Fingrid Oyj-i, Euroopa Liidu

Energeetikasektorit Reguleerivate Asutuste Koostöö Ameti (ACER) ning Energiavirasto

vahelise kirjavahetuse alates 01.01.2025, mis puudutab rahalisi ülekandeõiguseid (ingl

financial transmissioon rights, FTR).

Avaliku teabe seaduse (AvTS) § 3 lõike 1 järgi on avalik teave mis tahes viisil ja mis tahes

teabekandjale jäädvustatud ja dokumenteeritud teave, mis on saadud või loodud seaduses või

selle alusel antud õigusaktides sätestatud avalikke ülesandeid täites.

Teabevaldaja (käesoleval juhul Konkurentsiamet) on kohustatud võimaldama juurdepääsu tema

valduses olevale teabele seaduses sätestatud korras (AvTS § 4 ja 9). AvTS § 38 lõike 2 kohaselt,

kui teabele juurdepääsu võimaldamine võib põhjustada juurdepääsupiiranguga teabe avalikuks

tulemise, siis tagatakse juurdepääs üksnes sellele osale teabest või dokumendist, mille kohta

juurdepääsupiirangud ei kehti.

Avaliku teabe seaduse (AvTS) § 23 lg 1 p 1 alusel teabevaldaja keeldub teabenõude täitmisest,

kui taotletava teabe suhtes kehtivad juurdepääsupiirangud ja teabenõudjal ei ole taotletavale

teabele juurdepääsuõigust. AvTS § 23 lg 3 alusel teeb teabevaldaja teabenõude täitmisest

keeldumise koos põhjendusega teabenõudjale teatavaks viie tööpäeva jooksul.

AvTS § 35 lg 1 p 17 alusel teabevaldaja on kohustatud tunnistama asutusesiseseks kasutamiseks

mõeldud teabeks teabe, mille avalikustamine võib kahjustada ärisaladust (ärisaladusest allpool

pikemalt).

Tulenevalt AvTS § 4 ja 9 vastame teabenõudele osaliselt ning edastame Teile käesoleva kirjaga

Konkurentsiameti ja Energiavirasto FTRe puudutava kirjavahetuse alates 01.01.2025 (Lisa 1).

Lisaks märgime, et Konkurentsiameti ja Fingrid Oyj-i vahel ei ole alates 01.01.2025 FTRe

puudutavat kirjavahetust toimunud.

Konkurentsiamet selgitab, et konkurentsiseaduse § 63 lg 2 järgi ei ole Konkurentsiameti

ametnikul õigust avaldada teistele isikutele ega avalikustada ettevõtja nõusolekuta ärisaladusi.

2 (3)

Lähtudes eeltoodust, keeldub Konkurentsiamet osaliselt teabenõude täitmisest AvTS § 23 lg 1

p 1 ja § 23 lg 3 alusel, mis puudutab Elering AS-i ja ACERi kirjavahetuste edastamist.

Konkurentsiamet selgitab, et tegemist ei ole teabenõudega, mida on võimalik täita viie

tööpäeva jooksul. Amet on pöördunud taotlusega Elering AS-i ja ACERi poole alates

01.01.2025 toimunud FTRe puudutavates kirjavahetustes ärisaladuse eemaldamiseks ning

ootab vastuseid hiljemalt 23.09.2025. Pärast seda väljastab Konkurentsiamet Teile küsitud

kirjavahetused, millest on ärisaladus välja jäetud. Vaidluste tekkimisel Elering AS-iga ja/või

ACERiga või kui eeltoodud osapooled esitavad põhistatud taotluse eelpool nimetatud tähtaja

pikendamiseks võib dokumendi edastamine viibida.

Lugupidamisega

(allkirjastatud digitaalselt)

Marilin Tilkson

energiaturgude osakonna juhataja

Lisa:

1. Konkurentsiameti ja Energiavirasto vaheline FTRe puudutav kirjavahetus alates

01.01.2025.

Armin Ilisson

667 2437

[email protected]

Ärisaladusest:

Ebaausa konkurentsi takistamise ja ärisaladuse kaitse seaduse § 5 lg 2 alusel on ärisaladus

teave, mis vastab järgmistele tingimustele:

1) see ei ole kogumis või üksikosade täpses paigutuses ja kokkupanus üldteada või kergesti

kättesaadav nende ringkondade isikutele, kes tavaliselt kõnealust laadi teabega tegelevad;

2) sellel on kaubanduslik väärtus oma salajasuse tõttu ja

3) selle üle seaduslikku kontrolli omav isik on asjaoludest lähtuvalt võtnud vajalikke meetmeid,

et hoida seda salajas.

Konkurentsiamet on praktikas lugenud ärisaladuseks:

Ärisaladuseks võib olla tehnilist laadi teave, mis puudutab oskusteavet, tootmissaladuste

ja -protsesside kirjeldused, tehnoloogilised uuendused jms. Samuti loetakse ärisaladuseks

kaubanduslikku laadi teavet, nagu teave kulude hindamise metoodika, tarneallikate, ostumüügi

mahtude, turuosade, klientide ja edasimüüjate, äri- ja turundusplaanide, kulu- ja

3 (3)

hinnastruktuuride ning müügistrateegia ja strateegiliste otsuste kohta. Ka finantsalane teave

võib olla ärisaladuseks, eelkõige puudutab see finantsarvestuslikke andmeid, mis ei tulene

majandusaasta aruandest, näiteks konkreetse ettevõtte käitamisega seotud finantsandmed,

vabade rahaliste vahendite hulk teatud ajahetkel.

Ärisaladusena kaitstav teave peab olema spetsiifiline, nagu hinnakujundus, äristrateegiad,

lepingutingimused ja kliendinimekirjad, kui need on ettevõtja jaoks kriitilise tähtsusega ja

nende avalikustamine võiks tekitada ettevõtjale majanduslikku kahju. Regulaatori ülesandeid

täites on Konkurentsiamet lugenud ärisaladuseks näiteks teabe ettevõtja reguleeritud varade

hulga suurenemise ja investeeringute jaotuse kohta.