Riigikantselei resolutsioon: ELi majandusjulgeoleku tugevdamise teatis

18.12.2025

ELi majandusjulgeoleku tugevdamise teatis JOIN(2025) 977 final

Otsuse ettepanek koordinatsioonikogule

Kujundada seisukoht

Kaasvastutaja sisendi tähtpäev 26.01.2026

KOKi esitamise tähtpäev 18.02.2026

VV esitamise tähtpäev 26.02.2026

Peavastutaja: Välisministeerium

Kaasvastutajad: Majandus- ja Kommunikatsiooniministeerium, Justiits- ja Digiministeerium, Kliimaministeerium, Siseministeerium, Haridus- ja Teadusministeerium, Regionaal- ja Põllumajandusministeerium, Kaitseministeerium, Sotsiaalministeerium, Riigikantselei (julgeoleku ja riigikaitse koordinatsioonibüroo)

Seisukoha valitsusse toomise alus ja põhjendus

Algatuse vastuvõtmisega kaasneks oluline majanduslik või sotsiaalne mõju (RKKTS § 152¹ lg 1 p 2);

Seisukoha võtmist peab oluliseks peaminister või minister (VVS § 20¹ lg 2);

Sisukokkuvõte

Ühisteatis tugineb 2023. aasta majandusjulgeoleku strateegiale, milles seati üldisteks majandusjulgeoleku eesmärkideks edendada tööstuse tugevaid külgi, kaitsta Euroopa huve ja teha koostööd sarnaselt meelestatud riikidega. Riskid on viimastel aastatel paraku muutunud veelgi intensiivsemaks ning tänapäeva geopoliitilise maastiku üheks tunnuseks on saanud majanduslie vahendite üha sagedasem ja sihipärasem kasutamine strateegiliste eesmärkide saavutmamiseks. Seetõttu esitatakse ühisteatises jätkuvalt sihipärased, proportsionaalsed ja keskendatud konkreetsetele suure riskiga olukordadel. Julgeoleku ja vastupanuvõime tagamisega tuleb nii liidul, liikmesriikidel kui ettevõtjatel arvestada samas ka kaasnevate majanduslike kuludega.

Tuginedes koos liikmesriikidega tehtavale riskihindamisele, keskendub komisjon praegu kuuele prioriteetsele suure riskiga valdkonnale:

1) väiksem strateegiline sõltuvus kaupadest ja teenustest;

2) turvaliste investeeringute ligimeelitamine ELi;

2

3) elujõulise Euroopa kaitse- ja kosmosetööstuse ning muude elutähtsate tööstussektorite toetamine;

4) ELi juhtpositsiooni kindlustamine elutähtsate tehnoloogiate valdkonnas;

5) tundliku teabe ja andmete kaitse;

6) Euroopa elutähtsa taristu kaitsmine.

Kas EL algatus reguleerib karistusi või haldustrahve? Ei

Kas lahenduse rakendamine vajab IT-arendusi? Ei

Eesmärgid

1. Vähendada strateegilisi sõltuvusi

2. Tagada ELi juhtroll kriitilistes tehnoloogiates

3. Meelitada ELi turvalisi investeeringuid

4. Kaitsta tundlikke andmeid ja informatsiooni

5. Edendada tugevat Euroopa kaitse- ja kosmosetööstust

6. Kaitsta Euroopa kriitilist taristut

Mõju ja sihtrühm

Haridus

Sihtrühm: Teadusasutused

Mõju sihtrühmale: Soovitakse pakkuda rohkem tuge kriitiliste tehnoloogiatega seotud teadustööle ja innovatsioonile

Sihtrühm: Kõrgkoolid

Mõju sihtrühmale: Tahetakse pöörata senisest suuremat tähelepanu teadus- ja innovatsioonijulgeolekule, sh välistudengitele ja nendega seonduvatele riskidele eriti tundlike valdkondade puhul

Majandus

Ettevõtlus

Sihtrühm: Ettevõtjad erinevates valdkondades, sh teatud kriitilistes sektorites nt kaitsetööstus; investorid

Mõju sihtrühmale: Soovitakse tõhustada olemasolevate vahendite kasutamist majandusjulgeoleku tagamiseks, suurendada riskide kaardistust; ettevõtjatele võib selle tulemusel tekkida uusi kohustusi ja vajadust tarneahelaid ümber kujundada. Samuti

3

puudutab algatus välisinvesteeringuid – nii turvaliste investeeringute ELi meelitamist kui ka välisinvesteeringute paremat jälgimist. Oluline fookus on ka iduettevõtete rahastamist puudutaval, eriti kriitilistes sektorites.

Infotehnoloogia ja infoühiskond

Küberkeskkond ja -hügieen

Sihtrühm: Kriitilise taristu pakkujad

Mõju sihtrühmale: Soovitakse ELi küberturvalisuse määruse ülevaatuse raames viia sisse piirangud kõrge riskiga teenusepakkujate ligipääsule kriitilisele taristule

Riigikaitse ja välissuhted

Suhted välisriikide ja organisatsioonidega

Mõju sihtrühmale: Algatus näeb ette nii süvendatud koostööd samameelsete riikidega kui ka riskide maandamist ja kaubandusega seotud meetmete aktiivsemat kasutamist, millel võib olla ka mõju laiemalt ELi suhetele teatud riikidega

Siseturvalisus

Sisejulgeolek

Mõju sihtrühmale: Algatus peaks aitama maandada riske sisejulgeolekule

Kaasamine

Kaasata kõik asjassepuutuvad huvirühmad, sh ettevõtjate liidud (sh Kaubandus- Tööstuskoda, Eesti Tööandjate Keskliit, Eesti Kaitse- ja Kosmosetööstuse Liit), teadusasutused jne.

    Resolutsiooni liik: Riigikantselei resolutsioon Viide: Välisministeerium /  / ; Riigikantselei /  / 2-5/25-02365

Resolutsiooni teema: ELi majandusjulgeoleku tugevdamise teatis

Adressaat: Välisministeerium Ülesanne: Tulenevalt Riigikogu kodu- ja töökorra seaduse § 152` lg 1 p 2 ning Vabariigi Valitsuse reglemendi § 3 lg 4 palun valmistada ette Vabariigi Valitsuse seisukoha ja otsuse eelnõu järgneva algatuse kohta, kaasates seejuures olulisi huvigruppe ja osapooli: - JOINT COMMUNICATION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL Strengthening EU economic security, JOIN(2025)977.

EISi toimiku nr: 25-0591 Tähtaeg: 13.02.2026

Adressaat: Haridus- ja Teadusministeerium, Justiits- ja Digiministeerium, Kaitseministeerium, Kliimaministeerium, Majandus- ja Kommunikatsiooniministeerium, Majandus- ja Kommunikatsiooniministeerium, Regionaal- ja Põllumajandusministeerium, Riigikantselei, Siseministeerium, Sotsiaalministeerium Ülesanne: Palun esitada oma sisend Välisministeeriumile seisukohtade kujundamiseks antud eelnõu kohta (eelnõude infosüsteemi (EIS) kaudu). Tähtaeg: 26.01.2026

Lisainfo: Eelnõu on kavas arutada valitsuse 26.02.2026 istungil ja Vabariigi Valitsuse reglemendi § 6 lg 6 kohaselt sellele eelneval nädalal (18.02.2026) EL koordinatsioonikogus. Esialgsed materjalid EL koordinatsioonikoguks palume esitada hiljemalt 13.02.2026. 

Kinnitaja: Nele Grünberg, Euroopa Liidu asjade direktori asetäitja Kinnitamise kuupäev: 19.12.2025 Resolutsiooni koostaja: Sandra Metste [email protected],  

.

EN EN

EUROPEAN COMMISSION

HIGH REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNION FOR

FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND SECURITY POLICY

Brussels, 3.12.2025

JOIN(2025) 977 final

JOINT COMMUNICATION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE

COUNCIL

Strengthening EU economic security

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1. Introduction

The increasingly frequent and targeted use of economic tools to advance strategic

objectives has become a defining feature of today’s geopolitical landscape. From disruptive

tariffs and the weaponisation of dependencies to the arbitrary deployment of trade defence

measures, major players are using economic levers to pursue their strategic and geopolitical

objectives, putting the EU’s security, public order, competitiveness and economy at risk.

The risks to the EU’s economic security are not new but have recently intensified:

vulnerabilities are now more visible, more pressing, and more difficult to overlook. These

risks include:

- a growing instability in the global trade and investment environment, marked by the

rise of disruptive trade measures and export restrictions to weaponise dependencies;

- a proliferation of predatory practices targeting critical supply chains and technologies,

undermining our industrial base, some of which (such as State-funded overcapacities)

creating new dependencies;

- the continued deterioration of the security landscape, including in the context of Russia’s

continuing war of aggression against Ukraine and the rise in hybrid attacks.

The 2023 European Economic Security Strategy set out the EU’s initial response to these

challenges.1 It outlined a series of actions – grounded in risk assessments – to strengthen the

EU’s economic security by promoting competitiveness, protecting against risks and

partnering with those who share our concerns. These three pillars remain at the core of our

economic security approach and the Commission together with Member States work to

integrate them into any policy considerations and actions. Moreover, economic security is

essential for the EU to maintain its values, its principles and the wellbeing of its citizens, as

well as to reinforce our economic independence.

However, since the adoption of the 2023 strategy, the need for the EU to act with greater

boldness, speed and unity has become even stronger. This Communication outlines a more

strategic and assertive use of the Union’s tools – complementing their original policy

objectives - to support Europe’s economic security, which concerns the Union’s ability to

ensure security, alongside other objectives, through a strong, dynamic and resilient economy

by anticipating, deterring and responding to potential or actual threats, linked to the EU’s

economic relationships with the wider world. The EU can do this, in particular, by ensuring it

stays ahead in terms of critical technologies, industries and services. It reflects a paradigm

shift, moving from a reactive posture towards a more proactive and systematic deployment of

our toolbox. Moreover, in certain cases, the EU, its Member States and industry will

increasingly need to be ready to accept economic costs for the benefit of reduced

vulnerabilities and enhanced overall security.

This call to action includes improving information gathering, monitoring and analysis, as

well as the capacity to anticipate emerging threats; deterring third countries from

1 JOIN(2023) 20 final.

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weaponising the Union’s dependencies; reducing our exposure to third countries that may

weaponise such dependencies; and preventing efforts to undermine our derisking actions.

Importantly, this call to action also recognises the need to play to the EU’s strengths in terms

of, among others, the unparalleled weight of the EU’s single market, our technological and

industrial capabilities as well as access to EU funding and programmes. This includes

identifying, the EU’s economic opportunities as well as those areas where others are

dependent on the EU. Therefore, this communication makes the case for an integrated,

whole-of-government and business approach, improved governance as well as even

closer cooperation with like-minded partners and, where appropriate, joint action. It is

complementary to the comprehensive EU Preparedness Union Strategy. The EU’s economic

security is underpinned by that of its Member States. It is also intrinsically linked with its

broader relations with the world and therefore the Common Foreign and Security Policy,

which will be used more systematically to support the stated objectives.

On this basis, anchored in a risk-based analysis, this Communication focuses on six high-risk

areas outlined in Section 3, applies the tools at our disposal and outlines how they can be

further improved.

2. A proactive approach to economic security

The EU has a wide range of tools that contribute to its economic security. It must now deploy

them more strategically, efficiently and proactively to strengthen its economic security.

While most of these tools were not originally developed with economic security in mind, they

are nevertheless highly relevant to advance the Union’s economic security objectives.

A non-exhaustive list of key tools is set out in Figure 1, and their coordinated application

further articulated in section 3.

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Figure 1: List of tools which support economic security, non-exhaustive

To advance the EU’s economic security, the Commission will deploy these tools, in

coordination with Member States, as follows:

• Trade and competition tools will be used to gradually reduce the EU’s exposure to

risks and to prevent the EU’s derisking objectives from being undermined. This includes

expanding diversification opportunities and thus our broader security under EU trade

agreements, making strategic use of customs toolbox and addressing distortions caused

by foreign subsidies, both within the Single Market and through subsidies or dumped

imports.

• Resilience and cybersecurity tools will focus on preparing for and managing

emergency situations, as well as on reducing exposure to external threats, such as

cyberthreats.

• Security and public order tools will be used to reduce the EU’s excessive exposure to

risks to, inter alia, ensure the normal functioning of society, while supporting actions

aimed at developing its position in critical technologies and industries, as well as

preventing its derisking objectives from being undermined.

• Anti-coercion and restrictive measures will aim at deterrence and dealing with

situations where third countries attempt to coerce the EU as well as shielding the EU’s

businesses from extraterritorial measures imposed by third countries and, where

relevant, triggering a change in behaviour of the country concerned.

• Funding and restrictions through EU tools like the NDICI (Global Gateway), Horizon

Europe, NextGenerationEU, InvestEU, Digital Europe Programme, Connecting Europe

Facility, Instruments for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPAs), Growth Plans for the Western

Trade and competition

- Anti-subsidy measures

- Anti-dumping measures

- Safeguards

- Foreign Subsidies Regulation

- Other competition tools

- Customs procedures and controls

- Trade agreements

- Standards based trade

Resilience / cyber- security

- Internal Market Emergency and Resilience Act

- Regulation on common rules for exports

- Stockpiling strategy

- Resilience of Critical Entities Directive

- Cyber Resilience Act

- NIS2 Directive

- 5G toolbox

- Cyber Security Act (revision)

- Cyber Solidarity Act

- Public Procurement Directive

Security and public order

- FDI Screening Regulation

- Regulation on Dual Use Export Controls

- Recommendation on outbound investment monitoring

- Council Recommendation on Research Security

Anti-coercion and restrictive measures

- Anti-Coercion Instrument

- Sanctions / restrictive measures

- Blocking Statute Regulation

Funding and restrictions

- Global Gateway

- EU funding restrictions in Horizon Europe, Digital Europe Programme, Connecting Europe Facility

- Economic security restrictions (post- 2027 MFF)

- High-risk supplier restrictions (post- 2027 MFF)

- Competitiveness Coordination Tool

- Article 136 of the Financial Regulation

Selected sectoral initiatives

- ResourceEU

- CHIPS Act 2.0

- Quantum Strategy

- Industrial Accelerator Act

- Data Union Strategy

- CRM Act / CRM Centre

- EU startup scaleup strategy

- European Innovation Act

- EU Port Strategy

- Drone Strategy 2.0

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Balkans and Moldova, as well as the Ukraine Facility, EU4Health and the future

European Competitiveness Fund should strengthen the EU’s economic security or, as a

minimum, not weaken it, in line with the programmes’ rules.

• Sectoral initiatives – will be used to build up the EU’s own capacity and strategic

capabilities in the high-risk areas identified in the risk assessment process.

Close cooperation and coordination with countries that assign similar importance to economic

security and a rules-based global order, is more important than ever. The EU will work to

strengthen international cooperation on economic security issues, particularly with trusted

partners, including through focused economic security dialogues conducted both

bilaterally and in plurilateral settings. Such cooperation will support joint action on shared

economic security interests or concerns. It will also deepen the collective understanding of

risks, help anticipate threats, enable the design of mitigation measures that minimise negative

externalities, contribute to building and maintaining reliable and resilient supply chains in

key strategic sectors, and help to avoid negative impacts on our like-minded international

partners.

The Commission will seek cooperation

with third countries, bilaterally, through

the G7, and in frameworks such as the

Comprehensive and Progressive Trans-

Pacific Partnership and other relevant

fora. It will work with partners on the

development and deployment of

economic security standards for resilient

supply chains. Closer cooperation may

include coordinated deployment of

tools and coalition building with

partners who share similar economic

security objectives or face similar

challenges.

The relevance of, and impact on, the

EU’s neighbourhood and enlargement

policy must also be adequately factored

in. Risks and opportunities for the EU’s

economic security will be integrated in the Commission’s implementation of policies and

programmes with these regions. Candidate countries are on a path to become future EU

Member States; their alignment on economic security policy as well as gradual integration

into the Single Market, is essential to ensure their successful accession, while enhancing the

EU’s ability to address both existing and new risks. It is therefore important that candidate

countries reflect the EU’s economic security approach and, where appropriate, gradually align

with EU legislation of relevance to economic security objectives.

3. Advancing Europe’s economic security: high-risk areas

Deploying economic security standards

Building on work in the G7 on standards-based

trade, the Commission will encourage the

development and use of economic security

standards. They will be:

→ focused on action to diversify critical supply

chains by creating the conditions for new

suppliers to enter the market or limiting access

of dominant suppliers;

→ guided by the principles of transparency,

interoperability and compliance with

international rules;

→ targeted and tailor-made, factoring in the

specific risks, economic impacts and business

realities of each supply chain.

This work will focus as a matter of priority on

critical raw materials and semiconductor supply

chains, while exploring further collaboration in

other areas.

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Non-cumulative indicators of a high-risk

dependency:

- 60% or more of EU supply is controlled

by a single third country or operators;

- input/service has systemic value for the

EU’s economy due to their role in multiple

sectors, e.g. critical raw materials,

semiconductors;

- input/service is critical to the EU’s

defence industry/strategic capacities or

specific critical technology supply chains,

such as clean energy technologies;

- the third country has already weaponised

economic dependencies or threated to do

so, e.g. through export restrictions;

- there is already non-market overcapacity

or it is being created.

The 2023 Strategy launched risk assessments covering supply chain resilience and energy

security, critical infrastructure, weaponisation of economic dependencies, and technology

security and technology leakage. Four critical technologies – AI, quantum technologies,

semiconductors, and biotechnology - have already been assessed. Building on this work, the

Commission has identified six high-risk areas where it will concentrate its efforts in

immediate to short term, in close cooperation with Member States, industry and trusted

partners. At the same time, the Commission will continue to monitor developments and,

where needed, assess and act on newly emerging high-risk areas.

Overview of six high-risk areas

3.1. Strengthening supply chain resilience and counteracting high-risk dependencies in critical

goods and services

The risk. Modern economies are deeply

interconnected and rely on a wide range of

inputs, intermediate goods and essential services

from partners globally. In some cases, supply is

highly concentrated – often in countries that do

not share the same strategic interests and that

have the capability and willingness to increase

and weaponise such dependencies. These risks

to the EU’s supply chains are particularly visible

in our reliance on certain critical raw,

processed and advanced materials, clean tech

components, and mainstream

semiconductors, as well as in financial

services, pharmaceuticals, aeronautics,

digital and space technologies. They are also

Strengthening supply chain resilience and

counteracting strategic dependencies in goods

and services

Attracting value-added inbound investment

that reinforces the EU's economic security

Supporting a vibrant defence and space

industrial base, and other high-risk

industrial sectors

Developing and maintaining leadership

across critical technologies

Preventing access to sensitive information and data that could undermine the EU’s economic security

Preventing and mitigating disruptions to EU critical infrastructure

affecting the EU economy

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visible in the agri-food sector, where the Vision for Agriculture and Food2 sets out the need

to reduce strategic dependencies, notably where the EU relies on a handful of partners for

imports of feed and feed additives as well as fertilisers.

High-risk dependencies can: (i) be weaponised for coercion purposes (e.g. critical raw

materials, mainstream semiconductors, advanced materials, energy products, threats of

disabling certain services); (ii) create

systemic economic vulnerability or

systemic risk to public order and public

health protection in crises (e.g. personal

protective equipment, critical medicines

supply, food supplies); (iii) create the risk of

large-scale, cross-sector disruption (e.g. by

penetrating telecom networks, reliance on a

single cloud provider, kill switches of digital

services); (iv) affect the EU´s

competitiveness, slowing down the green

and digital transitions if supply is disrupted

(e.g. batteries, permanent magnets, clean

tech products and components, advanced

materials); (v) affect Member States’s

autonomy to develop and operate military

capabilities; or (vi) threaten EU’s food

sovereignty.

Objective. The Commission and Member States will seek to minimise the potential for

short-term disruption while putting in motion measures to progressively reduce current

high-risk dependencies in the single market and counter efforts to create new ones. It

will use its tools to monitor the supply chain, create a framework to support supply

diversification and prevent the undermining of EU action by addressing distortions of

competition in the single market. Actions in the context of advancing towards the Circular

Economy will also play an important role.

The Commission will take the necessary action to ensure its alternative supply chains are not

being undermined by dumping and price manipulation.

The Commission will assist Member States in deploying fully and effectively existing tools,

notably the resilience criteria that will have to be applied as of January 2026 by Member

States in public procurement, auctions and public support schemes under the Net Zero

Industry Act.

The Commission will also take measures to both develop the EU’s internal capacity and

capability and to diversify supply through cooperation with partners, including by

building on its extensive network of trade agreements and other forms of bilateral and

2 COM/2024/75 of 19 February 2025.

Application example: mainstream

semiconductors

Risk: structural reliance on a single third

country supplier for the manufacturing of

essential low margin chips puts several

European industries at risk. Such

semiconductors form a critical part of multiple

supply chains.

Use of tools: the Commission will work with

trusted partners to diversify sources of supply

and will seek to encourage the ramping up of

production within the EU. The upcoming

revision of the Chips Act will set out effective

mitigation measures. The cyber security of

imported mainstream semiconductors used in

security-related applications should be further

assessed under the Cyber Resilience Act.

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plurilateral forms of cooperation. This will include considering the production of certain

critical products in our candidate countries and our partner countries more broadly, including

with regions, such as the Middle East and North Africa. This will reinforce the resilience of

the EU’s diversified supply chains and open further opportunities for EU businesses. The

Commission will continue to identify and continuously monitor supply chain vulnerabilities

and high-risk dependencies through its risk assessment process and engagement with

Member States and industry. .

3.2. Attracting value-added inbound investment that reinforces the EU’s economic security

The risk. Inbound investments boost EU resilience and competitiveness by creating jobs,

developing industrial capabilities, tapping into financing and scale, supporting innovation and

technology transfer. However, certain forms of inbound investments may pose risks. The risks

include: (i) risks to security and public order, including access to sensitive data (e.g. geo-

localisation, biometric data, trade secrets), access to critical infrastructure, access to dual-use

and other critical technologies; and (ii) economic resilience risks, such as deeper

dependencies or a single point of failure in critical supply chains controlled by high-risk

entities or third countries which undermine our economic security interests (e.g. batteries,

CRM, software and components), which render the EU vulnerable to economic disruptions or

weaponisation; and (iii) low

competitiveness challenges, such as

lack of technological transfer, limited

added value creation (e.g. assembly

lines only), hiring workers from the

investing country and thereby

impacting, among others, the local

labour market.

Objective. The Commission’s focus

will be on ensuring that the EU remains

open and attractive to foreign

investments. It will seek to balance this

openness, where necessary for the EU’s

economic security, against the need to

avoid deepening dependencies or

creating new ones. Moreover, it is

crucial to preserve the ability of EU

companies to innovate, including

through foreign acquisition of key

intellectual property from emerging

champions, and ensuring security of supply and continuity of service. The Commission will

use its tools and initiatives to set out and implement targeted measures such as inbound

investment conditioning that encourage technology transfer for entities in countries that

purposefully undermine our economic security.

Example: battery electric vehicles (BEVs)

Risk. The dominant position of certain suppliers of

BEVs and strict controls on the technologies needed for

BEV production risk undermining the key role of the

automotive sector in the EU economy, while benefiting

from the EU market. There are also inherent

cybersecurity risks associated with connected vehicles.

Use of tools: The Commission is exploring ways in

which value-added investments can be encouraged,

including through the use of trade and competition

policy initiatives. It will continue monitoring trade

flows and deploy its risk mitigating toolbox to de-risk

connectivity elements, support investment in the next

generation of BEV technologies to ensure Europe

remains resilient and competitive and where necessary

limit exposure to high-risk entities in relevant

connected components of BEVs. The Commission will

also incentivise the sharing of technology and related

know-how that can strengthen the EU’s economic

security objectives.

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3.3. Supporting a vibrant defence and space industrial base and other high-risk industrial

sectors

The risk. Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, rising geopolitical tensions and policy-

driven action to weaponise trade dependencies highlight the importance of investing in a

vibrant domestic industrial base, notably in the defence and space sectors as well as strategic

dual-use sectors, such as transport (e.g. aviation, aeronautics, shipbuilding and ports), that

fuels the EU’s economy and supports its strategic autonomy. Risks in this area include: (i)

insufficient (internal) investment; (ii) low production volumes combined with insufficient

procurement of domestic technology for institutional infrastructure; (iii) third-country non-

market policies and practices that lead to distortions in global and regional markets; (iv)

unjustified or disproportionate export controls from third-countries imposed on European

products and technologies (extraterritoriality of third-country export regimes); (v) loss of

ownership and control due to foreign acquisitions, including in certain cases through portfolio

acquisitions; (vi) rigid regulatory framework and fragmented capital markets that neither

facilitate flow of funds nor promote the start-up and scale-up of high-risk / high-reward

technologies with dual-use capabilities.

Certain components in critical sectors

such as defence are sourced from high-

risk entities, which could prevent the

access to and use of defence

equipment, dual use technologies and

military mobility assets if a situation

of geopolitical tension arises. Moreover,

it is crucial that the EU maintains a

highly skilled workforce and does not

fall behind the innovation curve in the

technologies underpinning strategic

sectors. Effectively mitigating these

risks by swiftly mobilising targeted and

effective tools is essential for defence

and military capabilities in the EU.

Objective. The Commission will use its

tools to maintain and develop strategic

manufacturing capacity and capabilities

in the EU, notably by: (i) promoting

and, where relevant, derisking public

and private investment; (ii) supporting

demand (incentives) also through

aggregation or joint purchasing; (iii)

preventing the relocation of strategic capabilities and sectors; (iv) phasing out potentially

hostile actors from defence and other critical supply chains including limiting the

procurement of restricted critical defence and space technologies from outside the EU; (v)

mitigating threats posed by foreign direct investments into companies supplying critical

Application example: Key components for drones

and counter drones systems

Risk: Dependence on third-countries suppliers for

key components of drones, batteries and counter

drones systems; extremely short innovation cycle to

keep drone solution operationally effective, based

on real battlefield experience (counted in months

sometimes in weeks).

Use of tools: the Commission will use its tools

under the European defence industrial programmes

to secure EU-made production capacity and the

shortening of innovation cycles for drone

technologies based on real operational experience.

It will continue to strengthen cooperation and

information exchange on a voluntary basis between

relevant bodies (e.g. national procurement agencies,

international procurement organisations - OCCAR,

EDA, NATO) and within European defence

industrial programmes instruments/actions. In order

to ensure supply chain resilience, it will establish

targeted mapping of supply chains for specific

products and equipment, including dual-use items,

and support production through co-investment.

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products or technologies, (vi) support the development of critical technologies,

components and materials in the EU following long term objectives as well as their

domestic procurement for institutional infrastructures; (vii) ensuring that EU start-ups and

businesses have the conditions needed to scale up, for example, through adequate financing

and via a temporary favourable tariff treatment for certain inputs as well as a favourable

capital markets ecosystem.

The priority will be to support the defence and space industrial base. While the immediate

focus will be on the specific high-risk situations identified in the risk assessment process, the

Commission will closely monitor from an economic security perspective all key industries

such as clean tech, energy and energy-intensive and circular industries, agri-food, digital and

electronics, aviation (incl. aeronautics), shipbuilding, automotive and health.

3.4. Developing and maintaining leadership across critical technologies

The risk. Certain third countries and businesses have demonstrated their interest in acquiring

control of nascent or advanced EU technology and know-how. In some instances, such actions

have been aimed at compromising the

Union’s ability to compete in the

technology. They are pursuing this aim

by, for instance, acquisitions, R&D

cooperation, reverse engineering, or

industrial espionage. It is also done by

artificially taking market share away

from more innovative companies, which

in turn results in less revenue for them to

invest in cutting-edge R&D. In the long

term, the EU’s economic performance,

security and geopolitical standing will

depend on maintaining and developing

our technological capabilities. Therefore,

preserving EU capabilities across these

technologies, by enhancing dedicated

EU funding tools and addressing

technology security and leakage, is of

strategic importance. At the same time, a

close attention must be paid to the

increasingly fragmentated

implementation and enforcement of

dual-use export controls.

Objective. The Commission will use its

tools to support a positive framework environment to for the development of critical

technologies in the EU and prevent action that undermines the EU’s efforts by addressing

distortions. It will monitor market developments and provide further support for research and

innovation in the EU by start-ups and scale-ups, established businesses, research and

Application example: quantum

Risk: Foreign state-backed or high-risk entities seek

access to EU quantum computing, communication,

and sensing know-how and infrastructures via

investments, acquisitions or R&D partnerships,

accelerating sensitive military/intelligence uses

abroad and eroding EU technological sovereignty.

Use of tools: the Commission will continue to map

key EU quantum actors/infrastructures and track

foreign investments, partnerships and IP flows to

feed FDI screening, export control and research-

security risk assessments. It will use its tools to

investigate investments that pose risks and to work

with Member States to coordinate rapid responses

to attempted hostile takeovers or leakage cases. In

order to support economic security objectives, it

will prioritise EU/like-minded funding and

suppliers for critical quantum components and

services, and limit reliance on high-risk

quantum/cloud providers in sensitive sectors. It will

further seek to ensure that entities under undue

foreign influence cannot access sensitive quantum

projects.

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innovation organisations and academia. It will focus on ensuring the industrial deployment

and valorisation of RDI achievements in the single market’s industrial base. The 28th regime,

providing businesses with a single, harmonised set of EU-wide rules for company formation,

governance, mobility and access to finance, will strengthen the EU’s economic resilience by

enabling more secure cross-border operations and more robust, diversified supply chains.

The Commission will advance research and innovation security and take the flanking

measures needed to mitigate the risk of leakage of technology or know-how, for example

through predatory acquisitions, R&D cooperation and investment in strategic and emerging

EU markets in sensitive destinations or sectors while continuing to promote trusted

international research and innovation partnerships that are crucial for the Union’s economic

security objectives. It will explore how to ensure that businesses and research and innovation

organisations in the EU can scale up and avoid acquisitions/ownership transfers exclusively

driven by insufficient financing opportunities from trusted sources. At the same time, the

Commission will seek to prevent access by high-risk entities to Union supported actions in the

critical technology sphere, which can potentially be weaponised against the EU.

3.5. Prevent access to sensitive information and data that could undermine the EU’s economic

security

The risk. Third countries gain access to

sensitive information/data of the EU or its

Member States, either as a result of industrial

espionage, their supply of hardware or software

used in certain products (e.g. connected

vehicles, 5G/other telecommunication systems,

electricity grid infrastructure, DNA sequencing

platforms) or due to their ownership and control

of certain businesses possessing sensitive

information/data (e.g. port, airport and traffic

operators, financial networks, AI models, data

portals, telecom, personal data or sensitive

market information). There are clear

implications on security and public order,

further compounded by potential economic

impacts, for example linked to the

fragmentation of supply chains. In the energy

sector, for example, this risk extends to the

acquisition by non-EU investors of EU

companies that hold advanced technologies for

monitoring and processing operational data

from critical energy infrastructure.

Objective. Lower and where possible eliminate

the risk of access by high-risk entities and

related entities to sensitive information/data of

Example: detection equipment at EU

borders (ports, airports, land borders etc.)

Risk: lack of common practice across the

EU, dependency on a single or limited

number of suppliers, unauthorised access

(including through authorized channels, e.g.

maintenance) that impacts the performance

of the detection equipment and the integrity

and/or confidentiality of related sensitive

information, vulnerability to malware that

could compromise or distort the related

information/systems/networks through the

equipment

Use of tools: based on the cybersecurity risk

assessment under the NIS2 Directive, the

Commission will seek to mitigate identified

risks through the identification of high-risk

suppliers, use cybersecurity certification

schemes, strengthening cybersecurity

standards and embedding security

requirements in procurement calls for

tenders. The Commission will assess the

potential role of foreign subsidies in giving

competitive advantage to certain suppliers.

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the EU or its Member States and thereby limit the potential negative impacts on the EU

economy and security. Attention will also be given to the risk potentially posed by foreign

workers in strategic sectors and foreign students at higher education, including in Science,

Technology, Engineering, and Mathematics (STEM) in line with relevant procedures.

3.6. Prevent and mitigate disruptions to EU critical infrastructure affecting the EU economy

The risk. The EU’s critical infrastructure - including critical transport, space systems, energy

and communications infrastructure, in particular those that are identified as strategic to

military mobility - being disrupted by foreign actors, which could lead to cascade effects on

the European economy. The focus will be on ensuring the stability of services provided.

Disruptions could occur through physical-, cyber- or hybrid-attacks, including the sabotage of

entire facilities or their parts/subcomponents. They could also be linked to ICT supply chains,

which underly critical components or services to critical infrastructures. There is also a risk of

pre-positioning of high-risk third countries and operators in the EU’s critical infrastructure

with a view to gaining the capacity to disrupt them (when and if needed). In addition, there is

a reputational and credibility risk if certain infrastructure is threatened or actually impacted.

Finally, there is a risk linked to third countries taking a leading role in setting international

standards, which may affect critical infrastructure.

Objective. In line with relevant EU

strategies for defence, internal

security and preparedness, to

enforce existing rules to lower the

risk of data leakage/espionage and

of physical and cyber-disruption,

notably by: (i) limiting

ownership/control/operation by

high-risk entities of European

critical infrastructure; (ii) increasing

physical protection measures; (iii)

limiting cyber-vulnerabilities; and

(iv) limiting dependencies on

single suppliers or high-risk

suppliers, as well as concealed

vulnerabilities, backdoors or

potential systemic ICT supply

disruptions, particularly in cases of

technological lock-in or supplier

dependency; (v) reserving critical

EU manufacturing capacities with

the potential to scale up in times of

global supply chain disruptions or health crises; (vi) the Commission will prevent access by

high-risk entities to Union supported actions, including those actions supported by public

financial institutions and instruments; ; (vii) support the development of trusted suppliers of

Example: solar inverters

Risk: increasing reliance on a single supplier; cyber

risks - manipulating electricity production parameters,

preventing electricity production, access to operational

data, infiltrating supply chain actors.

Use of tools: the Commission will continue to assess

cyber risks through a coordinated assessment under the

framework of the NIS2 Directive (to be concluded in

2026). On this basis it will deploy mitigation measures

focused both on strengthening preparedness (e.g.

Electricity Risk Preparedness Regulation, Critical

Entities Directive) and to address identified

vulnerabilities through for example: certification and

standardisation under the Cyber Resilience Act and non-

price criteria under the Net-Zero Industry Act. The

Commission will monitor market developments and

seek to prevent or mitigate high-risk investments. The

Commission will continue to assess the role of foreign

subsidies that may distort the level playing field in solar

energy markets, notably through subsidised imports.

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critical subcomponents in the EU and in trusted third countries so that there are viable

alternatives; (viii) supporting flagship initiatives in defence and related domains (Eastern

Flank Watch, European Drone Defence Initiative).

4. Actions to strengthen EU economic security

Access to quality information and its thorough analysis is the starting point for an effective

and well-informed EU economic security policy and decision-making. The risk assessment

system launched by the 2023 Strategy will remain at the heart of these efforts. The existing

assessments will be updated, deepened, and complemented by new ones across critical

technologies and supply chains.

The Commission will further develop its economic security information gathering capability.

It will speed up the mapping of strategic dependencies along value chains that lead to

vulnerabilities for the Union’s economy and strengthen monitoring and anticipation of

third country actions to create new dependencies or sustain existing ones.

Furthermore, the success of the EU’s economic security policy will depend on greater

coordination both at EU level and with Member States. This includes building a common

understanding of the economic security threats, identifying concrete risks, and developing

mitigation measures. This should be underpinned by better information flows, a full

understanding of the costs and benefits of EU action, and a willingness to act jointly when

needed, putting the EU in a position of strength. The Commission has taken the necessary

internal organisational steps. But this also requires a new way of working with Member

States, and increasingly among and within the Member States themselves, especially with

regards to policy areas that are increasingly strategic but have been traditionally decentralised

such as research and innovation.

The EU will continue to engage closely with industry, by ensuring secure information

exchange and a more structured engagement. Industry is in the front line of the EU’s

economic security. Businesses must become more resilient and diversify their critical supply

chains, notably by eliminating a complete reliance on a single high-risk supplier. It is also

crucial to integrate in their business models the costs that come with greater diversification

recognising the benefit that resilience to geopolitical risks brings. This must be a two-way

process and a responsibility that must be shared between the public and private sector,

allowing policymakers to improve the EU’s threat assessment and business intelligence

capacity and equip it for action, while helping industry to pursue company-level mitigation

measures.

The Commission, supported by the High Representative, will:

→ Improve its information gathering and analysis capacity by advancing risk assessments

more rapidly on specific critical supply chains, critical infrastructure and critical

technologies, and launching regular calls for evidence to obtain industry and stakeholder

input into supply chain vulnerabilities and exposure to external pressure.

→ Promote greater coordination and information exchange through its Economic

Security Network with Member States. The Commission will use the Network to

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promote scenario development, align understanding of threats, risks and scope for

mitigation, facilitate information exchange and support implementation, particularly in the

use of the tools that are in the remit of Member State responsibilities. In this context, the

Commission will ensure that there are suitable information systems available to support

the rapid and secure exchange of classified information among and with Member

States on economic security issues – including on risk assessments, critical and high-risk

entities, and transactions of potential concern. This will complement the work of the EU

stockpiling network, which focuses on ensuring the supply of essential goods in crisis

situations.

→ Create an Economic Security Information Hub where with the support of EEAS,

INTCEN/SIAC3, the EU’s Delegation network and Member States, as well as existing

Single Market economic monitoring tools like the Supply Chain Alert Notification

(SCAN); it will map and consolidate available information under existing public and

private mechanisms and coordinate the collection of additional information relevant for

economic security. This will include a market monitoring mechanism to collect

information on developments in high-risk areas, including rapid information on trade

flows in sectors subject to diversification to ensure that EU action isn’t undermined. It will

also consolidate information on high-risk entities to support the process of assessing

eligibility for EU funding and participation in an EU investment or procurement process.

In addition, the European Customs Authority and the EU Customs Data Hub would allow

to efficiently support and enforce the implementation of the related EU economic

security initiatives facilitating also the exchange of relevant information.

→ Intensify structured engagement by EU Delegations, liaising with Member State

Missions, other EU bodies and the EU business community present in third countries; to

ensure effective contributions to risk assessments, monitoring and mitigation with regard

to economic security, including by facilitating business-to-business and business-to-

government exchanges.

→ Assess by Q3 2026 the extent to which the Internal Market Emergency and Resilience Act

(IMERA) allows to gather company level supply chain information from businesses in

high-risk sectors. In light of this analysis, the Commission will assess the necessity for

further measures.

→ Recommend that Member States nominate senior-level National Economic Security

Advisers responsible for cross-government coordination of economic security risk

assessment and mitigation. The Commission will promote greater policy coordination and

joint actions by regularly bringing these advisers together. It also invites the Council of

the EU to consider regularly convening the relevant Council formations for political-level

3 The EU Intelligence and Situation Centre (EU INTCEN) at the European External Action Service is part of the EU’s Single Intelligence Analysis Capacity (SIAC), and is the civilian intelligence centre of the EU, providing in- depth analysis for decision makers in all EU Institutions.

14

discussions.

→ Create a trusted adviser group drawn from EU business representatives to, among

others, advise on specific risks and potential responses as well as discuss de-risking

strategies. The Commission will regularly invite industry representatives to participate in

sector-specific discussions of the Economic Security Network and, where relevant, debrief

European Commissioners.

→ Set up a Trade Resilience Information Portal to provide EU businesses with up-to-date

information, as part of the Access to Markets (A2M) portal, on export restrictions and

other restrictive measures imposed by third countries, as well as on the potential risks

linked to the need to build EU resilience.

→ Expand the Observatory on Critical Technologies to identify, monitor and analyse the

defence and space industry and related supply chains, and to cover emerging technologies

and to support implementation at EU and national level of the resulting EU technology

roadmaps.

→ Use the future Centre of Expertise on Research Security to promote research security

and increase the research community’s resilience, including by developing a due diligence

platform to support universities in choosing their international partners.

→ Explore ways to align and integrate candidate countries with our economic security

approach, especially in those areas where their economic security vulnerabilities can pose

a security risk to the EU.

Building on a strengthened analysis and governance, the EU can better pursue its economic

security objectives by (i) clarifying and improving the deployment of existing tools and (ii)

developing new tools where needed.

First, the Commission will adapt how it uses some of its tools to make them more effective

in managing economic security risks and will seek to improve coordination between these

tools.

The Commission will take the following steps to improve the use of tools:

→ EU funding:

• Going forward, the Commission will incentivise in its funding activities projects

that support the EU’s economic security.

• In particular it should mobilise a sufficient level of funding for reducing

dependencies of critical technologies, components and materials especially in

strategic sectors as space and defence, including to fully implement the

Observatory for Critical Technologies’ (OCT) technology roadmaps.

• The Commission, Member States and implementing partners should seek to

prevent access by high-risk entities to sensitive Union supported actions. Article

136 of the Financial Regulation provides a horizontal legal base to protect the

EU’s security and public order when the Commission and implementing partners

15

implement the EU budget. This allows preventing high-risk entities from

benefitting from EU funds as well as restricting access to EU funds in the strategic

sectors and areas of critical technology and infrastructure by entities coming from

third countries which undermine the EU economic security interests. For the

avoidance of doubt implementing partners should refrain from supporting projects

that contradict the above, including in operations at own risk. To that end and to

ensure better policy alignment between EU programmes and economic security

aims guidance will be made available in Q1 2026, thereby supporting the

development of a more cohesive and effective approach. Furthermore, the

Commission will encourage the Member States, the EIB group and other

IFIs/national promotional banks and institutions that are implementing

national or EU budgets to prioritise support to EU businesses that reduce foreign

dependencies in critical sectors, especially for specific projects, critical

technologies and critical infrastructure identified as high-risk. Similarly, third-

country high-risk suppliers should be prevented from accessing EU and national

funding where those third countries, based on specific criteria, are identified as

undermining EU economic security interests.

→ FDI screening:

• Develop guidelines drawing on the experience of implementing the current FDI

Screening Regulation to ensure national screening authorities approach screening

consistently, including in strategic sectors. The guidelines would also set out how

to take account of the potential cumulative risk of multiple investments. This will

be complemented by guidance on the interplay between any EU level requirements

and the application of national screening mechanisms in the financial sector.

→ Export Controls of Dual-Use items:

• Carry out an overall evaluation of the Dual-Use Export Control Regulation. As

part of this evaluation, the Commission will assess whether the Regulation

achieves its objectives in the context of the new geopolitical and geoeconomic

realities, including the impacts of increasing recourse to unilateral controls that

may also impact the Single Market. It will continue exploring with Member States

how to efficiently adopt European controls in emerging technology areas in this

new context. During the evaluation process, the Commission will ensure active

outreach to stakeholders from the Member States, industry, research institutes and

academia.

→ Trade defence instruments:

• When a case of relevance for the EU’s economic security is initiated, the EU’s

economic security will be reflected in the conduct of the investigation and in

the design of possible measures.

→ Internal Market, Customs and Competition tools:

• Make full use of the Foreign Subsidies Regulation to maintain fair competition in

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areas where foreign subsidies lead to distortions that pose economic security risks.

• Encourage Member States to make full use of existing State aid possibilities, such

as the Clean Industrial State Aid Framework, the Regional Aid Guidelines, the

Research Development and Innovation framework, the General Block Exemption

Regulation and important projects of common European interest as instruments to

build greater resilience.

• Review the use of strategic customs instruments (tariff suspensions,

autonomous quotas) for key inputs with the view to support the competitiveness

of Union enterprises.

Second, the Commission will develop new measures to advance the EU’s economic security.

The Commission will:

→ Explore putting in place on a pilot basis an EU-level start-up monitoring mechanism

aimed at identifying startups in critical technology areas that are vulnerable to the

risk of hostile foreign acquisitions, redirecting them to EU investment alternatives and

other forms of support (e.g., advisory, capacity-building, matchmaking with investors).

The mechanism would work in lockstep with existing initiatives, such as the EU Startup

and Scaleup Strategy.

→ Work with supervisory authorities to monitor portfolio investments, (that fall outside the

scope of the FDI coordination mechanism), in areas identified as high-risk for economic

security purposes.

→ Include an economic security component for key strategic sectors in the upcoming

Competitiveness Coordination Tool.

→ Strengthen the EU’s industrial base and supply chains resilience through the Industrial

Accelerator Act.

→ As outlined in ResourceEU, further develop secondary markets for critical raw materials,

including through the Circular Economy Act, to make it easier to finance strategic CRM

projects in areas identified as high-risk for economic security purposes.

→ Assess by Q3 2026 ways of strengthening the protection of the industry from unfair

trade policies and negative global market developments, such as overcapacity. Here,

the Commission will evaluate the effectiveness and adequacy of the existing tools and

consider the necessity of possible new measures.

→ Review the Blocking Statute to simplify its application and reduce compliance costs for

EU persons and businesses and create a credible deterrent against the extra-territorial

application of third-country sanctions. This will strengthen European economic security

by better protecting EU operators from conflicting third-country measures and by ensuring

a more predictable, effective and assertive framework.

→ Explore the modalities of encouraging companies in specific high-risk sectors to ensure

that supplies are sourced from at least two different suppliers and limit exposure to a

17

single dominant supplier.

→ Explore the scope to provide financial support to companies subject to FDI screening

decisions in situations where their financial viability may be at risk absent an investment,

without prejudice to State aid rules.

→ As part of the review of the Public Procurement Directives, propose European

preference criteria in specific strategic sectors in which our public procurement

stimulates demand for European industrial leadership, increases our resilience and

mitigates risks for security.

→ Incentivise companies to reduce dependencies in emerging technology areas as part of

the upcoming Chips Act 2.0, Quantum Act, Cloud and AI Development Act and

Commission Strategy on Open Source.

→ Use the upcoming review of the Cybersecurity Act to enact at EU level restrictions on

access of high-risk suppliers to critical infrastructure.

5. Conclusion

The EU remains firmly committed to open and rules-based trade, investment relations and

international cooperation. It will therefore continue to support and benefit from open trade

and investment with partners around the world. At the same time, in today’s geopolitical

environment, safeguarding the EU’s economic security is imperative. Addressing the risks that

come with openness is key to preserving it, as well as our broader security and the

competitiveness of our industry.

The EU already has many tools at its disposal to pursue this goal. These instruments must

now be used strategically and, where needed, further improved, both to credibly deter threats

to the EU’s economic security before they arise and respond effectively when they do.

Achieving this requires the Commission, European Parliament and Member States to work in

lockstep and to cooperate closely with industry, towards an efficient and informed decision-

making.

The EU is determined to make a more proactive, strategic and coordinated use of all available

tools to build a strong, secure and resilient economy for the long term, and to operate

effectively in the new geopolitical and geoeconomic conditions shaping global trade.