| Dokumendiregister | Transpordiamet |
| Viit | 17.1-1/25 |
| Registreeritud | 26.01.2026 |
| Sünkroonitud | 27.01.2026 |
| Liik | Valjaminev kiri |
| Funktsioon | 17.1 Meresõiduohutus |
| Sari | 17.1-1 Ringkirjad meresõiduohutuse valdkonnas |
| Toimik | 17.1-1 |
| Juurdepääsupiirang | Avalik |
| Juurdepääsupiirang | |
| Adressaat | TRAM koduleht ja EMDE |
| Saabumis/saatmisviis | TRAM koduleht ja EMDE |
| Vastutaja | Jan Jaanson (Users, Merendusteenistus, Laevandusosakond) |
| Originaal | Ava uues aknas |
Lisa Ringkiri nr 21 ver 01
1 (3)
Open Letter by the Coastal States of the Baltic Sea and the North Sea
with Iceland on the Growing Risks to Maritime Safety
to the International Maritime Community
We, the Coastal States of the Baltic Sea and the North Sea (Belgium, Denmark, Estonia, Finland,
France, Germany, Latvia, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Sweden and the United
Kingdom) with Iceland are approaching the International Maritime Community, especially flag and
port states, national authorities, flag registries, classification societies, shipping companies,
managers and operators as well as seafarers, with this letter.
Dear Members of the International Maritime Community,
Modern maritime transport is fundamentally built on the reliability of satellite-based navigation. For
over three decades, global shipping has advanced by developing vessel operations to increasingly
depend on the position, timing, and navigation (PTN) data provided by satellite systems. This shift
has brought great efficiency but has also created a new dependency.
The accurate and uninterrupted functioning of Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS) is not a
technical luxury; it is a critical safety requirement. GNSS signals support not only ship navigation
but also precise time synchronization vital for systems such as the Global Maritime Distress and
Safety System (GMDSS). Disruption of these signals is a risk to the safety and reliability of maritime
transport.
We are now facing new emerging safety situations due to growing GNSS interference in European
waters, particularly in the Baltic Sea region. These disturbances, originating from the Russian
Federation, degrade the safety of international shipping. All vessels are at risk.
Equally vital is the integrity of the Automatic Identification System (AIS), which plays a key role in
traffic coordination, enhances situational awareness and emergency response. Spoofing or falsifying
AIS data undermines maritime safety and security, increases the risk of accidents, and severely
hampers rescue operations.
We therefore call upon the international maritime community and national authorities to:
1. Recognize GNSS interference and AIS manipulation as threats to maritime safety and
security.
2. Ensure vessels have adequate capabilities and properly trained crew as required by
international conventions to operate safely during navigation system outages.
3. Cooperate on the development of alternative terrestrial radionavigation systems which may
be used in place of GNSS in the event of disruption, loss of signal or interference.
Maintaining trust in maritime navigation requires more than technology – it demands responsibility,
transparency, and decisive action. We must ensure that our seas remain safe, including when systems
fail or face disturbances.
Furthermore, recognizing the essential role of maritime transport in global trade and the economy,
and emphasizing the importance of safe, efficient, and environmentally sustainable shipping, we
stress that the full and consistent implementation of the International Maritime Organization (IMO)
regulations is fundamental to ensuring maritime safety, the smooth functioning of shipping, and the
protection of seafarers and the marine environment, especially in the new emerging situations
Lisa Ringkiri nr 21 ver 01
2 (3)
affecting safety at sea, such as the increasing use of shadow fleet vessels to circumvent international
sanctions.
In order to uphold and strengthen maritime safety in the Baltic Sea and North Sea region, we require
that all vessels exercising freedom of navigation strictly comply with applicable international law,
whether customary international law or as contracting parties to international conventions, including
the 1972 Convention on the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea (COLREG),
the 1974 International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS), the International
Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL) and all other relevant IMO
conventions and resolutions which contain the generally accepted international rules and standards
referred to in the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).
We wish to highlight, in particular, the following:
1. Vessels shall sail under the flag of only one State and vessels that sail under the flags of two
or more states, using them according to convenience, may be treated as a ship without
nationality, as according to UNCLOS Article 92.
2. Vessels must maintain valid documentation and certification according to the above-
mentioned IMO Conventions, including but not limited to insurance or other financial security
in accordance with the rules laid down in Article VII of the 1992 Civil Liability Convention
and Article 7 of the 2001 Bunker Convention.
3. Companies must maintain a safety management system onboard the vessels operated,
according to SOLAS Chapter IX (ISM code).
4. Flag States shall take any steps which may be necessary in order to ensure that ships flying
their flag only proceed to sea in compliance with the requirements of the international rules
and standards, including investigations for the maintenance of ships’ condition after survey
according to UNCLOS art. 94 and 217 and SOLAS Regulation I/11. Such steps include
prohibiting ships from sailing if they fail to comply with said requirements.
5. Vessels, when underway, shall comply with the applicable requirements of the STCW
Convention, SOLAS Regulation V/14, and Rule 5 of the COLREGs regarding bridge
watchkeeping and lookout.
6. Vessels shall maintain the AIS and the LRIT equipment continuously in operation according
to SOLAS V/19.2.4.7 and A.1106(29) and SOLAS V/19-1.5.
7. Vessels must provide information about ship identification and any other required information
when entering an area covered by a ship reporting system according to SOLAS V/11.7:
SOLAS V/11.7: 7 The master of a ship shall comply with the requirements of adopted
ship reporting systems and report to the appropriate authority all information required
in accordance with the provisions of each such system.
8. Vessels must maintain clear communication with relevant maritime authorities including in
communication regarding Ship Reporting Systems and Vessel Traffic Services (VTS)
(SOLAS V/11.7 SOLAS V/12.4 (VTS).
9. Vessels shall comply with local navigation restrictions and any mandatory ships' routeing
systems adopted by IMO in accordance with SOLAS chapter V, regulation 10.7. Other IMO-
Lisa Ringkiri nr 21 ver 01
3 (3)
adopted routing measures and areas to be avoided designated under IMO and HELCOM
frameworks shall be taken into account as appropriate for safe navigation.
SOLAS V/10.7: 7 A ship shall use a mandatory ships' routeing system adopted by the
Organization as required for its category or cargo carried and in accordance with the
relevant provisions in force unless there are compelling reasons not to use a particular
ships' routeing system. Any such reason shall be recorded in the ship's log.
10. Vessels must report incident involving discharges of oil and other harmful substances as
required by international and national rules. (MARPOL art. 8 and Protocol I, International
Convention on Oil Pollution Preparedness, Response and Co-operation 1990, art. 4, Protocol
on Preparedness, Response and Co-operation to pollution Incidents by Hazardous and
Noxious Substances 2000, art. 3).
11. Vessels shall carry on board shipboard oil and marine pollution emergency plans as required
by the MARPOL Convention (Annex I Reg. 37, Annex II, Reg. 17).
12. Vessels shall carry onboard flag approved ship-to-ship operations plans according to
MARPOL Convention Annex I Reg. 41.
13. Vessels shall not conduct ship-to-ship transfers without sufficient and timely notification to
the coastal state in whose exclusive economic zone the transfer is to take place (MARPOL
Annex I, Reg. 42).
The Coastal States of the Baltic Sea and the North Sea with Iceland:
Belgium
Denmark
Estonia
Finland
France
Germany
Iceland
Latvia
Lithuania
the Netherlands
Norway
Poland
Sweden
the United Kingdom
Valge 4 / 11413 Tallinn / 620 1200 / [email protected] / www.transpordiamet.ee
Registrikood 70001490
Ringkiri nr 21 ver 01
RINGKIRI nr 21
Meie 26.01.2026 nr 17.1-1/25
Meresõiduohutuse kasvavatest riskidest ja
kohustustest GNSS-i häirete ning AIS-i
manipuleerimise tingimustes
Laevaomanikud, reederid, laevaagendid
1. Sissejuhatus
Läänemere ja Põhjamere rannikuriigid koos Islandiga on pöördunud rahvusvahelise
merenduskogukonna poole avatud kirjaga, milles juhitakse tähelepanu kasvavatele riskidele
meresõiduohutusele, mis tulenevad satelliitnavigatsioonisüsteemide (GNSS) tahtlikest
häiretest ning automaatse identifitseerimissüsteemi (AIS) manipuleerimisest.
Ringkirja eesmärk on juhtida Eesti merendussektori tähelepanu nimetatud riskidele ning meelde
tuletada kehtivaid rahvusvahelisi kohustusi, mille täitmine on vajalik meresõiduohutuse,
julgeoleku ja keskkonnakaitse tagamiseks.
2. GNSS-i ja AIS-i töökindluse tähtsus
Kaasaegne meretransport sõltub määrava tähtsusega:
laeva positsiooni-, aja- ja navigatsiooniandmetest (PTN),
GNSS-i toimimisest, sh GMDSS-i ajasünkroniseerimisest,
ning AIS-i usaldusväärsest ja pidevast tööst.
GNSS-i häired ja AIS-i andmete võltsimine:
vähendavad märkimisväärselt navigatsiooniohutust,
suurendavad kokkupõrgete ja keskkonnaõnnetuste riski,
takistavad tõrje- ja päästeoperatsioonide läbiviimist.
Eriti on täheldatud kasvavaid häireid Läänemere piirkonnas, mis mõjutavad kõiki laevu
sõltumata lipuriigist.
2 (3)
3. Tegevusootused merendussektorile
Kõigil Eesti jurisdiktsiooni alla kuuluvatel või Eesti vetes tegutsevatel merendussektori osapooltel
palutakse:
käsitleda GNSS-i häireid ja AIS-i manipuleerimist meresõiduohutuse ja turvalisuse
ohuna;
tagada, et laevadel on:
o piisavad alternatiivsed navigatsioonivõimekused,
o väljaõpetatud meeskond, kes suudab ohutult tegutseda navigatsioonisüsteemide
rikke või katkestuse korral;
toetada ja võimalusel osaleda alternatiivsete maismaal baseeruvate
raadionavigatsioonisüsteemide arendamises.
4. Rahvusvaheliste konventsioonide täitmine
Rõhutame, et kõik laevad peavad täielikult ja järjepidevalt järgima kehtivat rahvusvahelist õigust,
sealhulgas järgmisi konventsioone ja norme:
COLREG 1972 – kokkupõrgete vältimise eeskirjad;
SOLAS 1974, sh:
o peatükk IX (ISM koodeks),
o peatükk V (navigatsiooniohutus, AIS, LRIT, VTS, laevateede kasutamine);
STCW – vahiteenistus ja meeskonna pädevus;
MARPOL – keskkonnakaitse, õnnetusjuhtumite raporteerimine, hädaolukorra plaanid;
UNCLOS 1982, sh:
o lipuriigi kohustused (artiklid 92, 94, 217).
Eriliselt juhitakse tähelepanu järgmisele:
laev võib sõita ainult ühe lipuriigi lipu all;
kõik sertifikaadid, kindlustus ja finantstagatised peavad olema kehtivad;
AIS ja LRIT peavad olema pidevalt töös, välja arvatud rahvusvahelistes aktides lubatud
erandjuhtudel;
laevade teekonnad, kohustuslike laevateede ja vältimistsoonide kasutamine peab vastama
IMO ja regionaalsetele otsustele;
laevad peavad hoidma selget sidet ja kommunikatsiooni asjakohaste
mereadministratsioonidega, sealhulgas laevaliikluse korraldamise ja
ettekannete süsteemid;
laevalt‑laevale operatsioone tohib teostada üksnes pärast asjakohase ja kehtiva teavituse
esitamist ning kooskõlas MARPOL-i nõuetega;
kõik saaste- ja ohujuhtumid tuleb viivitamata raporteerida.
5. Lõppsätted
Meresõiduohutuse säilitamine GNSS-i häirete ja uute julgeolekuriskide tingimustes eeldab:
vastutustundlikku käitumist,
läbipaistvust,
ning rahvusvaheliste reeglite ranget järgimist.
3 (3)
Palume kõigil adressaatidel võtta ringkiri teadmiseks ning tagada, et nimetatud põhimõtted ja
nõuded on rakendatud nii laevade opereerimisel kui ka meeskondade väljaõppes.
(allkirjastatud digitaalselt)
Edgar Peganov
Merendusteenistuse direktor
Lisa: NB8+ Open Letter
Jan Jaanson
+372 58602264, [email protected]