Kiri

    Resolutsiooni liik: Riigikantselei resolutsioon Viide: Justiits- ja Digiministeerium /  / ; Riigikantselei /  / 2-5/26-00267

Resolutsiooni teema: Küberturvalisuse eelnõude pakett

Adressaat: Justiits- ja Digiministeerium Ülesanne: Tulenevalt Riigikogu kodu- ja töökorra seaduse § 152` lg 1 p 2 ning Vabariigi Valitsuse reglemendi § 3 lg 4 palun valmistada ette Vabariigi Valitsuse seisukohtade ja otsuste eelnõud järgmiste algatuste kohta, kaasates seejuures olulisi huvigruppe ja osapooli:

- Proposal for a REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL on the European Union Agency for Cybersecurity (ENISA), the European cybersecurity certification framework, and ICT supply chain security and repealing Regulation (EU) 2019/881 (The Cybersecurity Act 2), COM(2026)11

- Proposal for a DIRECTIVE OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL amending Directive (EU) 2022/2555 as regards simplification measures and alignment with the [Proposal for the Cybersecurity Act 2], COM(2026)13

EISi toimiku nr: 26-0038 Tähtaeg: 13.03.2026

Adressaat: Kaitseministeerium, Kliimaministeerium, Majandus- ja Kommunikatsiooniministeerium, Rahandusministeerium, Siseministeerium, Sotsiaalministeerium Ülesanne: Palun esitada oma sisend Justiits- ja Digiministeeriumile seisukohtade kujundamiseks antud eelnõu kohta (eelnõude infosüsteemi (EIS) kaudu). Tähtaeg: 09.03.2026

Lisainfo: Eelnõusi on kavas arutada valitsuse 26.03.2026 istungil ja Vabariigi Valitsuse reglemendi § 6 lg 6 kohaselt sellele eelneval nädalal (18.03.2026) EL koordinatsioonikogus. Esialgsed materjalid EL koordinatsioonikoguks palume esitada hiljemalt 13.03.2026. 

Kinnitaja: Merli Vahar, Euroopa Liidu asjade direktori asetäitja Kinnitamise kuupäev: 05.02.2026 Resolutsiooni koostaja: Sandra Metste [email protected],  

.

Küberturvalisuse eelnõude pakett

COM(2026) 11 ja COM(2026) 13

Otsuse ettepanek koordinatsioonikogule

Kujundada seisukoht

Kaasvastutaja sisendi tähtpäev 09.03.2026

KOKi esitamise tähtpäev 18.03.2026

VV esitamise tähtpäev 26.03.2026

Peavastutaja Justiits- ja digiministeerium,

Kaasvastutajad Majandus- ja kommunikatsiooniministeerium, Kaitseministeerium, Kliimaministeerium, Rahandusministeerium, Sotsiaalministeerium ja Siseministeerium.

Seisukoha valitsusse toomise alus ja põhjendus

Algatuse reguleerimisala nõuab vastavalt Eesti Vabariigi põhiseadusele seaduse või Riigikogu otsuse vastuvõtmist, muutmist või kehtetuks tunnistamist (RKKTS § 152¹ lg 1 p 1);

Algatuse vastuvõtmisega kaasneks oluline majanduslik või sotsiaalne mõju (RKKTS § 152¹ lg 1 p 2).

Sisukokkuvõte

Pakett sisaldab ettepanekut läbivaadatud küberturvalisuse määruse kohta, millega tugevdatakse ELi info- ja kommunikatsioonitehnoloogia (IKT) tarneahelate turvalisust. Lihtsama sertifitseerimisprotsessi kaudu soovitakse tagada, et ELi kodanikeni jõudvad tooted on algusest peale küberturvalised. Samuti on eesmärk hõlbustada ELi küberturvalisuse eeskirjade järgimist ning tugevdada Euroopa Liidu Küberturvalisuse Ameti (ENISA) rolli liikmesriikide ja ELi toetamisel küberohtude ohjamisel.

IKT tarneahelate turvalisuse suurendamine ELis

Uue küberturvalisuse määruse eesmärgiks on vähendada riske, mida ELi IKT tarneahelale kujutavad kolmandate riikide tarnijate küberturvalisusega seotud probleemid. Määruses sätestatakse usaldusväärne IKT tarneahelate turvalisuse raamistik, mis põhineb ühtlustatud, proportsionaalsel ja riskipõhisel lähenemisviisil. See võimaldab ELil ja liikmesriikidel ühiselt tuvastada ja leevendada riske 18 ELi jaoks elutähtsas sektoris,

2

võttes arvesse ka majanduslikku mõju ja pakkumist turul. IKT tarneahelad on elutähtsate teenuste ja elutähtsa taristu toimimiseks hädavajalikud. Hiljutised küberintsidendid on toonud esile nende nõrkustest tulenevad suured riskid. Tänapäeval ei tähenda tarneahelate turvalisus enam ainult toote või teenuse tehnilist turvalisust, vaid ka tarnijaga seotud riske, eelkõige sõltuvusi ja välissekkumist. Küberturvalisuse määrus näeb ette kohustuse leevendada Euroopa mobiilsidevõrkudele suure riskiga kolmandate riikide tarnijatest tulenevaid riske, tuginedes 5G küberturvalisuse meetmepaketi raames tehtule.

Euroopa küberturvalisuse sertifitseerimise raamistiku lihtsustamine ja tõhustamine

Uue küberturvalisuse määrusega tagatakse, et ELi tarbijateni jõudvate toodete ja teenuste turvalisust testitakse senisest tõhusamalt Euroopa küberturvalisuse sertifitseerimise raamistiku kaudu. Raamistikuga soovitakse pakkuda suuremat selgust ja lihtsamaid menetlusi, võimaldades sertifitseerimiskavade väljatöötamist vaikimisi 12 kuu jooksul. Samuti võetakse kasutusele paindlikum ja läbipaistvam juhtimine, et sidusrühmi avaliku teavitamise ja konsulteerimise kaudu paremini kaasata.

ENISA hallatavatest sertifitseerimiskavad võimaldavad ettevõtjatel tõendada oma tegevuse vastavust ELi õigusaktidele ning vähendada koormust ja kulusid. Lisaks IKT- toodetele, -teenustele, -protsessidele ja hallatud turbeteenustele saavad ettevõtjad ja organisatsioonid sertifitseerida oma turvaolekut, et see vastaks turu vajadustele.

Küberturvalisuse eeskirjade järgimise hõlbustamine

Paketiga täiendatakse digivaldkonna lihtsustamise koondpaketis kavandatud küberintsidentidest teavitamise ühtset kontaktpunkti. Pakett sisaldab meetmeid, millega lihtsustatakse ELis tegutsevate ettevõtjate jaoks ELi küberturvalisuse eeskirjade ja riskijuhtimisnõuete täitmist. Küberturvalisuse NIS2 direktiivi sihipäraste muudatuste eesmärk on suurendada õigusselgust, lihtsustatakse mikro- ja väikeettevõtjate ning väikeste keskmise turukapitalisatsiooniga ettevõtjate jaoks nõuete täitmist. Muudatustega lihtsustatakse kohtualluvuse reegleid, ühtlustatakse andmete kogumist lunavararünnete kohta ja hõlbustatakse piiriüleste üksuste järelevalvet ENISA koordineeriva rolli kaudu.

ENISA roll Euroopa küberturvalisuse alase vastupanuvõime tugevdamisel

ENISA ülesandeks on aidata ELil ja selle liikmesriikidel mõista ühiseid ohte, et võimaldada neil küberintsidentideks valmistuda ja neile reageerida. ENISA toetab ELis tegutsevaid ettevõtjaid ja sidusrühmi, andes varajasi hoiatusi küberohtude ja -intsidentide kohta. Koostöös Europoli ja küberintsidentidele reageerimise üksustega toetab ENISA ettevõtjaid lunavararünnetele reageerimisel ja neist taastumisel. ENISA töötab välja ka liidu nõrkusehalduse teenuste lähenemisviisi. ENISA hakkab haldama digivaldkonna lihtsustamise koondpaketis kavandatud küberintsidentidest teavitamise ühtset kontaktpunkti. Küberturvalisuse valdkonnas kvalifitseeritud tööjõu olemasolu tagamiseks

3

võetakse kasutusele küberoskuste akadeemia ja luuakse kogu ELi hõlmavad küberturbeoskuste tõendamise kavad.

Kas EL algatus reguleerib karistusi või haldustrahve? Jah

Kas nähakse ette uue asutuse loomine (järelevalvelised või muud asutused)? Jah

Ei pruugi tähendada uue asutuse loomist, kuid liikmesriigid peavad määrama pädeva asutuse.

Kas lahenduse rakendamine vajab IT-arendusi? Jah

Vajab selgitamist, kas algatusega kaasneb IT-arenduste vajadust.

Kaasamine

Kaasata eelnõude paketiga hõlmatud huvirühmad.

EN EN

EUROPEAN COMMISSION

Strasbourg, 20.1.2026

COM(2026) 11 final

2026/0011 (COD)

Proposal for a

REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL

on the European Union Agency for Cybersecurity (ENISA), the European cybersecurity

certification framework, and ICT supply chain security and repealing Regulation (EU)

2019/881 (The Cybersecurity Act 2)

{SEC(2026) 11 final} - {SWD(2026) 11 final} - {SWD(2026) 12 final}

(Text with EEA relevance)

EN 1 EN

EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM

1. CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL

• Reasons for and objectives of the proposal

Since the adoption of the Cybersecurity Act (CSA) in 2019, the cybersecurity threat landscape

has significantly evolved1 in an increasingly complex geopolitical reality. Cyberattacks have

surged and became more sophisticated, targeting critical infrastructure, businesses, and the

general public, with the ransomware activity at its core2. Emerging technologies like the

artificial intelligence (AI) and quantum computing are reshaping the tools of defence and the

tactics of adversaries. In his 2024 report ‘The future of European competitiveness’, Mario

Draghi highlighted the need to increase security and reduce dependencies as one main areas

of action needed in the European Union3. Both the European Preparedness Union

Strategy4 and the European Internal Security Strategy (ProtectEU)5 have placed cybersecurity

at the heart of the Union’s resilience agenda. These strategies recognise that persistent

cybersecurity threats are not just technical challenges, but strategic risks to our democracy,

economy and way of life. Similarly, the Communication on Strengthening EU economic

security6 identifies preventing access to sensitive information and data that could undermine

the Union’s economic security and preventing and mitigating disruptions to Union’s critical

infrastructure affecting the Union economy as priority objectives, in which effective

cybersecurity measures play a crucial role.

Against this background, there are four main problems that this proposed revision of the

CSA aims to tackle: (i) the misalignment between the Union’s cybersecurity policy

framework and stakeholders’ needs in an increasingly hostile threat landscape; (ii) the stalled

implementation of the European cybersecurity certification framework (ECCF); (iii) the

complexity and diversity of the cybersecurity-related policies impacting the Union’s cyber

posture; and (iv) increasing ICT supply chains security risks.

Based on the main problems identified, the two general objectives of the intervention are to

increase cybersecurity capabilities and resilience and prevent fragmentation across the single

market by:

• contributing to strengthening the Union’s cybersecurity governance and helping to

ensure that relevant institutions, authorities and other stakeholders are better prepared

to prevent, detect and respond to cybersecurity threats in a coordinated and effective

manner; and

• supporting the development, implementation and uptake of common Union

cybersecurity instruments, such as certification schemes, and providing harmonised

frameworks that build trust and interoperability across Member States.

1 ENISA, ENISA Threat Landscape 2024, https://www.enisa.europa.eu/publications/enisa-threat-

landscape-2024 2 ENISA, ENISA Threat Landscape 2025. 3 European Commission, The future of European Competitiveness,

https://commission.europa.eu/document/download/97e481fd-2dc3-412d-be4c-

f152a8232961_en?filename=The%20future%20of%20European%20competitiveness%20_%20A%20c

ompetitiveness%20strategy%20for%20Europe.pdf. 4 JOIN/2025/130 final. 5 COM/2025/148 final. 6 JOIN(2025) 977 final.

EN 2 EN

These general objectives respond to the key challenges identified in the problem definition.

They reflect the overarching policy aim of strengthening cybersecurity governance in the

Union and supporting the development of a secure, resilient and competitive digital single

market.

To help achieve the general objectives listed above, this intervention pursues the following

specific objectives (SPOs):

• to address the misalignment between the Union cybersecurity policy framework and

stakeholders’ needs:

• SPO1: create the capacity to effectively implement Union cybersecurity

policies and continuous operational cooperation enabling more structured

cooperation between Member States;

• SPO2: develop and implement means and mechanisms to effectively support

and address the needs of Member States, industry and other stakeholders;

• to address the limited uptake and effectiveness of the ECCF:

• SPO3: create the prerequisites for faster delivery of cybersecurity certification

schemes driven by market needs by broadening the scope of the ECCF,

ensuring effective maintenance and agile procedures and increasing

transparency;

• to address the fragmented compliance landscape and complexity of horizontal and

sectoral frameworks:

• SPO4: create mechanisms and conditions to facilitate compliance with

cybersecurity requirements, thereby making their implementation more

coherent and effective.

• to address cybersecurity risks in the supply chain:

• SPO5: De-risk critical ICT supply chains from entities established in or

controlled by entities from third countries posing cybersecurity concerns (high-

risk suppliers) and reduce critical dependencies by developing a coherent and

effective framework at EU level to address ICT supply chain security risks.

The revision of the CSA falls within the remit of the regulatory fitness and performance

programme (REFIT). It strongly contributes to improving clarity, removing inefficiencies

and aligning procedures across legal frameworks. The revision of the CSA contributes to the

proper functioning of the internal market while ensuring the security and strategic autonomy

of the Union.

More concretely, it proposes a full reform of the mandate of the European Union Agency for

Cybersecurity (ENISA) providing effective support for policy implementation and added

value in terms of supporting operational cooperation among Member States.

Given the increasing cybersecurity risks and challenges the Union is facing, the proposal aims

to increase ENISA’s financial and human resources to reflect its enhanced role, tasks, and its

critical position in defending the digital ecosystem of the Union, allowing ENISA to

effectively carry out the tasks conferred on it by this proposal.

EN 3 EN

The revision will also help eliminate fragmented practices, improving coordination while

lowering compliance and operational costs in the long term. By repealing the current CSA and

introducing a reformed ECCF, the proposal delivers a more effective and efficient tool that

both promotes trust among businesses, the general public and public authorities and eases

compliance with relevant Union legislation. It increases efficiency by revising the governance

model and supporting more predictable, coherent and agile certification procedures to enable

faster scheme development and implementation.

Greater synergies with relevant existing Union legal frameworks will promote certification as

a compliance tool for businesses and reduce the administrative burden on conformity

assessment bodies active under multiple pieces of cybersecurity legislation. Furthermore, by

extending the scope of the ECCF and enabling the development of a scheme on the cyber

posture of entities, the proposal reduces compliance costs for entities subject to relevant

Union cybersecurity legislation, starting with entities in scope of the NIS 2 Directive. This

approach will significantly simplify regulatory obligations for entities subject to multiple

compliance requirements and ensure a more effective use of resources across national

authorities. In addition to this revision, a proposal for a directive introducing targeted

amendments to the NIS 2 Directive aims at simplifying compliance with and ensuring

streamlined and coherent implementation of specific aspects of the cybersecurity framework,

including with regard to scope, definitions, ransomware reporting and supervision of entities

providing cross-border services.

The new regulation also creates a harmonised framework to tackle non-technical risks

affecting ICT supply chains, reducing the current fragmentation of approaches across Member

States. Together, these aspects represent a substantial simplification and modernisation of the

Union’s cybersecurity legal framework, fully aligned with the REFIT principles of clarity,

efficiency and digital readiness.

• Consistency with existing policy provisions in the policy area

The Union has expanded its legal and policy tools with the adoption of a number of legal

instruments and policy measures: (i) the NIS2 Directive serves to strengthen cybersecurity for

critical infrastructure; (ii) physical security measures are defined in its ‘sister directive’, the

Critical Entities Resilience (CER) Directive; (iii) the Cyber Resilience Act (CRA) enhances

the cybersecurity of products; (iv) the Cyber Solidarity Act (CSoA) builds EU-wide response

capabilities; (v) the EU Cyber Blueprint7 supports EU-level crisis management cooperation in

which the Commission and High Representative have key roles in preparing for and

responding to large-scale cybersecurity incidents; (vi) the 5G Cybersecurity Toolbox (5G

Toolbox) supports cybersecurity in 5G networks; (vii) the European action plan on the

cybersecurity of hospitals and healthcare providers8 helps improve their cybersecurity; and

(viii) the Cybersecurity Skills Academy9 addresses the growing challenge of the cybersecurity

talent gap.

The above-mentioned cybersecurity legal framework was complemented by sector-specific

legislation, i.e. the Digital Operational Resilience Act (DORA Regulation) for the financial

7 COM/2025/66 final. 8 COM(2025) 10 final. 9 COM(2023) 207 final.

EN 4 EN

sector, network code on sector-specific rules for cybersecurity aspects of cross-border

electricity flows (NCCS) for the electricity sub-sector, or information security rules (Part-

IS10) for the air transport sub-sector.

The CSA revision is aligned with and strengthens the NIS2 provisions regarding ENISA’s

role in supporting the NIS2 implementation, including as regards operational cooperation

support; it is also aligned with the CRA, including as regards the overview and management

of vulnerabilities across the internal market and increases added value of shared situational

awareness. Regarding the ECCF, the CSA revision is aligned with the CRA on product

security objectives and vulnerability handling, and with the New Legislative Framework

(NLF) on accreditation. Furthermore, there is a strong synergy stemming from the

development of cyber posture certification for the NIS2 Directive as well as potentially for

facilitating compliance with other relevant Union legal acts such as the General Data

Protection Regulation (GDPR), without prejudice to their specific certification requirements.

Additionally, the horizontal framework that addresses ICT supply chains cybersecurity risks

supports the overall objective of the NIS2 Directive to create a high common level of

cybersecurity across the Union and relies on the NIS2 Directive risk-based approach.

Furthermore, the CSA revision, in combination with the proposal for a Directive introducing

targeted amendments to the NIS2 Directive with the aim of simplification, provides the

necessary tools to make this comprehensive framework more effective and efficient in

delivering the expected results, provide for a stronger European dimension and fill in the

remaining regulatory gaps.

• Consistency with other Union policies

The CSA revision would complement the CER Directive which includes supply chain

considerations as part of the resilience measures of critical entities. Moreover, it would

complement upcoming initiatives, such as: (i) the Cloud and AI Development Act (CAIDA)

which aims, among others, to tackle the lack of a competitive Union-based offer of cloud

computing services at sufficient scale to serve highly critical use cases or sectors; (ii) the

proposal for the Digital Networks Act (DNA); (iii) the upcoming revision of Regulation (EU)

2023/178111, (iv) the public procurement framework12 which is currently under evaluation13

and the Proposal for Regulation on simplification of the digital legislation (Digital

Omnibus)14 which provides the obligation on ENISA to develop a single entry-point for

incident reporting through which entities can simultaneously fulfil their incident reporting

obligations under multiple legal acts. Furthermore, it would reinforce the position of the

Union authorities and operators, when engaging with southern Mediterranean partners,

notably through fostering interconnection through secure and trusted digital infrastructures

across the Mediterranean, which is a fundamental goal of the Pact for the Mediterranean.

10 Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2023/203 and Commission Delegated Regulation (EU)

2022/1645. 11 Regulation (EU) 2023/1781 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 September 2023

establishing a framework of measures for strengthening Europe’s semiconductor ecosystem and

amending Regulation (EU) 2021/694 (Chips Act), OJ L 229, 18.9.2023, pp. 1–53 12 In particular Directives 2014/23/EU, 2014/24/EU and 2014/25/EU. 13 European Commission, Commission launches call for evidence and public consultation on the

evaluation of the Public Procurement Directives, https://single-market-

economy.ec.europa.eu/news/commission-launches-call-evidence-and-public-consultation-evaluation-

public-procurement-directives-2024-12-13_en. 14 COM/2025/837 final

EN 5 EN

The CSA revision is also in line with the Union’s strategic documents, in particular when it

comes to the ICT supply chain security framework. In the ProtectEU Strategy, the

Commission further stated that a harmonised approach to the security of the Information and

Communication Technology (ICT) supply chain can address the current fragmentation of the

internal market caused by different approaches at national level, avoid critical dependencies

and de-risk ICT supply chains from high-risk suppliers, in this way securing critical

infrastructure. The Economic Security Strategy also highlighted the need to make the EU’s

economy and supply chain more resilient in order to promote its own competitiveness15. The

need to address disruptions of supply chains and cyberattacks was also highlighted in the

Preparedness Union Strategy and the White Paper for European Defence16. It is also aligned

with the Future of European Competitiveness report of Mario Draghi, as highlighted above.

What is more, the CSA revision in the area of ICT supply chain security with the recently

adopted Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the Council on strengthening

EU economic security17.

2. LEGAL BASIS, SUBSIDIARITY AND PROPORTIONALITY

• Legal basis

The legal basis for this proposal is Article 114 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the

European Union (TFEU). Article 114 TFEU provides for the adoption of measures to ensure

the establishment and functioning of the internal market. Regulation (EU) 2019/881 on

ENISA and on information and communications technology cybersecurity certification,

commonly known as the CSA18, was originally adopted under this provision.

In the area of the cybersecurity of ICT supply chain security, the fragmentation of national

frameworks addressing non-technical risk factors brings negative effects to the functioning of

the internal market as the divergence in national approaches might ultimately lead to higher

vulnerability of some Member States, with potential spill-over effects across the Union,

impacting overall resilience and also trustworthiness.

Given the evolving nature of cybersecurity threats, and the increasing interdependence of

Member States’ digital systems, Article 114 TFEU remains the justified legal basis for the

revision of the CSA. The proposed regulation reflects the most recent developments in the

cybersecurity legislative landscape, especially considering ENISA’s growing responsibilities

and the expanding scope of certifications and risk management.

• Subsidiarity (for non-exclusive competence)

The subsidiarity principle requires the assessment of the necessity and the added value of

Union action. Compliance with the subsidiarity principle in this area was already recognised

when adopting the current CSA.

As already analysed in relation to the CSA, Union intervention is crucial as cybersecurity

threats and related challenges extend beyond individual Member States. Fragmented national

solutions have proven insufficient to achieve market-wide trust and coordination. A revised

Union legal framework is required to remove barriers, ensure consistent implementation, and

15 JOIN/2023/20 final. 16 JOIN/2025/120 final. 17 JOIN/2025/977 final 18 Regulation - 2019/881 - EN - EUR-Lex

EN 6 EN

support Member States in an increasingly complex regulatory and threat environment.

Cybersecurity is an issue of common interest for the Union.

The actions covered by the proposed regulation offer clear added value by supporting

harmonisation, legal clarity and coordinated responses to cybersecurity challenges.

ENISA’s current tasks have expanded through subsequent legislation without a

comprehensive revision of its core responsibilities and resourcing. This has created

inefficiencies and insufficient prioritisation of core tasks in support of Member States.

Therefore, the proposal for intervention aims to refine and prioritise the current tasks in order

to strengthen ENISA’s mandate, enabling it to act as a single point of expertise for

cybersecurity at Union level. On this point, there is no substantial difference in terms of

subsidiarity compared to the CSA. In addition, diverse national certification schemes and

differing regulatory approaches by Member States create a market fragmentation and

additional compliance burdens, undermining competitiveness.

The new proposal also envisages new actions, in relation to supply chain policies and

simplification efforts at Union level. It further strengthens supply chain security and the

cybersecurity sector within the Union, and increases the preparedness and resilience of the

Member States and industry.

Dependencies on entities established in a third country posing cybersecurity or controlled by

such third country, by an entity established in such third country, or by a national of such third

country (high-risk suppliers) affect entities across the Union, while significant supply chain

cybersecurity incidents often spread across national borders. In addition, given the cross-

border nature of ICT supply chains, fragmentation of compliance requirements within the

internal market would undermine legal certainty for entities. Furthermore, the proposals for

Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) mandate the exclusion of high-risk suppliers to

protect the integrity of the EU budget and security interests. The supply chain framework

included in this regulation provides for the mechanism to identify countries posing

cybersecurity concerns, an activity that can be carried out effectively only at the EU level. In

relation to ICT supply chain security, only intervention at the EU level will ensure the same

minimum level of security across the Union and necessary harmonisation of approaches.

The purpose of the CSA is maintained and further enhanced in this revision. This cannot

be sufficiently achieved by the Member States, but can be better achieved at Union

level in accordance with Article 5 of the Treaty on European Union.

• Proportionality

The proposed measures do not go beyond what is necessary to achieve the policy objectives

of the proposal. Furthermore, the scope of Union intervention does not impede any further

national action on national security matters. Union action is therefore justified on grounds of

subsidiarity and proportionality.

The proposal aims to reflect better, in legal terms, ENISA’s mandate and the process for the

development, adoption and maintenance of European cybersecurity certificates. While the

proposal includes certain new tasks for ENISA, their aim is to support Member States in the

areas where significant gaps have been identified. ENISA will not replace Member States’

CSIRTs. As regards the ECCF, certification remains voluntary and can help entities

demonstrate compliance with Union’s cybersecurity requirements. This approach ensures that

the proportionality principle is respected.

EN 7 EN

Regarding the solutions proposed in relation to the ICT supply chain security, the framework

foresees gathering evidence of what constitutes key assets and what measures would be

proportionate and necessary to ensure de-risking of the critical supply chains. Prior to

defining these measures, an assessment of economic impacts will be performed, which would

look at, among others, economic feasibility, available alternatives in the market, lifecycle of

the specific products. This assessment will inform what risk-based measures are needed and

most appropriate.

• Choice of the instrument

The present proposal reviews Regulation (EU) 2019/881 which sets out the current mandate

and tasks for ENISA and the ECCF. Therefore, ENISA's revised mandate and amendments to

the ECCF are best established under the same legal instrument, using the instrument of a

regulation. The proposed legislation also entails an effective framework at EU level to address

ICT supply chain security risks, for which a regulation would more effectively address the

problems identified and meet the objectives formulated, since only intervention at the EU

level will ensure the same level of security across the Union and necessary harmonisation of

approaches. The transposition process in the case of a directive for such intervention could

leave too much room for discretion at national level, potentially leading to lack of uniformity

of certain essential cybersecurity requirements, legal uncertainty, further fragmentation or

even discriminatory cross-border situations.

3. RESULTS OF EX-POST EVALUATIONS, STAKEHOLDER

CONSULTATIONS AND IMPACT ASSESSMENTS

• Ex-post evaluations/fitness checks of existing legislation

The European Commission, according to Article 67 of Regulation (EU) 2019/881, assessed

the relevance, impact, effectiveness, efficiency, coherence and the added value of ENISA and

the ECCF, considering the evolving technological and regulatory landscape. This evaluation,

completed in December 2024, covered the period from 2017 to 2023 and aimed to review

ENISA's mandate and activities, and to assess the ECCF's role in fostering a secure cyber

environment across the EU. The main findings can be summarised as follows.

• Relevance: ENISA’s relevance in the cybersecurity domain is underscored by its

responsiveness to evolving stakeholder needs and adaptability to a changing

landscape. Although stakeholder satisfaction is generally positive, there are

opportunities to increase ENISA’s impact. This can be achieved by improving

support and visibility for diverse sectors, particularly small to medium-sized

enterprises (SMEs), which often struggle with cybersecurity requirements. Better

resource organisation and clearer coordination with national authorities are essential.

Reprioritising activities and optimising existing resources will better align ENISA

with the dynamic needs of the European cybersecurity landscape.

Regarding the ECCF, despite its promising premise, the framework is still considered

to have more potential than practical impact, as only one certification scheme has

recently become operational. The framework is designed to seamlessly integrate with

other Union legal acts to streamline procedures and facilitate cross-border trade. Its

significance is highlighted in high-assurance areas like cloud services and 5G

infrastructures.

• Effectiveness: ENISA has successfully met its mandate by delivering nearly all

planned outputs, showcasing flexibility and resilience during crises like the COVID-

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19 pandemic and Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine. However, improved

prioritisation, clear focus, and strategic resource allocation are needed to increase

efficiency. A more agile approach to internal governance is essential to adapt to

evolving cybersecurity demands and minimise delays.

The ECCF aimed to harmonise cybersecurity certification across the Union but

encountered significant challenges, including procedural limitations and

fragmentation, which led to delays and inefficiencies, such as the delay in adopting

the European Common Criteria-based cybersecurity certification scheme (EUCC).

External factors, like geopolitical tensions and the COVID-19 pandemic, further

complicated the achievement of the ECCF’s objectives, highlighting the need for

adaptable measures and consistent resource allocation among stakeholders to achieve

uniformity and effectiveness in cybersecurity certification. Despite these hurdles,

there have been positive outcomes - particularly in raising awareness among Member

States of the importance and intricacies of cybersecurity certification.

• Efficiency: ENISA operated efficiently under its matrix-based organisational

framework, promoting cooperation and task prioritisation. However, ENISA faced

challenges in meeting increasing demands and filling specialised positions,

exacerbated by a global shortage of IT specialists, leading to delays and heavy

workload. To address these issues, ENISA could optimise its internal workforce and

reallocate resources effectively, as demonstrated by strategic adjustments like the

2022 shift in resources towards the Cybersecurity Support Action. Additionally,

improving budget management and reducing administrative expenditure would

further improve the Agency’s operational efficiency.

The efficiency of the ECCF has been criticised due to extended timelines for

adopting cybersecurity certification schemes and the complexities involved, with the

first scheme only adopted in early 2024 nearly five years after the adoption of the

CSA. Political and technical challenges, such as debates about data sovereignty and

difficulties in translating drafts into legal acts, contributed to delays. Political

challenges and technical demands have impeded progress, as seen with the EU Cloud

Certification Scheme (EUCS) and the EU5G Scheme. Despite these inefficiencies,

the framework gave rise to several positive aspects. However, there remains a need

for improvements in stakeholder engagement and internal governance to ensure

optimal functioning and strategic input.

• Coherence: ENISA's coherence is supported by significant stakeholder engagement

and alignment with recent legislative frameworks. However, to enhance coherence

and resource allocation, it is essential to improve synergies with other Union bodies,

such as the European Cybersecurity Industrial, Technology and Research

Competence Centre (ECCC), and national authorities. Moreover, internal

communication and resource management within ENISA, along with transparent

interaction with private stakeholders, must be refined. Clear delineation of ENISA’s

tasks, consistent with the CRA and the NIS2 Directive, will improve both efficiency

and regulatory consistency.

Regarding the ECCF, full consistency with other Union legislative instruments,

including the NIS2 Directive and the CRA, is crucial for ensuring a unified

cybersecurity approach. While the ECCF shows theoretical alignment with these

legislative measures, real-world integration remains complex and requires diligent

oversight. The implementation of the adopted EUCC scheme within the CRA

framework will be a significant test in this regard.

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• EU added value: ENISA has made substantial contributions to the Union’s

cybersecurity ecosystem by promoting cooperation and aligning practices. Its role in

facilitating national efforts and providing insights into emerging threats has been

vital. However, criticism from private-sector stakeholders about the need for more

tailored support indicates a need for improved stakeholder engagement and industry

collaboration. Strategically reassessing resource management would enable ENISA

to better adapt to evolving cybersecurity challenges and serve diverse stakeholders

more effectively. The ECCF aimed to introduce harmonised certification processes

but faced implementation challenges due to prolonged timelines and fragmentation.

The added value of the ECCF has been limited due to its shortcomings in reaching its

objectives and its lack of efficiency. Despite those challenges, the ECCF did improve

harmonisation among Member States and established better cooperation

opportunities, particularly by creating stakeholder cooperation fora such as the

European Cybersecurity Certification Group (ECCG).

• Stakeholder consultations

Between 2023 and 2025, several stakeholder consultations were carried out both in the

context of the evaluation of the CSA and the revision of the CSA as follows below.

– In 2023, 65 interviews were conducted (52 of which focused more on ENISA and 13

mainly on the ECCF), a survey programme was carried out, which received 209 responses

(of which 70 were on the ECCF), a public consultation was concluded, and two workshops

were organised on SWOT (strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats) analysis and

recommendations with 26 and 70 participants respectively. These activities specifically

aimed to gather stakeholders’ views to evaluate the impact, effectiveness and efficiency of

ENISA. The final report of the Study to Support the Evaluation of the European Union

Agency for Cybersecurity (ENISA) and the European Cybersecurity Certification

Framework carried out for the Commission by PwC, Intellera Consulting and PPMI

(2024) was completed in December 2024.

– In 2025, the Commission launched a call for evidence. In particular, stakeholders were

invited to submit written contributions, including position papers, technical reports, or

comments on specific reform proposals.  A total of 184 individual contributions were

received from a broad range of stakeholder categories, including industry associations,

cybersecurity firms, SMEs, academic institutions, and public interest organisations.

– Between April and June 2025, the Commission organised a public consultation as part of

the revision of the CSA and received 193 replies. The consultation consisted of 38

questions, both closed and open-ended, covering ENISA’s mandate, the ECCF, ICT supply

chain security and simplification.

– Targeted consultation (interviews): A series of semi-structured interviews were

conducted with selected stakeholders. These included ENISA’s representatives as well as

national public authorities that have developed or manage national reporting platforms.

Interviews focused on ENISA’s role and capacity, the operational functioning of the

ECCF, practical challenges in aligning national and Union-level certification processes,

reporting burdens, and implementation obstacles. These discussions provided qualitative

insights that enriched the interpretation of the results of the public consultation and

supported the refinement of policy options.

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– Consultation of Member State representatives within the framework of the Council

working party19 and in bilateral discussions, where Member States could express their

views on the review of the CSA.

– Targeted consultation (ECCF groups – ECCG, Stakeholder Cybersecurity

Certification Group (SCCG)): The Commission in its capacity as the chair of both

groups, presented the state of play on the CSA revision at the ECCG meetings on

12 March and 3 July 2025, and the SCCG meeting on 17 March 2025. In addition,

supplementary expert opinions from ECCG members were collected through

questionnaires.

The consultation focused on five core areas identified as central to the future functioning and

coherence of the Union’s cybersecurity framework:

• ENISA’s mandate and operational role, including support for Member States and

expertise in emerging technologies;

• effectiveness of the European Cybersecurity Certification Framework, including

governance and development processes;

• complexity and fragmentation of cybersecurity obligations, with attention to

reporting burdens and potential simplification;

• proportionality of requirements for SMEs and the potential for differentiated

compliance paths; and

• societal and economic impacts of harmonised cybersecurity rules, including effects

on consumers, rights, innovation, and competitiveness.

• Impact assessment

The revision of the CSA, together with the proposal for a Directive introducing targeted

amendments of the NIS2 Directive, were supported by an impact assessment, see the

summary below. The Regulatory Scrutiny Board (RSB) issued a 'positive opinion with

reservations' of on the resubmitted draft impact assessment report related to the revision of the

CSA20. The impact assessment was adjusted to address the RSB’s recommendations and

comments.

The final policy proposal does not deviate from the options assessed in the impact assessment.

The Commission examined options in four areas of intervention, in view of the specific

objectives to be achieved: (1) ENISA’s mandate (also part of the current CSA); (2) the ECCF

(also part of the current CSA); (3) targeted amendments to the NIS 2 Directive, with an aim to

simplify, but also interlinked with ENISA’s mandate and the ECCF; and (4) ICT supply chain

security, which is also relevant both for NIS2 ecosystem and for ECCF. Each set of options

represents an intervention area on its own, while simultaneously being interlinked with and

relevant to each other.

Options to address the misalignment of the Union’s cybersecurity policy framework and

stakeholders’ needs in an increasingly hostile environment

19 Horizontal Working Party on Cyber Issues 20 Regulation (EU) 2019/881 (http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2019/881/oj)

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Option A.1: Clarifying ENISA’s mandate and providing for prioritisation – This option would

provide a clear and stable framework for ENISA’s tasks by incorporating the tasks set out by

other pieces of legislation.

Option A.2: Reforming ENISA’s mandate – This option would repeal and replace the CSA,

overhauling the Agency’s mandate.

Option A.3: Reforming ENISA’s mandate with a strong operational support focus – This

option would build upon option A.2. In addition, ENISA would develop capabilities

to support NIS 2 Directive entities directly in responding to and recovering from

cybersecurity incidents upon a Member State’s request.

Options for the ECCF

Option B.1: Clarifying the ECCF’s scope, elements and objectives and introducing a

maintenance mechanism – This option would provide for a new maintenance mechanism for

the schemes, after their adoption, to be implemented by ENISA.

Option B.2: Reforming the ECCF by revising its procedures and extending the scope to

facilitate simplification of regulatory compliance – This option would repeal the CSA and

replace it by a new regulation. In addition to option B.1, the procedures related to the request,

development and adoption of schemes would be revised to improve accountability and

efficiency.

Option B.3: Reforming the ECCF as envisaged under option B.2 and introducing mandatory

certification for cyber posture – This option would build on option B.2, but aims to further

increase the impact of the framework by introducing mandatory certification of essential

entities considering specific risk scenarios, instead of relying solely on voluntary certification

of entities.

Options for simplification

Option C.1: Taking a soft law and non-legislative instruments approach, including the use of

existing empowerments (adoption of implementing acts under Article 21(5) and Article 23(11)

of the NIS 2 Directive) – This option envisages the adoption of implementing acts using the

existing empowerments under the NIS 2 Directive to ensure a higher degree of harmonisation

of cybersecurity risk-management measures, incident reporting thresholds, as well as type of

information, the formats and the procedure of notifications. It also envisages the adoption of a

set of guidelines to enhance legal certainty and harmonised implementation.

Option C.2: Targeted intervention – further simplification of compliance with the relevant

Union cybersecurity legislative framework – This option involves limited intervention

through changes to the CSA and the NIS 2 Directive with an aim to simplify specific aspects

of the cybersecurity framework, including scope adaptations, maximum harmonisation for

implementing acts, compliance proof through certification, and adoption of the set of

guidelines as envisaged under option C.1.

Option C.3: Harmonising cybersecurity-related measures set out in Union legislation – This

option would build on option C.2 and would remove all cybersecurity risk-management

measures included in sectoral legislation and empowerments in relation to such measures.

Instead, the NIS 2 Directive ecosystem would be amended to provide for streamlined

requirements for all types of entities, with an aim to promote harmonisation.

Options for ICT Supply Chain Security

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Option D.1: Taking a soft law approach to address cybersecurity risks for ICT supply chains -

This option would not provide for regulatory intervention at EU level. Instead, the

Commission would increase the number of coordinated risk assessments and voluntary

toolboxes.

Option D.2: Ad hoc regulatory intervention codifying the 5G Toolbox - This option would

codify the 5G Toolbox measures. It would introduce an obligation for Member States to

ensure that components from high-risk suppliers are not used in key assets of the network.

Option D.3: Comprehensive and horizontal framework to address ICT supply chains

cybersecurity risks - This option would establish a horizontal, technology and sector-neutral

regulatory framework to address non-technical cybersecurity risks in ICT supply chains.

After extensive analysis, the following combination of options emerged as the preferred

policy package: option A.2 (reforming ENISA’s mandate); option B.2 (reforming the ECCF

by revising its procedures and extending the scope to facilitate simplification of regulatory

compliance); and option C.2 (targeted intervention – further simplification of compliance with

the relevant Union cybersecurity legislative framework) and Option D.3 - Comprehensive and

horizontal framework to address ICT supply chains cybersecurity risks.

This combination offers a well-balanced response to identified policy challenges, significantly

enhancing effectiveness, efficiency and coherence across the Union.

The transition to the proposed preferred option for the regulatory framework will incur costs,

both for ENISA to meet its new tasks (estimated at up to EUR 161.3 million over five years)

and for public authorities across the Union for supervising (estimated at up to EUR 80 million

over five years, considering relevant cost savings). Regarding businesses, over five years,

phasing out specific high-risk equipment could lead to annual costs of EUR 3.4 to 4.3 billion

for mobile network operators, while investments in trusted suppliers could grow up to 2

billion per year.

At the same time, streamlined and reduced compliance obligations are expected to generate

cost savings of up to EUR 15.3 billion for businesses over five years. Furthermore, improving

the Union’s overall cyber posture and technological sovereignty and stimulating innovation

and competitiveness would yield significant benefits for the general public, public authorities

and businesses. This is expected to largely offset initial expenditures in the long term.

By reducing market fragmentation and harmonising regulatory requirements, the preferred

options enhance competitive equality across the Union, providing businesses with clearer

paths to compliance and innovation.

The preferred options would also contribute to simplification through clear guidance and

integrated systems, decreasing administrative burdens. The options comply with the ’one-in,

one-out’ principle by ensuring that new obligations are counterbalanced by reductions

elsewhere.

• Regulatory fitness and simplification

The CSA revision, through the selected policy options A.2, B.2, C.2 and D.3, strongly

contributes to improving clarity, removing inefficiencies and aligning procedures across legal

frameworks. More concretely, option A.2 proposes a full reform of ENISA’s mandate,

effectively supporting policy implementation and operational cooperation among Member

States. This consolidation will also help eliminate fragmented practices, improving

coordination while lowering compliance and operational costs in the long term. Option B.2,

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which involves repealing the current CSA and introducing a reformed ECCF, increases

efficiency by revising the governance model and supporting more predictable, coherent and

agile certification procedures. This will enable faster scheme adoption and better alignment

with cross-cutting legislation, reducing regulatory fragmentation and easing the burden on

both public and private stakeholders. Option C.2 reduces compliance costs for entities subject

to relevant Union cybersecurity legislation through scope changes and by enabling

organisational cybersecurity certification schemes for entities in scope of the NIS 2 Directive

and other legal acts. This approach will significantly simplify regulatory obligations for

entities subject to multiple requirements and ensure a more effective use of resources across

national authorities. Option D.3 creates a harmonised framework to tackle non-technical risks

affecting ICT supply chains, reducing the current fragmentation of approaches across Member

States. Together, these options represent a substantial simplification and modernisation of the

Union’s cybersecurity legal framework, fully aligned with the REFIT principles of clarity,

efficiency and digital readiness.

The proposal is consistent with the ‘Digital Check’, as its emphasis on streamlined digital

processes demonstrates the Union’s commitment to a digital-first approach, ensuring faster,

more reliable data exchange and decision-making. Option D.3 could also have a high impact

on digitalisation as it would entail the replacement of components from entities established in

or controlled by entities from third countries posing cybersecurity concerns (high-risk

suppliers).

• Fundamental rights

The legislative proposal was assessed based on its potential to enhance or put at risk

fundamental rights and promote equality and trust, with a particular focus on societal impacts

and rights, including privacy, data protection and the ability of individuals to understand,

exercise and enforce their rights.

Extending ENISA’s mandate will contribute to more cyber resilience across the economy and

society in general, leading to better protection of people’s privacy and personal data. The

proposal will also support education and training on cybersecurity as it clarifies ENISA’s role

in the development of skills for the cybersecurity workforce.

Furthermore, the ECCF will improve trust among the general public and businesses in the

Union in certified ICT solutions that support everyday life. Putting in place additional

schemes would increase this impact.

The proposal contributes to people’s trust by incentivising entities in critical sectors to obtain

cybersecurity certification, thereby publicly demonstrating their high level of cybersecurity.

Moreover, by ensuring harmonised reporting on ransomware incidents and taking measures

for transition to post-quantum cryptography, it would increase public trust in the protection of

sensitive data in critical sectors.

The provisions regarding supply chain security will have some impact on the protection of

fundamental rights by limiting the foreign interference. Activities such as espionage and

surveillance heavily undermine citizens’ fundamental rights. This horizontal framework

would have the potential to improve the trust, security and privacy in various technologies and

digital solutions.

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4. BUDGETARY IMPLICATIONS

The estimated budget of the EU Cybersecurity Agency (ENISA), which will contribute to a

significant boost for the EU’s security, was estimated at EUR 341 million for 7 years or

yearly average budget of EUR 49 million (projection for 2028 to 2034). This represents

81.5% increase to the budget of the Agency in 2025. The generated benefits of the proposed

initiative, as analysed in the Impact Assessment will be significant with up to EUR 14.6

billion of cost savings for businesses. Furthermore, while the magnitude of the potential cost

savings linked to the overall improvement of the preparedness of the Union against

cybersecurity incidents is by nature difficult to quantify, it is estimated that costs savings

linked to faster response and slowing down proliferation of cybersecurity incidents could

range from ranging from EUR 3.7 to 4.4 bn over five years. In the context of upcoming policy

initiatives, the Commission will look at the overall distributions of resources for and within

European institutions, bodies, agencies and offices in the area of cybersecurity to leverage

knowledge and expertise, and to identify and develop synergies. The additional resources proposed to reinforce the Agency are translated into 118 FTEs and

additional operational costs that will cover for current contribution agreements between the

ENISA and the Commission such as the maintenance of the Single Reporting Platform; for

the FTEs working on the operation and administration of the EU Cybersecurity Reserve, as

well as for important Commission initiatives like the development of the Single Entry Point

under the Digital Omnibus Proposal. Other operational costs are related to the coordinated

vulnerability disclosure programme, gathering and analysis of cybersecurity threat

intelligence, secure communications and building cybersecurity maturity for ENISA. The

operational costs for the maintenance of the European Cybersecurity Certification schemes,

the cybersecurity skills authorisations and the testing tools service are also added in this

budged, however these costs also include self-funding mechanisms through fees.

Important aspect of the proposal is the introduction of fee mechanisms that among other

policy objectives will also contribute to a sustainable financial circuit within the Agency. The

revised CSA presents three types of fees that will contribute to the ENISA’s budget, namely,

fees from issuing authorisations for skills attestations, fees from testing tools service and fees

from supporting the maintenance of the European Cybersecurity Certification schemes. The

expected generated benefit for the EU budget is estimated at approximately, EUR 18.5 million

over 7-year period from 2028 to 2034.

The budgetary request of the Commission translates into 50 additional FTE posts, which will

be implementing the supply chain framework, as well as tasks related to drafting

implementing acts for the fee mechanisms, maintenance of certification schemes,

standardisation and support to operational cooperation among others. The cost for the

Commission of implementing the supply chain framework is expected to be specifically

impacted by the number of ownership and control assessments (OCA) the Commission will

be performing. The results of this task, however, will contribute greatly to savings for the

Member States when supervising the implementation of mitigating measures and obligations

imposed on the NIS2 entities by the framework. Member States will be able to leverage the

results of the OCA assessments directly, rather each one individually to spend resources on

the same assessments needs.

See the financial fiche accompanying the cyber package for more detailed information.

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5. OTHER ELEMENTS

• Implementation plans and monitoring, evaluation and reporting arrangements

The Commission will monitor the application of the proposed regulation and submit a report

on its evaluation to the European Parliament and to the Council every five years. These

reports will be public and detail the effective application and enforcement of the proposed

regulation.

• Explanatory documents (for directives)

Not applicable as the proposal is a regulation.

• Detailed explanation of the specific provisions of the proposal

The proposal clarifies the role of ENISA and entrusts it with concrete tasks to support its

stakeholders, at the forefront of which are the Member States, in particular as regards support

in implementing Union policy and legislation, operational cooperation, capacity-building,

cybersecurity certification and standardisation and the improvement of the cybersecurity

workforce and its mobility across the Union. The proposal further aims at making the

European Cybersecurity Certification Framework (ECCF) more effective and efficient to

improve the level of cybersecurity within the Union and empower customers to make

informed choices when procuring ICT products, services, processes and managed security

services across the internal market. Moreover, in combination with the proposal for a

Directive introducing targeted amendments to the NIS 2 Directive, this proposal aims to

facilitate compliance with cybersecurity obligations and unlock resources to strengthen the

operational cybersecurity preparedness of entities in the Union’s critical sectors. Last, the

proposal addresses the need to make the Union’s economy and ICT supply chain more

resilient to promote its own security and competitiveness. The details are provided below.

TITLE I: GENERAL PROVISIONS

Title I of the proposed regulation contains the general provisions: the subject matter

(Article 1) and the definitions (Article 2), including references to relevant definitions from

other Union instruments, such as Directive (EU) 2022/255521 (NIS 2 Directive), Regulation

(EC) No 765/200822 and Regulation (EU) No 1025/201223.

TITLE II: ENISA (THE EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR CYBERSECURITY)

Title II of the proposed regulation contains the key provisions related to ENISA.

Chapter I outlines the mission (Article 3) and objectives of ENISA (Article 4).

Chapter II outlines the tasks of the Agency in three sections.

Section 1 includes provisions concerning the tasks related to supporting the implementation of

Union policy and law. It specifies which entities and organisations are to receive support and

the manner in which this should be done (Article 5). Article 6 delineates the Agency’s

capacity-building responsibilities, including offering knowledge and expertise to Member

States on preventing and addressing cyber threats, updating cybersecurity strategies and

21 http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2022/2555/oj 22 http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2008/765/oj 23 http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2012/1025/oj

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expanding the cybersecurity workforce. ENISA will also assist Member States in their

awareness-raising activities (Article 7) and will perform analysis of the main market trends in

cybersecurity and disseminate technical advice and analyses (Article 8). ENISA will also

contribute to and promote international cooperation on cybersecurity matters as described in

Article 9.

Section 2 sets out ENISA’s tasks regarding operational cooperation in relation to Member

States, Union entities and CERT-EU, the computer security incident response teams (CSIRTs)

network, EU-CyCLONe and other stakeholders, including the issuance of guidelines and

implementation of secure communications tools (Article 10). ENISA will also help improve

situational awareness of cyber threats and incidents by (among others) developing one or

more repositories of cyber threat intelligence, performing analysis and issuing early alerts

(Article 11). The rules on such early alerts (content, timing, service) are set out in Article 12.

To assist essential and important entities in preparing for, responding to and recovering from

ransomware incidents, ENISA shall operate the EU Cybersecurity Reserve as explained in

Article 13 and in cooperation with Europol and CSIRTs or other competent authorities as

applicable. Article 14 includes provisions on ENISA’s role in cybersecurity exercises at

Union level, including the compilation of an annual rolling programme of Union-level

cybersecurity exercises. In addition to these tasks, ENISA should provide tools and platforms,

in particular the single reporting platform established pursuant to Article 16(1) of Regulation

(EU) 2024/2847 (Article 15). Lastly, the Agency must develop a common Union vulnerability

management service capacity and provide vulnerability management services (Article 16).

Section 3 on cybersecurity certification and standardisation sets out the Agency’s tasks in this

regard. Article 17 describes ENISA’s role in the development and implementation of the

ECCF, including its leading role in preparing schemes and ensuring their maintenance and

capacity-building, while Article 18 sets out how ENISA should engage in drafting technical

specifications and contribute to standardisation activities at European and international level,

including in the area of cryptographic algorithms.

Section 4 details the Agency’s tasks regarding the implementation of the Cybersecurity Skills

Academy. Article 19 includes provisions related to ENISA’s role regarding the European

cybersecurity skills framework (ECSF), while its tasks regarding the development and

maintenance of European individual cybersecurity skills attestation schemes are set out in

Article 20. Requirements to become an authorised attestation provider are stipulated in Article

21 and those related to the processing of applications in Article 22. ENISA must provide

public information related to the ECSF and individual cybersecurity skills attestations

(Article 23).

Chapter III concerns the organisation of ENISA. The administrative and management

structure of the Agency also includes a Deputy Executive Director (Article 24). Provisions

related to the Management Board, its composition, its chairperson, meetings, functions and

voting rules are included in Section 1 (Article 25 to 29). The Executive Board must assist the

Management Board as set out in Article 30 under Section 2. Section 3 includes rules on the

appointment, dismissal and extension of the term of office of the Executive Director

(Article 31) and rules on the Executive Director’s tasks and responsibilities (Article 32). The

Management Board may decide to create a Deputy Executive Director role to assist the

Executive Director (Section 4, Articles 33 and 34). The Management Board must set up the

ENISA Advisory Group, which must advise ENISA according to the rules in Article 35.

Section 6 sets out rules on the creation and composition of the Board of Appeal (Article 36)

and its members (Article 37). Article 38 specifies the circumstances under which members of

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the Board of Appeal must abstain from appeal proceedings and outlines the grounds for

objecting to any member of the Board. Appeals may be brought before the Board of Appeal

against decisions taken by ENISA or if ENISA fails to act (Article 39). Article 40 includes

provisions on the people entitled to appeal, the time limit and the form of the appeal. Articles

41 to 43 set out rules on interlocutory revision, the examination of decisions on appeals, and

actions before the Court of Justice. Finally, Article 44 provides for the process related to the

single programming document.

Chapter IV concerns the establishment and structure of the Agency’s budget, as well as rules

guiding its presentation and implementation (Articles 45 to 55). It also includes the provisions

facilitating the combating of fraud, corruption and other unlawful activities (Article 51).

Chapter V relates to the staffing of the Agency. It includes general provisions on the staff

regulations and the conditions of employment of other servants and rules guiding privileges

and immunity (Articles 56 and 57). It introduces provisions requiring Member States to

designate liaison officers as seconded national experts to ENISA and their role in the Agency

(Article 58). It also includes provisions guiding the use of seconded national experts and other

staff not employed by the Agency (Article 59).

Finally, Chapter VI contains the general provisions related to the Agency. It outlines its legal

status (Article 60), establishes its seat (Article 61) and contains provisions on the Agency’s

headquarters agreement and operating conditions, and on administrative control by the

Ombudsman (Articles 62 and 63). It includes provisions regulating the issues of liability,

language arrangements, and protection of personal data (Article 64 to 66), as well as security

rules on the protection of sensitive non-classified and classified information (Article 67). It

provides rules for the cooperation with Union entities and national authorities (Article 68) and

other stakeholders (Article 69). It describes the rules guiding the Agency’s cooperation with

third countries and international organisations (Article 70).

TITLE III: EUROPEAN CYBERSECURITY CERTIFICATION FRAMEWORK

Title III of the proposed regulation establishes the ECCF.

Chapter I introduces the objectives, scope and procedures of the framework. The objectives

(Article 71) include to strengthen cybersecurity across the Union and facilitate a harmonised

approach to the certification of ICT products, ICT services, ICT processes, managed security

services or cyber posture of entities. The framework should also leverage certification to

simplify compliance with applicable Union legislation through presumption of conformity,

thereby reducing the burden for businesses (Article 78). Chapter I then details procedural

aspects, starting with consultations on strategic European cybersecurity certification priorities

and public information related to scheme development by the Commission and the creation of

a new European Cybersecurity Certification Assembly (Article 72). Following a detailed

request by the Commission (Article 73), ENISA is expected to deliver a candidate scheme

within 12 months. Article 74 provides for additional timelines related to the submission of the

ECCG’s opinion and the submission of the scheme in view of its adoption by the

Commission. Article 75 introduces a clear maintenance mechanism for existing schemes,

which might lead to the review of such schemes (Article 76). The review of a scheme might

be further informed by a periodical evaluation of the scheme’s effectiveness and impact on

the Single Market. Article 77 provides a basis for ENISA to draw up technical specifications

in support of the development and maintenance of European cybersecurity certification

schemes. When adopting or reviewing a scheme, the Commission may include references to

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such technical specifications (Article 74). The various procedures ensure transparency and

quality of delivery by engaging expert and general stakeholders at various stages of the

planning, development, adoption and maintenance of certification schemes. Article 79

provides for a dedicated ENISA website on European cybersecurity certification schemes,

which ought to provide information on adopted schemes as well as European cybersecurity

certificates and EU statements of conformity issued under those schemes.

Chapter II provides general rules for the content of European cybersecurity certification

schemes.

Article 80 sets out a list of security objectives against which a scheme is to be designed by

ENISA and ensures alignment with relevant cybersecurity legislation. Each European

cybersecurity certification scheme may provide for elements specified in Article 81. These

elements must be compatible with Union legislation and may be harmonised across schemes

using model provisions. Both provisions provide the necessary flexibility to adapt to different

types of schemes. Additional provisions specify the rules related to assurance levels (Article

82) and conformity self-assessment (Article 83). The chapter further sets out a list of

supplementary information (Article 84) that the manufacturer or provider of ICT products,

ICT services or ICT processes must make available.

Finally, Chapter III establishes the rules of governance for the ECCF, divided into three

sections.

Section 1 relates to rules on the issuance of European cybersecurity certificates including

those at the assurance level ‘high’ (Article 85). Furthermore, it lays down rules for

harmonising European cybersecurity certification schemes with national cybersecurity

certification schemes and cybersecurity certificates (Article 86) and provides for the

possibility of international recognition of European cybersecurity certificates, based on the

equivalence principle (Article 87). The section also outlines the role of and rules applicable to

national cybersecurity certification authorities (Article 88) and lays down rules for a peer

review mechanism between those authorities, ensuring equivalent standards across the Union

(Article 89), and for cooperation between those authorities in the ECCG (Article 90).

Section 2 provides for: (i) harmonised rules on the accreditation and authorisation of

conformity assessment bodies (Articles 91-92); (ii) notification rules, including an

empowerment to ensure further alignment with relevant Union law and the NLF (Article 93);

and (iii) a challenge procedure (Article 94) ensuring that the requirements for conformity

assessment bodies are upheld.

Finally, Section 3 provides for rights and judicial remedies against certification-related

decisions (Article 96) and requires Member States to lay down and enforce proportionate

penalties for regulatory infringements.

TITLE IV

Chapter I, Article 98 sets out the scope of the trusted ICT supply chain framework. The

framework will address non-technical risks in sectors of high criticality and other critical

sectors as referred in Directive (EU) 2022/2555. The mechanism shall identify key ICT assets

in critical ICT supply chains and set out appropriate and proportionate mitigation measures on

type of entities referred to in Annex I and Annex II to Directive (EU) 2022/2555. The

framework will be based on Union-level coordinated security risk assessments, requested by

the Commission or at least three Member States. Article 99 details how these risk assessments

EN 19 EN

will be carried out and that they should also establish mitigating measures. These risk

assessments should be finalised within six months from the request. Upon request from the

Commission, the NIS Cooperation Group may agree to a shorter period. The framework

foresees a possibility of an emergency procedure if an immediate intervention is justified to

preserve the proper functioning of the internal market and where the Commission has

sufficient reason to consider that there is a significant cyber threat for the security of the

Union in relation to critical ICT supply chains. In such case, the Commission shall consult

Member States on the need to take one or several mitigation measures and shall conduct a risk

assessment. Article 100 provides that where, as a result of the risk assessment referred to in

Article 99, or based on other sources, such as a public statement on behalf of the Union or a

Member State, it appears that a third country poses serious and structural non-technical risks

to ICT supply chains, the Commission shall verify the threat posed by that country, taking

into account of the elements listed in Article 100. Where the Commission concludes that a

third country poses serious and structural non-technical risks to ICT supply chains, Article

100 provides for a procedure for the Commission to designate such a third country as a

country posing cybersecurity concerns to ICT supply chains. Entities established in a third

country posing cybersecurity concerns designated in accordance with this Article, or

controlled by such third country, by an entity established in such third country, or by a

national of such third country will not be allowed to carry out a number of activities specified

in this Article. Article 101 provides for a general ICT supply chain mechanism where upon

completion of the security risk assessment by the NIS Cooperation Group or by the

Commission in accordance with Article 99, the Commission may take measures provided in

Articles 102 and 103.

The Commission can identify, through implementing acts, key ICT assets used for the

manufacturing of products, provision of services by the types of entity referred to Annex I and

Annex II to Directive (EU) 2022/2555. Article 102 further details the elements to be taken

account for the identification of key ICT assets. Article 103 establishes potential mitigation

measures in the ICT supply chain. The Commission, through implementing acts, can decide

that entities operating in sectors of high criticality and other critical sectors have to be subject

to specific mitigating measures, further detailed in the Article.

The Commission, by way of implementing acts, shall establish lists of high-risk suppliers

relevant for the prohibitions laid down in the implementing acts adopted in accordance with

Article 103(1), Article 103(7) or the prohibition referred to in Article 110(1), after conducting

an assessment of establishment and ownership and control. It should consult suppliers

concerned and competent authorities (Article 104).

An entity established in or controlled by entities from a third country posing cybersecurity

concerns designated in accordance with Article 100, may request to be allowed to provide

ICT components in key ICT assets of entities of the type referred in Annexes I and II to

Directive (EU) 2022/2555 and to participate in public procurement in relation to the provision

of such ICT components. Article 105 specifies what the request should contain and what is

the procedure for such an exemption. Article 106 specifies the rights of defence for an entity

in question. The Commission shall maintain a publicly accessible register of the decisions

regarding exemptions (Article 107). Articles 108 and 109 specifies confidentiality rules and

fees related to the exemption procedure.

Chapter II provides for an application of the trusted ICT supply chain framework to mobile,

fixed and satellite electronic communications networks, ensuring alignment with the proposed

Digital Networks Act.

EN 20 EN

The key ICT assets for mobile, fixed and satellite electronic communications networks are set

out in Annex II. The transition period of phasing out ICT components from high-risk

suppliers for the key ICT assets of the mobile electronic communications network shall not

exceed 36 months from the entry into force of this Regulation. Transition periods for fixed

and satellite electronic communications networks shall be specified by the Commission by

virtue of implementing acts. The Commission is empowered to adopt delegated act to amend

designated key ICT assets and transition periods, including for the future mobile generations

(Article 110). Article 111 stipulates that providers of mobile, fixed and satellite electronic

communications networks cannot not use, install or integrate, in any form, ICT components

from high-risk suppliers and cannot be granted general or individual authorisation.

Competent authorities, supervision and enforcement, jurisdiction, rights of defence

(Chapter III)

Chapter III further lays down the rules on competent authorities, supervision and enforcement

and jurisdiction.

Articles 112-114 specify the powers, means and responsibilities of Member States in ensuring

the implementation and enforcement of the provisions in Title IV. Member States have to

designate one or more competent authorities, to be notified to the Commission. Article 113

provides for the Commission to set up a network for cooperation of competent authorities of

Member States and the Commission to facilitate compliance, while Article 114 specifies the

supervisory and enforcement measures that competent authorities are entitled to take.

Penalties in case of infringement of the provisions of Title IV are specified in Article 115.

Article 116 details the possibility for Member States to mutually assist each other when

entities are having cross-border activities or when their key ICT assets are located in several

Member States. Article 117 provides for the rules on jurisdiction and territoriality.

TITLE VI: FINAL PROVISIONS

Title VI of the proposed regulation includes the final provisions, outlining rules for adopting

implementing and delegated acts, the evaluation process of the proposed regulation, and the

repeal and succession of Regulation (EU) 2019/881. It also specifies the date of entry into

force of the proposed Regulation.

EN 21 EN

2026/0011 (COD)

Proposal for a

REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL

on the European Union Agency for Cybersecurity (ENISA), the European cybersecurity

certification framework, and ICT supply chain security and repealing Regulation (EU)

2019/881 (The Cybersecurity Act 2)

(Text with EEA relevance)

THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,

Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and in particular

Article 114 thereof,

Having regard to the proposal from the European Commission,

After transmission of the draft legislative act to the national parliaments,

Having regard to the opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee24,

Having regard to the opinion of the Committee of the Regions25,

Acting in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure,

Whereas:

(1) Since the adoption of Regulation (EU) 2019/881 of the European Parliament and of

the Council26, the geopolitical, technological and policy landscapes have undergone

significant transformations. Cybersecurity incidents, whether caused by system

failures, human error, malicious acts or natural phenomena, have surged and

cyberattacks have become more sophisticated, affecting essential entities, businesses,

and the general public. The cybercrime ecosystem has proliferated, with ransomware

activity at its core. Supply chain incidents, whether caused by criminals for financial

gain or by State actors for disruption, espionage, disinformation or warfare have

intensified. As part of a wider hybrid strategy, incidents resulting from malicious

cyber activities and system failures ripple outward, disrupting essential services,

undermining trust in institutions, and affecting the Union’s societal and defence

readiness. Such incidents have proved their potential to impact economic activity,

financial stability and people’s lives. At the same time, vulnerability of critical civilian

infrastructure and systems pose a risk to defence capabilities where they rely on them.

(2) In parallel, emerging technologies such as artificial intelligence and quantum

computing have a disruptive effect on cybersecurity and cyber defence. They are

24 OJ C , , p. . 25 OJ C , , p. . 26 Regulation (EU) 2019/881 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 April 2019 on ENISA

(the European Union Agency for Cybersecurity) and on information and communications technology

cybersecurity certification and repealing Regulation (EU) No 526/2013 (Cybersecurity Act) (OJ L 151,

7.6.2019, p. 15, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2019/881/oj).

EN 22 EN

reshaping the tools of defence and the tactics of adversaries, posing threats to

cybersecurity and cyber defence while also offering avenues for technological

advancements. Although they may contribute to cybersecurity through enhanced threat

detection or automated incident response, they are also increasing the overall attack

surface for organisations, are potential targets for manipulation, and can undermine the

long-term viability of security measures such as encryption.

(3) To address those developments, the Union has enhanced its legal and policy tools.

Directive (EU) 2022/2555 of the European Parliament and of the Council27

strengthens cybersecurity for critical infrastructure, complemented by Directive (EU)

2022/2557 of the European Parliament and of the Council28 for physical security.

Regulation (EU) 2024/2847 of the European Parliament and of the Council29 enhances

the cybersecurity of products with digital elements. Regulation (EU) 2025/38 of the

European Parliament and of the Council30 builds Union-wide response capabilities,

and the Council Recommendation of 6 June 2025 on an EU blueprint for cyber crisis

management31 (‘Recommendation on the Cyber Blueprint’) supports Union-level

crisis management cooperation. The 5G Cybersecurity Toolbox32 constitutes a first

step towards a coordinated approach at Union level to secure 5G networks. The

Commission communication on the Cybersecurity Skills Academy33 addresses the

growing challenge of the cybersecurity talent gap. Additionally, the cybersecurity

framework has been enhanced by sector-specific legislation, in particular Regulation

(EU) 2022/2554 of the European Parliament and of the Council34 for the financial

sector, Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2024/136635 for the electricity

27 Directive (EU) 2022/2555 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 December 2022 on

measures for a high common level of cybersecurity across the Union, amending Regulation (EU) No

910/2014 and Directive (EU) 2018/1972, and repealing Directive (EU) 2016/1148 (NIS 2 Directive)

(OJ L 333, 27.12.2022, p. 80, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2022/2555/oj). 28 Directive (EU) 2022/2557 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 December 2022 on the

resilience of critical entities and repealing Council Directive 2008/114/EC (OJ L 333, 27.12.2022, p.

164, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2022/2557/oj). 29 Regulation (EU) 2024/2847 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2024 on

horizontal cybersecurity requirements for products with digital elements and amending Regulations

(EU) No 168/2013 and (EU) 2019/1020 and Directive (EU) 2020/1828 (Cyber Resilience Act) (OJ L,

2024/2847, 20.11.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/2847/oj). 30 Regulation (EU) 2025/38 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 December 2024 laying

down measures to strengthen solidarity and capacities in the Union to detect, prepare for and respond to

cyber threats and incidents and amending Regulation (EU) 2021/694 (Cyber Solidarity Act) (OJ L,

2025/38, 15.01.2025, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2025/38/oj). 31 OJ C, C/2025/3445, 20.6.2025, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2025/3445/oj. 32 Cybersecurity of 5G networks – EU Toolbox of risk mitigating measures, NIS Cooperation Group,

1/2020, available at: https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/library/cybersecurity-5g-networks-eu-

toolbox-risk-mitigating-measures. 33 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council, Closing the

cybersecurity talent gap to boost the EU’s competitiveness, growth and resilience (‘The Cybersecurity

Skills Academy’), COM(2023)207 final, 18 April 2023. 34 Regulation (EU) 2022/2554 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 December 2022 on

digital operational resilience for the financial sector and amending Regulations (EC) No 1060/2009,

(EU) No 648/2012, (EU) No 600/2014, (EU) No 909/2014 and (EU) 2016/1011 (OJ L 333, 27.12.2022,

p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2022/2554/oj). 35 Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2024/1366 of 11 March 2024 supplementing Regulation (EU)

2019/943 of the European Parliament and of the Council by establishing a network code on sector-

specific rules for cybersecurity aspects of cross-border electricity flows (OJ L, 2024/1366, 24.05.2024,

ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg_del/2024/1366/oj).

EN 23 EN

subsector, Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2022/164536 and Commission

Implementing Regulation (EU) 2023/20337(PART-IS) as well as relevant aviation

security rules set out in Commission Regulation (EU) 2019/158338 for the air transport

sub-sector, and other policy documents such as the Commission communication on an

EU action plan on the cybersecurity of hospitals and healthcare providers39. Union

entities are also strengthened with Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2023/2841 of the

European Parliament and of the Council40, which lays down measures that aim to

achieve a high common level of cybersecurity within Union institutions, bodies,

offices and agencies. This enhanced legal framework for cybersecurity has further

specified ENISA’s tasks.

(4) In this context, and as stated in the ProtectEU: European Internal Security Strategy41,

Preparedness Union Strategy42, ensuring the preparedness, security and resilience of

the Union’s society and economy requires strong European coordination, trust and

information sharing between stakeholders, robust frameworks to ensure the security of

ICT products, services, processes and managed security services, as well as growing

and strengthening the cybersecurity workforce. It further calls for bolstering ICT

supply chains by ensuring European technological sovereignty over key assets, which

would increase the Union’s resilience and could benefit cyber defence efforts. In

36 Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2022/1645 of 14 July 2022 laying down rules for the

application of Regulation (EU) 2018/1139 of the European Parliament and of the Council, as regards

requirements for the management of information security risks with a potential impact on aviation

safety for organisations covered by Commission Regulations (EU) No 748/2012 and (EU) No 139/2014

and amending Commission Regulations (EU) No 748/2012 and (EU) No 139/2014 (OJ L 248, pp. 18–

31, 26.9.2022, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg_del/2022/1645/oj). 37 Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2023/203 of 27 October 2022 laying down rules for the

application of Regulation (EU) 2018/1139 of the European Parliament and of the Council, as regards

requirements for the management of information security risks with a potential impact on aviation

safety for organisations covered by Commission Regulations (EU) No 1321/2014, (EU) No 965/2012,

(EU) No 1178/2011, (EU) 2015/340, Commission Implementing Regulations (EU) 2017/373 and (EU)

2021/664, and for competent authorities covered by Commission Regulations (EU) No 748/2012, (EU)

No 1321/2014, (EU) No 965/2012, (EU) No 1178/2011, (EU) 2015/340 and (EU) No 139/2014,

Commission Implementing Regulations (EU) 2017/373 and (EU) 2021/664 and amending Commission

Regulations (EU) No 1178/2011, (EU) No 748/2012, (EU) No 965/2012, (EU) No 139/2014, (EU) No

1321/2014, (EU) 2015/340, and Commission Implementing Regulations (EU) 2017/373 and (EU)

2021/664 (OJ L 31, 2.2.2023, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg_impl/2023/203/oj). 38 Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/1583 of 25 September 2019 amending Implementing

Regulation (EU) 2015/1998 laying down detailed measures for the implementation of the common

basic standards on aviation security, as regards cybersecurity measures (OJ L 246, 26.9.2019, pp. 15–

18, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg_impl/2019/1583/oj). 39 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European

Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, European action plan on the

cybersecurity of hospitals and healthcare providers, COM(2025) 10 final, 15 January 2025. 40 Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2023/2841 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 December

2023 laying down measures for a high common level of cybersecurity at the institutions, bodies, offices

and agencies of the Union (OJ L, 2023/2841, 18.12.2023, ELI:

http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2023/2841/oj). 41 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European

Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions on Protect EU: a European Internal

Security Strategy, COM(2025)148 final, 1 April 2025. 42 Joint Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European

Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions on the European Preparedness

Union Strategy, JOIN(2025) 130 final.

EN 24 EN

addition, the Communication on Strengthening EU economic security43 identifies as

priority objectives the needs to prevent access to sensitive information and data that

could undermine the EU’s economic security and to prevent and mitigate disruptions

to EU critical infrastructure affecting the EU economy. It acknowledges the essential

role effective cybersecurity measures play in this regard.

(5) Large-scale cybersecurity incidents affecting critical infrastructure, digital services or

essential societal functions may have impacts on the population requiring coordinated

civil protection and crisis management action at Union level. In line with the all-

hazards approach of the European Preparedness Union Strategy and Decision No

1313/2013/EU on the Union Civil Protection Mechanism, arrangements for situational

awareness, incident response and exercises under this Regulation should feed in Union

crisis management, notably though the Emergency Response Coordination Centre

(ERCC).

(6) This proposal is consistent with and complemented by the [Proposal for a Directive

complementing [the revision of Regulation (EU) 2019/881] and amending Directive

(EU) 2022/2555 as regards the simplification of the implementation of measures for a

high common level of cybersecurity across the Union], as well as with the [Proposal

for Regulation on simplification of the digital legislation (Digital Omnibus)44 which

provides the obligation on ENISA to develop a single entry-point for incident

reporting through which entities can simultaneously fulfil their incident reporting

obligations under multiple legal acts.

(7) Regulation (EC) No 460/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council45

established ENISA with the aim of contributing to ensuring a high and effective level

of network and information security within the Union, and developing a culture of

network and information security for the benefit of citizens, consumers, enterprises

and public administrations. ENISA’s mandate was extended three times before

Regulation (EU) 2019/881 granted it a permanent mandate. In order to better address

the needs created by the evolving threat and technological landscapes, in particular

with regards to operational cooperation and the increased need for cybersecurity

professionals, ENISA’s mandate should be further reinforced. In the interest of legal

certainty, Regulation (EU) 2019/881 should be replaced.

(8) In an evolving threat landscape where cybersecurity incidents become increasingly

more significant, delivering trust for individuals, public authorities and businesses in

their daily use of technologies is even more important than ever. An increase in trust

can be facilitated by a reinforced Union-wide certification of the ECCF providing for

common cybersecurity requirements and evaluation criteria across national markets

and sectors. The new framework should lay down the main horizontal requirements

for European cybersecurity certification schemes and allow for European

cybersecurity certificates and EU statements of conformity to be recognised and used

in all Member States. In doing so, it should establish a procedure and governance

framework that allows for the timely and predictable development and maintenance of

European cybersecurity certification schemes. The European cybersecurity

43 Joint Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council, Strengthening

EU economic security, JOIN(2025) 977 final. 44 COM/2025/837 final 45 Regulation (EC) No 460/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 10 March 2004

establishing the European Network and Information Security Agency (OJ L 77, 13.3.2004, p. 1, ELI:

http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2004/460/oj).

EN 25 EN

certification schemes should be applied uniformly in all Member States to ensure a

harmonised implementation of cybersecurity requirements, level the playing field and

prevent ‘certification shopping’ based on different levels of stringency in different

Member States. ENISA should have a key role in providing for the development of the

schemes through technical specifications and ensuring that such schemes remain

technically up to date. Furthermore, to meet the market needs effectively, the

framework should provide for the possibility for certification of cybersecurity risk

management measures addressed to entities and facilitate compliance with other

applicable Union legislation in the field of cybersecurity. Alignment with existing

Union law, such as Regulation (EU) 2024/2847 and Directive (EU) 2022/2555, is

essential for European cybersecurity certification schemes to contribute to reducing

compliance burden on businesses, increase their attractiveness and strengthen the

cyber resilience of the Union.

(9) The mission of ENISA should be to support Member States and Union entities to

achieve a high level of cybersecurity, resilience and trust in the Union. To that end,

ENISA should act as a reference point for advice and expertise on cybersecurity, and

its work should primarily revolve around four key areas of cybersecurity at Union

level. First, ENISA should support Member States in the consistent implementation of

Union policy and legislation regarding cybersecurity and assist Member States through

capacity-building activities to continuously improve their capacities in terms of

preparedness, resilience and response. Second, ENISA should contribute to

operational cooperation at Union level, amongst Member States, and to enhanced

shared situational awareness of cyber threats and incidents among Member States and

Union entities. The third key area should be cybersecurity certification and

standardisation, while the fourth should be the implementation of the Cybersecurity

Skills Academy, which should contribute to the development of a thriving European

cybersecurity workforce with skills that should be portable across Member States.

(10) Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2023/2841 laying down measures for a high common level

of cybersecurity at the institutions, bodies, offices and agencies of the Union and

provides for the mandate of CERT-EU, establishing it as the Cybersecurity Service for

Union institutions, bodies, offices and agencies to contribute to the security of the

unclassified ICT environment of Union entities by advising them on cybersecurity,

supporting them to prevent, detect, handle, mitigate, respond to and recover from

incidents and acting as their cybersecurity information exchange and incident response

coordination hub. Furthermore, CERT-EU is tasked with offering relevant

cybersecurity services to Union entities. As part of its mission, ENISA should support

also Union entities. In particular, it should do so by engaging through structured

cooperation with CERT-EU on capacity building, operational cooperation and long-

term strategic analyses of cyber threats. When relevant, ENISA may leverage the

structured cooperation with CERT-EU for ENISA cybersecurity services or support

that can be of added value to Union entities, in a coordinated manner to ensure

synergies of efforts of CERT-EU.

(11) One of the core tasks of ENISA should be to support Member States in implementing

Union policy and law regarding cybersecurity consistently, in particular as regards

Directive (EU) 2022/2555, Regulation (EU) 2024/2847, and Regulation (EU) 2025/38.

To help achieve consistent and effective implementation of the Union cybersecurity

acquis, ENISA should issue technical guidance and reports, provide advice and best

practices, and facilitate the exchange of best practices between competent authorities

to this end. Furthermore, ENISA is assessing the state of cybersecurity in the Union

EN 26 EN

and adopts a report to that end in accordance with Article 18 of Directive (EU)

2022/2555. ENISA should also be able to respond to requests for advice and assistance

by Member States and, where applicable, Union entities, on matters falling within

ENISA’s mandate.

(12) With a view to stimulating cooperation between the public and private sectors and

within the private sector, in particular to support the protection of critical

infrastructure, ENISA should support information sharing within and among sectors,

in particular the sectors listed in Annexes I and II to Directive (EU) 2022/2555, and

information regarding products with digital elements falling within the scope of

Regulation (EU) 2024/2847. Such support may take the form of providing best

practices and guidance on available tools and procedures, as well as providing

guidance on how to address regulatory issues related to information sharing, for

example through facilitating the establishment of sectoral Information Sharing and

Analysis Centres (ISACs).

(13) In view of supporting and facilitating the strategic cooperation and the exchange of

information, ENISA should contribute to the work of the Cooperation Group

established by Directive (EU) 2022/2555 (‘NIS Cooperation Group’), in particular by

providing expertise, advice and by facilitating the exchange of best practices, among

others, in relation to cross-border dependencies, regarding risks and incidents. ENISA

should also contribute to the work of the European Digital Identity Cooperation Group

established by Regulation (EU) No 910/2014 of the European Parliament and of the

Council46, the European Cybersecurity Certification Group, and the administrative

cooperation group (ADCO) established by Regulation (EU) 2024/2847.

(14) The public core of the open internet, namely its main protocols and infrastructure,

which are a global public good, provides the essential functionality of the internet as a

whole and underpins its normal operation. Within its mandate, ENISA should support

the security and resilience of the public core of the open internet and the stability of its

functioning, including, but not limited to, the secure deployment and operation of key

protocols (in particular Domain Name System, Border Gateway Protocol, and Internet

Protocol version 6) and the operation of the domain name system (such as the

operation of all top-level domains), by promoting best practices, guidance, and

cooperation, in accordance with established global, multistakeholder Internet

governance arrangements and the respective roles and responsibilities of relevant

international technical and operational bodies.

(15) ENISA acts as a reference point for advice and expertise on cybersecurity. Therefore,

at the Commission’s request, ENISA should assist it by means of expertise, technical

advice, information, analyses, including feasibility studies, opinions and preparatory

work regarding any specific matter in the field of cybersecurity with a view to

informing the Commission’s policymaking and facilitating the Commission’s

monitoring of the implementation of Union legislation regarding cybersecurity.

(16) Similarly, taking into account its expertise, ENISA should assist Member States in

their efforts to build and enhance capabilities and preparedness to prevent, detect and

respond to cyber threats and incidents and in relation to the security of network and

46 Regulation (EU) No 910/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 July 2014 on

electronic identification and trust services for electronic transactions in the internal market and

repealing Directive 1999/93/EC (OJ L 257, 28.8.2014, p. 73, ELI:

http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2014/910/oj).

EN 27 EN

information systems. In particular, ENISA should support the development and

enhancement of computer security incident response teams (‘CSIRTs’) provided for in

Directive (EU) 2022/2555, with a view to achieving a high common level of maturity

of CSIRTs in the Union.

(17) ENISA has supported and should continue supporting Member States in developing

and implementing guidelines for their national cybersecurity strategies contributing to

the adoption and implementation of cybersecurity strategies by all Member States

ENISA should promote the dissemination of such strategies through the National

Cybersecurity Strategies (NCSS) Interactive Map and should further follow the

progress of their implementation, including by providing support in the development

of key performance indicators in this context.

(18) Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2023/2841 has tasked the Interinstitutional Cybersecurity

Board with supporting Union entities in elevating their respective cybersecurity

postures, and CERT-EU with contributing to the security of the unclassified ICT

environment of all Union entities. ENISA, based on its experience in cybersecurity,

should support the Interinstitutional Cybersecurity Board and CERT-EU in their tasks

in accordance with Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2023/2841, including by contributing to

cyber threat analysis, situational awareness, cybersecurity exercises, coordination on

incident response and the exchange of know-how and best practices.

(19) Based on ENISA’s expertise and to complement the capabilities of national and Union

public authorities, ENISA should deliver training using the European Cybersecurity

Skills Framework (ECSF) as a basis, in particular to support effective policy

implementation, operational cooperation, and awareness-raising.

(20) To ensure synergies with the European Cybersecurity Industrial, Technology and

Research Competence Centre (ECCC) and the Network of National Coordination

Centres established pursuant to Regulation (EU) 2021/887 of the European Parliament

and of the Council47, ENISA should support them by sharing information about

current and emerging risks and cyber threats, including risks and threats regarding

information and communications technologies.

(21) The Preparedness Strategy highlights that digital literacy, which relies on acquiring

basic digital skills, is essential to empower more resilient citizens in the face of

potential crises. However, as highlighted in the Commission Communication on the

Union of Skills48, almost half the adult population does not have basic digital skills

despite more than 90% of jobs requiring them. In order to ensure that the current and

potential future workforce have the required skills in a rapidly evolving digital

environment, and to contribute to the development of the European cybersecurity

talent pipeline, ENISA should support cybersecurity awareness-raising activities that

aim to attract talent and help informing about the education and skills needed in the

area of cybersecurity, such as the European Cybersecurity Challenge. In this regard,

ENISA should coordinate cybersecurity competitions, capture-the-flag events and

similar practical exercises, as a means of developing cybersecurity skills and fostering

47 Regulation (EU) 2021/887 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 2021 establishing

the European Cybersecurity Industrial, Technology and Research Competence Centre and the Network

of National Coordination Centres (OJ L 202, 8.6.2021, p. 1, ELI:

http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/887/oj). 48 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the European Council, the Council,

the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, The Union of Skills,

COM(2025) 90 final, 5 March 2025.

EN 28 EN

capacity building across the Union. When carrying out awareness-raising activities,

ENISA should ensure that these address the needs of national public authorities and

Union entities, as well as the needs of businesses, in particular SMEs, and education

and training institutions, by maintaining practical frameworks and trainings such as

awareness-raising-in-a-box. ENISA should further develop practical and actionable

guidance to support the implementation of Union cybersecurity policy and legislation.

ENISA should also strive to provide relevant information on applicable certification

schemes, for example by providing guidelines and recommendations.

(22) To support businesses operating in the cybersecurity sector, users of cybersecurity

solutions, and to ensure effective the implementation of Title III of this Regulation,

ENISA should develop and maintain a ‘market observatory’ by performing regular

analyses and disseminating information on the main trends in the cybersecurity

market, on both the demand and supply sides. Furthermore, to support the users of the

EU Cybersecurity Reserve established pursuant to Regulation (EU) 2025/38, ENISA

should prepare the mapping of the services needed by such users, and of availability of

such services, pursuant to that Regulation.

(23) Cyber threats are a global issue. Closer international cooperation is necessary to

improve cybersecurity, including to define common norms of behaviour and common

approaches. To that end, ENISA should support Union’s cooperation with third

countries, with a focus on countries that are candidates for accession to the Union, and

international organisations, such as NATO, by providing the necessary expertise and

analysis to the Commission and relevant Union entities, where appropriate. ENISA’s

activities in the international area should always be in line with the priorities of the

Union.

(24) To help achieve a high level of cybersecurity in the Union, ENISA should support

operational cooperation among Member States, in cooperation with CERT-EU, among

Union entities, and between stakeholders. To that end, ENISA’s role should be

strengthened. ENISA should become a member of the CSIRTs network, contributing

to the network information exchange and analysis. ENISA should further promote and

support cooperation between the relevant CSIRTs in the event of incidents, attacks or

disruptions of networks or infrastructure managed or protected by the CSIRTs.

ENISA’s active support for the work of the CSIRTs network and the European cyber

crisis liaison organisation network (EU-CyCLONe) should enable those networks to

continue strengthening their maturity level. ENISA’s role in supporting such

cooperation includes combating threats to the security and integrity of democratic

institutions, elections and other processes, and the critical infrastructure on which they

depend, in line with the European Democracy Shield: Empowering Strong and

Resilient Democracies49.

(25) To support capacity-building, operational cooperation, and long-term strategic

analyses of cyber threats, ENISA should make use of the available technical and

operational expertise of CERT-EU through structured cooperation, for example

through dedicated arrangements.

(26) In order to strengthen cybersecurity across the Union and ensure a rapid and effective

response to cyber threats, ENISA should support Member States at their request,

including by providing advice on the improvement of their capabilities to prevent,

detect, respond to and recover from incidents, by facilitating the technical handling of

49 JOIN(2025) 791 final.

EN 29 EN

significant incidents within the meaning of Directive (EU) 2022/2555, in particular

through supporting the voluntary sharing of technical solutions between Member

States, or by ensuring that cyber threats and incidents are analysed. ENISA should also

assist EU-CyCLONe in preparing reports to the Union’s and Member States’ political

level.

(27) To reduce exposure to foreign interference, supply-chain manipulation, and strategic

data exfiltration, ENISA should use within the CSIRTs network and EU-CyCLONe

secure communications tools. Building on the Recommendation on the Cyber

Blueprint, such tools should be provided by legal entities established or deemed to be

established in the Union and controlled by Member States or by nationals of Member

States.

(28) To contribute to Union-level preparedness and response in the case of large-scale

cybersecurity incidents and crises, ENISA should carry out cybersecurity situational

awareness activities.

(29) Access to real-time, verified, reliable cyber threat intelligence (CTI) is crucial for

building shared situational awareness in the Union. ENISA, the Commission, CERT-

EU and the European Cybercrime Centre (EC3) at Europol have already developed

repositories of cyber threat intelligence that are tailored to their specific needs. ENISA

and other relevant Union entities should cooperate, voluntarily, to develop repositories

of real-time, verified, reliable CTI, and seek synergies to ensure economies of scale

and reinforce sound financial management. This work should also include sectoral

Union entities such as the EU agency for the Space Programme. They should share

only derived analysis, trends, and tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs), not raw

sources, and should respect the independence of entities to manage their own CTI

lifecycle in line with their mandates and need-to-know rules.

(30) In order to contribute to a timely and coordinated response, ENISA should be able to

issue early alerts of a potential or ongoing significant or large-scale incident, or a

cyber threat of a potential cross-border nature to the CSIRT or CSIRTs concerned,

and, where appropriate, to the CSIRTs network and EU-CyCLONe, in particular in

relation to entities listed in Annexes I and II to Directive (EU) 2022/2555. Information

in such early alerts may include publicly known vulnerabilities and whether they affect

products with digital elements covered by Regulation (EU) 2024/2847, as well as

techniques and procedures, indicators of compromise, adversarial tactics, threat-actor-

specific information and recommendations on mitigation measures.

(31) In order to maintain trust and not jeopardise information-sharing, it is important for

ENISA to apply visible markings indicating the extent to which a document or

information it has produced or received may be shared further. Similarly, ENISA

should use documents or information it receives for the purposes of carrying out its

activities, subject to any limitations by means of a visible marking on further

distribution of that information.

(32) To help increase awareness of cyber threat indicators and recommendations on

mitigation measures, ENISA should make an early alert service available to entities

operating in sectors listed in Annexes I and II to Directive (EU) 2022/2555. Such

generic, voluntary early alerts should benefit in particular SMEs, and should be

provided in a machine-readable format made publicly available. In any case, such

voluntary service is separate from and not related to any public-private partnerships

that ENISA may establish or has already established.

EN 30 EN

(33) To support Union shared cybersecurity situational awareness, ENISA, in close

cooperation with the Member States, should prepare a regular in-depth EU

Cybersecurity Technical Situation Report on incidents and cyber threats, based on

publicly available information, its own analysis and reports shared with it by Member

States’ CSIRTs or the national single points of contact on the security of network and

information systems (‘single points of contact’) provided for in Directive (EU)

2022/2555, both on a voluntary basis, Europol and CERT-EU. That report should be

made available to the Council, the European External Action Service, EU-CyCLONe,

the CSIRTs network, the Commission and Europol.

(34) In order to enhance the shared situational awareness of the cyber threat and incident

landscape among stakeholders, ENISA should analyse trends in cyber threats and

incidents. This should include a regular analysis addressing the sectors of high

criticality and other critical sectors listed in Annexes I and II to Directive (EU)

2022/2555, including the healthcare, energy and transport sectors. Such analysis

should include maturity levels of sectors and identify, among others, possible

challenges specific to a given sector. Where relevant, and in order to identify supply

chain effects, the analysis should evidence cyber threats and trends related to product

categories covered by Regulation (EU) 2024/2847. ENISA should develop expertise in

the field of cybersecurity of infrastructures and their critical supply chain

dependencies, in particular to support the sectors listed in Annexes I and II to

Directive (EU) 2022/2555 and the implementation of Regulation (EU) 2024/2847. To

this end, ENISA should also cooperate, where appropriate, with other relevant Union

entities.

(35) Further, to understand better the challenges in the area of cybersecurity, ENISA needs

to analyse current and emerging technologies and provide topic-specific assessments

on the expected societal, legal, economic and regulatory impact of technological

innovations on cybersecurity. In order to ensure easier access of the public to

information on cybersecurity risks and possible remedies, ENISA may provide

relevant information on its website, in a user-friendly and well-structured manner.

(36) ENISA’s strengthened role in fostering situational awareness, analysing threats and

providing technical advice will contribute to enhance collective cybersecurity efforts

concerning products with digital elements and support the implementation of

Regulation (EU) 2024/2847. In accordance with Regulation (EU) 2024/2847, ENISA

may propose joint activities to market surveillance authorities for checking compliance

of products with digital elements and identify categories of products with digital

elements for which sweeps may be organised. Information stemming from cyber threat

analysis and early alerts should strengthen the support that ENISA provides to those

authorities and contribute to an effective enforcement of Regulation (EU) 2024/2847

to prevent supply chain effects of cyber attacks across the internal market and enhance

the overall Union’s preparedness.

(37) Ransomware attacks are a prominent cybersecurity threat to the Union. To boost the

Union’s cybersecurity and combat ransomware, ENISA should develop capabilities

for situational awareness and support for incident response and recovery. When

assisting individual essential and important entities in responding to and recovering

from a ransomware attack, ENISA should closely cooperate with Europol and with

CSIRTs or competent authorities as applicable, thereby drawing from Europol’s

established experience in fighting ransomware crime. Such assistance should

complement CSIRTs’ activities supporting incident response. To achieve synergies in

its work against ransomware, ENISA should establish a helpdesk and, for that

EN 31 EN

purpose, it could pool relevant capabilities and counter-ransomware services and make

easily available information, guidance, and tools that can help essential and important

entities respond to and recover from a ransomware incident.

(38) ENISA should provide technical expertise and support to the Commission in preparing

an annual rolling programme of Union-level cybersecurity exercises in accordance

with the Recommendation on the Cyber Blueprint to prepare for cyber crises, to test

the level of cybersecurity of entities participating in such exercises, and to minimise

duplication of effort. ENISA should, for example, advise on the appropriate types of

exercise, such as tabletop, hybrid or full live, as well as objectives, scenarios and

participation.

(39) Access to correct and timely information about vulnerabilities and a robust

vulnerability management are imperative for ensuring a high level of cybersecurity in

the internal market. For that reason, ENISA should maintain a European vulnerability

database pursuant to Directive (EU) 2022/2555 and create a common Union

vulnerability management service capacity, ensuring a resilient and sustainable service

level and reducing the risk of disruptions. To that end, ENISA should explore

possibilities to deepen structured cooperation with programmes, registries or databases

similar to the European vulnerability database, in order to avoid a duplication of

efforts and to seek complementarity on an international level, where appropriate.

Furthermore, ENISA should support multi-party coordinated vulnerability disclosure

at Union level and provide value added services, such as vulnerability advisories,

severity scoring and product lists, as well as providing an enhanced European known

exploited vulnerabilities catalogue to help entities in their vulnerability management.

(40) The role of ENISA in the development of the ECCF should be a key aspect of its

mandate. ENISA should provide its technical expertise throughout the lifecycle of

European cybersecurity certification schemes. In view of a future scheme, ENISA

should identify existing standards or technical specifications that can underlie such as

a scheme and, where relevant, draft technical specifications itself that can be

referenced in a scheme. ENISA should be in charge of preparing candidate scheme

following a Commission request. For schemes already in place, ENISA should be

responsible for their maintenance. In doing so, ENISA should contribute to building

and developing a certification ecosystem where the feedback of Member States and

private stakeholders is sought and their certification capacities are reinforced. This

should also include operating a dedicated certification website where relevant

information related to adopted schemes, including certificates and statements of

conformity, is freely and publicly accessible.

(41) To support the implementation of relevant Union legislation, ENISA should shape the

state of the art in cybersecurity by delivering technical specifications to support the

implementation of relevant Union legislation, including in view of their potential

referencing in European cybersecurity certification schemes. ENISA should also

monitor the creation and evolution of standards by relevant standardisation bodies

with a view to following standardisation trends at European and global level, and

whenever needed, shape such standards by participating to, including through drafting

contributions, and leading in the activities of standardisation organisations. In doing

so, ENISA should remain impartial. For instance, there might be situations, where

ENISA should withdraw from relevant activities in standardisation bodies if ENISA is

asked to assess European standards that were requested by the Commission in support

of Union legislation. ENISA should not contribute to the drafting of the standards that

it is in charge of assessing.

EN 32 EN

(42) To support the implementation of Union policies and preparation of potential

standardisation activities, ENISA should contribute to the development and evaluation

of cryptographic algorithms, in particular in the area of post-quantum cryptography. In

that context, upon request by the Commission and subject to a contribution agreement

as defined in Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/2509 of the European Parliament and of

the Council50, ENISA may establish a process to solicit and evaluate algorithms for

cryptographic algorithms by relevant stakeholders, in particular the cryptographic,

academic and research communities, as well as manufacturers, CSIRTs, national

cybersecurity certification authorities and competent authorities pursuant to Directive

(EU) 2022/2555. Where ENISA contributes to establishing such processes, it should

promote collaboration between the relevant stakeholders and implement the

organisational aspects. The process should be formal, open, transparent and inclusive,

including consultation of relevant stakeholders on draft minimum requirements and

the evaluation process and evaluation criteria, notably for security and performance of

evaluations.

(43) To support the implementation of conformity assessment activities under European

cybersecurity certification schemes and other relevant Union legislation, ENISA may

provide relevant technical testing tools to support Member States, businesses and

conformity assessment bodies in evaluation activities. Such tools should aim to create

synergies at Union level and an efficient operation of conformity assessment

procedures to meet the needs of Member States and market needs. Such needs may

arise for instance in the area of security by design to support businesses, including

small and medium-sized enterprises, in their implementation efforts in the context of

Regulation 2024/2847. In this context, ENISA should levy fees to cover relevant costs

related to establishing, designing, developing, maintaining and updating needed

software and hardware capabilities for such testing tools.

(44) To support Member States in their efforts to address the shortage of cybersecurity

professionals and the growing need for a skilled, diverse, including with regards to

gender balance, and agile workforce, and to enable labour mobility and preparedness

across Member States, ENISA should build on the principles and work initiated under

the Cybersecurity Skills Academy. In particular, ENISA should establish the European

Cybersecurity Skills Framework (‘ECSF’) as a common framework on cybersecurity

professional role profiles. ENISA should further support Member States in addressing

gender disparities in cybersecurity roles. This approach is consistent with the vision

outlined in the Commission Communication on the Union of Skills and would

contribute to its objectives. A quality label for European individual cybersecurity skills

attestations should further be explored.

(45) The ECSF should be a practical and flexible tool to be used on a voluntary basis that

provides a common understanding and terminology of the relevant roles and

associated tasks, skills and knowledge mostly required in cybersecurity roles, with a

view to supporting the identification of critical skill sets, including transversal skills,

required for the workforce, and enabling learning providers, including companies,

higher education institutions or vocational education and training providers, to design

programmes, and help policymakers to develop initiatives to address skills gaps.

Having the potential to be used as a reference framework for skills recognition, it

50 Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/2509 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 September

2024 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union (OJ L, 2024/2509, 26.09.2024,

ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/2509/oj).

EN 33 EN

should also be interoperable with the European classification of skills and occupations

(ESCO) in order to support human resources departments to understand the

requirements for resource planning, recruitment, and career development in support of

cybersecurity needs. Whereas DigComp 3.0 describes knowledge, skills and attitudes

that are needed to be digitally competent for daily life, participation in society,

working and learning, and can be used by both adults and children, the ECSF offer a

simple framework identifying cybersecurity roles and associated tasks, knowledge,

skills needed to perform them. In this regard, it addresses a specialised audience in

cybersecurity, ranging from actually or potential cybersecurity professionals,

education institutions to employers. The ECSF should also support the development of

European individual cybersecurity skills attestations by being the key instrument used

to develop the schemes, allowing the emergence of new market players and supporting

market competition within a common framework. The ECSF should be evaluated and

updated on a regular basis to ensure that it adequately reflects the cybersecurity labour

market’s needs, technological and policy developments. ENISA should support the

uptake of the ECSF by and within Member States and Union entities, and provide

adequate support where such assistance is required.

(46) Cybersecurity skills and qualifications should be made comparable, transparent and

trusted across the internal market. To this end, European individual cybersecurity

skills attestations51 should support employers, including SMEs and startups, to recruit

actual or potential cybersecurity professionals in an effective manner within and

across Member States, in line with the objectives set out in the Communication on the

Union of Skills. To ensure consistent implementation across Member States, European

individual cybersecurity skills attestations should be based on a common

understanding, at Union level, of the skills needed to meet those objectives and should

be delivered by providers authorised by ENISA against a common set of criteria. This

approach should be consistent with and contribute to the objectives of the future Skills

Portability Initiative.

(47) The development of European individual cybersecurity skills attestation schemes

should aim to supplement Member States’ actions by offering the possibility to public

authorities and economic actors to make use of a European attestation mechanism, in

line with the supporting competence of the Union in the area of education and

vocational training, as referred to in Article 6, point (e) and Articles 165(1) and 166(1)

TFEU. The schemes, together with the work of the Cybersecurity Skills Academy, can

also represent the basis for the higher education programmes, such as sectoral

European degrees and for the development of micro-credentials. Therefore, the

European individual cybersecurity attestation schemes should not aim to harmonise

law and regulations in Member States, but rather be considered as an enabler and an

opportunity which Member States and economic actors may wish to take up and

promote.

(48) ENISA should ensure that European individual cybersecurity skills attestation

schemes remain close to market needs and build on experience from both public and

private providers of individual certifications, including Member States, higher

education institutions, vocational education and training institutions and businesses.

51 European individual cybersecurity skills attestations should be understood as following a similar

approach to what the market recognises as ‘cybersecurity certifications’. However, in order to avoid

confusion with regards to the European Cybersecurity Certification Framework, the expression

‘attestation’, already used in the communication on the Cybersecurity Skills Academy, is preferred.

EN 34 EN

ENISA should consult the Commission on prioritisation of the European individual

cybersecurity skills attestation schemes, taking into due consideration policy

implementation and market needs.

(49) To ensure alignment between the ECSF and the schemes, revision of an ECSF role

profile should automatically trigger an evaluation of fitness of the associated European

individual cybersecurity skills attestation scheme or schemes, which may lead to their

review.

(50) Taking into consideration the diversity of cybersecurity role profiles and associated

tasks, skills and knowledge, the assessment of individuals and assessment methods

may have to be adapted in each European individual cybersecurity skills attestation

scheme. Each scheme should ensure that the assessment of an individual’s required

skills in terms of learning outcomes, including, where relevant, the evaluation of the

level of proficiency, is systematically evaluated against an ECSF role profile or subset

thereof. Assessment methods may include elements such as testing theoretical

knowledge, practical examination, prerequisites and peer assessment. Experience of

individuals should be duly taken into consideration.

(51) In order to ensure a consistent implementation of European individual cybersecurity

skills attestation schemes, in particular with regard to the assessment of individuals,

ENISA should provide obligatory training to personnel in charge of carrying out the

assessment of individuals. Such personnel should have experience in the field of

cybersecurity which could be demonstrated by holding a European individual

cybersecurity skills attestation for the role profile they are conducting the assessment

for and at a proficiency level at least equivalent to that of the individuals they are

assessing.

(52) The role of the authorised attestation providers is to attest the knowledge and

competences of an individual to be able to perform one of the ECSF roles and to give

assurance to the employers across the Union. As also employers operating Unions

critical infrastructure would look at the assurance of the quality of skills and

competences of individuals acquiring European individual cybersecurity skills

attestation, the authorised providers attesting the level of skills and competences

should be trustworthy from the cybersecurity point of view and should not be subject

of the undue influence by a third country that may pose cybersecurity concerns.

Therefore, entities established in a third country posing cybersecurity concerns

designated in accordance with this Regulation or controlled by such third country, by

an entity established in such third country, or by a national of such third country

(high-risk suppliers) in accordance with this Regulation should not be eligible to

become authorised attestation providers of any European individual cybersecurity

skills attestations pursuant to Title II, Section 4.

(53) To ensure that individuals that hold a European cybersecurity skills attestation can

easily use and share it, and that such an attestation can be used across Member States,

authorised attestation providers should ensure that electronic attestations of the

European individual cybersecurity skills attestations are issued to the European Digital

Identity Wallet (EUDI wallet) established by Regulation (EU) No 910/2014 at the

request of the individual. Authorised attestation providers should be considered as

trust service providers and subject to the supervisory and liability regime laid down in

Regulation (EU) No 910/2014. The scheme for the attestation of attributes used

EN 35 EN

pursuant to Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025/156952 should be

registered in the catalogue of schemes for the attestation of attributes provided for in

that Implementing Regulation.

(54) To contribute to the development of the cybersecurity workforce and the portability of

skills across the Union, ENISA should make the European individual cybersecurity

skills attestation schemes and the list of authorised attestation providers available to

the public via a dedicated website.

(55) ENISA should be governed and operated taking into account the principles of the

Common Approach on Union decentralised agencies adopted on 19 July 2012 by the

European Parliament, the Council and the Commission53. The recommendations in the

Common Approach should also be reflected, as appropriate, in ENISA’s work

programmes, evaluations of ENISA, and ENISA’s reporting and administrative

practice.

(56) In order for the Management Board to perform its functions effectively, particularly in

guiding the overall direction of ENISA’s activities and setting its strategic priorities, it

is essential for the Board to consist of high-level representatives from Member States

and the Commission. To that end, each Member State should appoint the head of a

national competent authority of that Member State responsible for cybersecurity

designated pursuant to Article 8(1) of Directive (EU) 2022/2555 as a member of the

Management Board.

(57) To ensure that alternates in the Management Board can fulfil their roles adequately,

Member States should appoint alternates that have appropriate professional expertise

and experience. The Commission and the Member States, as regards alternates, should

make efforts to achieve a balanced representation between men and women on the

Management Board and should limit their turnover in order to ensure continuity of the

Management Board’s work.

(58) To enable ENISA to fulfil its mission effectively, the Management Board, composed

of the representatives of the Member States and of the Commission, should establish

the general direction of ENISA’s operations, including its strategic priorities, and

ensure that it carries out its tasks in accordance with this Regulation. The Management

Board should be entrusted with the powers necessary to establish and verify the

execution of the budget, adopt appropriate financial rules, establish transparent

working procedures for decision making by ENISA, adopt ENISA’s single

programming document, adopt its own rules of procedure, appoint the Executive

Director, decide on the extension and termination of the Executive Director’s term of

office, and decide whether to create a function of Deputy Executive Director and, if

such a function is created, on their appointment, and the extension and termination of

their term of office. Any person exercising an executive function within ENISA

should therefore be appointed by the Management Board. The Management Board

should also be responsible for appointing or dismissing members of the Board of

52 Implementing regulation - EU - 2025/1569

53 Common Approach, annexed to the Joint Statement of the European Parliament, the Council of the EU

and the European Commission on decentralised agencies, adopted on 19 July 2012 and available at:

https://european-union.europa.eu/document/download/d4199ff4-1e3d-45e6-af7e-

90cf1a7b10bc_en?filename=joint_statement_on_decentralised_agencies_en.pdf.

EN 36 EN

Appeal, as well as establishing rules to prevent or manage conflicts of interest in this

respect.

(59) To help ensure that ENISA establishes its strategic priorities and maintains them up to

date, the Management Board should hold at least one meeting per year dedicated to the

strategic priorities of ENISA. To ensure that meetings of the Management Board are

effective and well-informed, the Management Board may invite to its meetings any

person whose opinion could be pertinent and of interest to the topics discussed to

provide insights, expertise or advice. Such a person would be an ad hoc observer

without voting rights.

(60) The Management Board should adopt decisions by an absolute majority of its

members with voting rights, unless otherwise provided for in this Regulation. Due to

the importance of budgetary and human resources matters, in particular matters on the

annual budget, annual activity report, the anti-fraud strategy, implementing rules

giving effect to Staff Regulations, the appointment of the Executive Director, the

Deputy Executive Director and the accounting officer, follow-up to findings of the

European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) and of the European Public Prosecutor’s Office

(EPPO), and the adoption of the financial rules of ENISA, the Management Board

should adopt such decisions only if the representative of the Commission casts a

positive vote. For the purposes of taking a decision on adopting a final single

programming document after taking into account Commission’s opinion, a positive

vote of the representative of the Commission should only be required on the elements

of the decision not related to the annual and multiannual work programme of ENISA.

(61) The Executive Board should contribute to the effective functioning of the

Management Board. As part of its preparatory work related to Management Board

decisions, the Executive Board should examine relevant information in detail, explore

available options and offer advice and solutions to prepare the decisions of the

Management Board. It should also assist and advise the Executive Director in

implementing Management Board decisions.

(62) The smooth functioning of ENISA requires that its Executive Director be appointed on

grounds of merit and documented administrative and managerial skills, as well as

competence and experience relevant to cybersecurity. The duties of the Executive

Director should be carried out with complete independence. The Management Board

should appoint the Executive Director from the list of candidates prepared by the

Commission, following an open and transparent procedure that respects the principle

of gender balance.

(63) The Executive Director should prepare a proposal for ENISA’s single programming

document, after prior consultation with the Commission, and should take all steps

necessary to ensure the proper implementation of that single programming document.

The Executive Director should prepare an annual report to be submitted to the

Management Board, covering the implementation of ENISA’s annual work

programme, draw up a draft statement of estimates of revenue and expenditure for

ENISA, and implement the budget. Furthermore, the Executive Director should have

the option of setting up ad hoc working groups to address specific matters, in

particular matters of a scientific, technical, legal or socio-economic nature. In

particular, in relation to the preparation of a specific candidate European cybersecurity

certification scheme (‘candidate scheme’), the setting up of an ad hoc working group

is considered to be necessary. Setting up of an ad hoc working group might also be

necessary for maintenance activities in relation to specific adopted European

EN 37 EN

cybersecurity certification schemes. Ad hoc working groups should also be set up to

develop and maintain European individual cybersecurity skills attestation schemes and

assist the Agency in the governance, implementation and evolution of the ECSF. The

Executive Director should ensure that the members of ad hoc working groups are

selected according to the highest standards of expertise, aiming to ensure gender

balance and an appropriate balance, according to the specific issues in question,

between the public administrations of the Member States, the Union entities and the

private sector, including industry, users, and academic experts in network and

information security, as well as academic experts in products with digital elements.

(64) The Management Board may decide to create a function of a Deputy Executive

Director to assist the Executive Director, where the Management Board considers that

such a function is necessary to ensure or maintain the smooth functioning of ENISA.

When deciding on whether to create that function, the Management Board may take

into account the opinion of the Executive Director.

(65) ENISA should have an Advisory Group to ensure regular dialogue with the private

sector, consumers’ organisations and other relevant stakeholders. The ENISA

Advisory Group, established by the Management Board on a proposal from the

Executive Director, should focus on issues relevant to stakeholders and should bring

them to the attention of ENISA. The ENISA Advisory Group should be consulted in

particular with regard to ENISA’s draft annual work programme. The composition of

the ENISA Advisory Group and the tasks assigned to it should ensure sufficient

representation of stakeholders in the work of ENISA. Representatives of national and

Union law enforcement, data protection and market surveillance authorities should be

eligible to be represented in the ENISA Advisory Group.

(66) Applicants to become authorised attestation providers or to renew their authorisation

should have access to the necessary remedies where they are affected by decisions

taken by ENISA. Therefore, an appropriate appeal mechanism should be set up so that

related decisions of ENISA can be challenged before a Board of Appeal, the decisions

of which can be subject to judicial review by the Court of Justice of the European

Union in accordance with the Treaties. The requirement to exhaust the appeal

procedure within ENISA before bringing an action before the Court of Justice of the

European Union is only applicable to the persons that have standing before the Board

of Appeals.

(67) In order to guarantee the full autonomy and independence of ENISA and to enable it

to perform its tasks, ENISA should be granted a sufficient and autonomous budget

primarily funded from a contribution from the Union, but also from contributions from

third countries participating in ENISA’s work, and from fees paid by authorised

attestation providers and by conformity assessment bodies participating in schemes

and issuing European cybersecurity certificates and EU statements of conformity. The

host Member State, and any other Member State, should be allowed to make voluntary

contributions to ENISA’s budget. No contribution, whether financial or in kind,

received by ENISA from Member States, third countries, or other entities or persons

should compromise its independence and impartiality. The Union budgetary procedure

should be applicable as far as the Union contribution and any other subsidies

chargeable to the general budget of the Union are concerned. The Court of Auditors

should audit ENISA’s accounts to ensure transparency and accountability. In order to

enable the Agency to participate in all relevant future projects, it should be given the

possibility to receive grants.

EN 38 EN

(68) To ensure ENISA’s capacity to respond to demand for the activities it carries out, in

particular as regards decisions to authorise providers to deliver European individual

cybersecurity skills attestations, and as regards the maintenance of the European

cybersecurity certification schemes and of testing tools, ENISA should be given the

power to levy fees. Fees associated with processing of applications to become an

authorised attestation provider should be appropriately determined to sufficiently

contribute to covering the estimated costs of developing and maintaining the European

individual cybersecurity skills attestation schemes and evaluating whether

requirements and obligations to become and remain an authorised attestation provider

are and continue to be met. Fees associated to the costs of issuing and renewing

authorisations to authorised attestation providers should include costs associated to

evaluations performed by or under the supervision of ENISA. Fees associated with the

participation in European cybersecurity certifications schemes and for the issuance of

certificates under such schemes should be appropriately determined to sufficiently

contribute to covering the estimated costs of maintaining such schemes. The payment

of such fees should enable notified conformity assessment bodies and, where

applicable, certificate holders under a scheme to take part in such activities as well as

relevant capacity building and promotional activities to promote the exchange of best

practices and foster the uptake of schemes and certified solutions.

(69) To ensure proportionality, transparency and legal certainty, fees should be set in a

transparent and fair manner. All expenditure of ENISA attributed to staff involved in

activities subject to fees, in particular the employer's pro-rata contribution to the

pension scheme, and costs related to the Board of Appeal, should be reflected in that

cost. Fees must not lead to the imposition of unnecessary financial or administrative

burdens on applicants. Reasonable deadlines should be set for the payment of fees.

(70) It is necessary to put in place a set of indicators to measure the Agency’s workload,

effectiveness and efficiency in relation to activities financed through fees. Having

regard to these indicators, the Agency should adapt its staff planning and management

of resources related to fees to be able to adequately respond to such demand and to any

fluctuations in revenue from fees.

(71) To identify and correctly manage the risk of actual or perceived conflict of interests,

ENISA should have rules in place regarding the prevention and the management of

conflicts of interest. ENISA should also apply the rules on access to documents set out

in Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council54.

The processing of personal data by ENISA should be subject to Regulation (EU)

2018/1725 of the European Parliament and of the Council55. ENISA should comply

with the provisions applicable to the Union entities, and with national legislation

regarding the handling of information, in particular sensitive non-classified

information and European Union classified information (EUCI).

54 Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 2001

regarding public access to European Parliament, Council and Commission documents (OJ L 145,

31.5.2001, p. 43, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2001/1049/oj). 55 Regulation (EU) 2018/1725 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2018 on the

protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data by the Union institutions,

bodies, offices and agencies and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Regulation (EC) No

45/2001 and Decision No 1247/2002/EC (OJ L 295, 21.11.2018, p. 39, ELI:

http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2018/1725/oj).

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(72) When performing its tasks, ENISA may have access to sensitive information, such as

information regarding cyber threats and incidents. Therefore, it is essential for ENISA

to preserve the confidentiality of information it handles. In particular, in line with

Article 339 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), officials

and other servants of ENISA should not disclose any information of the kind covered

by the obligation of professional secrecy, in particular information about undertakings,

their business relations or their cost components, even after their duties have ceased.

(73) To ensure that it fully achieves its objectives, ENISA should liaise with the relevant

Union supervisory authorities and with other competent authorities in the Union,

relevant Union entities, including CERT-EU, EC3 at Europol, the ECCC, the

European Defence Agency (EDA), the European Union Agency for the Space

Programme (EUSPA), the Body of European Regulators for Electronic

Communications (BEREC), the European Agency for the Operational Management of

Large-Scale IT Systems in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (eu-LISA), the

European Central Bank (ECB), the European Banking Authority (EBA), the European

Data Protection Board, the Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators (ACER),

the European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA), and any other Union entity

involved in cybersecurity. ENISA should also liaise with competent authorities under

Directive (EU) 2022/2555, market surveillance authorities and authorities that deal

with data protection in order to exchange know-how and best practices and should

provide advice on cybersecurity issues that might have an impact on their work.

(74) Europol has an important role in preventing and combating cybercrime, including

cybercrime related to network and information security incidents. To create synergies

between the respective tasks of each Agency, ENISA should cooperate with Europol,

in particular by sharing information regarding trends in techniques, demands and

impacts of ransomware attacks. Such cooperation may also consist in identifying the

most common ransomware strains targeting entities listed in Annexes I and II to

Directive (EU) 2022/2555 to support essential and important entities in incident

response and recovery.

(75) To support operational cooperation and shared situational awareness of cyber threats

and incidents, it is essential for ENISA to cooperate with stakeholders and in particular

companies and organisations from the private sector, with which ENISA may establish

public-private partnerships.

(76) To effectively meet the goals outlined in this Regulation, ENISA may collaborate in

particular with academic institutions that have research initiatives in relevant fields,

and develop appropriate channels for input from consumer organisations and other

organisations.

(77) Given the borderless nature of cyber threats and incidents, the level of cybersecurity

and preparedness of third countries may impact entities in the Union. Therefore,

ENISA should be able to provide capacity-building activities, including training,

capacity-building, twinning activities in third countries, and in particular tailored

capacity-building activities for countries that are candidates for accession to the Union

or other partner countries in accordance with the Union priorities. Such activities

should be conducted following a specific request to provide adequate support, taking

into account the priorities of the Union, and be implemented through special

arrangements, including through contribution agreements as referred to in Regulation

(EU, Euratom) 2024/2509. The European cybersecurity certification framework aims

to protect against cyber threats such as maliciously exploited cybersecurity

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vulnerabilities or cybersecurity incidents affecting the functionality (design and

operation) of ICT products, ICT services, ICT processes, managed security services,

or cyber posture of entities. By focusing on technical risks related to ICT products,

ICT services, ICT processes, managed security services or cyber posture of entities,

the ECCF should complement the security of ICT supply chains framework, which

aims to ensure a harmonised approach at Union level to address non-technical risks in

sectors of high criticality and other critical sectors.

(78) It should be possible for Member States to have recourse to European cybersecurity

certification in the context of public procurement in accordance with Directive

2014/24/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council56.

(79) To facilitate simplification of compliance for entities, the ECCF should provide for the

possibility to certify their cyber posture. Entities, notably those providing multiple

types of services across several Member States, may face different cybersecurity and

data security-related obligations under horizontal instruments, such as Regulation

(EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council57 and Directive (EU)

2022/2555 of the European Parliament and of the Council58, as well as sector-specific

instruments. In order to streamline the implementation of the overall cybersecurity

regulatory framework and facilitate compliance therewith, it should be possible for

Union legislation to provide for the possibility of entities to demonstrate their

compliance with cybersecurity risk-management requirements through a European

cybersecurity certification certificate. A relevant scheme could contribute to

streamlining compliance requirements arising from different regulatory instruments,

without prejudice to their specific certification requirements. Such simplification

measures have the potential to reduce administrative burden, unlocking resources to

strengthen the operational cybersecurity preparedness of entities in critical sectors of

the Union.

(80) European certification of cybersecurity risk-management requirements developed

within the ECCF should enable entities to demonstrate compliance with relevant

Union legislation where a scheme covers the respective legal requirements laid down

in such an act and where it provides so. On that basis, a Union legal act may also

provide for a presumption of conformity with those requirements. Such schemes could

contribute to improving the coherent implementation of cybersecurity requirements of

Union legislation to level the playing field across Member States and ease the

compliance burden.

(81) The European cybersecurity certification framework should provide for the possibility

to certify ICT processes, defined as a set of activities performed to design, develop,

deliver or maintain an ICT product or ICT service. A protection profile is an example

of an ICT process, as specified under Commission Implementing Regulation (EU)

56 Directive 2014/24/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 2014 on public

procurement and repealing Directive 2004/18/EC (OJ L 94, 28.3.2014, p. 65, ELI:

http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2014/24/oj). 57 Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the

protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of

such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation) (OJ L 119, 4.5.2016,

p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2016/679/oj). 58 Directive (EU) 2022/2555 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 December 2022 on

measures for a high common level of cybersecurity across the Union, amending Regulation (EU) No

910/2014 and Directive (EU) 2018/1972, and repealing Directive (EU) 2016/1148 (NIS 2 Directive) OJ

L 333, 27.12.2022, p. 80, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2022/2555/oj).

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2024/48259. Another example of an ICT process is the set of activities undertaken by a

manufacturer to securely design and develop an ICT product, including the physical,

logical, procedural, personnel, and other security measures that are necessary to

protect the confidentiality and integrity of the design and implementation of an ICT

product in its development environment. The certification of such activities is often

referred to as ‘site certification’ in the context of a certification process under

Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2024/482.

(82) The definition of managed security services in this Regulation should be consistent

with that of managed security service providers in Directive (EU) 2022/2555. Those

services consist of carrying out, or providing assistance for, activities relating to their

customers’ cybersecurity risk management, and have gained increasing importance in

the prevention and mitigation of incidents. Accordingly, the providers of those

services are considered to be essential or important entities belonging to a sector of

high criticality pursuant to Directive (EU) 2022/2555. Managed security service

providers in areas such as incident response, penetration testing, security audits and

consultancy, play a particularly important role in assisting entities in their efforts to

prevent, detect, respond to or recover from incidents. However, managed security

service providers have themselves also been the target of cyberattacks and pose a

particular risk because of their close integration in the operations of their customers. It

is therefore necessary that essential and important entities within the meaning of

Directive (EU) 2022/2555 exercise increased diligence in selecting managed security

service providers.

(83) European cybersecurity certification schemes are relevant to a wide community of

stakeholders, such as providers of ICT solutions, conformity assessment bodies and

users. To promote wide stakeholder engagement, the European Cybersecurity

Certification Assembly (“the Assembly”) should be organised at least once a year with

the aim to foster collaboration between the Commission, ENISA, Member States and

relevant stakeholders. It will play a pivotal role in identifying and addressing new

cybersecurity challenges and strategic priorities for certification, and ensuring that

certification schemes facilitate the secure integration of digital technologies and are fit

for users’ needs. The Assembly should foster Union leadership in certification

activities and uphold the certification framework’s ability to deliver trust for

businesses, public authorities, and the public.

(84) The Commission should maintain a dedicated website to ensure transparency by

publishing up to date information on the implementation progress of the ECCF. The

website should include information related to certification schemes under preparation,

strategic priorities for upcoming certification schemes, requests to ENISA to prepare

candidate certification schemes and information on adoption of certification schemes.

The Commission website will complement ENISA’s website on European

cybersecurity certification schemes, which should offer comprehensive details on the

technical preparation of candidate schemes and of the maintenance of schemes,

focusing on issued European cybersecurity certificates and EU statements of

conformity.

59 Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2024/482 of 31 January 2024 laying down rules for the

application of Regulation (EU) 2019/881 of the European Parliament and of the Council as regards the

adoption of the European Common Criteria-based cybersecurity certification scheme (EUCC) (OJ L,

2024/482, 7.2.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg_impl/2024/482/oj).

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(85) In order to enhance the dialogue between the Union institutions and to contribute to

a formal, open, transparent and inclusive consultation process, the Commission should

take into account elements arising from the views expressed by the European

Parliament and by the Council and the European Cybersecurity Certification Assembly

when evaluating this Regulation.

(86) Feasibility studies conducted by ENISA should help to prepare for the planning and

development of cybersecurity certification schemes. The studies should incorporate

the perspectives of relevant stakeholders and align the future certification schemes

with ongoing research, development, and technological assessment activities,

recognising, in particular, the contributions of Union and Member State research

initiatives. Such studies can help to identify available standards and technical

specifications. They should be carried out upon request from the Commission, or in

accordance with the Union strategic priorities to ensure that the evolving technological

landscape and cybersecurity needs are adequately addressed and reflected when

requesting and developing schemes.

(87) The design of the candidate scheme and its coverage of security objectives and

elements should be commensurate to the subject matter and scope of the certification

object. For example, a certification scheme of cloud services might therefore address

security objectives which are relevant for ICT services and organisational security. As

another example, a security objective related to not including known exploitable

vulnerabilities will likely not be relevant to certification of ICT processes.

(88) In order to ensure that European cybersecurity certification schemes are implemented

in a harmonised manner across Member States, it is necessary to provide for rules on

the maintenance of the schemes. Maintenance activities are also necessary to ensure

that the schemes and their supporting documentation remain up-to-date, especially in a

cybersecurity field where the threat landscape and technologies constantly evolve.

Certification schemes should therefore be designed and maintained in a way that

avoids the risk that they are quickly outdated. Maintenance activities should typically

involve drafting and updating supporting documentation, including technical

specifications and guidelines, as well as identifying standards or technical

specifications that are relevant to the scheme. The analysis of the functioning of the

scheme, its potential shortcomings and necessary improvement, should also be part of

the maintenance activities. In addition, maintenance activities should include

information sharing between Member States with regard to on the implementation of

the schemes and contributions to peer review and peer assessment mechanisms.

(89) Due to the technical nature of the maintenance activities, ENISA should manage such

activities, in cooperation with the Commission and with the support of the European

Cybersecurity Certification Group (ECCG) and its relevant sub-group on maintenance.

The establishment of the ECCG sub-group on maintenance allows gathering technical

contributions and insights from Member States with a view to harmonising

approaches.

(90) Maintenance activities should entail interactions with relevant stakeholder groups to

ensure that schemes remain market-relevant and up to date, including by sharing and

receiving technical contributions. Such stakeholder groups can be standardisation

organisations, conformity assessment bodies, vendors, users, public authorities, or

trade associations. The specificities of each scheme, including their corresponding

technical forums and industries, imply that it should be possible for technical

contributions to be gathered in different ways from one scheme to the other. For some

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schemes, ENISA should be able to rely on an ad hoc working group that gathers

experts from the public administrations of the Member States, Union entities, and the

private sector. Technical contributions could also come from ISACs or standardisation

organisations. ENISA should analyse which format is most suitable for each scheme

and include a maintenance strategy in each candidate scheme.

(91) European cybersecurity certification schemes should rely on standards or technical

specifications, notably for the definition of security requirements and evaluation

methodologies. ENISA should be given the possibility to draft technical specifications

to support the preparation and maintenance of schemes, in particular where

deliverables from standardisation organisations are missing or not suitable to fulfil the

objectives of the scheme. As part of the drafting process, ENISA should be supported

by the ECCG and, where applicable, the ad hoc working group set up for the relevant

scheme. ENISA should also seek contributions from stakeholder groups. Additionally,

ENISA should consider market acceptance, as well as European and international

standards. Taking into account the quality of the technical specifications and the

objectives of the scheme, it should be possible for the Commission to reference

technical specifications drafted by ENISA in a European cybersecurity certification

scheme.

(92) Technical specifications developed by ENISA and referenced in a scheme should be

made available on the ENISA website on European cybersecurity certification

schemes so that all interested parties can access them. However, in some specific

cases, publication on the website could pose a risk to the cybersecurity of certified ICT

products, ICT services, ICT processes, managed security services or cyber posture of

entities and by extension to public safety. For example, technical specifications could

contain precise information on new attack paths whose public availability would make

it possible for malicious actors to use them. This type of information should be

distributed in a restricted manner on a need-to-know basis to relevant stakeholders,

such as national cybersecurity certification authorities, conformity assessment bodies

and vendors being certified. Due to their restricted distribution, such technical

specifications should not be referenced in European cybersecurity certification

schemes and, therefore, should be of non-binding nature.

(93) The cyber posture certification schemes should be designed in a modular way, with a

view to allowing demonstration of compliance and the presumption of

conformity with relevant cybersecurity requirements set out in other Union legislation,

where that legislation provides for that possibility. The presumption of conformity

with the requirements of these legal acts will therefore only take effect as a possible

avenue to demonstrate compliance if the respective legal acts enable such presumption

of conformity. The details of such a scheme, namely purpose, objectives or elements

will therefore likely differ from those of other schemes. In particular, schemes for the

certification of cyber posture of entities should be developed to provide for assessment

of continuous conformity of an entity with Union legislation. It is therefore not

necessary that cyber posture certification schemes cover all elements of the European

cybersecurity certification schemes, such as assurance levels, and this should be

reflected in the rules for the schemes.

(94) A framework for cyber posture certification in the ECCF, allows for developing a

scheme that enables entities providing services across several Member States to

demonstrate compliance with the cybersecurity risk-management obligations laid

down in Directive 2022/2555 of the European Parliament and of the Council. On that

basis, with the ability to demonstrate compliance, entities can benefit from more

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coherent and less burdensome supervisory approaches across the internal market. The

development of such a certification scheme should be facilitated by the adoption of

implementing acts under Directive (EU) 2022/2555. Through extension profiles, a

cyber posture certification scheme may demonstrate compliance with requirements

where a Member State adopted or maintained provisions ensuring a higher level of

cybersecurity in line with Directive (EU) 2022/2555. On this basis, an entity providing

services across several Member States can demonstrate compliance with all relevant

extension profiles through a single European cybersecurity certificate.

(95) The security objectives and the security requirements set out in European

cybersecurity certification schemes for what pertains to product security should be

consistent with the essential cybersecurity requirements set out in Annex I to

Regulation (EU) 2024/2847. This coherence is necessary to ensure that manufacturers

whose products fall within the scope of Regulation (EU) 2024/2847 do not face

contradictory requirements when certifying their products under a European

cybersecurity certification scheme. Furthermore, consistency of requirements

facilitates the presumption of conformity by Article 27 of Regulation (EU) 2024/2847

whereby manufacturers of products with digital elements that have been certified

under a European cybersecurity certification scheme can benefit under certain

conditions from presumption of conformity with the essential cybersecurity

requirements set out in Annex I to that Regulation.

(96) Within the European cybersecurity certification scheme, it should be possible to

specify an extension profile, by setting out additional or specific requirements for use

cases, including additional capabilities such as enhanced product features, specialised

service offerings or assets, optimised processes, and advanced security measures.

Since extension profiles do not correspond to a specific assurance level, they should

describe their purpose in detail, including the security threats addressed. Extension

profiles are intended in particular to demonstrate compliance with specific standards

and regulatory requirements, including, where applicable, requirements as regards

additional cybersecurity risk-management measures laid down by a Member State

following the minimum harmonisation principle in line with Directive (EU)

2022/2555.

(97) Without prejudice to the general peer review system to be put in place across all

national cybersecurity certification authorities within the ECCF, it should be possible

to include in the European cybersecurity certification schemes a peer-assessment

mechanism for the bodies that issue European cybersecurity certificates for ICT

products, ICT services, ICT processes, managed security services and cyber posture of

entities, in particular for those bodies that issue certificates with an assurance level

‘high’ under such schemes. Such bodies should also include certification bodies of the

national cybersecurity certification authorities issuing certificates at assurance level

‘high’. The ECCG should support the implementation of such peer-assessment

mechanisms. The peer assessments should assess in particular whether the bodies

concerned carry out their tasks in a harmonised way and may include appeal

mechanisms.

(98) Crises such as wars, natural disasters, and pandemics might negatively impact

certification activities. In crisis scenarios of this nature, it might not be feasible, for

example, to ensure site security due to infrastructure destruction, cyberattacks,

personnel unavailability, and the inaccessibility of the site. A European cybersecurity

certification scheme should therefore specify temporary rules on continuity of

certification activities during such scenarios.

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(99) Translating technical candidate schemes into implementing acts requires complex

technical and legal knowledge and can create significant administrative burden.

Moreover, certain elements of European cybersecurity certification schemes, such as

vulnerability management or the conditions under which such marks or labels may be

used, are cross-sectoral and may benefit from harmonised reference provisions. To

ensure the quality of adopted European cybersecurity certification schemes and reduce

compliance burden for businesses, the Commission should be empowered to adopt

model provisions covering certain elements of European cybersecurity certification

schemes.

(100) In order to ensure the consistency of the European cybersecurity certification

framework, it should be possible within a European cybersecurity certification scheme

to specify assurance levels for European cybersecurity certificates and EU statements

of conformity issued under that scheme. A European cybersecurity certificate should

refer to one of the assurance levels: ‘basic’, ‘substantial’ or ‘high’, while the EU

statement of conformity should only refer to the assurance level ‘basic’. The assurance

levels should provide the corresponding rigour and depth of the evaluation of the ICT

product, ICT service, ICT process, managed security service or cyber posture of an

entity and should be characterised by reference to technical specifications, standards

and procedures related thereto, including technical controls, the purpose of which is to

mitigate or prevent incidents. Each assurance level should be consistent among the

different sectorial domains where certification is applied.

(101) The choice of the appropriate certification and associated security requirements by the

users of European cybersecurity certificates should be based on an analysis of the risks

associated with the use of the ICT products, ICT services, ICT processes, managed

security services or the context of the certification of entities. Accordingly, the

assurance level should be commensurate with the level of risk associated with the

intended use of the ICT product, ICT service, ICT process, managed security services,

or the operational environment and nature of the entity the cyber posture of which is

subject to certification.

(102) For assurance level ‘basic’, the evaluation should be guided at least by the following

assurance components: the evaluation should at least include a review of the technical

documentation of the ICT product, ICT service, ICT process, managed security service

or cyber posture of an entity by the conformity assessment body. Where the

certification includes ICT processes, the process used to design, develop and maintain

an ICT product, ICT service, managed security service or cyber posture of an entity

should also be subject to the technical review. Where a European cybersecurity

certification scheme provides for a conformity self-assessment, it should be sufficient

that the manufacturer or provider of ICT products, ICT services, ICT processes or

managed security services, or the entity whose cyber posture of which is subject to

certification, has carried out a self-assessment of the compliance of the ICT product,

ICT service, ICT process, managed security service or cyber posture of an entity with

the certification scheme.

(103) For assurance level ‘substantial’, the evaluation, in addition to the requirements for

assurance level ‘basic’, should be guided at least by the verification of the compliance

of the security functionalities of the ICT product, ICT service, ICT process, managed

security service or cyber posture of an entity with its technical documentation.

(104) For assurance level ‘high’, the evaluation, in addition to the requirements for

assurance level ‘substantial’, should be guided at least by an efficiency testing which

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assesses the resistance of the security functionalities against elaborate cyberattacks

performed by persons who have significant skills and resources. Conformity

assessment activities should be performed in the European Economic Area for

assurance level ‘high’ or where a scheme is designed to demonstrate compliance and

provide for presumption of conformity with other Union legislation. This requirement

is justified by the fact that assessment activities taking place outside the European

Economic Area give rise to additional threats to cybersecurity, in particular the

intellectual property of the evaluated ICT products, ICT services, ICT processes,

managed security services or entities. For instance, the source code of an ICT product

could be scrutinised when crossing the border of a third country, which constitutes a

risk to intellectual property. Additionally, testing laboratories established in third

countries do not operate in an environment that is concerned by the cybersecurity

measures mandated by EU legislation, such as Directive (EU) 2022/2555 or

Regulation (EU) 2024/2847. For instance, a testing laboratory may rely on a third-

party cloud service provider which do not abide to the cybersecurity requirements of

Directive (EU) 2022/2555. Nevertheless, a certification scheme should be allowed to

provide for derogation mechanisms for instance related to site certification or in other

instances where conformity assessment activities cannot be reasonably performed in

the European Economic Area.

(105) In some cases, different approaches to meet security objectives of a given assurance

level might be required to address specifics of an ICT product, ICT service, ICT

process, managed security services or cyber posture of entities. To allow for a more

granular approach, it should be possible in a European cybersecurity certification

scheme to specify one or several evaluation levels corresponding to one of the

assurance levels. This will enable development of schemes where multiple evaluation

levels designed for a different purpose will correspond to the level of security

associated with a specific assurance level.

(106) European cybersecurity certification schemes should be allowed to provide for a

conformity assessment to be carried out under the sole responsibility of the

manufacturer or provider of ICT products, ICT services, ICT processes or managed

security services, or the entity the cyber posture of which is certified (‘conformity self-

assessment’). In such cases, it should be sufficient that the manufacturer, provider or

entity the cyber posture of which is certified, carries out all of the checks itself to

ensure that the ICT products, ICT services, ICT processes, managed security service

or cyber posture of an entity conform with the European cybersecurity certification

scheme. Conformity self-assessment should be considered to be appropriate for ICT

products, ICT services, ICT processes, managed security service or cyber posture of

entity that are of low complexity, that present a low risk to the public and that have a

simple design or simple production mechanisms.

(107) Where a European cybersecurity certification scheme allows for both conformity self-

assessments and certifications of ICT products, ICT services, ICT processes, managed

security services or cyber posture of entities, in such a case, the certification scheme

should provide for clear and understandable means for consumers or other users to

differentiate between self-assessed and third-party certified ICT products, ICT

services, ICT processes, managed security services or cyber posture of entities.

(108) The manufacturer or provider of ICT products, ICT services, ICT processes or

managed security services, or the entities the cyber posture of which is certified,

should be able to issue and sign the EU statement of conformity as part of the

conformity assessment procedure. An EU statement of conformity is a document that

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states that a specific ICT product, ICT service, ICT process, managed security service

or the cyber posture of an entity complies with the requirements of the European

cybersecurity certification scheme. By issuing and signing the EU statement of

conformity, the manufacturer or provider of ICT products, ICT services, ICT

processes or managed security services, or the entity the cyber posture of which is

certified, assumes responsibility for the compliance of the ICT product, ICT service,

ICT process, managed security service or the cyber posture of the entity with the

security requirements of the European cybersecurity certification scheme. A copy of

the EU statement of conformity should be submitted to the national cybersecurity

certification authority and to ENISA.

(109) Manufacturers or providers of ICT products, ICT services, ICT processes or managed

security services, or entities the cyber posture of which is certified, should make the

EU statement of conformity, technical documentation, and all other relevant

information relating to the conformity with a European cybersecurity certification

scheme available to the competent national cybersecurity certification authority for a

period provided for in the relevant European cybersecurity certification scheme and in

line with applicable Union legislation. The technical documentation should specify the

requirements applicable under the scheme to the extent relevant to the conformity self-

assessment. The technical documentation should be so compiled as to enable the

assessment of whether an ICT product, ICT service, ICT process or managed security

service, or cyber posture of the entity complies with the requirements applicable under

the scheme.

(110) European cybersecurity certificates and EU statements of conformity should help users

make informed choices. Therefore, relevant information should be published on a

website maintained by ENISA. Furthermore, ICT products, ICT services, and ICT

processes that have been certified or for which an EU statement of conformity has

been issued should be accompanied by structured information that is adapted to the

expected technical level of the intended user. All users should have access to

information regarding the reference number of the certification scheme, the issuing

authority or body, and, where applicable, the assurance level, or should be able to

obtain a copy of the European cybersecurity certificate. That information should be

regularly updated and made available on a dedicated website on European

cybersecurity certification schemes. Furthermore, in order to ensure continuous

accessibility, manufacturers and providers should be required to notify the relevant

certification body if the location of the online or, where relevant, physical information

changes.

(111) A conformity assessment is a procedure for evaluating whether specified requirements

relating to an ICT product, ICT service, ICT process, managed security service or

entity have been fulfilled. That procedure is carried out by an independent third party

that is not the manufacturer or provider of the ICT products, ICT services, ICT

processes or managed security services that are being certified, nor the entity the cyber

posture of which is being assessed. A European cybersecurity certificate should be

issued following the successful evaluation of an ICT product, ICT service, ICT

process, managed security service or cyber posture of the entity. A European

cybersecurity certificate should be considered to be a confirmation that the evaluation

has been properly carried out.

(112) The strict separation of the supervisory and certification activities is important to avoid

distortions and interferences that may be caused in situations where the entity

supervising the market is also competing in the same market. Consequently, activities

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where the national cybersecurity certification authorities merely carry out their

supervisory role, such as by providing prior approval to the issuance of a certificate,

should not require further internal separation from other supervisory activities. This

includes, for example, a situation where the national cybersecurity certification

authority actively gathers information throughout the certification process carried out

by private conformity assessment bodies and then gives its opinion on the issuance of

the certificate by those bodies (‘prior approval model’).

(113) European cybersecurity certification schemes should specify the conditions under

which ICT products, ICT services, ICT processes, managed security services or cyber

posture of an entity may need to be recertified or under which the scope of a specific

European cybersecurity certificate may need to be reduced. Furthermore, European

cybersecurity certification schemes should take into account any possible adverse

effects of any subsequently detected vulnerabilities or nonconformities concerning the

certified ICT product, ICT service, ICT process, managed security service or cyber

posture of an entity with regard to conformity with the security requirements of that

certificate.

(114) Harmonisation plays a crucial role in ensuring robust cybersecurity and enhancing

market access for businesses. In contrast, fragmentation and the lack of mutual

recognition of certificates pose significant barriers to the seamless flow of data,

thereby increasing operational costs for Union industry. To mitigate those challenges,

it is essential to avoid fragmentation both in the scope of the security controls and in

the conformity assessment methods throughout the Union.

(115) Member States should inform the Commission and the ECCG sufficiently in advance

before adopting new national cybersecurity certification schemes for ICT products,

ICT services, ICT processes, managed security services or cyber posture of entities in

order to help the Commission and the ECCG evaluate the impact of the new national

cybersecurity certification scheme on the proper functioning of the internal market,

and in light of any strategic interest in requesting a European cybersecurity

certification scheme.

(116) References in national legislation to national standards which have ceased to be

effective due to the entry into force of a European cybersecurity certification scheme

can be a source of confusion. Therefore, where relevant, Member States should reflect

the adoption of a European cybersecurity certification scheme in their national

legislation.

(117) With a view to facilitating the growth of a reliable internal market, while also creating

partnerships with third countries, the certification process established within the ECCF

should be implemented in a manner that facilitates international recognition, mutual

recognition and alignment with international standards.

(118) In order to further facilitate trade, and recognising that ICT supply chains are

international, mutual recognition agreements concerning European cybersecurity

certificates may be concluded by the Union in accordance with Article 218 TFEU. The

Commission should be empowered to adopt implementing acts to unilaterally

recognise the equivalence of third country certificates with European cybersecurity

certificates. It should be possible to provide specific conditions for such recognition of

third country certificates.

(119) In order to achieve equivalent implementation of the framework throughout the Union,

to facilitate mutual recognition and to promote the overall acceptance of European

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cybersecurity certificates and EU statements of conformity, it is necessary to put in

place a system of peer review between national cybersecurity certification authorities.

Peer review should cover procedures for supervising the compliance of ICT products,

ICT services, ICT processes, managed security services and cyber posture of entities

with European cybersecurity certificates, for monitoring the obligations of

manufacturers or providers of ICT products, ICT services, ICT processes, managed

security services and certified entities who carry out the conformity self-assessment,

for monitoring conformity assessment bodies, as well as the appropriateness of the

expertise of the staff of bodies issuing certificates for assurance level ‘high’. ENISA

should participate in the peer reviews as observer and support the organisation of the

peer review mechanism and peer reviews, including by developing relevant guidance

documents and templates, in cooperation with the Commission and the ECCG. ENISA

should also make publicly available on their website on European cybersecurity

certification schemes the information on the schedule of peer reviews and the list of

peer-reviewed national cybersecurity certification authorities that are to carry out the

schedule. Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025/254060, adopted under

Regulation (EU) 2019/881 establishes the plan for peer reviews which is being utilised

by the adopted European cybersecurity certification schemes. It is necessary to ensure

the continuation of the peer reviews. Nevertheless, the Commission should be able, by

means of implementing acts, where needed, to establish a new plan for peer reviews of

at least five years, as well as to lay down criteria and methodologies for the operation

of the peer review system.

(120) Once a European cybersecurity certification scheme is adopted, manufacturers or

providers of ICT products, ICT services, ICT processes, managed security services or

the entities the cyber posture of which is the subject of certification, should be able to

submit applications for certification of their ICT products, ICT services, ICT

processes, managed security services or cyber posture to the conformity assessment

body of their choice anywhere in the Union. Conformity assessment bodies should be

accredited by a national accreditation body if they comply with the requirements set

out in this Regulation, and, where applicable, with the requirements specified by the

Commission in accordance with this Regulation. The system set out in this Regulation

should be complemented by the accreditation system provided for in Regulation (EC)

No 765/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council61.

(121) Conformity assessment bodies that have been accredited or notified under existing

Union legislation, in particular Regulation (EU) 2024/2847 or Implementing

Regulation (EU) 2024/482, might possess competencies that are relevant to newly

adopted European cybersecurity certification schemes. To avoid unnecessary financial

and administrative burden, it is appropriate to create synergies for the accreditation of

conformity assessment bodies under this Regulation. For this reason, the accreditation

requirements of the schemes should be established in such a way that there is as much

alignment as possible with requirements relating to notified bodies set out in

60 Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025/2540 of 9 December 2025 laying down rules for the

application of Regulation (EU) 2019/881 of the European Parliament and of the Council as regards the

establishment of the plan for peer review (OJ L 2540, 12.12.2025,

ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg_impl/2025/2540/oj). 61 Regulation (EC) No 765/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 July 2008 setting out

the requirements for accreditation and market surveillance relating to the marketing of products and

repealing Regulation (EEC) No 339/93 (OJ L 218, 13.8.2008, p. 30, ELI:

http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2008/765/oj).

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Regulation (EU) 2024/2847 and accreditation requirements under Implementing

Regulation (EU) 2024/482. In addition, conformity assessment bodies that undergo an

accreditation process under this Regulation should be able to rely on previous results

of evaluation of their competences under other Union legislation, whenever there is an

overlap in the accreditation requirements.

(122) With a view to facilitating harmonised conformity assessment services across the

Union, it should be possible to set out in a European cybersecurity certification

scheme additional or specific requirements for conformity assessment bodies. In the

context of certification, an authorisation should be understood as a decision by a

national cybersecurity certification authority that a conformity assessment body meets

the specific or additional requirements set out in a European cybersecurity certification

scheme, to carry out a specific conformity assessment activity.

(123) Where a European cybersecurity certification scheme sets out additional or specific

requirements in accordance with this Regulation, the conformity assessment bodies

should be authorised by the national cybersecurity certification authorities to carry out

tasks under such scheme. In order to avoid multiple authorisation, to enhance

acceptance and recognition of authorisation decisions and to carry out effective

monitoring of authorised conformity assessment bodies, conformity assessment bodies

should request authorisation by the national cybersecurity certification authority of the

Member State in which they are established. Nevertheless, it is necessary to ensure

that a conformity assessment body is able to request authorisation in another Member

State in the event that there is no national cybersecurity certification authority in its

own Member State or where the national cybersecurity certification authority does not

have the competence to provide the authorisation services requested. In such cases,

appropriate cooperation and exchange of information between national cybersecurity

certification authorities should be ensured. The Commission should be empowered to

adopt implementing acts establishing the procedures for authorisation, including for

cross-border cooperation with regard to authorisation.

(124) In order to safeguard the level of protection required for an ICT product, ICT service,

ICT process, managed security service or cyber posture of an entity, it is essential that

conformity assessment subcontractors and subsidiaries are required to meet the same

requirements as the notified conformity assessment bodies in relation to the

performance of conformity assessment tasks. Accordingly, a conformity assessment

body should have the appropriate competence and be able to verify that the applicable

requirements are met by its subcontractors.

(125) The extent to which the conformity assessment body intends to rely on subcontractors

established outside the Union, or have access to personnel or facilities outside the

Member State of notification should be appropriately assessed by the notifying

authority. The public authority of a Member State should have the possibility to decide

that it cannot take the overall responsibility as a national cybersecurity certification

authority for such an arrangement, and to withdraw or limit the scope of the

notification.

(126) In order to evaluate the cybersecurity requirements for ICT products, ICT services,

ICT processes, managed security services or the cyber posture of entities, accredited

conformity assessment bodies should be notified by the national cybersecurity

certification authorities to the Commission and the other Member States. Notification

of accredited and, where applicable, authorised conformity assessment bodies

indicates that those bodies can be trusted in performing evaluation and certification

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activities in accordance with this Regulation and the European cybersecurity

certification scheme, contributing to the overall reputation of European cybersecurity

certification. It is therefore essential to ensure that conformity assessment bodies that

have been notified meet their requirements and fulfil their obligations over time, and

that the list of notified conformity assessment bodies is kept up to date.

(127) Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2024/314362 adopted under Regulation

(EU) 2019/881 establishes the circumstances, formats and procedures for notifications

of conformity assessment bodies which are being utilised by the adopted European

cybersecurity certification schemes. It is therefore necessary to ensure the continuation

of the notification activities. Nevertheless, the Commission should be empowered to

adopt implementing acts to adjust those circumstances, procedures and formats for the

notification of conformity assessment bodies. In this context, the Commission should

draw on the experience gained in the context of existing schemes, and seek alignment

with other relevant Union legislation and frameworks, in particular Regulation (EU)

2024/2847 and the new legislative framework, in view of reducing compliance burden

for conformity assessment bodies active under different legal instruments.

(128) Information and communication technology (ICT) supply chains are composed of a

linked set of resources and processes between economic operators. ICT supply chains

play a crucial role in sustaining societal stability and driving economic activity across

the Union. They also play a critical role in enabling the digital infrastructure in the

Union and underpin the functioning of Union society and economy. ICT supply chains

enable the manufacture, production, distribution, and maintenance of ICT services,

ICT systems and ICT products that underpin various critical and highly critical

sectors, including healthcare, finance, transportation, telecommunication, energy and

customs. The security of the ICT supply chains of those critical sectors may also have

impact on the security of defence and military infrastructure, where this infrastructure

relies on civilian critical sectors and their ICT supply chains. However, according to

the report on the status of the cybersecurity threats issued by ENISA (ENISA Threat

Landscape 2025)63, attacks against supply chains are amongst the five prime threats to

cybersecurity showing that attackers actively leveraging indirect pathways through

third-party providers and dependencies. Disruption of ICT supply chains can impede

the pursuit of economic activities in the internal market, generate financial loss,

undermine user confidence and cause major damage to the Union’s economy and

society. Cybersecurity preparedness and effectiveness are therefore more essential

than ever to the proper functioning of the internal market.

(129) Beyond technical risks which are addressed by Directive (EU) 2022/55 of the

European Parliament and of the Council64, Regulation (EU) 2024/2847 of the

62 Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2024/3143 of 18 December 2024 establishing the

circumstances, formats and procedures for notifications pursuant to Article 61(5) of Regulation (EU)

2019/881 of the European Parliament and of the Council on ENISA (the European Union Agency for

Cybersecurity) and on information and communications technology cybersecurity certification (OJ L

3143, 19.12.2025, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg_impl/2024/3143/oj). 63 ENISA Threat Landscape 2025, October 2025. 64 Directive (EU) 2022/2555 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 December 2022 on

measures for a high common level of cybersecurity across the Union, amending Regulation (EU) No

910/2014 and Directive (EU) 2018/1972, and repealing Directive (EU) 2016/1148 (NIS 2 Directive)

(OJ L 333 du 27.12.2022, p. 80-152, ELI: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dir/2022/2555/oj).

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European Parliament and of the Council65 and the European cybersecurity certification

Framework established by Regulation (EU) 2019/881, ICT supply chains are

increasingly exposed to risks of a non-technical nature. Such non-technical risks may

be linked, but not limited, to the jurisdiction to which a supplier of certain components

is subject, in particular where a third country or threat actors controlled from that

country engage in economic espionage, carry out malicious cyber activities or

campaigns against the Union or its Member States, or engages in irresponsible State

behaviour in cyberspace. Non-technical risks can also be linked to concealed

vulnerabilities or backdoors or potential systemic supply disruptions, in particular in

the case of technological lock-in or supplier dependency. For instance, kill switches

could be used to negatively impact the availability of communication networks and

electricity grids.

(130) The Joint Communication on Strengthening EU economic security66 underlined the

risk of third countries gaining access to sensitive information and data in the Union or

its Member States, either as a result of industrial espionage, their supply of hardware

or software used in certain products or due to their ownership and control of certain

businesses possessing sensitive information and data. It also underlined the risk of the

Union’s critical infrastructure - including critical transport, space systems, energy and

communications infrastructure, in particular those that are identified as strategic to

military mobility - being disrupted by foreign actors, which could lead to cascade

effects on the Union economy. Disruptions could occur through physical, cyber or

hybrid attacks, including the sabotage of entire facilities or their parts or

subcomponents. They could also be linked to ICT supply chains, which underly

critical components or services to critical infrastructures.

(131) In response to challenges to ICT supply chain security posed by non-technical risks,

some Member States have taken regulatory measures, including designation of high-

risk suppliers, whilst other Member States are likely to do so. This could lead to

further divergence in national approaches, and ultimately to higher vulnerability of

some Member States, with potential spill-over effects across the Union. Therefore, it is

necessary to harmonise certain aspects related to the non-technical cybersecurity risks

to the ICT supply chain. Such intervention at Union level is also justified in view of

the need to ensure a high level of cybersecurity across the Union. The provisions on

the ICT supply chain security aim to remove such wide divergences among Member

States, in particular by setting out rules for risk assessment mechanisms of ICT supply

chain security risks at Union level and minimum standards of protection from ICT

supply chain risks.

(132) To reduce critical dependencies and vulnerabilities, it is necessary to establish a

trusted ICT supply chain framework which should address non-technical risks related

to high-risk suppliers and dependencies in sectors of high criticality and other critical

sectors. Therefore, it is necessary to provide an objective, risk-based, future-proof and

technology-neutral framework at Union level, to identify key ICT assets and provide

for a set of proportionate mitigating measures to address the risks.

65 Regulation (EU) 2024/2847 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2024 on

horizontal cybersecurity requirements for products with digital elements and amending Regulations

(EU) No 168/2013 and (EU) 2019/1020 and Directive (EU) 2020/1828 (Cyber Resilience Act) (OJ L,

2024/2847, 20.11.2024, ELI: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/2847/oj/eng). 66 Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the Council, Strengthening EU economic

security, 3 December 2025, JOIN(2025) 977 final.

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(133) Cybersecurity risks, including risks related to dependency on high-risk suppliers may

be observed in several critical ICT supply chains in the Union, including detection

equipment, connected and automated vehicles, electricity supply systems and

electricity storage, water supply systems, drones and counter-drones systems, cloud

computing services, medical devices, surveillance equipment, space services and

semiconductors. For example, vulnerabilities in security detection equipment could

grant access to ICT systems allowing malicious actors to manipulate scanners in such

a way that prohibited items could be brought through the security checkpoint without

being detected, with possibly catastrophic consequences.

(134) This Regulation should not preclude Member States from adopting or maintaining

provisions ensuring a higher level of cybersecurity for what concerns ICT supply

chain security, provided that such provisions are consistent with Member States’

obligations laid down in Union law. Such provisions may for instance include

imposing stricter mitigation measures as regards the key ICT assets.

(135) In order to identify potential cybersecurity risks affecting specific ICT supply chains,

the Cooperation Group established by Article 14 of Directive (EU) 2022/2555 (‘NIS

Cooperation Group’) may assess specific ICT supply chains by means of Union-level

coordinated security risk assessments. The Union-level coordinated security risk

assessments should look, among others, at the main threat actors, the main threats and

vulnerabilities affecting the key ICT assets. The Union-level coordinated security risk

assessments should develop a list of risk scenarios and a list of measures to mitigate

the risks. Union-level coordinated security risk assessments should be completed

within six months. In case of specific urgency, it should be possible to shorten the

deadlines.

(136) In cases where the Commission has sufficient reason to believe that there is a

significant cyber threat for the security of the Union related to critical ICT supply

chains and an action might be necessary to preserve the proper functioning of the

internal market, it should without delay consult Member States on the need for

mitigating measures and carry out a security risk assessment, taking into account the

consultation of the Member States.

(137) Where, as a result of a security risk assessment conducted by the NIS Cooperation

Group or the Commission, it appears that a specific third country poses serious and

structural non-technical cybersecurity risks to ICT supply chains, the Commission

should verify the threat posed by that country. The Commission may initiate such

verification also on the basis of other sources such as a public statement on behalf of

the Union or a Member States in response to, instances of irresponsible state behaviour

in cyberspace that has led to a cybersecurity incident. In order to assess the level of

threat, the Commission should take into account elements such as the existence of

laws or practices in the third country which require entities under their jurisdiction to

report information on software or hardware vulnerabilities to authorities of that third

country prior to those vulnerabilities being known to have been exploited. Another

relevant element is the absence of effective judicial remedies, and independent and

democratic control mechanisms, that can correct security concerns, including about

existing practices, the substantiated information about incidents of threat actors

operating out of the territory of that country carrying out malicious cyber activities or

campaigns, and the lack of ability or willingness of the third country to cooperate with

the Commission or Member States to address the risk stemming from the operation of

such threat actors. The Commission should also take into account information

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stemming from Union-level coordinated security risk assessments or reports issued by

Member States or international organisations such as NATO.

(138) For the purpose of this Regulation, the notion of control should be understood as the

ability to exercise a decisive influence on a legal entity directly, or indirectly through

one or more intermediate legal entities The control of entities from a third country

posing cybersecurity concerns should also be established in situations where such

entity is having executive management structures in that country.

(139) The Union should not fund projects involving high-risk suppliers, which would

jeopardise the Union’s security and undermine the Union’s interests and credibility.

High-risk suppliers identified under this Regulation should therefore not be entitled to

participate in any Union funding programmes and instruments implemented in direct

and indirect management in accordance with the Article 136 of the Regulation

(EU/Eurotom) 2024/2509 and Union sector specific rules as well as in any Union

funding activities implemented in shared management, including under the next

Multiannual Financial Framework in relation to the provision of ICT components or

components that include ICT components to be used in identified key ICT assets.

Union implementing partners, such as European Investment Bank Group and national

promotional banks and institutions should refrain from supporting projects that

contradict the above, including in operations at own risk.

(140) Public procurement can be a strong tool for public authorities to contribute to a more

innovative, sustainable and competitive economy and for spending public money in a

strategic manner. Public procurement related to ICT supply chains should not be used

to benefit suppliers that threaten the security of the Union’s critical infrastructure.

High-risk suppliers identified under this Regulation should therefore not be entitled to

participate in public procurement concerning the provision of ICT components or

components that include ICT components to be used in identified key ICT assets.

(141) Cybersecurity certification plays a role in strengthening overall security and

countering cyber threats, serving as benchmark of trust. This trust could be eroded if

cybersecurity skills attestations were delivered by high-risk suppliers that should

therefore not be entitled to apply to become authorised providers of any Union

individual cybersecurity skills attestations. In a similar vein, it is also appropriate to

exclude high-risk suppliers from obtaining cybersecurity certification under the ECCF,

and becoming accredited conformity assessment bodies to deliver such certificates.

(142) Cybersecurity standards play a critical role in the security and trustworthiness of

digital infrastructures. It is necessary to take appropriate measures to ensure

standardisation in the field of cybersecurity. The involvement of entities established in

or controlled from countries which have been identified as posing cybersecurity

concerns to the ICT supply chain in line with this Regulation may lead to influencing

cybersecurity standards in a way that undermines their security and trustworthiness.

(143) Based on the results of the security risk assessments, the Commission may identify, by

means of implementing acts, which ICT assets should be regarded as key ICT assets

due to their criticality and subject to specific mitigating measures. The mere existence

of the possibility of connectivity of the asset should be sufficient to consider their

cybersecurity risk.

(144) Where necessary to ensure a high level of cybersecurity, cyber resilience and trust

within the Union, the mitigating measures may be applied to entities in relation to their

ICT supply chain and in particular to key ICT assets identified. The proposed

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mitigating measures should be based on the assessment of potential risks and

dependencies, including the potential economic and societal impact of such measures

on the entities concerned operating in highly critical or other critical sectors and in

particular SMEs. The economic impact should look at the costs of the implementation

of the mitigation measures, including the duration of the lifecycle of the relevant

components in the key ICT assets in case where the measures include the replacement

of suppliers. The availability of alternative suppliers on the market should also be

assessed in order to ensure continued provision of the services.

(145) As mitigating measures could potentially have a restrictive effect on international

trade in goods and services, they should be proportionate and targeted to pursue the

legitimate objective to ensure the cybersecurity of ICT supply chains in relation to

entities of the type referred to in Annexes I and II to Directive (EU) 2022/2555, in line

with the Union’s international obligations.

(146) Use, installation or any other kind of integration of components provided by high-risk

suppliers in the operation of key ICT assets may be related to risks of subsequent

transfers of data to a third country. In particular, risks may be posed by an insufficient

level of protection offered to the data in the third country, such as for the protection of

fundamental rights, intellectual property or trade secrets, or unlawful access and

exploitation of that data for possible future supply chain disruptions and espionage

purposes. To mitigate such risks, restrictions in relation to transfer of specific types of

data to third countries may be applied.

(147) Important vulnerabilities stem from a lack of diversity in equipment used by entities of

the type referred to in Annexes I and II to Directive (EU) 2022/2555. A reliance on a

single supplier creates a dependency on specific equipment or solutions. A lack of

diversity of suppliers increases the overall vulnerability of critical infrastructure, in

particular if entities source their ICT components used in sensitive ICT assets from a

supplier presenting a high degree of risk. Dependency also significantly affects

national and Union-wide resilience and creates single points of failure. To mitigate

such risks, requirements to have more than one supplier for specific key ICT assets

may be applied.

(148) Union entities may also be using key assets as defined by this Regulation. Therefore,

the rules laid down in this Regulation concerning ICT supply chain security should

also be applicable to them. To ensure that the specificity of Union entities is taken into

account, it is important to consider non-technical risks stemming from ICT supply

chains in regard to Union entities when conducting Union-level coordinated security

risk assessments.

(149) In exceptional circumstances justifying an immediate intervention to preserve the

proper functioning of the internal market and where there is a clear evidence giving

the Commission sufficient reason to consider that the use of ICT components or

components that include ICT components from a specific supplier represents a

significant cybersecurity threat for the economic or societal activities of at least three

Member States, the Commission may propose, in close consultation with Member

States, to prohibit the use, installation or integration of such components from this

supplier by type of entities referred to in Annexes I and II to Directive (EU)

2022/2555.

(150) In order to ensure proportionality of measures applied, entities established in a third

country posing cybersecurity concerns designated in accordance with this Regulation,

or controlled by such third country, by an entity established in such third country, or

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by a national of such third country can apply to be exempted from the prohibition to

provide to entities of a type referred to in Annexes I and II to Directive (EU)

2022/2555 ICT components or components that include ICT components for their use,

installation or integration in key ICT assets of that entity and participate in public

procurement procedures organised in accordance with legislation transposing

Directives 2014/24/EU67 and 2014/25/EU of the European Parliament and of the

Council68 procedures in relation to the provision of ICT components or components

that include ICT components to be used in identified key ICT assets. For that purpose,

the entity should demonstrate with clear evidence that it applies effective measures

addressing the non-technical risks and ensuring the absence of any possible undue

interference by a third country posing cybersecurity concerns.

(151) Electronic communications networks form the backbone for a wide range of services

that are essential for the functioning of the internal market and the maintenance and

operation of vital societal and economic functions – such as energy, transport,

banking, health, defence, as well as industrial control systems. Therefore, those highly

critical networks are attractive targets for all types of cyberattacks and hybrid threats,

for disruptions, espionage, intelligence gathering, as well as for fraud and financial

crime. The risk assessment of the NIS Cooperation Group on the cybersecurity and

resiliency of Europe’s communications infrastructures and networks identified a

number of risks and threats of strategic importance from a Union perspective, such as

wiper/ransomware, attacks, supply chain attacks, network intrusions, and Distributed

denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks.

(152) In view of the interconnection and interdependence between the different national

electronic communications networks, it is necessary that all Member States take

appropriate measures to ensure the security of their networks. For the same reasons,

there is a need to have in place an effective legal framework at Union level addressing

also non-technical risks and ensuring the security of interconnected electronic

communications networks in a comprehensive way.

(153) In particular, the cybersecurity of 5G networks is a matter of strategic importance for

the Union as those networks form the backbone for a wide range of services of

essential importance for the functioning of the internal market and are also key in

setting up our defence readiness, including in relation to military mobility. 5G

networks are capable of providing reliable ultra-fast connectivity, for example for data

and information sharing, detection of drones and real-time battlefield coordination.

(154) 5G deployment consists primarily in non-standalone networks, where only the radio

access network is upgraded to 5G technology, while the rest of the network still relies

on an existing 4G core network. 5G non-standalone networks builds primarily on

infrastructure already in place, meaning that the security of future 5G networks is, to a

certain extent, determined by network equipment already in place and the

configuration of such equipment. Therefore, mitigating measures should also cover 4G

networks on which the 5G deployment relies.

67 Directive 2014/24/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 2014 on public

procurement and repealing Directive 2004/18/EC (OJ L 94, 28.3.2014, pp. 65–242, ELI: https://eur-

lex.europa.eu/eli/dir/2014/24/oj/eng). 68 Directive 2014/25/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 2014 on

procurement by entities operating in the water, energy, transport and postal services sectors and

repealing Directive 2004/17/EC (OJ L 94 du 28.3.2014, p. 243-374, ELI: https://eur-

lex.europa.eu/eli/dir/2014/25/oj?locale=fr).

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(155) In order to address important security challenges in 5G networks, Member States

within the NIS Cooperation Group, together with the Commission and ENISA, carried

out a Union-level coordinated security risk assessment of 5G networks, examining

both technical and non-technical risks. This assessment identified several risks,

including potential interference from third countries or third country actors via the

supply chain, and categorised assets according to their criticality. This assessment

should be taken as a basis for defining the key ICT assets for 5G communications

networks.

(156) To mitigate the risks identified in the Union-level coordinated security risk assessment

of 5G networks, the NIS Cooperation Group adopted the EU Toolbox on 5G

cybersecurity, setting out strategic and technical measures. Even though a majority of

the Member States have legal frameworks that allow for restrictions or exclusions of

high-risk suppliers as recommended in the 5G Toolbox, the implementation of those

frameworks has not been uniform. This results in an important number of 5G sites

across the Union being supplied by high-risk suppliers as referred to in the

Commission’s communication on the implementation of the 5G Toolbox69. This

situation creates vulnerabilities, including strategic dependency and potential exposure

to third-country interference, which could also affect future 6G infrastructure built on

existing 5G networks. The fragmented implementation of the 5G Toolbox

recommended measures, particularly regarding the scope of restrictions on high-risk

suppliers, has led to divergences between Member States, which results in an

unlevelled playing field that divides the internal market and weakens overall network

security. The European Court of Auditors has highlighted these disparities, warning

that the absence of a coordinated approach undermines the functioning of the internal

market. Persistent dependency on high-risk suppliers poses serious risks to the security

of critical infrastructure in the Union and could erode trust in the internal market, as

inconsistent security levels may discourage consumers and businesses from relying on

5G-based products and services across the Union. It is therefore essential to have

Union-level measures to ensure a harmonised approach to the security of 5G networks.

(157) For the purpose of setting up a phasing out period for the key ICT assets of fixed and

satellite electronic communications networks, the Commission should carry out an

assessment taking due account of the degree of the security risks related to each

specific ICT key assets of the fixed and satellite networks, the lifetime of relevant

components and the economic impact that the removal of those components would

have on the operators concerned. Based on the results of that assessment, the

Commission may consider setting up different phasing out periods for the particular

key ICT assets and their integral elements.

(158) For the purposes of effective supervision and enforcement of obligations concerning

the providers of mobile, fixed and satellite electronic communication networks, the

relevant competent authorities under this Regulation should ensure close cooperation

with the competent authorities under the [DNA proposal]. Upon request from a

competent authority designated under this Regulation, national regulatory authorities

or other competent authorities for radio spectrum, where appropriate, should withdraw

the rights referred to in Article 9 and Article 20 [DNA Proposal] if the provider of

public electronic communications networks is not complying with the obligations

under this Regulation, including if the provider does not phase out ICT components or

69 Communication from the Commission on the implementation of the 5G cybersecurity Toolbox, 15 June

2023, C(2023) 4049 final.

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components that include ICT components from high-risk suppliers in the operation of

key ICT assets within the period specified in accordance with this Regulation.

(159) In view of the differences in national governance structures, Member States should

designate or establish one or more competent authorities responsible for the

supervisory and enforcement measures under this Regulation.

(160) The competent authorities should provide support to entities of the type referred to in

Annexes I and II o Directive (EU) 2022/2555 for the compliance with their obligations

under this Regulation. For that purpose, the Commission should assess whether

suppliers that may be affected by specific prohibitions are established in third country

posing cybersecurity concerns or controlled by such third country or by an entity

established in such third country or by a national of such third country. Competent

authorities should cooperate closely with the Commission and other competent

authorities within the Network established under this Regulation. Based on the

assessment by the Commission, the competent authorities should share relevant

information concerning high-risk suppliers with relevant entities of the type referred to

in Annexes I and II to Directive (EU) 2022/2555. Entities are not expected to verify

whether a supplier is under foreign control but may rely fully on information received

from competent authorities. The competent authorities should ensure that no

unnecessary administrative burden is imposed on those entities.

(161) In order to ensure effective compliance, this Regulation should provide for supervisory

and enforcement measures through which the competent authorities can supervise

entities of the type referred to in Annexes I and II to Directive (EU) 2022/2555. Where

the competent authorities execute their supervisory and enforcement tasks in relation

to those entities, they should not go beyond what is necessary and be proportionate to

the identified risks.

(162) In order to make enforcement effective and consistent across the Union, it is necessary

to provide enforcement powers that competent authorities can exercise for breach of

the obligations laid down in this Regulation. When exercising those enforcement

powers, the competent authorities should have due regard to a number of factors,

including the nature, gravity and duration of the infringement, the material or non-

material damage caused, whether the infringement was intentional or negligent,

actions taken to prevent or mitigate the material or non-material damage, the degree of

responsibility or any relevant previous infringements, the degree of cooperation with

the competent authority and any other aggravating or mitigating factor. The

enforcement measures, including penalties, should be proportionate and their

imposition should be subject to appropriate procedural safeguards in accordance with

the general principles of Union law and the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the

European Union, including the right to an effective remedy and to a fair trial, the

presumption of innocence and the rights of defence.

(163) It is important to also provide for the power to impose periodic penalty payments, in

order to compel an entity of the type referred to in Annexes I or II to Directive (EU)

2022/2555 to cease an infringement of this Regulation in accordance with a prior

decision of the competent authority.

(164) In order to ensure effective enforcement of the obligations laid down in this

Regulation, each competent authority should have the power to impose or request the

imposition of penalties.

EN 59 EN

(165) For the purpose of imposing penalties on an entity of the type referred to in Annexes I

and II to Directive (EU) 2022/2555 that is an undertaking, an undertaking should be

understood to be an undertaking in accordance with Articles 101 and 102 TFEU.

Where a fine is imposed on a person that is not an undertaking, the competent

authority should take account of the general level of income in the Member State as

well as the economic situation of the person when considering the appropriate amount

of the penalties. It should be for the Member States to determine whether and to what

extent public authorities should be subject to penalties. Imposing a penalty should not

affect the application of other powers of the competent authorities.

(166) In order to ensure uniform conditions for the implementation of this Regulation,

implementing powers should be conferred on the Commission in respect of the

adoption of implementing acts laying down detailed rules relating to fees levied by

ENISA, implementing acts providing for a European cybersecurity certification

scheme for ICT products, ICT services, ICT processes, managed security services or

cyber posture of entities, implementing acts laying down common principles and

reference provisions intended to provide for elements across European cybersecurity

certification schemes, implementing acts specifying procedures for prior approval or

general delegation models, implementing acts on recognising a third country or

international organisation cybersecurity certificates as equivalent to European

cybersecurity certificates, implementing acts establishing a plan for peer review,

implementing acts to establish the procedures, including on cross-border cooperation,

for authorisation of the conformity assessment bodies, implementing acts to establish

the circumstances, formats and procedures for notifications of conformity assessment

bodies, implementing acts designating a third country as a country posing

cybersecurity concerns to ICT supply chains, implementing acts identifying key ICT

assets used for the manufacturing of products or the provision of services by entities of

the type referred to Annexes I and II to Directive (EU) 2022/2555, implementing acts

establishing that entities operating in sectors of high criticality and other critical

sectors are subject to specific mitigating measures and specifying the time periods for

the phasing out of ICT components or components that include ICT components

provided by high-risk suppliers, implementing acts further specifying conditions

regarding the exemption for entities established in or controlled by entities from a

third country posing cybersecurity concerns, as well as the adoption of implementing

acts laying down detailed rules relating to fees levied by the Commission. Those

powers should be exercised in accordance with Regulation (EU) No 182/2011 of the

European Parliament and of the Council, and the examination procedure should be

used. In order to ensure uniform conditions for the implementation of this Regulation,

implementing powers should also be conferred on the Commission in respect of

establishing a list of high-risk suppliers relevant for certain measures provided for in

this Regulation.

(167) It is necessary that European cybersecurity certification schemes reflect the latest

technological developments, new related threats, and the adoption of new Union

legislation setting out the demonstration of compliance and the presumption of

conformity through European cybersecurity certification with relevant cybersecurity

requirements of that legislation. For these reasons, the power to adopt acts in

accordance with Article 290 TFEU should be delegated to the Commission in order to

add or modify the security objectives that European cybersecurity certification

schemes pursue. Similarly, in the interests of a trusted ICT supply chain framework,

the power to adopt acts in accordance with Article 290 TFEU should be delegated to

the Commission to amend Annex II to this Regulation in order to adapt it to

EN 60 EN

technological developments. It is of particular importance that the Commission carry

out appropriate consultations during its preparatory work, including at expert level,

and that those consultations be conducted in accordance with the principles laid down

in the Interinstitutional Agreement of 13 April 2016 on Better Law-Making. In

particular, to ensure equal participation in the preparation of delegated acts, the

European Parliament and the Council should receive all documents at the same time as

Member States’ experts, and their experts should systematically have access to

meetings of Commission expert groups dealing with the preparation of delegated acts.

(168) ENISA’s operations should be subject to regular and independent evaluation. That

evaluation should have regard to ENISA’s objectives, and the relevance of its tasks, in

particular its tasks relating to the operational cooperation at Union level. In the event

of a review, the Commission should evaluate how ENISA’s role as a reference point

for advice and expertise can be reinforced.

(169) Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2024/482 lays down rules as regards the

adoption of the European Common Criteria-based cybersecurity certification scheme

(EUCC). The EUCC is the first and only European cybersecurity certification scheme

adopted under Regulation (EU) 2019/881. It concerns the certification of ICT

products, including products belonging to the technical domains ‘smart cards and

similar devices’ and ‘hardware devices with security boxes’, and protection profiles

(as ICT processes). It is therefore necessary to ensure the continuation of certification

activities as well as of the Agency’s activities.

(170) The European Data Protection Supervisor and the European Data Protection Board

were consulted in accordance with Article 42(2) of Regulation (EU) 2018/172570 and

delivered a joint opinion [date].

(171) Regulation (EU) 2019/881 should be repealed.

(172) Since the objectives of this Regulation cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member

States but can rather, by reason of its scale and effects, be better achieved at Union

level, the Union may adopt measures, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity

as set out in Article 5 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU). In accordance with the

principle of proportionality as set out in that Article, this Regulation does not go

beyond what is necessary in order to achieve those objectives,

HAVE ADOPTED THIS REGULATION:

TITLE I

GENERAL PROVISIONS

Article 1

Subject matter and scope

1. This Regulation lays down:

(a) the mission, objectives, tasks and organisational matters relating to the

European Union Agency for Cybersecurity (ENISA);

70 Regulation (EU) 2018/1725 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2018 on the

protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data by the Union institutions,

bodies, offices and agencies and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Regulation (EC) No

45/2001 and Decision No 1247/2002/EC (OJ L 295, 21.11.2018,

ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2018/1725/oj).

EN 61 EN

(b) a framework for establishing European cybersecurity certification schemes for

the purpose of ensuring an adequate level of cybersecurity for ICT products,

ICT services, ICT processes, managed security services or the cybersecurity

posture of entities in the Union, as well as for the purpose of avoiding the

fragmentation of the internal market with regard to cybersecurity certification

schemes in the Union; and

(c) a trusted ICT supply chain framework.

2. The framework referred to in paragraph 1, point (b) applies without prejudice to

specific provisions in other Union legal acts regarding voluntary or mandatory

certification.

3. The framework referred to in the first subparagraph point (c) shall apply to public or

private entities of a type referred to in Annex I or II to Directive (EU) 2022/2555

which provide their services or carry out their activities within the Union.

4. This Regulation is without prejudice to the Member States’ essential State functions,

including ensuring the territorial integrity of the State, maintaining law and order and

safeguarding national security. In particular, national security remains the sole

responsibility of each Member State.

Article 2

Definitions

For the purposes of this Regulation, the following definitions apply:

(1) ‘cybersecurity’ means the activities necessary to protect network and information

systems, the users of such systems, and other persons affected by cyber threats;

(2) ‘Union entities’ means Union entities as defined in Article 3, point (1), of Regulation

(EU, Euratom) 2023/2841;

(3) ‘authorised attestation provider’ means an entity, public or private, for which ENISA

has adopted a decision authorising that entity to award European individual

cybersecurity skills attestations as laid down in a European individual cybersecurity

skills attestation scheme;

(4) ‘European individual cybersecurity skills attestation’ means a record, in digital or

physical form, attesting that an individual knows, understands and is able to perform

the tasks associated to a role profile or a subset of a role profile of the European

Cybersecurity Skills Framework (‘ECSF’), following an assessment as laid down in

a European individual cybersecurity skills attestation scheme;

(5) ‘European individual cybersecurity skills attestation scheme’ means a comprehensive

set of rules, requirements, standards and procedures established by ENISA and

associated to a role profile of the ECSF or a subset thereof, and that apply to and are

applied by authorised attestation providers;

(6) ‘network and information system’ means a network and information system as

defined in Article 6, point (1), of Directive (EU) 2022/2555;

(7) ‘national cybersecurity strategy’ means a national cybersecurity strategy as defined

in Article 6, point (4), of Directive (EU) 2022/2555;

EN 62 EN

(8) ‘incident’ means an incident as defined in Article 6, point (6), of Directive (EU)

2022/2555;

(9) ‘large-scale cybersecurity incident’ means a large-scale cybersecurity incident as

defined in Article 6, point (7), of Directive (EU) 2022/2555;

(10) ‘incident handling’ means incident handling as defined in Article 6, point (8), of

Directive (EU) 2022/2555;

(11) ‘cyber threat’ means any potential circumstance, event or action that could damage,

disrupt or otherwise adversely impact network and information systems, the users of

such systems and other persons;

(12) ‘European cybersecurity certification scheme’ means a comprehensive set of rules,

technical requirements, standards and procedures that are established at Union level

and that apply to the certification or conformity assessment of specific ICT products,

ICT services, ICT processes, managed security services or cyber posture of entities;

(13) ‘national cybersecurity certification scheme’ means a comprehensive set of rules,

technical requirements, standards and procedures developed and adopted by a

national public authority and that apply to the certification or conformity assessment

of ICT products, ICT services, ICT processes, managed security services or cyber

posture of entities falling under the scope of the specific scheme;

(14) ‘European cybersecurity certificate’ means a document issued by a relevant body,

attesting that a given ICT product, ICT service, ICT process or managed security

services, or the cyber posture of an entity has been evaluated for compliance with

specific security requirements laid down in a European cybersecurity certification

scheme;

(15) ‘EU statement of conformity’ means a document issued by a manufacturer or

provider of ICT products, ICT services, ICT processes, managed security services or

the entity the cyber posture of which is subject to certification, stating that the

fulfilment of the requirements corresponding to assurance level “basic”, laid down in

the European cybersecurity certification scheme, has been demonstrated through

conformity self-assessment;

(16) ‘ICT product’ means an element or a group of elements of a network or information

system;

(17) ‘ICT service’ means a service consisting fully or mainly in the transmission, storing,

retrieving or processing of information by means of network and information

systems;

(18) ‘ICT process’ means a set of activities performed to design, develop, deliver or

maintain an ICT product or ICT service;

(19) ‘managed security service’ means a service provided to a third party consisting of

carrying out, or providing assistance for, activities relating to cybersecurity risk

management, such as incident handling, penetration testing, security audits and

consulting, including expert advice related to technical support;

(20) ‘accreditation’ means accreditation as defined in Article 2, point (10), of Regulation

(EC) No 765/2008;

(21) ‘national accreditation body’ means a national accreditation body as defined in

Article 2, point (11), of Regulation (EC) No 765/2008;

EN 63 EN

(22) ‘conformity assessment’ means a conformity assessment as defined in Article 2,

point (12), of Regulation (EC) No 765/2008;

(23) ‘conformity assessment body’ means a conformity assessment body as defined in

Article 2, point (13), of Regulation (EC) No 765/2008;

(24) ‘standard’ means a standard as defined in Article 2, point (1), of Regulation (EU) No

1025/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council71;

(25) ‘technical specification’ means a technical specification as defined in Article 2, point

(4), of Regulation (EU) No 1025/2012;

(26) ‘harmonised standard’ means a harmonised standard as defined in Article 2, point (1)

(c), of Regulation (EU) No 1025/2012;

(27) ‘assurance level’ means a basis for confidence that an ICT product, ICT service, ICT

process, managed security service or the cyber posture of an entity meets the security

requirements of a specific European cybersecurity certification scheme, and indicates

the level at which an ICT product, ICT service, ICT process, managed security

service or cyber posture of entity has been evaluated but as such does not measure

the security of the ICT product, ICT service, ICT process, managed security service

or cyber posture of entity concerned;

(28) ‘conformity self-assessment’ means an action carried out by a manufacturer or

provider of ICT products, ICT services, ICT processes, managed security services or

the entity the cyber posture of which is subject to certification, which evaluates

whether those ICT products, ICT services, ICT processes, managed security services

or cyber posture of entities meet the requirements of a specific European

cybersecurity certification scheme;

(29) ‘cyber posture of entities’ means entities’ level of cybersecurity with respect to the

specific security requirements;

(30) ‘prior approval model’ means a model whereby a conformity assessment body may

issue a European cybersecurity certificate based on the assessment by a national

cybersecurity certification authority in the context of a specific certification process

under a relevant scheme;

(31) ‘general delegation model’ means a model whereby a conformity assessment body

may issue a European cybersecurity certificate based on a delegation of certification

activities by a national cybersecurity certification authority;

(32) ‘computer security incident response team’ or ‘CSIRT’ means a CSIRT designated

or established pursuant to Article 10 of Directive (EU) 2022/2555.

(33) ‘ICT components’ means ICT products, ICT services or ICT processes that may be

used in the operation of ICT assets;

71 Regulation (EU) No 1025/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2012 on

European standardisation, amending Council Directives 89/686/EEC and 93/15/EEC and Directives

94/9/EC, 94/25/EC, 95/16/EC, 97/23/EC, 98/34/EC, 2004/22/EC, 2007/23/EC, 2009/23/EC and

2009/105/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and repealing Council Decision

87/95/EEC and Decision No 1673/2006/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council (OJ L 316,

14.11.2012, p. 12, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2012/1025/oj).

EN 64 EN

(34) ‘ICT assets’ means software or hardware assets in the network and information

systems used by an entity of the type referred to in Annexes I and II to Directive

(EU) 2022/2555;

(35) ‘key ICT assets’ means ICT assets identified in accordance with Article 102;

(36) ‘electronic communications network’ means electronic communications network as

defined in Article 2, point (1), of Regulation (EU) XX/XXXX [DNA proposal];

(37) ‘control’ means the ability to exercise a decisive influence on a legal entity directly,

or indirectly through one or more intermediate legal entities;

(38) ‘establishment’ means the effective exercise of activity through

stable arrangements in the country where the entity has its central administration or

its principal place of business;

(39) ‘high-risk supplier’ means either of the following:

(a) an entity established in a third country posing cybersecurity concerns

designated in accordance with Article 100, or controlled by such third country,

by an entity established in such third country, or by a national of such third

country;

(b) an entity designated in accordance with Article 103(7) and entities controlled

by that entity;

(40) ‘ICT supply chain’ means a sum of ICT services, ICT products and ICT processes

that encompass activities and actors involved at all stages upstream of a product

being made available or a service being delivered on the market;

(41) ‘third country’ means third country as defined in Article 3 (4) of Regulation (EU)

2023/2675 of the European Parliament and the Council72;

(42) ‘non-technical risk’ means the likelihood of the supplier being subject to influence

by a third country with the potential to cause loss or disruption of the service

provided or to compromise the product manufactured by an entity or to lead to

exfiltration of data, including for the purposes of espionage or revenue generation;

(43) ‘significant non-technical cybersecurity risk’ means a non-technical cybersecurity

risk which can be assumed to have a high likelihood to cause an incident that could

lead to a severe negative impact, including by causing considerable material or non-

material loss or disruption;

(44) ‘core network functions of mobile electronic communications networks’ means the

central architectural element of the mobile electronic communications networks

connecting major network nodes to the Internet and managing essential system

functions that includes user equipment authentication, lawful interception (LI)

functions, security gateways (SeGW) at the network edge, signalling security

functions, roaming and session management, user and control plane data transport,

access policy management, registration and authorisation of network services,

storage of end-user and network data, critical network services including domain

name system (DNS), interconnection with third-party mobile networks, exposure of

72 Regulation (EU) 2023/2675 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 November 2023 on

the protection of the Union and its Member States from economic coercion by third countries (OJ L,

2023/2675, 7.12.2023, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2023/2675/oj).

EN 65 EN

core network functions to external applications, and the selection and management of

network slices;

(45) ‘network function virtualisation (NFV) and management and network orchestration

(MANO) of mobile electronic communications networks’ means the software and

architectural framework ensuring the lifecycle management, orchestration, and

automation of virtualised network functions (VNFs), cloud-native network functions

(CNFs) and the selection and management of network slices within mobile electronic

communications networks;

(46) ‘radio access network (RAN) of mobile electronic communications networks’ means

the network connecting the mobile user equipment to the core network, including

base stations (eNodeB for 4G, gNodeB for 5G), remote radio heads (RRH) and

baseband units (BBU), active antenna systems (AAS), and where applicable,

disaggregated RAN components such as centralised units (CU) and distributed units

(DU), and the RAN intelligent controller (RIC);

(47) ‘core network functions of fixed electronic communications networks’ means the

backbone intelligence of the network, connecting the major nodes and handling a

range of essential functions, including user authentication and authorisation (AAA),

lawful interception (LI) functions, domain name system (DNS) and IP addressing

services (DHCP), access policy management, storage of end-user and network data,

IP switching and routing, and international internet gateways (IIG);

(48) ‘network management system of fixed electronic communications networks’ means

all centralised platforms and software components necessary for the operation,

administration, maintenance and provisioning (OAM&P) of the network and the

monitoring of network-related information;

(49) ‘transport and transmission functions of fixed electronic communications networks’

means all components necessary for the backhaul and aggregation of traffic across

the network, including optical transport equipment, microwave links and submarine

cable systems that include the underwater equipment as well as the submarine line

terminal equipment (SLTE) and the physical landing station facilities;

(50) ‘access network of fixed electronic communications networks’ means the network

connecting the end-user premises to the aggregation or core network, including the

optical line termination (OLT) and the optical network termination (ONT) for fibre

networks; coaxial cable modem termination system (CMTS) and cable modems for

coaxial cable networks, and fixed wireless access components where used as a fixed

line substitute.

TITLE II

THE EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR CYBERSECURITY

Chapter I

Mission and Objectives

EN 66 EN

Article 3

Mission of ENISA

1. The mission of ENISA is to support Member States and Union entities in achieving a

high level of cybersecurity, cyber resilience and trust within the Union.

2. ENISA shall act as a reference point for advice and expertise on cybersecurity for

Member States, as well as for other stakeholders in the Union.

3. ENISA shall contribute to reducing the fragmentation of the internal market by

carrying out the tasks assigned to it under this Regulation.

4. ENISA shall carry out the tasks assigned to it by Union legal acts.

5. ENISA shall develop its own capabilities, including technical and human capabilities

and skills, necessary to perform the tasks assigned to it under this Regulation.

Article 4

Objectives of ENISA

1. ENISA shall be a centre of expertise on cybersecurity by virtue of its independence,

the scientific and technical quality of the advice, contributions, and assistance it

delivers, the information it provides, the transparency of its operating procedures, the

methods of operation, and its diligence in carrying out its tasks.

2. ENISA shall assist Member States and, where appropriate, Union entities in

implementing horizontal and sectoral Union policies and legislation related to

cybersecurity, including market surveillance activities.

3. ENISA shall provide its expertise and assist the Commission in developing Union

policies and legislation related to cybersecurity.

4. ENISA shall support capacity-building and preparedness across the Union by

assisting Member States, Union entities, through the Cybersecurity Service for the

Union institutions, bodies, offices and agencies (CERT-EU) referred to in Chapter IV

of Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2023/2841, and public and private stakeholders to

increase the protection of their network and information systems, to develop and

improve cyber resilience and response capacities.

5. ENISA shall contribute to the implementation of the Cybersecurity Skills Academy

and the growth of the cybersecurity workforce in the Union by supporting efforts to

develop skills portability across the Union, including through the maintenance and

uptake of the ECSF and the development, maintenance and uptake of European

individual cybersecurity skills attestation schemes in accordance with Chapter II,

Section 4 of this Title, and by ensuring the provision of training in accordance with

Article 6(8).

6. ENISA shall promote cooperation, including information sharing and coordination at

Union level, among Member States, Union entities in accordance with Regulation

(EU, Euratom) 2023/2841, and relevant private and public stakeholders on matters

related to cybersecurity.

7. ENISA shall contribute to increasing cybersecurity capabilities at Union level in

order to support the actions of Member States in preventing and responding to cyber

threats.

8. ENISA shall support operational cooperation at Union level, including by

contributing to shared situational awareness of the cyber threat and incident

EN 67 EN

landscape among Member States and, in cooperation with CERT-EU, among Union

entities.

9. ENISA shall closely cooperate with Europol, CSIRTs and other relevant national

authorities in order to improve cybersecurity preparedness and response to

ransomware incidents.

10. ENISA shall contribute to the establishment and maintenance of a European

cybersecurity certification framework in accordance with Title III of this Regulation.

ENISA shall promote the use of European cybersecurity certification, with a view to

avoiding the fragmentation of the internal market.

11. ENISA shall contribute to the harmonisation of the digital single market by engaging

in standardisation work relevant for Union policies related to cybersecurity and by

developing technical specifications.

12. ENISA shall promote a high level of cybersecurity awareness among organisations

and businesses.

Chapter II

Tasks

Section 1

Support for implementation of Union policy and law

Article 5

Support for implementation of Union policy and law

1. ENISA shall contribute to the implementation of Union policy and law by:

(a) assisting Member States in implementing Union policy and law regarding

cybersecurity consistently, including by issuing technical guidance and reports,

by providing advice and sharing best practices, and by facilitating the exchange

of best practices between competent authorities in this regard;

(b) supporting information sharing within and between sectors, in particular

regarding the sectors listed in Annexes I and II to Directive (EU) 2022/2555

and products with digital elements falling within the scope of Regulation (EU)

2024/2847, by providing best practices and guidance on available tools and

procedures;

(c) at the request of the Commission, assisting Member States by providing

support, such as technical guidance, including on cybersecurity risk

management measures, tools for cybersecurity maturity assessment, and

incident response playbooks, tailored to the sectors listed in Annexes I and II to

Directive (EU) 2022/2555 or support for the implementation of secure-by-

design principles for products with digital elements in line with Regulation

(EU) 2024/2847, with a view to facilitating the improvement of the

cybersecurity maturity levels and compliance with Union law regarding

cybersecurity;

(d) contributing to the work of the Cooperation Group established pursuant to

Article 14(1) of Directive (EU) 2022/2555 (‘NIS Cooperation Group’), the

European Digital Identity Cooperation Group established pursuant to Article

EN 68 EN

46e(1) of Regulation (EU) No 910/2014, the European Cybersecurity

Certification Group (‘ECCG’) as referred to in Article 90 of this Regulation,

and the administrative cooperation group (ADCO) established pursuant to

Article 52(15) of Regulation (EU) 2024/2847;

(e) assisting Member States and relevant Union entities in developing and

promoting cybersecurity policies related to sustaining the general availability

and integrity of the public core of the open internet;

(f) in accordance with Regulation (EU) 2024/2847, providing technical advice and

support to Member States and the Commission on matters related to the

implementation of that Regulation;

(g) assisting Member States in carrying out mutual assistance and in facilitating

such cooperation processes for essential and important entities pursuant to

[Article 37a of Directive (EU) 2022/2555];

(h) at the request of the European Data Protection Board, providing advice on the

implementation of specific cybersecurity aspects of Union policy and law

related to data protection and privacy.

2. ENISA shall contribute to coordinated Union level cybersecurity risk assessments,

including those carried out pursuant to Article 22 of Directive (EU) 2022/2555.

3. ENISA shall issue guidelines regarding the interoperability of network and

information systems used for information-sharing, including with regard to Cross-

Border Cyber Hubs as referred to in Article 6(3) of Regulation (EU) 2025/38.

4. ENISA shall be a member of the NIS Cooperation Group pursuant to Article 14(3) of

Directive (EU) 2022/2555.

5. At the Commission’s request, ENISA shall provide expertise, technical advice,

information or analysis or carry out preparatory work on specific cybersecurity

matters with a view to informing the Commission’s policymaking and monitoring of

the implementation of Union legislation.

Article 6

Capacity-building

ENISA shall assist:

(1) Member States in their efforts to improve the prevention, detection and

analysis of, and the capability to respond to cyber threats and incidents by

providing them with knowledge and expertise;

(2) Member States, at their request, in establishing and implementing vulnerability

disclosure policies on a voluntary basis;

(3) in accordance with Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2023/2841, CERT-EU and the

Interinstitutional Cybersecurity Board in their efforts to support Union entities

in strengthening their cybersecurity, improve the prevention, detection and

analysis of cyber threats and incidents as well as to improve their capabilities

to respond to such cyber threats and incidents;

(4) Member States in developing national CSIRTs, where requested pursuant to

Article 10(10) of Directive (EU) 2022/2555;

EN 69 EN

(5) Member States in developing or updating a national cybersecurity strategy and

key performance indicators for the assessment of that strategy, where requested

pursuant to Article 7(4) of Directive (EU) 2022/2555, promote the

dissemination of those strategies and note the progress in their implementation

across the Union in order to promote best practices;

(6) Union institutions, at their request, in developing and reviewing Union

strategies regarding cybersecurity, promoting their dissemination and tracking

the progress in their implementation;

(7) national CSIRTs in raising the level of their capabilities, including by

promoting dialogue and exchanges of information, with a view to ensuring

that, with regard to the state of the art, each CSIRT possesses a common set of

minimum capabilities and operates according to best practices;

(8) Member States, Union entities and public and private stakeholders in their

efforts to assess, grow and enhance the cybersecurity workforce, including by

developing, maintaining and promoting the uptake of relevant tools, such as the

ECSF and European individual cybersecurity skills attestation schemes in

accordance with Section 4 of this Chapter;

(9) relevant public bodies as well as private stakeholders by conducting targeted

trainings, where appropriate in cooperation with stakeholders;

(10) the NIS Cooperation Group in the exchange of best practices and information,

in particular in relation to the implementation of Directive (EU) 2022/2555

pursuant to Article 14(4), point (c), of that Directive;

(11) the market surveillance authorities designated pursuant to Regulation (EU)

2024/2847 in their activities that aim to ensure the effective implementation of

that Regulation, including support for guidance and technical advice to

economic operators, support for compliance checks, evaluation of risks, joint

activities and sweeps as laid down in Regulation (EU) 2024/2847;

(12) the ECCG members in the exchange of best practices and upon request from

individual Member States assist national cybersecurity certification authorities

in relation to the implementation of the European cybersecurity certification

schemes at national level;

(13) public authorities and private stakeholders in relation to conformity assessment

and evaluation activities, including conformity assessment bodies and small

and medium-sized enterprises, to support a robust, competitive, inclusive and

harmonised conformity assessment ecosystem supporting the implementation

Regulation (EU) 2024/2847 and the European cybersecurity certification

framework;

(14) the European Cybersecurity Industrial, Technology and Research Competence

Centre and the Network of National Coordination Centres established pursuant

to Regulation (EU) 2021/887 by sharing information about current and

emerging risks and cyber threats, including with respect to new and emerging

information and communications technologies;

(15) Member States by providing technical support, including for the establishment

and operation of regulatory sandboxes in the area of cybersecurity in

accordance with relevant Union legislation.

EN 70 EN

Article 7

Awareness-raising and talent pool

ENISA shall assist Member States in their efforts to raise awareness of Union policies and

legislation regarding cybersecurity and promote their visibility by developing actionable tools

and guidance. ENISA shall support initiatives aimed at increasing the European cybersecurity

talent pool, in particular by coordinating competitions.

Article 8

Market knowledge and analyses

1. ENISA shall carry out and disseminate analyses of the main market trends in the

cybersecurity market on both the demand and supply sides, in particular related to

the areas where European cybersecurity certification schemes exist or are planned,

sectors listed in Annexes I and II to Directive (EU) 2022/2555, and product

categories covered by Regulation (EU) 2024/2847, including Annexes III and IV to

that Regulation.

2. ENISA shall carry out and disseminate analyses of technological cybersecurity

trends in particular in relation to activities and entities falling within the scope of

Directive (EU) 2022/2555 and products with digital elements falling within the scope

of Regulation (EU) 2024/2847.

3. ENISA shall build knowledge and disseminate technical advice and analyses on

state-of-the-art cybersecurity tools, frameworks standards and best practices.

Article 9

International cooperation

ENISA shall contribute to the Union’s efforts to cooperate with third countries and

international organisations as well as within relevant international cooperation frameworks to

promote international cooperation on issues related to cybersecurity, by:

(a) where appropriate, engaging as an observer in the organisation of international

exercises, and analysing and reporting to the Management Board on the outcome of

such exercises;

(b) at the request of the Commission, facilitating the exchange of best practices with

third countries and international organisations;

(c) at the request of the Commission, providing it with expertise;

(d) providing expert advice and support to the Commission on matters relating to the

international recognition of European cybersecurity certificates in accordance with

Article 87;

(e) providing expert advice and support to the Commission on matters concerning

international standardisation and engaging with relevant international standardisation

organisations, where relevant, in collaboration with the ECCG established under

Article 90.

Section 2

Operational Cooperation

EN 71 EN

Article 10

Operational cooperation at Union level

1. ENISA shall support operational cooperation among Member States, Union entities

through CERT-EU, and between other stakeholders.

2. ENISA shall be a member of the network of national CSIRTs established pursuant to

Article 15(1) of Directive (EU) 2022/2555 and shall provide the secretariat of the

CSIRTs network pursuant to Article 15(2) of Directive (EU) 2022/2555.

3. ENISA shall provide the secretariat of the European cyber crisis liaison organisation

network (EU-CyCLONe) pursuant to Article 16(2), second subparagraph, of

Directive (EU) 2022/2555.

4. ENISA shall support technical and operational cooperation among Member States, in

particular through the CSIRTs network and EU-CyCLONe. Such support shall

include:

(a) advising on improvement of capabilities to prevent, detect, respond to and

recover from incidents;

(b) at the request of one or more Member States, providing advice and assessments

in relation to a specific potential or ongoing incident or cyber threat, including

through the provision of expertise and facilitating the technical handling of

such incidents, and through supporting the voluntary sharing of relevant

information and technical solutions between Member States;

(c) analysing vulnerabilities, threats and incidents;

(d) at the request of one or more Member States, providing support in relation to

ex post technical inquiries regarding significant incidents within the meaning of

Article 23(3) of Directive (EU) 2022/2555;

(e) contributing to supporting the coordinated management of large-scale

cybersecurity incidents and crises at operational level, in particular by assisting

EU-CyCLONe in preparing reports to political level and by facilitating timely

information sharing between the CSIRTs network and EU-CyCLONe;

5. At the request of a Member State or a Union entity in cooperation with CERT-EU,

ENISA shall support consistent public communication relating to an incident or

cyber threat.

6. ENISA shall support cooperation among Member States and through CERT-EU

among Union entities with regard to the deployment of secure communications tools.

ENISA shall use within the CSIRTs network and EU-CyCLONe secure

communications tools which are provided by legal entities established or deemed to

be established in the Union and controlled by Member States or by nationals of

Member States.

Article 11

Shared cybersecurity situational awareness

1. For the purposes of an enhanced shared situational awareness of the cyber threat and

incident landscape among Member States and among Union entities, ENISA shall:

(a) develop in cooperation with EU-CyCLONe, the CSIRTs network, the

Commission, CERT-EU, Europol and other relevant Union entities,

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repositories of verified, reliable cyber threat intelligence, including trends in

incidents, tactics, techniques and procedures;

(b) in accordance with Article 12, issue early alerts of a potential or ongoing

significant or large-scale incident, or a cyber threat of a potential cross-border

nature, in particular in relation to sectors listed in Annexes I and II to Directive

(EU) 2022/2555;

(c) provide timely ad hoc analyses on emerging trends in incidents upon request of

the CSIRTs network, EU-CyCLONe, or the Commission;

(d) provide, at the request of Member States or the Commission, analysis or other

information regarding an actual or perceived cybersecurity risk or threat;

(e) provide analysis and technical advice regarding cybersecurity risks in products

with digital elements, including to support market surveillance and by drawing

up a biennial technical report on emerging trends in accordance with Article

17(3) of Regulation (EU) 2024/2847;

(f) prepare a regular in-depth EU Cybersecurity Technical Situation Report on

incidents and cyber threats, and make the report available to the Council, EU-

CyCLONe, the CSIRTs network, the Commission, the European External

Action Service and Europol;

(g) monitor trends in techniques, demands and impact of ransomware attacks and

provide information about such trends to the Commission, the CSIRTs network

and EU-CyCLONe and Europol.

2. For the purposes of an enhanced shared situational awareness of the cyber threat and

incident landscape among stakeholders, ENISA shall:

(a) perform analyses of cyber threats, incidents, trends, emerging technologies and

their impacts, including a regular analysis addressing sectors listed in Annexes

I and II to Directive (EU) 2022/2555 and relevant product categories covered

by Regulation (EU) 2024/2847;

(b) issue, in cooperation with the Commission, and, where appropriate, the

CSIRTs network, advice, guidance and best practices for the security of

network and information systems, in particular for the security of the

infrastructures supporting the sectors listed in Annexes I and II to Directive

(EU) 2022/2555;

(c) carry out long-term strategic analyses of cyber threats and incidents in order to

identify emerging trends and help prevent incidents.

3. ENISA may make the analyses, advice, guidance, best practices and reports referred

to in paragraph 2 public, in agreement with the contributing entities referred to in

paragraph 2.

4. In carrying out the activities listed in paragraph 1, points (a) to (d) and (f), and

paragraph 2, ENISA shall use its own analyses and, as appropriate, the information

received in carrying out its tasks, including:

(a) information provided in publicly available sources, including publicly known

vulnerabilities in ICT products or ICT services available in the European

vulnerability database established pursuant to Article 12(2) of Directive (EU)

2022/2555;

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(b) information shared by Member States, Union entities, CERT-EU, private sector

or non-governmental partners and third country and international organisations,

subject to any limitations by means of a visible marking on further distribution

of that information.

5. ENISA shall cooperate closely with the Member States in the preparation of the EU

Cybersecurity Technical Situation Report referred to in paragraph 1, point (e). The

Report shall be based on publicly available information, ENISA’s own analysis, and

reports shared by, among others, the Member States’ CSIRTs or the single points of

contact established by Directive (EU) 2022/2555, both on a voluntary basis, EC3 and

CERT-EU. In agreement with the contributing entities, ENISA may make an

aggregated version of the Report publicly available.

Article 12

Early alerts

1. Early alerts referred to in Article 11(1), first subparagraph, point (b), of this

Regulation shall contain relevant information concerning a potential or ongoing

significant or large-scale incident, or a cyber threat of a potential cross-border nature,

in relation to sectors listed in Annexes I and II to Directive (EU) 2022/2555. Such

information may include publicly known vulnerabilities and whether they affect

products with digital elements covered by Regulation (EU) 2024/2847, techniques

and procedures, indicators of compromise, adversarial tactics, threat actor-specific

information and recommendations on mitigation measures.

2. Early alerts referred to in Article 11(1), first subparagraph, point (b), shall be issued

as soon as possible to the CSIRT or CSIRTs concerned, and, where appropriate, to

the CSIRTs network and EU-CyCLONe.

3. ENISA shall offer an early alert service to entities operating in sectors listed in

Annexes I and II to Directive (EU) 2022/2555.

4. The service referred to in paragraph 3 shall be provided upon a request of the entity

and in a machine-readable format made publicly available. That service shall include

sharing of information on cyber threat indicators and recommendations on mitigation

measures.

5. ENISA shall establish a procedure to disseminate the early alerts to entities referred

to in paragraph 3.

Article 13

Support in incident response and review

1. ENISA shall operate and administer the EU Cybersecurity Reserve, in full or in part,

in accordance with Regulation (EU) 2025/38.

2. At the request of the Commission or EU-CyCLONe, ENISA, with the support of the

CSIRTs network and with the approval of the Member State concerned, shall review

and assess significant cybersecurity incidents or large-scale cybersecurity incidents

in accordance with Article 21 of Regulation (EU) 2025/38.

3. ENISA shall assist, in cooperation with Europol and CSIRTs or other competent

authorities as applicable, individual essential and important entities listed in Annexes

I and II to Directive (EU) 2022/2555 in preparing, responding to and recovering from

a ransomware incident. For that purpose, ENISA shall establish a helpdesk and in

EN 74 EN

particular make use of the enhanced shared situational awareness of the cyber threat

and incident landscape pursuant to Article 11(1), first subparagraph, points (a) and

(g) of this Regulation.

Article 14

Cybersecurity exercises at Union level

1. ENISA shall support the Commission in compiling an annual rolling programme of

Union-level cybersecurity exercises

2. ENISA shall maintain a repository of lessons learned from the exercises referred to

in paragraph 1 and recommend to Member States and, where relevant, to Union

entities how to implement the lessons learned effectively and efficiently.

3. At the request of EU-CyCLONe, the Commission, ENISA shall organise, or

contribute to the organisation of, cybersecurity exercises at Union level, including

testing preparedness to respond to large-scale cybersecurity incidents and crises at

Union level.

4. At the request of Member States, ENISA shall support them in organising national

cybersecurity exercises.

5. At the request of CERT-EU, ENISA shall contribute to the organisation of

cybersecurity exercises organised by CERT-EU pursuant to Article 13(7) of

Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2023/2841.

Article 15

Provision of tools and platforms

1. ENISA shall establish, provide, operate, maintain and update as necessary,

operational technical tools, including platforms related to cybersecurity at Union

level, in particular the single reporting platform established pursuant to Article 16(1)

of Regulation (EU) 2024/2847 [and the single-entry point for incident reporting

established pursuant to Article 23a of Directive (EU) 2022/2555], and testing tools to

support the implementation of conformity assessment procedures in accordance with

the relevant Union legislation.

2. Where appropriate for the purposes of paragraph 1, ENISA shall cooperate and

exchange information with the CSIRTs network and, where applicable, market

surveillance authorities.

Article 16

Vulnerability management services

ENISA shall develop a common Union vulnerability management service capacity and

provide vulnerability management services to stakeholders by:

(a) maintaining the European vulnerability database established pursuant to Article 12(2)

of Directive (EU) 2022/2555;

(b) providing vulnerability management services to stakeholders, building on the

European vulnerability database and making use of relevant information available to

ENISA;

(c) where appropriate, entering into structured cooperation with organisations providing

programmes, registries or databases similar to the European vulnerability database;

EN 75 EN

(d) actively supporting the CSIRTs designated as coordinators pursuant to Article 12(1)

of Directive (EU) 2022/2555 with regard to the management of the coordinated

disclosure of vulnerabilities which may have a significant impact on entities in more

than one Member State;

(e) developing and maintaining methodologies and governance mechanisms for

vulnerability identification and coordinated disclosure, in cooperation with national

competent authorities, CSIRTs, industry and the research community.

Section 3

Cybersecurity Certification and Standardisation

Article 17

Cybersecurity certification

1. ENISA shall contribute to and promote the development and implementation of

Union policy on cybersecurity certification as established in Title III of this

Regulation. ENISA shall be in charge of:

(a) preparing candidate European cybersecurity certification schemes (‘candidate

schemes’) for ICT products, ICT services, ICT processes, managed security

services and the cyber posture of entities in accordance with Article 74 and,

where applicable, developing technical specifications in accordance with

Article 77;

(b) maintaining adopted European cybersecurity certification schemes in

accordance with Article 75, including in view of a possible review of the

adopted European cybersecurity certification schemes in accordance with

Article 76;

(c) promoting the uptake of adopted schemes and maintaining a dedicated website

providing information on, and publicising, European cybersecurity certification

schemes, European cybersecurity certificates and EU statements of conformity

in accordance with Article 79;

(d) organising capacity-building related to certification processes, evaluation

activities, peer review and peer assessment, including by providing support to

Member States at their request in accordance with Article 6, point (12).

2. ENISA shall support the Commission in the following activities:

(a) the governance of the ECCG pursuant to Article 90;

(b) organising a European Cybersecurity Certification Assembly in accordance

with Article 72(1);

(c) relating to the international recognition of European cybersecurity certificates

in accordance with Article 87;

(d) organising peer reviews pursuant to Article 89;

(e) preparing model provisions to be referenced in the European cybersecurity

certification schemes for ICT products, ICT services, ICT processes, managed

security services and cyber posture of entities in accordance with Article 81(5).

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Article 18

Standardisation, technical specifications and guidance

1. ENISA shall draft technical specifications and guidance to support the

implementation of Union legislation in the field of cybersecurity. When drafting

those technical specifications, ENISA shall consider existing European and

international standards as well as other relevant technical specifications. ENISA shall

ensure the consistency of its technical specifications and guidance.

2. ENISA shall monitor and, where relevant, participate and lead in standardisation

development activities at Union level and, in accordance with Article 9, at

international level, in view of supporting Union policies related to cybersecurity.

3. ENISA shall support the development and evaluation of cryptographic algorithms.

Where a cryptographic algorithm is evaluated positively by ENISA, ENISA shall

cooperate, in accordance with Regulation (EU) No 1025/2012, with the European

standardisation bodies to support its standardisation.

4. ENISA shall provide technical advice to the Commission and, where relevant, the

Member States, on appropriate standards or technical specifications in support of

Union policies related to cybersecurity, including for Union harmonisation

legislation in the field of cybersecurity, in particular Regulation (EU) 2024/2847,

technical areas for the purpose of Article 25 of Directive (EU) 2022/2555, and

European cybersecurity certification schemes pursuant to Article 81(1), point (d).

5. ENISA shall assist the Commission in the assessment of draft harmonised standards

to support the implementation of Union harmonisation legislation in the field of

cybersecurity.

6. ENISA shall promote the uptake of European and international standards for

cybersecurity.

7. ENISA shall carry out the tasks referred to in paragraphs 1 to 6 with integrity,

impartiality and confidentiality, including by withdrawing or pausing its participation

from specific technical bodies when such a participation conflicts with other tasks or

objectives.

Section 4

Implementation of the Cybersecurity Skills Academy

Article 19

European Cybersecurity Skills Framework

1. ENISA shall develop and make publicly available a European Cybersecurity Skills

framework (‘ECSF’). Before making the ECSF publicly available or updating it

pursuant to paragraph 4, ENISA shall consult the Commission.

2. The ECSF shall define profiles of cybersecurity professionals and association of

specific tasks, skills and knowledge to a given role profile. The use of the ECSF shall

be voluntary for public and private entities.

3. ENISA may consult stakeholders in the development and uptake of the ECSF.

4. ENISA shall assess the need to update the ECSF on a regular basis and, where

relevant, update it.

EN 77 EN

Article 20

Development, adoption and maintenance of European individual cybersecurity skills

attestation schemes

1. ENISA shall develop, adopt and maintain European individual cybersecurity skills

attestation schemes. The use of European individual cybersecurity skills attestation

schemes shall be voluntary for national public bodies and private entities, unless

otherwise specified by national law.

2. Prior to initiating a new European individual cybersecurity skills attestation scheme,

ENISA shall consult the Commission. ENISA shall only adopt such a scheme

following a positive opinion from the Commission. When preparing a European

individual cybersecurity skills attestation scheme, ENISA may consult relevant

stakeholders.

3. A European individual cybersecurity skills attestation scheme shall include the

following:

(a) subject matter and scope of the attestation scheme based on ECSF role profiles

or subsets thereof;

(b) requirements applicable to individuals trained to perform assessments

(‘assessors’) in accordance with Article 21, the necessary skills, knowledge and

experience as well as training methods;

(c) market uptake analysis specific to each attestation scheme;

(d) the learning outcomes, assessment methods, and conditions that authorised

attestation providers shall use to evaluate an individual's demonstration of the

required skills in accordance with Article 21;

(e) where relevant, one or more proficiency levels;

(f) rules concerning the retention of records by authorised attestation providers;

(g) the content and the format of the European individual cybersecurity skills

attestations, taking into due consideration Article 21(5), point (e);

(h) maximum period of validity of a European individual cybersecurity skills

attestation issued under the attestation scheme.

4. A European individual cybersecurity skills attestation scheme may include the

indicative cost of a European individual cybersecurity skills attestation.

5. ENISA shall ensure close cooperation with Member States throughout preparation of

the European individual cybersecurity skills attestation schemes.

6. The modification of a European individual cybersecurity skills attestation scheme

shall not affect the authorisation granted pursuant to Article 22(3)(a), which shall

remain valid for the period it is granted for.

Article 21

Authorised attestation providers

1. Authorised attestation providers shall assess whether individuals meet the

requirements of a European individual cybersecurity skills attestation scheme and,

where those requirements are met, issue European individual cybersecurity skills

attestations. Attestation providers may hold several authorisations, each granted for

one European individual cybersecurity skills attestation scheme.

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2. ENISA shall provide guidance to and conduct obligatory training of assessors

regarding the requirements and assessment methods included in the European

individual cybersecurity skills attestation scheme as referred to in Article 20(3), point

(b).

3. Entities wishing to become authorised attestation providers or renew their

authorisation (‘applicants’) shall submit an application to ENISA. They shall meet

the following requirements:

(a) they shall have legal personality;

(b) they shall be capable of carrying out the tasks laid down in this Regulation in

relation to European individual cybersecurity skills attestations, regardless of

whether the assessment is carried out by the authorised attestation provider

itself or on its behalf and under its responsibility;

(c) they shall have the means necessary to perform the technical and

administrative tasks connected with the European individual cybersecurity

skills attestation scheme in an appropriate manner and have access to all

necessary equipment and facilities.

For the purposes of the first subparagraph, point (b), any subcontracting to, or

consultation of, external staff shall be properly documented, shall not involve any

intermediaries and shall be subject to a written agreement covering, among other

things, confidentiality and conflicts of interest.

4. Applicants shall not be high-risk suppliers.

5. Authorised attestation providers shall meet the following obligations:

(a) for the implementation of each European individual cybersecurity skills

attestation scheme:

(i) have at their disposal the necessary assessors and personnel to carry out

their activities as established in that scheme in a timely manner;

(ii) ensure that assessors observe professional secrecy, are impartial and

perform their work independently and with the highest degree of

professional integrity;

(iii) have written procedures for carrying out their activities under the scheme

that they are authorised for.

(b) not assess or issue European individual cybersecurity skills attestations to their

own assessors;

(c) ensure, where relevant by putting in place appropriate safeguards, that their

assessors can perform their work independently, in particular where such

individuals belong to their own structure or are employees or learners of such a

structure;

(d) not engage in any activity that may conflict with the independence of

judgement or integrity of their assessors;

(e) ensure that, at the request of the individual, electronic attestations of European

individual cybersecurity skills attestations are issued as electronic attestations

of attributes in a format that can be stored in the European Digital Identity

Wallets set out in Regulation (EU) No 910/2014.

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6. Authorised attestation providers shall immediately inform ENISA if any of the

requirements listed in paragraphs 3 and 4 or the obligations listed in paragraph 5, are

no longer met or if any doubt that those requirements or obligations are not met,

arises, including regarding the independence of assessors.

7. Authorised attestation providers may request a fee from individuals for assessing and

issuing the European individual cybersecurity skills attestations, taking into account

the indicative cost of a European individual cybersecurity skills attestation pursuant

to Article 20(4) and made public on a dedicated website in accordance with Article

23, point (d).

8. Applicants and authorised attestation providers shall allow ENISA to conduct

evaluations as part of the application process or maintenance of the authorisation and

share all relevant information to ensure the requirements laid down in paragraphs 3

and 4, or the obligations laid down in paragraph 5, are met or continue to be met in

accordance with Article 22(2).

Article 22

Examination of applications to become an authorised attestation provider and maintenance of

authorisations

1. Applicants shall pay a fee to ENISA for the examination of their application.

Authorised attestation providers shall pay a fee to ENISA for the maintenance of

their authorisation.

2. ENISA shall evaluate whether the requirements laid down in Article 21(3) and (4)

and the obligations laid down in Article 21(5) are met or continue to be met by

applicants and authorised attestation providers.

3. After examining an application against the requirements laid down in Article 21(3)

and (4), ENISA may issue one of the following decisions:

(a) granting the applicant the status of authorised attestation provider or renewing

it;

(b) rejecting the application to become an authorised attestation provider or not

renewing it;

(c) closing the processing of the application due to the applicant’s inaction

following a request for additional information by ENISA.

ENISA may amend, suspend or revoke such decisions based on its evaluation

pursuant to Article 22(2) or in the case referred to in Article 21(6).

4. ENISA shall issue the decision referred to in paragraph 3 within three months from

the date of submission of an application in accordance with Article 21(3). Where

ENISA requested the applicant for the additional information, ENISA shall issue the

decision referred to in paragraph 3 within one month of receiving additional

information.

5. The decision referred to in paragraph 3, point (a) shall have a maximum duration of

three years and indicate the fee related to the yearly maintenance of the authorisation.

6. ENISA shall ensure that its activities relating to the development and adoption of

European individual cybersecurity skills attestation schemes as laid down in Article

20 are strictly separated and carried out independently from the activities on the

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examination of applications and on evaluations set out in paragraphs 2 and 3 of this

Article.

Article 23

Public information

ENISA shall maintain and regularly update a dedicated website providing public information

on:

(a) the ECSF, including the framework and its timeline for update;

(b) the European individual cybersecurity skills attestation schemes, their progress and

timelines for their development;

(c) the fees associated with each European individual cybersecurity skills attestation

scheme adopted pursuant to Article 47 of this Regulation;

(d) the indicative cost of a European individual cybersecurity skills attestation in

accordance with Article 20(4);

(e) the list of authorised attestation providers.

Chapter III

Organisation of ENISA

Article 24

Administrative and management structure of ENISA

The administrative and management structure of ENISA shall comprise:

(a) a Management Board which shall exercise the functions set out in Article 28;

(b) an Executive Board which shall exercise the functions set out in Article 30;

(c) an Executive Director who shall exercise the responsibilities set out in Article 32;

(d) a Deputy Executive Director who shall exercise the responsibilities set out in Article

34;

(e) an ENISA Advisory Group;

(f) a Board of Appeals which shall exercise the functions set out in Articles 39 to 42.

Section 1

Management Board

Article 25

Composition of the Management Board

1. The Management Board shall be composed of one member appointed by each

Member State and two members appointed by the Commission. All members shall

have the right to vote.

2. Each member of the Management Board shall have an alternate. The alternates shall

represent the members in their absence.

3. Each Member State shall appoint the head of a national competent authority

designated pursuant to Article 8(1) of Directive (EU) 2022/2555 as the member of

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the Management Board. Where this proves not to be feasible, Member States shall

appoint a high-level representative of a national competent authority designated

pursuant to Article 8(1) of Directive (EU) 2022/2555 as the member of the

Management Board.

4. Members appointed by the Commission and alternate members of the Management

Board shall be appointed in light of their knowledge in the field of cybersecurity,

taking into account their relevant managerial, administrative and budgetary skills.

The Commission and the Member States as regards alternates, shall aim to achieve a

balanced representation between men and women on the Management Board and

shall make efforts to limit their turnover in order to ensure continuity of the

Management Board’s work.

5. The term of office of the members appointed by Member States shall be equal to the

term of their function referred to in paragraph 3.

6. The term of office of the alternates and of the members appointed by the

Commission shall be four years. That term shall be renewable.

Article 26

Chairperson of the Management Board

1. The Management Board shall elect a Chairperson and a Deputy Chairperson from

among its members with voting rights. The Chairperson and the Deputy Chairperson

shall be elected by a majority of two thirds of the members of the Management

Board with voting rights.

2. The Deputy Chairperson shall automatically replace the Chairperson if the

Chairperson is prevented from attending to their duties.

3. The term of office of the Chairperson and of the Deputy Chairperson shall be four

years and may be renewed once. If, however, their membership of the Management

Board ends at any time during their term of office, that term of office shall

automatically expire on that date.

Article 27

Meetings of the Management Board

1. The Chairperson shall convene meetings of the Management Board.

2. The Executive Director shall take part in the meetings of the Management Board,

without the right to vote.

3. The Management Board shall hold at least two ordinary meetings a year. In addition,

it shall meet on the initiative of its Chairperson, at the request of the Commission, or

at the request of at least one third of its members.

4. A representative from the European Cybersecurity Industrial, Technology and

Research Competence Centre established by Regulation (EU) 2021/887 shall be a

permanent observer, without voting rights, at the meetings of the Management

Board.

5. The Management Board may invite any person whose opinion may be of interest to

attend a meeting, or part of a meeting, as an ad hoc observer, without voting rights

and subject to the rules of procedure of the Management Board.

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6. The members of the Management Board and their alternates may be assisted at the

meetings of the Management Board by advisers or experts, subject to the rules of

procedure of the Management Board.

Article 28

Functions of the Management Board

1. The Management Board shall:

(a) establish the general direction of the operation of ENISA and ensure that

ENISA operates in accordance with the rules and principles laid down in this

Regulation; it shall also ensure the consistency of ENISA’s work with

activities conducted by the Member States as well as at Union level;

(b) adopt ENISA’s draft single programming document referred to in Article 44,

before its submission to the Commission for an opinion;

(c) taking into account the opinion of the Commission, adopt ENISA’s single

programming document in accordance with Article 29(2), point (a);

(d) supervise the implementation of the multiannual and annual programme

included in the single programming document;

(e) adopt the annual budget of ENISA in accordance with Article 29(2), point (b),

and exercise other functions in respect of ENISA’s budget in accordance with

Chapter IV;

(f) assess and adopt the consolidated annual report on ENISA’s activities,

including the accounts and a description of how ENISA has met its

performance indicators; submit both the annual report and the assessment

thereof by 1 July of the following year to the European Parliament, to the

Council, to the Commission and to the European Court of Auditors; make the

annual report public;

(g) adopt the financial rules applicable to ENISA in accordance with Article 50;

(h) adopt an anti-fraud strategy that is proportionate to the fraud risks, having

regard to a cost-benefit analysis of the measures to be implemented;

(i) ensure adequate follow-up to findings and recommendations stemming from

internal or external audit reports and evaluations and from investigations of the

European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) and of the European Public Prosecutor’s

Office (EPPO);

(j) adopt its rules of procedure, including rules for provisional decisions on the

delegation of specific tasks, pursuant to Article 30(7);

(k) exercise, in accordance with paragraph 2 of this Article, with respect to the

staff of ENISA, the powers conferred by the Staff Regulations of Officials of

the European Union (the ‘Staff Regulations’) and by the Conditions of

Employment of Other Servants of the European Union (the ‘Conditions of

Employment’), laid down in Council Regulation (EEC, Euratom, ECSC) No

259/6873, respectively, on the appointing authority and on the authority

73 OJ L 56, 4.3.1968, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/1968/259(1)/oj.

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empowered to conclude a contract of employment (‘appointing authority

powers’);

(l) adopt implementing rules giving effect to the Staff Regulations and the

Conditions of Employment in accordance with Article 110(2) of the Staff

Regulations;

(m) appoint the Executive Director and, if it decides to create the function of a

Deputy Executive Director, the Deputy Executive Director, and where relevant

extend their term of office or remove them from office in accordance with

Article 31;

(n) appoint an accounting officer, subject to the Staff Regulations and the

Conditions of Employment, who shall be independent in the performance of

their duties;

(o) take all decisions concerning the establishment of ENISA’s internal structures

and, where necessary, the modification of those internal structures, taking into

consideration ENISA’s activity needs and having regard to sound budgetary

management;

(p) authorise the conclusion of working arrangements with regard to Article 68;

(q) authorise the conclusion of working arrangements in accordance with Article

70;

(r) appoint and remove the members of the Board of Appeal in accordance with

Article 29(2), point (d);

(s) adopt rules for the prevention and management of conflicts of interest in

respect of the members of the Board of Appeal.

2. In accordance with Article 110(2) of the Staff Regulations, the Management Board

shall adopt a decision based on Article 2(1) of the Staff Regulations and Article 6 of

the Conditions of Employment, delegating the relevant appointing authority powers

to the Executive Director and defining the conditions under which that delegation of

powers can be suspended. The Executive Director may sub-delegate those powers.

3. Where exceptional circumstances so require, the Management Board may adopt a

decision to temporarily suspend the delegation of appointing authority powers to the

Executive Director and any appointing authority powers sub-delegated by the

Executive Director and instead exercise them itself or delegate them to one of its

members or to a staff member other than the Executive Director.

Article 29

Voting rules of the Management Board

1. The Management Board shall adopt its decisions by an absolute majority of its

members with voting rights, except if otherwise provided in this Regulation.

2. A majority of two thirds of the members of the Management Board with voting

rights shall be required for:

(a) the adoption of the single programming document referred to in Article

28(1)(c);

(b) the adoption of the annual budget referred to in Article 28(1)(e);

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(c) the appointment, extension of the term of office or removal of the Executive

Director and of the Deputy Executive Director, as referred to in Articles 31 and

33;

(d) the appointment and removal of the members of the Board of Appeal, as

referred to in Article 36.

3. Decisions on budgetary or human resources matters, in particular matters referred to

in Article 28(1), points (c), (e), (f), (g), (h), (i), (k), (l), (m), (n), shall only be adopted

if the representatives of the Commission cast a positive vote. For the purposes of

adopting the decisions referred to in Article 28(1), point (c) regarding ENISA’s

single programming document, a positive vote of the representative of the

Commission shall only be required on the elements of the decision not related to the

annual and multiannual work programme of ENISA.

4. Each member with voting rights shall have one vote. In the absence of a member

with the right to vote, their alternate shall be entitled to exercise the member’s right

to vote.

5. The Chairperson of the Management Board shall take part in the voting.

6. The Executive Director shall not take part in the voting.

7. The Management Board’s rules of procedure shall establish more detailed voting

arrangements, in particular the circumstances in which a member may act on behalf

of another member.

Section 2

Executive Board

Article 30

Executive Board

1. The Management Board shall be assisted by an Executive Board.

2. The Executive Board shall:

(a) prepare decisions to be adopted by the Management Board;

(b) together with the Management Board, ensure the adequate follow-up to

findings and recommendations stemming from internal or external audit reports

and evaluations, as well as from investigations of OLAF and the EPPO;

(c) without prejudice to the responsibilities of the Executive Director set out in

Article 32, assist and advise the Executive Director in implementing the

decisions of the Management Board, with a view to reinforcing supervision of

administrative and budgetary management.

3. The Executive Board shall be composed of the Chairperson of the Management

Board, one representative of the Commission to the Management Board, and three

other members appointed by the Management Board from among its members with

the right to vote. The Chairperson of the Management Board shall also be the

Chairperson of the Executive Board. The appointments of the members of the

Executive Board shall aim to ensure gender balance on the Executive Board. The

Executive Director shall take part in the meetings of the Executive Board without the

right to vote.

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4. The term of office of the members of the Executive Board shall be four years. That

term shall be renewable. The term of office of members of the Executive Board shall

end when their membership of the Management Board ends.

5. The Executive Board shall hold at least one ordinary meeting every three months. In

addition, it shall meet on the initiative of its Chairperson or at the request of its

members.

6. The Management Board shall lay down the rules of procedure of the Executive

Board.

7. When necessary due to urgency, the Executive Board may take certain provisional

decisions on behalf of the Management Board, in particular on administrative

management matters, including the suspension of the delegation of the appointing

authority powers and budgetary matters. Any such provisional decisions shall be

notified to the Management Board without undue delay. The Management Board

shall then decide whether to approve or reject the provisional decision no later than

three months after that decision was taken. The Executive Board shall not take

decisions on behalf of the Management Board that require the approval of a majority

of two thirds of the members of the Management Board with voting rights.

Section 3

Executive Director

Article 31

Appointment, dismissal and extension of the term of office

1. The Executive Director shall be appointed by the Management Board on the basis of

merit and skills from a list of candidates proposed by the Commission, following an

open and transparent and selection procedure.

2. Before appointment, the candidate selected by the Management Board shall be

invited to make a statement before the relevant committee of the European

Parliament and to answer Members’ questions.

3. The Executive Director shall be engaged as a temporary agent of ENISA under

Article 2(a) of the Conditions of Employment.

4. For the purpose of concluding the contract with the Executive Director, ENISA shall

be represented by the Chairperson of the Management Board.

5. The term of office of the Executive Director shall be five years. In due time before

the end of that period, the Commission shall carry out an assessment that takes into

account an evaluation of the performance of the Executive Director and ENISA’s

future tasks and challenges.

6. The Management Board, acting on a proposal from the Commission which takes into

account the assessment referred to in paragraph 5, may extend the term of office of

the Executive Director once for no more than five years.

7. An Executive Director whose term of office has been extended may not participate in

another selection procedure for the same post at the end of the overall period.

8. The Management Board shall inform the European Parliament about its intention to

extend the Executive Director’s term of office in accordance with paragraph 6.

Within three months before any such extension, the Executive Director, if invited,

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shall make a statement before the relevant committee of the European Parliament and

answer members’ questions.

9. The Executive Director may be removed from office only upon a decision of the

Management Board acting on a proposal from the Commission.

Article 32

Tasks and responsibilities of the Executive Director

1. The Executive Director shall manage ENISA and shall be accountable to the

Management Board.

2. The Executive Director shall be independent in the performance of their tasks and

shall neither seek nor take instructions from any government nor from any other

body.

3. The Executive Director shall report to the European Parliament on the performance

of their tasks when invited to do so. The Council may invite the Executive Director

to report on the performance of their tasks.

4. The Executive Director shall be the legal representative of ENISA.

5. The Executive Director shall be responsible for the implementation of the tasks

assigned to ENISA by this Regulation. In particular, the Executive Director shall:

(a) ensure the day-to-day administration of ENISA;

(b) implement decisions adopted by the Management Board;

(c) ensure compliance with the financial rules of ENISA;

(d) prepare the draft single programming document and submit it to the

Management Board for approval before its submission to the Commission for

an opinion;

(e) implement the single programming document and report to the Management

Board on its implementation;

(f) prepare ENISA’s consolidated annual activity report, including the

implementation of ENISA’s annual work programme, and present it to the

Management Board for assessment and adoption;

(g) prepare an action plan that follows up on the conclusions of the retrospective

evaluations of ENISA as referred to in Article 121, and reporting on progress

every two years to the Commission;

(h) prepare an action plan that follows up on conclusions of internal or external

audit reports and evaluations, and from investigations of OLAF and of the

EPPO and report on progress biannually to the Commission and regularly to

the Management Board;

(i) prepare the draft financial rules applicable to ENISA as referred to in Article

50;

(j) prepare ENISA’s draft statement of estimates of revenue and expenditure and

implement its budget;

(k) protect the financial interests of the Union by applying preventive measures

against fraud, corruption and any other illegal activities, without prejudicing

the investigative competence of OLAF and the EPPO, by effective checks and,

EN 87 EN

if irregularities are detected, by recovering amounts wrongly paid and, where

appropriate, by imposing effective, proportionate and dissuasive administrative

and financial penalties;

(l) prepare an anti-fraud strategy, an efficiency gains and synergies strategy, a

strategy for cooperation with third countries or international organisations and

a strategy for the organisational management and internal control systems for

ENISA, and present it to the Management Board for approval;

(m) develop and maintain contact with the business community and consumers’

organisations to ensure regular dialogue with relevant stakeholders;

(n) exchange views and information regularly with relevant Union entities

regarding their activities relating to cybersecurity to ensure coherence in the

implementation of Union policy in that field;

(o) promote diversity and gender balance in the recruitment of ENISA’s staff;

(p) adopt European individual cybersecurity skills attestation schemes, as referred

to in Article 20(1);

(q) adopt decisions with respect to applicants to become authorised attestation

providers or to renew their authorisation, as referred to in Article 22(3);

(r) carry out other tasks assigned to the Executive Director by this Regulation.

6. Where necessary and within ENISA’s objectives and tasks, the Executive Director

may set up ad hoc working groups composed of experts, including experts from the

Member States’ competent authorities. The Executive Director shall inform the

Management Board in advance thereof. The procedures regarding in particular the

composition of the working groups, the appointment of the experts of the working

groups by the Executive Director and the operation of the working groups shall be

specified in ENISA’s internal rules of operation.

7. Where necessary for the purpose of carrying out ENISA’s tasks in an efficient and

effective manner and based on an appropriate cost-benefit analysis, the Executive

Director may decide to establish one or more local offices in one or more Member

States. Before deciding to establish a local office, the Executive Director shall seek

the opinion of the Member States concerned, including the Member State in which

the seat of ENISA is located, and shall obtain the prior consent of the Commission

and the Management Board. In cases of disagreement during the consultation process

between the Executive Director and the Member States concerned, the issue shall be

brought to the Council for discussion. The aggregate number of staff in all local

offices shall be kept to a minimum and shall not exceed 40% of the total number of

ENISA’s staff located in the Member State in which the seat of ENISA is located.

The number of the staff in each local office shall not exceed 10% of the total number

of ENISA’s staff located in the Member State in which the seat of ENISA is located.

8. The decision establishing a local office shall specify the scope of the activities to be

carried out at the local office in a manner that avoids unnecessary costs and

duplication of administrative functions of ENISA.

Section 4

Deputy Executive Director

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Article 33

Deputy Executive Director

1. The Management Board may decide to create a function of a Deputy Executive

Director to assist the Executive Director.

2. Where the Management Board decides to create a function of a Deputy Executive

Director, the provisions of Article 31 shall apply to the Deputy Executive Director

accordingly.

Article 34

Tasks and responsibilities of the Deputy Executive Director

The Deputy Executive Director shall assist the Executive Director in managing ENISA and in

carrying out the tasks referred to in Article 32. If the Executive Director is absent or

indisposed, or the post is vacant, the Deputy Executive Director shall take their place during

the time of absence or until the post is filled.

Section 5

ENISA Advisory Group

Article 35

ENISA Advisory Group

1. The Management Board, acting on a proposal from the Executive Director, shall

establish in a transparent manner the ENISA Advisory Group. The ENISA Advisory

Group shall be composed of recognised experts representing relevant stakeholders,

such as the cybersecurity industry, ICT industry, SMEs, entities operating in sectors

listed in Annexes I and II to Directive (EU) 2022/2555, manufacturers of products

with digital elements and open-source software stewards within the meaning of

Regulation (EU) 2024/2847, conformity assessment bodies notified under the

European Cybersecurity Certification Framework referred to in Article 93 and

Regulation (EU) 2024/2847, entities operating in the area of electronic identification

means, consumer groups, academic experts in the field of cybersecurity, European

standardisation organisations, as well as law enforcement and data protection

supervisory authorities. Those recognised experts shall be nationals of Member

States. The Management Board shall aim to ensure an appropriate gender and

geographical balance, as well as a balance between the different stakeholder groups.

2. Procedures for the ENISA Advisory Group, in particular regarding its composition,

the proposal by the Executive Director referred to in paragraph 1, the number and

appointment of its members and the operation of the ENISA Advisory Group, shall

be specified in ENISA’s internal rules of operation and shall be made public.

3. The ENISA Advisory Group shall be chaired by the Executive Director or by any

person whom the Executive Director appoints on a case-by-case basis.

4. The term of office of the members of the ENISA Advisory Group shall be two and a

half years and shall be renewable once. Members of the Management Board shall not

be members of the ENISA Advisory Group. Experts from the Commission and

experts from the Member States shall be entitled to be present at the meetings of the

ENISA Advisory Group and to participate in its work. The Executive Director may

invite representatives of other bodies that are not members of the ENISA Advisory

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Group, to attend the meetings of the ENISA Advisory Group and to participate in its

work.

5. The ENISA Advisory Group shall advise ENISA in respect of the performance of

ENISA’s tasks, except for the application of the provisions of Titles III, IV and V of

this Regulation. It shall in particular advise the Executive Director on the drawing up

of a proposal for ENISA’s annual work programme, and on ensuring communication

with the relevant stakeholders on issues related to the annual work programme.

6. The ENISA Advisory Group shall inform the Management Board of its activities on

a regular basis.

7. ENISA shall provide the logistical support necessary for the ENISA Advisory Group

and provide a secretariat for its meetings.

Section 6

Board of Appeal

Article 36

Creation and composition of the Board of Appeal

1. ENISA shall establish a Board of Appeal by a decision of the Management Board.

2. The Board of Appeal shall be composed of a Chairperson and three other members.

Each member of the Board of Appeal shall have an alternate. The alternate shall

represent the member in their absence.

3. The Management Board shall appoint the Chairperson, the other members and their

alternates from a list of qualified candidates established by the Commission. The list

of qualified candidates shall be valid for four years. The validity of this list may be

extended by the Management Board for additional four-year periods acting on a

proposal from the Commission.

4. Where the Board of Appeal considers that the nature of the appeal so requires, it may

request the Management Board to appoint two additional members and their

alternates from the list referred to in paragraph 3.

5. The Board of Appeal shall adopt and make public its rules of procedure.

Article 37

Members of the Board of Appeal

1. The term of office of the members and alternates of the Board of Appeal shall be

four years. Their term of office may be renewed by the Management Board for

additional four-year periods acting on a proposal from the Commission.

2. The members of the Board of Appeal shall be independent and shall not perform any

other duties within ENISA. In making their decisions they shall neither seek nor take

instructions from any government, any other body or any private entity.

3. The members of the Board of Appeal shall not be removed from office or from the

list of qualified candidates during their term of office, unless there are serious

grounds for such removal and the Management Board takes a decision to that effect,

acting on a proposal from the Commission.

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Article 38

Exclusion and objection

1. The members of the Board of Appeal shall not take part in any appeal proceedings if

they have any personal interest in the proceedings, if they have previously been

involved as representatives of one of the parties to the proceedings, or if they

participated in the adoption of the decision under appeal.

2. If, for one of the reasons listed in paragraph 1 or for any other reason, a member of a

Board of Appeal considers that they should not take part in any appeal proceeding,

they shall inform the Board of Appeal accordingly.

3. A party to the appeal proceedings may object to any member of a Board of Appeal

on any of the grounds listed in paragraph 1, or if the member is suspected of

partiality. Any such objection shall not be admissible if, while being aware of a

reason for objecting, the party to the appeal proceedings has taken a procedural step.

No objection may be based on the nationality of members of the Board of Appeal.

4. The Board of Appeal shall decide as to the action to be taken in the cases specified in

paragraphs 2 and 3 without the participation of the member concerned. For the

purposes of taking that decision, the member concerned shall be replaced on the

Board of Appeal by their alternate.

Article 39

Appeals against decisions and failures to act

1. An appeal may be brought before the Board of Appeal against:

(a) decisions adopted by ENISA pursuant to Article 22(3);

(b) ENISA’s failure to act within the applicable time limits laid down in Article

22(4).

2. An appeal brought pursuant to paragraph 1 shall be subject to interlocutory revision

in accordance with Article 41 before being put to the Board of Appeal for

examination.

3. An appeal brought pursuant to paragraph 1 shall not have a suspensive effect.

Article 40

Persons entitled to appeal, time limit and form

1. Applicants within the meaning of Article 21(3) may appeal against

(a) a decision of ENISA addressed to them, pursuant to Article 22(3);

(b) ENISA’s failure to act in respect of an application submitted by them to

ENISA within the applicable time limits laid down in Article 22(4).

2. In the case referred to in paragraph 1, point (a), the appeal, together with the

statement of grounds thereof, shall be filed in writing in accordance with the rules of

procedure referred to in Article 36(5) within two months of notification of the

decision to the applicant concerned, or, in the absence thereof, of the day on which

the decision came to the knowledge of the applicant.

3. In the case referred to in paragraph 1, point (b), the appeal shall be filed with ENISA

in writing in accordance with the rules of procedure referred to in Article 36(5)

within two months of the day of expiry of the time limit set out in Article 22(4).

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Article 41

Interlocutory revision

1. If ENISA considers the appeal to be admissible and well founded, it shall rectify the

decision or failure to act referred to in Article 40(1).

2. If ENISA does not rectify the decision within one month after receipt of the appeal, it

shall immediately decide whether to suspend the application of its decision and shall

refer the appeal to the Board of Appeal.

Article 42

Examination of decisions on appeals

1. The Board of Appeal shall decide within three months of the appeal being filed

whether to grant or refuse that appeal. When examining an appeal, the Board of

Appeal shall act within the deadlines laid down in its rules of procedure. It shall, as

often as necessary, invite the parties to the appeal proceedings to file, within

specified time limits, observations on its notifications or on communications from

other parties to the appeal proceedings. Parties to the appeal proceedings shall be

entitled to make oral representations.

2. Where the Board of Appeal finds that the grounds for appeal are founded, it shall

remit the case to ENISA. ENISA shall take its final decision in compliance with the

findings of the Board of Appeal and shall provide a statement of reasons for that

decision. ENISA shall inform the parties to the appeal proceedings accordingly.

Article 43

Actions before the Court of Justice of the European Union

1. Actions for the annulment of decisions of ENISA adopted pursuant to Article 22(3),

or actions for failure to act within the applicable time limits pursuant to Article 22(4),

may be brought before the Court of Justice of the European Union, after the appeal

procedure within ENISA laid down in Articles 39 to 42 has been exhausted or in the

event of failure to act within the applicable time limit pursuant to Article 41(2).

2. ENISA shall take all necessary measures to comply with the judgment of the Court

of Justice of the European Union.

Section 7

Operations

Article 44

Single programming document

1. ENISA shall operate in accordance with a single programming document containing

its annual and multiannual work programme, which shall include all of its planned

activities.

2. Each year, the Executive Director shall draw up a draft single programming

document, as referred to in paragraph 1, with the corresponding financial and human

resources planning in accordance with Article 32 of Commission Delegated

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Regulation (EU) 2019/71574 and taking into account the guidelines set by the

Commission.

3. By 30 November each year, the Management Board shall adopt the single

programming document referred to in paragraph 1, taking into account the opinion of

the Commission referred to in Article 32(7) of Delegated Regulation (EU) 2019/715.

If the Management Board decides not to take into account any elements of the

opinion of the Commission, it shall provide thorough justification for that decision.

The Management Board shall forward the single programming document to the

European Parliament, to the Council and to the Commission by 31 January of the

following year, as well as any subsequently updated versions of that document.

4. The single programming document shall become final after the definitive adoption of

the general budget of the Union and shall be adjusted as necessary.

5. The annual work programme shall comprise detailed objectives and expected results

including performance indicators. It shall also contain a description of the actions to

be financed and an indication of the financial and human resources allocated to each

action, in accordance with the principles of activity-based budgeting and

management. The annual work programme shall be coherent with the multiannual

work programme referred to in paragraph 7. It shall clearly indicate tasks that have

been added, changed or deleted in comparison with the previous financial year.

6. The Management Board shall amend the adopted annual work programme when a

new task is assigned to ENISA. Any substantial amendments to the annual work

programme shall be adopted by the same procedure as for the initial annual work

programme. The Management Board may delegate the power to make non-

substantial amendments to the annual work programme to the Executive Director.

7. The multiannual work programme shall set out the overall strategic programming

including objectives, expected results and performance indicators. It shall also set out

the resource programming including multiannual budget and staff.

8. The resource programming shall be updated annually. The strategic programming

shall be updated where appropriate and in particular where necessary to address the

outcome of the evaluation referred to in Article 120.

CHAPTER IV

Establishment and structure of ENISA’s budget

Article 45

Establishment of ENISA’s budget

1. Each year, the Executive Director shall draw up a provisional draft estimate of

ENISA’s revenue and expenditure for the following financial year, including the

establishment plan, and shall send it to the Management Board.

2. The provisional draft estimate shall be based on the objectives and expected results

of the annual work programme, and shall take into account the financial resources

74 Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2019/715 of 18 December 2018 on the framework financial

regulation for the bodies set up under the TFEU and Euratom Treaty and referred to in Article 70 of

Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2018/1046 of the European Parliament and of the Council (OJ L 122,

10.5.2019, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg_del/2019/715/oj).

EN 93 EN

necessary to achieve those objectives and expected results, in accordance with the

principle of sound financial management and performance.

3. On the basis of the provisional draft estimate, the Management Board shall adopt a

draft estimate of ENISA’s revenue and expenditure for the following financial year,

and shall send it to the Commission by 31 January each year.

4. The Commission shall send the draft estimate to the budgetary authority together

with the draft general budget of the Union. The draft estimate shall also be made

available to ENISA.

5. On the basis of the draft estimate, the Commission shall enter in the draft general

budget of the Union the estimates it considers to be necessary for the establishment

plan and the amount of the contribution to be charged to the general budget of the

Union, which it shall submit to the budgetary authority in accordance with Articles

313 and 314 TFEU.

6. The budgetary authority shall authorise the appropriations for the contribution from

the general budget of the Union to ENISA.

7. The budgetary authority shall adopt ENISA’s establishment plan.

8. The Management Board shall adopt ENISA’s budget. It shall become final following

the final adoption of the general budget of the Union, and, if necessary, it shall be

adjusted accordingly.

9. For any building project likely to have significant implications for the budget of

ENISA, Delegated Regulation (EU) 2019/715 shall apply.

Article 46

Structure of ENISA’s budget

1. Estimates of all revenue and expenditure of ENISA shall be prepared each financial

year and shall be shown in ENISA’s budget. The financial year shall correspond to

the calendar year.

2. ENISA’s budget shall be balanced in terms of revenue and expenditure.

3. Without prejudice to other resources, ENISA’s revenue shall be composed of:

(a) a contribution from the Union entered in the general budget of the Union;

(b) revenue assigned to specific items of expenditure in accordance with its

financial rules referred to in Article 50;

(c) Union funding in the form of contribution agreements or ad hoc grants in

accordance with ENISA’s financial rules referred to in Article 50 and with the

provisions of the relevant instruments supporting the policies of the Union;

(d) the fees levied on the applicants for activities related to European individual

cybersecurity skills attestation schemes referred to in Article 22(1);

(e) the fees levied on the conformity assessment bodies for participation in and

issuance of European cybersecurity certificates under a European cybersecurity

certification scheme referred to in Article 47(2);

(f) the fees levied on public authorities or private bodies for testing tools as

referred to in Article 47(3);

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(g) any contribution from third countries participating in the work of ENISA, as

provided for in Article 70(4);

(h) any voluntary contributions from Member States in money or in kind.

4. Member States that provide voluntary contributions, as referred to in paragraph 3,

point (g) shall not claim any specific right or service as a result thereof.

5. The expenditure of ENISA shall include staff remuneration, administrative and

infrastructure expenses, and operational expenditure.

Article 47

Fees

1. In relation to each European attestation scheme activity referred to in Article 22(1),

the following fees shall be levied towards applicants within the meaning of Article

21(3) or to authorised attestation providers to contribute to covering the full costs of

the activities performed by ENISA:

(a) issuing authorisations following examination of the requirements laid down in

Article 21(3) and (4), including conducting evaluations;

(b) yearly maintenance of the authorisation;

(c) renewing authorisations for providers of European individual cybersecurity

skills attestations, including conducting evaluations.

2. In relation to certification, the following fees shall be levied on the conformity

assessment bodies for the maintenance of European cybersecurity certification

schemes under which European cybersecurity certificates are issued, in particular:

(a) an annual fee for the participation in a European cybersecurity certification

scheme;

(b) a fee for issuance of European cybersecurity certificates under European

cybersecurity certification schemes.

The fees referred to in point b) shall be levied when the conformity assessment body

submits European cybersecurity certificates to ENISA for publication on their

website pursuant to Article 79.

3. In relation to testing tools referred to in Article 15(1), a fee shall be levied on any

public authority or private body for their use.

4. Fees shall be expressed and payable in euro.

5. The Commission shall adopt implementing acts laying down detailed rules relating to

determining the fees to be levied by ENISA, specifying in particular the estimated

costs attributable to each of the matters for which fees pursuant to paragraphs 1, 2

and 3 are chargeable, and the individual fee amounts chargeable, as well as the ways

and conditions under which the fees should be paid. Those implementing acts shall

be adopted in accordance with the examination procedure referred to in Article

118(2). The Commission shall consult ENISA when preparing those draft

implementing acts.

6. The fees determined by the implementing acts referred in paragraph 5 shall be set

out in advance to be proportionate to the estimated costs of the activities performed

or services delivered as determined in a cost-effective way and shall be sufficient to

cover those costs. All expenditure of ENISA attributed to staff involved in activities

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referred to in paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 shall be reflected in the costs to cover. Fees shall

be set at such a level as to avoid a deficit or a significant accumulation of surplus in

ENISA’s budget. Budgetary surpluses generated through fees shall be carried over to

fund activities of ENISA, in particular future activities related to fees, or offset the

losses incurred. If a significant positive balance in the budget, resulting from

activities covered by fees, becomes recurrent, or if a significant negative balance

results from the provision of the services covered by fees, the Commission shall

amend the implementing acts referred to in paragraph 5 to revise the method for

calculating the fees in accordance with Article 118(2).

The amount of the fees for the tasks referred to in paragraph 1 shall be fixed at such a

level as to ensure that the revenue in respect thereof sufficiently contributes to cover

the costs of the activities related to the development and maintenance of European

individual attestation schemes, the processing of applications and the delivery and

renewal of authorisations and the necessary for those oversight activities by ENISA.

The amount of the fees for the tasks referred to in paragraph 2 shall be fixed at such a

level as to ensure that the revenue in respect thereof sufficiently contributes to cover

the full costs of the activities related to maintaining the European cybersecurity

certification schemes set out in Article 75.

The amount of the fees for the tasks referred to in paragraph 3 shall be fixed at such a

level as to ensure that the revenue in respect thereof sufficiently contributes to cover

the costs of the activities related to the provision of testing tools as set out in Article

15(1).

7. ENISA shall provide a report on the fees levied and their impact on its budget as part

of the procedure for the presentation of accounts laid down in Article 50.

8. ENISA shall put in place a set of indicators to measure the workload, effectiveness

and efficiency in relation to activities financed through fees. ENISA shall adapt its

staff planning and management of resources related to fees accordingly to be able to

adequately respond to such demand and to any fluctuations in revenue from fees.

ENISA shall share the report with the Commission, which the Commission may use

for the purpose of the evaluation referred to in Article 120(1).

Article 48

Implementation of ENISA’s budget

1. The Executive Director shall be responsible for the implementation of ENISA’s

budget and shall act as authorising officer.

2. The Commission’s internal auditor shall exercise the same powers over ENISA as

over Commission departments.

3. Each year, the Executive Director shall send to the budgetary authority all

information relevant to the findings of evaluation procedures.

Article 49

Presentation of accounts and discharge

1. ENISA’s accounting officer shall send the provisional accounts for the financial year

(year N) to the Commission’s accounting officer and to the Court of Auditors by 1

March of the following financial year (year N + 1).

EN 96 EN

2. ENISA’s accounting officer shall also provide the required accounting information

for consolidation purposes to the Commission’s accounting officer, in the manner

and format required by the latter by 1 March of year N + 1.

3. ENISA shall send the report on the budgetary and financial management for year N

to the European Parliament, the Council, the Commission and the Court of Auditors

by 31 March of year N + 1.

4. On receipt of the Court of Auditor’s observations on ENISA’s provisional accounts

for year N, ENISA’s accounting officer shall draw up ENISA’s final accounts on

their own responsibility. The Executive Director shall submit them to the

Management Board for an opinion.

5. The Management Board shall deliver an opinion on ENISA’s final accounts for year

N.

6. ENISA’s accounting officer shall, by 1 July of year N + 1 send the final accounts for

year N to the European Parliament, the Council, the Commission and the Court of

Auditors, together with the Management Board’s opinion.

7. A link to the web pages containing ENISA’s final accounts shall be published in the

Official Journal of the European Union by 15 November of year N + 1.

8. The Executive Director shall send to the Court of Auditors, by 30 September of year

N + 1, a reply to the observations made in its annual report. The Executive Director

shall also send that reply to the Management Board and to the Commission.

9. The Executive Director shall submit to the European Parliament, at the latter’s

request, any information required for the smooth application of the discharge

procedure for year N, in accordance with Article 267(3) of Regulation (EU,

Euratom) 2024/2509 of the European Parliament and of the Council.

10. On a recommendation from the Council acting by qualified majority, the European

Parliament shall, before 15 May of year N + 2, give a discharge to the Executive

Director in respect of the implementation of the budget for year N.

Article 50

Financial rules

1. The financial rules applicable to ENISA shall be adopted by the Management Board

after consulting the Commission. They shall not depart from Delegated Regulation

(EU) 2019/715 unless such a departure is specifically required for the operation of

ENISA and the Commission has given its prior consent.

2. ENISA shall establish and implement its budget in accordance with its financial rules

and Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/2509.

EN 97 EN

Article 51

Combating fraud

1. In order to combat fraud, corruption and other unlawful activities, the provisions of

Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 883/2013 of the European Parliament and of the

Council 75 shall apply without restriction to the activities of ENISA.

2. ENISA shall accede to the Interinstitutional Agreement of 25 May 1999 between the

European Parliament, the Council of the European Union and the Commission of the

European Communities concerning internal investigations by the European Anti-

Fraud Office (OLAF)76 within six months from [OP please insert the exact date, as

referred to in Art. 127] and shall adopt the appropriate provisions applicable to its

staff using the template set out in the Annex to that Agreement.

3. The Court of Auditors shall have the power of audit, on the basis of documents and

on-the-spot checks, over all grant beneficiaries, contractors and subcontractors who

have received Union funds from ENISA.

4. OLAF may carry out investigations, including on-the-spot checks and inspections

with a view to establishing whether there has been fraud, corruption or any other

illegal activity affecting the financial interests of the Union in connection with a

grant or a contract funded by ENISA, in accordance with the provisions and

procedures laid down in Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 883/2013 and Council

Regulation (Euratom, EC) No 2185/9677.

5. Without prejudice to paragraphs 1to 4, working agreements with third countries and

international organisations, contracts, grant agreements and grant decisions of

ENISA shall contain provisions expressly empowering the Court of Auditors and

OLAF to conduct such audits and investigations, according to their respective

competencies.

6. In accordance with Council Regulation (EU) 2017/1939, the EPPO may investigate

and prosecute fraud and other illegal activities affecting the financial interests of the

Union as provided for in Directive (EU) 2017/1371 of the European Parliament and

of the Council78.

Article 52

Declaration of interests

1. Members of the Management Board, the Executive Director, the Deputy Executive

Director, and officials seconded by Member States on a temporary basis, shall each

75 Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 883/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11

September 2013 concerning investigations conducted by the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) and

repealing Regulation (EC) No 1073/1999 of the European Parliament and of the Council and Council

Regulation (Euratom) No 1074/1999 (OJ L 248, 18.9.2013, p. 1, ELI:

http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2013/883/oj). 76 OJ L 136, 31.5.1999, p. 15, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/agree_interinstit/1999/531/oj. 77 Council Regulation (Euratom, EC) No 2185/96 of 11 November 1996 concerning on-the-spot checks

and inspections carried out by the Commission in order to protect the European Communities' financial

interests against fraud and other irregularities (OJ L 292, 15.11.1996, p. 2, ELI:

http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/1996/2185/oj). 78 Directive (EU) 2017/1371 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 July 2017 on the fight

against fraud to the Union's financial interests by means of criminal law (OJ L 198, 28.7.2017, p. 29,

ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2017/1371/oj).

EN 98 EN

make a declaration of commitments and a declaration indicating the absence or

presence of any direct or indirect interest which might be considered to be prejudicial

to their independence. The declarations shall be accurate and complete, shall be

made annually in writing, and shall be updated whenever necessary.

2. Members of the Management Board, the Executive Director, the Deputy Executive

Director, external experts participating in ad hoc working groups, shall each

accurately and completely declare, at the latest at the start of each meeting, any

interest which might be considered to be prejudicial to their independence in relation

to the items on the agenda, and shall abstain from participating in the discussion of

and voting on such items.

3. ENISA shall lay down, in its internal rules of operation, the practical arrangements

for the rules on declarations of interest referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2.

Article 53

Transparency

1. ENISA shall carry out its activities with a high level of transparency and in

accordance with Article 55.

2. ENISA shall ensure that the public and any interested parties are provided with

appropriate, objective, reliable and easily accessible information, in particular with

regard to the results of its work. It shall also make publicly available the declarations

of interest made in accordance with Article 52.

3. The Management Board, acting on a proposal from the Executive Director, may

authorise interested parties to observe the proceedings of some of ENISA’s activities.

4. ENISA shall lay down, in its internal rules of operation, the practical arrangements

for implementing the transparency rules referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2.

Article 54

Confidentiality within ENISA

1. Without prejudice to Article 55, ENISA shall not disclose to third parties information

that it processes or receives in relation to which a reasoned request for confidential

treatment has been made.

2. Members of the Management Board, the Executive Director, the Deputy Executive

Director, the members of the ENISA Advisory Group, external experts participating

in ad hoc working groups, and members of the staff of ENISA, including officials

seconded by Member States on a temporary basis, shall comply with the

confidentiality requirements of Article 339 TFEU, even after their duties have

ceased.

3. ENISA shall lay down, in its internal rules of operation, the practical arrangements

for implementing the confidentiality rules referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2.

Article 55

Access to documents

1. Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 shall apply to documents held by ENISA.

2. The Management Board shall adopt arrangements for implementing Regulation (EC)

No 1049/2001.

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3. Decisions taken by ENISA pursuant to Article 8 of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001

may be the subject of a complaint to the European Ombudsman under Article 228

TFEU or of an action before the Court of Justice of the European Union under

Article 263 TFEU.

CHAPTER V

Staff and Liaison Officers

Article 56

General provisions

1. The Staff Regulations of Officials and the Conditions of Employment of Other

Servants, as well as the rules adopted by agreement between the Union institutions

for giving effect to the Staff Regulations of Officials and the Conditions of

Employment of Other Servants shall apply to the staff of ENISA.

2. The staff of ENISA, liaison officers and seconded national experts to ENISA shall

undergo appropriate security clearance procedure.

Article 57

Privileges and immunities

Protocol No 7 on the privileges and immunities of the European Union, annexed to the TFEU,

shall apply to ENISA and its staff.

Article 58

Liaison officers

1. Each Member State shall designate at least two liaison officers from a national

competent authority designated pursuant to Article 8(1) of Directive (EU) 2022/2555

as seconded national experts to ENISA to work at its seat or its local office, in

accordance with Article 59(2). The Commission may also designate a liaison officer.

2. Liaison officers shall contribute to executing the tasks of ENISA, including by

facilitating operational cooperation and exchange of information as referred to in

Article 11. Liaison officers shall also support ENISA in disseminating information

about its activities, findings and recommendations to relevant stakeholders across the

Union. They shall also act as national contact points for questions from their Member

States and relating to their Member States, either by answering those questions

directly or by liaising with their national administrations.

3. Liaison officers designated by their Member States shall be entitled to request and

receive all relevant information from their Member States, as provided for by this

Regulation, while fully respecting the national law and the Member State’s practices,

in particular as regards data protection and confidentiality.

Article 59

Seconded national experts and other staff

1. ENISA may make use of seconded national experts or other staff not employed by

ENISA, in any areas of its work. The Staff Regulations and the Conditions of

Employment shall not apply to such staff.

EN 100 EN

2. The Management Board shall adopt a decision laying down rules on the secondment

of national experts, including liaison officers, to ENISA.

CHAPTER VI

GENERAL PROVISIONS CONCERNING ENISA

Article 60

Legal status of ENISA

1. ENISA shall be a body of the Union with legal personality.

2. In each Member State, ENISA shall enjoy the most extensive legal capacity accorded

to legal persons under that Member State’s national law. It may, in particular, acquire

or dispose of movable and immovable property and be a party to legal proceedings.

3. ENISA shall be represented by the Executive Director.

Article 61

Seat

ENISA shall have its seat in Athens, Greece.

Article 62

Headquarters Agreement and operating conditions

1. The necessary arrangements concerning the accommodation to be provided for

ENISA in the host Member State and the facilities to be made available by that

Member State together with the specific rules applicable in the host Member State to

the Executive Director, members of the Management Board, ENISA’s staff and

members of their families shall be laid down in a headquarters agreement between

ENISA and the host Member State, concluded after obtaining the approval of the

Management Board.

2. ENISA’s host Member State shall provide the best possible conditions for ensuring

the proper functioning of ENISA, taking into account the accessibility of the

location, the existence of adequate education facilities for the children of staff

members, appropriate access to the labour market, social security and medical care

for both children and spouses of staff members.

Article 63

Administrative control

The operations of ENISA shall be supervised by the European Ombudsman in accordance

with Article 228 TFEU.

Article 64

Liability of ENISA

1. The contractual liability of ENISA shall be governed by the law applicable to the

contract in question.

2. The Court of Justice of the European Union shall have jurisdiction to give judgment

pursuant to any arbitration clause contained in a contract concluded by ENISA.

EN 101 EN

3. In the case of non-contractual liability, ENISA shall make good any damage caused

by it or its staff in the performance of their duties, in accordance with the general

principles common to the laws of the Member States.

4. The Court of Justice of the European Union shall have jurisdiction in disputes

overcompensation for damages referred to in paragraph 3.

5. The personal liability of ENISA’s staff towards ENISA shall be governed by the

provisions laid down in the Staff Regulations or Conditions of Employment

applicable to them.

Article 65

Language arrangements

1. Council Regulation No 179 shall apply to ENISA. The Member States and the other

bodies appointed by the Member States may address ENISA and receive a reply in

the official language of the institutions of the Union that they choose.

2. Translation and all other linguistic services required for the functioning of ENISA,

other than interpretation, shall be provided by the Translation Centre for the Bodies

of the European Union.

Article 66

Protection of personal data

1. The processing of personal data by ENISA shall be subject to Regulation (EU)

2018/1725.

2. The Management Board shall adopt implementing rules as referred to in Article

45(3) of Regulation (EU) 2018/1725. The Management Board may adopt additional

measures necessary for the application of Regulation (EU) 2018/1725 by ENISA.

Article 67

Security rules on the protection of sensitive non-classified information and classified

information

In agreement with the Commission, ENISA shall adopt security rules applying the security

principles contained in the Commission’s security rules for protecting sensitive non-classified

information and EUCI, as set out in Decisions (EU, Euratom) 2015/44380 and 2015/44481.

Those security rules shall include provisions for the exchange, processing and storage of such

information.

Article 68

Cooperation with Union entities and national authorities

1. To ensure consistency, create synergies and address issues of common concern,

ENISA shall cooperate on matters related to cybersecurity with CERT-EU and

79 Council Regulation No 1 determining the languages to be used by the European Economic Community

(OJ 17, 6.10.1958, p. 385, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/1958/1(1)/oj). 80 Commission Decision (EU, Euratom) 2015/443 of 13 March 2015 on Security in the Commission (OJ L

72, 17.3.2015, p. 41, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dec/2015/443/oj). 81 Commission Decision (EU, Euratom) 2015/444 of 13 March 2015 on the security rules for protecting

EU classified information (OJ L 72, 17.3.2015, p. 53, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dec/2015/444/oj).

EN 102 EN

relevant Union entities, including Europol, the European Cybersecurity Industrial,

Technology and Research Competence Centre established pursuant to Regulation

(EU) 2021/887, and the European Data Protection Board established pursuant to

Article 68(1) of Regulation (EU) 2016/679.

2. The cooperation referred to in paragraph 1 may be ensured by means of:

(a) the exchange of know-how and best practices;

(b) the provision of advice and issuance of guidance on matters related to

cybersecurity;

(c) the establishment of practical arrangements for the execution of specific tasks,

after consulting the Commission.

3. ENISA shall engage in a structured cooperation with CERT-EU, in particular on

matters related to capacity-building, operational cooperation, and long-term strategic

analyses of cyber threats.

4. ENISA shall cooperate and exchange information with relevant market surveillance

and supervisory authorities designated under Union legislation in the field of

cybersecurity, including Regulation (EU) 2024/2847.

Article 69

Cooperation with stakeholders

1. Where necessary to achieve the objectives of this Regulation, ENISA shall cooperate

with relevant stakeholders, such as the cybersecurity industry, the ICT industry,

SMEs, entities operating in sectors listed in Annexes I and II to Directive (EU)

2022/2555, manufacturers, importers or distributors of products with digital elements

within the meaning of Regulation (EU) 2024/2847, conformity assessment bodies

notified under the European cybersecurity certification framework and Regulation

(EU) 2024/2847, entities operating in the area of electronic identification means,

consumer groups, and academic experts in the field of cybersecurity. To that end,

ENISA may establish public-private partnerships.

2. ENISA shall, in consultation with the Commission, support cooperation between

notified conformity assessment bodies pursuant to Article 93. In particular, it may

establish a group of notified conformity assessment bodies for sharing of best

practices, creating synergies with other relevant Union legislation, in particular

Regulation (EU) 2024/2847.

Article 70

Cooperation with third countries and international organisations

1. To the extent necessary to achieve the objectives of this Regulation, ENISA may

cooperate with the competent authorities of third countries or with international

organisations or both, in line with the priorities of the Union. To that end, ENISA

may establish working arrangements with the authorities of third countries and

international organisations, subject to the prior approval of the Commission. Those

working arrangements shall not create legal obligations incumbent on the Union and

its Member States.

2. The Management Board shall adopt a strategy for relations with third countries and

international organisations concerning matters for which ENISA is competent and in

line with the priorities referred to in paragraph 1. The Commission shall ensure that

EN 103 EN

ENISA operates within its mandate and the existing institutional framework by

concluding appropriate working arrangements with the Executive Director.

3. To support cooperation with third countries, in particular countries that are

candidates for accession to the Union, ENISA may deliver its capacity-building

expertise, in particular in the following areas:

(a) assessment of the level of maturity of cybersecurity capabilities and resources;

(b) growth and enhancement of the cybersecurity workforce, including by

promoting the ECSF and the European individual cybersecurity skills

attestation schemes, and providing learning and training activities;

(c) supporting the planning and execution of cybersecurity exercises.

4. ENISA shall be open to the participation of third countries in ENISA’s work that

have concluded agreements with the Union to that effect. Under the relevant

provisions of agreements concluded between third countries and the Union, working

arrangements shall be established, subject to prior approval of the Commission,

specifying in particular the nature, extent and manner in which those third countries

are to participate in ENISA’s work, and shall include provisions relating to

participation in the initiatives undertaken by ENISA, to financial contributions and to

staff. As regards staff matters, those working arrangements shall comply with the

Staff Regulations and Conditions of Employment in any event.

5. ENISA shall regularly report to the Council and the Commission on the

implementation of the working arrangements referred to in paragraphs 1 and 4.

TITLE III

EUROPEAN CYBERSECURITY CERTIFICATION FRAMEWORK

CHAPTER I

Objectives, Scope and Procedures

Article 71

Objectives and scope of the European cybersecurity certification framework

1. The European cybersecurity certification framework shall be established with a view

of creating a digital single market for ICT products, ICT services, ICT processes,

managed security services and entities. To that end, it shall increase the level of

cybersecurity within the Union and enable a harmonised approach to European

cybersecurity certification schemes as well as leverage certification to facilitate

compliance with applicable Union legislation.

2. The European cybersecurity certification framework shall provide for a mechanism

to establish European cybersecurity certification schemes and to attest the following:

(a) that the ICT products, ICT services and ICT processes that have been evaluated

in accordance with such schemes comply with specified security requirements

for the purpose of protecting the availability, authenticity, integrity or

confidentiality of stored or transmitted or processed data or the functions or

services offered by, or accessible via, those products, services and processes

throughout their lifecycle;

EN 104 EN

(b) that managed security services that have been evaluated in accordance with

such schemes comply with specified security requirements for the purpose of

protecting the availability, authenticity, integrity and confidentiality of data

which are accessed, processed, stored or transmitted in relation to the provision

of those services, and that those services are provided continuously with the

requisite competence, expertise and experience by staff with a sufficient and

appropriate level of relevant technical knowledge and professional integrity;

(c) that the cyber posture of an entity that has been evaluated in accordance with

such schemes complies with specified cybersecurity requirements.

3. European cybersecurity certification shall be voluntary, unless otherwise specified in

Union or national law.

4. A European cybersecurity certificate and EU statement of conformity issued under

the European cybersecurity certification framework shall be automatically

recognised in all Member States.

Article 72

Public information and consultation

1. At least once a year, the Commission shall organise, with the support of ENISA, a

European Cybersecurity Certification Assembly, inviting ECCG members and other

relevant experts from Member States, relevant experts from Union entities and

relevant stakeholders to discuss strategic priorities for harmonisation in the area of

cybersecurity certification.

2. The Commission shall maintain and regularly update a dedicated website providing

information on the following aspects:

(a) European cybersecurity certification schemes requested for development

pursuant to Article 73;

(b) strategic priorities for harmonisation of ICT products, ICT services, ICT

processes, managed security services, cyber posture of entities or security

requirements of Union legislation, including potential areas for which a

European cybersecurity certification scheme might be requested.

3. The Commission shall make publicly available on the website referred to in

paragraph 2 of this Article the information on its request to ENISA to prepare

a candidate scheme as referred to in Article 73 and its decision to accept, reject or

discontinue a candidate scheme transmitted by ENISA in accordance with Article

74(7).

4. During the preparation of a candidate scheme by ENISA pursuant to Article 74, the

European Parliament and the Council may request the Commission, in its capacity as

chair of the ECCG, and ENISA to present relevant information on the draft candidate

scheme. Upon the request of the European Parliament or the Council, ENISA, in

agreement with the Commission and without prejudice to Article 54, may make

available to the European Parliament and to the Council relevant parts of a draft

candidate scheme in a manner appropriate to the confidentiality level required, and

where appropriate in a restricted manner.

5. The European Parliament and the Council may invite the Commission and ENISA to

discuss matters concerning the implementation of European cybersecurity

EN 105 EN

certification schemes for ICT products, ICT services, ICT processes, managed

security services or cyber posture of entities.

Article 73

Requests for a European cybersecurity certification scheme

1. The Commission may request ENISA to prepare a candidate European cybersecurity

certification scheme for ICT products, ICT services, ICT processes, managed

security services or cyber posture of entities.

2. In duly justified cases, the ECCG may suggest to the Commission to put forward a

request referred to in paragraph 1.

3. The request referred to in paragraph 1 shall detail the purpose, scope and modalities

of meeting relevant security objectives and elements set out in Articles 80 and 81.

The request shall also specify the development plan of the candidate European

cybersecurity certification scheme and relevant technical specifications to be

referenced or defined in the scheme.

4. When preparing the request referred to in paragraph 1, the Commission shall duly

consult ENISA and the ECCG as well as take into account the views of all relevant

stakeholders and other Union entities, including, where applicable, those that are

relevant under Union legislation in which a European cybersecurity certification

scheme is demonstrating compliance and providing presumption of conformity.

Article 74

Preparation and adoption of European cybersecurity certification schemes

1. No later than 12 months after receiving a request from the Commission pursuant to

Article 73, unless otherwise specified in the request, ENISA shall prepare a

candidate European cybersecurity certification scheme that meets the requirements

set out in Articles 80 and 81.

2. For the preparation of each candidate scheme, ENISA shall establish an ad hoc

working group in accordance with Article 32(6) for the purpose of providing ENISA

with expertise advice.

3. When preparing the candidate scheme, ENISA shall closely cooperate with the

ECCG. The ECCG shall provide ENISA with assistance and expert advice in relation

to the preparation of the candidate scheme and, where applicable, supporting

technical specifications.

4. When preparing the candidate scheme, including, where applicable, supporting

technical specifications, ENISA shall consult stakeholders in a timely manner by

means of a formal, open, transparent and inclusive consultation process. ENISA shall

also cooperate with relevant public authorities in the Member States and with

relevant Union entities to gather their expert advice in relation to the preparation of

the candidate scheme and, where applicable, supporting technical specifications.

When transmitting the candidate scheme to the Commission pursuant to paragraph 6,

ENISA shall describe the manner in which it has complied with this paragraph.

5. Before transmitting the candidate scheme and, where applicable, supporting technical

specifications, to the Commission, ENISA shall request members of the ECCG to

provide written opinions on the candidate scheme. The opinions shall be provided no

later than 30 days from date of the request. ENISA shall take the utmost account of

EN 106 EN

the opinions of the ECCG members. The absence of such opinions shall not prevent

ENISA from transmitting the candidate scheme to the Commission.

6. ENISA shall transmit the candidate scheme to the Commission no later than 60 days

from the date of the request referred to in paragraph 5.

7. When receiving the candidate scheme, the Commission shall evaluate whether the

scheme corresponds to the request made in accordance with Article 73. Within 30

days of the date of transmission of that candidate scheme the Commission shall take

one of the following actions:

(a) accept the candidate scheme;

(b) return the candidate scheme to ENISA for revision together with a justification

for this return and a deadline not exceeding 90 days, within which ENISA shall

provide a revised candidate scheme;

(c) discontinue the candidate scheme.

8. Where the Commission returns a candidate scheme to ENISA for revision in

accordance with paragraph 7, point (b), paragraphs 4, 5 and 7 shall apply

accordingly.

9. The Commission, based on the accepted candidate scheme prepared by ENISA, is

empowered to adopt implementing acts providing for a European cybersecurity

certification scheme for ICT products, ICT services, ICT processes, managed

security services or cyber posture of entities that meets the requirements set out in

Articles 80 and 81. That implementing act shall be adopted in accordance with the

examination procedure referred to in Article 118(2).

10. The Commission may reference technical specifications developed by ENISA in the

implementing acts referred to in paragraph 9 of this Article, in accordance with

Articles 18 and 77.

11. The Commission may specify the conditions for the international recognition of

European cybersecurity certificates, in the implementing acts referred to in paragraph

9 of this Article, in accordance with Article 87.

Article 75

Maintenance of a European cybersecurity certification scheme

1. Each European cybersecurity certification scheme shall establish a maintenance

strategy. The maintenance strategy shall outline expectations with regard to

maintenance activities, in particular those related to the standards or technical

specifications referenced in the scheme and to the interaction with relevant

stakeholders.

2. ENISA, in cooperation with the Commission and supported by the ECCG and its

relevant maintenance sub-group, shall ensure the maintenance of European

cybersecurity certification schemes, including in view of the possible review of such

schemes by the Commission. ENISA shall cooperate and exchange information with

relevant Union entities and groups in relation to maintenance activities.

3. ENISA may organise the involvement of the private sector for the maintenance of a

scheme in the form of an ad hoc working group in accordance with the maintenance

strategy referred to in paragraph 1.

EN 107 EN

4. The maintenance activities of European cybersecurity certification schemes shall

include the following:

(a) the preparation, update and endorsement of technical specifications and

guidelines to support the harmonised and uniform operation of the schemes;

(b) the identification of standards or technical specifications that are relevant to the

scheme;

(c) interactions and, where relevant, the establishment of liaisons, with relevant

stakeholders, including European or international standardisation organisations,

including for the purpose of making or receiving technical contributions;

(d) the issuance of recommendations to the Commission on necessary

improvements and updates to the schemes, including in view of a possible

review of the schemes;

(e) the exchange of information related to the practical implementation of the

schemes between Member States;

(f) contributions to peer review and peer assessment mechanisms and analyses of

the outcome of such assessments to improve the operation of the schemes and

support their possible review.

5. The ECCG may issue an opinion on the maintenance of European cybersecurity

certification schemes.

Article 76

Evaluation, review and withdrawal of a European cybersecurity certification scheme

1. At least every four years following the entry into application of a European

cybersecurity certification scheme, ENISA shall evaluate the impact and

effectiveness of that scheme, in cooperation with the relevant maintenance sub-group

of the ECCG, and by taking into account the feedback received from stakeholders.

ENISA shall conduct the evaluation by carrying out the market analysis in

accordance with Article 8(1).

2. Following the evaluation referred to in paragraph 1, the Commission may review or

withdraw implementing acts providing for a European cybersecurity certification

scheme pursuant to Article 74(9).

3. When reviewing or withdrawing European cybersecurity certification schemes, the

Commission shall consult ENISA, the ECCG and its relevant maintenance sub-

group, as well as take into account the views of relevant stakeholders and other

Union entities.

4. The ECCG may issue an opinion on the review or withdrawal of a European

cybersecurity certification scheme. The Commission shall take due account of it

when reviewing or withdrawing the European cybersecurity certification scheme.

Article 77

Technical specifications in European cybersecurity certification schemes

1. ENISA may develop technical specifications in view of a future European

cybersecurity certification scheme or in support of the maintenance of a European

cybersecurity certification scheme.

EN 108 EN

2. The technical specifications referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article shall be

developed in a timely manner, with the support of the ECCG and its maintenance

sub-groups and, where applicable, the corresponding ad hoc working group as

referred to in Article 75(3). For this purpose, ENISA shall also seek contributions

from relevant stakeholder groups taking into account the maintenance strategy

referred to in Article 75(1).

3. Where technical specifications are referenced in a European cybersecurity

certification scheme as referred to in Article 74(10), they shall be made available on

the website referred to in Article 79.

4. In duly justified cases, in particular where the technical specifications contain

information that could compromise the security of certified ICT products, ICT

services, ICT processes, managed security services or cyber posture of entities, they

shall be distributed only to those stakeholders concerned by the requirements of the

scheme. Such technical specifications shall not be referenced in a European

cybersecurity certification scheme as referred to in Article 74(10).

Article 78

Facilitation of compliance with Union legislation

1. Where a specific Union legal act so provides, a certificate issued under a European

cybersecurity certification scheme shall demonstrate compliance and confer a

presumption of conformity with corresponding requirements set out in that legal act.

2. Evaluation activities under a European cybersecurity certification scheme shall be

consistent with the corresponding Union legal act setting out the demonstration of

compliance and the presumption of conformity. Where such evaluation activities are

not specified in the corresponding Union legal act, the scheme shall specify them. A

conformity assessment for certification granting the presumption of conformity with

requirements set out in Union legislation shall be conducted by a third-party body.

3. In the absence of harmonised Union legislation, national law may also provide that a

European cybersecurity certification scheme may be used for demonstrating the

compliance and establishing the presumption of conformity with specific legal

requirements set out in national law.

Article 79

Uptake of European cybersecurity certification schemes, ENISA website and publication of

certificates

1. ENISA shall organise activities to promote the uptake of adopted European

cybersecurity certification schemes, including by maintaining the website referred to

in paragraph 2 of this Article.

2. ENISA shall maintain and regularly update a dedicated website providing public

information on the following:

(a) European cybersecurity certification schemes;

(b) the fees associated with the maintenance of each European cybersecurity

certification scheme;

(c) relevant ENISA technical specifications;

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(d) European cybersecurity certificates and EU statements of conformity,

including information with regard to such certificates and statements which are

no longer valid, or which are suspended, withdrawn or expired;

(e) relevant supplementary cybersecurity information provided in accordance with

Article 84;

(f) summaries of peer reviews pursuant to Article 89(7);

(g) technical specifications referenced in a European cybersecurity certification

scheme pursuant to Article 74(10).

3. Where applicable, the website referred to in paragraph 2 shall also indicate the

national cybersecurity certification schemes that have been replaced by a European

cybersecurity certification scheme.

CHAPTER II

Content of European Cybersecurity Certification Schemes

Article 80

Security objectives of European cybersecurity certification schemes

1. A European cybersecurity certification scheme shall pursue, as applicable, the

following security objectives:

(a) to ensure that ICT products, ICT services, ICT processes and managed security

services are secure by default and by design;

(b) to protect stored, transmitted or otherwise processed data against accidental or

unauthorised storage, processing, access or disclosure using appropriate

technical means, taking into account the entire lifecycle of the ICT products,

ICT services or ICT processes;

(c) to protect the integrity of stored, transmitted or otherwise processed, personal

or other data, commands, programmes and configurations against any

manipulation or modification not authorised by the user, and report on

corruptions, taking into account the entire lifecycle of the ICT products, ICT

services or ICT processes;

(d) to ensure protection from unauthorised access by means of appropriate control

mechanisms, including but not limited to authentication, identity or access

management systems, and report on possible unauthorised access;

(e) to identify and document components and vulnerabilities, including, where

appropriate, by drawing up a software bill of materials covering at the very

least the top-level dependencies;

(f) to provide security-related information by recording and monitoring relevant

internal activity, including access to or modification of data, services or

functions, where applicable, with an opt-out mechanism for the user;

(g) to verify that ICT products, ICT services and ICT processes do not contain

known exploitable vulnerabilities;

(h) to protect the availability of essential and basic functions, including after an

incident, including through resilience and mitigation measures against denial-

of-service attacks;

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(i) to minimise the negative impact on the availability of services provided by

other networks and devices in the event of a physical or technical incident;

(j) to ensure that ICT products, ICT services and ICT processes are regularly

tested and their security reviewed;

(k) to ensure that vulnerabilities are addressed and remediated without delay,

including through security updates, and that information about fixed

vulnerabilities is shared and publicly disclosed, unless the risks of publication

outweigh the security benefits;

(l) to ensure that a policy on coordinated vulnerability disclosure is in place;

(m) to facilitate the sharing of information about potential vulnerabilities in ICT

products, ICT services and ICT processes;

(n) to ensure that, where security updates are available to address identified

security issues, those security updates are disseminated without delay;

(o) to ensure that the managed security services are provided with the requisite

competence, expertise and experience, including that the staff tasked with

providing those services have a sufficient and appropriate level of technical

knowledge and competence in the specific field, sufficient and appropriate

experience, and the highest degree of professional integrity;

(p) to ensure that the ICT products, ICT services and ICT processes deployed in

the provision of the managed security services are secure by design and by

default and, where applicable, include the latest security updates and do not

contain publicly known vulnerabilities;

(q) to ensure that the certified entity has appropriate internal procedures in place to

ensure that services are provided at a sufficient and appropriate level of quality;

(r) to ensure that the certified entity is able to identify, protect against, detect,

respond to, and recover from incidents;

(s) to ensure that the certified entity is able to manage the risks posed to the

security of network and information systems used by the entity for its

operations or for the provision of its services, and to prevent or minimise the

impact of incidents on recipients of its services and on other services;

(t) to ensure that the certified entity is able to build, assure and review its

operational integrity and reliability by ensuring, either directly or indirectly

through the use of services provided by ICT third-party service providers, that

it has in place the full range of ICT-related capabilities needed to address the

security of the network and information systems that are used by the entity, and

that support the continued provision of services and their quality, including

throughout disruptions;

(u) to ensure that the certified entity is able to implement and maintain an

information security management system;

(v) to resist any event that may compromise the availability, authenticity, integrity

or confidentiality of stored, transmitted or processed data or of the services

offered by, or accessible via, the network and information system used by the

entity, and to ensure the continued provision of services and their quality,

including throughout disruptions;

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(w) to ensure that the entity is able to ensure the security of processing of personal

data.

2. The Commission is empowered to adopt delegated acts in accordance with

Article 119 to amend paragraph 1 of this Article by adding or modifying security

objectives in order to ensure that they reflect the latest technological development

and new related threats as well as adoption of new Union legislation setting out the

demonstration of compliance and the presumption of conformity through European

cybersecurity certification with relevant cybersecurity requirements of that

legislation.

3. A European cybersecurity certification scheme addressing products with digital

elements as defined in Article 3, point (1), of Regulation (EU) 2024/2847 shall be

designed in alignment with the essential cybersecurity requirements set out in

Annex I that Regulation and take into account available harmonised standards.

Article 81

Elements of European cybersecurity certification schemes

1. A European cybersecurity certification scheme shall include at least the following:

(a) the subject matter and scope of the certification scheme, including the type or

categories of ICT products, ICT services, ICT processes or managed security

services, or the entity’s assets, services and functions covered in scope of

certification;

(b) a clear description of the purpose of the scheme and, where applicable and the

identification of Union legislation setting out requirements for which the

European cybersecurity certificates demonstrate compliance and confer a

presumption of conformity;

(c) the maintenance strategy specifying the approach to maintenance activities set

out in Article 75;

(d) the specific cybersecurity requirements, evaluation criteria and methods to be

used for evaluation of ICT products, ICT services, ICT processes, managed

security services or cyber posture of entities, and references to the

international, European or national standards applied in the evaluation of ICT

products, ICT services, ICT processes, managed security services or cyber

posture of entities or, where such standards are not available or appropriate, to

technical specifications drawn up by ENISA pursuant to Article 77 or, if such

specifications are not available, to other technical specifications;

(e) the maximum period of validity of European cybersecurity certificates issued

under the scheme.

2. A European cybersecurity certification scheme shall include at least rules and

conditions concerning the following:

(a) the monitoring of compliance of ICT products, ICT services, ICT processes,

managed security services or cyber posture of entities with the requirements of

the European cybersecurity certificates or the EU statements of conformity,

including the mechanisms to demonstrate continued compliance with the

specified cybersecurity requirements;

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(b) the issuing, confirming, withdrawing and renewing of the European

cybersecurity certificates, the extension or reduction of the scope of

certification and the recertification;

(c) the consequences for ICT products, ICT services, ICT processes, managed

security services or entities that have been certified or for which an EU

statement of conformity has been issued, but which do not comply with the

requirements of the scheme;

(d) how previously undetected cybersecurity vulnerabilities in ICT products, ICT

services and ICT processes are to be reported and dealt with;

(e) the content and the format of the European cybersecurity certificates and the

EU statements of conformity to be issued;

(f) the period of availability of the EU statement of conformity, technical

documentation, and all other relevant information to be made available by the

manufacturer or provider of ICT products, ICT services, ICT processes or

managed security services or by the entity the cyber posture of which is subject

to certification;

(g) any peer assessment mechanisms established under the scheme for authorities

or bodies issuing European cybersecurity certificates pursuant to Article 85(4),

which shall be without prejudice to the peer review provided for in Article 90;

(h) the confidentiality of information and data obtained by all parties in carrying

out tasks and activities related to the implementation of the provisions set out

in this Title;

(i) the format and procedures to be followed by manufacturers or providers of ICT

products, ICT services or ICT processes in supplying and updating the

supplementary cybersecurity information in accordance with Article 84; and

(j) the continuity of certification activities during extraordinary crisis situations,

that are unavoidable and hinder the possibility to apply the certification

scheme’s rules.

3. A European cybersecurity certification scheme shall, where appropriate, also include

the following:

(a) one or more assurance levels and corresponding evaluation levels;

(b) protection profiles to specify the security requirements that are applicable to a

given category of ICT products, ICT services, ICT processes or managed

security services;

(c) extension profiles to set out additional security requirements, including, where

applicable, security requirements set out in national provisions transposing

Union law;

(d) clarification on which conformity assessment activities, including calibration,

testing, certification and inspection, for assurance level ‘high’, or for the

purpose of demonstrating compliance and granting presumption of conformity,

are permitted outside the European Economic Area (EEA);

(e) the identification of national or international cybersecurity certification

schemes covering the same type or categories of ICT products, ICT services,

ICT processes, managed security services or cyber posture of entities;

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(f) additional or specific requirements to which conformity assessment bodies are

subject in order to guarantee their technical competence to evaluate the

cybersecurity requirements;

(g) the information which is necessary for certification and which an applicant is to

provide or otherwise make available to the conformity assessment bodies;

(h) marks or labels and the conditions under which such marks or labels may be

used;

(i) conditions for the international recognition of European cybersecurity

certificates in accordance with Article 87.

4. The specified requirements of the European cybersecurity certification scheme shall

be consistent with the requirements of Union legislation.

5. The Commission is empowered to adopt implementing acts laying down common

principles and model provisions for elements set out in paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 across

European cybersecurity certification schemes. Where appropriate and available, a

European cybersecurity certification scheme may include references to those

principles and model provisions.

6. The implementing acts referred to in paragraph 5 shall be adopted in accordance with

the examination procedure referred to in Article 118(2). When developing or revising

the common principles and model provisions for the elements of European

cybersecurity certification schemes, the Commission shall consult ENISA and take

into account, as appropriate, views expressed by the ECCG, relevant stakeholders

and other relevant bodies.

Article 82

Assurance and evaluation levels of European cybersecurity certification schemes

1. A European cybersecurity certification scheme may specify one or more of the

following assurance levels for ICT products, ICT services, ICT processes, managed

security services or cyber posture of entities: “basic”, “substantial” or “high”. Those

assurance levels shall be commensurate with the level of the risk associated with the

intended use of the ICT product, ICT service, ICT process, managed security service,

or with the nature of entities, the cyber posture of which is subject to certification,

and their operational environment, in terms of the probability and impact of an

incident.

2. European cybersecurity certificates shall refer to any assurance level specified in the

European cybersecurity certification scheme under which those certificates are

issued. EU statements of conformity shall refer to the assurance level “basic”.

3. The security requirements corresponding to each assurance level shall be provided in

the relevant European cybersecurity certification scheme, including the

corresponding security controls and the corresponding evaluation that the ICT

product, ICT service, ICT process, managed security service or cyber posture of

entity is to undergo.

4. The European cybersecurity certificate or the EU statement of conformity shall refer

to technical specifications, standards and procedures related thereto, including

technical controls, the purpose of which is to decrease the risk of or to prevent

cybersecurity incidents.

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5. A European cybersecurity certificate or EU statement of conformity that refers to

assurance level “basic” shall provide assurance that the ICT products, ICT services,

ICT processes, managed security services or cyber posture of entities for which that

certificate or that EU statement of conformity is issued meet the corresponding

security requirements, including security controls, and that they have been evaluated

at a level intended to minimise the known basic risks of incidents and cyberattacks.

The evaluation activities to be undertaken shall include at least a review of the

technical documentation. Where such a review is not appropriate, substitute

evaluation activities with equivalent effect shall be undertaken.

6. A European cybersecurity certificate that refers to assurance level “substantial” shall

provide assurance that the ICT products, ICT services, ICT processes, managed

security services or cyber posture of entities for which that certificate is issued meet

the corresponding security requirements, including security controls, and that they

have been evaluated at a level intended to minimise known risks of incidents and

cyberattacks and the risk of cyberattacks carried out by actors with limited skills and

resources. The evaluation activities to be undertaken shall include at least a review to

demonstrate the absence of publicly known vulnerabilities and testing to demonstrate

that the ICT products, ICT services, ICT processes, managed security services or

entities correctly implement the necessary security controls. Where any such

evaluation activities are not appropriate, substitute evaluation activities with

equivalent effect shall be undertaken.

7. A European cybersecurity certificate that refers to assurance level “high” shall

provide assurance that the ICT products, ICT services, ICT processes, managed

security services or cyber posture of entities for which that certificate is issued meet

the corresponding security requirements, including security controls, and that they

have been evaluated at a level intended to minimise the risk of incidents and state-of-

the-art cyberattacks carried out by actors with significant skills and resources. The

evaluation activities to be undertaken shall include at least the following:

(a) a review to demonstrate the absence of publicly known vulnerabilities;

(b) testing to demonstrate that the ICT products, ICT services, ICT processes,

managed security services or entities correctly implement the necessary

security controls at the state of the art;

(c) an assessment of the resistance of the ICT products, ICT services, ICT

processes, managed security services or entities to skilled attackers, using,

where relevant, penetration testing.

Where any such evaluation activities are not appropriate, substitute activities with

equivalent effect shall be undertaken. Any conformity assessment activities,

including calibration, testing, certification and inspection, for assurance level ‘high’

shall be undertaken in the European Economic Area, unless otherwise provided for in

a European cybersecurity certification scheme.

8. Where a European cybersecurity certification scheme is designed to demonstrate

compliance and grant presumption of conformity with a specific Union legal act, a

European cybersecurity certificate shall provide assurance that the certified ICT

products, ICT services, ICT processes, managed security services or cyber posture of

entities meet the corresponding cybersecurity requirements of that legal act. Any

conformity assessment activities, including calibration, testing, certification and

inspection, for the purpose of presumption of conformity shall be undertaken in the

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European Economic Area, unless otherwise provided for in a European cybersecurity

certification scheme.

9. A European cybersecurity certification scheme may specify several evaluation levels

for a given assurance level. Each of the evaluation levels shall correspond to one of

the assurance levels.

Article 83

Conformity self-assessment

1. A European cybersecurity certification scheme may allow for conformity self-

assessment under the sole responsibility of the manufacturer or provider of

ICT products, ICT services, ICT processes, managed security services or the entity

the cyber posture of which is subject to certification. Conformity self-assessment

shall be permitted only in relation to ICT products, ICT services, ICT processes,

managed security services or cyber posture of entities that present a low risk

corresponding to assurance level “basic”.

2. The manufacturer or provider of ICT products, ICT services, ICT processes,

managed security services or the entity the cyber posture of which is subject to

certification may issue an EU statement of conformity stating that the fulfilment of

the requirements set out in the European cybersecurity certification scheme has been

demonstrated. By issuing such a statement, that manufacturer or provider or entity

assumes responsibility for the compliance of the ICT product, ICT service, ICT

process, managed security service or cyber posture with the requirements set out in

that scheme.

3. The manufacturer or provider of ICT products, ICT services, ICT processes,

managed security services or the entity the cyber posture of which is subject to

certification shall make the EU statement of conformity, technical documentation,

and all other relevant information relating to the conformity of the ICT products, ICT

services, ICT processes, managed security services or cyber posture with the

European cybersecurity certification scheme available to the national cybersecurity

certification authority designated pursuant to Article 89 for the period provided for in

that scheme. A copy of the EU statement of conformity shall be submitted without

undue delay to the national cybersecurity certification authority and to ENISA.

Article 84

Supplementary cybersecurity information for certified ICT products, ICT services and ICT

processes

1. The manufacturer or provider of ICT products, ICT services or ICT processes for

which an EU statement of conformity or European cybersecurity certificate has been

issued shall make available to the user the following supplementary cybersecurity

information:

(a) the intended purpose of the relevant ICT product, ICT service or ICT process,

including the security environment provided by the manufacturer or provider;

(b) guidance and recommendations to assist users with the secure configuration,

installation, deployment, operation and maintenance of the ICT products or

ICT services;

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(c) the type of technical security support offered by the manufacturer or provider

and the end date of the support period during which users can expect

vulnerabilities to be handled and to receive security updates;

(d) if the manufacturer or provider decides to make available a software bill of

materials to the user, information on where that can be accessed.

2. The manufacturer or provider of ICT products, ICT services or ICT processes for

which an EU statement of conformity or European cybersecurity certificate has been

issued shall make publicly available the following supplementary cybersecurity

information:

(a) the single point of contact where information about vulnerabilities can be

reported and received, and where the manufacturer’s policy on coordinated

vulnerability disclosure can be found;

(b) information about fixed vulnerabilities, including a description of the

vulnerabilities, including information allowing users to identify the product

with digital elements affected, the impacts of the vulnerabilities, their severity,

and clear and accessible information helping users to remediate the

vulnerabilities; in duly justified cases, where manufacturers consider the

security risks of publication to outweigh the security benefits, they may delay

making public information regarding a fixed vulnerability until after users have

been given the possibility to apply the relevant patch.

3. The information referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2 shall be available in electronic

form and shall remain available and be updated as necessary during the validity and

at least for a period of five years after the expiry or withdrawal of the relevant

European cybersecurity certificate or EU statement of conformity.

4. The obligations set out in paragraphs 1 and 2 shall not apply where the security of

the relevant ICT product, ICT service or ICT process might be compromised if the

information is made publicly available.

CHAPTER III

Governance for the European Cybersecurity Certification Framework

Section 1

General rules and management of European cybersecurity certification schemes

Article 85

Issuance of European cybersecurity certificates

1. ICT products, ICT services, ICT processes, managed security services or cyber

posture of entities that have been certified under a European cybersecurity

certification scheme shall be presumed to comply with the requirements of such

scheme.

2. The conformity assessment bodies referred to in Article 91 shall issue European

cybersecurity certificates on the basis of criteria included in the European

cybersecurity certification scheme adopted pursuant to Article 74.

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3. By way of derogation from paragraph 2, a European cybersecurity certification

scheme may provide that European cybersecurity certificates resulting from that

scheme are to be issued only by one of the following public bodies:

(a) a national cybersecurity certification authority referred to in Article 88 that is

accredited as a conformity assessment body pursuant to Article 91(1);

(b) a public body that is accredited as a conformity assessment body pursuant to

Article 91(1).

4. Where a European cybersecurity certification scheme adopted pursuant to Article 74

establishes assurance level ‘high’ or where such scheme specifies otherwise, the

European cybersecurity certificate under that scheme is to be issued only by a

national cybersecurity certification authority as referred to in Article 88 that is

accredited as a conformity assessment body pursuant to Article 91(1) or, in the

following cases:

(a) by a conformity assessment body on the basis of a prior approval model; or

(b) by a conformity assessment body on the basis of a general delegation model.

5. The Commission is empowered to adopt implementing acts specifying procedures

for prior approval or general delegation models referred to in paragraph 4 of this

Article. In the preparation process for those implementing acts, the Commission shall

consult the ECCG. Those implementing acts shall be adopted in accordance with the

examination procedure referred to in Article 118(2).

6. The natural or legal person who submits ICT products, ICT services, ICT processes

or managed security services for certification, or the entity which applies for

certification of its cyber posture, shall make available all information necessary to

conduct the certification to the national cybersecurity certification authority

designated pursuant to Article 89, where that authority is the body issuing the

European cybersecurity certificate, or to the conformity assessment body referred to

in Article 91.

7. Conformity assessment bodies and, where applicable, national cybersecurity

certification authorities shall inform ENISA without undue delay about their

decisions that affect the status of European cybersecurity certificates and EU

statements of conformity in accordance with Article 94.

8. The holder of a European cybersecurity certificate shall inform the conformity

assessment body and, where applicable, national cybersecurity certification authority,

referred to in paragraph 7, of any subsequently detected vulnerabilities or

nonconformities concerning the certified ICT product, ICT service, ICT process,

managed security service or cyber posture of entity that have a likely impact on its

conformity with the certificate. That body shall forward that information without

undue delay to the national cybersecurity certification authority concerned and assess

the impact on the certificate in line with the scheme’s conditions as referred to in

Article 81(2), point (d).

9. For their certified ICT products, ICT services, ICT processes or managed security

services identified, for their entirety or parts thereof, as key assets pursuant to Article

102, the holders of a European cybersecurity certificate shall not use, install or

otherwise integrate ICT components or components that include ICT components

from high-risk suppliers in certified ICT products, ICT services, ICT processes or

managed security services.

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10. A European cybersecurity certificate shall be issued for the period provided for in the

European cybersecurity certification scheme and may be renewed, provided that the

relevant requirements continue to be met.

11. The Commission shall cooperate with Member States to ensure the application of

provisions related to the issuance of European cybersecurity certificates also in a

view application of Article 100(4), point (b). The conformity assessment body and,

where relevant, the national cybersecurity certification authority shall provide the

Commission, on request and without undue delay, with all information relating to the

issuance of the relevant European cybersecurity certificates or EU statements of

conformity.

Article 86

National cybersecurity certification schemes and certificates

1. National cybersecurity certification schemes, and the related procedures for the ICT

products, ICT services, ICT processes, managed security services and cyber posture

of entities that are covered by the subject matter and scope of a European

cybersecurity certification scheme shall cease to produce effects from the date

established in the implementing act adopted pursuant to Article 74(9). National

cybersecurity certification schemes and the related procedures for the ICT products,

ICT services, ICT processes, managed security services and cyber posture of entities

that are not covered by the subject matter and scope of a European cybersecurity

certification scheme may continue to exist.

2. Member States shall not introduce new national cybersecurity certification schemes

or related procedures for the ICT products, ICT services, ICT processes, managed

security services and cyber posture of entities already covered by the subject matter

and scope of a European cybersecurity certification scheme.

3. Existing certificates that were issued under national cybersecurity certification

schemes and are covered by the subject matter and scope of a European

cybersecurity certification scheme shall remain valid until their expiry date.

4. Member States shall notify the Commission and the ECCG before adopting new

national cybersecurity certification schemes for ICT products, ICT services,

ICT processes, managed security services and cyber posture of entities.

5. The Commission may suggest to a Member State to withdraw a national

cybersecurity certification scheme for ICT products, ICT services, ICT processes,

managed security services or cyber posture of entities, where the development of a

European cybersecurity certification scheme covering such products, services,

processes or cyber posture has already been requested in accordance with Article 73,

taking into account the development plan of such scheme.

Article 87

International recognition of European cybersecurity certificates

1. Third country certificates of ICT products, ICT services, ICT processes, managed

security services and cyber posture of entities may be recognised, by means of an

implementing act or through the conclusion of an agreement between the Union and

the third country in question or an international organisation, as equivalent to

European cybersecurity certificates if the requirements of the relevant third country

scheme or international organisation scheme are considered equivalent to those in

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European cybersecurity certification schemes. The Commission is empowered to

adopt such implementing acts. The implementing acts shall be adopted in accordance

with the examination procedure referred to in Article 118(2).

2. The implementing acts and the agreements referred to in paragraph 1 shall be based

on the conditions for international recognition of European cybersecurity certificates

set out in accordance with Article 74(11).

3. Agreements on the recognition of third country certificates or the international

organisation certificates referred to in paragraph 1 shall only be concluded if they

also recognize European cybersecurity certificates as equivalent to the third country

certificates.

Article 88

National cybersecurity certification authorities

1. Each Member State shall designate one or more national cybersecurity certification

authorities in its territory or, with the agreement of another Member State, one or

more national cybersecurity certification authorities in that other Member State to be

responsible for the supervisory tasks in the designating Member State.

2. Each Member State shall inform the Commission of the identity of the designated

national cybersecurity certification authorities. Where a Member State designates

more than one authority, it shall also inform the Commission about the tasks

assigned to each of those authorities.

3. Each national cybersecurity certification authority shall be independent of the entities

it supervises with regard to its organisation, funding decisions, legal structure and

decision-making.

4. The activities of the national cybersecurity certification authorities that relate to the

issuance of European cybersecurity certificates under this Regulation shall be strictly

separated from their supervisory activities set out in this Article and in Article 85(4),

points (a) and (b), and that those activities are carried out independently from each

other.

5. Member States shall ensure that national cybersecurity certification authorities have

adequate resources to exercise their powers and to carry out their tasks in an effective

and efficient manner.

6. National cybersecurity certification authorities shall have the following tasks:

(a) participate in the ECCG pursuant to Article 90(2);

(b) supervise and enforce rules included in European cybersecurity certification

schemes pursuant to Article 81(2), point (a), to ensure the compliance of ICT

products, ICT services, ICT processes, managed security services and cyber

posture of entities with the requirements of the European cybersecurity

certificates that have been issued in their respective territories, in cooperation

with relevant market surveillance or supervisory authorities, including,

competent authorities under Directive (EU) 2022/2555 of the European

Parliament and of the Council82 or Regulation (EU) 2024/2847;

82 Directive (EU) 2022/2555 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 December 2022 on

measures for a high common level of cybersecurity across the Union, amending Regulation (EU) No

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(c) monitor, in cooperation with relevant market surveillance authorities,

compliance with and enforce the obligations of the manufacturers or providers

of ICT products, ICT services, ICT processes, managed security services or

entities the cyber posture of which is certified set out in this Regulation that are

established in their respective territories and that carry out conformity self-

assessment in the corresponding European cybersecurity certification scheme;

(d) without prejudice to Article 91(3), actively assist and support the national

accreditation bodies or other relevant authorities in the monitoring and

supervision of the activities of conformity assessment bodies, for the purposes

of this Regulation;

(e) cooperate with the Commission where the competence of a conformity

assessment body is challenged pursuant to Article 94;

(f) monitor and supervise the activities of the public bodies referred to in Article

85(3);

(g) where applicable, authorise conformity assessment bodies in accordance with

Article 93, monitor compliance with and enforce the obligations of conformity

assessment bodies with the additional or specific requirements set out in

European cybersecurity certification schemes pursuant to Article 81(3), point

(f), and restrict, suspend or withdraw existing authorisation where conformity

assessment bodies do not meet the requirements of this Regulation;

(h) handle complaints by natural or legal persons in relation to European

cybersecurity certificates issued by national cybersecurity certification

authorities or to European cybersecurity certificates issued by conformity

assessment bodies in accordance with Article 85(4) or in relation to EU

statements of conformity issued under Article 83, investigate the subject matter

of such complaints to the extent appropriate, and inform the complainant of the

progress and the outcome of the investigation within a reasonable period;

(i) provide an annual report on its main activities to the Commission, ENISA and

the ECCG by 31 March [year of entry into force + 12 months] each year, and

make these reports available to the peer review team where the national

cybersecurity certification authority is subject to peer review in accordance

with Article 89;

(j) cooperate with other national cybersecurity certification authorities, market

surveillance authorities or other public authorities, including by sharing

information on the possible non-compliance of ICT products, ICT services,

ICT processes, managed security services and cyber posture of entities with the

requirements of this Regulation or with the requirements of specific European

cybersecurity certification schemes;

(k) monitor relevant developments in the field of cybersecurity certification.

7. Each national cybersecurity certification authority shall have at least the following

powers:

910/2014 and Directive (EU) 2018/1972, and repealing Directive (EU) 2016/1148 (NIS 2 Directive)

(OJ L 333, 27.12.2022, p. 80, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2022/2555/oj).

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(a) to request conformity assessment bodies, European cybersecurity certificates’

holders and issuers of EU statements of conformity to provide any information

it requires for the performance of its tasks;

(b) to carry out investigations, in the form of audits, of conformity assessment

bodies, European cybersecurity certificates’ holders and issuers of EU

statements of conformity, for the purpose of verifying their compliance with

the requirements set out in this Title;

(c) to take appropriate measures, in accordance with national law, to ensure that

conformity assessment bodies, European cybersecurity certificates’ holders and

issuers of EU statements of conformity comply with this Regulation or with a

European cybersecurity certification scheme;

(d) to obtain access to the premises of any conformity assessment bodies or

holders of European cybersecurity certificates, for the purpose of carrying out

investigations in accordance with Union legislation or national procedural law;

(e) to withdraw, in accordance with national law, European cybersecurity

certificates issued by national cybersecurity certification authorities or by

conformity assessment bodies in accordance with Article 85(4), where such

certificates do not comply with this Regulation or with a European

cybersecurity certification scheme;

(f) to impose penalties in accordance with national law, as provided for in Article

97, and to require the immediate cessation of infringements of the obligations

set out in this Regulation.

8. National cybersecurity certification authorities shall cooperate with each other and

with the Commission, in particular, by exchanging information, experience and good

practices as regards cybersecurity certification and technical issues concerning the

cybersecurity of ICT products, ICT services, ICT processes, managed security

services and the cyber posture of entities.

9. By [entry into force + 6 months], ENISA shall develop a template for the report

referred to in paragraph 6, point (i), of this Article, in cooperation with the

Commission and the ECCG.

Article 89

Peer review

1. National cybersecurity certification authorities shall be subject to peer review.

2. Peer review shall be carried out on the basis of sound and transparent evaluation

criteria and procedures, in particular concerning structural, human resource and

process requirements, confidentiality and complaints.

3. Peer review shall assess:

(a) where applicable, whether the activities of the national cybersecurity

certification authorities that relate to the issuance of European cybersecurity

certificates referred to in this Regulation are strictly separated from their

supervisory activities set out in Article 88 and whether those activities are

carried out independently from each other;

(b) the procedures for supervising and enforcing the rules for monitoring the

compliance of ICT products, ICT services, ICT processes, managed security

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services and cyber posture of entities with European cybersecurity certificates

pursuant to Article 88(7), point (a);

(c) the procedures for monitoring and enforcing the obligations of manufacturers

or providers of ICT products, ICT services, ICT processes or managed security

services or entities the cyber posture of which is certified, pursuant to Article

88(7), point (b);

(d) the procedures for monitoring, authorising and supervising the activities of the

conformity assessment bodies.

4. Peer review shall be carried out at least once every five years by at least two national

cybersecurity certification authorities of other Member States and by the

Commission. ENISA shall also participate in the peer review as observer. The peer

review team shall draw up the final report and the summary of the peer review.

5. ENISA shall support the organisation of the peer review mechanism and the peer

reviews, including by developing relevant guidance documents and templates, in

cooperation with the Commission and the ECCG.

6. The Commission is empowered to adopt implementing acts establishing a plan for

peer review which covers a period of at least five years, laying down the criteria

concerning the composition of the peer review team, the methodology to be used in

peer review, and the schedule, the frequency and other tasks related to peer review.

In the preparation of those implementing acts, the Commission shall consult the

ECCG and ENISA. Those implementing acts shall be adopted in accordance with the

examination procedure referred to in Article 118(2).

7. The final report, including possible guidelines or recommendations, and the

summary of the peer review shall be examined by the ECCG, which shall endorse the

summary for publication on the website referred to in Article 79(2).

Article 90

European Cybersecurity Certification Group

1. The European Cybersecurity Certification Group (the ‘ECCG’) shall be established.

2. The ECCG shall be composed of representatives of national cybersecurity

certification authorities or representatives of other relevant national authorities. A

member of the ECCG shall not represent more than two Member States.

3. The ECCG shall have the following tasks:

(a) to advise and assist the Commission in its work to ensure the consistent

implementation and application the rules set out in this Title, cybersecurity

certification policy issues, and the coordination of policy approaches;

(b) to advise and assist the Commission in the preparation of requests for European

cybersecurity certification schemes pursuant to Article 73;

(c) to assist, advise and cooperate with ENISA in relation to the preparation of a

candidate scheme pursuant to Article 74 and technical specifications pursuant

to Article 77;

(d) to assist, advise and cooperate with ENISA and the Commission in relation to

the maintenance activities pursuant to Article 75;

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(e) to assist, advise and cooperate with the Commission in relation to the review or

withdrawal of existing European cybersecurity certifications schemes pursuant

to Article 76;

(f) to suggest that a request is submitted to the Commission with regard to the

preparation of a candidate European cybersecurity certification scheme

pursuant to Article 73(2);

(g) to adopt opinions addressed to the Commission relating to the maintenance,

review and withdrawal of existing European cybersecurity certifications

schemes;

(h) to examine relevant developments in the field of cybersecurity certification,

including at national level pursuant to Article 86, and to exchange information

and good practices on cybersecurity certification schemes;

(i) to facilitate the cooperation between national cybersecurity certification

authorities under the rules set out in this Title through capacity-building and

exchange of information, in particular relating to issues concerning

cybersecurity certification;

(j) to support the implementation of the peer review mechanism pursuant to

Article 89 and of peer assessment mechanisms in accordance with the rules

established in a European cybersecurity certification scheme pursuant to

Article 81(2), point (g);

(k) to facilitate the alignment of European cybersecurity certification schemes with

internationally recognised standards, including as part of the maintenance of

existing European cybersecurity certification schemes and, where appropriate,

to make recommendations to ENISA to engage with relevant European or

international standardisation organisations to address insufficiencies or gaps in

available European or internationally recognised standards.

4. With the assistance of ENISA, the Commission shall chair the ECCG and provide

the ECCG with a secretariat.

5. The Commission may set up ECCG sub-groups for any of the following purposes:

(a) to examine specific questions on the basis of terms of reference established by

the Commission;

(b) to maintain and review the European certification schemes in accordance with

this Regulation and on the basis of terms of reference established by the

Commission.

6. The sub-groups shall report to the ECCG.

7. The sub-groups shall be co-chaired by the Commission and ENISA, and the

secretariat of the sub-groups shall be provided by ENISA.

8. The ECCG and its sub-groups shall adopt rules of procedure by simple majority of

their members, based on a proposal by, and in agreement with the Commission.

Section 2

Conformity assessment bodies

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Article 91

Competence of conformity assessment bodies

1. The conformity assessment bodies shall be accredited by national accreditation

bodies appointed pursuant to Regulation (EC) No 765/2008. Such accreditation shall

be issued only where the conformity assessment body meets the requirements set out

in Annex I to this Regulation.

2. Where a European cybersecurity certificate is issued by a national cybersecurity

certification authority pursuant to this Regulation, the certification body of the

national cybersecurity certification authority shall be accredited as a conformity

assessment body pursuant to paragraph 1.

3. The accreditation referred to in paragraph 1 shall be issued to the conformity

assessment bodies for a maximum of five years and may be renewed, provided that

the conformity assessment body meets the requirements set out in this Article.

National accreditation bodies shall take all appropriate measures within a reasonable

timeframe to restrict, suspend or revoke the accreditation of a conformity assessment

body issued pursuant to paragraph 1 where the conditions for the accreditation have

not been met or are no longer met, or where the conformity assessment body does

not comply with this Regulation.

4. When establishing additional or specific accreditation requirements for a European

cybersecurity certification scheme covering ICT products, pursuant to Article 92,

synergies shall be sought, where appropriate, with the requirements relating to

notified bodies under Regulation (EU) 2024/2847 and the accreditation requirements

under the cybersecurity certification schemes which have already been adopted.

5. Where a conformity assessment body is accredited in accordance with Regulation

(EU) 2024/2847, relevant authorities may reuse results from previous accreditation

process regarding any overlapping requirements as evidence during the accreditation

process under this Regulation.

Article 92

Additional harmonisation of the competence of conformity assessment bodies

1. Where a European cybersecurity certification scheme sets out additional or specific

requirements pursuant to Article 81(3), point (f), conformity assessment bodies shall

be authorised by a national cybersecurity certification authority appointed pursuant

to Article 88(1) to carry out tasks under such scheme. Such authorisation shall be

issued only where the conformity assessment body has been accredited and meets the

additional or specific requirements set out under the European cybersecurity

certification scheme.

2. Where a conformity assessment body requests an authorisation under this Article, it

shall submit the request to the national cybersecurity certification authority of the

Member State in which it is established or with the national cybersecurity

certification authority to which that Member State has had recourse in accordance

with Article 88(1).

3. A conformity assessment body may request authorisation by a national cybersecurity

certification authority other than that referred to in paragraph 2 in any one of the

following situations:

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(a) where the national cybersecurity certification authority referred to in paragraph

1 does not perform authorisation in respect of the conformity assessment

activities for which authorisation is sought;

(b) where the national cybersecurity certification authority referred to in paragraph

1 has not undergone peer review in accordance with Article 89 in respect of the

conformity assessment activities for which authorisation is sought.

4. Where a national cybersecurity certification authority receives a request pursuant to

paragraph 3, it shall inform the national cybersecurity certification authority of the

Member State in which the requesting conformity assessment body is established. In

such cases, the national cybersecurity certification authority of that Member State

may participate in the authorisation as an observer.

5. A national cybersecurity certification authority may request another national

cybersecurity certification authority to carry out parts of the assessment activity. In

such a case, the authorisation certificate shall be issued by the requesting authority.

6. The authorisation referred to in paragraph 1 shall be valid for a period no longer than

the period of validity of the accreditation, and may be renewed provided that the

conformity assessment body meets the requirements set out in paragraph 1 and its

accreditation has also been renewed.

7. National cybersecurity certification authorities shall, within a reasonable timeframe,

take all appropriate measures to restrict, suspend or revoke the authorisation of a

conformity assessment body issued pursuant to paragraph 1 where the conditions for

the authorisation have not been met or are no longer met, or where the conformity

assessment body does not comply with this Regulation.

8. The Commission is empowered to adopt implementing acts to lay down the

procedures, including on cross-border cooperation, for authorisation of conformity

assessment bodies. In the preparation process of implementing acts, the Commission

shall consult ENISA and the ECCG. Those implementing acts shall be adopted in

accordance with the examination procedure referred to in Article 118(2).

Article 93

Notification of conformity assessment bodies

1. For each European cybersecurity certification scheme, the national cybersecurity

certification authorities of a Member State shall notify the Commission and the other

Member States of the conformity assessment bodies that have been accredited and,

where applicable, authorised pursuant to Article 92.

2. The national cybersecurity certification authorities shall carry out the notification as

referred to in paragraph 1 using the electronic notification tool developed and

managed by the Commission.

3. The Commission is empowered to adopt implementing acts to lay down the

circumstances, formats and procedures for notifications referred to in paragraph 1 of

this Article, including the objection procedure by other Member States during the

notification process, the unique identification of conformity assessment bodies, as

well as the circumstances for restriction, suspension or withdrawal of notification.

Those implementing acts shall be adopted in accordance with the examination

procedure referred to in Article 118(2).

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Article 94

Challenges with regard to the competence of conformity assessment bodies

1. The Commission shall investigate any cases in which it has doubts, or is made aware

of doubts about the competence of a conformity assessment body to meet, or the

continued fulfilment by a conformity assessment body of, the requirements and

responsibilities to which it is subject.

2. The national cybersecurity certification authority shall provide the Commission, on

request, with all information relating to the basis for the notification or the

maintenance of the competence of the conformity assessment body concerned.

3. The Commission shall ensure that all sensitive information obtained in the course of

its investigations is treated confidentially.

4. Where the Commission ascertains that a conformity assessment body does not meet

or no longer meets the requirements for its notification, it shall inform the national

cybersecurity certification authority accordingly and request it to take the necessary

corrective measures, including de-notification if necessary.

5. Member States shall ensure that an appeal procedure against decisions of the notified

bodies is available.

Article 95

Information and retention obligation on conformity assessment bodies

1. Conformity assessment bodies shall inform the national cybersecurity certification

authority of the following:

(a) any refusal, restriction, suspension or withdrawal of a certificate;

(b) any circumstances affecting the scope of and conditions for the notification

referred to in Article 93(1);

(c) any request for information that they have received from market surveillance

authorities regarding conformity assessment activities;

(d) on request, any conformity assessment activities performed within the scope of

their notification and any other activity performed, including cross-border

activities and subcontracting.

2. Conformity assessment bodies shall also provide ENISA with the information

referred to in paragraph 1 point (a) in view of facilitating the performance of its task

under Article 79.

3. Conformity assessment bodies shall provide the other conformity assessment bodies

under this Regulation carrying out similar conformity assessment activities covering

the same ICT products, ICT services, ICT processes, managed security services or

entities the cyber posture of which is certified without undue delay with relevant

information on issues relating to negative and, upon request, positive conformity

assessment results.

4. Conformity assessment bodies shall maintain a record system, containing all the

documents and evidence produced or received in connection with each evaluation

and certification that they perform. The record shall be stored in a secure and

accessible manner for the period necessary for the purposes of certification and for at

least five years after the expiry or withdrawal of a relevant European cybersecurity

certificate.

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Section 3

Other provisions

Article 96

Rights to lodge a complaint and right to an effective judicial remedy

1. Natural and legal persons shall have the right to lodge a complaint with the issuer of

a European cybersecurity certificate or, where the complaint relates to a European

cybersecurity certificate issued by a conformity assessment body when acting in

accordance with Article 85(4), with the relevant national cybersecurity certification

authority.

2. The authority or body with which the complaint has been lodged shall inform the

complainant of the progress of the proceedings, of the decision taken, and of the right

to an effective judicial remedy referred to in paragraphs 3 and 4.

3. Notwithstanding any administrative or other non-judicial remedies, natural and legal

persons shall have the right to an effective judicial remedy with regard to:

(a) decisions taken by the authority or body referred to in paragraph 1 including,

where applicable, in relation to the improper issuing, failure to issue or

recognition of a European cybersecurity certificate held by those natural and

legal persons;

(b) a failure to act on a complaint lodged with the authority or body referred to in

paragraph 1.

4. Proceedings pursuant to this Article shall be brought before the courts of the Member

State in which the authority or body against which the judicial remedy is sought is

located.

Article 97

Penalties

Member States shall lay down the rules on penalties applicable to infringements of this Title

and to infringements of European cybersecurity certification schemes, and shall take all

measures necessary to ensure that they are implemented. The penalties provided for shall be

effective, proportionate and dissuasive. Member States shall without delay notify the

Commission of those rules and of those measures and shall notify it of any subsequent

amendment affecting them.

TITLE IV

SECURITY OF ICT SUPPLY CHAINS

CHAPTER I

Trusted ICT supply chain framework

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Article 98

Scope of the framework

1. The trusted ICT supply chain framework shall provide for a security mechanism at

Union level to address non-technical risks in sectors of high criticality and other

critical sectors as referred to in Directive (EU) 2022/2555. The mechanism shall

identify key ICT assets in critical ICT supply chains and set out appropriate and

proportionate mitigation measures on entities of the type referred to in Annexes I and

II to Directive (EU) 2022/2555.

2. The obligations set out in this Title shall be without prejudice to obligations set out in

Article 13 of Regulation (EU) 2024/2847 and in national provisions transposing

Article 21 of Directive (EU) 2022/2555.

3. The provisions laid down in this Chapter shall not preclude Member States from

adopting or maintaining provisions ensuring a higher level of cybersecurity in ICT

supply chains, provided that such provisions are consistent with their obligations

under in Union law.

Article 99

Security risk assessments

1. The Commission or a group of at least three Member States may request the

Cooperation Group established by Article 14 of Directive (EU) 2022/2555 (‘NIS

Cooperation Group’) to conduct the Union-level coordinated security risk

assessments in accordance with Article 22 of that Directive. Where a security risk

assessment is conducted following such request, it shall include in particular the

proposed identification of the key ICT assets of the respective ICT supply chain as

well as the main threat actors, risks and vulnerabilities affecting those assets. The

Union-level coordinated security risk assessments shall develop risk scenarios and

propose measures to mitigate the identified risks.

2. The Union-level coordinated security risk assessments shall be completed within six

months from the request referred to in paragraph 1. Upon request of the Commission,

the NIS Cooperation Group may agree to a shorter period.

3. Where the Commission has sufficient reason to believe that there is a significant

cyber threat for the security of the Union in relation to an ICT supply chain and that

action is required to preserve the proper functioning of the internal market, the

Commission shall without delay:

(a) consult the Member States on the need to take one or several of the mitigating

measures referred to in Article 103; and

(b) conduct a security risk assessment, taking into account the consultation of the

Member States. The security risk assessment shall include the proposed

identification of the key ICT assets as well as the main threat actors, risks and

vulnerabilities affecting those assets. The security risk assessment shall

develop risk scenarios and propose measures to mitigate the identified risks.

Article 100

Designation of third countries posing cybersecurity concerns

1. Where, as a result of the security risk assessment referred to in Article 99, or based

on other sources, such as a public statement on behalf of the Union or a Member

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State, it appears that a third country poses a serious and structural non-technical risk

to ICT supply chains, the Commission shall verify the risk posed by that country,

taking into account the following elements:

(a) the existence of laws in the third country which require entities under their

jurisdiction to report information on software or hardware vulnerabilities to

authorities of that third country prior to those vulnerabilities being known to

have been exploited;

(b) existing practices in the third country, demonstrated by independent sources,

that require entities under the jurisdiction of the third country to report

information on software or hardware vulnerabilities to authorities of that third

country prior to those vulnerabilities being known to have been exploited;

(c) the absence of effective judicial remedies, and independent and democratic

control mechanisms, that can correct the identified security concerns, including

about existing practices referred to in point (b);

(d) substantiated information about one or more incidents of threat actors

controlled from that country and operating out of the territory of that country

carrying out malicious cyber activities or campaigns, and the lack of ability or

willingness of the third country to cooperate with the Commission or Member

States to address the risk stemming from the operation of such threat actors;

(e) relevant information stemming from Union-level coordinated security risk

assessments or reports by Member States or international organisations.

2. When the Commission, following the verification referred to in paragraph 1,

concludes that a third country poses serious and structural non-technical risks to ICT

supply chains, it may, by means of an implementing act, designate that third country

as a country posing cybersecurity concerns to ICT supply chains. That implementing

act shall be adopted in accordance with the examination procedure referred to in

Article 118(2).

3. The Commission shall review regularly the implementing acts adopted in accordance

with paragraph 2.

4. High-risk suppliers shall not be entitled to:

(a) participate in the development of, assessment, consultation or decisions

concerning European standards and European standardisation deliverables

referred to in Article 10(1) of Regulation (EU) 1025/2012 and common

specifications referred to in Article 27 of Regulation (EU) 2024/2847 in the

area of cybersecurity;

(b) apply for or be a holder of any European cybersecurity certificates pursuant to

Title III;

(c) become accredited conformity assessment body pursuant to Title III;

(d) apply to become authorised attestation provider of any European individual

cybersecurity skills attestations pursuant to Title II, Section 4;

(e) participate in public procurement procedures, organised in accordance with

legislation transposing Directive 2014/24/EU and 2014/25/EU in relation to the

provision of ICT components or components that include ICT components to

be used in key ICT assets as identified in accordance with Article 102;

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(f) participate in any activities under Union funding programmes and instruments

implemented in direct and indirect management in accordance with Article 136

Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/2509 and Union sector-specific rules as well

as in any Union funding activities implemented in shared management in

relation to the provision of ICT components or components that include ICT

components to be used in key ICT assets as identified in accordance with

Article 102.

The authorities in charge of the procedures referred to in points (a) to (f) shall

conduct the necessary assessments for the purpose of this paragraph. The authorities

may also rely for this purpose on the list referred to in Article 104.

5. In cases where a high-risk supplier has already obtained a European cybersecurity

certificate pursuant to Title III, the competent authority shall withdraw it without

undue delay.

Article 101

General ICT supply chain security mechanism

Where the NIS Cooperation Group has conducted a Union-level coordinated security risk

assessment pursuant to Article 99(1) of this Regulation, or after the completion of the

procedure in case of significant cyber threat pursuant to Article 99(3) for an ICT supply chain,

the Commission may take measures provided for in Articles 102 and 103(1) and (2).

Article 102

Identification of key ICT assets

1. Where the risk assessment conducted in accordance with Article 99(1) or (3)

indicates significant cybersecurity risks in relation to an ICT supply chain, the

Commission is empowered to adopt implementing acts identifying key ICT assets

used for the manufacturing of products or the provision of services by entities of the

type referred to in Annexes I and II to Directive (EU) 2022/2555. Those

implementing acts shall be adopted in accordance with the examination procedure

referred to in Article 118(2) of this Regulation.

2. When identifying the key ICT assets referred to in paragraph 1, the Commission

shall take into account the following elements:

(a) whether those assets have essential and sensitive functions for the functioning

of products manufactured or services provided by the entity of the type referred

to in Annexes I and II to Directive (EU) 2022/2555;

(b) whether incidents, including such caused by exploited vulnerabilities

concerning those assets can lead to serious disruptions of ICT supply chains

across the internal market or lead to exfiltration of data;

(c) whether there is a dependency on a limited number of suppliers of those assets;

(d) the results of the risk assessments referred to in Article 99.

Article 103

Mitigation measures in the ICT supply chain

1. The Commission is empowered to adopt implementing acts establishing, where

necessary to ensure high level of cybersecurity, cyber resilience and trust within the

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Union, that specific type of entities referred to in Annex I and II to Directive (EU)

2022/2555 shall be prohibited to use, install or integrate in any form ICT components

or components that include ICT components from high-risk suppliers as identified in

accordance with Article 104 in key ICT assets identified in accordance with Article

102. Such implementing acts shall provide for appropriate transition periods, during

which the Commission shall publish the list of high-risk suppliers referred to in

Article 104, as well as additional time periods for phasing out the relevant ICT

components and components that include ICT components. Such implementing act

may also specify these ICT component or components that include ICT components.

2. The Commission is empowered to adopt implementing acts establishing, where

necessary to ensure a high level of cybersecurity, cyber resilience and trust within the

Union, that specific type of entities referred to in Annexes I and II to Directive (EU)

2022/2555 shall be subject to one or several of the following mitigating measures in

relation to their ICT supply chain and in particular to key ICT assets identified in

accordance with Article 102, to mitigate risks identified in the security risk

assessments conducted pursuant to Article 99:

(a) application of transparency requirements concerning the provision of

information to the competent authority about the suppliers in the ICT supply

chain for key ICT assets designated in accordance with Article 102;

(b) prohibition related to transfers of data to third countries and remote data

processing from a third country;

(c) technical measures to be audited by a third party, including:

(i) the use of on-device processing;

(ii) specific segmentation of network systems;

(iii) the disabling of any remote or physical access to key ICT assets;

(iv) the disabling of non-essential features;

(v) operational network monitoring;

(vi) testing of hardware and software.

(d) restrictions related to operational control, including outsourcing of

organisational functions to managed service providers;

(e) restrictions related to the contractual relations of the entity with its suppliers;

(f) requirement for the service to be operated, managed, maintained or supported

by personnel vetted by the relevant national competent authorities;

(g) diversification of supply of ICT components or components included in ICT

components.

3. When introducing measures referred to in paragraph 2, the Commission may lay

down technical and methodological requirements for the measures.

4. Before adopting the implementing acts referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2, the

Commission shall assess potential risks and dependencies and in particular:

(a) where applicable, the level of risk associated with the use, installation or

integration, in any form, of ICT components or components that include ICT

components from high-risk suppliers in key ICT assets;

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(b) the potential economic and societal impacts the obligation may have on entities

of the type referred to in Annexes I and II to Directive (EU) 2022/2555;

(c) the availability of alternative suppliers to high-risk ones;

(d) the potential disruption of cross-border economic and societal activities caused

by an incident affecting an entity’s ICT supply chain.

5. The implementing acts referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Article shall be

adopted in accordance with the examination procedure referred to in Article 118(2)

and shall be reviewed at least every 36 months.

6. In exceptional circumstances, which justify an intervention to preserve the proper

functioning of the internal market and where the Commission has sufficient reason to

consider that the use, installation or integration of ICT components or components

that include ICT components from a specific entity established in or controlled by a

third country or entities from a third country, or a national from a third country

represent a significant non-technical cybersecurity risk for the economic or societal

activities of at least three Member States, the Commission shall without delay

consult the Member States on the need to take measures at Union level.

7. The Commission is empowered to adopt implementing acts to establish that specific

type of entities referred to in Annexes I and II to Directive (EU) 2022/2555 shall be

prohibited to use, install or integrate ICT components or components that include

ICT components from an entity referred to in paragraph 6. To that end, it shall

consult the entities of the types referred to in Annexes I and II to Directive (EU)

2022/2555 potentially concerned by the prohibition. Those implementing acts shall

be adopted in accordance with the examination procedure referred to in Article

118(2). Where relevant, they shall include appropriate periods for the phasing out of

these ICT components or components that include ICT components. Such

implementing act may also specify these ICT component or components that include

ICT components subject to the prohibition. This prohibition shall also concern ICT

components or components including ICT components from all entities controlled by

the specific entity referred to in paragraph 6.

8. The implementing acts referred to in paragraphs (1), (2) and (7) may also specify that

the mitigation measures are only applicable to types of entities referred to in Annex I

and II to Directive (EU) 2022/2555 of a specific size.

9. Article 100(4) shall apply to the specific entity established in or controlled by a third

country or an entity from a third country, or a national from a third country referred

to in paragraph 7.

10. The implementing acts adopted in accordance with paragraphs (1), (2) and (7) that

are applicable to type of entities referred to in Annex I point 10 to Directive (EU)

2022/2555 shall apply mutatis mutandis to the European Institution, bodies, offices

and agencies.

Article 104

Identification of high-risk suppliers

1. By way of implementing acts, the Commission shall establish lists of high-risk

suppliers relevant for the prohibitions laid down in the implementing acts adopted in

accordance with Article 103(1), Article 103(7) or the prohibition referred to in

Article 111(1).

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2. For that purpose, the Commission shall map the suppliers providing ICT components

and components that include ICT components relevant for the prohibition referred to

in paragraph 1.

On this basis, the Commission shall do an initial assessment to identify which of the

mapped suppliers are potentially established in a third country designated in

accordance with Article 100 or controlled by such third country, by an entity

established in such third country or by a national of such third country. The

Commission shall also do an initial mapping on suppliers potentially controlled by

the entity referred to in Article 103(6).

3. The Commission shall assess the place of establishment as well as the ownership and

control structure of the suppliers initially identified in accordance with the second

subparagraph of paragraph 2.

4. For the purpose of the assessment referred to in paragraph 3, the Commission shall

be entitled to request the necessary information from the suppliers. In case the

supplier does not provide the necessary information within the established deadline,

the Commission may conclude that the supplier is established in a third country

designated in accordance with Article 100 or controlled by such third country, by

entities from that third country or by nationals of such third country. Where the

Commission is carrying out an assessment for the purpose of Article 103(7) and the

supplier does not provide the necessary information within the established deadline,

the Commission may conclude that the supplier is controlled by an entity designated

in line with that Article. The competent authorities referred to in Article 112 shall

also share relevant information with the Commission upon request.

5. The Commission shall share preliminary findings concerning the establishment,

control and ownership assessment with the concerned supplier. The Commission

shall grant the supplier an opportunity to be heard on those preliminary findings.

6. The Commission may ask a competent authority to carry out the initial

establishment, ownership and control assessment of a supplier, where justified in

view of the characteristics of the operation of this supplier. A competent authority

may offer to carry out such initial assessment. The Commission shall verify these

initial findings in view of deciding whether the supplier should be included in the list

of high-risk suppliers.

7. The Commission shall regularly update the list of high-risk suppliers in view of

removing or adding high-risk suppliers. High-risk suppliers included in the list may

request the Commission to re-assess their establishment, control and ownership

structure upon provision of evidence that there have been relevant changes.

8. Where a competent authority becomes aware, including on the basis of information

provided by an entity of the type referred to in Annexes I and II to Directive (EU)

2022/2555 that a supplier may need to be included in a list of high-risk suppliers, it

shall inform the Commission without undue delay.

Article 105

Exemption for entities established in or controlled by entities from a third country posing

cybersecurity concerns

1. An entity established in or controlled by entities from a third country posing

cybersecurity concerns designated in accordance with Article 100 may make a

reasoned request to the Commission to be exempted:

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(a) from being subject to the prohibition imposed on entities of the type referred to

in Annexes I and II to Directive (EU) 2022/2555 to use, install or integrate in

any form its ICT components or components that include its ICT components

in key ICT assets of those entities by way of derogation from Article 111 or

implementing acts adopted pursuant to Article 103(1);

(b) from being subject to the prohibition to participate in public procurement

procedures, organised in accordance with legislation transposing Directive

2014/24/EU and Directive 2014/25/EU in relation to the provision of ICT

components or components that include ICT components to be used in key ICT

assets as defined in accordance with Article 102 in derogation to Article

100(4).

2. The request referred to in paragraph 1 shall:

(a) specify the interest of the entity established in or controlled by entities from a

third country posing cybersecurity concerns designated in accordance with

Article 100 in being granted the exemption referred to in paragraph 1 of this

Article; and

(b) demonstrate with clear evidence that effective mitigating measures will be put

in place to address non-technical risks and ensure the absence of any possible

exercise of undue interference by the third country designated pursuant to

Article 100 in relation to the provision of ICT components or components that

include ICT components for the use, installation or integration in key ICT

assets of an entity of the type referred to in Annexes I and II to Directive (EU)

2022/2555.

3. The Commission is empowered to adopt implementing acts to further specify the

conditions referred to in paragraph 2 point (b), and to lay down detailed rules in

respect of the procedures referred to in this Article. Those implementing acts shall be

adopted in accordance with the examination procedure referred to in Article 118(2).

4. The Commission shall assess the request referred to in paragraph 1 through a fair and

transparent process, taking into account:

(a) the circumstances and additional elements referred to in Article 100(1) and (2)

in relation to the designated country posing cybersecurity concerns to ICT

supply chains where the entity is established or from where it is controlled;

(b) the effectiveness of the mitigating measures referred to in paragraph 2 point

(b);

(c) whether the exemption for the entity established in or controlled by entities

from a third country posing cybersecurity concerns to ICT supply chains would

not be detrimental to the Union’s interest.

5. When the Commission, following the assessment in paragraph 3, concludes that it is

justified to grant an exemption, it shall do so by way of decision, which it shall notify

to the applicant within 9 months of receipt of the request.

6. When adopting a decision referred to in paragraph 4, the Commission may limit the

exemption to a specific period of time and may subject the exemption to conditions

for the entity, including:

(a) a timeline for the implementation of mitigating measures referred to in

paragraph 2, point (b);

EN 135 EN

(b) third-party audits on a regular basis to ensure the effective implementation of

mitigating measures;

(c) reporting obligations regarding compliance.

7. When the Commission, following the assessment in paragraph 3, concludes that it is

not justified to grant an exemption, it shall do so by way of a decision, and shall

notify it to the applicants within 9 months of receipt of the request.

8. The Commission may, on its own initiative, withdraw or modify the decision

referred to in paragraph 4 in one or more of the following situations:

(a) there has been a material change in the facts on which the decision was based;

(b) the entity which has requested the exemption acts contrary to its commitments;

(c) the exemption was based on incomplete, incorrect or misleading information

provided by the entity making the request.

Article 106

Rights of defence

The Commission shall ensure that before it adopts an implementing act pursuant to Article

103(7) or before it adopts a decision refusing the granting of exemption pursuant to Article

105(7) on the basis of elements not submitted by the applicant or before it withdraws a

decision pursuant to Article 105(8), the entity concerned is given the opportunity of being

heard, taking into account the need, in some cases, for an urgency procedure.

Article 107

Register

The Commission shall maintain a publicly accessible register of its decisions referred to in

Article 105(5). The register shall state the names of the entities that have been subject to such

decisions. The Commission shall update the register on a regular basis.

Article 108

Confidentiality

Information received by the Commission pursuant to Articles 105 and 106 shall be used only

for the purpose for which it was acquired.

Article 109

Fees

1. The Commission shall levy fees for requests submitted in accordance with Article

105(1).

2. Fees shall be expressed and payable in euro.

3. Fees shall be commensurate to the costs linked to the processing of requests referred

to in Article 105(1), the assessment of the criteria and information referred to in

Article 105(2), and the set-up, maintenance and operation of the register referred to

in Article 107. All expenditure of the Commission attributed to staff involved in

those activities, shall be included in such costs.

4. The Commission shall adopt implementing acts laying down detailed rules relating to

the fees, specifying the amount of the fees and the way in which they are to be paid.

EN 136 EN

Those implementing acts shall be adopted in accordance with the examination

procedure referred to in Article 118(2).

CHAPTER II

ICT supply chains in electronic communications networks

Article 110

Key ICT assets for mobile, fixed and satellite electronic communications networks

1. The key ICT assets for mobile, fixed and satellite electronic communications

networks shall be as set out in Annex II.

2. ICT components or components that include ICT components provided by high-risk

suppliers shall be phased out from the key ICT assets of mobile, fixed and satellite

electronic communication networks.

3. The time period for the phasing out the ICT components or components that include

ICT components provided by high-risk suppliers with regard to mobile electronic

communications networks shall not exceed 36 months from the publication of the list

of high-risk suppliers referred to in Article 104 relevant for the mobile electronic

communications networks.

4. The Commission is empowered to adopt implementing acts in accordance with

Article 118(2) to specify the time periods for the phasing out the ICT components or

components that include ICT components provided by high-risk suppliers with

regard to fixed and satellite electronic communications networks.

5. The Commission is empowered to adopt delegated acts in accordance with Article

119 to amend Annex II to this Regulation in order to adapt it to technological

developments by taking into account the elements referred to in Article 103(4).

Article 111

Prohibitions for mobile, fixed and satellite electronic communication networks

1. Providers of mobile, fixed and satellite electronic communications networks shall not

use, install or integrate, in any form, ICT components or components that include

ICT components from high-risk suppliers in the operation of key ICT assets referred

to in Annex II.

2. In cases where the competent authority designated under this Regulation in a

Member State differs from the competent authority pursuant to Regulation (EU)

XX/XXXX [DNA proposal], the competent authority designated under this

Regulation shall inform without delay the competent authority pursuant to

Regulation (EU) XX/XXXX [DNA proposal] about the measures imposed on

providers of mobile, fixed and satellite electronic communications networks in

accordance with Article 114. The authorities shall ensure close cooperation for the

purposes of effective supervision and enforcement of those measures.

CHAPTER III

Competent authorities, supervision and enforcement, jurisdiction, rights of defence

EN 137 EN

Article 112

Competent authorities

1. Each Member State shall designate the competent authorities referred to in Article 8

of Directive (EU) 2022/2555 as authorities responsible for taking the supervisory and

enforcement measures referred to in Article 114.

2. Competent authorities shall be structurally and functionally fully impartial and free

from any external influence, whether direct or indirect; in particular they shall neither

seek nor take instructions from any other public authority or any private party.

3. Member States shall ensure that their competent authorities have appropriate powers,

sufficient human and technical resources and relevant expertise to effectively carry

out the supervisory and enforcement measures referred to in Article 114.

4. Each Member State shall without undue delay notify the Commission of the names

of the competent authorities designated in accordance with paragraph 1, of the

respective tasks of those authorities and of any subsequent changes thereto. Each

Member State shall also make public the names of the competent authorities

designated in accordance with paragraph 1.

Article 113

Network for cooperation and support services of the Commission

In view of effective supervision, the Commission shall set up a network for cooperation of

competent authorities of Member States referred to in Article 112 and the Commission to

serve as a platform for cooperation and exchange of information, in particular for the purpose

of the establishment, control and ownership assessment referred to in Article 104. The

Commission shall provide the administrative support to the network.

Article 114

Supervisory and enforcement measures

1. The competent authorities as referred to in Article 112 are entitled to take the

supervisory and enforcement measures on entities of the type referred to in Annexes

I and II to Directive (EU) 2022/2555. Member States shall ensure that the

abovementioned measures are effective, proportionate and dissuasive, taking into

account the circumstances of each individual case. Member States shall notify the

Commission of the rules enacted to that end and their subsequent amendments.

2. When exercising their supervisory tasks in relation to entities referred to in Annexes

I and II to Directive (EU) 2022/2555, competent authorities are entitled to subject

those entities to the following:

(a) requests for a detailed and up-to-date list of their relevant suppliers and service

suppliers;

(b) requests to access data, documents and information necessary to verify

compliance with this Regulation;

(c) on-site inspections and off-site supervision, including random checks

conducted by trained professionals;

(d) requests regarding the composition of hardware or software products installed

or integrated in any form into the network or system, including components

and transitive dependencies, in a commonly used and machine-readable format.

EN 138 EN

3. When exercising their enforcement powers in relation to entities of the type referred

to in Annexes I and II to Directive (EU) 2022/2555, competent authorities are

entitled to:

(a) issue warnings about infringements of this Regulation by the entities

concerned, setting out the relevant facts and legal considerations;

(b) adopt decisions requiring the entities concerned to remedy the infringement of

this Regulation or the deficiencies identified in the implementation of

mitigating measures;

(c) order the entities concerned to cease activities that infringe this Regulation and

desist from repeating such activities; and

(d) impose penalties, in accordance with the rules relates to the amount laid down

in Article 115 or request the imposition of such penalties by the relevant

bodies, courts or tribunals, in accordance with national law.

4. When taking any of the enforcement measures referred to in the previous paragraph,

the competent authorities shall consider the circumstances of each individual case

and take due account of the following factors:

(a) the seriousness of the infringement and the importance of the provisions

breached;

(b) the duration of the infringement;

(c) the turnover of the relevance of the entity concerned;

(d) any relevant previous infringement by the entity concerned;

(e) where applicable, any material or non-material damage caused by the

infringement, including any financial or economic loss, effects on other entities

and the number of users affected;

(f) any intent or negligence on the part of the entity concerned;

(g) any measures taken by the entity to prevent or mitigate the material or non-

material damage;

(h) the level of cooperation with the competent authorities of the natural or legal

persons held responsible.

For the purposes of the first subparagraph, point (a), the following shall constitute

serious infringement:

(i) repeated violations;

(j) failure to notify or remedy significant incidents;

(k) failure to remedy deficiencies following binding instructions from competent

authorities.

5. The competent authorities shall notify the entities concerned of their preliminary

findings before taking enforcement measures. The entities concerned shall be given a

reasonable time to submit observations on the preliminary findings. The competent

authorities shall set out detailed reasoning for their enforcement measures.

6. The competent authorities shall respect the principles of confidentiality and of

professional and commercial secrecy.

EN 139 EN

7. The competent authorities shall cooperate with each other and with the Commission

for the purposes of supervision and enforcement under this Title in accordance with

Article 116.

Article 115

Penalties

1. Member States shall lay down the rules on penalties applicable to infringements of

this Regulation and shall take all measures necessary to ensure that they are

implemented.

2. The penalties provided for shall be effective, proportionate and dissuasive. Member

States shall notify the Commission of those rules and of those measures and shall

notify it, without delay, of any subsequent amendments affecting them.

3. Penalties shall be imposed in addition to any of the measures referred to in Article

114(3), points (a), (b) and (c).

4. When deciding whether to impose a penalty and deciding on its amount in each

individual case, due regard shall be given, as a minimum, to the factors referred to in

Article 114(4) first subparagraph..

5. Infringements of Article 103(2), point (a), shall, in accordance with paragraph 3 of

this Article, be subject to penalties of a maximum of 1 % of the total worldwide

annual turnover in the preceding financial year of the undertaking to which the entity

belongs.

6. Infringements of Article 103(2), points (b) to (g), shall, in accordance with paragraph

3 of this Article, be subject to penalties of a maximum of 2 % of the total worldwide

annual turnover in the preceding financial year of the undertaking to which the entity

belongs.

7. Infringements of Article 103(1), and of Article 111 shall, in accordance with

paragraph 3, of this Article be subject to penalties of a maximum of 7 % of the total

worldwide annual turnover in the preceding financial year of the undertaking to

which the entity belongs.

Article 116

Mutual assistance

1. Where an entity of the type referred to in Annexes I or II to Directive (EU)

2022/2555 provides services in more than one Member State, or provides services in

one or more Member States and its key ICT assets are located in one or more other

Member States, the competent authorities of the Member States concerned shall

cooperate with each other and the Commission and shall assist each other and the

Commission with a view to ensuring the effective and efficient application of the

Regulation. To that end, the following rules shall apply as a minimum:

(a) the competent authorities applying supervisory or enforcement measures in a

Member State shall inform and consult the competent authorities in the other

Member States concerned on the supervisory and enforcement measures taken;

(b) a competent authority in a Member State may request another competent

authority in another Member State to take supervisory or enforcement

measures;

EN 140 EN

(c) a competent authority in a Member State shall, upon receipt of a substantiated

request from another competent authority in another Member State, provide

that other competent authority with mutual assistance, on a best-efforts basis,

so that the supervisory or enforcement measures can be implemented in an

effective, efficient and consistent manner.

2. The mutual assistance referred to in paragraph 1, point (c), may cover information

requests and supervisory measures, including requests to carry out on-site inspections

or off-site supervision or targeted security audits. A competent authority to which a

request for assistance is addressed shall not refuse that request unless it is established

that it does not have the competence to provide the requested assistance, the

requested assistance is not proportionate to the supervisory tasks of the competent

authority, or the request concerns information or entails activities which, if disclosed

or carried out, would be contrary to the essential interests of the Member State’s

national security, public security or defence. Before refusing such a request, the

competent authority shall consult the other competent authorities concerned as well

as, upon the request of one of the Member States concerned, the Commission.

3. Where appropriate and with common agreement, the competent authorities of various

Member States may carry out joint supervisory actions.

4. In view of the obligation to comply with the principles of confidentiality and of

professional and commercial secrecy as referred to Article 114(6), any information

exchanged in the context of a request for assistance and provided pursuant to this

Article shall be used only in respect of the matter for which it was requested.

Article 117

Jurisdiction and territoriality

1. Entities of a type referred to in Annexes I and II to Directive (EU) 2022/2555 falling

within the scope of this Regulation shall be considered to fall under the jurisdiction

of the Member State in which they are established, except in the case of:

(a) providers of public electronic communications networks or providers of

publicly available electronic communications services, which shall be

considered to fall under the jurisdiction of the Member State in which they

provide their services;

(b) DNS service providers, top-level-domain (TLD) name registries, cloud

computing service providers, data centre service providers, content delivery

network providers, managed service providers, managed security service

providers, as well as providers of online marketplaces, of online search engines

or of social networking services platforms, which shall be considered to fall

under the jurisdiction of the Member State in which they have their main

establishment in the Union under paragraph 2;

(c) public administration entities, which shall be considered to fall under the

jurisdiction of the Member State to which they belong;

(d) air carriers, which shall be considered to fall under the jurisdiction of the

Member State whose competent licensing authority granted the operating

licence to the entity pursuant to Regulation (EC) No 1008/2008 of the

EN 141 EN

European Parliament and of the Council83, or, where the operating licence or

equivalent has not been granted in accordance with that Regulation, they shall

be considered to fall under the jurisdiction of the Member State in which they

have their main establishment in the Union under paragraph 2.

2. For the purposes of this Regulation an entity as referred to in paragraph 1, point (b),

shall be considered to have its main establishment in the Union in the Member State

where the decisions related to the cybersecurity risk-management measures are

predominantly taken. If such a Member State cannot be determined or if such

decisions are not taken in the Union, the main establishment shall be considered to be

in the Member State where most of the cybersecurity operations are carried out. If

such a Member State cannot be determined, the main establishment shall be

considered to be in the Member State where the entity concerned has the

establishment with the highest number of employees in the Union.

3. If an entity of a type referred to in Annexes I and II to Directive (EU) 2022/2555, is

not established in the Union, but offers services within the Union, it shall designate a

representative in the Union. The representative shall be established in one of those

Member States where the services are offered. Such an entity shall be considered to

fall under the jurisdiction of the Member State where the representative is

established. Where such an entity is an entity as referred to in paragraph 1, point (a),

it shall be considered to fall under the jurisdiction of the Member State in which it

provides its services. In the absence of a representative in the Union designated

under this paragraph, any Member State in which the entity provides services may

take legal actions against the entity for the infringement of this Regulation.

4. The designation of a representative by an entity referred to in paragraph 1, point (b),

shall be without prejudice to legal actions, which could be initiated against the entity

itself.

5. Member States that have received a request for mutual assistance in relation to an

entity as referred to in paragraph 1, point (b), may, within the limits of that request,

take appropriate supervisory and enforcement measures in relation to the entity

concerned where the entity provides services or has a network and information

system on their territory.

TITLE VI

FINAL PROVISIONS

Article 118

Committee procedure

1. The Commission shall be assisted by a committee. That committee shall have two

configurations. In respect of Titles II and III, the Commission shall be assisted by a

committee in the first configuration, whereas in respect of Title IV, the Commission

shall be assisted by a committee in the second configuration. That committee shall be

committee within the meaning of Regulation (EU) No 182/2011.

83 Regulation (EC) No 1008/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 September 2008

on common rules for the operation of air services in the Community (Recast) (OJ L 293, 31.10.2008, p.

3-20, ELI: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2008/1008/oj/eng).

EN 142 EN

2. Where reference is made to this paragraph, Article 5 of Regulation (EU) No

182/2011 shall apply.

Article 119

Exercise of the delegation

1. The power to adopt delegated acts is conferred on the Commission subject to the

conditions laid down in this Article.

2. The power to adopt delegated acts according to Articles 80(2) and Article 110(5)

shall be conferred on the Commission for an indeterminate period of time from the

date of entry into force of this Regulation.

3. The delegation of power referred to in Articles 80(2) and Article 110(5) may be

revoked at any time by the European Parliament or by the Council. A decision to

revoke shall put an end to the delegation of the power specified in that decision. It

shall take effect the day following the publication of the decision in the Official

Journal of the European Union or at a later date specified therein. It shall not affect

the validity of any delegated acts already in force.

4. Before adopting a delegated act, the Commission shall consult experts designated by

each Member State in accordance with the principles laid down in the

Interinstitutional Agreement of 13 April 2016 on Better Law-Making.

5. As soon as it adopts a delegated act, the Commission shall notify it simultaneously to

the European Parliament and to the Council.

6. A delegated act adopted pursuant to Articles 80(2) and Article 110(5) shall enter into

force only if no objection has been expressed either by the European Parliament or

the Council within a period of two months of notification of that act to the European

Parliament and the Council or if, before the expiry of that period, the European

Parliament and the Council have both informed the Commission that they will not

object. That period shall be extended by two months at the initiative of the

European Parliament or of the Council.

Article 120

Evaluation and review

1. By [DD MM YYYY], and every five years thereafter, the Commission shall

commission an evaluation which shall be conducted in accordance with the

Commission’s guidelines.

2. The evaluation referred to in paragraph 1 shall include an assessment of the

following:

(a) ENISA’s performance in relation to its objectives, mandate, mission, tasks,

governance and location;

(b) the effectiveness, efficiency and EU added value of the European individual

cybersecurity skills attestations schemes as laid down in Title II, Chapter II,

Section 4 of this Regulation;

(c) the impact, effectiveness and efficiency of the provisions of Title III of this

Regulation with regard to the objectives of ensuring an adequate level of

cybersecurity of ICT products, ICT services, ICT processes, managed security

EN 143 EN

services and entities in the Union and improving the functioning of the internal

market;

(d) the impact, effectiveness and efficiency of provisions of Title IV of this

Regulation with regard to the objectives of the trusted ICT supply chain

framework.

3. The evaluation referred to in paragraph 1, point (a), shall, in particular, address the

possible need to modify the mandate of ENISA, and the financial implications of any

such modification.

4. On the occasion of every second evaluation, referred to in paragraph 1, point (a), the

Commission shall assess the results achieved by ENISA having regard to its

objectives, mandate, mission, governance and tasks, including an assessment of

whether the continuation of ENISA is still justified with regard to these objectives,

mandate, mission, governance and tasks.

5. The Commission shall report to the European Parliament, the Council and the

Management Board on the evaluation findings. The findings of the evaluation shall

be made public.

Article 121

Repeal and continuation of activities

1. Regulation (EU) 2019/881 of the European Parliament and of the Council is repealed

with effect from DDMMYYYY.

2. References to Regulation (EU) 2019/881, ENISA and European cybersecurity

certification schemes as established by that Regulation shall be construed as

references to this Regulation and shall be read in accordance with the correlation

table set out in Annex III to this Regulation.

3. ENISA as governed by this Regulation shall continue operations and activities of

ENISA as established by Regulation (EU) 2019/881 as regards all ownership,

agreements, legal obligations, employment contracts, financial commitments and

liabilities. All decisions of the Management Board and the Executive Board adopted

in accordance with Regulation (EU) 2019/881 shall remain valid, provided that they

comply with this Regulation.

4. The Executive Director appointed pursuant to Article 15(1), point (n) of Regulation

(EU) 2019/881 shall remain in office and exercise the tasks and responsibilities of

the Executive Director as referred to in Article 32 of this Regulation for the

remaining part of the Executive Director’s term of office. The other conditions of

their contract shall remain unchanged.

5. The candidate schemes whose preparation was requested pursuant to Article 49 of

Regulation (EU) 2019/881 shall be considered to have been requested pursuant to the

corresponding provisions of this Regulation. The provisions of Title III of this

Regulation shall apply to those candidate schemes accordingly.

6. The members of the Management Board appointed by the Commission and alternate

members appointed pursuant to Article 14 of Regulation (EU) 2019/881 shall remain

in office and exercise the functions of the Management Board as referred to in

Article 27 of this Regulation for the remaining part of their term of office. The

members of the Management Board appointed by Member States pursuant to Article

14 of Regulation (EU) 2019/881 shall remain in office and exercise the functions of

EN 144 EN

the Management Board as referred to in Article 27 of this Regulation provided that

they hold functions referred to in Article 24(3) of this Regulation.

Article 122

Entry into force

This Regulation shall enter into force on the […] day following that of its publication in the

Official Journal of the European Union.

This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States.

Done at Strasbourg,

For the European Parliament For the Council

The President The President

EN 1 EN

LEGISLATIVE FINANCIAL AND DIGITAL STATEMENT

1. FRAMEWORK OF THE PROPOSAL/INITIATIVE ................................................. 3

1.1. Title of the proposal/initiative ...................................................................................... 3

1.2. Policy area(s) concerned .............................................................................................. 3

1.3. Objective(s) .................................................................................................................. 3

1.3.1. General objective(s) ..................................................................................................... 3

1.3.2. Specific objective(s) ..................................................................................................... 3

1.3.3. Expected result(s) and impact ...................................................................................... 3

1.3.4. Indicators of performance ............................................................................................ 3

1.4. The proposal/initiative relates to: ................................................................................. 4

1.5. Grounds for the proposal/initiative .............................................................................. 4

1.5.1. Requirement(s) to be met in the short or long term including a detailed timeline for

roll-out of the implementation of the initiative ............................................................ 4

1.5.2. Added value of EU involvement (it may result from different factors, e.g.

coordination gains, legal certainty, greater effectiveness or complementarities). For

the purposes of this section 'added value of EU involvement' is the value resulting

from EU action, that is additional to the value that would have been otherwise

created by Member States alone. ................................................................................. 4

1.5.3. Lessons learned from similar experiences in the past .................................................. 4

1.5.4. Compatibility with the multiannual financial framework and possible synergies with

other appropriate instruments ....................................................................................... 5

1.5.5. Assessment of the different available financing options, including scope for

redeployment ................................................................................................................ 5

1.6. Duration of the proposal/initiative and of its financial impact .................................... 6

1.7. Method(s) of budget implementation planned ............................................................. 6

2. MANAGEMENT MEASURES................................................................................... 8

2.1. Monitoring and reporting rules .................................................................................... 8

2.2. Management and control system(s) ............................................................................. 8

2.2.1. Justification of the budget implementation method(s), the funding implementation

mechanism(s), the payment modalities and the control strategy proposed .................. 8

2.2.2. Information concerning the risks identified and the internal control system(s) set up

to mitigate them............................................................................................................ 8

2.2.3. Estimation and justification of the cost-effectiveness of the controls (ratio between

the control costs and the value of the related funds managed), and assessment of the

expected levels of risk of error (at payment & at closure) ........................................... 8

2.3. Measures to prevent fraud and irregularities ................................................................ 9

3. ESTIMATED FINANCIAL IMPACT OF THE PROPOSAL/INITIATIVE ............ 10

3.1. Heading(s) of the multiannual financial framework and expenditure budget line(s)

affected ....................................................................................................................... 10

EN 2 EN

3.2. Estimated financial impact of the proposal on appropriations ................................... 12

3.2.1. Summary of estimated impact on operational appropriations.................................... 12

3.2.1.1. Appropriations from voted budget ............................................................................. 12

3.2.1.2. Appropriations from external assigned revenues ....................................................... 17

3.2.2. Estimated output funded from operational appropriations......................................... 22

3.2.3. Summary of estimated impact on administrative appropriations ............................... 24

3.2.3.1. Appropriations from voted budget .............................................................................. 24

3.2.3.2. Appropriations from external assigned revenues ....................................................... 24

3.2.3.3. Total appropriations ................................................................................................... 24

3.2.4. Estimated requirements of human resources.............................................................. 25

3.2.4.1. Financed from voted budget....................................................................................... 25

3.2.4.2. Financed from external assigned revenues ................................................................ 26

3.2.4.3. Total requirements of human resources ..................................................................... 26

3.2.5. Overview of estimated impact on digital technology-related investments ................ 28

3.2.6. Compatibility with the current multiannual financial framework.............................. 28

3.2.7. Third-party contributions ........................................................................................... 28

3.3. Estimated impact on revenue ..................................................................................... 29

4. DIGITAL DIMENSIONS .......................................................................................... 29

4.1. Requirements of digital relevance .............................................................................. 30

4.2. Data ............................................................................................................................ 30

4.3. Digital solutions ......................................................................................................... 31

4.4. Interoperability assessment ........................................................................................ 31

4.5. Measures to support digital implementation .............................................................. 32

EN 3 EN

1. FRAMEWORK OF THE PROPOSAL/INITIATIVE

1.1. Title of the proposal/initiative

Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the

European Union Agency for Cybersecurity (ENISA), European cybersecurity

certification framework, and ICT supply chain security and repealing Regulation

(EU) 2019/881 (The Cybersecurity Act 2)

(Text with EEA relevance)

Short title: The Cybersecurity Act 2 (CSA2)

And

Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending

Directive (EU) 2022/2555 as regards simplification measures and alignment with the

[Proposal for the Cybersecurity Act 2]

1.2. Policy area(s) concerned

Policy area: 09 – Communications networks, content and technology

Activity: 09.02 digital single market

1.3. Objective(s)

1.3.1. General objective(s)

The main objectives of the intervention are:

(1) Enhance cybersecurity capabilities and resilience

Contribute to strengthen the Union’s cybersecurity governance and helping to ensure

that relevant institutions, authorities and other stakeholders are better prepared to

prevent, detect, and respond to cybersecurity threats in a coordinated and effective

manner.

(2) Prevent fragmentation across the internal market by:

Supporting the development, implementation and uptake of common Union

cybersecurity instruments, such as certification schemes and providing harmonised

frameworks that build trust and interoperability across Member States.

These general objectives respond to the key challenges identified in the problem

definition of the Impact Assessment of the proposed initiative. They reflect the

overarching policy aim of strengthening cybersecurity governance in the Union and

supporting the development of a secure, resilient and competitive digital single

market.

1.3.2. Specific objective(s)

To address the misalignment between the EU cybersecurity policy framework and

stakeholders’ needs:

Specific objective No 1: Create the capacity to effectively implement of Union

cybersecurity policies and continuous operational cooperation enabling more

structured cooperation between Member States.

EN 4 EN

Specific objective No 2: Develop and implement the means and mechanisms to

effectively support and address the needs of Member States, industry and other

stakeholders.

To address the limited uptake and effectiveness of the European Cybersecurity

Certification Framework (ECCF):

Specific objective No 3: Create the prerequisites for faster delivery of cybersecurity

certification schemes, driven by market needs, by broadening the scope of the ECCF,

ensuring effective maintenance and agile procedures and increasing transparency.

To address the fragmented compliance landscape and complexity of horizontal and

sectoral frameworks:

Specific objective No 4: Create mechanisms and conditions to facilitate compliance

with cybersecurity requirements, thereby making and in that way make their

implementation more coherent and effective.

To address cybersecurity risks in the supply chain:

Specific objective No 5: De-risk critical ICT supply chains from entities established

in or controlled by entities from countries posing cybersecurity concerns (high-risk

suppliers) and reduce critical dependencies by developing a coherent and effective

framework at EU level to address ICT supply chain security risks.

1.3.3. Expected result(s) and impact

Specify the effects which the proposal/initiative should have on the beneficiaries/groups targeted.

The expected results are as follows:

(1) Functional reform of ENISA

(2) Reform of ECCF – scope extension, new procedure and revised governance

(3) Further simplification of compliance with relevant Union cybersecurity

legislative framework

(4) Comprehensive and horizontal framework to address ICT supply chains

cybersecurity risks

Overall impact:

The proposal will have an immense impact on the cybersecurity in the Union as it

tackles number of areas such as the needed reinforcement of the European Union

Agency for Cybersecurity, strengthens the support for the implementation of the EU

law, introduces reforms for smooth implementation of the European certification

framework, supports the Union’s joint understanding of the cyber threats and

addresses the mitigation of cybersecurity risks according to the geopolitical reality.

The implementation of the proposed provisions will ensure high levels of efficiency

and coherence and avoid excessive regulatory burden. The package is designed to be

resilient to implementation challenges and to support long-term policy coherence

across the digital and cybersecurity ecosystem. It improves clarity, removing

inefficiencies and aligning procedures across legal frameworks, while contributing to

achieving high level of cybersecurity across the EU. As one of the main priority

objectives of the EU Commission, the envisaged simplification efforts will yield

significant economic benefits for businesses, including SMEs, of more than EUR

14.63 billion and for public authorities of EUR 7.5 million.

EN 5 EN

Specific results include:

- increased awareness and improved operational coordination, which could

generate considerable costs savings related to faster incident detection and

response for businesses, public authorities and citizens;

- providing clarity of the scope and remit of ENISA, while ensuring the

necessary prioritisation of its primary tasks;

- ensure that the stakeholders receive adequate support for policy

implementation, operational activities and overall coordination;

- Support Union’s shared situational awareness

- enhanced cooperation with EU-CyCLONe, the CSIRTs network, the

Commission, Europol and CERT-EU and relevant Union entities with the aim

to develop a repositories of verified, reliable cyber threat intelligence;

- support the efforts of mitigating ransomware attacks;

- enhanced coordination with private sector on cybersecurity related topics;

- disseminating timely information through early alerts on significant or large-

scale incident, or a cyber threat of a cross-border nature, in relation to sectors

listed in Annexes I and II to Directive (EU) 2022/2555;

- foster effective synergies with other EU bodies and agencies;

- lower the price of skills certifications, including by increasing the offering on

the market by introducing the European skills attestation schemes;

- support closing the skills gap in Europe through individual cybersecurity skills

attestations and support Member States and industry in strengthening their

workforce;

- addressing the lack of clarity of the ECCF framework and its limited impact,

expanding its scope and improving its governance model;

- increase the reputation of adopted schemes by establishment of a maintenance

structure and the introduction of a timely and transparent development process;

- introducing fees mechanism in relation to the costs occurring for developing

and maintaining the European individual cybersecurity skills attestation

schemes and processing applications and granting authorisations to providers,

and for maintenance of schemes, adopted under ECCF, which will contribute

to the Agency financial stability and create savings under the EU budget;

- aligned European certification schemes with the existing legislative framework

and hence better serve implementation efforts and support compliance needs of

businesses;

- enabling the adoption of currently blocked schemes;

- foster competitiveness of European companies by promoting alignment

between international and European standards;

- limiting fragmentation in cybersecurity measures and requirements;

- providing for legal clarity and substantially reducing the administrative burden,

without leading to significant legal uncertainty among stakeholders that are in