Digivõrkude õigusakt

12.02.2026

Digivõrkude õigusakt (EL määruse eelnõu COM(2026) 16)

Otsuse ettepanek koordinatsioonikogule

Kujundada seisukoht

Kaasvastutaja sisendi tähtpäev 13.03.2026

KOKi esitamise tähtpäev 25.03.2026

VV esitamise tähtpäev 02.04.2026

Peavastutaja Justiits- ja digiministeerium,

Kaasvastutajad Majandus- ja kommunikatsiooniministeerium, Kaitseministeerium, Kliimaministeerium, Rahandusministeerium, Siseministeerium, Välisministeerium, Riigikantselei JRKB.

Ettepaneku selgitus: Digivõrkude õigusakti eesmärk on ajakohastada, lihtsustada ja ühtlustada ühenduvusvõrke käsitlevaid ELi õigusnorme, et luua ettevõtjatele tingimused investeerimiseks kõrgtehnoloogiliste kiudoptiliste ja mobiilsidevõrkude kasutuselevõttu. Suure läbilaskevõimega võrgud võimaldavad kasutada uuenduslikku tehnoloogiat nagu tehisintellekt ja pilvandmetöötlus. Digivõrkude õigusakti ettepanek asendab 2018. aasta ELi elektroonilise side seadustiku.

Seisukoha valitsusse toomise alus ja põhjendus

Algatuse reguleerimisala nõuab vastavalt Eesti Vabariigi põhiseadusele seaduse või Riigikogu otsuse vastuvõtmist, muutmist või kehtetuks tunnistamist (RKKTS § 152¹ lg 1 p 1);

Algatuse vastuvõtmisega kaasneks oluline majanduslik või sotsiaalne mõju (RKKTS § 152¹ lg 1 p 2);

Sisukokkuvõte

Ühtse turu tugevdamine ühenduvuse soodustamiseks

Ettepaneku eesmärk on luua toimiv ELi ühtne turg, ühtlustades eeskirju ja hõlbustades piiriülest äritegevust, et motiveerida ettevõtjaid laienema, kasvama ja uuendusi tegema. Selle võimaldamiseks on digivõrkude õigusakti ettepaneku eesmärk:

• hõlbustada äriühingutel teenuste osutamist kogu ELis, olles samal ajal kohustatud end registreerima ainult ühes liikmesriigis;

2

• stimuleerida üleeuroopaliste satelliitsideteenuste loomist, luues ELi tasandil spektrilubade andmise raamistiku;

• suurendada riiklike spektrilubade andmise regulatiivset järjepidevust, andes ettevõtjatele pikema kestusega spektrilitsentsid ja muutes litsentsid prognoositavuse suurendamiseks vaikimisi pikendatavaks;

• tagada kogu olemasoleva spektri kasutamine, muutes spektri ühiskasutuse ettevõtjate vahel tavalisemaks (põhimõttel „kasuta või jaga“), ja

• võtta kasutusele vabatahtlik koostöömehhanism ühenduvuse pakkujate ja muude asjaosaliste, näiteks sisurakenduste ja pilveteenuste pakkujate vahel.

Üleminek täiustatud ühenduvusvõrkudele

Vananenud vaskvõrgud ei vasta eesmärgile teha uuenduslikud tehnoloogiad kogu ELis laialdaselt kättesaadavaks. Digivõrkude õigusaktiga kehtestatakse kohustuslikud riiklikud üleminekukavad, et tagada täiustatud ühenduvusvõrkudele üleminek aastatel 2030–2035. Liikmesriigid peavad esitama oma riiklikud kavad 2029. aastal. Protsessiga kaasnevad kaitsemeetmed tarbijate kaitsmiseks, nagu selge ja õigeaegne teave väljalülitamiste kohta ja teenuste järjepidevuse tagamine.

Lihtsustamine ja investeerimine

Digivõrkude õigusaktiga ajakohastatakse õiguslikku raamistikku, vähendatakse halduskoormust ja aruandekohustust nii, et äriühingud saaksid suunata oma vahendid investeeringutesse ja innovatsiooni. Eesmärk on muuta ettevõtjatevahelised suhted paindlikumaks, säilitades samas tarbijakaitse kõrge taseme.

Turvaline ja vastupidav ühenduvus

Ettepanekuga parandatakse võrgu turvalisust ja vastupidavust piirates sõltuvusi ühendatuse ökosüsteemis ja soovitakse edendada koostööd ELi tasandil. Ettepanekuga kehtestatakse ELi valmisoleku kava kriiside, kaasa arvatud loodusõnnetuste ja võrkudele suunatud välisrünnakute puhuks. Peale selle lisatakse üle-euroopalise satelliitside valimise ühisesse mehhanismi kriteeriumid, mis keskenduvad kaitsele ja vastupidavusele.

Võrgu neutraalsuse kaitsmine uuenduslike teenuste puhul

Ettepanek säilitab võrgu neutraalsuse põhimõtted. Sellega kehtestatakse mehhanism, mis selgitab avatud interneti reegleid innovaatiliste teenuste jaoks, et suurendada õigusselgust, ning vabatahtlik koostöömehhanism ökosüsteemi osalistele IP- ühenduvuse, liikluse tõhususe ja muude esilekerkivate valdkondade küsimustes.

Kas EL algatus reguleerib karistusi või haldustrahve? Jah

3

Kas nähakse ette uue asutuse loomine (järelevalvelised või muud asutused)? Jah

Vajab selgitamist.

Kas lahenduse rakendamine vajab IT-arendusi? Jah

Vajab selgitamist.

Mõju ja sihtrühm

Hinnata algatusega kaasnevat mõju.

Kaasamine

Kaasata algatusega seonduvad huvirühmad.

    Resolutsiooni liik: Riigikantselei resolutsioon Viide: Justiits- ja Digiministeerium /  / ; Riigikantselei /  / 2-5/26-00324

Resolutsiooni teema: Digivõrkude õigusakt

Adressaat: Justiits- ja Digiministeerium Ülesanne: Tulenevalt Riigikogu kodu- ja töökorra seaduse § 152` lg 1 p 2 ning Vabariigi Valitsuse reglemendi § 3 lg 4 palun valmistada ette Vabariigi Valitsuse seisukoha ja otsuse eelnõu järgneva algatuse kohta, kaasates seejuures olulisi huvigruppe ja osapooli: - Proposal for a REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL on digital networks, amending Regulation (EU) 2015/2120, Directive 2002/58/EC and Decision No 676/2002/EC and repealing Regulation (EU) 2018/1971, Directive (EU) 2018/1972 and Decision No 243/2012/EU (Digital Networks Act),COM(2026)16

EISi toimiku nr: 26-0036 Tähtaeg: 20.03.2026

Adressaat: Kaitseministeerium, Kliimaministeerium, Majandus- ja Kommunikatsiooniministeerium, Rahandusministeerium, Riigikantselei, Siseministeerium, Välisministeerium Ülesanne: Palun esitada oma sisend Justiits- ja Digiministeeriumile seisukohtade kujundamiseks antud eelnõu kohta (eelnõude infosüsteemi (EIS) kaudu). Tähtaeg: 13.03.2026

Lisainfo: Eelnõu on kavas arutada valitsuse 02.04.2026 istungil ja Vabariigi Valitsuse reglemendi § 6 lg 6 kohaselt sellele eelneval nädalal (25.03.2026) EL koordinatsioonikogus. Esialgsed materjalid EL koordinatsioonikoguks palume esitada hiljemalt 20.03.2026. 

Kinnitaja: Merli Vahar, Euroopa Liidu asjade direktori asetäitja Kinnitamise kuupäev: 13.02.2026 Resolutsiooni koostaja: Sandra Metste [email protected],  

.

EN EN

EUROPEAN COMMISSION

Brussels, 21.1.2026

COM(2026) 16 final

2026/0013 (COD)

Proposal for a

REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL

on digital networks, amending Regulation (EU) 2015/2120, Directive 2002/58/EC and

Decision No 676/2002/EC and repealing Regulation (EU) 2018/1971, Directive (EU)

2018/1972 and Decision No 243/2012/EU (Digital Networks Act)

{SEC(2026) 14 final} - {SWD(2026) 13 final} - {SWD(2026) 14 final}

(Text with EEA relevance)

EN 1 EN

EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM

1. CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL

• Reasons for and objectives of the proposal

As the European Digital Decade Policy Programme (1) states, connectivity is crucial for

digital transformation, aiming for universal gigabit broadband and 5G in populated areas by

2030. Robust, fast, and secure networks enable digital skills development, business innovation

(Artificial Intelligence (AI), cloud), essential e-government/health services. They also make it

possible to close the digital divide, ensuring inclusive participation and competitiveness

across the EU. Connectivity is not just access. It is about real-time data exchange, vital for the

EU to be able to achieve its broader digital goals and for supporting a truly connected,

prosperous society.

A modern and simplified legal framework that incentivises the transition from legacy

networks to fibre, high quality 5G and 6G networks, and cloud-based infrastructures, as well

as increased scale through service provision and cross-border operation, is crucial. This has

also been pointed out in the results of the exploratory consultation on the future of the

electronic communications sector and its infrastructure (2023) (2), and later in the

Commission White Paper ‘How to master Europe’s digital infrastructure needs?’ (2024) (3),

as well as in the response to the Call for Evidence for the Digital Networks Act (2025) (4).

Subsequent strategic analyses, including the Letta (5), Draghi (6) and Niinistö (7) reports, and

the Commission Communication ‘A Competitiveness Compass for the EU’ (8) also make the

point that a cutting edge digital network infrastructure is critical for the future competitiveness

of the EU economy, security and social welfare. The availability of high-quality, reliable and

secure connectivity for end users and for key economic sectors is a must.

At the same time, the Letta and Draghi reports underlined that the single electronic

communications market remains fragmented, and European operators continue to face barriers

to operating cross-border and scaling-up, limiting their ability to invest, innovate, and

compete with their global counterparts. The current legal framework being a Directive has

resulted in national fragmentation and therefore has failed to deliver a true single market.

Operators face divergent general authorisation conditions across Member States and a

patchwork of national requirements that disincentivise cross-border operations, increase

compliance costs and delay the introduction of new technologies.

1 Decision (EU) 2022/2481 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 December 2022

establishing the Digital Decade Policy Programme 2030 (OJ L 323, 19.12.2022, p. 4). 2 https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/consultations/future-electronic-communications-sector-and-its-

infrastructure. 3 https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/library/white-paper-how-master-europes-digital-infrastructure-

needs. 4 https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/better-regulation/have-your-say/initiatives/14709-Digital-Networks-

Act_en. 5 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/ny3j24sm/much-more-than-a-market-report-by-enrico-

letta.pdf. 6 https://commission.europa.eu/topics/competitiveness/draghi-report_en. 7 https://commission.europa.eu/topics/defence/safer-together-path-towards-fully-prepared-union_en. 8 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the European Council, the Council,

the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, ‘A Competitiveness

Compass for the EU’, 29.1.2025, COM(2025) 30 final.

EN 2 EN

Driven by the increasing importance of performance and security requirements for such

services, digital networks are undergoing a technological transformation whereby cloud and

edge computing capabilities are becoming an integral part of connectivity infrastructure. The

adoption of the Digital Networks Act (DNA), accompanied by the review and evaluation of

the European Electronic Communications Code (EECC) (9) and related legal acts, is an

opportunity to simplify and further harmonise the legal framework. This will boost

competitiveness and resilience and make for a more integrated single market.

Satellite connectivity is emerging as one of the core enablers of EU strategic autonomy. It is

crucial for affordable broadband internet access in remote areas and for the provision of

services related to security, crisis management, defence and other critical applications. In the

rapidly evolving satellite technological landscape, the EU needs to strengthen its strategic

autonomy in satellite communications, including networks and services, to secure and

improve resilience while contributing to the single market, something that can be done with

harmonised EU satellite authorisation conditions.

In parallel, satellite connectivity must build greater resilience against harmful interference that

affects global navigation satellite systems (GNSS) such as Galileo. The EU should be able to

respond in a concrete, actionable and operational way to the security threats posed by drones.

To support the achievement of the EU’s policy objectives of consumer welfare, industrial

competitiveness, security and resilience and sustainability, the DNA aims to incentivise all

market players to innovate and invest in advanced connectivity and to promote an ecosystem

of connectivity and computing infrastructures that enable the AI continent and foster the

single market.

• Consistency with existing policy provisions in the policy area

The DNA replaces certain existing EU legislative instruments that govern the connectivity

ecosystem: the EECC, the Body of European Regulators for Electronic Communications

(BEREC) Regulation (10), the Radio Spectrum Policy Programme (RSPP) (11), parts of the

Open Internet Regulation (OIR) (12) and Directive 2002/58/EC (ePrivacy Directive)13. The

aim of merging these instruments into the DNA in the form of a Regulation is to simplify and

better coordinate the rules, enabling providers to operate and innovate in the single market.

Providers need simplified and consistent authorisation rules (the EECC), access to fixed

networks and spectrum resources (the EECC, the RSPP), and a simplified and harmonised set

9 Directive (EU) 2018/1972 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 December 2018

establishing the European Electronic Communications Code ( OJ L 321, 17.12.2018, p. 36). 10 Regulation (EU) 2018/1971 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 December 2018

establishing the Body of European Regulators for Electronic Communications (BEREC) and the

Agency for Support for BEREC (BEREC Office), amending Regulation (EU) 2015/2120 and repealing

Regulation (EC) No 1211/2009 (OJ L 321, 17.12.2018, p. 1). 11 Decision No 243/2012/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 March 2012

establishing a multiannual radio spectrum policy programme (OJ L 81, 21.3.2012, p. 7). 12 Regulation (EU) 2015/2120 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 November 2015

laying down measures concerning open internet access and amending Directive 2002/22/EC on

universal service and users’ rights relating to electronic communications networks and services and

Regulation (EU) No 531/2012 on roaming on public mobile communications networks within the

Union (OJ L 310, 26.11.2015, p. 1). 13 Directive 2002/58/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 July 2002 concerning the

processing of personal data and the protection of privacy in the electronic communications sector

(Directive on privacy and electronic communications) (OJ L 201, 31.7.2002, p. 37).

EN 3 EN

of rules for networks and services (the EECC, the OIR). Finally, governance arrangements

need to support and enable single market conditions (the EECC, the BEREC Regulation, the

RSPP). The proposal also complements the Gigabit Infrastructure Act (14), which sets out a

framework to support faster and more cost-effective deployment of very high capacity

networks (VHCN). The DNA is also consistent with the Roaming Regulation (15), which

governs roaming charges in the EU. The proposal also complements and is in line with EU

competition rules, which are applied on a case-by-case basis (often ex post).

In the area of consumer protection, the DNA continues to complement the EU’s horizontal

consumer protection framework. While maintaining a high level of consumer protection, the

DNA proposal simplifies and further harmonises the sector-specific rules for end-user

protection in the area of electronic communications. The proposal is fully in line with the

Digital Decade Policy Programme, which outlines a vision for Europe’s digital transformation

until 2030, by designing the regulatory framework in such a way as to achieve secure and

sustainable digital infrastructures.

• Consistency with other Union policies

This proposal is designed to ensure full complementarity with existing and forthcoming EU

proposals in cloud, AI, data, cybersecurity and preparedness, and space. Ensuring coherence

across these interconnected policy areas is essential for the EU’s ability to build the necessary

technological capacities along the entire digital value chain. At the same time, and by

strengthening the foundations for a more integrated digital single market and innovative and

investment-friendly digital infrastructure ecosystem, the Digital Networks Act is one of the

key flagship initiatives under the horizontal strategy to reignite Europe’s economy, the EU

Competitiveness Compass.

While the DNA does not seek to regulate cloud services, the increasing convergence between

electronic communications networks and cloud/edge computing necessitates alignment with

the Cloud and AI Development Act (CADA) (16), which aims to strengthen EU cloud and

edge capabilities through better investment conditions and streamlined permitting procedures.

Related EU actions under the AI Continent Action Plan (17) on access to AI data and

infrastructure and support for sectoral AI applications, reflect the broader transition towards

cloud-based and AI-enabled network infrastructures. The initiative is also consistent with the

Data Union Strategy (18), which enhances access to high-quality data and further develops

data-related infrastructure. By improving secure and reliable connectivity, the DNA will

support the achievement of those broader objectives.

14 Regulation (EU) 2024/1309 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2024 on

measures to reduce the cost of deploying gigabit electronic communications networks, amending

Regulation (EU) 2015/2120 and repealing Directive 2014/61/EU (Gigabit Infrastructure Act) (OJ L,

2024/1309, 8.5.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/1309/oj

http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/1309/OJ). 15 Regulation (EU) 2022/612 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 April 2022 on roaming

on public mobile communications networks within the Union, OJ L 115, 13.4.2022, p. 1. 16 According to the 2026's Commission Work Program, the Commission will adopt a proposal for a Cloud

and AI Development Act in Q1 2026 (https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/strategy-

documents/commission-work-programme/commission-work-programme-2026_en). 17 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European

Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, ‘AI Continent Action Plan’,

9.4.2025, COM(2025) 165 final. 18 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council, ‘Data Union

Strategy Unlocking Data For AI’, 19.11.2025, COM(2025) 835 final.

EN 4 EN

Despite work done through the 5G cybersecurity toolbox (19), resilience risks in the electronic

communications sector persist. Dependencies continue to affect 4G/5G and fixed networks,

submarine cables, cloud services and critical sectors. The revision of the Cybersecurity Act

(20) provides an opportunity to address ICT supply chain risks more systematically. These

actions are closely linked to, and mutually reinforcing with, this proposal’s focus on

enhancing network security and resilience. While cybersecurity and resilience obligations are

provided by the NIS2 Directive (21) and the Critical Entities Resilience (CER) Directive

(22),greater EU coordination is still needed. The absence of a sector-specific operational body

and of a centralised EU-wide overview of preparedness, early warning crisis management

mechanisms, and resilience mapping in electronic communications, further highlights this

need.

The proposal is aligned with the objectives of the EU’s Economic Security Strategy and the

EU Preparedness Union Strategy by strengthening the resilience, redundancy and capabilities

of electronic communications networks and services, to ensure the reliable transmission of

communications during natural or man-made disruptions, crises or cases of force majeure. In

particular, it will support much improved network and service capabilities, including

measures to ensure the continuity and uninterrupted availability of emergency

communications and the effective functioning of public warning services.

The DNA complements measures proposed under the EU Space Act (23). The EU’s Strategic

Vision for the Space Economy recognises that space-related investments are closely linked to

the removal of regulatory barriers. The DNA is therefore seen as a critical building block of

the EU single market for space. By eliminating regulatory barriers, this Regulation will

improve pan-European access to satellite spectrum and strengthen the single market for

satellite communication services, enabling greater scalability and innovation. Investments in

satellite infrastructure and the wider value chain are addressed by other EU instruments,

including financial support for the multi-orbit infrastructure for resilience, interconnectivity

and security by satellite, such as IRIS² constellation (the EU’s secure connectivity satellite

system) and EU programmes such as the EU’s space entrepreneurship CASSINI initiative and

InvestEU, which provide funding mechanisms for space operations.

It complements the EU’s support for the IRIS2 satellite constellation, which aims to

strengthen EU sovereignty in satellite connectivity and to facilitate the integration of

terrestrial and non-terrestrial networks.

The Commission will adopt in 2026 a proposal to establish the European Union Critical

Communication System (EUCCS), to be operational by 2030, that will provide broadband-

19 https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/library/eu-toolbox-5g-security. 20 Regulation (EU) 2019/881 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 April 2019 on ENISA

(the European Union Agency for Cybersecurity) and on information and communications technology

cybersecurity certification and repealing Regulation (EU) No 526/2013 (Cybersecurity Act) (OJ L 151,

7.6.2019, p. 15). 21 Directive (EU) 2022/2555 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 December 2022 on

measures for a high common level of cybersecurity across the Union, amending Regulation (EU)

No 910/2014 and Directive (EU) 2018/1972, and repealing Directive (EU) 2016/1148 (NIS 2 Directive)

(OJ L 333, 27.12.2022, p. 80). 22 Directive (EU) 2022/2557 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 December 2022 on the

resilience of critical entities and repealing Council Directive 2008/114/EC (OJ L 333, 27.12.2022,

p. 164). 23 https://defence-industry-space.ec.europa.eu/eu-space-act_en.

EN 5 EN

based secure communication services for public authorities across the EU and the Schengen

area. The DNA proposal complements those efforts by contributing to the EU’s overall

capacity to respond to security threats and crises.

2. LEGAL BASIS, SUBSIDIARITY AND PROPORTIONALITY

• Legal basis

The proposal is based on Article 114 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union

(TFEU), as it aims to buttress the single market in electronic communications and to ensure

its functioning as well as the functioning of the single market in other EU policy areas

involving the use of spectrum.

• Subsidiarity (for non-exclusive competence)

The DNA will have significant added value compared to action taken at Member State level.

Strengthening European competitiveness requires access to fast, secure and resilient digital

infrastructure across the EU. In a context where the digital connectivity landscape is changing

rapidly with the integration of telecom, satellite, cloud and edge computing technology,

driven by virtualisation and AI, the EU will only be able to achieve those objectives through a

more harmonised legal environment across the EU that avoids fragmentation caused by

inconsistent national administrative practices or implementation conditions that limit the

opportunities of the single market.

Spectrum, like other resources such as numbers and to some extent land, is a scarce resource

whose management and assignment needs to consider national specificities and needs but also

the EU’s interests. There is therefore a need for more convergent and consistent EU regulation

of market entry to eliminate the obstacles that arise due to divergent conditions for the

assignment of individual rights of use for spectrum, numbers or land. For the EU to lead the

rest of the world on new and improved services, such as 5G, equipment manufacturers and

providers of communications services need sufficient scale. This means not only technical

harmonisation, but most importantly a single market that develops in a broadly aligned

fashion, for services and devices to benefit from stable and harmonised rules.

On satellite connectivity, the inherently global nature of satellite services, which transcend

national borders, makes satellite connectivity a policy area in which EU action is more

effective than national measures alone. The timely availability and uptake of satellite

connectivity, which rely exclusively on access to satellite spectrum across the EU, are critical

inputs for European industrial autonomy and play a central role in making the EU more

competitive. There is therefore a strong case for the EU to adopt an ambitious, coordinated,

EU-wide approach to satellite authorisation, underpinned by appropriate regulatory

instruments and complementary measures designed to facilitate and accelerate the

achievement of this objective.

The objective of ensuring a timely and orderly transition from legacy copper networks to

fibre-based networks cannot be sufficiently achieved by Member States acting alone, as

divergent national approaches would risk fragmenting the single market, legal uncertainty for

operators active in several Member States, and uneven conditions for investment and end-user

protection. EU action is therefore justified to establish a common framework, safeguards and

minimum principles governing the transition. At the same time, in line with the principle of

subsidiarity, the design, sequencing and implementation of the transition are entrusted to the

Member States and national regulatory authorities, which are best placed to take account of

EN 6 EN

local market conditions, network topologies, consumer needs and geographic specificities.

The Regulation thus combines a harmonised EU approach with nationally managed processes,

ensuring effectiveness while fully respecting Member States’ responsibilities.

EU action is needed to reduce fragmentation of consumer and end-user protection rules,

which gives rise to administrative costs for cross-border service providers and hinders the

development of innovative services, and results in an uneven and sub-optimal level of

consumer protection across the EU.

Overall, the scale of the problems in the digital ecosystem requires an EU legislative initiative

because they increasingly have an EU dimension, and can be more efficiently solved at EU

level, leading to greater benefits overall, more accelerated and harmonised implementation,

and lower costs than if Member States acted alone.

• Proportionality

Proportionality is ensured as the proposed measures focus on tackling bottlenecks in in the

single market, to create the conditions for new more virtualised and software-based electronic

communications networks and services in the Union, in particular by simplifying and

harmonising the general authorisation regime. In doing so it supports the achievement of the

single market objective of freedom of provision of electronic communications services. It also

avoids disrupting the operations of providers who would opt to keep a national (or regional)

footprint.

Building upon the successful parts of the existing regulatory framework, the proposal retains

the well-functioning significant market power (SMP) regime and the three-criteria test,

however, re-focusing intervention on market failures, enabling national regulatory authorities

(NRAs) to use more easily symmetric measures, where appropriate, and putting emphasis on

using less intrusive regulatory tools where possible. The harmonisation of access products,

coupled with well targeted and proportionate regulation, including access to in-building

wiring and potentially more, should support greater take-up of Gigabit broadband and higher

broadband speeds. The proposed Regulation would enable both a smooth transition from

copper to fibre networks and proportionate regulation in a full fibre environment.

Compared to the current framework, the proposal accelerates the transition to fibre networks.

Proportionality is ensured by appropriate safeguards for end users and by the fact that the

process being reviewed and managed nationally. The competent authorities are responsible

for ensuring that adequate broadband services are available, using appropriate safeguards

(ensuring comparable quality and comparable prices of retail fibre-based services, coverage

by alternative technologies, etc.). This process will be subject to the Commission’s scrutiny.

The proposed measures will also entail proportionate governance changes, creating a

governance system both for market regulation and spectrum management that is suitable for

the new EU-level tasks with a single market dimension and enabling decisions to be made at

the most efficient level. The Radio Spectrum Policy Group (RSPG) will become Radio

Spectrum Policy Body (RSPB), similar to BEREC. Given the absence of legal personality,

both BEREC and RSPB) will not exercise binding decision-making powers. Such

competences will remain with the Commission and national regulatory authorities or national

authorities responsible for spectrum. BEREC and the RSPB will continue to provide advice,

opinions, guidelines and other forms of policymaking support.

EN 7 EN

To promote greater convergence in spectrum management, significant spectrum assignments

will be subject to a mandatory EU spectrum single market mechanism, enabling the

Commission, BEREC and the RSPB to comment on draft measures. The Commission could

intervene where necessary in situations with potential single market implications. Given the

cross-border nature of satellite services, the Commission, supported by the advisory

structures, would manage the EU satellite authorisation, including by selecting satellite

licensees, if spectrum resources are limited.

The end-user protection rules are simplified and strengthen full harmonisation with targeted

exceptions (regarding maximum contract duration for example), but harmonisation is limited

to the areas the proposal covers. On universal service obligations (USO), a more harmonised

approach to defining adequate internet access service is introduced. The USO scope maintains

the availability, ensuring that consumers (and by extension micro-enterprises, small

enterprises and not-for-profit organisations) have adequate internet access and voice

communication services available at a fixed location. The concept of affordability of adequate

internet access and voice communication services, with possible measures for consumers with

low income or consumers with special social needs, is also maintained, with a more

harmonised approach to to establishing affordability. The USO provisions complement the

copper switch-off process and the transition to fibre and will therefore be subject to review.

The solutions will enable relevant stakeholders to capitalise on the synergies of a large Single

market and reduce inefficiencies in their operations and investments, in the most timely and

effective manner. At the same time, the proposal ensures to operators who opt to provide

services in a single Member State continuity of the current rules while benefiting from better

and clearer rules on the rights of end users, and a more predictable environment for access to

spectrum inputs and to electronic communications networks and services.

• Choice of the instrument

The Commission proposes a Regulation as it ensures the removal of single market barriers by

harmonising the existing regulatory framework for electronic communications. This includes

specific, directly applicable rights and obligations for providers, competent authorities and

end-users. It also includes coordinating mechanisms for certain inputs at European level to

facilitate the provision of electronic communications networks and services across borders

and an adapted general authorisation regime for providers operating in one, several or all

Member States. A Regulation is also a valuable resilience tool. In a cross-border connectivity

environment, vulnerabilities in one Member State can undermine security across the EU and

threats to electronic communications networks and services, whether cyberattacks, physical

disruptions or systemic failures, are inherently cross-border. Geopolitical instability requires a

rapid, coordinated and EU-wide response, which cannot be ensured if Member States

implement measures at different speeds or with varying levels of ambition.

Finally, as set out in the staff working document Annex 11 to the Impact Assessment:

Evaluation – Review of the functioning of the European Electronic Communications Code

(EECC), the Body of European Regulators for Electronic Communications (BEREC)

Regulation, the Open Internet Regulation, and certain aspects of the ePrivacy Directive,

experience with the EECC shows that Member States have not been able to address the

sectoral challenges in time, due to the long time it took to transpose the EECC into national

law. This was particularly the case for spectrum authorisations, as many of the 5G auctions

took place many years after the transposition date of the EECC on the basis of outdated

legislation. Transposition has also often been accompanied by additional layers of rules

resulting in overregulation and gold-plating, making it difficult for companies to grow cross-

EN 8 EN

border and to scale up. Fragmented national rules under the current Directive have failed to

deliver a true single market. Divergent authorisation conditions, end-user rules, and additional

national requirements create a patchwork that gives rise to compliance costs and blocks the

scaling-scaling-up of innovative cross-border services, despite their significant market

potential. As connectivity converges with cloud, edge computing and AI, new business

models could flourish, but today’s complexity discourages operators from centralising

operations, leveraging economies of scale, and deploying pan-European services.

3. RESULTS OF EX POST EVALUATIONS, STAKEHOLDER

CONSULTATIONS AND IMPACT ASSESSMENTS

• Ex post evaluations/fitness checks of existing legislation

Analysis has shown that the EECC, through its objectives of promoting connectivity and

access to, and take-up of, very high capacity networks, has helped to achieve and maintain

effective competition and to protect end users. However, the EECC, being a directive, has

resulted in national fragmentation and has therefore not achieved the completion of the single

market. Analysis has also identified the need for some rebalancing of objectives, (investment,

demand), as well as the need to consider adding new objectives of greater competitiveness,

security, resilience and sustainability.

Several pillars of the EECC are still fit for purpose.

The SMP regime remains the key instrument for ex -ante regulation, ensuring that markets

work well. However, NRAs have increasingly defined regional or local markets and the

overall use of ex ante regulation has decreased.

Radio spectrum is of utmost strategic and geopolitical importance. It is essential for enabling

communication, driving economic growth and social prosperity, and supporting critical

services across various sectors.

The USO in the EECC are a safety net to ensure all consumers in the EU have access to

affordable adequate internet and voice communication services.

The provisions on end-user rights are mostly still fit for purpose but some aspects of them

could be simplified.

Access regulation is based on competition law principles and on transparent consultation

mechanisms with the Commission as the guardian of the Treaties, ensuring that the proposed

regulations would not create a barrier to the single market and are compatible with EU law.

Such a system promotes regulatory predictability by ensuring a consistent regulatory

approach.

The current framework is, in principle, well adapted to addressing instances of significant

market power including local monopolies. This is relevant in a full fibre environment in a

post-copper world. The number of cases regarding oligopolistic markets, notified under

Article 32 EECC, has been very limited. Possible issues in oligopolistic markets have been

addressed under the spectrum authorisation regime or under competition law.

There is also room for simplifying some key EECC provisions that have not been applied by

regulators (Article 76 on co-investments, Article 77 on the imposition of functional

separation) or that have been applied by some regulators but should be further simplified to

enable a broader application (Article 61(3) on symmetric regulation, Article 79 on regulatory

commitments, Article 80 on wholesale-only networks).

EN 9 EN

On copper switch-off, Article 81 EECC has had limited practical relevance primarily due to

the lack of plans announced by incumbent operators and has not significantly helped to

accelerate the transition from copper to fibre networks. Instead, its primary purpose has been

to provide NRAs with a framework for managing the switch-off process transparently and

competitively, ensuring that migrations do not harm competition or end-user rights, and that

alternative access products of comparable quality are available.

On wireless connectivity, although the EU spectrum policy framework has laid the

foundation for coordinated 5G deployment through early harmonisation and binding deadlines

for the assignment of spectrum, and has ensured competitive prices for end users, albeit with

different levels and some exceptions, the EU is lagging behind in high-quality 5G deployment

compared to leading world economies. This has negative implications not only for consumers

but also for the EU’s industrial competitiveness and innovation. There are many reasons for

this. Spectrum assignment conditions remain excessively fragmented and have not ensured

consistent investment outcomes. Ill-designed auctions, the insufficiently long duration of

licences, a lack of flexibility and incentives to share spectrum and use it more efficiently, have

increased the cost of spectrum which, combined with limited mobile revenues and lack of

demand, has negatively affected deployment.

The procedural tools of the EECC to help establish the single market for spectrum, and in

particular the voluntary peer review of spectrum assignment procedures or the voluntary joint

authorisation procedure allowing several Member States to cooperate to grant spectrum usage

rights through common conditions and procedures, have been rarely used or ineffective at

promoting regulatory predictability and investment. As regards cross-border harmful

interferences between Member States, the good offices involvement of the RSPG has brought

significant added value according to participants but has not been fully efficient at addressing

cross-border coordination issues with third countries or in non-harmonised bands.

Overall, the lack of regulatory predictability and inefficient spectrum use have affected the

financial attractiveness of 5G investment projects.

For satellite services of a clear cross-border nature, the failure to establish a Single Market is

even more apparent. There are no minimum common authorisation conditions or satellite

spectrum requirements, or common selection procedures (except for the 2 GHz mobile

satellite service (MSS) band), and there is a wide variation in timescales for issuing a licence,

different approaches to national coordination with existing services, different fees and

different conditions attached to licences. This fragmentation is not conducive to leveraging

the strength of the single market to ensure a level playing field in space, is not favourable to

scaling up for EU-wide provision of satellite services and makes regulatory forum shopping

possible. These barriers affect EU readiness for the direct-to-device challenge in a context

where the EU risks being strategically dependent on foreign players for services that are

crucial for its security and defence.

The evaluation findings on the general authorisation provisions identified the need to

further harmonise, update and simplify the general authorisation regime and pave the way for

facilitating the deployment of more virtualised, centrally managed networks, software- and

cloud-based electronic communications networks and services in the EU.

The provisions on end-user rights are mostly still fit for purpose and there must be

continued focus on their enforcement and implementation. At the same time, some updates

and simplification could benefit both consumers and service providers, for example, the

streamlining of contractual information (Article 102 EECC) and the harmonisation at EU

level of some aspects, such as parameters for the quality of services (Article 104 EECC).

Some eprivacy Directive provisions concerning the technical facility for calling line

EN 10 EN

identification and the related rights to privacy are updated in view of the evolution of

electronic communications networks and the transition to IP-based ones and thus, covering

the originating identification as well. There are also updates related to the automatic call

forwarding and automated calling systems and non-itemised billing. Other obsolete provisions

about public directories are deleted.

As regards governance, the assessment of the BEREC and the BEREC Office and their

contribution to the harmonised implementation of the EECC has been positive overall, in

particular as regards the quality of BEREC guidelines and reports, and helped NRAs reach

common approaches. Yet BEREC guidelines and exchanges of best practices have still not

managed to bring about the single market. As markets, technology and the broader digital

ecosystem rapidly evolve, BEREC’s mandate should also evolve to encompass new tasks in

areas such as resilience, spectrum and satellites. The BEREC Office should also have its

capacity increased so it can support BEREC, including on substance, to ensure better

alignment with EU policies.

The assessment of the RSPG’s contribution to spectrum policy is also positive. Its

deliverables related to spectrum for future wireless connectivity, including 6G, spectrum

sharing, future use of the ultra high frequency band, World Radiocommunication Conferences

and their outcome, satellite connectivity, and climate change have provided valuable input for

further Commissions’ considerations. However, as the RSPG adopts deliverables in general

by consensus, at least on some sensitive matters, it needs to strike a balance between different

national interests and EU interests, sometimes to the EU’s detriment. RSPG opinions

sometimes tend to be too technical and not as political/strategic as its role as a high-level

advisory group to the Commission would require. Several limitations have also significantly

reduced its impact, such as the voluntary nature of the peer review, or the legal limitations on

using its good offices mechanism to address interferences from third countries. Synergies

between the RSPG and BEREC work in technical, economic and overall policy areas have not

been leveraged.

• Stakeholder consultations

The Commission launched a broad exploratory consultation on the future of the electronic

communications sector and its infrastructure in 2023. In February 2024, the Commission

launched a consultation on its White Paper ‘How to master Europe’s digital infrastructure

needs?’. The White Paper was published on the Commission's ‘Have Your Say’ website for

feedback over an 18-week period and it received 357 responses. A call for evidence was also

launched in June 2025 on the objectives and policy options for a DNA proposal. Significant

feedback has been received on the call for evidence.

In addition to the call for evidence, the three studies commissioned by the Commission have

conducted two rounds of consultations targeting 134 selected stakeholders. The targeted

industry stakeholders represented different electronic communications network (ECN) and

electronic communications service (ECS) providers and other service providers. Most were

fixed network operators but also included a sizeable number of content and application

providers (CAPs) and broadcasters.

The White Paper analysed the challenges Europe currently faces in the roll-out of future

connectivity networks. It presented possible scenarios for public policy action going forward,

including possible future DNA, divided in three strands. Stakeholders agreed on the

importance of modern, secure and resilient digital infrastructures for EU competitiveness.

Telco incumbents were positive towards the idea of a regulatory level playing field but raised

questions about the regulatory solution. Cloud providers were concerned about being included

EN 11 EN

within the scope of telecom-specific regulation. Most stakeholders broadly supported

reducing reporting obligations and removing unnecessary regulatory burdens. The feedback

on the White Paper was crucial in concluding that a new regulatory framework is needed to

complete the digital single market in Europe.

In the call for evidence most stakeholders broadly supported reducing reporting obligations

and removing unnecessary regulatory burdens.

Member States and NRAs did not see scope for a fully-fledged country of origin regime for

electronic communications services because a significant set of national rules would remain.

On end-user protection, Member States, NRAs and consumer organisations emphasised that

robust consumer protection must be maintained. Most telecom operators and service providers

called for simplification and the removal of sector-specific rules.

Traditional telecom operators called for a recalibration of the regulatory framework that

currently places them at a disadvantage compared to CAPs. Internet community and consumer

groups opposed changes to the open internet rules that would, in their view, risk leading to a

two-speed internetInternet.

In access policy the traditional difference between incumbents and access seekers can be

noted, with the former calling for deregulation and the latter keeping the current access

regime untouched. Some smaller ECN providers (AltNets) advocated for setting a specific

EU-wide target date to encourage fibre adoption and environmental benefits. Concerns were

raised about potential digital exclusion and market distortions if the switch-off is premature.

On spectrum, Member States and BEREC consider the current spectrum governance model

appropriate and are generally reluctant to introduce changes. They are also opposed to

centralisation of spectrum authorisation. While they support harmonised spectrum use for its

economic benefits, they stress the importance of maintaining flexibility to reflect national

market differences. A common European approach to satellite market access is considered

essential to unlocking the full potential of satellite connectivity across the EU.

The electronic communications community supports a more investment-friendly spectrum

policy that increases certainty and flexibility. It favours longer or indefinite licence durations,

tacit renewals, lower spectrum costs, and flexible usage rules. The sector also supports

reducing market fragmentation, strengthening peer review, and introducing common

authorisation procedures, alongside a clear EU roadmap for spectrum availability. It stresses

that market-shaping measures that undermine investment and network differentiation should

be avoided. The electronic communications community also supports EU-driven collaboration

on emerging technologies, such as satellite direct-to-device (D2D) services.

Alternative telecom stakeholders support greater coordination and harmonisation of spectrum

assignment across Member States. An evolving EU roadmap for spectrum availability is also

seen as beneficial. They support clear and early-defined conditions for licence renewal, as

well as policies promoting spectrum trading and use-it-or-share-it-or-lose-it obligations to

ensure more efficient spectrum use. However, they express serious doubts over imposing

legal deadlines for spectrum awards.

• Collection and use of expertise

The proposal takes into account the following main inputs:

The contributions received to the exploratory consultation on the future of the electronic

communications sector and its infrastructure, launched in February 2023;

The stakeholders’ feedback to the White Paper - ‘How to master Europe’s digital

infrastructure needs?’ of February 2024;

EN 12 EN

The stakeholders’ feedback received for the call for evidence on DNA published in 2025.

Three review studies were conducted to inform this proposal:

Study 2024-025 on ‘Completing the Digital Single Market (DSM): Regulatory enablers for

cross-border networks - FWC No FW-00141705;

Study 2024-026 on ‘Review of Access Regulation under the European Electronic

Communications Code and analysis of future Access policy in full fibre environment’ - FwC

No FW-00141705;

Study 2024-028 on ‘Financial conditions, demand and investment needs and their regulatory

and policy implications including on the universal service’ - FwC No FW-00141705.

In parallel, between March and September 2025, the Commission organised strategic

workshops with BEREC and the RSPG, to gather the views of high-level representatives

from the competent authorities of all Member States. Furthermore, a workshop was organised

with BEUC and the correspondent national consumer organisations in July 2025 to

discuss the concerns and challenges for consumers and end-users of electronic

communications. In addition, a high number of meetings were held with industrial

stakeholders active across the whole digital value chain, and their business associations.

• Impact assessment

The impact assessment identified the following options as the best ways to address the

problems.

Copper-switch-off and access regulation

The preferred option to accelerate fibre-to-the home (FTTH) network deployment and take-up

will be based on national plans to be notified to the Commission. The plans will explain (i) in

which areas copper will be switched off and by when; and (ii) the measures to support the

transition to fibre. Until 31 December 2035, copper switch off is triggered when the following

two conditions are cumulatively met (i) at least 95% of fibre coverage; and (ii) availability of

affordable retail connectivity services. After this date, the conditions will not play a role

anymore and Member States will be required to mandate the switch-off in all the remaining

copper switch-off areas with some exceptions. On access regulation, this option builds on the

existing regulatory framework, including both symmetric and asymmetric (SMP-based)

measures. Focus will be on regional and local markets.

With respect to the economic and environmental impacts, this would have positive impacts in

terms of (i) accumulated GDP increase in the range of EUR 157 - 327 billion above the

baseline scenario; (ii) total CO2 emission reduction below baseline scenario (0.7 million

tonnes); and (iii) average download speeds (314 Mbps in 2030 and 743 Mbps in 2035). As for

the social impact, the impact of the options cannot be quantified. However, the option is very

likely to result in highest positive social impact as it is performing well in terms of FTTH

coverage and FTTH take-up rate. On the impact on fundamental rights, the option ranks

medium.

Spectrum

The preferred option entails mainly unlimited licence duration by default, with possibility for

review clauses and revocation of rights of use, quasi automatic renewals, and the application

of pro-investment auction designs. It provides for the possibility to harmonise spectrum

authorisation conditions and includes a mandatory spectrum single market procedure at EU

level. It ensures increased transparency and predictability of the timing of availability of

EN 13 EN

spectrum through strategy and roadmaps. This option is the most efficient given that overall

benefits significantly outweigh its costs. It would ensure timely deployment of high-quality

5G and future 6G networks. It would have a positive impact on GDP, have spillover effects

on vertical sectors and be coherent and complement the copper-switch-off process..

General authorisation and authorisation for satellite services

The preferred option includes a “Single Passport” for networks and services other than

satellite and an EU authorisation for satellite spectrum, including selection of licensees in

cases of scarcity and enforcement of authorisation conditions. This option would reduce the

administrative and compliance costs as well as the reporting costs. Combined with

harmonised authorisation conditions and other applicable rules (including end-user rules) and

soft measures to facilitate ecosystem cooperation, the preferred option would allow providers

to virtualise network operations more easily and provide more consistent cross-border

services. The preferred option would therefore enable cooperation on a level playing field

with actors in the extended connectivity ecosystem. EU satellite authorisation would allow

operators guaranteed access to spectrum in all Member States under the same authorisation

conditions, providing them with the means to scale up and provide services across the EU

while addressing sovereignty aspects.

Governance

The preferred option builds on the existing set up of BEREC and the BEREC Office and

upgrades the RSPG from a Commission expert group to a body with a secretariat provided by

the BEREC Office. The Office whose name will be changed to ‘Office for Digital Networks’

(ODN) will have a new coordination task which will boost the effectiveness of spectrum

management. By providing administrative and support services to both BEREC and the Radio

Spectrum Policy Body (RSPB), the ODN will strengthen the existing link between the two

bodies, enabling better coordination and more coherent outcomes.

Administrative costs

The administrative costs for businesses relate to the obligations and benefits of the copper

switch-off and access, plus the simplification areas. The additional administrative obligations

related to the conditional copper switch-off lead to an increase in direct recurring

administrative costs by 7% (in FTEs per year) and EUR 73 million one-off cost, compared to

the current situation. Both the harmonisation of the authorisation conditions and the EU

satellite authorisation will result in some one-off costs to adapt to the common conditions.

However, overall, the recurrent costs for authorisation and implementation will go down.

• Regulatory fitness and simplification

On access regulation, the preferred option would remove a number of provisions relating to

SMP regulation such as those regarding co-investment (Article 76 EECC) and functional

separation (Articles 77 and 78 EECC). At the same time, enabling the NRAs to impose access

to in-house wiring and beyond the first concentration point from own initiative (and not at

request as this is currently the case) would simplify the way how access regulation is

implemented. This would have the effect of simplifying existing rules and remove the

perceived shortcomings and unnecessary complexities and potential lack of coherence

associated with those provisions that led to the limited usage of them. Furthermore, the

impacts on fibre coverage, take-up and competition of their removal is likely to be limited.

This is particularly true for Article 76 EECC, which has been superseded by wider analysis by

EN 14 EN

NRAs of the implications of commercial arrangements including co-investment in the context

of the market analysis procedure. Stakeholders have also recognised the REFIT potential of

these provisions.

Furthermore, the proposed option will simplify, strengthen and increase oversight leading to

remedies being applied more consistently, which will also benefit the EU single market.

Harmonisation of specifications for key wholesale products as well as attention to quality of

service guarantees for businesses should simplify the use of access products and also

contribute to the development of competition in services for multi-site and multinational

businesses.

On spectrum, the consolidation of the relevant RSPP and the EECC provisions presents major

benefits for REFIT since it will ensure consistency, by eliminating duplicative and outdated

provisions that hinder EU competitiveness in the deployment of innovative services.

The EU authorisation for providing satellite networks and services and use of satellite

spectrum presents a potential for major efficiency gains as it would reduce the cost of satellite

authorisation for satellite operators and national authorities. A satellite operator wishing to

provide services across the EU would not need to follow 27 authorisation processes, respect

27 sets of authorisation conditions, which include diverse and costly reporting obligations and

ineffective enforcement measures, and obtain spectrum rights in all Member States.

Rather, the Commission, with the assistance of the ODN, would receive the requests and issue

the authorisations to provide satellite services as well as authorisations to use spectrum

including individual rights of use of spectrum, either in some Member States where the

provider wishes to provide services, or for the EU as a whole. The authorisation conditions,

including the reporting elements, would be common across the EU and developed with the

assistance of the ODN and the RSPB. The Commission would also ensure selection at EU

level in case of spectrum scarcity. Furthermore, there would be a binding EU-level

compliance and enforcement framework for ensuring that satellite constellations’ access to the

EU market complies with the common conditions in line with international law.

Enforcement at the EU level (including withdrawal of the authorisation for the EU entire

Single Market) would be to effectively address interference issues while incentivising

compliance with the authorisation requirements.

Authorisations for terrestrial networks and services is another key area where improved

efficiency potential will be achieved. A major driver for problems with the general

authorisation (GA) regime in the EU electronic communications sector arise from the EECC’s

regulatory flexibility. This flexibility has led to fragmentation and inconsistent application of

the GA conditions. The EECC established harmonised GA conditions, but it remained a

maximum list and therefore, national discretion was kept on attaching the conditions.

Consequently, Member States did not take a common approach to GA regime in terms of

types of providers of networks and services and introduced divergent secondary legislation

and/or administrative (regulatory) decisions to further detailing the conditions. This situation

of a maximum list of 39 conditions in 26 Member States (except for Denmark which has no

general authorisation system in place) may result up to 1 014 conditions being set out

specified at national level, and for instance, a cross-border operator (present or with a

regulatory footprint in 27 Member States) could be required to comply with.

EN 15 EN

The proposal reduces this fragmentation and limits reporting and compliance obligations by

subjecting providers only to streamlined further harmonised conditions and obligations that

are established in the Regulation, including coherent with other EU laws and policy

initiatives, such as the EU’s economic security strategy, for strengthening the trusted and

secure provision of networks and services. Furthermore, for companies wishing to provide

networks and services in the single market, the proposal, in the form of a Single Passport

maintains a streamlined notification-based system but enables providers to operate in one,

several or all Member States on the basis of a confirmation by one national regulatory

authority. To this end, it sets out the general authorisation conditions, the single passport

procedure, and mechanisms for coordination, mutual assistance and consistent enforcement

among national regulatory authorities, supported by BEREC and the ODN.

As regards the impact on SMEs, simplified procedures, including a common notification

template and a single notification mechanism, are expected to reduce administrative and

compliance costs for providers, in particular SMEs. These savings will allow SMEs to redirect

resources towards innovation and growth rather than regulatory processes. Greater legal

certainty and regulatory predictability further strengthen SMEs’ competitiveness and facilitate

market entry. SMEs also benefit indirectly from common more flexible access regimes,

including simplified access to spectrum and spectrum sharing, which lower entry barriers and

support the development and scaling-up of innovative services. This is particularly the case

for sectors such as manufacturing, health, agriculture and transport. No disproportionate

negative impacts on SMEs are expected. On the contrary, the measures are expected to

generate net benefits, including cost savings and improved opportunities for innovation.

• Fundamental rights

The proposal’s impact on fundamental rights such as the freedom of expression and

information, non-discrimination, consumer protection, including the protection of consumers

with disabilities, the protection of personal data and the right to privacy, has been analysed. In

particular, the Regulation will set a higher level of harmonisation for end-user rights, while

maintaining a high level of consumer protection.

The proposal takes full account of the fundamental rights and principles recognised by the

Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. In particular, the proposed measures

aim at achieving higher levels of connectivity with a modernised set of consumer protection

rules. This will in turn ensure non-discriminatory access to any contents and services,

including public services, and help promote freedom of expression and freedom to conduct

business, and enable Member States to comply with the Charter.

The introduction of a mandatory, but conditional, copper switch-off constitutes a limitation of

the freedom to conduct a business under Article 16 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of

the EU. However, such a limitation may be justified where it pursues the general interest

objective and complies with the principles of necessity and proportionality. Market

developments already show that operators are progressively retiring copper networks on the

basis of commercial considerations, suggesting that a structured switch-off is not inherently at

odds with their interests. Given the expected social, economic and environmental benefits, the

measure appears consistent with the requirement of necessity. Moreover, the proposed

sustainability conditions, the option to maintain copper networks for a longer period where

the conditions are not met and the possible exception to copper switch-off when the

deployment of fibre or other adequate connectivity solution is not possible ensure respect for

proportionality.

EN 16 EN

4. BUDGETARY IMPLICATIONS

The proposal's budgetary implications are described in detail in the legislative financial and

digital statement accompanying the proposal. Overall, 47 full-time equivalent (FTEs) are

required to work on the initiative consisting of 32 establishment plan posts and 15 external

staff (CAs and SNEs) to ensure full and effective implementation of the initiative. The need

will be met by staff from the DG who are already assigned to the management of the action

and/or have been redeployed within the DG or other Commission services. In addition to

these existing resources, the initiative requires 5 FTEs of exceptional additional staff, which

are requested on top of the current staffing levels in order to ensure full and effective

implementation of the initiative. The current budget expenditure line of the BEREC Office

will continue to finance the unchanged portion of the ODN, while additional expenditure

resulting from the new tasks dedicated to the ODN, described in the proposal, will be financed

from satellite spectrum authorisation fees, and, if available, EU numbering authorisation fees,

and voluntary and in-kind contributions from Member States.

The proposal also includes tasks that require additional staff for the BEREC Office (to be

changed into the Office for Digital Networks - ODN), leading to a total increase of staff with

25 FTE, all financed from fees.

5. OTHER ELEMENTS

• Implementation plans and monitoring, evaluation and reporting arrangements

The Commission should monitor the application of this Regulation and evaluate its

effectiveness over time. 5 years after entry into force and every five years after that, the

Commission should review the functioning of this Regulation and submit a report to the

European Parliament and to the Council. Those reviews should evaluate in particular, the

market implications of Article 69 and Article 83 and whether the ex ante and other

intervention powers pursuant to this Regulation are sufficient to enable national regulatory

authorities to ensure that competition in electronic communications markets continues to

thrive to the benefit of end-users.

National regulatory authorities should also notify the Commission of the names of

undertakings designated as having significant market power for the purposes of this

Regulation and of the obligations imposed on such undertakings under the Regulation. Any

changes affecting the obligations imposed on undertakings, or the undertakings concerned,

should be notified to the Commission without delay.

By three years after the date of application of this Regulation, the Commission should review

the functioning of the ecosystem cooperation, taking utmost account of the BEREC report on

the effects of the application of the guidelines on effective ecosystem cooperation as well as

on the functioning of the facility for voluntary conciliation.

In addition, by 30 June 2034, the Commission should review the scope of affordable universal

service, and availability of universal service in the light of social, economic and technological

developments, including the transition to fibre. The review should take into account the

prevailing technologies used by most consumers. The Commission should submit a report to

the European Parliament and to the Council setting out the outcomes of the review.

Within two years of this Regulation becoming applicable, the ODN should prepare a report on

the single market for electronic communications networks and services. This report should

provide an overview of market developments and examine how the measures introduced

EN 17 EN

under this Regulation affect the functioning of the single market, as well as the market impact

of mergers. The draft report should be shared with BEREC and the RSPB for approval before

being published. Following this, updated reports should be published yearly to track progress

and emerging trends.

• Explanatory documents (for directives)

Not applicable.

• Detailed explanation of the specific provisions of the proposal

Part I: Scope, objectives and definitions

Part I of this Regulation establishes the horizontal framework governing the organisation of

the electronic communications sector within the EU. It defines its subject matter, scope and

key concepts, establishing the common definitions that apply to the legal framework in order

to ensure legal certainty and consistent application across Member States. It also sets out the

general objectives and regulatory principles to guide Member States, national regulatory and

other competent authorities, BEREC, the RSPB and the ODN, as well as the Commission, in

their work.

Part II: Resilience

Part II introduces a specific framework for network and service resilience and preparedness,

recognising electronic communications networks and services and other digital infrastructures

are essential to the functioning of society and the economy. To this end, it establishes

obligations and cooperation mechanisms to ensure the availability and capabilities of

networks and services in situations of major crisis. This includes the continuity of emergency

communications and public warnings. It also provides for the adoption of a report by BEREC

titled ‘Union Preparedness Plan for Digital Infrastructures’. The report will include an

assessment, common operational recommendations and crisis management practices. It will

also clarify the respective roles of EU bodies and national competent authorities in

monitoring, coordination and response, in turn strengthening a coherent and effective EU-

wide approach to resilience and preparedness in the electronic communications sector.

Part III: Single market authorisation and passporting

Part III establishes the single passporting framework for electronic communications networks

and services under a general authorisation regime. It affirms the freedom to provide such

networks and services across the EU as long as the common further conditions and

obligations laid down in this Regulation are met. It also maintains a streamlined notification-

based system enabling providers to operate in one, several or all Member States on the basis

of a single confirmation by one national regulatory authority. The proposal is coherent with

other initiatives on strengthened ICT supply chain security requirements. To this end, it sets

out the general authorisation conditions, the Single Passport procedure, and mechanisms for

coordination, mutual assistance and consistent enforcement among national authorities,

supported by BEREC and the ODN. BEREC guidelines, in cooperation with other competent

authorities and the Commission, will establish the procedural aspects on the interactions

between the providers, national regulatory and other competent authorities as well as the

approximation of the applicable conditions and rules in the Member States.

Part IV: Resources, spectrum and numbering

EN 18 EN

Part IV establishes a comprehensive and forward-looking framework for the management,

allocation and use of key electronic communications resources. This includes radio spectrum

and numbering resources, recognising their role as strategic public goods essential for

connectivity, innovation, security and the functioning of the single market. On radio

spectrum, it sets out common principles and objectives for coordinated strategic planning and

management at EU level, in line with international obligations, and reinforces mechanisms for

cross-border coordination and the resolution of harmful interference. It introduces technology

and service neutrality, promotes shared and efficient use of spectrum, and provides for an EU

spectrum strategy and roadmaps to ensure predictability, timely availability and alignment

with wider EU policy objectives.

This Regulation also harmonises authorisation regimes, conditions for assignment, duration,

renewal, transfer and sharing of spectrum rights, strengthens pro-investment and competition-

friendly award procedures. Further, it establishes EU-wide tools such as spectrum single

market procedure, common authorisation conditions, one-stop-shop procedures and EU

authorisations, including a specific framework for satellite networks and services in the EU.

In particular, it establishes EU-level authorisations for satellite spectrum as well as its

monitoring and enforcement. Moreover, it defines a procedure for granting such

authorisations and sets out greater coordination mechanisms for ITU filings along with

ensuring coexistence between satellite and terrestrial spectrum allocations within the EU.

In parallel, Part IV provides the framework for pan-European numbering resources and sets

the rules governing numbering resources, ensuring their efficient management, availability

and extraterritorial use across the EU, supporting EU-wide services, and safeguarding

consumer protection and fair access. Taken together, these provisions aim to ensure the

efficient, coordinated and future-proof use of scarce resources while boosting legal certainty,

reducing fragmentation and enabling the development of innovative, cross-border electronic

communications networks and services across the EU.

Part V: Transition to fibre, markets functioning and competition

Part V lays down the rules ensuring the proper functioning of electronic communications

markets and the effectiveness of competition across the EU.

First, it introduces a specific framework for the orderly transition from legacy copper

networks to FTTH networks. The framework will apply where copper remains in service

beyond a defined date. The transition to fibre process will be based on national plans to be

notified to the Commission. These national plans will explain (i) in which areas copper will

be switched off and by when and (ii) the measures to support the transition to fibre.

In the initial phase, Member States will be required to mandate the copper-switch-off in areas

where the following two conditions are cumulatively met: (i) at least 95% of fibre coverage

and (ii) availability of affordable retail connectivity services. In the latter phase, the

conditions will no longer play a role and Member States will be required to mandate the

switch-off in all the remaining copper switch-off areas except in the areas where fibre

deployment is not economically viable and no adequate connectivity solution capable of

replacing copper-based services is available. Safeguards apply during the entire process in

order to maintain continuity and protect consumers.

Part V covers also the framework for access to land and rights of way, interconnection and

access, and the application of symmetric and SMP-based regulatory remedies. It clarifies the

EN 19 EN

rights and obligations of undertakings in negotiating access and interconnection, empowers

national regulatory authorities to impose proportionate measures to ensure end-to-end

connectivity and interoperability where justified.

This part maintains the main strands of the current system of symmetric and SMP access

regulation. As for the SMP, the rules prioritise the ‘investment friendly’ access regulation of

passive networks (ducts and poles where operators deploy own fibre networks) and promote

the harmonisation of access products. As far as symmetric access is concerned, the rules aim

at stimulating fibre take-up by maintaining access to in-building wiring when requested. In

addition, NRAs can use symmetric measures to tackle local bottlenecks by imposing access to

local fibre networks. Moreover, the symmetric rules should allow the connection of end users

whose premises are not connected through an obligation on fibre operators deploying a

network nearby to connect those users.

Part V strengthens single market procedures for draft national measures affecting trade

between Member States, ensuring consistent application across the EU through coordinated

notification, assessment, and intervention mechanisms.

Part VI: Services

Part VI sets out service-related obligations aimed at ensuring that end-users in the EU can

benefit from essential connectivity and common level of protection. It modernises universal

service obligations by refreshing, in line with principle 20 of the European Pillar of Social

Rights, the right of all consumers, in particular those with low income, to access an affordable

adequate internet access service and voice communications services at a fixed location. It sets

common procedures on how Member States define ‘adequate’ connectivity in the light of

minimum bandwidth enjoyed by most consumers. These common procedures are supported

by BEREC guidance and ensure the bandwidth needed for social and economic participation

in society. It also provides a structured approach to affordability, including monitoring of

retail price evolution, measures for consumers with low income or special social needs, and

specific support to ensure equivalent access for end-users with disabilities, while enabling the

Commission to adopt implementing acts on adequate internet access service in the light of the

national conditions and criteria and methodology to consider for affordability assessment. A

new and more flexible approach to financing is proposed without sector-specific designation

or the related funding mechanism.

Part VI further safeguards end-user rights in the digital environment. It preserves open

internet access by codifying end-user rights to access and distribute content and to use

applications and terminal equipment of their choice. This sits alongside strict net neutrality

obligations subject only to narrowly defined and proportionate exceptions and robust

supervision by national regulatory authorities, complemented by BEREC reporting and

guidelines. It consolidates and updates end-user protection rules that are presented in three

chapters.

The chapter ‘Rights of consumers’ covers consumers and extends to micro-enterprises and

not-for-profit organisations (some provisions also apply to small and medium-sized

enterprises) and includes sector-specific rules on transparency and contract information

(including a contract summary template), contract duration and termination, and bundled

offers.

EN 20 EN

The chapter ‘Rights of end-users’ includes switching and number portability and ensures non-

discrimination.

The chapter ‘Facilities and functionalities for end-users’ includes measures against fraudulent

activities and ensures critical services such as missing children hotlines, emergency

communications and public warning systems, and the use of the European Digital Identity

Wallet. Reflecting the technology evolution and new challenges to end-user protection in this

regard, the chapter also includes updated rules on calling line identification, originating

identification, automatic call forwarding and automated calling systems. It contains provisions

on equivalent access and choice for end-users with disabilities.

Part VI also maintains targeted interoperability and ‘must carry’ provisions and empowers the

Commission to amend technical annexes by delegated acts in order to update to reflect

technological and societal developments.

Part VII: Governance

Part VII establishes the governance framework to ensure the coherent, independent and

effective functioning of the single market for electronic communications. It defines the roles,

powers and safeguards applicable to national regulatory and other competent authorities,

entrusts them with clearly identified tasks, preserves their legal and functional independence

from market actors, and provides them with adequate resources and budgetary autonomy. It

also lays down common principles on appointment, dismissal, accountability and

transparency, as well as obligations for cooperation and coordination at national and cross-

border level, in turn boosting regulatory consistency and mutual trust across the EU.

Part VII further consolidates EU-level governance by integrating and strengthening the roles

of BEREC, the RSPB and the ODN. It clarifies BEREC’s objectives, tasks and internal

organisation, boosting its capacity to promote consistent implementation of the regulatory

framework through opinions, guidelines, reports and best practices, supported by structured

data collection and market monitoring. And given the geopolitical context, it strengthens

BEREC’s competences linked to resilience and preparedness, such as via the adoption of the

EU Preparedness Plan for Digital Infrastructures. In parallel, it establishes a more robust

framework for strategic radio spectrum governance through the RSPB, defining its advisory

and coordination role in EU spectrum policy, cross-border coordination and international

engagement, while ensuring close cooperation with BEREC where regulatory and spectrum

matters intersect.

Part VII provides a comprehensive organisational, financial and accountability framework for

the ODN as a EU body supporting both BEREC and the RSPB. It sets out the ODN’s tasks,

governance structure, programming, budgetary and staffing rules, and ensures transparency,

sound financial management and effective oversight, including anti-fraud, audit and

evaluation mechanisms.

Part VIII: General and final provisions

Part VIII lays down the general, procedural and final provisions that ensure the effective,

transparent and common application of this Regulation across the EU. It establishes a

comprehensive framework for harmonised provision, exchange and publication of

information, empowering national regulatory and other competent authorities, BEREC and

the RSPB to request proportionate, justified and timely information from undertakings,

including on sustainability, while safeguarding confidentiality, data protection and business

EN 21 EN

secrets. It further provides for regular geographical surveys of network deployments and

forecasts, enabling evidence-based regulatory action, possibly contributing to informed public

funding decisions and coordinated planning, including during the transition from legacy to

fibre networks.

Part VIII also reinforces openness, participation and regulatory consistency through structured

consultation and transparency mechanisms. It requires public consultation on draft measures

with significant market impact, accessible consultation procedures and the systematic

involvement of end-users, including consumers and end-users with disabilities, and other

stakeholders. At the EU level, it introduces harmonisation and standardisation procedures

allowing the Commission, with the support of BEREC or the RSPB, to address divergences

that risk fragmenting the single market, while promoting interoperable, future-proof technical

standards in a technology-neutral manner.

Part VIII provides clear rules on dispute resolution, compliance, enforcement and legal

certainty. It establishes out-of-court and regulatory dispute resolution mechanisms at national

and cross-border level, complemented by guidance and voluntary conciliation to encourage

cooperative, innovative and sustainable ecosystem practices. It sets out proportionate

enforcement powers, penalties and safeguards, including rights of appeal, and defines the use

of delegated and implementing powers, committee procedures, monitoring, review and

transitional arrangements.

EN 22 EN

2026/0013 (COD)

Proposal for a

REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL

on digital networks, amending Regulation (EU) 2015/2120, Directive 2002/58/EC and

Decision No 676/2002/EC and repealing Regulation (EU) 2018/1971, Directive (EU)

2018/1972 and Decision No 243/2012/EU (Digital Networks Act)

(Text with EEA relevance)

THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,

Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and in particular

Article 114 thereof,

Having regard to the proposal from the European Commission,

After transmission of the draft legislative act to the national parliaments,

Having regard to the opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee24,

Having regard to the opinion of the Committee of the Regions25 ,

Acting in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure,

Whereas:

(1) Technologies are rapidly evolving, data traffic is growing significantly, and demand

for gigabit connectivity is increasing. Modern and sustainable digital infrastructures

for connectivity and computing are critical enablers for digitalisation and therefore

both for the industrial competitiveness and for society to benefit fully from digital

services. For that reason, high-quality, secure and resilient connectivity for everybody

and everywhere in the Union is needed, including affordable access for people with

low incomes, and across all territories, including rural and remote areas, islands, and

mountainous, scarcely populated, or the outermost regions.

(2) The internal market in the area of electronic communications remains fragmented into

27 national markets and European operators continue to face barriers to operating

cross-border and scaling-up, limiting their ability to invest, innovate, and compete in

the extended connectivity ecosystem on a level-playing field. Other players entering

the broader connectivity ecosystem such as content and application providers (‘CAPs’)

are benefiting to a large extent from a country-of-establishment regime and therefore

operate in the Union in one single market. This uneven level playing field among

various actors in the ecosystem has been recognized in the Commission White Paper

"How to master Europe's digital infrastructure needs?"26. as well as the Letta Report27.

24 OJ C , , p. . 25 OJ C , , p. 26 White Paper of the Commission of 21 February 2024, "How to master Europe's digital infrastructure

needs?", COM(2024) 81 final.

EN 23 EN

In this context, the European Council underlined in its conclusions from October 2025

that particular efforts are required to ‘deepen the single market for electronic

communications’.

(3) Decision (EU) 2022/2481 of the European Parliament and of the Council28 established

the 'Digital Decade Policy Programme" digital targets for 2030. That Programme

reflects the expected connectivity targets where all end users at a fixed location are

covered by a gigabit network up to the network termination point, and all populated

areas are covered by next-generation wireless high-speed networks with performance

at least equivalent to that of 5G. To achieve those targets, policies should simplify,

speed up, and lower the costs of, deployment of gigabit fixed and wireless networks

across the Union, including by reducing the administrative burden for both operators

and national administrations.

(4) Directive (EU) 2018/1972 created the European Electronic Communications Code

(‘EECC’). The EECC, through its objectives of promotion of connectivity and access

to, and take-up of, advanced networks, helped achieve or maintain effective

competition in the markets for electronic communications networks and services.

Member States were required to adopt and publish, by 21 December 2020, the laws,

regulations and administrative provisions necessary to implement the EECC into their

national law. The full transposition in all 27 Member States was only completed in

2024. Such long delays from the adoption of the Directive to the transposition of that

Directive into the legal systems of the Member States are no longer suitable for the

rapid transformations of technology in the current geopolitical and economic context,

which require rules that can have a fast impact on the market. Moreover, certain

national provisions which are related to provisions of the EECC go beyond what

would be strictly necessary for the completeness and conformity of the transposition.

Therefore, the EECC, being a directive, resulted in national fragmentation and

therefore has not delivered a true single market. It is therefore necessary to transform

the EECC into a regulation, and to merge the provisions of the EECC with provisions

that are related to the objectives but are laid down in other directives, or in regulations

or in decisions, including Regulation (EU) 2018/1971 of the European Parliament and

of the Council29. Therefore Directive 2018/1972, Regulation (EU) 2018/1971,

Decision No 243/2012/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council30, parts of

Regulation (EU) 2015/2120 of the European Parliament and of the Council31 and of

27 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/ny3j24sm/much-more-than-a-market-report-by-enrico-

letta.pdf. 28 Decision (EU) 2022/2481 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 December 2022

establishing the Digital Decade Policy Programme 2030 (OJ L 323, 19.12.2022, p. 4,

ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dec/2022/2481/oj). 29 Regulation (EU) 2018/1971 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 December 2018

establishing the Body of European Regulators for Electronic Communications (BEREC) and the

Agency for Support for BEREC (BEREC Office), amending Regulation (EU) 2015/2120 and repealing

Regulation (EC) No 1211/2009 (OJ L 321, 17.12.2018, p. 1,

ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2018/1971/oj). 30 Decision No 243/2012/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 March 2012

establishing a multiannual radio spectrum policy programme, (OJ L 081, 21.3.2012, p. 7,

ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dec/2012/243(2)/oj), as amended by Directive (EU) 2018/1972 of the

European Parliament and of the Council of 11 December 2018 (OJ L 321, 17.12.2018, p. 36). 31 Regulation (EU) 2015/2120 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 November 2015

laying down measures concerning open internet access and retail charges for regulated intra-EU

EN 24 EN

Directive 2002/58/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council32 should be

merged into one single regulation, the Digital Networks Act.

(5) In its 2024 White Paper "How to master Europe's digital infrastructure needs?’33 the

Commission observed that the connectivity sector is undergoing significant

technological changes, where digital infrastructures are becoming cloud- and AI-based

and the connectivity ecosystem is broadening to provide new innovative services. It is

therefore necessary to take account of the evolution from electronic communications

networks towards ‘digital networks’.

(6) This Regulation does not cover the content delivered over electronic communications

networks using electronic communications services, such as broadcasting content,

financial services, and certain information society services, and is without prejudice to

measures taken at Union or national level in respect of such services, in accordance

with Union law or national law, in order to promote cultural and linguistic diversity

and to ensure the defence of media pluralism. The content of television programmes is

covered by Directive 2010/13/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council34.

The regulation of audiovisual policy and content aims at achieving general interest

objectives, such as freedom of expression, media pluralism, impartiality, cultural and

linguistic diversity, social inclusion, consumer protection and the protection of minors.

The separation between the regulation of electronic communications and the

regulation of content does not affect the taking into account of the links existing

between them, in particular in order to guarantee media pluralism, cultural diversity

and consumer protection. Within the limits of their competences, competent

authorities should contribute to ensuring the implementation of policies aiming to

promote those objectives.

(7) This Regulation does not affect the application to radio equipment of Directive

2014/53/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council35, but does cover car radio

and consumer radio receivers, and consumer digital television equipment. In order to

provide safeguards for end-to-end interoperability, it is necessary to regulate certain

aspects of radio equipment as defined in Directive 2014/53/EU and of consumer

equipment used for digital television, in order to facilitate access for end-users with

disabilities. It is important for national regulatory and other competent authorities to

encourage network operators and equipment manufacturers to cooperate to facilitate

access by end-users with disabilities to electronic communications services. To ensure

a coordinated approach with regard to the authorisation regime of radio terminal

communications and amending Directive 2002/22/EC and Regulation (EU) No 531/2012 (OJ L 310,

26.11.2015, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2015/2120/oj). 32 Directive 2002/58/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 July 2002 concerning the

processing of personal data and the protection of privacy in the electronic communications sector

(Directive on privacy and electronic communications) (OJ L 201, 31.7.2002, p. 37,

ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2002/58/oj). 33 COM(2024) 81 final. 34 Directive 2010/13/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 10 March 2010 on the

coordination of certain provisions laid down by law, regulation or administrative action in Member

States concerning the provision of audiovisual media services (Audiovisual Media Services Directive)

(OJ L 95, 15.4.2010, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2010/13/oj). 35 Directive 2014/53/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 April 2014 on the

harmonisation of the laws of the Member States relating to the making available on the market of radio

equipment and repealing Directive 1999/5/EC (OJ L 153, 22.5.2014, p. 62).,

ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2014/53/oj).

EN 25 EN

equipment, the non-exclusive use of radio spectrum for the self-use of such radio

terminal equipment should also be regulated.

(8) The requirements concerning the capabilities of electronic communications networks

are constantly increasing. While in the past the focus was mainly on growing

bandwidth available overall and to each individual user, other parameters such as

downlink and uplink data rates, latency, availability and reliability are becoming

increasingly important. The current response towards that demand is to bring optical

fibre closer and closer to the end-user, and future ‘gigabit networks’ require

performance parameters which are equivalent to those that a network based on optical

fibre elements at least up to the network termination point can deliver. In the case of

wireless connection, this corresponds to network performance similar to that

achievable based on an optical fibre installation up to the base station, considered to be

the network termination point. Such gigabit networks, both fixed and mobile, are

capable to provide data rates in the order of at least one gigabit per second in uplink

and downlink, as well as other advanced performance parameters like low latency and

high stability. The term ‘gigabit network’ replaces the term ‘very high capacity

network’ with updated performance characteristics corresponding to the technological

and market evolution. As a result, by virtue of this Regulation, any reference to ‘very

high capacity network’ as defined in Article 2(2) of Directive (EU) 2018/1972 shall be

construed as ‘gigabit network’ as defined in this Regulation.

(9) Certain electronic communications services under this Regulation could also fall

within the scope of the definition of ‘information society service’ set out in Article 1

of Directive (EU) 2015/1535 of the European Parliament and of the Council36. The

provisions of that Directive that govern information society services apply to those

electronic communications services to the extent that this Regulation or other Union

legal acts do not contain more specific provisions applicable to electronic

communications services. However, electronic communications services such as voice

telephony, messaging services and electronic mail services are covered by this

Regulation. The same undertaking, for example an internet service provider, can offer

both an electronic communications service, such as access to the internet, and services

not covered by this Regulation such as the provision of web-based and not

communications-related content.

(10) The same undertaking, for example a cable operator, can offer both an electronic

communications service, such as the conveyance of television signals, and services not

covered under this Regulation, such as the commercialisation of an offer of sound or

television broadcasting content services, and therefore additional obligations can be

imposed on such an undertaking in relation to its activity as a content provider or

distributor, in accordance with provisions other than those of this Regulation, without

prejudice to the conditions laid in an annex to this Regulation.

(11) In order to fall within the scope of the definition of electronic communications service,

a service normally needs to be provided in exchange for remuneration. While fully

recognising that the protection of personal data is a fundamental right and that

therefore personal data cannot be considered a commodity, access, use, or otherwise

36 Directive (EU) 2015/1535 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 September 2015 laying

down a procedure for the provision of information in the field of technical regulations and of rules on

Information Society services (OJ L 241, 17.9.2015, p. 1, ELI:

http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2015/1535/oj).

EN 26 EN

processing of personal data in the context of the supply of electronic communications

services should be treated in same manner as remuneration,where the provider of a

service requests and the end-user knowingly provides personal data within the

meaning of Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the

Council37 directly or indirectly to the provider. This encompasses situations where the

end-user allows access to information without actively supplying it, such as personal

data, including the IP address, or other automatically generated information, such as

information collected and transmitted by a cookie or similar technologies. The

processing of personal data should in any event comply with Union data protection

law. In line with the case-law of the Court of Justice of the European Union (Court of

Justice) on Article 57 TFEU38, remuneration also exists within the meaning of the

Treaty if the service provider is paid by a third party and not by the service recipient.

The concept of remuneration should therefore also encompass situations in which the

end-user is exposed to advertisements.

(12) Interpersonal communications services are services that enable interpersonal and

interactive exchange of information, covering services like traditional voice calls

between two individuals but also all types of emails, messaging services, or group

chats. Interpersonal communications services only cover communications between a

finite, that is to say not potentially unlimited, number of natural persons, which is

determined by the sender of the communication. Communications involving legal

persons should fall within the scope of the definition where natural persons act on

behalf of those legal persons or are involved at least on one side of the

communication. Interactive communication entails that the service allows the recipient

of the information to respond. Services which do not meet those requirements, such as

linear broadcasting, video on demand, websites, social networks, blogs, or exchange of

information between machines, should not be considered to be interpersonal

communications services. In exceptional circumstances a service should not be

considered to be an interpersonal communications service if the interpersonal and

interactive communication facility is a minor and purely ancillary feature to another

service and for objective technical reasons cannot be used without that principal

service, and its integration is not a means to circumvent the applicability of the rules

governing electronic communications services. As elements of an exemption from the

definition, the terms ‘minor’ and ‘purely ancillary’ should be interpreted narrowly and

from an objective end-user’s perspective. An interpersonal communications feature

could be considered to be minor where its objective utility for an end-user is very

limited and where it is in reality barely used by end-users. An example of a feature that

could be considered to fall outside the scope of the definition of interpersonal

communications services might be, in principle, a communication channel in online

games, depending on the features of the communication facility of the service.

(13) Interpersonal communications services using numbers from national and international

numbering plans connect with publicly assigned numbering resources. Those number-

based interpersonal communications services comprise both services to which end-

users’ numbers are assigned for the purpose of ensuring end-to-end connectivity and

37 Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the

protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of

such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation) (OJ L 119, 4.5.2016,

p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2016/679/oj). 38 Judgment of the Court of Justice of 26 April 1988, Bond van Adverteerders and Others v The

Netherlands State, C-352/85, ECLI: EU:C:1988:196.

EN 27 EN

services enabling end-users to reach persons to whom such numbers have been

assigned. The mere use of a number as an identifier should not be considered to be

equivalent to the use of a number to connect with publicly assigned numbers and

should therefore, in itself, not be considered to be sufficient to qualify a service as a

number-based interpersonal communications service. Number-independent

interpersonal communications services should be subject to obligations only where

public interests require that specific regulatory obligations apply to all types of

interpersonal communications services, regardless of whether they use numbers for the

provision of their service. It is justified to treat number-based interpersonal

communications services differently, as they participate in, and hence also benefit

from, a publicly assured interoperable ecosystem.

(14) The network termination point represents a boundary for regulatory purposes between

the regulatory framework for electronic communications networks and services and

the regulation of telecommunications terminal equipment. Defining the location of the

network termination point is the responsibility of the national regulatory authority

(15) The notion of interconnection should be understood as referring primarily to the

technical interconnection between networks, irrespective of whether such networks are

public electronic communications networks or private networks including those owned

or operated by content and application providers, including content-delivery

infrastructures. Technological and commercial developments have led to an increased

deployment of caches, content delivery nodes, and other techniques that enhance

traffic exchange and optimise end-to-end performance, thereby resulting in closer

technical cooperation and more frequent interconnection between public and private

networks.

(16) The objectives of the new regulatory framework should also be updated to address the

challenges of the sector and ensure it can adapt to future developments. With the

technological transformation of electronic communications networks towards digital

networks integrating cloud and artificial intelligence (‘AI’) based solutions, the

connectivity ecosystem is expanding. Therefore, this Regulation should support the

competitiveness of the sector and the ability to master this transformation. It should

foster innovation and effective cooperation among the broad range of players in the

extended connectivity ecosystem.

(17) With a view to increasing the competitiveness and resilience of the sector, this

Regulation should facilitate the development of a single market for electronic

communications by introducing simplified and further harmonised measures,

facilitating scale-up in the Union, supporting and incentivising innovation and

investment in modern, resilient and sustainable networks and services. This should

include facilitating cross border provision of electronic communications networks and

services, including pan-European satellite communications services as well as the

development of trans-European digital networks.

(18) Strengthening the resilience of digital infrastructure and services of the Union is of

vital importance in view of increasing preparedness against natural disasters, man-

made threats and crises, as well as interference in networks and radio signals. To this

end, this Regulation should strengthen the Union’s strategic autonomy, ensuring

resilient digital infrastructure and services and ensuring preparedness for

contingencies, such as physical, cyber and hybrid attacks and natural disasters, making

mitigating measures available, improving resilience, in particular redundancy of

critical network segments based on the coherent integration of terrestrial and non-

EN 28 EN

terrestrial networks, and providing for the needed network capabilities for the society

to respond to crises.

(19) As bottlenecks and barriers to entry remain at the infrastructure level, including as a

consequence of the transition to fibre, it is necessary to ensure sustainable competition

through the implementation of a simplified regulatory framework for access that

addresses market failure, so that end-users continue to benefit from a larger choice of

advanced affordable and high-quality services.

(20) It is necessary to reduce ex ante sector-specific rules in the future as competition in the

markets develops and, ultimately, to ensure that electronic communications are

governed only by competition law. That was the aim since the first regulatory

framework for the electronic communications network and services was adopted in

2009. However, the current framework has resulted in national fragmentation and has

not achieved the completion of the single market, and therefore more consistency in

ante regulatory obligations is needed. Considering that the markets for electronic

communications have shown strong competitive dynamics in recent years, it is

essential that ex ante regulatory obligations are imposed only where there is a market

failure on the markets concerned, without prejudice to competition law.

(21) It is also necessary to give appropriate incentives for investment in gigabit networks

(including advanced 5G, 6G, fibre, submarine communication cables, backbone

networks) that support innovation in content-rich internet services and strengthen the

overall competitiveness of the Union. It is therefore vital to promote efficient

investment in the development of those networks and solutions, and to support

widespread availability and take up of gigabit networks and of electronic

communications services, including by the timely transition to a full fibre environment

across the Union.

(22) For the Member States, the national regulatory and other competent authorities, and

the stakeholders, the connectivity objective translates, on the one hand, into aiming for

the highest capacity networks and services economically sustainable in a given area,

and, on the other hand, into pursuing territorial cohesion, in the sense of convergence

in capacity available in different areas.

(23) In order to closely align the electronic communications framework with the Union

objectives regarding its transition to a low-carbon economy, it is necessary to promote

sustainable networks and services by supporting attractive investment conditions for

energy-efficient and low-carbon networks and solutions. In particular, that objective

should be aligned with fostering connectivity enabling energy efficiency and carbon

neutrality in other industrial sectors and investment in energy-efficient connectivity

infrastructure in line with the updated taxonomy framework and related Union Code of

Conduct for Sustainability of Telecommunications Networks. It is also necessary to

foster cooperation among the actors involved in end-to-end service delivery as regards

efficient management of data traffic.

(24) To achieve the objectives, national regulatory authorities and other competent

authorities should, where necessary, coordinate their actions with the authorities of

other Member States and with the Body of European Regulators for Electronic

Communications (‘BEREC’), the Radio Spectrum Policy Body (‘RSPB’) and the

Office for Digital Networks (‘ODN’).

(25) As a follow-up to the Nevers Call of 9 March 2022, Member States conducted a risk

assessment of Europe’s communications infrastructures and networks. To mitigate the

EN 29 EN

identified risks, that assessment put forward a number of strategic and technical

recommendations for Member States, the Commission and the European Union

Agency for Cybersecurity (‘ENISA’), to be implemented with the support of BEREC.

Among other strategic recommendations, the risk assessment proposes to (i) assess

resilience of international interconnections, (ii) assess criticality, resilience and

redundancy of core Internet infrastructure, such as subsea communication cables, and

(iii) reinforce Union capabilities and coordinated action to strengthen the resilience of

communications infrastructures. To achieve effective preparedness and enhance

resilience, cooperation among national competent authorities and Union level bodies

should be strengthened, including through common guidance and timely information-

sharing.

(26) Electronic communications networks and services form a critical backbone of Union

society and economy. While Directive (EU) 2022/2555 of the European Parliament

and of the Council 39 addresses the cybersecurity and resilience of essential and

important as well as critical entities, there is a need to further enhance the overall

resilience, preparedness and continuity of electronic communications at Union level,

including in situations involving cross-border or large-scale natural or man-made

disruptions, crises or force majeure that may negatively affect the population. The

ODN should play a central coordination role as regards resilience in the electronic

communications sector, drawing on its expertise, market oversight and Union-wide

perspective. As such, the ODN should exchange and coordinate with national

regulatory authorities, the Commission and other relevant Union bodies and agencies,

including ENISA, as well as, where appropriate, international organisations such as

NATO, on issues relating to Union-level assessment, monitoring, analysis and

preparedness of electronic communications networks and services and their capability

to contribute to the overall resilience of Union society and economy, while fully

respecting the roles of ENISA, the Network and Information Systems Cooperation

Group (‘NIS Cooperation Group’) and the European cyber crisis liaison organisation

network (‘EU-CyCLONe’) under the Union cybersecurity and civil protection

frameworks.

(27) In this context, the ODN should be tasked with ensuring a coherent, cross-border

approach for electronic communications networks and services. The ODN’s role

should complement and be without prejudice to Directive (EU) 2022/2555, focusing

on a system-wide preparedness, interchangeable infrastructures, trans-European

network and services continuity and coordinated crisis response.

(28) In the Union, when natural or man-made disruptions, crises or force majeure arise that

may negatively affect the population, the availability and specific capabilities of

electronic communications networks and services are crucial as they enable the

population to receive timely information, maintain social and economic interactions,

and access public and emergency-related services, and enable national authorities to

communicate with the population and to organise rescue and relief efforts. Without

prejudice to Directive (EU) 2022/2555, all providers of public electronic

communications networks, publicly available electronic communications services and

other providers under the general authorisation regime should therefore adopt

39 Directive (EU) 2022/2555 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 December 2022 on

measures for a high common level of cybersecurity across the Union, amending Regulation (EU)

No 910/2014 and Directive (EU) 2018/1972, and repealing Directive (EU) 2016/1148 (NIS 2 Directive)

(OJ L 333, 27.12.2022, p. 80, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2022/2555/oj).

EN 30 EN

measures to contribute to ensuring the availability of interpersonal communications

services and internet access services when such events arise. Providers of electronic

communications networks used, wholly or mainly, for the purpose of providing

electronic communications services or information society services available to the

public, such as submarine communication cables, could ensure redundancy in such

critical situations. They should to the extent it is technically possible and as far as

public interest is served, cooperate and contribute to the availability of interpersonal

communications services and internet access services, if the publicly available

electronic communications networks and services are critically disrupted by the

aforementioned large-scale events.

(29) End-users should be able to ask for help or assistance from the competent authorities

via emergency communications and receive information from the competent

authorities in a manner that they can perceive and understand via public warnings in

case of large-scale events that have the potential to negatively affect the population,

like catastrophic network breakdowns or in case of force majeure. Similarly, critical

communications, that enable emergency services and public authorities in charge of

security and safety to fulfil their mission, should be fully available. Consequently,

electronic communications networks and services providers should adopt specific

measures to ensure uninterrupted electronic communications, including internet traffic,

to the extent necessary to effectively convey emergency communications and public

warnings from and to all affected end-users or population. Critical communications

that are normally provided within a dedicated network of national authorities may be

implemented as a specialised service supported by new technologies, like network

slicing, which should benefit from sufficient network capacity to ensure quality of

service in crisis situations. If necessary to ensure the quality of such services, the

related traffic should be prioritised and redundancy for continued availability of

critical communications should be ensured. National public safety answering point

systems and public warning systems should be designed to be redundant and resilient

in case of large-scale events that have the potential to negatively affect the population.

(30) Before significant changes in the networks used to provide access to emergency

services are implemented, providers of interpersonal communications services and

public safety answering points (‘PSAPs’) should take all necessary steps, including

testing and validation of solutions in order to ensure the continued availability and

accessibility of emergency communications and caller location information for end-

users and to ensure the continued possibility to send public warnings to end-users.

Electronic communications networks and service providers should present to the

competent authorities of the Member State a roadmap indicating the process of

migration, and containing sufficient information to assess the risk posed to the

availability of emergency communications services and the potentially affected end-

users. Such a roadmap should be provided in order to inform in a timely manner the

users of electronic communications services relying on the current technology and to

allow them to prepare for, or adapt to, the new technologies and avoid the

discontinuation of the electronic communications services on the devices they are

using.

(31) As part of long-term resilience enhancing measures, the development of the resilient

integrated connectivity should, among others, address the preparedness for adoption of

state-of-the-art technology such as the emerging quantum communication

technologies, to ensure next generation of secure communications in critical network

segments in particular. In this regard, the transition to post-quantum cryptography is

EN 31 EN

necessary. In addition, quantum communication supported by fibre-based

communications networks could play an important role. The European Quantum

Communication Infrastructure (‘EuroQCI’), designed to become an integral part of the

new Union space-based secure communication system (Infrastructure for Resilience,

Interconnectivity and Security by Satellite – ‘IRIS2’), could be a driver for the next

generation of secure communications to the benefit of governments and businesses

across the Union. Thus, the security of sensitive data and critical infrastructure should

be reinforced by ensuring timely transition to post-quantum cryptography, by

progressively integrating quantum-based systems into existing communications

infrastructure and by developing a resilient quantum communication ecosystem and

industry in the Union.

(32) In order to ensure the effective preparedness of electronic communications networks

and digital infrastructure, as well as the uninterrupted provision of electronic

communications services, including in situations of natural or man-made disasters,

crises or force majeure, and relying on resilient national and cross-border

interconnections, the role of BEREC at Union level in the areas of preparedness and

crisis management should be strengthened. In this regard, BEREC should complement

Union-level efforts to ensure a high level of preparedness and resilience by adopting a

report titled ‘Union Preparedness Plan for Digital Infrastructures’ (the ‘Plan’),

prepared by the ODN. The Plan should consist of a comprehensive assessment,

operational recommendations and crisis management practices. These should ensure a

consistent approach to resilience across the Union including to funding mechanisms

ensuring redundancy and enhancing Union-level preparedness for crisis.

(33) The BEREC template for collection of data on resilience of electronic communications

networks and services, which should support the preparation of the Plan, should

include information about capacity, architecture, capabilities and usage of network

segments, which are considered key to ensuring overall resilience and continuity of

services at Union scale. This should notably include specific network segments such

as international interconnections, aggregation networks, core and backbone networks,

submarine communication cables, including their cable landing stations, satellite

networks integrated with terrestrial networks which are capable of providing back-up

service in the event of unavailability of any of these networks, content delivery

networks or networks connecting large data centre facilities. Where information which

is classified in accordance with Union law or national law needs to be exchanged,

reported or otherwise shared under this Regulation, the rules on the handling of

classified information should be applied. Where appropriate, non-classified summaries

enabling operational coordination should be allowed to be shared in parallel.

(34) Furthermore, the ODN should contribute, at Union level, to the monitoring, analysis

and synthesis of information on architecture, capacity, technical capabilities and

resilience of electronic communications networks, and support coordination efforts

aimed at ensuring the availability and increased capabilities of electronic

communications networks and services during natural or man-made disruptions, crises

or force majeure, while fully respecting the national crisis response coordination

frameworks. This could include, for instance, identification of areas where redundancy

is needed, informing strategic policy and investments decisions to support redundancy,

in particular for trans-European digital networks and related future funding

programmes, such as proposed as part of the digital window of the European

Competitiveness Fund under the multiannual financial framework. The BEREC

comprehensive assessment prepared by the ODN should also provide an overview of

EN 32 EN

reserve network capacities, as well as an overview of existing and emerging

mechanisms for traffic prioritisation, including network slicing and other network

management and network optimisation solutions which protect and secure

communications. Such mechanisms play an important role in ensuring the continuity

of essential communications networks and services during situations of increased

demand, network congestion, or other communication disruptions, which may occur

during crises.

(35) In particular, specialised services enabled by advanced network capabilities, such as

network slicing, play an increasingly important role in supporting use cases with

heightened requirements for security, reliability and low latency. This includes

applications such as the operation of unmanned aircraft systems, including drones,

which require assured levels of performance, resilience and isolation from other traffic

to ensure safe and secure functioning. The availability of such specialised services can

enable public authorities and private operators to deploy security-related and safety-

critical applications more effectively, while fostering innovation and efficient use of

network resources, in line with Union objectives for security, technological leadership

and the development of advanced digital services. Electronic communications

networks should be leveraged to enhance detection of drones and other flying assets,

whether they are connected to the network or not. In particular, cellular sensing should

be progressively developed and deployed on a large scale as an overlay and

complementary detection system for civilian and military applications, including

detecting, tracking and tracing of airborne threats, as well as detecting interference.

(36) The Union’s resilience increasingly depends on future-proof connectivity and reduced

strategic dependencies. This calls for a forward-looking approach that strengthens the

ability of terrestrial and non-terrestrial (satellite) networks to interconnect and operate

seamlessly, including in crisis situations. Resilience can be enhanced through

integrated, layered network architectures combining terrestrial networks with non-

terrestrial networks (‘NTNs’), supported by virtualisation, redundancy and automated

network management. Such integration can maintain essential communications where

terrestrial infrastructure is damaged or congested and strengthen overall continuity of

service. In this context, the ODN should participate in market monitoring and

technological developments, identify bottlenecks to interoperability and deployment

(including between terrestrial and NTN systems and for emerging technologies), and

provide recommendations to support a coherent Union-level approach to resilient

connectivity.

(37) The ODN should be able, where appropriate, and in cooperation with relevant bodies

and competent authorities, to analyse the threat landscape which the Union electronic

communications networks and services are increasingly exposed to. This includes,

among others, incidents of harmful radio spectrum interference. Such incidents have

increased in recent years in a context of heightened geopolitical tensions and may

affect the availability and quality of services, often with cross-border implications. In

this context, the ODN should analyse such trends and support competent authorities by

issuing operational recommendations. This role should complement national

responsibilities and contribute to a coordinated Union-level response.

(38) In order to complement the consistent and coordinated regulatory response at Union

level to enhance the preparedness for crisis, BEREC should adopt crisis management

practices setting out common procedures and coordination arrangements for national

regulatory and other competent authorities, including in crisis management and civil

protection in the event of natural or man-made disruptions, crises or force majeure.

EN 33 EN

Those practices should be aligned with existing Union and national crisis management

frameworks and support coherent action, including through information sharing with

relevant Union-level crisis response and civil protection coordination systems and

through cyber-response mechanisms, where cybersecurity incidents are involved. The

Plan should also cover aspects related to situational awareness regarding significant

disruptions affecting emergency communications, critical communications and the

transmission of public warnings in line with obligations stemming from relevant

Union law.

(39) Under Directive (EU) 2018/1972, Member States are able to subject the right of

providers of public electronic communications networks and services only to a rather

flexible general authorisation regime. The objective is to stimulate the development of

new networks and services while allowing service providers and consumers to benefit

from the economies of scale of the internal market. This Regulation supports this

objective and maintains the freedom to provide electronic communications networks

and services under general authorisation in the Union.

(40) The general authorisation system currently in place is based on a harmonised but

maximum list of conditions that kept the flexibility of the Member States to decide

which general authorisation conditions to attach to the general authorisation within

their territories, how to further specify them at national level and the possibility to

require providers to submit to the national regulatory authority or other competent

authorities a notification indicating their intention to start providing the services. The

notification was intended to have a declaratory nature and no explicit decision or

administrative act by the national regulatory authority was required.

(41) The evaluation of Directive (EU) 2018/1972 has revealed, however, that the lack of a

single and coordinated general authorisation, largely developed and implemented at

national level and the absence of a uniform and coherent approach to the conditions

applicable as well as the notification procedures despite the BEREC harmonised, non-

mandatory template, led to regulatory fragmentation and to increased barriers for

operators to scale up and operate cross border.

(42) To overcome the challenges posed by Directive (EU) 2018/1972 and enable providers

to benefit fully from the internal market for electronic communications, it is necessary

to introduce a modern general authorisation regime applicable to all types of electronic

communications networks involved in the delivery of publicly available digital

services and, with some exceptions, to publicly available electronic communications

services.

(43) In relation to the providers of electronic communications networks, the general

authorisation system should not apply to certain types of networks that do not have the

main purpose to support the provision of publicly available electronic communication

or digital services. Examples are networks mainly used for private, internal or closed,

predetermined user group communications, including networks used only for internal

links between communications infrastructure facilities not mainly intended for

publicly available digital services. In relation to the provision of electronic

communications services, number-independent interpersonal communications services

should remain excluded from the scope of general authorisation. Contrary to other

categories of electronic communications networks and services, number-independent

interpersonal communications services do not benefit from the use of public

numbering resources and do not participate in a publicly assured interoperable

ecosystem. It is therefore appropriate to not subject those types of services to the

EN 34 EN

general authorisation regime. However, number-independent interpersonal

communications service providers may be subject to certain obligations under this

Regulation.

(44) The general authorisation regime should be subject to compliance with a shorter and

updated list of fully harmonised conditions applicable in all Member States, as well as

with some other conditions that stem from other Union law or national laws, but that

are not yet fully harmonised, such as rules on access to data by law enforcement and

judicial authorities, including on lawful interception and data retention and ICT supply

chain security requirements in accordance with cybersecurity rules, including the

Cybersecurity Act which is to replace Regulation (EU) 2019/881 of the European

Parliament and of the Council40.

(45) Furthermore, providers subject to a general authorisation should submit a notification

to the national regulatory authority of the Member State in which they intend to start

the provision of electronic communications networks or services or where such

networks or services are already provided. They should also be allowed to submit only

one notification to one Member State in case they intend to provide networks or

services in one or several Member States under the Single Passport regime. Satellite

systems should not be subject to the Single Passport, but to a specific procedure at

Union level.

(46) The notification should use a mandatory template made available by BEREC. It

should consist of a declaration by a natural or legal person to the national regulatory

authority of the intention to start the provision of electronic communications networks

or services and the submission of limited information further specified by the related

BEREC template including identity, contact and business details, information about

the networks or services intended to be provided and their geographical area of

availability as well as the estimated date for starting the activity.

(47) National regulatory authorities should not impose additional or separate notification

requirements. In this regard, national regulatory authorities should not require any

additional documents as part of the general authorisation that are not contained in

BEREC’s notification template. Notification requirements and updates of such

requirements should be kept to the minimum.

(48) To encourage the provision of cross-border networks and services, providers should be

allowed to submit the notification in any official language of the Union or at least in

English.

(49) To contribute to the digitalisation objectives of the Union, all national regulatory

authorities should accept notifications online, for example, via an entry point at the

website of the relevant authority and, where mandated, through harmonised digital

solutions such as business wallets, and should not require providers to use digital

certificates limited to the national territory that are not mutually recognised in other

Member States and that are not in accordance with the minimum requirements

established in Commission Decision 2011/130/EU41 for the cross-border processing of

40 Regulation (EU) 2019/881 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 April 2019 on ENISA

(the European Union Agency for Cybersecurity) and on information and communications technology

cybersecurity certification and repealing Regulation (EU) No 526/2013 (Cybersecurity Act) (OJ L 151,

7.6.2019, p. 15, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2019/881/oj). 41 Commission Decision 2011/130/EU of 25 February 2011 establishing minimum requirements for the

cross-border processing of documents signed electronically by competent authorities under Directive

EN 35 EN

documents signed electronically by competent authorities. For the same reason,

providers should not be required to have national representatives to interact with

national authorities. In their exchange of information or documents by electronic

means, public authorities should fulfil the requirements set out in Regulation (EU)

2024/903 of the European Parliament and of the Council42.

(50) Competent authorities should not impede the provision of electronic communications

networks or services in any way, including on grounds of incompleteness of a

notification. The notification to start their activities should not entail administrative

costs for the providers of electronic communications networks or services.

(51) In order to support effective cross-border coordination, the ODN should maintain a

central database of all notifications. Competent authorities should transmit only

complete notifications to the ODN.

(52) Following the notification, national regulatory authorities should confirm to the

provider by electronic means the start of the provision of networks or services

describing the conditions, rights and obligations applicable in the Member State or

Member States where the provider intends to provide the networks or services. When

the provider has notified its intention to provide networks or services only within the

territory of one Member State, it should comply with the harmonised general

authorisation conditions and, as regards any specificities, the conditions applicable in

the jurisdiction of that Member State.

(53) The confirmation that providers can start their activities should include information

about the rights and obligations of undertakings under the general authorisation.

Providers might need such confirmation, for example to apply for rights of use for

radio spectrum or numbering resources, obtain access or interconnection and rights to

install facilities, including rights of way, in particular to facilitate negotiations with

other, regional or local, levels of government or with service providers in other

Member States. If a provider so requests, it should also be possible to provide the

confirmation in the form of a declaration. Such declarations should not by themselves

constitute entitlements to rights, nor should any rights under the general authorisation,

rights of use or the exercise of such rights depend upon a declaration. A declaration

should serve as a confirmation or proof to other national or regional authorities that the

provider is authorised under this Regulation.

(54) When granting rights of use for radio spectrum, for numbering resources or rights to

install facilities, the national regulatory authorities should inform the undertakings to

which they grant such rights of the relevant conditions for the use of radio spectrum in

individual rights of use or in the confirmation for operations under a general

authorisation.

(55) Specific obligations imposed on undertakings providing electronic communications

networks and electronic communications services in accordance with Union law by

virtue of their designation as having significant market power should be imposed

separately from the general rights and obligations under the general authorisation.

2006/123/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on services in the internal market (OJ L

80, 19.3.2014, p. 7, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dec/2011/130(1)/oj). 42 Regulation (EU) 2024/903 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 March 2024 laying

down measures for a high level of public sector interoperability across the Union (Interoperable Europe

Act) (OJ L, 2024/903, 22.3.2024, ELI:.http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/903/oj)

EN 36 EN

(56) In the case of electronic communications networks not provided to the public, it is

appropriate to impose fewer and less strict obligations, if any, than those that are

justified for electronic communications networks and services provided to the public.

However, they remain bound, among others, by obligations related to public interest

such as for network resilience, preparedness, cybersecurity, lawful interception and

data retention in accordance with this Regulation or other applicable Union or national

legislation which complies with Union law. Although not subject to general

authorisation under this Regulation, such obligations may be imposed on providers of

number-independent interpersonal communications services.

(57) The Single Passport procedure should facilitate the provision of electronic

communications networks and services across Member States. The procedure should

end by a confirmation to the provider to start provision of networks or services. It

should be possible to issue additional declarations, but only upon request by a provider

and following the BEREC guidelines on general authorisation. For example, where

needed, under the Single Passport confirmation the provider may ask through the

ODN for a declaration describing under which circumstances the provider of

electronic communications networks or services under general authorisation has the

right to apply for rights to install facilities, negotiate interconnection, and obtain

access to interconnection, in order to facilitate the exercise of those rights, for

instance, at other public authorities or in relation to other undertakings. Such

declarations could describe the criteria and procedure regarding the specific

obligations on individual undertakings and should be provided through the ODN by

the national regulatory authority of the Member State where networks or services will

be provided and upon request by the provider. The BEREC guidelines should specify

the details about the possibility to request such declaration.

(58) It is important to ensure the effectiveness of the Single Passport regime. Therefore,

national regulatory authorities or other competent authorities of the Member States

should be required to cooperate among themselves to support BEREC and the ODN in

developing and updating of guidelines and information resources on the harmonised

application of general authorisation conditions in the Member States. For this purpose,

Member States should designate national single contact points.

(59) The full benefit of the Single Passport regime can only be achieved if national

specificities related to the general authorisation conditions are reduced to a minimum.

This also applies to rules that are not part of the DNA such as in the areas of

cybersecurity or law enforcement. The BEREC guidelines should therefore identify

areas where further alignment between national rules or their implementation is

necessary. These elements should serve as basis for follow-up by the Commission,

competent Union bodies, or other expert groups for dealing with these rules. To

support these activities, the designated national single contact points should cooperate

closely with the ODN and with each other, on general authorisation conditions related

to national legislation and procedures, in compliance with Union law, applicable to the

provision of electronic communications networks and services, in particular related to

cybersecurity or law enforcement.

(60) In particular, the designated national single contact points should communicate to the

ODN any specificities regarding the national implementation of the harmonised

general authorisation conditions in their respective Member States, as well as any

national procedures put in place to make effective the general authorisation conditions.

Where in a Member State there are different authorities responsible for the

EN 37 EN

enforcement of the general authorisation conditions, those national authorities should

work closely with the designated single contact points.

(61) The designated national single contact points should also provide mutual assistance

with regard to enforcement of the general authorisation conditions in line with the

BEREC guidelines.

(62) The national regulatory authority of the Member State of notification should have the

power to impose penalties for the breach of the general authorisation conditions,

provided that the national regulatory authority where networks or services are

provided has not already imposed penalties for the breach of the same conditions.

Penalties should be imposed in accordance with national law and could include, in

case of serious breach, and where necessary after consultation with the regulatory

authorities of the affected Member States, the withdrawal of the right to provide

networks and services in all the Member States covered by the Single Passport. A

serious breach could be found, for example, where non-compliance with one or more

general authorisation conditions persists despite the remedial actions undertaken by

the national regulatory authority or other competent authority. Only in exceptional

cases, when a national regulatory authority of the Member State where the networks or

services are provided concluded that the breach of the authorisation conditions may

have a negative impact in its territory on the grounds of national security or public

interest, it should have the right to impose penalties within its jurisdiction. Such

exceptional enforcement measure should be taken in coordination with the relevant

competent authorities of the Member State of notification.

(63) As an exception, in the case of machine-to-machine services with extraterritorial use

of numbering resources, relevant rules of the Member State of notification should

apply.

(64) The requirements for the Single Passport should be without prejudice to Member

States’ powers to block, on a case-by-case basis, access to numbers or services where

this is justified by reasons of fraud or misuse.

(65) It should be possible to impose administrative charges on undertakings providing

electronic communications services in order to finance the activities of the national

regulatory authority or other competent authorities in managing the general

authorisation system and the granting of rights of use. Such charges should be limited

to cover the actual administrative costs for those activities and should not be imposed

on small providers. To that end, transparency should be ensured in the income and

expenditure of national regulatory authorities and other competent authorities by

means of annual reporting about the total sum of charges collected and the

administrative costs incurred, in order to allow undertakings to verify that they are in

balance.

(66) Systems for administrative charges should not distort competition or create barriers to

market entry. A general authorisation system renders it impossible to attribute

administrative costs and hence charges to individual undertakings, except for the

granting of rights of use for numbering resources, radio spectrum and for rights to

install facilities. An example of a fair, simple and transparent alternative for those

charge attribution criteria could be a turnover related distribution key. Where

administrative charges are very low, flat rate charges, or charges combining a flat rate

basis with a turnover related element could also be appropriate. To the extent that the

general authorisation system extends to undertakings with very small market shares,

such as community-based network providers, or to service providers the business

EN 38 EN

model of which generates very limited revenues even in the case of significant market

penetration in terms of volumes, Member States should establish an appropriate de

minimis threshold for the imposition of administrative charges.

(67) Amendments should be considered as minor amendments, which provides,

rights minor amendments are such restriction, withdrawal or amendment should

require the prior consultation of the right they are adopted. The current regulatory

framework addressing radio spectrum, mainly the European Electronic

Communications Code, the Radio Spectrum Decision (Decision No°676/2002/EC) and

the Radio Spectrum Policy Programme (Decision No°243/2012/EU) were developed

in a different geopolitical context. In this framework, the strategic dimension of radio

spectrum has not been sufficiently addressed. Radio spectrum supports vital services

like critical communications, emergency communications, air traffic control, maritime

navigation, public security and safety networks. As all basic commodities, radio

spectrum, and access to it, could become a vulnerability. Moreover, it could be

weaponised in the context of armed and economic conflicts, for instance for jamming

and spoofing signals and disturbing key military and civil activities from transport to

banking.

(68) Radio spectrum is of utmost strategic and geopolitical importance for the Union and

its Member States. It is essential to enable communication, drive economic growth and

social prosperity, and support security and provision of mission critical services across

various sectors. Radio spectrum has become key for the Union’s strategic autonomy

and security, and its management in a coordinated way is indispensable to ensure

Union security, resilience and digital sovereignty. At the same time, a number of

Union policies are relying on an appropriate access to and management of spectrum,

such as space, connectivity or transport policies. Moreover, an efficient and

coordinated management of radio spectrum is key for the deployment of high-quality

wireless networks, which are a condition of Union’s economic development and

competitiveness and of the completion of a single market for electronic

communications. Thanks to technological progress, in particular the possibility of

satellites to communicate with unmodified user mobile devices, and the convergence

between terrestrial and non-terrestrial networks, and between telecom networks, edge

and cloud computing, the management of radio spectrum as a common European

resource has the potential to maximise its value for the Member States and the Union.

It is hence necessary to effectively manage and efficiently use radio spectrum in a

strategic way as a common resource.

(69) Due to the development of new wireless technologies and applications, demand for

radio spectrum is growing, not just in the area of electronic communications, such as

for providing citizens and businesses with ubiquitous gigabit connectivity on the

move, but also in other sectors relying on radio spectrum, such as transport,

manufacturing, space and energy. To meet growing demand, an appropriate cross-

sectorial approach to radio spectrum management is essential to ensure the efficient

use of radio spectrum.

(70) Radio spectrum should be managed in a manner that ensures the avoidance of harmful

interference. The basic concept of harmful interference should therefore be properly

defined to ensure that regulatory intervention is limited to the extent necessary to

prevent such interference. Advanced methods for protection against harmful

interference and other radio spectrum management methods should be applied in order

to avoid, to the extent possible, the application of the non-interference and non-

protection principle, i.e. the obligation laid down in ITU Radio Regulations for

EN 39 EN

stations operating on a secondary basis not to cause harmful interference to primary

services, and the principle that they cannot claim protection from interference caused

by authorised primary services.

(71) National borders are increasingly irrelevant in determining optimal radio spectrum use.

Undue fragmentation amongst national policies results in increased costs and lost

market opportunities for radio spectrum users and slows down innovation to the

detriment of the proper functioning of the internal market as well as to consumers and

the economy as a whole. Strategic planning, coordination and, where appropriate,

harmonisation at Union level can help ensure that radio spectrum users derive the full

benefits of the internal market and that Union interests can be effectively defended on

the global level.

(72) Radio spectrum policy activities in the Union should be without prejudice to measures

taken, at Union or national level, in accordance with Union law, to pursue general

interest objectives, in particular with regard to public governmental and defence

networks, content regulation and audiovisual and media policies, and the right of

Member States to organise and use their radio spectrum for public order, public

security and defence.

(73) The radio spectrum management rules should be consistent with the work of

international and regional organisations dealing with radio spectrum management,

such as the International Telecommunication Union (‘ITU’) and the European

Conference of Postal and Telecommunications Administrations (‘CEPT’), in order to

ensure the effective management of and harmonisation of the use of radio spectrum

across the Union and between the Member States and other members of the ITU.

(74) The need to ensure that citizens are not exposed to electromagnetic fields at a level

harmful to public health is imperative. National competent authorities should pursue

consistency across the Union to address this issue, having particular regard to the

precautionary approach taken in Council Recommendation 1999/519/EC43, in order to

work towards ensuring more consistent deployment conditions. National competent

authorities should apply the procedure set out in Directive (EU) 2015/1535, where

relevant, with a view also to providing transparency to stakeholders and to allowing

other Member States and the Commission to react.

(75) Radio spectrum is a scarce public resource with an important public and market value.

It is an essential input for all kinds of wireless networks and services, including for

radio-based electronic communications networks and services. It should therefore be

efficiently allocated and assigned by national regulatory authorities or other competent

authorities in accordance with harmonised objectives and principles governing their

action as well as objective, transparent and non-discriminatory criteria, taking into

account the democratic, social, linguistic and cultural interests related to the use of

radio spectrum. Decision No 676/2002/EC of the European Parliament and of the

Council44 establishes a framework for harmonisation of radio spectrum.

43 1999/519/EC: Council Recommendation 1999/519/EC of 12 July 1999 on the limitation of exposure of

the general public to electromagnetic fields (0 Hz to 300 GHz) (OJ L 199, 30.7.1999, p. 59, ELI:

http://data.europa.eu/eli/reco/1999/519/oj).59, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reco/1999/519/oj) 44 Decision No 676/2002/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 March 2002 on a

regulatory framework for radio spectrum policy in the European Community (Radio Spectrum

Decision) (OJ L 108, 24.4.2002, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reco/1999/519/oj).

EN 40 EN

(76) Lack of coordination between Member States and their competent authorities when

organising the use of radio spectrum in their territory can, if not solved through

bilateral Member States negotiations, create large-scale interference issues severely

impacting the development of the digital single market. Member States and their

competent authorities should take all necessary measures to avoid cross-border and

harmful interference between them. The Radio Spectrum Policy Group (‘RSPG’) that

had been established by Commission Decision 2002/622/EC45 has been supporting the

necessary cross-border coordination and has been the forum for resolving cross-border

issues between Member States. However, the RSPG assistance has fallen short in

cross-border coordination issues with third countries in general or between Member

States involving the non-harmonised radio spectrum (e.g. FM frequencies), as there

have been simply not a sufficient legal basis and the tools for the RSPG to act. The

process of cross-border coordination should continue, but should be extended to non-

harmonised radio spectrum, for instance FM frequencies used for radio broadcasting,

as such radio spectrum might also have a high economic, cultural and social value for

Union citizens. Moreover, any holder of a radio spectrum usage right should be given

the opportunity to initiate the process of assistance to the resolution of the interference,

when it is directly impacted from harmful interference in the lawful use of its radio

spectrum.

(77) Difficult harmful interference cases between Member States that cannot be solved by

direct negotiations, notwithstanding the support of the RSPB, might require the

imposition of binding solutions adopted by the Commission, building on the RSPB’s

proposed solution, to resolve the case definitively or to enforce under Union law a

coordinated solution. Such mechanism should apply under specific deadlines ensuring

that there is no unjustified delay, and propose appropriate solutions, including the

withdrawal of any right that is at the source of the harmful interference situation and

the right to damages.

(78) Cross-border interference from third countries has become an increasingly alarming

problem at the Union borders and a threat not only to the networks themselves, but

also to Union security. For instance, interference to the Global Navigation Satellite

System (‘GNSS’) close to armed conflict areas, such as at the eastern borders of the

Union, has serious consequences to transportation, critical infrastructures, electronic

communications and finance sectors, because modern infrastructure depends heavily

on that system for precise positioning, navigation, and timing (‘PNT’) data. In such

cases, it is not sufficient to rely on efforts at the ITU. There is a need to provide in

Union law a solidarity mechanism to more effectively support affected Member States.

Under that solidarity mechanism, all Member States should be requested to act

together and in line with particular actions defined by the Union together with the

RSPB, and intervene alongside the Commission in supporting affected Member States.

In the case of persistent and serious harmful interference cases violating international

law, the Council may consider adopting restrictive measure under Article 29 TFEU in

line with the objectives of the Common Foreign and Security Policy.

(79) Technological developments, in particular next-generation (e.g. 6G) radio technologies

as well as AI, improve the viability and reliability of radio spectrum sharing across a

45 Commission Decision of 11 June 2019 setting up the Radio Spectrum Policy Group and repealing

Decision 2002/622/EC (OJ C 196, 12.6.2019, p. 16; Commission Decision 2002/622/EC of 26 July

2002 establishing a Radio Spectrum Policy Group (OJ L 198, 27.7.2002, p. 49, ELI:

http://data.europa.eu/eli/dec/2002/622/oj).

EN 41 EN

wide range of frequency bands, thus providing access to a scarce resource to multiple

users, while preventing harmful interference and ensuring adequate protection of

incumbent services. An efficient, effective and innovation-driven use of radio

spectrum is essential to achieve the Union connectivity targets and to support Union

competitiveness. Achieving those objectives requires a regulatory approach that

systematically considers shared radio spectrum use as the norm for radio spectrum

authorisation based on the principle of ‘use it or share it’, while exclusive rights of

radio spectrum use are applied only where necessary and justified. At the same time,

such policy should ensure that radio spectrum sharing is fostering competition, rather

than restricting it.

(80) National competent authorities should consider that radio spectrum which is not used

in a territory or for a period of time is sharable, unless the holder of the right of use

demonstrates that it is not technically feasible to share or that sharing would interfere

with, degrade, or otherwise limit the original holder’s use of the radio spectrum or that

it has plans to use the radio spectrum in a way which does not allow sharing. In order

to determine whether the radio spectrum is being used, national competent authorities

should take into account several elements, including the deployment plans of the

holder of the right in a foreseeable future, and legal obligations under Union law. The

conditions for sharing under the principle of ‘use it or share it’, including the

remuneration, the way to determine the duration of the sharing obligation and the

technical conditions should be determined in advance when granting the right of use.

(81) National competent authorities should promote the shared use of radio spectrum, in

compliance with competition law, by determining the most appropriate authorisation

regimes for each scenario and by establishing appropriate and transparent rules and

conditions therefor. Shared use of radio spectrum can be based on general

authorisations or licence-exempt use allowing, under specific sharing conditions,

several users to access and use the same radio spectrum in different geographic areas

or at different moments in time. It can also be based on individual rights of use under

arrangements such as licensed shared access where all users (existing users and new

users) agree on the terms and conditions for shared access, under the supervision of

the national competent authorities, in such a way as to ensure a minimum guaranteed

radio transmission quality and compliance with competition law. When allowing

shared use of radio spectrum under different authorisation regimes, competent

authorities should not set widely diverging durations for the shared use to ensure

spectrum can be repurposed or reopened for competitive assignment.

(82) While shared use of spectrum promotes its efficient use, it may not be appropriate in

all circumstances. National competent authorities should be able to restrict or refrain

from proposing the shared use of spectrum for reasons relating to competition and

non-discriminatory market access, technical or economic feasibility, the need for

exclusive spectrum use to safeguard public safety, national security, defence or the

protection of essential services as defined in Directive (EU) 2022/2557 of the

European Parliament and of the Council46. This includes, where relevant, the

deployment of key secure and critical communication systems for Europe, which may

require predictable access to spectrum, enhanced resilience and assured performance

46 Directive (EU) 2022/2557 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 December 2022 on the

resilience of critical entities and repealing Council Directive 2008/114/EC (OJ L 333, 27.12.2022,

p. 164, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2022/2557/oj).

EN 42 EN

that cannot be guaranteed under shared use. Any decision to limit or exclude shared

used should be duly justified, proportionate, and based on objective criteria.

(83) Flexibility in radio spectrum management and access to radio spectrum is currently

ensured through technology and service-neutral authorisations to allow radio spectrum

users to choose the best technologies to apply, and services to be provided in radio

spectrum bands declared available for electronic communications services in the

relevant National Frequency Allocation Plans in accordance with Union law (‘the

principle of technology neutrality and the principle of service neutrality’). Any

administrative determination of technologies and services to be used in a given band

should be based on proportionate and non-discriminatory criteria, and should be

clearly justified, in the case of services by general interest objectives, and subject to

regular review. As such determination would introduce an exception to the technology

and service neutrality rule and reduce the freedom to choose the service provided or

technology used, any proposal for such determination should be transparent and

subject to public consultation.

(84) Restrictions to the principle of technology neutrality should be appropriate and

justified by the need to avoid harmful interference, for example by imposing emission

masks and power levels, to ensure the protection of public health by limiting public

exposure to electromagnetic fields, to ensure the proper functioning of services

through an adequate level of technical quality of service, while not necessarily

precluding the possibility of using more than one service in the same radio spectrum

band, to ensure proper sharing of radio spectrum, in particular where its use is subject

only to general authorisation, to safeguard efficient use of radio spectrum, or to fulfil a

general interest objective in accordance with Union law.

(85) National competent authorities should be allowed to require the provision of a specific

service in a particular radio spectrum band to meet clearly defined objectives such as

safety of life, public safety and security, the need to promote social, regional and

territorial cohesion, or the avoidance of the inefficient use of radio spectrum. Those

objectives should include the promotion of cultural and linguistic diversity and media

pluralism, as defined by Member States in accordance with Union law. Except where

necessary to protect safety of life, public safety and security, exceptions should not

result in certain services having exclusive use, but should rather grant them priority so

that, insofar as possible, other services or technologies can coexist in the same radio

spectrum band. It lies within the competence of the Member States to define the scope

and nature of any exception regarding the promotion of cultural and linguistic

diversity and media pluralism.

(86) Where national competent authorities decide, by way of exception, to limit the

freedom to provide electronic communications networks and services based on

grounds of public policy, public security or public health, they should explain the

reasons for such a limitation.

(87) Different Union policy areas rely on radio spectrum, such as electronic

communications, research, technological development and space, transport, energy,

common security and defence, audiovisual and cultural policies. It should be possible

to set policy orientations and objectives for the availability and efficient use of radio

spectrum where it is necessary for the completion of the internal market in those

Union policy areas. In particular, national competent authorities and the Commission

should take all steps necessary to ensure that sufficient radio spectrum is available for

the provision of ubiquitous and high-quality connectivity to all Union citizens and

EN 43 EN

businesses, including when travelling or when they are in rural, remote or offshore

areas. They should ensure radio spectrum availability and protect radio spectrum for

the implementation of Union programmes related to space, in particular for earth and

space observation, satellite navigation and positioning, and secure and resilient

satellite communications for governmental users, as well as for transport and transport

management systems, and the Common Security and Defence Policy activities. Given

the importance of these policies for the EU economy and society, they should also aim

to ensure sufficient radio spectrum for audiovisual and content production services, as

well as for research and scientific activities.

(88) While such policy orientations and objectives set by the multiannual radio spectrum

policy programme, established by Decision No 243/2012/EU47, are still valid, its

actions have been largely completed or became outdated. To avoid duplication and

ensure consistency, the objectives from the multiannual Radio Spectrum Policy

Programme (‘RSPP’) should be reflected in this Regulation and Decision

No 243/2012/EU should be repealed.

(89) In view to the implementation of the specific current and future Union policies relying

on radio spectrum, timely identification of their radio spectrum needs is essential.

Considering that, in order to increase regulatory predictability, the precise needs and

timing for availability of radio spectrum should be known when such policies are

being developed or adopted, the harmonised details of the specific bands involved and

the coordinated rules for their availability and use should be specified for each case by

the Commission in a strategic document adopted after consulting the RSPB. A Union

radio spectrum strategy should be adopted after each ITU World Radiocommunication

Conference (‘WRC’) to provide, inter alia, transparency as to how the different WRC

decisions will be incorporated in the Union legal order. The aim of the radio spectrum

strategy is to increase the transparency of radio spectrum related activity at Union

level and enhance predictability for different competent authorities and market players.

(90) Union radio spectrum strategy could include operational radio spectrum roadmaps

defining specific milestones and deadlines for the availability and authorisation of

radio spectrum which are to be established through Commission implementing acts

when the specific circumstances and needs for radio spectrum are known. When

adopting the Union radio spectrum strategy and roadmaps, the Commission should

take into consideration Union policy objectives, such as the need to safeguard the

Union’s strategic autonomy, including common security and defence needs, the

Digital Decade connectivity targets, in particular for 5G and advanced wireless

networks, the completion of the single market and the need to meet specific

technological or quality requirements for cross-border services. In particular, such

Union spectrum strategy should identify spectrum (parts of spectrum/bands) which

Member States should make available under harmonised procedures and conditions for

the purpose of serving Union common security and defence policy. The Commission

should also take into account that radio spectrum is a public good with an important

social, cultural and economic value, that should be used effectively and efficiently.

Union radio spectrum strategy and roadmaps should respect relevant international

agreements applicable to radio spectrum, including avoidance of harmful interference,

47 Decision No 243/2012/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 March 2012

establishing a multiannual radio spectrum policy programme (OJ L 81, 21.3.2012, p. 7

ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dec/2012/243(2)/oj).

EN 44 EN

and should promote the principles of technology and service neutrality and of shared

used of radio spectrum, in compliance with competition law. For the Union radio

spectrum strategy and roadmaps to make a difference, a process should be established

within the RSPB which allows national competent authorities, together with the

Commission, to monitor advancement in implementation in Member States and

exchange experience, good practices and information. Moreover, synergies should be

explored with the monitoring mechanism of the Digital Decade and of the European

Semester.

(91) Given the importance for EU competitiveness of the timely introduction of the next-

generation (6G) wireless broadband communications, including its non-terrestrial

elements, this should be the focus of the first Union radio spectrum strategy and

roadmap. Nevertheless, the strategy should also include radio spectrum needs of other

Union policies, as they arise, and should be holistic cater for the use not only of

licenses, but also of unlicensed use, such as for instance for Radio Local Area

Networks (‘RLAN’).

(92) To tap the full benefit of harmonisation under Decision No 676/2002/EC, the use of

harmonised radio spectrum bands should be allowed in a timely and synchronised

manner throughout the Union. Allowing the use of a radio spectrum band entails

assigning radio spectrum under a general authorisation regime or individual rights of

use in order to permit the use of radio spectrum as soon as the assignment process is

completed. In order to assign radio spectrum bands, it might be necessary to release a

band occupied by other users and to compensate those users for the direct costs of

migrating or reallocating the spectrum according to national law. The implementation

of a common deadline might however be affected in a particular Member State by

issues relating to unresolved cross-border coordination, to the complex technical

migration of existing users of a band, to a general interest objective, to the

safeguarding of national security and defence or to force majeure. In any case,

competent authorities should take all measures necessary to reduce any delay to the

minimum in terms of geographical coverage, timing and radio spectrum range.

National competent authorities should, depending on relevant circumstances, request

the Union to provide legal, political and technical support to resolve radio spectrum

coordination issues with neighbouring countries, including candidate and acceding

countries.

(93) With the fast development of new wireless technologies and services, including using

modern capabilities, such as AI, the Union radio spectrum management should be

more agile and pro-active. In this regard, it is important to give innovators and other

prospective users the opportunity to initiate the harmonisation process at Union level,

if the need is demonstrated for, inter alia, the introduction of new technologies or the

elimination of old technologies that make the use of radio spectrum inefficient or harm

consumers. An open, transparent and non-discriminatory process should therefore be

created for a formal filing and review of requests for harmonisation of spectrum by the

Commission. The process should include a public consultation helping the

Commission to decide whether to start a new process, and if so with which scope. As a

consequence, the Commission should be able to decide whether to start updating or

developing a radio spectrum related policy with support of the RSPB or to initiate the

development of harmonised technical and operational conditions for the use of a

particular radio spectrum band together with the Radio Spectrum Committee pursuant

to Decision No 676/2002/EC. The form, content and level of detail to be given in the

EN 45 EN

requests, details of the process of handling of the requests and, where relevant, any

deadlines should be provided in guidelines.

(94) General authorisations for the use of radio spectrum can facilitate the most effective

use of radio spectrum and foster innovation in some cases and are pro-competitive,

whereas individual rights of use for radio spectrum in other cases may be the most

appropriate authorisation regime in the presence of certain specific circumstances.

Individual rights of use should be considered, for example, when favourable

propagation characteristics of the radio spectrum or the envisaged power level of the

transmission imply that general authorisations cannot address the interference

concerns in light of the required quality of service. Technical measures, such as

solutions to improve receiver resilience, can enable the use of general authorisations or

radio spectrum sharing, and possibly avoid systematic recourse to the non-interference

and non-protection principle. General authorisations can be combined with individual

rights of use. This could be particularly useful for bands which do not have good

propagation characteristics, such as the millimetre wave bands. For instance, a band

may be assigned under individual rights of use in urban areas, while in rural areas it is

made available under general authorisation. In order to promote a consistent approach

in the Union, the Commission may adopt a recommendation designating the most

appropriate authorisation regime for the use of radio spectrum in a particular

harmonised radio spectrum band, or parts thereof.

(95) In general, it is for the competent authorities to decide on the most appropriate

authorisation regime to be applied in a particular radio spectrum band or parts thereof.

Where there is a risk of diverging solutions that could fragment the internal market,

particularly where harmonised conditions for a radio spectrum band are established

under Decision No 676/2002/EC, and thereby delay the rollout of wireless systems,

the Commission should be empowered to decide, taking account of the opinion of the

RSPB, on common solutions, acknowledging the technical harmonisation measures in

force. The aim of such decisions is to provide a common toolbox for competent

authorities which they should take into account when identifying appropriate

consistent authorisation regimes to be applied to a band, or part of a band, depending

on factors such as population density, propagation characteristics of the bands,

divergence between urban and rural uses, the possible need to protect existing services

and the resulting implications for economies of scale in manufacturing.

(96) In order to facilitate the development of advanced services at larger scale, enable a

more efficient use of the radio spectrum, and decrease the cost of wireless network

deployment, prospective users of radio spectrum for public or non-public networks

should be allowed to request that, to the extent possible, the same authorisation

conditions apply in the Member States where they use radio spectrum for their

networks. The Commission and competent authorities should cooperate with each

other, and with the RSPB, to develop common authorisation conditions. The

Commission should also have the power to make the use of such conditions binding.

The harmonisation of authorisation conditions aims to facilitate the cross-border

provision of services and economies of scale.

(97) To promote the provision of pan-European high-quality networks and services or to

exploit economies of scale, the Commission should be empowered to authorise a part

of radio spectrum at Union level. Every new generation of mobile networks is more

expensive to deploy than the previous one. It is hence not economically feasible for all

mobile network operators currently active in the Union market to upgrade their

networks to 6G. If requested by the Commission, the RSPB should hence assess, in its

EN 46 EN

opinion on common authorisation conditions, the opportunity of an award of radio

spectrum at the Union level and suggest an appropriate authorisation procedure and

award conditions, such as, for instance, operation on a wholesale model. The same

need could also arise to increase the amount of radio spectrum used for mobile satellite

services, by repurposing terrestrial radio spectrum. In order to ensure the provision of

pan-European services, such repurposed radio spectrum should also be awarded and

authorised at the Union level. Setting the same authorisation conditions at the Union

level and, if requested, Union authorisation and harmonised award conditions at the

Union level could facilitate the deployment and development of high-quality networks

and services, such as satellite communications services provided using radio spectrum

allocated for terrestrial services or 6G networks.

(98) In order to reduce bureaucracy and accelerate access to radio spectrum for which the

authorisation conditions have been harmonised in more than one Member State, it

should be possible to establish a procedure to facilitate the granting of individual

rights of use by more than one national regulatory authority, in a coordinated manner

and at a single location in the form of a ‘one stop shop procedure’. The Commission

should be able to recommend ways for competent authorities to deal with such

requests in a one-stop-shop manner.

(99) Where the harmonised assignment of radio spectrum to particular undertakings has

been agreed at Union level, Member States should strictly implement such agreements

in the granting of rights of use for radio spectrum from the National Frequency

Allocation Plan.

(100) Sufficiently long duration of rights of use of radio spectrum will increase investment

predictability and contribute to faster network roll-out and better services, as well as

stability to support radio spectrum trading and leasing. The minimum duration of

rights of use for wireless broadband established by Directive (EU) 2018/1972 has not

proven sufficient to attract sufficient investments, to allow for business continuity and

amortisation of mobile ventures compared to other communication technologies, and

to encourage more ambitious deployments of networks and advanced and cross border

services.

(101) Investment predictability can hence be better achieved by the provision of rights with

indefinite duration, which national competent authorities should have the possibility to

subject to periodic reviews, with credible revocation options administered by the

competent authorities, including the national competition authorities. At the same

time, indefinite duration facilitates the development of a functioning secondary market

for radio spectrum trading and leasing. The risk that indefinite duration of rights of use

would prevent market entry and reduce competition, availability, quality of services,

and investment incentives should however be addressed through strong and credible

regulatory safeguards that protect competition and prevent radio spectrum hoarding,

such as obligations to provide wholesale access or enable radio spectrum sharing

subject to compliance with competition law. By choosing appropriate authorisation

conditions - such as ‘use-it-or-share-it’ or ‘use-it-or-lose-it’ conditions and rollout

obligations - and by enforcing them, the national competent authorities are able to

ensure that radio spectrum is not left idle or blocked and is made available to more

efficient or innovative competitors. Considering the importance of technical

innovation, national competent authorities should be able to provide for rights to use

radio spectrum for experimental purposes, including in scientific research projects and

experimentations conducted in the lifecycle of the projects funded in the scope of the

EN 47 EN

EU programmes, subject to specific restrictions and conditions, including duration,

strictly justified by the experimental nature of such rights.

(102) As long-term investment planning depends on guarantees for renewals of the rights of

use in the same way as on the duration of the rights of use, the renewal should be in

principle automatic, unless there are compelling reasons against it. National competent

authorities should have the power not to renew the rights of use or to renew them for a

shorter period or under changed conditions. This should be the case where certain

conditions for refusal or change are met based on criteria that should be restrictively

interpreted to provide sufficient guarantees and predictability. Refusal of renewal

could be based on public policy objectives under Union law, as well as on the general

objectives of this Regulation, including defence and security needs. Any decision not

to renew should be subject to an open, non-discriminatory and transparent procedure

and be notified under the spectrum single market procedure. In order to ensure legal

certainty and respect, legitimate expectations of holders of the rights, the possibility of

refusal to renew should be considered within an appropriate timespan prior to the

expiry of the rights concerned, of at least 5 years.

(103) Renewals should be accompanied by a review of the annual and one-off fees for the

use of radio spectrum to ensure that those fees continue to promote optimal use, taking

account, inter alia, of market developments and technological evolution. Such review

should be based on the value of the rights of use as resulted from the latest competitive

or comparative assignment procedure adjusted to reflect the cost of additional terms

and conditions attached thereto, such as coverage or quality of service requirements.

The revenues per connection, as well as the overall burden that holders of rights have

from all their radio spectrum holdings, should also be taken into account, to avoid that

very high prices paid in past auctions continue to overburden holders of rights and

prevent them from investing in networks. For reasons of legal certainty, any

adjustments to the existing fees should be based on the same principles as those

applicable to the fees established in the context of awards of new rights of use.

(104) Transfer of rights of use for radio spectrum can be an effective means of increasing the

efficient use of radio spectrum. For the sake of flexibility and efficiency, and to allow

valuation of radio spectrum by the market, national competent authorities should by

default allow radio spectrum users to transfer or lease their rights of use for radio

spectrum to third parties following a simple procedure and subject to the conditions

attached to such rights and to competition rules, under the supervision of the national

regulatory authorities responsible. The conditions under which an individual right may

be transferred or leased by the holder of the right should be specified at the moment of

granting that right. In order to facilitate such transfers or leases, provided that technical

implementing measures adopted under Decision No 676/2002/EC are respected,

Member States should also consider requests to have radio spectrum rights partitioned

or disaggregated and conditions for use reviewed. At the same time, it should be

possible for the national competent authority to reject the transfer or lease of radio

spectrum for reasons of security or sovereignty or other public/policy goals, including

promoting or maintaining effective competition, or in the absence of sufficient

guarantees that the radio spectrum will be used in accordance with the authorisation

conditions or for the intended use.

(105) New concepts of radio spectrum sharing require accurate, real-time data on frequency

occupancy to ensure efficient use of radio spectrum and avoidance of interference. A

dynamic database focused on specific frequency bands should help identifying

underused radio spectrum and support more efficient radio spectrum use and sharing

EN 48 EN

practices, in line with competition law. Such a dynamic inventory could also

contribute to the development and implementation of any operational radio spectrum

roadmap.

(106) In line with the case-law of the Court of Justice, national competent authorities should

not levy any charges or fees in relation to the provision of networks and electronic

communications services other than those provided for by this Regulation. Where the

provision of electronic communications relies on public resources the use of which is

subject to specific authorisation, national competent authorities should be able to

impose fees to ensure optimal use of those resources. Fees should reflect the value of

the rights of use taking account inter alia of the economic and technical situation of the

market concerned and be set in a manner that ensures efficient assignment and use of

radio spectrum. It should be possible, for example, to use such fees to finance

activities of national regulatory and other national competent authorities that cannot be

covered by administrative charges. Where, in the case of competitive or comparative

selection procedures, fees for rights of use for radio spectrum consist entirely or partly

of a one-off amount, payment arrangements should ensure that such fees do not in

practice lead to selection on the basis of criteria unrelated to the objective of ensuring

optimal use of radio spectrum.

(107) The methodology for calculating the level of radio spectrum fees in the Union differs

considerably between Member States. This discrepancy could make difficult the

provision of networks based on radio spectrum in multiple Member States. The

Commission should hence publish, on a regular basis, benchmark studies and, as

appropriate, develop other guidance with regard to the methodology for calculating

radio spectrum annual fees to be imposed by national national competent authorities

for terrestrial spectrum. Such methodology should be based on the principles of

effective and efficient use of radio spectrum, transparency, non-discrimination and

proportionality in relation to their intended purpose, and allow national competent

authorities to calculate the exact fee to be applied, which could comprise a fixed

annual part (per KHz per category of band) and a percentage of the yearly turnover

generated through the use of frequencies. When the Commission determines the

methodology, the experience of BEREC and the national regulatory authorities in

building suitable cost models will be invaluable and should be taken into

account. National competent authorities should make sure that the amount of the fees

in any case covers the cost of the management of the radio spectrum.

(108) Any burden imposed on undertakings for rights of use for radio spectrum can

influence decisions about whether to seek and put into use radio spectrum

resources. National competent authorities should therefore set reserve prices in a way

that leads to the efficient assignment of those rights, irrespective of the type of

selection procedure used. The Commission may issue a recommendation on a common

methodology for defining reserve prices, considering criteria such as the opportunity

cost of radio spectrum, the characteristics of the band and the costs associated with the

fulfilment of authorisation conditions imposed to further policy objectives. In doing

so, the competitive situation of the market concerned including the possible alternative

uses of the resources should also be considered. In principle, national

competent authorities should not set reserve prices where they impose coverage or

quality of service obligations, unless there is a risk of collusion and/or non-serious

participation unduly lengthening the procedure, etc. The Commission should be

empowered to adopt implementing acts, if the recommendation is not successful to

EN 49 EN

ensure consistent outcomes in the Union and this jeopardises the ubiquitous

deployment of high quality wireless networks in the Union.

(109) Considering the high level of cost of radio spectrum that has originated due to the

reliance of auction selection based on the comparative payment of fees, priority should

be given to commitments over fees. It should therefore be possible to substitute fees

by commitments offered by applicants to implement measures that would directly

benefit the deployment of networks and the quality of wireless communications. In

practice, this could take the form of advanced payments that would be repaid, or bank

guarantees that would be lifted when those commitments are fulfilled.

(110) The requirement to respect the principles of technology and service neutrality in

granting rights of use, together with the possibility to transfer rights between

undertakings, underpin the freedom and means to deliver electronic communications

services to the public, thereby also facilitating the achievement of general interest

objectives. This Regulation is without prejudice whether radio spectrum is assigned

directly to providers of electronic communications networks or services or to entities

that use those networks or services. Such entities may be radio or television broadcast

content providers. The responsibility for compliance with the conditions attached to

the right of use for radio spectrum and the relevant conditions attached to the general

authorisation should in any case lie with the undertaking to which the right of use for

radio spectrum has been granted. Certain obligations imposed on broadcasters for the

delivery of audiovisual media services may require the use of specific criteria and

procedures for the granting of radio spectrum usage rights to meet a specific general

interest objective set out by national competent authorities in accordance with Union

law. However, the procedure for the granting of such right should in any event be

objective, transparent, non-discriminatory and proportionate.

(111) The case-law of the Court of Justice requires that any national restrictions to the rights

guaranteed by Article 56 TFEU are objectively justified and proportionate and do not

exceed those necessary to achieve their objectives. Moreover, radio spectrum granted

without an open procedure should not be used for purposes other than the general

interest objective for which they were granted. In such a case, the interested parties

should be given the opportunity to comment within a reasonable period.

(112) As part of the application procedure for granting rights, the national competent

authorities should verify whether the applicant is able to comply with the conditions to

be attached to such rights. Those conditions should be reflected in eligibility criteria

set out in objective, transparent, proportionate and non-discriminatory terms prior to

the launch of any competitive selection procedure. For the purpose of applying such

criteria, it should be possible to require that applicants submit the necessary

information to prove their ability to comply with those conditions. Where such

information is not provided, the national competent authority should be able to reject

the application for the right of use of radio spectrum.

(113) National competent authorities should, prior to the granting of the right, only verify

elements that can reasonably be demonstrated by an applicant exercising ordinary

care, taking due account of the important public and market value of radio spectrum as

a scarce public resource. This should not prevent the national competent authority

from carrying out subsequent verification of the fulfilment of eligibility criteria, for

example through milestones, where the criteria could not reasonably be met initially.

To preserve effective and efficient use of radio spectrum, national competent

authorities should not grant rights where their review indicates applicants’ inability to

EN 50 EN

comply with the conditions, without prejudice to the possibility of facilitating time-

limited experimental use.

(114) Where demand for a radio spectrum band exceeds the availability and, as a result, a

national competent authority concludes that the number of rights of use for radio

spectrum is to be limited, appropriate and transparent procedures should apply for the

granting of such rights to avoid any discrimination and optimise the use of the scarce

resource. Such limitation should be justified, proportionate and based on a thorough

assessment of market conditions, giving due weight to the overall benefits for users

and to national and internal market objectives. The objectives governing any limitation

procedure should be clearly established in advance and, where possible, quantified

giving due weight to the need to fulfil national and internal market objectives. When

considering the most appropriate selection procedure, national competent authorities

should, in accordance with coordination measures taken at Union level, in a timely and

transparent manner, consult all interested parties on the justification, objectives and

conditions of the procedure, inter alia stating the outcome of any related assessment of

the competitive, technical and economic situation of the market. National competent

authorities should be able to use, inter alia, competitive or comparative selection

procedures for the assignment of radio spectrum, taking into account, inter alia, the

competitive, technical and economic situation of the market. In administering such

schemes, national competent authorities should take into account the objectives of this

Regulation. If a Member State finds that further rights can be made available in a

band, it should start the process therefor.

(115) While supporting transparent, non-discriminatory assignment and efficient use of radio

spectrum, auctions - as a type of a selection procedure relying on competitive price

bidding - could result in creation of an important financial burden on operators if they

are not designed properly or the award conditions do not reflect the situation on the

market. Therefore, priority should be given to investment-oriented auctions focusing

on the achievement of certain quality and coverage commitments rather than on the

payment of fees.

(116) The voluntary Peer Review Forum established by Directive (EU) 2018/1972 as an

instrument for peer learning has not succeeded in making more convergent use and

definition of elements of selection procedures and the conditions attached to the rights

of use for radio spectrum, as only about one third of the national measures were

reviewed by peers. As those elements and conditions have a significant impact on

market conditions and the competitive situation, including conditions for entry and

expansion, a new ex ante coordination mechanism – a radio spectrum single market

procedure – should be established. That procedure should apply to every measure

proposed by national competent authorities with a view to undertake a selection

procedure or to amend or renew rights of use in relation to harmonised radio spectrum

for wireless broadband electronic communications networks and services. Such an

ex ante mechanism is more efficient than intervention ex post, as it can detect in

advance measures which are ill justified or disproportionate. The notifying authority

should especially explain how any proposed market shaping measure is necessary to

maintain or achieve effective competition and outline its likely effects on existing and

future investments by market participants, on the basis of a market analysis. If the

notifying authority intends to impose a definite duration of a right to use, it should

present arguments for how it considers the proposed duration to be sufficient in light

of the investments that are needed to achieve the objectives of the assignment

procedure and of this Regulation. The Commission should be able to notify any

EN 51 EN

reservations that it may have on draft market shaping measures, i.e. measures that

impact the structure or the level of competition in the market, such as radio spectrum

caps, reservations or wholesale access obligations, and should in such case state the

reasons for the reservation. The Commission could consider that the measure would

create a barrier to the internal market or have seriously doubts about its compatibility

with Union law, in particular the objectives of this Regulation. The Commission could

also notify any reservations that may arise in the case of a limited duration, where it

considers that such duration is insufficient. In its evaluation, the Commission will need

to consider any possible impact that duration of rights of use would have on

competition. To ensure its effectiveness, the process should provide the Commission

with a possibility of a veto on the duration of rights of use and on market shaping

measures if deemed necessary. This new radio spectrum single market procedure

should replace the Peer Review Forum.

(117) Where they are supported by robust economic evidence and are well designed, market-

shaping measures and limited licence durations can play an important role in

safeguarding effective competition in electronic communications markets. Measures

taken specifically to promote competition when granting or renewing rights of use for

radio spectrum should be decided by national regulatory authorities and other national

competent authorities, which have the necessary economic, technical and market

knowledge. Radio spectrum assignment conditions can influence the competitive

situation in electronic communications markets and conditions for entry. Limited

access to radio spectrum, in particular when radio spectrum is scarce, can create a

barrier to entry or hamper investment, network roll-out, the provision of new services

or applications, innovation and competition. New rights of use, including those

acquired through transfer or leasing, and the introduction of new flexible criteria for

radio spectrum use can also influence existing competition. Where unduly applied,

certain conditions used to promote competition can have other effects. For example,

radio spectrum caps and reservations can create artificial scarcity, wholesale access

obligations can unduly constrain business models in the absence of market power, and

limits on transfers can impede the development of secondary markets. Therefore, a

consistent and objective competition test for the imposition of such conditions is

necessary and should be applied in a coordinated manner. The use of such measures

should therefore be based on a thorough and objective assessment, by national

regulatory authorities, of the market and the competitive conditions thereof on the

basis of a market analysis. National competent authorities should, however, always

ensure the effective and efficient use of radio spectrum and avoid distortion of

competition through anti-competitive hoarding.

(118) Measures which intervene in the structure of the market, such as radio spectrum caps

or reservations, may be imposed only where less intrusive measures, such as wholesale

access obligations, are not sufficient to guarantee effective competition at retail level.

Before wholesale access obligations are imposed, national competent authorities

should assess whether retail markets would be effectively competitive in the absence

of wholesale intervention. The assessment should be holistic and take into account a

number of parameters, such as but not limited to listed prices for mass market

consumer and business products, rebates, including targeted rebates, as well as

investments and quality of service. When determining the rights of use subject to such

obligations, the national competent authority should consider the capacity available to

support wholesale offers.

EN 52 EN

(119) Massive growth in radio spectrum demand, and in end-user demand for wireless

broadband capacity, calls for solutions allowing alternative, complementary, spectrally

efficient access solutions, including low-power wireless access systems with a small-

area operating range, such as RLANs and networks of low-power small-size cellular

access points. Such complementary wireless access systems, in particular publicly

accessible RLAN access points, increase access to the internet for end-users and

mobile traffic off-loading for mobile operators. RLANs use harmonised radio

spectrum without requiring an individual authorisation or a right of use for radio

spectrum. To date, most RLAN access points are used by private users as local

wireless extension of their fixed broadband connection. End-users, within the limits of

their own internet subscription, should not be prevented from sharing access to their

RLAN with others, in order to increase the number of available access points, in

particular in densely populated areas, maximise wireless data capacity through radio

spectrum re-use and create a cost-effective complementary wireless broadband

infrastructure accessible to other end-users. Therefore, unnecessary restrictions to the

deployment and interlinkage of RLAN access points should be removed.

(120) Public authorities or public service providers that use RLANs in their premises for

their personnel, visitors or clients, for example to facilitate access to e-Government

services or for information on public transport or road traffic management, should also

provide access to such access points for general use by citizens as an ancillary service

to services they offer to the public on such premises, to the extent allowed by

competition and public procurement rules. Moreover, the provider of such local access

to electronic communications networks within or around a private property or a

limited public area on a non-commercial basis or as an ancillary service to another

activity that is not dependent on such access, such as RLAN hotspots made available

to customers of other commercial activities or to the general public in that area, can be

subject to compliance with general authorisations for rights of use for radio spectrum

but should not be subject to any conditions or requirements attached to general

authorisations applicable to providers of public electronic communications networks

or services or to obligations regarding end-users or interconnection. However, such a

provider should remain subject to the liability rules set out in Regulation (EU)

2022/2065 of the European Parliament and of the Council48. Further technologies,

such as visible light communications, are emerging and will complement current radio

spectrum capabilities of RLANs and wireless access point to include optical visible

light-based access points and lead to hybrid local area networks allowing optical

wireless communication.

(121) Since low-power small-area wireless access points, such as femtocells, picocells,

metrocells or microcells, can be very small and make use of unobtrusive equipment

similar to that of domestic RLAN routers, which do not require any permits beyond

those necessary for the use of radio spectrum, and considering the positive impact of

such access points on the use of radio spectrum and on the development of wireless

communications, any restriction to their deployment should be limited to the greatest

extent possible. As a result, in order to facilitate the deployment of small-area wireless

access points, and without prejudice to any applicable requirement related to radio

spectrum management, national competent authorities, in principle, should not subject

48 Regulation (EU) 2022/2065 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 October 2022 on a

Single Market For Digital Services and amending Directive 2000/31/EC (Digital Services Act) (OJ L

277, 27.10.2022, p. 1, ELI:http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2022/2065/oj).

EN 53 EN

any individual permits to the deployment of such devices on buildings which are not

officially protected as part of a designated environment or because of their special

architectural or historical merit, except for reasons of public safety. To that end, their

characteristics, such as maximum size, weight and emission characteristics, should be

specified at Union level in a proportionate way for local deployment and to ensure a

high level of protection of public health. For the operation of small-area wireless

access points, Article 7 of Directive 2014/53/EU should apply. This is without

prejudice to private property rights set out in Union law or national law. The

procedure for considering permit applications should be streamlined and without

prejudice to any commercial agreements and any administrative charge involved

should be limited to the administrative costs relating to the processing of the

application. The process of assessing a request for a permit should take as little time as

possible, and in principle no longer than four months.

(122) Public buildings and other public infrastructure are visited and used daily by a

significant number of end-users who need connectivity to consume Digital Public

Services, Digital Transport and other services. Other public infrastructure, such as

streetlamps, traffic lights, offer very valuable sites for deploying small cells, for

instance, due to their density. Without prejudice to the possibility for national

competent authorities to subject the deployment of small-area wireless access points to

prior individual permits, operators should have the right of access to those public sites

for the purpose of adequately serving demand. National competent authorities should

therefore ensure that such public buildings and other public infrastructure are made

available on reasonable conditions for the deployment of small cells with a view to

complementing Regulation (EU) 2024/1309 of the European Parliament and of the

Council49 and without prejudice to the principles set out in that Regulation. Regulation

(EU) 2024/1309 follows a functional approach and imposes obligations of access to

physical infrastructure only when it is part of a network and only if it is owned or used

by a network operator, thereby leaving many buildings owned or used by public

authorities outside its scope. On the contrary, a specific obligation is not necessary for

physical infrastructure, such as ducts or poles, used for intelligent transport systems,

which are owned by network operators (providers of transport services or providers of

public electronic communications networks), and host parts of a network, thus falling

within the scope of Regulation (EU) 2024/1309.

(123) Article 4 of Decision No 676/2002/EC related to the function of the Radio Spectrum

Committee should be amended. In order to ensure the security and the technological

sovereignty of the Union and of its Member States, a mechanism should be established

that allows the Commission and Member States to discuss issues and decide on the

common position without involvement of third countries and stakeholders. The

Commission should therefore be empowered to require Member States to establish, in

the Radio Spectrum Committee, common positions related to the development of

certain technical implementing measures that might affect the security or the

technological sovereignty of the Union or of its Member States, prior to the

discussions at the CEPT.

49 Regulation (EU) 2024/1309 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2024 on

measures to reduce the cost of deploying high-speed gigabit electronic communications networks,

amending Regulation (EU) 2015/2120 and repealing Directive 2014/61/EU (Gigabit Infrastructure Act),

(OJ L 2024/1309, 8.5.2014, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/1309/oj).

EN 54 EN

(124) Satellite communications play a vital role in ensuring the Union’s security, resilience,

and strategic autonomy. Recent technological advancements, evolving market

dynamics, geopolitical challenges, and competition concerns related to satellite

networks necessitate enhanced action at Union level. Satellite operators are

increasingly seeking pan-European market access, and regulators are under growing

pressure to establish appropriate regulatory frameworks that align with Union policies

and objectives. There is a need to simplify and consolidate the rules on the provision

of satellite communications networks and services, and use of satellite spectrum,

facilitate the creation of cross-border services and networks, and prevent regulatory

gaps in conditions to access the Union satellite markets.

(125) In its opinion of 16 June 2021 on the Radio Spectrum Policy Programme, the RSPG

emphasised that spectrum policy should support the development of innovative

satellite systems ensuring EU-controlled connectivity and the provision of reliable,

resilient and cost-effective governmental satellite services. A strengthened Union

framework is hence necessary to position the Union as a prominent actor in the global

space industry, provide a robust basis for the development and operation of pan-

European satellite infrastructures, and ensure the effective enforcement of security and

competition safeguards. Further, this framework should be essential to implement the

European Preparedness Union Strategy, adopted on 26 March 2025, that stresses inter

alia the need to develop minimum preparedness criteria for essential services such as

electronic communications services to ensure the resilience of vital societal functions,

and to promote dual use by design, in developing secure communications and

connectivity across the Union.

(126) In accordance with Article 216(1) TFEU, the Union has external competence and may

conclude agreements with international organisations where the Treaties so provide or

where this is necessary to achieve the objectives of the Union’s policies. The

management of radio spectrum and the use of radio frequencies, including for satellite

communications, are areas largely regulated by Union legislation adopted on the basis

of Article 114 TFEU, in particular Directive (EU) 2019/1872 and Decision No

676/2002/EC. The use of radio spectrum by satellites is inherently international in

nature, as it is governed by global coordination mechanisms in the ITU and enables

cross-border service provision across multiple countries. At the same time, satellite

radio spectrum constitutes a critical asset for global communication markets,

influencing competitiveness, investment, and the availability to provide innovative

services across the Union. In view of these dual international and market dimensions,

a coherent and forward-looking Union approach is necessary to ensure efficient

satellite radio spectrum use, effective coordination, and proper functioning of the

internal single market.

(127) One of the basic processes to ensure an interference free operation is coordination of

satellite networks prior to their launching. In accordance with the ITU Radio

Regulations, the administration that is filing a new satellite system should coordinate

with all already launched or filed systems that the new satellite system might affect

and adjust parameters, so it does not cause harmful interference to such systems. In

order to enhance transparency within the Union with regard to ITU filings and

registers, national competent authorities should inform the Commission and other

national competent authorities in the RSPB of such activities. Moreover, a mechanism

should be set up to ensure that an administration may seek support from other national

competent authorities and the Union to carry out the ITU coordination in particular

where there is risk that Union interest and policies are affected.

EN 55 EN

(128) Harmonisation and management of radio spectrum for satellite use at the international

level through the ITU do not have as an effect the harmonisation of national

authorisation procedures for the provision of satellite communications services and for

use of related spectrum. Applicable rules and conditions governing satellite networks

and satellite communications services remain fragmented across Member States,

hindering satellite operators in the Union from achieving the necessary scale to

provide cross-border or pan-European connectivity services. Such services are

increasingly essential for connecting underserved and remote areas, strengthening

resilience, and supporting the deployment of new technologies. To overcome those

challenges, the provision of satellite networks and services should be subject to

general authorisation at Union level, under conditions developed by the Commission

together with the Member States. In view of the diversity of satellite networks and

services, such authorisation conditions should better be developed through

implementing acts, and in close cooperation with the RSPB, given the vast experience

of national spectrum authorities in satellite authorisation. A notification to the

Commission under such general authorisation would confer to an undertaking the

same rights all over the Union without a need to notify separately in individual

Member States.

(129) A harmonised and centralised Union framework for the authorisation of the use of

satellite spectrum should be established, with implementation supported by national

competent authorities from Member States. Such a framework, granting Union-level

rights of use under common conditions, would enhance legal certainty, reduce

fragmentation, and strengthen the Union’s strategic autonomy, security and

sovereignty in satellite communications, while complementing the objectives of the

Union Space Act and the Vision for the Union Space Economy. Union-level satellite

authorisation, through a procedure involving the Commission and the RSPB,

supported by the ODN, in all steps from allocation, licensing to enforcement, would

reduce administrative burden, enhance transparency in market access, and ensure

consistent management of radio spectrum scarcity and interference. It would safeguard

the integrity of the internal market, promote secure and competitive services, and align

radio spectrum policies with the Union’s strategic objectives, thereby supporting

secure, scalable and strategically autonomous satellite communications.

(130) Spectrum used for satellite networks and services should be subject to a Union

authorisation granted by the Commission with the assistance of RSPB. A European

Table of Allocation of Satellite Frequencies should be adopted to provide transparency

to satellite operators as to which spectrum may be accessed for specific satellite

services. While for certain satellite spectrum bands, the Commission may decide that

their access shall be possible under general authorisation, such as for Internet of

Things, for others, individual rights of use should be preferred, in view of the need to

avoid harmful interference, ensure quality of service, network resilience and security

of communications.

(131) Moreover, in order to enable the provision of pan-European satellite networks and

services, the authorisation conditions for the use of satellite spectrum should be the

same across the Union. Such authorisation conditions should in particular guarantee

the respect of applicable ITU Radio Regulations’ rules on satellite coordination and

avoidance of harmful interference as well as coordination with other satellite systems,

present and future, which is of special importance for the existing and planned satellite

systems under Union’s programmes. Authorisation conditions for the provision of

satellite networks or services should also seek coherence with the Cybersecurity Act

EN 56 EN

which is to replace Regulation (EU) 2019/881 of the European Parliament and of the

Council.

(132) As most satellite spectrum might be efficiently shared between different providers, the

majority of Union authorisations would be granted on a first come first served basis.

To date, only the holders of the right to use the 2 GHz band for pan-European

provision of the Mobile Satellite Service (‘MSS’) were chosen subject to the Union

selection procedure under Decision 626/2008/EC. As other satellite spectrum might

become scarce in the future, an appropriate selection procedure should be established

in the Regulation to select holders of rights of use in bands in such circumstances.

Such procedure should be inspired by the procedure under Decision 626/2008/EC,

which sets out a comparative selection procedure. Comparative selection procedures

should focus on deploying innovative satellite communications as well as fostering the

integration of European technologies within the new space ecosystem. This is crucial

for enhancing the Union's industrial and scientific capabilities and strengthening

Europe’s strategic autonomy and supply chains in the space sector. In certain cases,

competitive procedures, such as auctions, may be more appropriate to ensure that

spectrum is assigned to the undertakings which could make the best use of it. In such

cases, care should be taken to ensure that other policy objectives are appropriately

taken into account, such as the need to ensure broad coverage of the Union territory.

(133) In its opinion from 17 June 2025 on the EU-level policy approach to satellite Direct-

to-Device connectivity and related Single Market issues, the RSPG identified a need

for a safeguarding mechanism to enable Member States to react collectively in the

benefit of EU interests to the cases of non-compliance to common requirements of

satellite communications services. Indeed, although there is a well-established process,

under ITU, for the bilateral resolution of cross-border interference cases between

administrations, such process is long and is not accompanied by sufficient guarantees

for an effective and timely resolution of the interferences. This Regulation should

hence establish the tools to ensure compliance with authorisation conditions set in the

Regulation, especially obligations to coordinate and to prevent harmful interference in

the Union territory. Moreover, although the authorisation of satellite networks and

services and the use of related spectrum should be done at Union level, monitoring

compliance with the conditions of the authorisation should benefit from the

cooperation between the Commission and national competent authorities, which have

jurisdiction, capacity and expertise to check compliance and detect issues of harmful

interference.

(134) With the view to ensuring a coordinated monitoring and enforcement of Union

authorisations, the Commission should, taking into account the opinion of the RSPB,

adopt detailed arrangements setting out the modalities for enforcement. The

Commission may also impose fines or periodic penalty payments for violation of

authorisation conditions or other provisions of the Title on the use of satellite radio

spectrum. Such fines should take into account the gravity and duration of the

infringement and, where the infringement consists in the violation of national rules, of

any penalties already applied by national authorities. National competent authorities

should be able to alert the Commission on any breach of authorisation conditions or

provisions of the Title on the use of satellite radio spectrum. In order to ensure

compliance, Member States should give full effect in their territory of the decision

imposing corrective measures or sanctions, including ultimately preventing an

undertaking from providing satellite networks or services in the Union. In such cases,

however, it should be possible for a Member State, the connectivity of which would be

EN 57 EN

seriously disrupted by any suspension or cessation of the activity of a satellite

operator, to request the Commission to defer the application of such coordinated

measure on its national territory for a renewable period of up to six months.

(135) Technological developments are leading to the progressive integration of terrestrial

and non-terrestrial networks into a unified communication architecture, combining

ground-based infrastructure with non-terrestrial components, in particular Low Earth

Orbit (‘LEO’) satellite constellations, thereby ensuring ubiquitous, resilient and high-

performance connectivity on a global scale. The global competition for standardisation

and for access to satellite spectrum for next-generation mobile technologies

demonstrates the strategic importance of spectrum as a critical resource. Specific legal

provisions in this area are necessary to effectively address these developments, by

strengthening the rules governing satellite spectrum management to enable the Union

to ensure its strategic autonomy in the deployment of secure and resilient terrestrial

and non-terrestrial 5G and 6G networks. At the same time, due to the scarcity of

Mobile Satellite Spectrum, there is an increasing need to share spectrum between

terrestrial and non-terrestrial users. Such sharing should be done in a way which does

not jeopardise the provision of the terrestrial services. To safeguard the unconstrained

continuity of the current uses and applications, this Regulation should guarantee that

shared use of spectrum between terrestrial and satellite systems can only take place

when the primary holder of the terrestrial right of use has agreed and under their

responsibility. In a context of integrated satellite and mobile communication services

enabled by 6G technologies, traditional boundaries between terrestrial and satellite

networks are becoming blurred. Thereforea coordinated and forward-looking

regulatory framework is required in order to prevent market fragmentation and

spectrum interference, particulary in frequency bands that will be jointly used by both

terrestrial mobile and satellite operators.

(136) In view of the implementation of the specific current and future Union policies relying

on numbering resources, timely identification of needs for both current and innovative

services is essential. The development of the Union internal market results in

increasing deployment of cross-border services that often rely on numbering resources.

In order for such services to thrive and bring the expected societal benefits and

economic growth, regulatory consistency and predictability should be ensured with

regard to the planning, allocation and management of numbering resources in the

Union. The Commission should deliver a forward-looking numbering strategy, relying

on the input of all interested parties and with due consideration of the opinion of

BEREC, that would constitute the basis of the Union numbering plan.

(137) The availability of pan-European numbering resources would enable consistency and

simplification of the use of numbering resources by providers of cross-border or pan-

European services. The Commission, relying on Member States’ support, should be

able to take measures, including by means of adopting implementing acts, to adopt the

Union numbering plan, to enable the application for numbering ranges to the ITU and

r to set the conditions that may be attached to the right of use of numbering resources

from the Union numbering plan, including the fees for rights of use for such resources

and the possibility to transfer such fees to the ODN. While national regulatory

authorities should assign the pan-European numbering resources as they are best

placed to ensure the enforcement of the conditions attached to the individual rights of

use, the ODN, in cooperation with national regulatory authorities, and under the

supervision of BEREC, should keep an up-to-date database of the pan-European

numbering resources to have a centralised overview of their availability.

EN 58 EN

(138) The development of pan-European services, in particular machine to machine services,

would be further enabled by the availability of harmonised numbers across the Union

while the management of these numbering resources by national regulatory authorities

in cooperation with the ODN would ensure a single set of conditions to comply with

by these service providers. For this purpose, Member States should support the

Commission to obtain ranges of numbering resources from the ITU, including by

applying for such specific numbering ranges on their behalf. Where there is a need for

harmonisation of numbering resources in the Union to support the development of

pan-European services or cross-border services, in particular new machine-to-

machine-based services such as connected cars, and where the management of these

resources in a centralised way by national regulatory authorities in cooperation with

the ODN would enable simpler and more transparent allocation procedures for service

providers, the Commission should be empowered to adopt implementing acts.

(139) In order to effectively support the free movement of goods, services and persons

within the Union, it should be possible to use certain national numbering resources, in

particular certain non-geographic numbers, in an extraterritorial manner, that is to say

outside the territory of the assigning Member State. In light of the considerable risk of

fraud with respect to interpersonal communications, such extraterritorial use should be

allowed only for the provision of electronic communications services other than

interpersonal communications services. Enforcement of relevant national laws, in

particular consumer protection rules and other rules related to the use of numbering

resources should be ensured by Member States independently of where the rights of

use have been granted and where the numbering resources are used within the Union.

national competent

(140) The national regulatory authorities of the Member States where numbering resources

from another Member State are used, do not have control over those numbering

resources. It is therefore essential that the national regulatory authority of the Member

State which grants the rights of extraterritorial use should also ensure the effective

protection of the end-users in the Member States where those numbers are used. In

order to achieve effective protection, the national regulatory authorities granting rights

of extraterritorial use should attach conditions regarding the respect by the provider of

consumer protection rules and other rules related to the use of numbering resources in

those Member States where the numbering resources will be used.

(141) The national regulatory authorities of those Member States where numbering

resources are used should be able to request the support of the national regulatory

authorities that granted the rights of use for the numbering resources to assist in

enforcing their national rules. Enforcement measures by the national regulatory

authorities that granted the rights of use should include dissuasive penalties, in

particular in the case of a serious breach the withdrawal of the right of extraterritorial

use for the numbering resources assigned to the undertaking concerned. The

requirements on extraterritorial use should be without prejudice to the powers of the

national regulatory authority to block access to numbers or services where that is

justified by reasons of fraud or misuse. The extraterritorial use of numbering resources

should be without prejudice to Union rules related to the provision of roaming

services, including those relative to preventing anomalous or abusive use of roaming

services which are subject to retail price regulation and which benefit from regulated

wholesale roaming rates. Member States should be able to enter into specific

agreements on extraterritorial use of numbering resources with third countries.

EN 59 EN

(142) Access to numbering resources on the basis of transparent, objective and non-

discriminatory criteria is essential for undertakings to compete in the electronic

communications sector. National regulatory authorities should be able to grant rights

of use for numbering resources to undertakings other than providers of electronic

communications networks or services in light of the increasing relevance of numbers

for various Internet of Things services. All elements of national numbering plans

should be managed by national regulatory authorities, including point codes used in

network addressing.

(143) In order to give the opportunity to interested parties to inform themselves, the

decisions on the granting of rights of use for numbering resources should be published.

It should be possible to fulfil the publishing requirement by making those decisions

publicly accessible via a website.

(144) The originating party should be able to access all numbers included in the national

numbering plans of other Member States and to access services using non-geographic

numbers, including freephone and premium-rate numbers and pan-European

numbering resources within the Union, except where the receiving party has chosen,

for commercial reasons, to limit access from certain geographical areas. The

originating party should also be able to access numbers from the Universal

International Freephone Numbers.

(145) Cross-border access to numbering resources and associated services should not be

prevented, except in objectively justified cases, such as to combat fraud or abuse (for

example, in connection with certain premium-rate services), when the number is

defined as having a national scope only (for example, a national short code) or when it

is economically unfeasible. National regulatory authorities should have the powers to

block, including in a preventive manner, on the basis of the case-by-case analysis of

the risks entailed by a certain pattern of use, access to numbers or services where that

is justified by reasons of fraud or misuse. Tariffs charged to parties calling from

outside the Member State concerned need not be the same as for those parties calling

from inside that Member State. Users should be fully informed in advance and in a

clear manner of any charges applicable to freephone numbers, such as international

call charges for numbers accessible through standard international dialling codes.

Where interconnection or other service revenues are withheld by providers of

electronic communications services for reasons of fraud or misuse, Member States

should ensure that retained service revenues are refunded to the end-users affected by

the relevant fraud or misuse where possible.

(146) High-speed and high-quality connectivity is essential for the cohesion of the Union’s

society and the competitiveness of the Union economy. Fibre-to-the-home (‘FTTH’)

networks constitute the most future-proof means of providing secure, reliable and

energy-efficient fixed connectivity capable of meeting the Union’s digital

transformation and climate objectives, while also reducing maintenance and

operational costs for operators.

(147) To accelerate the transition to fibre, in particular the deployment of FTTH networks

and increase the take-up of services provided over those networks, it is necessary to

plan and implement the switch-off of legacy copper networks in an orderly and timely

manner. To that effect, a structured framework for the progressive and proportionate

transition from copper to fibre networks should be established. The use of copper

networks in the general interest should be regulated, without prejudice to the

ownership of network assets, which should remain governed by national law.

EN 60 EN

(148) The copper switch-off should respect the principles of predictability, transparency and

proportionality. It is therefore necessary to lay down objective conditions, procedural

steps and safeguards governing the copper switch-off, while providing for

proportionate exceptions. Together with a sufficiently long transition period, those

measures protect the interests of end-users, enhance legal certainty for businesses and

avoid distortions of competition. That transition period is sufficient to allow copper

network operators to organise, prepare for and complete the copper switch-off. This

period should also allow copper network operators, where they consider it

economically and commercially justified, to upgrade their existing networks to FTTH

or deploy FTTH networks. In addition, the deadline of one year from the binding legal

act mandating the copper switch-off leaves the copper network operators sufficient

time to plan the start of the copper switch-off and implement all the necessary steps

prior to this start.

(149) To support a coherent and efficient preparation of the copper switch-off, a coordinated

action is needed at Union and national level in those Member States in which copper-

based services are still in operation after 30 June 2029. Those Member States play a

key role in achieving a rapid and orderly transition to fibre to the benefit of end-users.

Each such Member State should draw up a national transition to fibre plan setting out

its strategy for the transition to fibre networks. That plan should describe network

coverage for the relevant technologies, identify deployment initiatives and specify

measures to support a timely and orderly migration from copper to fibre networks.

(150) The transition to fibre plans should support the achievement of Digital Decade

connectivity targets, in particular gigabit connectivity. To ensure that investments

needs for the transition to fiber networks can be identified with sufficient granularity

at an early stage, Member States should take into account the recommendations

addressed to them in their Digital Decade Reports to prepare the National and

Regional Partnership (‘NRP’) Plans under the next Multiannual Financial Framework

and adjust their national digital decade strategic roadmaps accordingly. Member States

should also take into account their evolving needs, in particular in view of the progress

with the transition to fiber and the copper switch-off, in the revision of their NRP

Plans, as part of the mid-term review50.

(151) To plan and manage the copper switch-off in a structured and transparent manner,

national regulatory authorities should identify specific geographic copper switch-off

areas (‘CSO areas’), using harmonised criteria based on guidance adopted by the

Commission. National regulatory authorities should keep those areas under review in

light of network deployment and market developments.

(152) The sustainability condition related to the fibre coverage can be met irrespective of

whether such networks are deployed by the incumbent or alternative operators. For the

purposes of assessing whether affordable retail connectivity services of comparable

quality are available to end-users relying on copper-based services, national regulatory

authorities should apply objective and transparent criteria, taking into account national

circumstances, local deployment conditions and relevant market data.

50 In line with Article 25 of Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council

establishing the European Fund for economic, social and territorial cohesion, agriculture and rural,

fisheries and maritime, prosperity and security for the period 2028-2034 and amending Regulation (EU)

2023/955 and Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/2509 (COM/2025/565 final).

EN 61 EN

(153) Member States should aim to start the copper switch-off in a significant proportion of

CSO areas well in advance of 31 December 2035. To that effect, they should take

appropriate measures, in line with their national transition to fibre plan, to maximise

the number of CSO areas where the sustainability conditions are met at an early stage.

(154) Where the sustainability conditions are met, Member States should mandate the

copper switch-off within defined time limits, following the publication of the relevant

assessments by national regulatory authorities. This progressive approach facilitates

orderly migration, reduces uncertainty and allows sufficient time for operators and

end-users to adapt.

(155) Where the sustainability conditions are not met in a CSO area, Member States are not

obliged to mandate copper switch-off in those areas before 31 December 2035 and

copper network may continue to be in service. However, by 31 December 2035, the

copper switch-off should, as a rule, be mandated in all CSO areas. This long-term

objective provides a clear investment signal while allowing sufficient flexibility to

accommodate differences in deployment progress across Member States and regions.

(156) In exceptional cases, where fibre deployment is not economically viable and no

adequate connectivity solution capable of replacing copper-based services is available,

Member States should be able to refrain from mandating the copper switch-off. Such

exceptions are necessary to avoid disproportionate impacts on end-users and ensure

the continuity of essential services. In that context, adequate connectivity solutions

refer to solutions capable of ensuring the continuity of electronic communications

services of a quality comparable to that provided by the copper network in the same

area. The availability of such adequate connectivity solutions should be determined by

national regulatory authorities on the basis of objective criteria, including quality and

affordability, taking into account market conditions.

(157) To ensure a smooth transition and protect end-users, Member States should provide

for appropriate safeguards prior to the copper switch-off. Those safeguards should

include clear and timely information, as well as measures to ensure the continuity or

migration of critical services to functionally equivalent alternatives.

(158) National regulatory authorities should supervise the implementation of the copper

switch-off and ensure that operators comply with approved switch-off plans, timelines

and communication obligations. Effective, proportionate and dissuasive penalties

should be imposed in cases of non-compliance.

(159) It is necessary to give appropriate incentives for investment in gigabit networks that

support innovation in content-rich internet services and strengthen the overall

competitiveness of the Union. It is therefore vital to promote efficient investment in

the development of those networks, while safeguarding competition, as bottlenecks

and barriers to entry remain at the infrastructure level, and boosting consumer choice

through regulatory predictability and consistency.

(160) Competition can best be fostered through an economically efficient level of

investment in new and existing infrastructure, complemented by regulation, where

necessary, to ensure consumers and business choices of services. An efficient level of

infrastructure-based competition is the extent of infrastructure duplication at which

investors can reasonably expect to make a fair return.

(161) It should be ensured that procedures exist for the granting of rights to install facilities

that are timely, non-discriminatory and transparent, in order to guarantee the

conditions for fair and effective competition. Permits issued to providers of electronic

EN 62 EN

communications networks and services allowing them to gain access to public or

private property are essential factors for the establishment of electronic

communications networks or new network elements. Unnecessary complexity and

delay in the procedures for granting rights of way may therefore represent important

obstacles to the development of competition. Consequently, the acquisition of rights of

way by authorised undertakings should be simplified. Competent authorities should

coordinate the acquisition of rights of way, making relevant information accessible on

their websites.

(162) It is necessary to strengthen the powers of the Member States as regards holders of

rights of way to ensure the entry or roll-out of a new network in a fair, efficient and

environmentally responsible way and independently of any obligation on an

undertaking designated as having significant market power to grant access to its

electronic communications network. Improving facility sharing can lower the

environmental cost of deploying electronic communications infrastructure and serve

public health, public security and meet town and country planning objectives.

Competent authorities should therefore have the power to require that the undertakings

which have benefited from rights to install facilities on, over or under public or private

property share such facilities or property, including physical co-location, after an

appropriate period of public consultation, during which all interested parties should be

given the opportunity to state their views, in the specific areas where such general

interest reasons impose such sharing. That can be the case for instance where the

subsoil is highly congested or where a natural barrier needs to be crossed. Competent

authorities should in particular be able to impose the sharing of network elements and

associated facilities, such as ducts, conduits, masts, manholes, cabinets, antennae,

towers and other supporting constructions, buildings or entries into buildings, and a

better coordination of civil works on environmental sustainability of electronic

communications networks or other public policy grounds. On the contrary, it should be

for national regulatory authorities to establish rules for apportioning the costs of the

facility or property sharing, to ensure that there is an appropriate reward of risk for the

undertakings concerned. For example, in a symmetric context, any guidance issued by

the Commission or BEREC, pursuant to Article 3, Article 5(6) and Article 11(6) of

Regulation (EU) 2024/1309 should be taken into account, as appropriate. In light of

the obligations imposed by Regulation (EU) 2024/1309, the competent authorities, in

particular local authorities, should also establish appropriate coordination procedures,

in cooperation with national regulatory authorities, with respect to public works and

other appropriate public facilities or property, including procedures ensuring that

interested parties have information concerning appropriate public facilities or property

and ongoing and planned public works, that they are notified in a timely manner of

such works, and that sharing is facilitated to the maximum extent possible.

(163) Where mobile operators are required to share towers or masts for environmental

reasons, such mandated sharing could lead to a reduction in the maximum transmitted

power levels allowed for each operator for reasons of public health, and this in turn

could require operators to install more transmission sites to ensure national coverage.

Competent authorities should seek to reconcile the environmental and public health

considerations in question, taking due account of the precautionary approach.

(164) The obligations on access and interconnection should only apply to public electronic

communications networks. Providers of electronic communications networks other

than public should not be subject to those obligations. They may, however, benefit

from access to public networks subject to conditions laid down by Member States.

EN 63 EN

However, as a means of end-to-end traffic delivery, providers of electronic

communications networks other than public increasingly hand-over traffic to providers

of public electronic communications networks in the form of peering or transit. In

certain cases, such traffic may give rise to disproportionate or unsustainable

investment needs for the receiving providers of public electronic communications

networks. Such situations should be addressed in accordance with the guidelines to

facilitate ecosystem cooperation adopted by BEREC and, where appropriate, through

the foreseen facility for voluntary conciliation.

(165) In an open and competitive market, there should be no restrictions that prevent

undertakings from negotiating access and interconnection arrangements between

themselves, in particular on cross-border agreements, subject to the competition rules

laid down in the TFEU. In the context of achieving a more efficient, truly pan-

European market, with effective competition, more choice and competitive services to

end-users, undertakings which receive requests for access or interconnection from

other undertakings that are subject to general authorisation in order to provide

electronic communications networks or services to the public should in principle

conclude such agreements on a commercial basis, and negotiate in good faith.

(166) In markets where there continue to be large differences in negotiating power between

undertakings, and where some undertakings rely on infrastructure provided by others

for delivery of their services, it is appropriate to establish a regulatory framework to

ensure that the market functions effectively. National regulatory authorities should

have the power to secure, where commercial negotiation fails, adequate access and

interconnection and interoperability of services in the interest of end-users. In

particular, they should ensure end-to-end connectivity by imposing proportionate

obligations on undertakings that are subject to the general authorisation and that

control access to end-users. Control of means of access may entail ownership or

control of the physical link to the end-user (either fixed or mobile), or the ability to

change or withdraw the national number or numbers needed to access an end-user’s

network termination point. This would be the case for example if network operators

were to restrict unreasonably end-user choice for access to internet portals and

services.

(167) In light of the principle of non-discrimination, national regulatory authorities should

ensure that all undertakings, irrespective of their size and business model, whether

vertically integrated or separated, can interconnect on reasonable terms and conditions,

with a view to providing end-to-end connectivity and access to the internet.

(168) National legal or administrative measures that link the terms and conditions for access

or interconnection to the activities of the party seeking interconnection, and

specifically to the degree of its investment in network infrastructure, and not to the

interconnection or access services provided, may cause market distortion and may

therefore not be compatible with competition rules.

(169) Network operators who control access to their own customers do so on the basis of

unique numbers or addresses from a published numbering or addressing range. Other

network operators need to be able to deliver traffic to those customers, and so need to

be able to interconnect directly or indirectly to each other. It is therefore appropriate to

lay down rights and obligations to negotiate interconnection.

(170) Interoperability is of benefit to end-users and is an important aim of the EU regulatory

framework. Encouraging interoperability is one of the objectives for national

regulatory and other competent authorities as set out in that framework. That

EN 64 EN

framework should also provide for the Commission to publish a list of standards or

specifications covering the provision of services, technical interfaces or network

functions, as the basis for encouraging harmonisation in electronic communications.

Member States should encourage the use of published standards or specifications to

the extent strictly necessary to ensure interoperability of services and to improve

freedom of choice for users.

(171) Currently both end-to-end connectivity and access to emergency services depend on

end-users using number-based interpersonal communications services. An increased

exclusive use of number-independent interpersonal communications services by an

increasing number of end-users could entail a lack of sufficient interoperability

between communications services. As a consequence, significant barriers to market

entry and obstacles to further onward innovation could emerge and appreciably

threaten effective end-to-end connectivity between end-users.

(172) Where such interoperability issues arise, the Commission should be able to request a

BEREC report providing a factual assessment of the market situation at Union and

Member State level. Taking account of the BEREC report and other available evidence

and taking into account the effects on the internal market, the Commission should

decide whether there is a need for regulatory intervention, including by national

regulatory authorities or other competent authorities. If the Commission considers that

such regulatory intervention is necessary at Union level or should be considered by

national regulatory or other competent authorities, it should be empowered to adopt

implementing acts specifying the nature and scope of possible regulatory

interventions, including by national regulatory or other competent authorities,

including in particular obligations to publish and allow the use, modification and

redistribution of relevant information by authorities and providers and measures to

impose the mandatory use of standards or specifications on all or on specific

providers.

(173) National regulatory authorities should assess, in light of the specific national

circumstances, whether any intervention is necessary and justified to ensure end-to-

end-connectivity, and if so, impose proportionate obligations, in accordance with the

Commission’s implementing acts, on those providers of number-independent

interpersonal communications services with a significant level of coverage and user-

uptake. Providers with a limited number of end-users or limited geographic coverage

which would contribute only marginally to achieving that goal, should normally not be

subject to such interoperability obligations.

(174) In situations where undertakings are deprived of access to viable alternatives to non-

replicable wiring, cables and associated facilities inside buildings or up to the first

concentration or distribution point and in order to promote competitive outcomes in

the interest of end-users, national regulatory authorities should have the power to

impose access obligations on all undertakings, irrespective of a designation as having

significant market power. In that regard, national regulatory authorities should take

into consideration all technical and economic barriers to future replication of

networks. However, as such obligations can in certain cases be intrusive, can

undermine incentives for investments, and can have the effect of strengthening the

position of players with significant market power, they should be imposed only where

justified and proportionate to achieving sustainable competition in the relevant

markets. The mere fact that more than one such infrastructure already exists should not

necessarily be interpreted as showing that its assets are replicable. Where necessary in

combination with such access obligations, undertakings should also be able to rely on

EN 65 EN

the obligations to provide access to physical infrastructure on the basis of Regulation

(EU) 2024/1309. Any obligations imposed by the national regulatory authority and

any decisions taken by other competent authorities under Regulation (EU) 2024/1309

to ensure access to in-building physical infrastructure or to physical infrastructure up

to the access point should be consistent.

(175) National regulatory authorities should be able, to the extent necessary, to impose

obligations on undertakings to provide access to the certain facilities, namely

application programming interfaces (‘APIs’) and electronic programme guides

(‘EPGs’), to ensure not only accessibility for end-users to digital radio and television

broadcast services but also to related complementary services, including programme

related services which are specifically designed to improve accessibility for end-users

with disabilities, and programme related connected television services.

(176) It is important that when national regulatory authorities assess the concentration or

distribution point up to which they intend to impose access, they choose a point in

accordance with BEREC guidelines. Selecting, where possible, a point nearer to end-

users will be more beneficial to infrastructure competition and the roll-out of gigabit

networks. It could also be justified to impose access obligations to wiring and cables

beyond the first concentration or distribution point, where it is demonstrated that

replication faces high and non-transitory physical or economic barriers, leading to

competition problems or market failures at the retail level to the detriment of end-

users. The assessment of the replicability of network elements requires a market

analysis, but the national regulatory authority should not be required to impose those

obligations. On the other hand, such market analysis requires a sufficient economic

assessment of market conditions, to establish whether the criteria necessary to impose

obligations beyond the first concentration or distribution point are met. Such access

obligations are more likely to be necessary in geographical areas where the business

case for alternative infrastructure rollout is not viable or riskier, for example because

of low population density. Conversely, normally a high concentration of households

might indicate that the imposition of such obligations is unnecessary.

(177) National regulatory authorities should consider whether such symmetric obligations

have the potential to strengthen the position of undertakings designated as having

significant market power. National regulatory authorities should be able to impose

access to active or virtual network elements used for service provision on such

infrastructure beyond the first concentration or distribution point if access to passive

elements would be economically inefficient or physically impracticable, and if the

national regulatory authority considers that, absent such an intervention, the purpose

of the access obligation would be circumvented. In order to enhance consistent

regulatory practice across the Union, the Commission should be empowered to require

the national regulatory authority to withdraw its draft measures extending access

obligations beyond the first concentration or distribution point.

(178) In order to comply with the principle of proportionality, it can be appropriate for

national regulatory authorities to exempt certain categories of undertakings from

obligations going beyond the first concentration or distribution point, which should be

determined by national regulatory authorities, on the grounds that an access obligation

not based on an undertaking’s designation as having significant market power would

risk compromising their business case for recently deployed network elements, in

particular by small local projects. Wholesale-only undertakings should not be subject

to such access obligations if they offer an effective alternative access on a commercial

basis to a gigabit network, on fair, non-discriminatory and reasonable terms and

EN 66 EN

conditions, including as regards price. It should be possible to extend that exemption

to other providers on the same terms. The exemption should not apply to providers

that are in receipt of public funding.

(179) Sharing of passive infrastructure used in the provision of wireless electronic

communications services in compliance with competition law principles can be

particularly useful to maximise gigabit connectivity throughout the Union, especially

in less densely populated areas where replication is impracticable and end-users risk

being deprived of such connectivity. National regulatory authorities should, by way of

exception, be able to impose such sharing or localised roaming access, in accordance

with Union law, if that possibility has been clearly established in the original

conditions for the granting of the right of use and they demonstrate the benefits of

such sharing in terms of overcoming insurmountable economic or physical obstacles

and access to networks or services is therefore severely deficient or absent, and taking

into account several factors, including in particular the need for coverage along major

transport paths, choice and a higher quality of service for end-users as well as the need

to maintain infrastructure roll-out incentives. In circumstances where there is no

access by end-users, and sharing of passive infrastructure alone does not suffice to

address the situation, the national regulatory authorities should be able to impose

obligations on the sharing of active infrastructure. In so doing, national regulatory

authorities or other competent authorities should retain the flexibility to choose the

most appropriate sharing or access obligation which should be proportionate and

justified based on the nature of the problem identified.

(180) While it is appropriate in some circumstances for a national regulatory authority or

other competent authority to impose obligations on undertakings irrespective of a

designation of significant market power in order to achieve goals such as end-to-end

connectivity or interoperability of services, it is necessary to ensure that such

obligations are imposed in accordance with the regulatory framework and, in

particular, applicable notification procedures. Such obligations should be imposed

only where justified in order to secure the objectives, and where they are objectively

justified, transparent, proportionate and non-discriminatory in accordance with the

relevant notification procedures.

(181) In the context of the transition to fibre, it is crucial to ensure that end-users are

connected to the available fibre networks that pass their premises within a reasonable

time frame.

(182) In order to ensure the connection of end-users, national regulatory authorities should

oblige any provider of electronic communications networks to deploy, with reasonable

additional build-out, a connecting link between the requesting end-user’s home and the

nearest distribution or connection point intended to serve their premises.

(183) In principle the prices charged for this connection should not exceed the usual

connection fees in the Member State concerned. However, national regulatory

authorities may allow an additional fee, having regard to the geographic conditions

and any other relevant conditions, provided that the costs paid by the end-users are fair

and reasonable and may intervene to set maximum prices where needed. National

regulatory authorities should be allowed to use existing contracts and commercial

terms and conditions agreed between retail services providers and end-users as

a benchmark to determine whether prices, and terms and conditions are fair and

reasonable.

EN 67 EN

(184) The transition to fibre, the need to ensure that end-users are connected to fibre in their

homes and the reported difficulties that operators encounter in deploying fibre in

multi-dwelling buildings to address end-users’ demand justify an exception to

Article 11(4) of Regulation (EU) 2024/1309. In such circumstances, where connecting

the requesting end-user requires deploying in-building wiring and associated facilities

within a multi-dwelling unit, the owners or the administrators of the unit should not be

allowed to refuse such deployment. However, to avoid excessive intrusions in private

properties and unnecessary duplication of infrastructure within their building, they

should be entitled to refuse the deployment of a second in-building wiring and

associated facilities. National regulatory authorities should then ensure that access to

the network is provided on a symmetric basis.

(185) In order to overcome insurmountable economic or physical obstacles for providing

end-users with services or networks which rely on the use of radio spectrum and where

mobile coverage gaps persist, this may require the access and sharing of passive

infrastructure, or, where this is not sufficient, the sharing of active infrastructure, or

localised roaming access agreements. Without prejudice to sharing obligations

attached to the rights of use on the basis of provisions on authorisation and assignment

of rights of use, and in particular measures to promote competition, where national

regulatory or other competent authorities intend to take measures to impose the

sharing of passive infrastructure, or when passive access and sharing are not sufficient,

active infrastructure sharing or localised roaming access agreements, they may,

however, also be called to consider the possible risk for market participants in

underserved areas.

(186) Competition rules alone may not always be sufficient to ensure cultural diversity and

media pluralism in the area of digital television. Technological and market

developments make it necessary to review obligations to provide conditional access on

fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory terms on a regular basis, by a Member State

for its national market, in particular to determine whether it is justified to extend

obligations to EPGs and APIs, to the extent necessary to ensure accessibility for end-

users to specified digital broadcasting services. Member States should therefore be

able to specify the digital broadcasting services to which access by end-users is to be

ensured by any legislative, regulatory or administrative means that they consider to be

necessary.

(187) Member States should also be able to permit their national regulatory authority to

review obligations in relation to conditional access to digital broadcasting services in

order to assess through a market analysis whether to withdraw or amend conditions for

undertakings that do not have significant market power on the relevant market. Such a

withdrawal or amendment should not adversely affect access for end-users to such

services or the prospects for effective competition.

(188) There is a need for ex ante obligations in certain circumstances in order to ensure the

development of a competitive market, the conditions of which favour the deployment

and take-up of gigabit networks and services, and the maximisation of end-user

benefits. In assessing the need for ex ante regulatory intervention, national regulatory

authorities should take into account whether wholesale access is available to any

interested undertaking on the basis of either already existing regulation (in particular

based on Regulation (EU) 2024/1309) or commercial conditions permitting

sustainable competitive outcomes for end-users on the retail market. If those access

possibilities are not sufficiently significant , the national regulatory authority should

assess without delay whether it is necessary to impose the obligations on undertakings

EN 68 EN

designated as having significant market power. It is essential that ex ante regulatory

obligations are imposed on a wholesale market only where there are one or more

undertakings with significant market power, with a view to ensuring sustainable

competition and where Union and national competition law are not sufficient to

address the problem. The concept of significant market power should be in line with

the concept of dominance as defined in the case-law of the Court of Justice.

(189) The Commission has drawn up guidelines at Union level in accordance with the

principles of competition law for national regulatory authorities to follow in assessing

whether competition is effective in a given market and in assessing significant market

power. National regulatory authorities should analyse whether a given product or

service market is effectively competitive in a given geographical area, which could be

the whole or a part of the territory of the Member State concerned or neighbouring

parts of territories of Member States considered together. An analysis of effective

competition should include an analysis as to whether the market is prospectively

competitive, and thus whether any lack of effective competition is durable. The

Commission should review the guidelines regularly, in particular on the occasion of a

review of the existing law, taking into account the case-law of the Court of Justice,

economic literature and actual market experience and with a view to ensuring that they

remain appropriate in a rapidly developing market. National regulatory authorities

should cooperate with each other where the relevant market is found to be

transnational.

(190) In its regular assessment of the market trends in the Union, the Commission should

take into account the feedback of stakeholders. The results of the stakeholders’

consultation should be made publicly available in a report. In its assessment of

whether the adoption of a Commission Recommendation on relevant product and

service markets (‘the markets Recommendation’) is required, the Commission will

assess whether any relevant product and service market meets the three criteria test.

The Commission may adopt the markets Recommendation, after public consultation,

including with national regulatory authorities, and taking account of the opinion of

BEREC.

(191) National regulatory authorities should define relevant geographic markets within their

territory taking into account the markets Recommendation when such a

Recommendation is adopted pursuant to this Regulation and taking into account

national and local circumstances. Therefore, national regulatory authorities should at

least analyse the markets that are contained in the markets Recommendation, including

those markets that are listed but no longer regulated in the specific national or local

context. National regulatory authorities should also analyse markets that are not

contained in the markets Recommendation, but that are regulated within the territory

of their jurisdiction on the basis of previous market analyses, or other markets, if they

have sufficient grounds to consider that the three criteria are met. National regulatory

authorities should also decide whether there is a need to conduct a market review

based on the results of information gathered in the context of the geographical survey

exercise.

(192) In some circumstances, geographic markets are defined as national or sub-national, for

example due to the national or local nature of network roll-out which determines the

boundaries of undertakings’ potential market power in respect of wholesale supply,

but there is still a significant transnational demand from one or more categories of

end-users. That can in particular be the case for demand from business end-users with

multisite facility operations in different Member States. If that transnational demand is

EN 69 EN

not sufficiently met by suppliers, for example if they are fragmented along national

borders or locally, a potential internal market barrier arises. Therefore, BEREC should

provide guidelines to national regulatory authorities on common regulatory

approaches to ensure that transnational demand can be met in a satisfactory way,

providing a basis for the interoperability of wholesale access products across the

Union and permitting efficiencies and economies of scale despite the fragmented

supply side. BEREC’s guidelines should shape the choices of national regulatory

authorities in pursuing the internal market objective when imposing regulatory

obligations on undertakings designated as having significant market power at national

level while providing guidance for the harmonisation of technical specifications of

wholesale access products capable of meeting such identified transnational demand, in

the interest of the internal market.

(193) In determining whether an undertaking has significant market power in a specific

market, national regulatory authorities should act in accordance with Union law and

take account of the Commission guidelines on market analysis and the assessment of

significant market power.

(194) For national regulatory authorities, the starting point for the identification of wholesale

markets susceptible to ex ante regulation should be the analysis of corresponding retail

markets. The analysis of effective competition at the retail and at the wholesale level

should be conducted from a forward-looking perspective over a given time horizon,

and should be guided by competition law, including, as appropriate, the relevant case

law of the Court of Justice. If it is concluded that a retail market would be effectively

competitive in the absence of ex ante wholesale regulation on the corresponding

relevant markets, this should lead the national regulatory authority to conclude that

regulation is no longer needed at the relevant wholesale level.

(195) National regulatory authorities should ensure that markets are analysed in a consistent

manner and, where possible, at the same time. Moreover, the notification should be

comprehensive, including the market definition, SMP designation and correlated

remedies to ensure that the remedies imposed are proportionate and reflect the actual

market situation and to ensure transparency for the market participants to the greatest

extent.

(196) Wholesale regulation should solve problems at the retail level. National regulatory

authorities should conduct its assessment for each individual wholesale market

considered for regulation, starting with remedies for access to civil infrastructure, as

such remedies are usually conducive to more sustainable competition including

infrastructure competition, and thereafter analysing any wholesale markets considered

susceptible to ex ante regulation in order of their likely suitability to address identified

competition problems at retail level. When deciding on the specific remedy to be

imposed, national regulatory authorities should consider the consequences of imposing

any specific remedy which, if feasible only on certain network topologies, could

constitute a disincentive for the deployment of gigabit networks in the interest of end-

users.

(197) Without prejudice to the principle of technology neutrality, the national regulatory

authorities should provide incentives through the remedies imposed, and, where

possible, before the roll-out of infrastructure, for the development of flexible and open

network architecture, which would reduce eventually the burden and complexity of

remedies imposed at a later stage. At each stage of the assessment, before the national

regulatory authority determines whether any additional, more burdensome, remedy

EN 70 EN

should be imposed, it should seek to determine whether the retail market concerned

would be effectively competitive, also taking into account any relevant commercial

arrangements or other wholesale market circumstances, including other types of

regulation already in force, and of any regulation already considered to be appropriate

by the national regulatory authority for an undertaking designated as having

significant market power. Such an assessment, aiming to ensure that only the most

appropriate remedies necessary to effectively address any problems identified in the

market analysis are imposed, does not preclude a national regulatory authority from

finding that a mix of such remedies together, even if of differing intensity, in line with

the proportionality principle, offers the least intrusive way of addressing the problem.

Even if such differences do not result in the definition of distinct geographic markets,

they should be able to justify differentiation in the appropriate remedies imposed in

light of the differing intensity of competitive constraints.

(198) When a national regulatory authority withdraws wholesale regulation, it should define

an appropriate notice period to ensure a sustainable transition to a de-regulated market.

In defining such a notice period, the national regulatory authority should take into

account the existing agreements between access providers and access seekers that have

been entered into on the basis of the imposed regulatory obligations. In particular,

such agreements can provide a contractual legal protection to access seekers for a

determined period. The national regulatory authority shall also take into account the

effective possibility for market participants to take up any commercial wholesale

access or co-investment offers which can be present in the market and the need to

avoid an extended period of possible regulatory arbitrage. Transition arrangements

established by the national regulatory authority should consider the extent and timing

of regulatory oversight of pre-existing agreements, once the notice period starts.

(199) In order to provide market players with certainty as to regulatory conditions, a time

limit for market reviews is necessary. It is important to conduct a market analysis on a

regular basis and within a reasonable and appropriate timeframe. There is a risk that

failure by a national regulatory authority to analyse a market within the time-limit

jeopardises the internal market.

(200) Due to the high level of technological innovation and highly dynamic markets in the

electronic communications sector, there is a need to adapt regulation rapidly in a

coordinated and harmonised way at Union level, as experience has shown that

divergence among the national regulatory authorities in the implementation of the

regulatory framework may create a barrier to the internal market.

(201) In the interest of greater stability and predictability of regulatory measures, the

maximum period allowed between market analyses should remain five years, provided

market changes in the intervening period do not require a new analysis and without

prejudice to the possibility of imposing interim measures. National regulatory

authorities should comply with its obligation to analyse markets and notified the

corresponding draft measure at a minimum every five years, to ensure that the

applicable regulation reflects competitive condition in the market. This is why, only a

notification including a new assessment of the market definition and of significant

market power should be considered to be starting a new five-year market cycle.

(202) The imposition of a specific obligation on an undertaking designated as having

significant market power does not require an additional market analysis but rather a

justification that the obligation in question is appropriate and proportionate in relation

EN 71 EN

to the nature of the problem identified on the market in question, and on the related

retail market.

(203) When assessing the proportionality of the obligations and conditions to be imposed,

national regulatory authorities should take into account the different competitive

conditions existing in the different areas within their Member States having regard in

particular to the results of the conducted geographical survey.

(204) Reviews of obligations imposed on undertakings designated as having significant

market power during the timeframe of a market analysis should allow national

regulatory authorities to take into account the impact on competitive conditions of new

market developments. Transparency, non-discrimination, accounting separation, price

control and cost accounting could be envisaged as complements to the imposition of

the Union harmonised access products. Where obligations are imposed on

undertakings that require them to meet reasonable requests for access to and use of

networks elements and associated facilities, such requests should be refused only on

the basis of objective criteria such as technical feasibility or the need to maintain

network integrity. Where access is refused, the aggrieved party should be able to

submit the case to the dispute resolutions procedures under this Regulation. An

undertaking with mandated access obligations cannot be required to provide types of

access which it is not within its power to provide. The imposition by national

regulatory authorities of mandated access that increases competition in the short term

should not reduce incentives for competitors to invest in alternative facilities that will

secure more sustainable competition or higher performance and end-user benefits in

the long term. When choosing the least intrusive regulatory intervention, and in line

with the principle of proportionality, national regulatory authorities could, for

example, decide to review the obligations imposed on undertakings designated as

having significant market power and amend any previous decision, including by

withdrawing obligations, imposing or not imposing new access obligations if this is in

the interests of users and sustainable service competition. Since technical details of

access obligation may play a key role in the ability to effectively replicate the access

providers’ services and compete at retail level, national regulatory authorities should

be able to impose technical and operational conditions on the provider or beneficiaries

of mandated access in accordance with Union law. In particular the imposition of

technical standards should comply with Directive (EU) 2015/1535. National

regulatory authorities should, when imposing obligations for access to new and

enhanced infrastructures, ensure that access conditions reflect the circumstances

underlying the investment decision, taking into account, among others, the roll-out

costs, the expected rate of take up of the new products and services and the expected

retail price levels. Moreover, in order to provide planning certainty to investors,

national regulatory authorities should be able to set, if applicable, terms and conditions

ed provided they have no discriminatory effect. Any access conditions imposed should

respect the need to preserve effective competition in services to consumers and

businesses.

(205) Mandating access to network infrastructure can be justified as a means of increasing

competition, but national regulatory authorities need to balance the rights of an

infrastructure owner to exploit its infrastructure for its own benefit, and the rights of

other service providers to access facilities that are essential for the provision of

services. Mandating access to network infrastructure can be justified as a means of

increasing competition, but national regulatory authorities need to balance the rights of

an infrastructure owner to exploit its infrastructure for its own benefit, and the rights

EN 72 EN

of other service providers to access facilities that are essential for the provision of

competing services. Price control may be necessary when market analysis in a

particular market reveals ineffective competition. In particular, undertakings

designated as having significant market power should avoid a price squeeze whereby

the difference between their retail prices and the interconnection or access prices

charged to competitors who provide similar retail services is not adequate to ensure

sustainable competition. When a national regulatory authority calculates costs incurred

in establishing a service mandated under this Regulation, it is appropriate to allow a

reasonable return on the capital employed by the operators having significant market

power, including appropriate labour and building costs, with the value of capital

adjusted where necessary to reflect the current valuation of assets and efficiency of

operations. The method of cost recovery should be appropriate to the circumstances

taking account of the need to promote efficiency, sustainable competition and

deployment of gigabit networks and should take in account gigabit connectivity.

National regulatory authorities should be able to decide to maintain or not to impose

regulated wholesale access prices on next-generation networks if sufficient

competition safeguards are present. More specifically, to prevent excessive prices in

markets where there are undertakings designated as having significant market power,

pricing flexibility should be accompanied by additional safeguards to protect

competition and end-user interests, such as strict non-discrimination obligations,

measures to ensure technical and economic replicability of downstream products, and

a demonstrable retail price constraint resulting from infrastructure competition or a

price anchor stemming from other regulated access products, or both. Those

competitive safeguards do not prejudice the identification by national regulatory

authorities of other circumstances under which it would be appropriate not to impose

regulated access prices for certain wholesale inputs, such as where high price elasticity

of end-user demand makes it unprofitable for the undertaking designated as having

significant market power to charge prices appreciably above the competitive level or

where lower population density reduces the incentives for the development of gigabit

networks and the national regulatory authority establishes that effective and non-

discriminatory access is ensured through obligations imposed.

(206) Civil engineering assets that can host an electronic communications network are

crucial for the successful roll-out of new networks because of the high cost of

duplicating them, and the significant savings that can be made when they can be

reused. Therefore, in addition to the rules on physical infrastructure laid down in

Regulation (EU) 2024/1309, a specific remedy is necessary in those circumstances

where civil engineering assets are owned by an undertaking designated as having

significant market power. Where civil engineering assets exist and are reusable, the

positive effect of achieving effective access to them on the roll-out of competing

infrastructure is very high, and it is therefore necessary to ensure that access to such

assets can be used as a self-standing remedy for the improvement of competitive and

deployment dynamics in any downstream market, to be considered before assessing

the need to impose any other potential remedies, and not just as an ancillary remedy to

other wholesale products or services or as a remedy limited to undertakings availing

themselves of such other wholesale products or services. National regulatory

authorities should value reusable legacy civil engineering assets on the basis of the

regulatory accounting value net of the accumulated depreciation at the time of

calculation, indexed by an appropriate price index, such as the retail price index, and

excluding those assets which are fully depreciated, over a period of not less than 40

years, but still in use. When also based on the information gathered on deployment of

EN 73 EN

gigabit infrastructures, it results that access to physical infrastructure it is a crucial

precondition for the deployed networks and thus for the downstream market, the

identification of a separate physical infrastructure market may be considered also to

provide long term regulatory predictability.

(207) In order to foster the achievement of an internal market in the area of digital networks

and services, it is essential to further harmonise, wherever possible, access products.

Therefore, this regulation should provide the requirements according to which a

wholesale access product could be considered as a European harmonised wholesale

access product, which could be imposed by national regulatory authorities of all

Member States. Harmonised access products may include FTTH unbundling, virtual

unbundled local access as the products typically imposed in the wholesale markets

serving mass customers. In addition, such harmonised products could include ethernet

leased lines and quality of service parameters in the markets serving business

customers when needed.

(208) National regulatory authorities should accordingly assess whether the replacement of

obligations previously imposed on undertakings with significant market power to

provide wholesale access to gigabit networks with an obligation to supply a European

harmonised access product would be appropriate and proportionate.

(209) In consideration of the constantly evolving market and technological developments,

the Commission should be empowered to adopt implementing acts to define the

technical requirements of European access products as needs be.

(210) Where a national regulatory authority has concluded that a European harmonised

access product would be appropriate and proportionate, it should impose it on the

undertaking with significant power concerned. The imposition of the European

harmonised access products should take precedence over the imposition of any other

remedies. National regulatory authorities should impose obligations of access to, and

use of, specific networks elements and associated facilities only where a European

harmonised access product would not be sufficient to address the competitive

problems on a specific market.

(211) The pricing of access to newly built civil-engineering infrastructure of the

undertakings designated as having significant market power for the deployment of

gigabit networks by alternative operators could have an impact on the SMP operator’s

incentives to build new civil-engineering infrastructure with sufficient capacity to host

alternative networks. The price for access to the newly built civil-engineering

infrastructure should reflect current market conditions and should be based on the full

actual costs incurred by the SMP operator, as long as strict non-discrimination is

ensured in the terms and conditions of access to such infrastructure. Such an approach

would provide the right incentives for investing in new civil-engineering

infrastructure. Moreover, depending on market circumstances, building significant

new civil-engineering infrastructure may represent for the SMP operator a risk-

investment profile higher than the risk profile associated with the reuse of legacy civil-

engineering infrastructure. That risk profile would involve risks in terms of incurred

costs and in terms of expected revenues, which should be assessed by the NRAs.

However, where equivalence of access obligation (equivalence of input or output) is

effectively implemented and there is a proven retail market price constraint,

complemented by economic replicability of downstream products, national regulatory

authorities should in principle refrain from imposing regulated prices. Such

obligations should consist, for instance, of technical and economic replicability tests,

EN 74 EN

combined with monitoring mechanisms. The retail market price constraint could arise

from infrastructural competition, clear commitments made by alternative providers to

deploy gigabit networks in underserved areas as resulting from geographical surveys,

and regulated anchor products subject to cost orientation. Where a national regulatory

authority imposes obligations to implement a cost-accounting system in order to

support price controls, it should be able to undertake an annual audit to ensure

compliance with that cost-accounting system, provided that it has the necessary

qualified staff, or to require such an audit to be carried out by another qualified body,

independent of the undertaking concerned. The charging system in the Union for

wholesale voice call termination is based on Calling Party Network Pays. An analysis

of demand and supply substitutability shows that currently or in the foreseeable future,

there are no substitutes at wholesale level which might constrain the setting of charges

for termination in a given network. Taking into account the two-way access nature of

termination markets, further potential competition problems include cross-

subsidisation between operators. Those potential competition problems are common to

both fixed and mobile voice call termination markets. Therefore, in light of the ability

and incentives of terminating operators to raise prices substantially above cost, cost

orientation is considered to be the most appropriate intervention to address this

concern over the medium term. Future market developments may alter the dynamics of

those markets to the extent that regulation would no longer be necessary.

(212) In order to reduce the regulatory burden in addressing the competition problems

relating to wholesale voice call termination consistently across the Union, the

Commission should continue to establish, by means of a delegated act, a single

maximum voice termination rate for mobile services and a single maximum voice

termination rate for fixed services that apply Union-wide. Detailed criteria and

parameters on the basis of which the values of voice call termination rates are set,

should be laid down. Termination rates across the Union have decreased consistently

and are expected to continue to do so.

(213) In order to take account of market, social and technological developments, including

evolution of technical standards, to manage the risks posed to security of networks and

services and to ensure effective access to emergency services through emergency

communications, the power to adopt delegated acts in accordance with Article 290

TFEU should be delegated to the Commission in respect of setting a single maximum

Union-wide voice termination rate in fixed and mobile markets; fraud preventing

measures; measures related to adopting measures related to emergency

communications in the Union; and amending the annexes to this Regulation in order to

take account of technological and social development or changes in market demand. It

is of particular importance that the Commission carry out appropriate consultations

during its preparatory work, including at expert level, and that those consultations be

conducted in accordance with the principles laid down in the Interinstitutional

Agreement of 13 April 2016 on Better Law-Making51. In particular, to ensure equal

participation in the preparation of delegated acts, the European Parliament and the

Council receive all documents at the same time as Member States’ experts, and their

experts systematically have access to meetings of Commission expert groups dealing

with the preparation of delegated acts.

51 OJ L 123, 12.5.2016, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/agree_interinstit/2016/512/oj.

EN 75 EN

(214) It is already possible today in some markets that as part of the market analysis the

undertakings designated as having significant market power are able to offer

commitments which aim to address competition problems identified by the national

regulatory authority and which the national regulatory authority then takes into

account in deciding on the appropriate regulatory obligations. Such remedies may also

consist in transferring local access network assets or a substantial part thereof to a

separate legal entity under different ownership or in the establishment of a separate

business entity. Any new market developments should be taken into account in

deciding on the most appropriate remedies capable of ensuring long-term

effectiveness. However, and without prejudice to the provisions on the regulatory

treatment of wholesale-only undertakings, the nature of the commitments offered as

such does not limit the discretion accorded to the national regulatory authority to

impose remedies on undertakings designated as having significant market power. In

order to enhance transparency and to provide legal certainty across the Union, the

procedure for undertakings to offer commitments and for the national regulatory

authorities to assess them, taking into account the views of market participants by

means of a market test, and where appropriate to make them binding on the

committing undertaking and enforceable by the national regulatory authority, should

be laid down in this Regulation. Unless the national regulatory authority has made

commitments binding and decided not to impose obligations, that procedure is without

prejudice to the application of the market analysis procedure and the obligation to

impose appropriate and proportionate remedies to address the identified market failure.

(215) National regulatory authorities should be able to make the commitments binding,

wholly or in part, for a specific period which should not exceed the period for which

they are offered, after having conducted a market test by means of a public

consultation of interested parties. Where the commitments have been made binding,

the national regulatory authority should consider the consequences of this decision in

its market analysis and take them into account when choosing the most appropriate

regulatory measures. National regulatory authorities should assess the commitments

made in a forward-looking perspective of sustainability, in particular when choosing

the period for which they are made binding, and should have regard to the need to

ensure stable and predictable market conditions. Binding commitments related to

voluntary separation by a vertically integrated undertaking which has been designated

as having significant market power in one or more relevant markets can add

predictability and transparency by setting out the process of implementation of the

planned separation of an undertaking designated as having significant market power.

To assist the national regulatory authorities in overseeing the parties' compliance, the

commitments may include the appointment of a monitoring trustee, whose identity and

mandate should be approved by the national regulatory authority, and the obligation

on the undertaking offering them to provide periodic implementation reports.

(216) Network owners whose business model is limited to the provision of wholesale

services to others, can be beneficial to the creation of a thriving wholesale market,

with positive effects on retail competition downstream. Furthermore, their business

model, although less attractive for short term investors, can be attractive to potential

financial investors in less volatile infrastructure assets and with longer term

perspectives on deployment of gigabit networks. Nevertheless, the presence of a

wholesale-only undertaking does not necessarily lead to effectively competitive retail

markets, and wholesale-only undertakings can be designated as having significant

market power in particular product and geographic markets. Certain competition risks

arising from the behaviour of undertakings following wholesale-only business models

EN 76 EN

might be lower than for vertically integrated undertakings, provided the wholesale-

only model is genuine and no incentives to discriminate between downstream

providers exist. The regulatory response should therefore be commensurately less

intrusive, but should preserve in particular the possibility to introduce obligations in

relation to fair and reasonable pricing. On the other hand, national regulatory

authorities should be able to intervene if competition problems have arisen to the

detriment of end-users. This would be particularly important in those areas where,

after completion of the copper switch-off process, a wholesale-only undertaking may

remain as the sole provider of a gigabit network. An undertaking active on a wholesale

market that supplies retail services solely to business users larger than small and

medium-sized enterprises should be regarded as a wholesale-only undertaking.

(217) The Union mechanism allowing the Commission to require national regulatory

authorities to withdraw planned measures concerning market definition and the

designation of undertakings as having significant market power has contributed

significantly to a consistent approach in identifying the circumstances in which ex ante

regulation may be applied and those in which the undertakings are subject to such

regulation. The experience of the procedures, under Article 32 and 33 of Directive

(EU) 2018/1972 has shown that inconsistencies in the national regulatory authorities’

application of remedies under similar market conditions undermine the internal market

in electronic communications. Therefore, it is still necessary to empower the

Commission and BEREC, within their respective responsibilities, to ensure a higher

level of consistency in the application of remedies concerning draft measures proposed

by national regulatory authorities. With regard to draft measures relating to the

extension of obligations beyond the first concentration or distribution point, where

needed to address high and non-transitory economic or physical barriers to replication,

on undertakings irrespective of a designation as having significant market power, or to

the regulatory treatment of new gigabit network elements, it is still necessary that the

Commission should be able to require a national regulatory authority to withdraw a

draft measure. In order to benefit from the expertise of national regulatory authorities

on the market analysis, the Commission should consult BEREC prior to adoption of its

decisions or recommendations.

(218) In assessing draft measures, the Commission should continue to be bound by a clear

deadline, to ensure a thorough yet swift assessment. However, it is no longer justified

to provide for different deadlines for the assessment of market reviews, on the one

hand, and of remedies, on the other hand. A single deadline for both assessments

would improve consistency and contribute to the creation of a simplified and more

efficient regulatory framework.

(219) Transparency in the application of the Union mechanism for consolidating the internal

market for electronic communications should be increased in the interest of citizens

and stakeholders and to enable parties concerned to make their views known,

including by way of requiring national regulatory authorities to publish any draft

measure at the same time as it is communicated to the Commission, to BEREC, and to

the national regulatory authorities in other Member States. Any such draft measure

should be reasoned and should contain a detailed market analysis.

(220) The national consultation of interested parties should be conducted prior to the

consultation at Union level for the purposes of consolidating the internal market for

electronic communications and within the procedure for the consistent application of

remedies, in order to allow the views of interested parties to be reflected in the

consultation at Union level. This would also avoid the need for a second consultation

EN 77 EN

at Union level in the event of changes to a planned measure as a result of the national

consultation.

(221) National regulatory authorities should be required to cooperate with each other, with

BEREC and with the Commission, in a transparent manner, to ensure the consistent

application, in all Member States, of this Regulation.

(222) The discretion of national regulatory authorities needs to be reconciled with the

development of consistent regulatory practices and the consistent application of the

regulatory framework in order to contribute effectively to the development and

completion of the internal market. National regulatory authorities should therefore

support the relevant internal market activities of the Commission and of BEREC.

(223) Measures that could affect trade between Member States are measures that could have

an influence, direct or indirect, actual or potential, on the pattern of trade between

Member States in a manner which might create a barrier to the internal market. They

comprise measures that have a significant impact on undertakings or users in other

Member States, which include: measures which affect prices for users in other

Member States; measures which affect the ability of an undertaking established in

another Member State to provide an electronic communications service, and in

particular measures which affect the ability to offer services on a transnational basis;

and measures which affect market structure or access, leading to repercussions for

undertakings in other Member States. Tackling such measures is of utmost importance

as this regulation strives to progressively achieve an internal market for electronic

communications and digital networks.

(224) When the Commission has taken a decision requiring a national regulatory authority to

withdraw a planned measure, national regulatory authorities should withdraw its draft

measure or submit a revised measure to the Commission. A deadline for the national

regulatory authority should be laid down for the notification of the revised measure to

the Commission in order to inform market players of the duration of the market review

and in order to increase legal certainty.

(225) While it is essential that national regulatory authorities are given adequate time to

conduct thorough market analyses/reviews, they should also be enabled to promptly

address situations requiring urgent measures.

(226) Therefore, an exception to the general timeline provided for market reviews should be

established to allow national regulatory authorities to adopt provisional measures.

Such provisional measures should apply for a limited period of time and should not be

used more than once to address the same problem.

(227) Having regard to the short time-limits in the consultation mechanism at Union level,

powers should be conferred on the Commission to adopt recommendations or

guidelines to simplify the procedures for exchanging information between the

Commission and national regulatory authorities, for example in cases concerning

stable markets, or involving only minor changes to previously notified measures.

Powers should also be conferred on the Commission in order to allow for the

introduction of a notification exemption in order to streamline procedures in certain

cases. Finally, the Commission should be able to adopt, as necessary, having taken

account of the opinion of BEREC, recommendations in relation to the identification of

the relevant product and service markets, the notifications under the procedure for

consolidating the internal market and the harmonised application of the provisions of

the regulatory framework.

EN 78 EN

(228) The increased competition and choice for communications services have gradually led

to reduction of the universal service scope. Elements such as directories or provision

of public pay phones have been phased out of the universal service scope. Therefore,

the concept of universal service should continue to evolve to reflect advances in

technology, market developments and changes in user demand.

(229) Universal service should remain a safety net to ensure that a set of at least the

minimum services is available to all and at an affordable price to consumers, where a

risk of social exclusion arising from the lack of such access prevents citizens from full

social and economic participation in society.

(230) A fundamental requirement of universal service is to ensure that all consumers have

access at an affordable price to an adequate internet access and voice communications

services at a fixed location. Where there are limitations for access Member States may

also consider to ensure affordability of adequate internet access and voice

communications services other than at a fixed location, where they consider that this is

necessary to ensure consumers’ full social and economic participation in society.

Particular attention should be paid to ensuring that consumers with disabilities have

equivalent access at a fixed location. There should be no limitations on the technical

means by which the adequate internet access and voice communications services at a

fixed location are provided, allowing for wired or wireless technologies in a

technologically neutral way, nor any limitations on which undertakings provide part or

all of universal service obligations.

(231) The speed of internet access experienced by a given user depends on a number of

factors, including the providers of internet connectivity as well as the given

application for which a connection is being used. It is for the Member States, taking

into account BEREC guidelines, to define adequate internet access in light of the

minimum bandwidth enjoyed by the majority of consumers within a Member State’s

territory in order to allow an adequate level of social inclusion and participation in the

digital economy and society in their territory. The adequate internet access service

should have sufficient bandwidth to support access to and use of at least basic services

that reflect the services used by the majority of consumers. To that end, in order to

contribute towards a consistent application in the Member States, the BEREC

guidelines should take into account the development in the use of the internet to

identify those online services used by a majority of consumers across the Union and

necessary for social and economic participation in society. BEREC should take into

account the data collected annually by the national regulatory authorities on the

evolution and level of retail prices of adequate internet access services and voice

communications services at a quality specified in the respective national territories.

Before issuing the guidelines, BEREC should consult stakeholders, including civil

society organisations representing vulnerable consumers. The Commission should be

empowered to adopt implementing acts to determine the adequate internet access

service and the bandwidth necessary for social and economic participation in society.

The end-user rights applicable to electronic communications services should also

apply to any adequate internet access and voice communications services.

(232) National regulatory authorities in coordination with other competent authorities should

monitor the evolution and details of retail prices for adequate internet access and voice

communications services used by consumers to assess the need for affordability

measures. Such monitoring should be carried out not more than annually to ensure that

it would not represent an excessive administrative burden for either national regulatory

and other competent authorities or providers of such services. The monitoring could

EN 79 EN

include the details of offers of tariff options or packages for consumers with low

income, or special social needs, including consumers with disabilities, and should be

the basis for establishing affordability measures.

(233) The need for affordability measures varies between Member States and a harmonised

approach for the criteria and methodology to be considered for assessing the

affordability of adequate internet access and voice communications services should

ensure the consistency of approaches, while taking into account the distinct situations

across Member States. For harmonising the criteria and methodology to consider for

assessing affordability, the Commission should be empowered to adopt implementing

acts. The criteria should include, amongst other factors, the most affordable price

available in the market and its percentage of consumer income taking into account

consumers with low income or special social needs. Furthermore, the economic and

social aspects to be taken into account should also include purchasing power and

national support schemes, especially for vulnerable consumers.

(234) An affordable price means a price defined by Member States at national level

considering the common criteria and methodology set in the Commission

implementing act. Where Member States establish that retail prices for adequate

internet access and voice communications services are not affordable to consumers

with low income or special social needs, including older people, consumers with

disabilities and consumers living in rural or geographically isolated areas, they should

take appropriate measures. To that end, Member States could provide those consumers

with direct support for communication purposes, which could be part of social

allowances, vouchers, or direct payments to those consumers. Alternatively, or in

addition, Member States could require all providers of such services to offer basic

tariff options or packages, including reduced monthly subscription fees.

(235) Such special tariff options or packages to deal with the needs of consumers with low

income or with special social needs should provide adequate internet access and voice

communications services, without additional bundled services, in order to reduce

impact on the functioning of the market.

(236) Where a Member State requires providers to offer to consumers with a low income or

special social needs tariff options or packages different from those provided under

normal commercial conditions, those tariff options or packages should be provided by

all providers of internet access and voice communications services., Requiring all

providers of internet access and voice communications services to offer tariff options

or packages should not result in excessive administrative or financial burden for those

providers or Member States.

(237) In light of the reduced scope of universal service obligations, there is a limited need to

use sector-specific designations. Public financial support may prove necessary to

cover some or all of the specific net costs incurred in discharging the universal service

obligations, including a reasonable profit, while avoiding overcompensation. In this

case, given the existence of State aid rules for public funding, in particular for services

of general economic interest (‘SGEI package’)52, the sector specific rules on the

52 Communication from the Commission on the application of the European Union State aid rules to

compensation granted for the provision of services of general economic interest (OJ C8, 11.01.2012, p.

4); Commission Decision 2025/2630/EU of 16 December 2025 on the application of Article 106(2) of

the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to State aid in the form of public service

compensation granted to certain undertakings entrusted with the operation of services of general

EN 80 EN

designation of undertakings and calculation of possible compensation for the provision

of universal service for electronic communications should be repealed. If any public

compensation is granted for the provision of universal service obligations, it is to

comply with the applicable State aid rules, in particular Articles 106(2), 107 and 108

TFEU and the SGEI package. The simplification concerning the removal of the sector-

specific designation of the universal service obligation and the related net costs

calculation method could increase Member States’ flexibility when choosing the

method of financing of universal service obligations, possibly reducing the

administrative burden for providers while ensuring compatibility with the internal

market.

(238) Affordability should not be a barrier to consumers’ access to the minimum set of

connectivity services. A right to contract with a provider should mean that consumers

with low income or special social needs entitled to social tariff options or packages

should have the possibility to enter into a contract for the provision of affordable

adequate internet access and voice communications services at least at a fixed location.

In order to minimise the financial risks such as non-payment of bills, providers should

be free to provide the contract under pre-payment terms, on the basis of affordable

individual pre-paid units.

(239) Affordability for individual consumers should be founded upon their right to contract

with a provider. Other rights, for example, itemised billing, the availability of a

number for an adequate period and ability to monitor and control expenditure are end-

user rights in this Regulation for all consumers and should apply also to consumers

benefiting from universal service affordability measures.

(240) Consumers should not be obliged to access services they do not want, and it should

therefore be possible for eligible consumers to restrict, on request, the affordable

universal service to voice communications services.

(241) Member States should introduce measures to promote the creation of a market for

affordable products and services incorporating facilities for consumers with

disabilities, including equipment with assistive technologies. This can be achieved,

inter alia, by referring to European standards, or by supporting the implementation of

requirements under Directive (EU) 2019/882 of the European Parliament and of the

Council53. Member States should introduce appropriate measures and take specific

measures for instance if the market is not delivering affordable products and services

incorporating facilities for consumers with disabilities under normal economic

conditions. Those measures could include direct financial support to consumers. The

cost to consumers with disabilities of relay services should be equivalent to the

average cost of voice communications services.

economic interest (OJ L, 2025/2630, 19.12.2025, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dec/2025/2630/oj);

Communication from the Commission — European Union framework for State aid in the form of

public service compensation (2011) (OJ C 8, 11.1.2012, p. 15); and Commission Regulation (EU)

2023/2832 of 13 December 2023 on the application of Articles 107 and 108 of the Treaty on the

Functioning of the European Union to de minimis aid granted to undertakings providing services of

general economic interest (OJ L, 2023/2832, 15.12.2023, ELI:

http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2023/2832/oj).

53 Directive (EU) 2019/882 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 April 2019 on the

accessibility requirements for products and services (OJ L 151, 7.6.2019, p. 70, ELI:

http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2019/882/oj).

EN 81 EN

(242) Relay services refer to services which enable two-way communication between remote

end-users of different modes of communication (for example text, sign, speech) by

providing conversion between those modes of communication, normally by a human

operator. Real time text is defined in accordance with Directive (EU) 2019/882. Where

a Member State decides to compensate the undertakings providing basic tariff options

or packages, for example when the provision results in unfair financial burden, it

should ensure the compatibility of such a measure with the internal market, including

competition rules.

(243) For data communications at data rates that are sufficient to permit an adequate internet

access, fixed-line connections are nearly universally available and used by a majority

of citizens of the Union and services based on wireless technologies have even greater

reach. However, there are differences between Member States as regards availability

and affordability of adequate internet access services at a fixed location across urban

and rural areas.

(244) The market has a leading role to play in ensuring availability of internet access with

constantly growing capacity. In areas where the market would not deliver, other public

policy tools to support availability of adequate internet access connections appear, in

principle, more cost-effective and less market-distortive than universal service

obligations, for example recourse to financial instruments such as those available

under the InvestEU programme and the Connecting Europe Broadband Fund

supported by the Connecting Europe Facility, the use of Union public funding

managed by Member States, national funding and attaching coverage obligations to

rights of use for radio spectrum to support the deployment of broadband networks in

less densely populated areas. One of the objectives of public policy measures may also

be to enable end-users to purchase adequate internet access services they would

otherwise not buy, for instance, where appropriate, through direct support or

connectivity vouchers for financing of monthly fees, standard set-up connection costs,

necessary terminal equipment or limited in-house wiring, e.g. when necessary and

ancillary to the provision of the service. When a Member State intends to grant

financial support for this purpose, it should ensure the compatibility of such a measure

with the internal market, including competition rules.

(245) If, after carrying out a due assessment, taking into account the results of the

geographical survey of networks deployment conducted by the competent authority, it

is shown that neither the market nor public intervention mechanisms are likely to

provide consumers, microenterprises, small enterprises or not-for-profit organisations

in certain areas with a connection capable of delivering adequate internet access

service as defined by Member States and voice communications services at a fixed

location, the Member State should be able to exceptionally entrust different providers

or sets of providers of those services in the different relevant parts of the national

territory. In addition to the geographical survey, Member States should be able to use,

where necessary, any additional evidence to establish to what extent adequate internet

access and voice communications services are available at a fixed location. That

additional evidence could include data available to the national regulatory authorities

through the market analysis procedure and data collected from users. Member States

should be able to restrict universal service obligations in support of availability of

adequate internet access services to the end-user’s primary location or residence.

(246) Where, in order to ensure the availability of an adequate internet access and voice

communications services when such a service cannot be ensured under normal

commercial circumstances or other public policy tools, a Member State decides to

EN 82 EN

entrust one or more undertakings to guarantee such availability throughout the national

territory or parts of it and to grant financial support for this purpose, it should ensure

the compatibility of such a measure with the internal market, including competition

rules.

(247) Requirements to ensure nation-wide territorial coverage imposed in an entrustment

procedure are likely to exclude or dissuade certain undertakings from applying for

being universal service providers. Entrusting providers with universal service

obligations for an excessive or indefinite period might also lead to an exclusion of

certain providers. Where a Member State decides to entrust all providers the provision

of tariff options or packages for affordability purposes, it could entrust only one or

some of them the provision of the availability element of universal service.

(248) Following the gradual reduction of the scope of the universal service, provision of

public payphones and directories and directory enquiry services under the universal

service regime has continued to phase out. This renders the provisions of Directive

(EU) 2018/1972 on the status of the existing universal services beyond the scope of

Directive (EU) 2018/1972 obsolete.

(249) The affordability of adequate internet access and voice communications services is

related to the information which users receive regarding usage expenses as well as the

relative cost of usage compared to other services and is also related to their ability to

control expenditure. Those facilities by providers of affordable universal service to

eligible consumers include, among others, the possibility for consumers selectively to

block certain calls, such as high-priced calls to premium services, to control

expenditure via pre-payment means, and to offset up-front connection fees.

(250) Except in cases of persistent late payment or non-payment of bills, consumers entitled

to affordable tariffs should, pending resolution of the dispute, be protected from

immediate disconnection from the network on the grounds of an unpaid bill and, in

particular, in the case of disputes over high bills for premium-rate services, continue to

have access to essential voice communications services and a minimum service level

of internet access.

(251) In order to provide stability and support a gradual transition from sector-specific rules

for organising and financing the universal service to the legal framework applicable to

SGEI, existing designations of undertakings for the provision of universal service in

Member States on the basis of Directive (EU) 2018/1972 should not be affected,

provided they were in force 6 months after the date of entry into force of this

Regulation. They should maintain their status until the expiry of such designations,

provided the services or comparable services are not available under normal

commercial circumstances.

(252) Future social, economic and technological developments, including transition to fibre,

might change the need for the availability or affordability of universal service. BEREC

should therefore monitor the availability and affordability regarding adequate internet

access and voice communications in Member States, and publish an opinion including

an assessment of the impact of such developments on the application in practice of the

provisions of this Regulation. The BEREC opinion could take into account the

possible safeguards adopted by Member States for consumers with low income or

special social needs in the context of the copper switch-off. The Commission, taking

account of BEREC’s opinion, should submit a report in particular with a view to

proposing that the scope of the rules on the availability or affordability of universal

service should be changed or redefined.

EN 83 EN

(253) Regulation (EU) 2015/2120 established common rules to safeguard equal and non-

discriminatory treatment of traffic in the provision of internet access services and

related end-users’ rights and aimed to protect end-users and simultaneously to

guarantee the continued functioning of the internet ecosystem as an engine of

innovation.

(254) The present reframing of the European regulatory framework for electronic networks

and services in this Regulation offers an occasion to merge the provisions for

measures concerning the open internet contained in Regulation (EU) 2015/2120 into

this Regulation, without touching upon the fundamental principles of equal and non-

discriminatory treatment of traffic in the provision of internet access services, as well

as the right of end-users to access and distribute information and content, use and

provide applications and services, and use terminal equipment of their choice.

(255) The second Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council

on the implementation of Regulation (EU) 2015/2120 confirmed that the principles

governing open internet access continue to be fit for purpose and to strike an

appropriate balance between protecting end-users and enabling technological progress.

However, in light of the significant evolution of networking technologies since 2015,

there is a need to define the conditions under which specialised business services

should be offered. Those specialised business services are becoming integral part of

network offering for interconnecting data centres, in provision of edge computing and

for AI services. The provision of low latency and guaranteed quality of service are

essential features of specialised business services. Critical government services should

also be considered as priority services in order to make sure that electronic

communications networks are meeting increased demand for security and defence

needs, such as detection response and mobility. While BEREC is empowered to issue

guidelines to support consistent implementation by national regulatory authorities,

additional guidance at Union level may be necessary to ensure a harmonised approach

to emerging services and technologies, including network slicing, experimental

services and differentiated industrial use-cases. Empowering the Commission to adopt

implementing act on the implementation of specialised services should therefore

contribute to legal certainty and regulatory coherence across the Union, by providing

clear criteria for compliance, including, inter alia, quality-of-service parameters or

minimum levels to be ensured for general internet access services. Such implementing

act should complement BEREC guidelines, support uniform application of the

framework, and encourage investment and innovation in advanced connectivity

services and in the business-to-business segment in particular, thereby strengthening

the competitiveness of the Union’s digital economy as well as ensuring prioritisation

of critical government services.

(256) In order to facilitate comparability across the Union and to reduce compliance cost,

BEREC should adopt guidelines on relevant quality of service parameters for internet

access services which national regulatory authorities in coordination with other

competent authorities should take into utmost account when enforcing the quality of

service obligations relevant to the end-user rights. In its guidelines for internet access

services, BEREC should specify the quality of service parameters to be measured for

the purposes of information requirements for contracts and for information to be

published for transparency, considering standards and technical specifications issued

by European and international standardisation bodies. The parameters should include

at least parameters for the monitoring mechanism for internet access services, relevant

parameters for end-users with disabilities, download and upload speeds pursuant to

EN 84 EN

required information on speeds for information for contracts with internet access

services and for information to be published, latency, jitter and packet loss. The

relevant parameters for end-users with disabilities should include also parameters for

interpersonal communications services.

(257) Divergent implementation of the rules on end-user protection has created significant

internal market barriers affecting both providers of electronic communications services

and end-users. Those barriers should be reduced by the applicability of the same rules

ensuring a high common level of protection across the Union. A calibrated full

harmonisation of the end-user rights covered by this Regulation should considerably

increase legal certainty for both end-users and providers of electronic communications

services and should significantly lower entry barriers and unnecessary compliance

burden stemming from the fragmentation of the rules. Full harmonisation helps to

overcome barriers to the functioning of the internal market resulting from such

national provisions concerning end-user rights which at the same time protect national

providers against competition from other Member States. Full harmonisation of their

rights increases the trust of end-users in the internal market as they benefit from an

equally high level of protection when using electronic communications services, not

only in their Member State but also while living, working or travelling in other

Member States.

(258) Contracts are an important tool for end-users to ensure transparency of information

and legal certainty. Most service providers in a competitive environment will conclude

contracts with their customers for reasons of commercial desirability. The obligations

on information requirements for contracts cover internet access services and

interpersonal communications services. Services consisting wholly or mainly in the

conveyance of signals, such as transmission services used for machine-to-machine

services, are not covered by the additional information requirements for contracts. The

information requirements, which might also be required pursuant to Directive

2011/83/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council54, should not lead to

duplication of the information within pre-contractual and contractual documents.

Relevant information provided in respect of this Directive, including any more

prescriptive and more detailed informational requirements, should be considered to

fulfil the corresponding requirements pursuant to Directive 2011/83/EU. In addition,

the requirements of existing Union consumer protection law relating to contracts, in

particular Council Directive 93/13/EEC55, and Directive 2011/83/EU, apply to

consumer transactions relating to electronic communications networks and services.

Regulation 2016/679 on data protection applies to processing of personal data.

(259) Some of those end-user protection provisions which apply only to consumers, namely

those on contract information, maximum contract duration and bundles, should benefit

not only consumers, but also microenterprises and not-for-profit organisations as

defined in Union law or national law. The bargaining position of those categories of

enterprises and organisations is comparable to that of consumers, and they should

54 Directive 2011/83/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2011 on consumer

rights, amending Council Directive 93/13/EEC and Directive 1999/44/EC of the European Parliament

and of the Council and repealing Council Directive 85/ 577/EEC and Directive 97/7/EC of the

European Parliament and of the Council (OJ L 304, 22.11.2011, p. 64, ELI:

http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2011/83/oj). 55 Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on unfair terms in consumer contracts (OJ L 95,

21.4.1993, p. 29, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/1993/13/oj).

EN 85 EN

therefore benefit from the same level of protection unless they explicitly waive those

rights. Obligations on contract information in this Regulation, including those of

Directive 2011/83/EU that are referred to in this Regulation, should apply irrespective

of whether any payment is made and of the amount of the payment to be made by the

customer. The obligations on contract information, including those contained in

Directive 2011/83/EU, should apply automatically to microenterprises, and not-for-

profit organisations unless they prefer negotiating individualised contract terms with

providers of electronic communications services. As opposed to microenterprises and

not-for-profit organisations, larger enterprises usually have stronger bargaining power

and do, therefore, not depend on the same contractual information requirements as

consumers. The provisions on provider switching and number portability, which are

important also for larger enterprises should continue to apply to all end-users. Not-for-

profit organisations are legal entities that do not earn a profit for their owners or

members. Typically, not-for-profit organisations are charities or other types of public

interest organisations. Hence, considering the comparable situation, it is legitimate to

treat such organisations in the same way as microenterprises under this Regulation,

insofar as end-user rights are concerned. Furthermore, consumers entitled to affordable

tariffs based on universal service are entitled to the same level of protection as all

other consumers.

(260) The specificities of the electronic communications sector require, beyond horizontal

contract rules, a limited number of additional end-user protection provisions. End-

users should be informed, among others, of quality of service levels offered,

conditions for promotions and termination of contracts, applicable tariff plans and

tariffs for services subject to particular pricing conditions. That information is relevant

for providers of internet access services and publicly available interpersonal

communications services. A provider of publicly available electronic communications

services should not be subject to the obligations on information requirements for

contracts where that provider, and affiliated companies or persons, do not receive any

remuneration directly or indirectly linked to the provision of electronic

communications services, such as where a university gives visitors free access to its

Wi-Fi network on campus without receiving any remuneration, whether through

payment from the users or through advertising revenues. This should not affect

information requirements in accordance with Union data protection law.

(261) It is essential that the required relevant information is provided prior to the conclusion

of the contract and in clear and understandable language and on a durable medium or,

where not feasible and without prejudice to the definition or the requirements

concerning durable medium set out in Directive 2011/83/EU, in a document, made

available by the provider and notified to the user, that is easy to download, open and

consult on devices commonly used by consumers. Providers should also present a

summary of the essential contract terms. The pre-contractually provided information

as well as the summary should constitute an integral part of the final contract. The

contract summary should be concise and easily readable, ideally no longer than the

equivalent of one single-sided A4 page or, where a number of different services are

bundled into a single contract, the equivalent of up to three single-sided A4 pages. In

order to respond to technological, social and market developments and to reduce

compliance cost, the Commission may adopt implementing acts for such contract

summaries to be used by the providers in line with the main elements of information

requirements set out in this Regulation.

EN 86 EN

(262) Without prejudice to the substantive obligation on the provider related to security, the

contract should specify the type of action the provider might take in the case of

security incidents, threats or vulnerabilities. In addition, the contract should also

specify any compensation and refund arrangements available if a provider responds

inadequately to a security incident, including where a security incident, notified to the

provider, takes place due to known software or hardware vulnerabilities, for which

patches have been issued by the manufacturer or developer and the service provider

has not applied those patches or taken any other appropriate countermeasure.

(263) The provisions on safeguarding of open internet access should be complemented by

effective end-user provisions which address issues particularly linked to internet

access services and enable consumers to make informed choices. Providers of internet

access services should inform consumers in a clear manner how traffic management

practices deployed might have an impact on the quality of internet access services,

consumers’ privacy and the protection of personal data as well as about the possible

impact of services other than internet access services to which they subscribe, on the

quality and availability of their respective internet access services. In order to

empower consumers in such situations, providers of internet access services should

therefore inform consumers in the contract of the speed which they are able

realistically to deliver. The normally available speed is understood to be the speed that

an end-user could expect to receive most of the time when accessing the service.

Providers of internet access services should also inform consumers of available

remedies in accordance with national law in the event of non-compliance of

performance. Any significant and continuous or regularly recurring difference, where

established by a monitoring mechanism certified by the national regulatory authority,

between the actual performance of the service and the performance indicated in the

contract should be deemed to constitute non-conformity of performance for the

purposes of determining the remedies available to the consumer in accordance with

national law. The methodology should be established in the guidelines of BEREC.

(264) End-users are often not aware of the cost of their consumption behaviour or have

difficulties in estimating their time or data consumption when using electronic

communications services. In order to increase transparency and to allow for better

control of their communications budget, it is important to provide end-users with

facilities that enable them to track their consumption in a timely manner. In addition,

in order to protect against ‘bill-shocks’, providers should provide free-of-charge alerts

in case of atypical or excessive consumption patterns including in relation to premium

rate services and other services subject to particular pricing conditions. Itemised bills

on the usage of internet access should indicate only the time, duration and amount of

consumption during a usage session but not indicate the websites or internet end-

points connected to during such a usage session. Under Directive (EU) 2018/1972

Member States were able to ensure that competent authorities in coordination, where

relevant, with national regulatory authorities are able to require providers of internet

access service or publicly available number-based interpersonal communications

services to make available all or part of additional facilities included in Directive (EU)

2018/1972. Member States were also able to go beyond the facilities in order to ensure

a higher level of consumer protection. These additional facilities should be provided

for universal service consumers benefiting from affordability measures. In addition,

itemised billing, where applicable, and certain cost control measures are obligatory

facilities to be provided to all consumers free of charge. Member States should not

introduce in their national law other diverging requirements for additional facilities.

However, Member States should be able to maintain provisions on those facilities that

EN 87 EN

were set out in Directive (EU) 2018/1972, including facilities requiring providers to

provide additional information on the consumption level and temporarily prevent

further use of the relevant service in excess of a financial or volume limit.

(265) The availability of transparent, up-to-date and comparable information on offers and

services is a key element for consumers in competitive markets where several

providers offer services. Consumers should be able to compare the prices of various

services offered on the market easily on the basis of information published in an easily

accessible form. In order to allow them to make price and service comparisons easily,

providers of internet access services or publicly available interpersonal

communications services should publish for greater transparency information,

including tariffs, quality of service, conditions on terminal equipment supplied, and

other relevant information. Enterprises typically rely on negotiated contract terms and

do not depend on the same requirements of publication of offers as consumers.

(266) Providers of interpersonal communications services that have an obligation to provide

access to emergency services through emergency communications, in exceptional

circumstances, namely due to a lack of technical feasibility, might not be able to

provide access to emergency services or caller location, or to both. In such cases, they

should inform their customers adequately in the contract. Such providers should

provide their customers with clear and transparent information in the initial contract

and update it in the event of any change in the provision of access to emergency

services, for example in invoices. That information should include any limitations on

territorial coverage, on the basis of the planned technical operating parameters of the

communications service and the available infrastructure. Where the service is not

provided over a connection which is managed to give a specified quality of service, the

information should also include the level of reliability of the access and of caller

location information compared to a service that is provided over such a connection,

taking into account current technology and quality standards, as well as any quality of

service parameters specified under this Regulation.

(267) Following the increased possibilities of end-users to search and compare a broad range

of offers using advanced digital search tools, private or public, the obligatory

provision of comparison tools by the relevant competent authorities has become less

relevant. Comparison tools, such as websites, are an effective means for end-users to

assess the merits of different providers of internet access services and interpersonal

communications services, where provided against recurring or consumption-based

direct monetary payments, and to obtain impartial information, in particular by

comparing prices, tariffs, and quality parameters in one place. Competent authorities

could certify such tools, upon request by the provider of the tool, in order to ensure

they are operationally independent from service providers and no service provider is

given favourable treatment in search results.

(268) In order to take full advantage of the competitive environment, consumers should be

able to make informed choices and to change providers when it is in their best interest

to do so. It is essential to ensure that they are able to do so without being hindered by

legal, technical or practical obstacles, including contractual conditions, procedures and

charges. That does not preclude providers from setting reasonable minimum

contractual periods of up to 24 months in consumer contracts. However, Member

States should have the possibility to maintain provisions for a shorter maximum

duration and to permit consumers to change tariff plans or terminate the contract

within the contract period without incurring additional costs in light of national

conditions, such as levels of competition and stability of network investments.

EN 88 EN

Independently from the electronic communications service contract, consumers might

prefer and benefit from a longer reimbursement period for physical connections. Such

consumer commitments can be an important factor in facilitating deployment of

gigabit networks up to or very close to end-user premises, including through demand

aggregation schemes which enable network investors to reduce initial take-up risks.

However, the rights of consumers to switch between providers of electronic

communications services, should not be restricted by such reimbursement periods in

contracts on physical connections and such contracts should not cover terminal or

internet access equipment, such as handsets, routers or modems. The equal treatment

of entities, including operators, financing the deployment of a gigabit physical

connection to the premises of an end-user, including where such financing is by way

of an instalment contract should be ensured. The obligations on contract duration

should apply to microenterprises, and not-for-profit organisations unless they prefer

negotiating individualised contract terms with providers of electronic communications

services. As opposed to microenterprises, larger enterprises usually have stronger

bargaining power and do, therefore, not depend on the same requirements for contract

duration as consumers. The obligations on contract termination should apply to

microenterprises, small enterprises, medium enterprises and not-for profit

organizations, unless they prefer to negotiating individualised contract terms with the

provider of electronic communications services.

(269) Automatic prolongation of contracts for electronic communications services is

possible. In those cases, consumers should be able to terminate their contract without

incurring any costs after the expiry of the initial contract term.

(270) Any changes to the contractual conditions proposed by providers of publicly available

electronic communications services other than number-independent interpersonal

communications services, which are not to the benefit of the consumer, for example in

relation to charges, tariffs, data volume limitations, data speeds, coverage, or the

processing of personal data on lawful grounds pursuant to Union data protection law

other than consent, should give rise to the right of the consumer to terminate the

contract without incurring any costs, even if they are combined with some beneficial

changes. Any change to the contractual conditions by the provider should therefore

entitle the consumer to terminate the contract unless each change is in itself beneficial

to the consumer, or the changes are of a purely administrative nature, such as a change

in the provider’s address, and have no negative effect on the consumer, or the changes

are strictly imposed by legislative or regulatory changes, such as new contract

information requirements imposed by Union law or national law. Whether a change is

exclusively to the benefit of the consumer should be assessed on the basis of objective

criteria. The consumer’s right to terminate the contract should be excluded only if the

provider is able to demonstrate that all contract changes are exclusively to the benefit

of the consumer or are of a purely administrative nature without any negative effect on

the consumer.

(271) Where a lawful price-indexation clause, specified according to the information

requirements for contracts that require to describe the method by which price may

lawfully vary, is an integral part of the contract, its implementation would not

constitute a change in contractual conditions but the application of an existing contract

provision, where the clause is in accordance with Union and national law.

(272) Consumers should be notified of any changes to the contractual conditions by means

of a durable medium. The provisions on contract termination should be without

prejudice to other provisions of Union law or national law concerning the grounds on

EN 89 EN

which contracts can be terminated or on which contractual terms and conditions can be

changed by the service provider or by the consumer.

(273) With respect to terminal equipment, the customer contract should specify any

conditions imposed by the provider on the use of the equipment, such as by way of

‘SIM-locking’ mobile devices, if such conditions are not prohibited under national

law, and any charges due on termination of the contract, whether before or on the

agreed expiry date, including any cost imposed in order to retain the equipment.

Where the consumer chooses to retain terminal equipment bundled at the moment of

the contract conclusion, any compensation due should not exceed its pro rata temporis

value calculated on the basis of the value at the moment of the contract conclusion, or

on the remaining part of the service fee until the end of the contract, whichever

amount is smaller. Any restriction to the usage of terminal equipment on other

networks should be lifted, free of charge, by the provider at the latest upon payment of

such compensation.

(274) Bundles comprising at least either an internet access service or a publicly available

number-based interpersonal communications service, as well as other services, such as

publicly available number-independent interpersonal communications services, linear

broadcasting and machine-to-machine services, or terminal equipment, have become

increasingly widespread and are an important element of competition. For the

purposes of this Regulation, a bundle should be considered to exist in situations where

the elements of the bundle are provided or sold by the same provider under the same

or a closely related or linked contract. While bundles often bring about benefits for

consumers, they can make switching more difficult or costly and raise risks of

contractual ‘lock-in’. Where different services and terminal equipment within a bundle

are subject to divergent rules on contract termination and switching or on contractual

commitments regarding the acquisition of terminal equipment, consumers are

effectively hampered in their rights under this Regulation to switch to competitive

offers for the entire bundle or parts of it. Certain essential provisions of this

Regulation regarding contract summary information, transparency, contract duration

and termination and switching should, therefore, apply to all elements of a bundle,

including terminal equipment, other services such as digital content or digital services,

and electronic communications services which are not directly covered by the scope of

those provisions. All end-user obligations applicable to a given electronic

communications service when provided or sold as a stand-alone service should also be

applicable when it is part of a bundle with at least an internet access service or a

publicly available number-based interpersonal communications service. Other

contractual issues, such as the remedies applicable in the event of non-conformity with

the contract, should be governed by the rules applicable to the respective element of

the bundle, for instance by the rules of contracts for the sales of goods or for the

supply of digital content. However, a right to terminate any element of a bundle

comprising at least an internet access service or a publicly available number-based

interpersonal communications service before the end of the agreed contract term

because of a lack of conformity or a failure to supply should give a consumer the right

to terminate all elements of the bundle. Also, in order to maintain their capacity to

switch easily providers, consumers should not be locked in with a provider by means

of a contractual de facto extension of the initial contract period.

(275) The possibility of switching between providers is key for effective competition in a

competitive environment. The availability of transparent, accurate and timely

information on switching should increase the end-users’ confidence in switching and

EN 90 EN

make them more willing to engage actively in the competitive process. Service

providers should ensure continuity of service so that end-users are able to switch

providers without being hindered by the risk of a loss of service and, where technically

possible, allow for switching on the date requested by end-users. In exceptional

circumstances, switching might not be possible for objective technical reasons such as

in situations where the secure functioning of terminal equipment or its integrity would

otherwise be endangered. This could possibly be the case for SIM cards or eSIMs that

are embedded in terminal equipment and that are used for both transmission of

machine-to-machine services as well as for internet access. An example for this could

be a car where the same eSIM is used for updating the car’s automotive software as

well as for internet access for the infotainment system.

(276) Number portability is a key facilitator of consumer choice and effective competition in

competitive electronic communications markets. End-users who so request should be

able to retain their numbers independently of the provider of service and for a limited

time between the switching of providers of service. The provision of this facility

between connections to the public telephone network at fixed and non-fixed locations

is not covered by the provider switching and number portability provisions.

(277) The impact of number portability is considerably strengthened when there is

transparent tariff information, both for end-users who port their numbers and for end-

users who call those who have ported their numbers. National regulatory authorities

should, where feasible, facilitate appropriate tariff transparency as part of the

implementation of number portability.

(278) When ensuring that pricing for interconnection related to the provision of number

portability is cost-oriented, national regulatory authorities should also be able to take

account of prices available in comparable markets.

(279) Number portability should be implemented with the minimum delay, so that the

number is functionally activated within one working day and the end-user does not

experience a loss of service lasting longer than one working day from the agreed date.

The right to port the number should be attributed to the end-user who has the relevant

(pre- or post-paid) contract with the provider. In order to facilitate a one-stop-shop

enabling a seamless switching experience for end- users, the switching process should

be led by the receiving provider of electronic communications to the public. In order to

contribute to a consistent application of provider switching and number portability

rules in Member States, BEREC should issue guidelines on the global process of the

switching and of the porting of numbers, taking into account technological

developments. This should include, where available, a requirement for the porting to

be completed though over-the-air provisioning, unless an end-user requests otherwise

as well as details on the compensation process in case of delays in, or abuse of, porting

and switching processes, missed service and installation appointments or failure by the

provider to comply with the obligations related to switching and number portability.

(280) Member States should define rules on penalties in the case of the failure of a provider

to comply with the obligations on switching and porting laid down in this Regulation,

including delays in, or abuses of, porting by, or on behalf of, a provider. Experience in

certain Member States has shown that there is a risk of end-users being switched to

another provider without having given their consent. While that is a matter that should

primarily be addressed by law enforcement authorities, Member States should be able

to impose appropriate penalties, as are necessary to minimise such risks, and to ensure

that end-users are protected throughout the switching process without making the

EN 91 EN

process less attractive for them. The right to port numbers should not be restricted by

contractual conditions.

(281) In order to ensure that switching and porting take place within the time-limits provided

for in this Regulation, Member States should be able to provide for the compensation

of end-users by providers in an easy and timely manner where an agreement between a

provider and an end-user is not respected. Such measures should be proportionate to

the length of the delay in complying with the agreement. Those measures could

include compensation for delays exceeding one working day in activation of service,

porting of a number, or loss of service, and where providers miss agreed service or

installation appointments. Additional compensation could also be in the form of an

automatic reduction of the remuneration where the transferring provider is to continue

providing its services until the services of the receiving provider are activated.

(282) In accordance with the principle of proportionality, a number of provisions on end-

user rights in this Regulation should not apply to microenterprises which provide only

number-independent interpersonal communications services. According to the case

law of the Court of Justice56, the definition of small and medium-sized enterprises,

which includes microenterprises, is to be interpreted strictly. In order to include only

enterprises that are genuinely independent microenterprises, it is necessary to examine

the structure of microenterprises which form an economic group, the power of which

exceeds the power of a microenterprise, and to ensure that the definition of

microenterprise is not circumvented by purely formal means.

(283) The completion of the internal market for electronic communications requires the

removal of barriers for end-users to have cross-border access to electronic

communications services across the Union. Providers of electronic communications to

the public should not deny or restrict access or discriminate against end-users.

Differentiation should, however, be possible based on and within the boundaries set by

the Union law, for example the measures provided for in Regulation (EU) 2022/612 to

prevent abusive or anomalous use of regulated retail roaming services.

(284) End-users are increasingly vulnerable to fraudulent activities carried out through

interpersonal communications services. Several Member States have introduced

national measures to combat evolving fraud schemes, such as CLI spoofing, phishing,

smishing, and vishing. However, those measures remain uncoordinated and reflect

primarily national perspectives, enabling fraudsters to shift their activities to

jurisdictions where such practices are not effectively addressed. The ODN should

enable the gathering of relevant information and best practices to enable BEREC to

issue technical and legal guidelines on the measures that could effectively protect end-

users against fraudulent activities in the Union. The BEREC guidelines should enable

Member States adopt coordinated measures to be implemented by interpersonal

communications services, with full respect of Union legislation on personal data

protection. The Commission should be empowered to adopt delegated acts to

supplement the effectiveness of measures that interpersonal communications services

put in place to protect end-users against fraudulent activities.

(285) Considering the particular aspects related to the reporting of missing children, Member

States should maintain their commitment to ensure that a well-functioning service for

reporting missing children is actually available in their territories under the number

56 Judgment of the Court (Seventh Chamber) of 27 February 2014, HaTeFo v Finanzamt Haldensleben, C-

110/013 (ECLI: EU:C:2014:114).

EN 92 EN

‘116000’. Member States should take appropriate measures to ensure that a sufficient

level of service quality in operating the ‘116000’ number is achieved.

(286) In parallel with the missing children hotline number ‘116000’, many Member States

also ensure that children have access to a child-friendly service operating a helpline

that helps children in need of care and protection through the use of the ‘116111’

number. Such Member States and the Commission should ensure that awareness is

raised among citizens, and in particular among children and among national child

protection systems, about the existence of the ‘116111’ helpline.

(287) In order to address public interest issues with respect to the use of internet access

services and publicly available number-based interpersonal communications services

and to encourage protection of the rights and freedoms of others, Member States

should be able to produce and disseminate or have disseminated, with the aid of

providers of such services, public-interest information related to the use of such

services. It should be possible to include public-interest information regarding the

most common infringements and their legal consequences, for instance regarding

copyright infringement, other unlawful uses and the dissemination of harmful content,

and advice and means of protection against risks to personal security, for example

those arising from disclosure of personal information in certain circumstances, as well

as risks to privacy and personal data, and the availability of easy-to-use and

configurable software or software options allowing protection for children or

vulnerable persons. In addition, end-users should be made aware of the risks to

personal security, privacy and personal data when using internet access services and

publicly available interpersonal communications services, including protection against

fraudulent activities perpetrated via those services and should be informed be informed

on the ways they can protect themselves against those risks. The information could be

coordinated by way of a cooperation procedure. Such public-interest information

should be updated where necessary and should be presented in easily comprehensible

formats, as determined by each Member State, and on national public authority

websites. Member States should be able to oblige providers of internet access services

and publicly available number-based interpersonal communications services to

disseminate this standardised information to all of their customers in a manner

considered to be appropriate by the national public authorities. Dissemination of such

public-interest information should, however, not impose an excessive burden on

providers. If it does so, Member States should require such dissemination by the

means used by providers in communications with end-users made in the ordinary

course of business.

(288) In the absence of relevant rules of Union law, content, applications and services are

considered to be lawful or harmful in accordance with national substantive and

procedural law. Providers of electronic communications networks or services should

act in accordance with requirements under Regulation (EU) 2022/2065 whether

content, applications or services are lawful or harmful. This Regulation and Directive

2002/58/EC are without prejudice to Regulation (EU) 2022/2065, which, amongst

other, contains a ‘mere conduit’ rule for intermediary service providers, as defined

therein.

(289) End-users should be able to access emergency services through emergency

communications free of charge and without having to use any means of payment, from

any device which enables number-based interpersonal communications services,

including when travelling within the Union. Emergency communications are a means

of communication that includes voice communications services, messaging, video or

EN 93 EN

other types of communications, for example real-time text, total conversation and relay

services. Member States, taking into account the capabilities and technical equipment

of the PSAPs, should be able to determine which number-based interpersonal

communications services are appropriate for emergency services, including the

possibility to limit those options to voice communications services and their

equivalent for end-users with disabilities, or to add additional options as agreed with

national PSAPs. Emergency communication can be triggered on behalf of a person by

an in-vehicle system system as an eCall as defined in Regulation (EU) 2015/758. The

European Digital Identity Walletsissued under Regulation (EU) 910/2014 of the

European Parliament and of the Council57 enables end-users to access a digital hub for

essential services. Therefore, Member States have to ensure that end-users will be also

able to originate an emergency communication by using their digital wallet.

(290) Emergency communications and caller location information have to be routed to the

most appropriate PSAP without delay to enable the appropriate answering and

handling of the emergency communications. Effective routing of emergency

communications should be ensured also in the context of the technological migration

from circuit-switched to packet-switched technologies. The most appropriate PSAP is

normally determined by the Member State on the basis of a territorial competence to

handle emergency communications or the competence to handle a certain type of

communication, for example a PSAP equipped to handle real-time text or sign-

language communication. Interpersonal communications services provided through

packet-switched technologies providing voice, text – including real-time text –, and

video may be routed in the public network domain or PSAP domain. Depending on the

national organisation of PSAPs, while the emergency communication reaches PSAP

system through the public networks, further routing may be necessary within the

PSAP IP network to reach the most appropriate PSAP. In order to guarantee the

availability of effective emergency communications to the benefit of all end-users,

Member States should ensure the timeliness of routing to the most appropriate PSAP

of all types of emergency communications and of caller location information mandated

on their territory. Member States should be able to mandate access to emergency

services through emergency communications from number-independent interpersonal

communications services as long as the national PSAP system allows for receiving

these communications by routing to the most appropriate PSAP and for the receipt of

caller location information. This may include the designation by a Member State of a

single IP gateway for receiving emergency communications. Nonetheless, such

providers should inform end-users when access to the single European emergency

number ‘112’ or to caller location information is not supported.

(291) Member States should consider the PSAP’s ability to handle emergency

communications in more than one language.

(292) Member States should take specific measures to ensure that emergency services,

including the single European emergency number ‘112’, are equally accessible to end-

users with disabilities, in particular deaf, hearing-impaired, speech-impaired and deaf-

blind end-users and in accordance with Directive (EU) 2019/882. The principle of

equivalence implies that end-users with disabilities should be able to access

57 Regulation (EU) No 910/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 July 2014 on

electronic identification and trust services for electronic transactions in the internal market and

repealing Directive 1999/93/EC (OJ L 257, 28.8.2014, p. 73, ELI:

http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2014/910/oj).

EN 94 EN

emergency services through emergency communications in a functionally equivalent

manner to that in which other end-users access emergency services, in particular by

calling the ‘112’ number via voice-based services.

(293) Caller location information, which applies to all emergency communications,

improves the level of protection and the security of end-users and assists the

emergency services in the discharge of their duties, provided that the transfer of

emergency communication and associated data to the emergency services concerned is

to be guaranteed by the national system of PSAPs. The reception and use of caller

location information, which includes both network-based location information where

the network that ensures the connectivity provides that information to the service

provider or the PSAP and enhanced handset caller location information, where the

radio equipment device makes it available for transmission, should comply with all

other requirements of Union law on the processing of personal data . Undertakings that

provide network-based location should make caller location information available to

emergency services as soon as the call reaches that service, independently of the

technology used. However, handset-based location technologies have proven to be

significantly more accurate and cost effective due to the availability of data provided

by the European Geostationary Navigation Overlay Service and Galileo Satellite

system and other Global Navigation Satellite Systems and Wi-Fi data. Therefore,

handset-derived caller location information should complement network-based

location information even if the handset-derived location becomes available only after

the emergency communication is set up. Member States should ensure that, where

available, the handset-derived caller location information is made available to the most

appropriate PSAP. This might not be always possible, for example when the location

is not available on the handset or through the interpersonal communications service

used, or when it is not technically feasible to obtain that information. Furthermore,

Member States should ensure that the PSAPs are able to retrieve and manage the caller

location information available, where feasible. The establishment and transmission of

caller location information should be free of charge for both the end-user and the

authority handling the emergency communication irrespective of the means of

establishment, for example through the handset or the network, or the means of

transmission, for example through voice channel, SMS or IP-based.

(294) It is important to increase awareness of the single European emergency number ‘112’

in order to improve the level of protection and security of citizens travelling in the

Union. To that end, citizens should be made fully aware, when travelling in any

Member State, in particular through information provided in international bus

terminals, train stations, ports or airports and in telephone directories, end-user and

billing material, that the single European emergency number ‘112’ can be used as a

single emergency number throughout the Union. This is primarily the responsibility of

the Member States, but the Commission should continue both to support and to

supplement initiatives of the Member States to heighten awareness of the single

European emergency number ‘112’ and periodically to evaluate the public’s awareness

of it and the evolution of its use.

(295) In order to respond to technological developments concerning access to emergency

services by using the digital wallet, accurate caller location information, equivalent

access for end-users with disabilities and call routing to the most appropriate PSAP,

the Commission should be empowered to adopt by means of a delegated act measures

necessary to ensure effective emergency communications in the Union. Such measures

EN 95 EN

should be without prejudice to the organisation of emergency services of Member

States.

(296) A citizen in one Member State who needs to contact the emergency services in another

Member State cannot do so because the home country PSAP may not have any contact

information of the PSAP systemin other Member States. A Union-wide, secure

database of numbers to reach the PSAP systems in each Member State should

therefore be maintained. To that end, the ODN should maintain a secure database of

E.164 numbers to contact Member State’s PSAP systems, in order to ensure that the

PSAPs in one Member State can be contacted by the PSAP in another.

(297) Mobile number-based interpersonal communications service providers have an

important role in the national preparedness strategies, therefore public warnings

should be transmitted by those providers to all end-users concerned. The end-users

concerned should be considered to be those who are located in the geographic areas

potentially being affected by imminent or developing major emergencies and disasters

during the warning period, as determined by the competent authorities.

(298) Where the effective reach of all end-users concerned, independently of their place or

Member State of residence, is ensured and fulfils the highest level of data security,

Member States should be able to provide for the transmission of public warnings by

using the European Digital Identity Wallets issued under Regulation (EU) 910/2014.

while ensuring that the citizens of the Union are effectively protected when travelling

in another Member State.

(299) Originating identification means identification information of the communication

originator or endpoint of an electronic communications service such as Voice over

Internet Protocol (‘VoIP’) in packet-switched networks that may be transmitted to the

terminal of the receiving party or end-user when the communication is being set up. In

circuit-switched networks, the presentation of the calling party’s number to the called

party prior to the call being established is known as calling line identification.

(300) The originating identification may use identifiers as signalling protocols other than

E.164 numbers or national numbering plans to transmit identification of the originator

or the endpoint to the terminal equipment of the called or receiving party when the call

or the communication is being set up. The interconnecting providers, including

providers of transit services, should ensure the transfer of the authentic originating

identification or calling line identification information in the national and international

interconnection agreements according to the national or international regulations or

rules of the countries involved.

(301) It is necessary to protect the right of the calling party to withhold the presentation of

the identification of the line/originating identification from which the call is being

made (‘CLIR’) and the right of the called party to reject calls from unidentified lines.

Certain end-users, in particular help lines, and similar organisations, have an interest

in guaranteeing the anonymity of their callers.

(302) A public safety answering point that displays a generic line identification when

responding to an emergency communication should not be considered as an

unidentified line.

(303) As regards connected line identification, it is necessary to protect the right and the

legitimate interest of the called party to withhold the presentation of the identification

of the line to which the calling party is actually connected (‘COLR’).

EN 96 EN

(304) Using a specific code or prefix should not relieve the legal or natural persons sending

direct marketing call from the obligation to present their calling line or originating

identification.

(305) There is justification for overriding the elimination of calling line or originating

identification presentation in specific cases. End-users’ rights to privacy and

protection of personal data with regard to calling line/originating identification should

be restricted where this is necessary to trace malicious and nuisance calls upon

complaint against such use to the competent authorities or when originating an

emergency communication and with regard to calling line or originating identification

and location data where this is necessary to enable emergency services and PSAPs to

effectively answer and handle emergency communications.

(306) Technology exists that enables providers of electronic communications services to

limit the reception of malicious, nuisance or other fraudulent calls by end-users in

different ways, including blocking of silent calls, and to assist competent authorities in

tracing such calls. These calls could include calls originating from invalid numbers,

i.e. numbers that do not exist in the numbering plan, or valid numbers that are not

allocated to a provider of a number-based interpersonal communications service or

that are not assigned to an end-user. Providers of publicly available interpersonal

communications services should protect end-users by offering them, free of charge, the

possibility to request the blocking of such calls, where technically feasible, or the

stopping of automatic call forwarding by a third party to the end-user’s terminal

equipment. To this end, providers should deploy state of the art technology such as

authentication solutions. Providers should make end-users aware of the existence of

such functionalities through information accompanying the contract and by other

means, for instance, by publication on their webpage, where appropriate. The

possibility to block unwanted calls should be deemed to be technically feasible unless

the provider demonstrates objective technical obstacles, which may exist, for instance,

in PSTN networks. Number-independent interpersonal communications service

providers should be able to take authentication measures to verify the users in

accordance with Directive (EU) 2022/2555.

(307) Publicly available directories consist of any directory or service containing

information of end-users, such as phone numbers (including mobile phone numbers),

email address, contact details and includes inquiry services. The main function of

directory services is to enable to identify such persons. The increasing availability and

use of digital alternatives like online search engines, social media and online

directories that offer an up-to-date way to find contact information do not justify

maintaining the obligation on number-based interpersonal communications services

providers. In addition, many directory enquiry services are now available as apps or

online, allowing users to search for information digitally. Furthermore, it is

appropriate for ensuring a high level of protection of the right to privacy and to

protection of the personal data that end-users who are natural persons are asked for

consent before their personal data are included in a directory. Different from natural

persons, legitimate interests of legal entities related to their data being included in a

directory should be also protected. The application of Directive 2002/58/EC showed

divergent practices across Member States as regards the exercise of the choice of end-

users that are natural persons for inclusion of their personal data in a directory.

Sometimes, Member States provide that end-users have the right to object the

inclusion of their personal data in their national laws or the withdrawal of consent of a

natural person is not shared with third parties processing personal data from the

EN 97 EN

directories, which may not only lower the level of protection throughout the Union,

but also expose end-users to fraudulent practices by malicious actors. Requesting

consent, including for sharing contact details in an electronic or paper form

irrespective of the provider should be in accordance with Regulation (EU) 2016/679.

(308) In line with the objectives of the Charter and the obligations enshrined in the United

Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, the regulatory

framework should ensure that all end-users, including end-users with disabilities, older

people, and users with special social needs, have easy and equivalent access to

affordable high-quality services regardless of their place of residence within the

Union. Declaration 22 annexed to the Treaty of Amsterdam58 provides that the

institutions of the Union are to take account of the needs of persons with disabilities in

drawing up measures under Article 114 TFEU.

(309) In order to ensure that end-users with disabilities benefit from competition and the

choice of service providers enjoyed by the majority of end-users, competent

authorities should specify, where appropriate and in light of national conditions, and

after consulting end-users with disabilities, consumer protection requirements for end-

users with disabilities to be met by providers of publicly available electronic

communications services. Such requirements can include, in particular, that providers

ensure that end-users with disabilities take advantage of their services on equivalent

terms and conditions, including prices, tariffs and quality, as those offered to their

other end-users, irrespective of any additional costs incurred by those providers. In

taking the measures on equivalent access and choice, competent authorities should

encourage compliance with the relevant standards and specifications laid down in

accordance with the provisions of this Regulation on standardisation. The consumer

protection requirements for end-users with disabilities may be applied also to

wholesale arrangements between providers. In order to avoid creating an excessive

burden on service providers competent authorities should verify, whether the

objectives of equivalent access and choice can be achieved without such measures.

(310) End-users should be able to enjoy a guarantee of interoperability in respect of all

equipment sold in the Union for the reception of radio in new vehicles of category M

and of digital television. Member States should be able to require minimum

harmonised standards in respect of such equipment. Such standards could be adapted

from time to time in light of technological and market developments.

(311) Where Member States decide to adopt measures in accordance with Directive

(EU) 2015/1535 for the interoperability of consumer radio receivers, the impact on the

market for low-value radio broadcast receivers should be limited and receivers should

be capable of receiving and reproducing radio services provided via digital terrestrial

radio broadcasting or via IP networks, in order to ensure that interoperability is

maintained. This may also improve public safety, by enabling users to rely on a wider

set of technologies for accessing and receiving emergency information in the Member

States.

(312) The provisions on interoperability of consumer radio and television equipment do not

prevent car radio receivers in new vehicles of category M from being capable of

receiving and reproducing radio services provided via analogue terrestrial radio

broadcasting and those provisions do not prevent Member States from imposing

58 OJ C 340, 10.11.1997, p. 115, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/treaty/ams/fna_1/dcl_22/sign.

EN 98 EN

obligations to ensure that digital radio receivers are capable of receiving and

reproducing analogue terrestrial radio broadcasts.

(313) Without prejudice to Union law, this Regulation should not prevent Member States

from adopting technical regulations related to digital terrestrial television equipment,

to prepare the migration of consumers to new terrestrial broadcasting standards, and

avoid the supply of equipment that would not be compliant with the standards to be

rolled out.

(314) Member States should continue to be able to lay down proportionate ‘must carry’

obligations on undertakings under their jurisdiction, in the interest of legitimate public

policy considerations, but such obligations should only be imposed where they are

necessary to meet general interest objectives clearly defined by Member States in

accordance with Union law and should be proportionate and transparent. It should be

possible to apply ‘must carry’ obligations to specified radio and television broadcast

channels and complementary services supplied by a specified media service provider.

Obligations imposed by Member States should be proportionate and transparent in

light of clearly defined general interest objectives. Member States should provide an

objective justification for the ‘must carry’ obligations that they impose in their

national law in order to ensure that such obligations are transparent, proportionate and

clearly defined. The obligations should be designed in a way which provides sufficient

incentives for efficient investment in infrastructure.

(315) Electronic communications networks and services used for the distribution of radio or

television broadcasts to the public include cable, IPTV, satellite and terrestrial

broadcasting networks. They might also include other networks to the extent that a

significant number of end-users use such networks as their principal means to receive

radio and television broadcasts. ‘Must carry’ obligations related to analogue television

broadcast transmissions should be considered only where the lack of such an

obligation would cause significant disruption for a significant number of end-users or

where there are no other means of transmission for specified television broadcast

channels. ‘Must carry’ obligations can include the transmission of services specifically

designed to enable equivalent access by end-users with disabilities. Accordingly

complementary services include services designed to improve accessibility for end-

users with disabilities, such as videotext, subtitling for end-users who are deaf or hard

of hearing, audio description, spoken subtitles and sign language interpretation, and

could include access to the related raw-data where necessary. In light of the growing

provision and reception of connected television services and the continued importance

of EPGs for end-user choice the transmission of programme-related data necessary to

support connected television and EPG functionalities can be included in ‘must carry’

obligations. It should be possible for such programme-related data to include

information about the programme content and how to access it, but not the programme

content itself.

(316) ‘Must carry’ obligations should be subject to review by Member States taking into

account technological and market evolution and in order to ensure that they continue

to be proportionate to the objectives to be achieved. Such obligations could, where

appropriate, entail a provision for proportionate remuneration which should be set out

in national law. Where that is the case, national law should also determine the

applicable methodology for calculating appropriate remuneration. That methodology

should avoid inconsistency with access remedies that may be imposed by national

regulatory authorities on providers of transmission services used for broadcasting

which have been designated as having significant market power. However, where a

EN 99 EN

fixed-term contract provides for a different methodology, it should be possible to

continue to apply that methodology for the duration of the contract. In the absence of a

national provision on remuneration, providers of radio or television broadcast channels

and providers of electronic communications networks used for the transmission of

those radio or television broadcast channels should be able to agree contractually on a

proportionate remuneration.

(317) The regulatory framework and its governance structures, including the Commission,

national regulatory and other competent authorities, BEREC and the BEREC Office,

have delivered good results in terms of harmonisation of the internal market. However,

national markets are still fragmented and an internal market for electronic networks

and services has not been achieved. This affects providers of electronic

communications engaged in cross-border business or active in a significant number of

Member States, including where BEREC guidelines exist. The evaluation identified in

particular three problematic issues, first, the strong national influence on BEREC that

may affect the impact of its output on the internal market, second, the asymmetric

extension of national regulatory authorities’ competences creating inconsistencies in

national regulatory authorities’ contributions to BEREC work, and third, resource

constraints and structural weaknesses which affect BEREC’s ability to carry out the

tasks assigned to it. Therefore, the governance framework needs to evolve to support

the completion of the internal market for electronic communications throughout the

Union, by ensuring consistent approaches in the application of rules and more

coordination among national regulatory and other competent authorities at national

level, among Union bodies and offices at Union level and between the national and the

Union level.

(318) Certain tasks should be undertaken only by national regulatory authorities, namely,

bodies which are independent both from the sector and from any external intervention

or political pressure. To ensure that national regulatory authorities are all competent to

carry out necessary tasks and that BEREC outputs represent the position of the

Member States well, those tasks should be extended to, for example, tasks related to

the handling of the notifications and Single Passport procedure under the general

authorisation regime, tasks related to the implementation of measures for the transition

to fibre or related to the support on preparedness and resilience. In particular, given

their expertise in market regulation and competition, national regulatory authorities

should be competent to decide on market shaping and competition aspects of spectrum

assignment procedures. Unless otherwise provided, Member States should be able to

assign other regulatory tasks provided for in this Regulation either to the national

regulatory authorities or to other competent authorities. Member States should

promote the stability of competences of the national regulatory authorities with regard

to the assignment of tasks which resulted from the transposition of the Union

electronic communications regulatory framework, in particular those related to market

competition or market entry. Where tasks are assigned to other competent authorities,

those other competent authorities should seek to consult the national regulatory

authorities before taking a decision. Pursuant to the principle of good cooperation,

national regulatory and other competent authorities should exchange information for

the exercise of their tasks.

(319) Member States should notify the Commission of the identity of the national regulatory

and other competent authorities. For authorities competent for granting rights of way,

it should be possible to fulfil the notification requirement by a reference to the single

information point established pursuant to Regulation (EU) 2024/1309.

EN 100 EN

(320) In accordance with the principle of the separation of regulatory and operational

functions, Member States should guarantee the independence of the national

regulatory and other competent authorities with a view to ensuring the impartiality of

their decisions. This requirement of independence is without prejudice to the

institutional autonomy and constitutional obligations of the Member States or to the

principle of neutrality with regard to the rules in Member States governing the system

of property ownership laid down in Article 345 TFEU.

(321) In order to ensure an effective application of the regulatory framework and to increase

their authority and the predictability of its decisions, a national regulatory authority

should be protected against external intervention or political pressure liable to

jeopardise its independent assessment of matters coming before it. Such outside

influence makes a national legislative body unsuited to act as a national regulatory

authority under the regulatory framework. For that purpose, Member States should lay

down rules at the outset regarding the grounds for the dismissal of the head of the

national regulatory authority in order to remove any reasonable doubt as to the

neutrality of that body and its imperviousness to external factors. In order to avoid

arbitrary dismissals, dismissed members should have the right to request that the

competent courts verify the existence of a valid reason to dismiss, among those

provided for in this Regulation. Such dismissals should relate only to the personal or

professional qualifications of the head or member. It is important that national

regulatory authorities have their own budget allowing them, in particular, to recruit a

sufficient number of qualified staff. In order to ensure transparency, that budget should

be published annually. Within the limits of their budget, they should have autonomy in

managing their resources, human and financial. In order to ensure impartiality,

Member States that retain ownership of, or control of, undertakings contributing to the

budget of the national regulatory or other competent authorities through administrative

charges should ensure that there is effective structural separation of activities

associated with the exercise of ownership or control from the exercise of control over

the budget.

(322) There is a need to further reinforce the independence of the national regulatory

authorities to ensure the imperviousness of its head and members to external pressure,

by providing minimum appointment qualifications, and a minimum duration for their

mandate. Furthermore, to address the risk of regulatory capture, ensure continuity and

enhance independence, Member States should consider limiting the possibility of

renewing the mandates of the head or members of the board and set up an appropriate

rotation scheme for the board and the top management. This could be arranged, for

instance, by appointing the first members of the collegiate body for different periods in

order for their mandates, as well as that of their successors, not to lapse at the same

moment.

(323) National regulatory authorities should be accountable for, and should be required to

report on, the way in which they are exercising their tasks. That obligation should

normally take the form of an annual reporting obligation rather than ad hoc reporting

requests, which, if disproportionate, could limit their independence or hinder them in

the exercise of their tasks.

(324) National regulatory authorities should have adequate financial and human resources to

carry out the tasks assigned to them. To strengthen BEREC, make it more

representative and safeguard its expertise, experience and knowledge of the specific

situation in the full range of national markets, each Member State should ensure that

EN 101 EN

its national regulatory authority has adequate financial and human resources required

to participate fully in the work of BEREC.

(325) BEREC was first established by the Commission in 200259 as a Commission expert

working group, the European Regulators Group for Electronic Communications

Networks and Services (‘ERG’), to advise and assist the Commission in consolidating

the internal market for electronic communications networks and services by ensuring

the development of consistent regulatory practice and the consistent application of the

Union’s regulatory framework for electronic communications. Regulation (EC)

No 1211/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council60 established BEREC as

a Union body, composed of national regulatory authorities, replacing the ERG, and

supported by the Office, a Community body with legal personality established to carry

out the tasks referred to in that Regulation, in particular the provision of professional

and administrative support services to BEREC. In order to support BEREC efficiently,

the Office was given legal, administrative and financial autonomy. Regulation (EU)

2018/1971 established the Agency for Support for BEREC (‘BEREC Office’) as a

Union agency for the support of BEREC. Overall, the evaluation of BEREC and the

BEREC Office has shown that both had been effective in delivering on their tasks and

objectives, and therefore the setup worked well and can be preserved.

(326) In order to carry out its tasks, BEREC should pool expertise from national regulatory

authorities and staff from the ODN. BEREC should aim to ensure the participation of

all national regulatory authorities in the fulfilment of its regulatory tasks and its

functioning.

(327) BEREC acts as a forum for cooperation among national regulatory authorities and

between national regulatory authorities and the Commission in the exercise of the full

range of their respective responsibilities under the Union regulatory framework.

BEREC also serves as a body for reflection, debate and advice for the European

Parliament, the Council and the Commission in the field of electronic

communications.

(328) The Union institutions and the national regulatory authorities should benefit from

BEREC’s assistance and advice, including on the relevant regulatory impact of any

issue concerning the overall dynamics of digital markets or with regard to their

relationship, discussions and exchanges with, and the dissemination of regulatory best

practices to, third parties. In addition to its contribution to the Commission’s public

consultation, BEREC should, when requested, advise the Commission in the

preparation of legislative proposals. BEREC should also be able to provide advice to

the European Parliament and to the Council, on their request or on its own initiative.

(329) In light of the increasing convergence between the sectors providing electronic

communications services, and the horizontal dimension of regulatory issues related to

their development, BEREC and the ODN should cooperate with, and without

prejudice to the role of, national regulatory authorities, other Union bodies, offices,

agencies and advisory groups, in particular the RSPB, the European Data Protection

59 Commission Decision 2002/627/EC of 29 July 2002 establishing the European Regulators Group for

Electronic Communications Networks and Services (OJ L 200, 30.7.2002, p. 38, ELI:

http://data.europa.eu/eli/dec/2002/627/oj). 60 Regulation (EC) No 1211/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 November 2009

establishing the Body of European Regulators for Electronic Communications (BEREC) and the Office

(OJ L 337, 18.12.2009, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2009/1211/oj).

EN 102 EN

Supervisor established by Regulation (EU) 2018/1725 of the European Parliament and

of the Council61, the European Data Protection Board established by Regulation

(EU) 2016/679, the European Regulators Group for Audiovisual Media Services

established by the Directive 2010/13/EU of the European Parliament and the Council,

the European Union Agency for Network and Information Security established by

Regulation (EU) 526/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council62, the

European GNSS Agency established by Regulation (EU) No 912/2010 of the

European Parliament and of the Council63, the Consumer Protection Cooperation

Network established pursuant to Regulation (EC) No 2006/2004 of the European

Parliament and the Council64, the European Competition Network and European

standardisation organisations, as well as with existing committees (such as the

Communications Committee and the Radio Spectrum Committee). Where appropriate,

BEREC and the ODN should also cooperate with relevant competent authorities of

Member States responsible for competition, consumer protection, cybersecurity and

data protection, and with the competent authorities of third countries, in particular,

regulatory authorities competent in the field of electronic communications or groups

of those authorities, as well as with international organisations when necessary for the

carrying out of their tasks. BEREC should also be able to consult interested parties by

means of public consultation.

(330) BEREC, as a technical body with expertise on electronic communications and

composed of representatives from national regulatory authorities and the Commission,

is best placed to be entrusted with tasks such as contributing to efficient internal

market procedures for draft national measures as regards market regulation, providing

the necessary guidelines to national regulatory and other competent authorities in order

to ensure common criteria and a consistent regulatory approach. The ODN should be

equipped to support BEREC in all its regulatory tasks. This is without prejudice to the

tasks established for national regulatory authorities, which are closest to the electronic

communications markets and their local conditions.

(331) To contribute to the objectives of this Regulation, in addition to its current tasks,

BEREC should promote effective cooperation among providers of electronic

communications networks and undertakings active in closely related sectors, by

issuing guidelines on facilitating ecosystem cooperation on technical and commercial

matters related to the provision of electronic communications services or information

61 Regulation (EU) 2018/1725 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2018 on the

protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data by the Union institutions,

bodies, offices and agencies and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Regulation (EC) No

45/2001 and Decision No 1247/2002/EC (OJ L 295, 21.11.2018, p. 39, ELI:

http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2018/1725/oj). 62 Regulation (EU) 2019/881 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 April 2019 on ENISA

(the European Union Agency for Cybersecurity) and on information and communications technology

cybersecurity certification and repealing Regulation (EU) No 526/2013 (Cybersecurity Act) (OJ L 151,

p. 15, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2019/881/oj). 63 Regulation (EU) 2021/696 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 April 2021 establishing

the Union Space Programme and the European Union Agency for the Space Programme and repealing

Regulations (EU) No 912/2010, (EU) No 1285/2013 and (EU) No 377/2014 and Decision

No 541/2014/EU (OJ L 170, , p. 69, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/696/oj). 64 Regulation (EU) 2017/2394 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2017 on

cooperation between national authorities responsible for the enforcement of consumer protection laws

and repealing Regulation (EC) No 2006/2004 (OJ L 345, p. 1,

ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2017/2394/oj).

EN 103 EN

society services and of innovative products and services to the benefit, in particular, of

end-users, in compliance with competition law rules. BEREC should also be entrusted

with new tasks on resilience and preparedness, including the adoption of a Union

Preparedness Plan for Digital Infrastructures prepared by the ODN. BEREC should

also adopt guidelines on technical and legal measures that could effectively protect

end-users against fraudulent activities in the Union.

(332) The members of the BEREC Board of Regulators should be appointed by national

regulatory authorities normally from among the heads of the national regulatory

authority or members of its collegiate body. The rotation of the role of Chair of the

BEREC Board of Regulators is intended to ensure continuity of BEREC’s work. A

rotation of the roles of Vice-Chairs is also promoted.

(333) BEREC should be able to act in the interests of the Union, independently from any

external intervention, including political pressure or commercial interference. It is

therefore important to ensure that the persons appointed to the Board of Regulators

enjoy the highest guarantees of personal and functional independence. The head of a

national regulatory authority, a member of its collegiate body, or the replacement of

either of them, enjoy such a level of personal and functional independence. More

specifically, they should act independently and objectively, should not seek or take

instructions in the exercise of their functions, and should be protected against arbitrary

dismissal. The function of the alternate on the Board of Regulators could also be

performed by the head of the national regulatory authority, a member of its collegiate

body, the replacement of either of them, or by another member of staff of the national

regulatory authority, who acts on behalf of, and in accordance with the scope of the

mandate of, the member of the Board of Regulators replaced.

(334) BEREC should provide expertise and establish confidence by virtue of its

independence, the quality of its advice and information, the transparency of its

procedures and methods of operation, and its diligence in carrying out its tasks with

the support of the ODN. BEREC’s independence should not prevent its Board of

Regulators from deliberating on the basis of drafts prepared by working groups under

its guidance.

(335) The RSPG was first established by Decision 2002/622/EC to contribute to the

development of the internal market and to support the development of a Union-level

radio spectrum policy. Decision 2002/622/EC was later replaced by Commission

Decision of 11 June 2019. The RSPG assists and advises the Commission on radio

spectrum policy issues. Those include radio spectrum availability, harmonisation and

allocation of radio spectrum, provision of information concerning allocation,

availability and use of radio spectrum, methods for granting rights to use radio

spectrum, refarming, relocation, valuation and efficient use of radio spectrum and the

protection of human health. The RSPG provides advice to the European Parliament

and to the Council upon their request on matters of radio spectrum. The RSPG has

become the forum for the coordination of implementation by Member States of their

obligations related to radio spectrum under by Directive (EU) 2018/1972 and plays a

central role in fields essential for the internal market, such as cross-border radio

spectrum coordination and standardisation.

(336) In general, the RSPG deliverables provided valuable input for further Commission’s

considerations, contributed to the development of the internal market and to support

the development of a Union-level radio spectrum policy, and were welcomed by

stakeholders. However, the RSPG in its opinions did not fully exploit its mandate to

EN 104 EN

advise Union institutions on broader aspects of radio spectrum policy in general (e.g.

economic, political, cultural, strategic, security, health and social issues), partly due to

a lack of a proper support structure. The close cooperation between BEREC and the

RSPG where radio spectrum issues have regulatory implications envisaged by

Directive (EU) 2018/1972, was in practice limited to few joint opinions or reports.

Both BEREC and RSPG relied on the resources of their members for the work on

substance, which means that any constraints that the national authorities have, be it of

budgetary nature, staffing or workload, are reflected in their ability to effectively

contribute to the work of BEREC and RSPG.

(337) New tasks under this Regulation, such as in the area of use of radio spectrum by

satellites and in the spectrum single market procedure, call for strengthening the

RSPG. It should evolve from the Commission advisory group to become similar to

BEREC, with adequate administrative and professional support by the ODN. This

Regulation thus establishes the RSPB which replaces the RSPG. The RSPB should

continue to have advisory role in the development of a radio spectrum policy in the

Union. The Commission or the European Parliament or the Council may at any time

request the RSPB to adopt an opinion or a report on any radio spectrum policy issue.

In its opinions, the RSPB should take into account inter alia technical, economic,

political, cultural, strategic, health and social aspects, as well as the various potentially

conflicting needs of radio spectrum users with a view to ensuring that a fair, non-

discriminatory and proportionate balance is achieved. Furthermore, the RSPB should

assume new tasks under this Regulation.

(338) Since the tasks related to radio spectrum policy require expertise from different

national competent authorities with responsibility on spectrum issues, including from

bodies making political decisions, the RSPB tasks cannot be conferred to BEREC,

which is composed of national regulatory authorities which do not necessarilly have

competences in spectrum policy matters.

(339) RSPB should be composed of the RSPB Board and working groups. The working

groups should make preparatory work for the RSPB Board deliberation in a similar

way as the subgroups have been for the RSPG.

(340) The RSPB Board should include high-level experts from the Member States with

responsibility for strategic radio spectrum policy. These experts could come from

national regulatory or other competent authorities. At RSPB meetings, national

delegations should present a consolidated and coordinated national view, no matter if

responsibility for radio spectrum are shared between different national bodies, not only

in relation to the internal market but also to public order, public security, civil

protection and defence policies as such policies may influence the organisation of

radio spectrum as a whole.

(341) The current RSPG’s arrangement that a Chair has a term of office of two years and

that at its end, he or she is replaced by a Deputy-Chair proved beneficial for ensuring

continuity of the RSPG work. Therefore, a similar arrangement should continue for a

Chair and a Vice-Chair of the RSPB Board.

(342) The CEPT should be invited as an observer of the RSPB's work considering that the

activities of the RSPB have a significant impact on radio spectrum at pan-European

level and that CEPT and its affiliate bodies have extensive technical expertise in radio

spectrum management. Drawing on CEPT's expertise is also appropriate based on

mandates granted thereto pursuant to the Decision No 676/2002/EC in order to

develop technical implementing measures in the areas of radio spectrum allocation and

EN 105 EN

information availability. In view of the importance of European standardisation for the

development of equipment using radio spectrum, it is likewise important to associate

as observer the European Telecommunications Standardisation Institute (‘ETSI’).

(343) In addition, where necessary, and on a case-by-case basis, the BEREC Board of

Regulators, the RSPB Board and the ODN Management Board should be able to invite

any person whose opinion may be of relevance, for example in light of their role and

expertise, to participate in their meetings as an observer. Such observer status should

not be permanent and consequently, an invite to participate in the meetings of the

Board of Regulators, the RSPB Board or the Management Board should be issued for

a specific meeting. Given the sensitive and confidential nature of certain discussions

that BEREC and RSPB members may be required to have to carry out tasks such as

for example related to resilience or with a strong Union dimension, it is necessary to

empower the Commission to request that the participation to BEREC and RSPB

meeting is restricted. The same possibility to request to limit participation should be

given to the Chairs of BEREC and of the RSPB which may make such request in

agreement with the Director of the ODN.

(344) The BEREC Board of Regulators, the RSPB Board and the ODN Management Board

should hold at least two ordinary meetings a year. Given past experience and the

enhanced role of BEREC and the RSPB, the BEREC Board of Regulators, RSPB

Board and the ODN Management Board may need to hold additional meetings. To

further enhance cooperation between BEREC and the RSPB, joint meetings of the

Board of Regulator and RSPB Board may be convened to discuss matters of relevance

for both BEREC and the RSPB.

(345) In order to further increase the single market dimension of BEREC and the RSPB

guidelines, opinions, reports and other documents, the single majority should become

the rule for voting.

(346) Experience has shown that most of BEREC’s and RSPB’s tasks are better carried out

through working groups. BEREC working groups should always ensure equal

consideration of all national regulatory authorities’ views and contributions, while

RSPB working groups should ensure equal consideration of all RSPB members’ views

and contributions. National regulatory and, where relevant, competent authorities

responsible for radio spectrum should promptly respond to nomination requests in

order to ensure the quick establishment of working groups, in particular those related

to procedures with time-limits. The working groups should be open to the participation

of experts from the Commission. To further enhance the impact of BEREC’s and

RSPB’s output on the internal market, professional staff from the ODN should also

systematically support and contribute to the working groups’ activities. The BEREC

Board of Regulators and the RSPB Board should therefore set up working groups,

through the ODN, and appoint their Chairs, representing where possible different

national regulatory and, where relevant, competent authorities responsible for radio

spectrum, and the ODN in light of expertise and availability of the ODN staff.

(347) In the internal market procedure, where the BEREC working group is assessing a draft

national measure proposed by a national regulatory authority and developing a draft

opinion, if relevant, it should not be influenced by the views of the national regulatory

authority that proposed the measure itself or of the Commission. Likewise, the RSPB

and BEREC working groups dealing with the notified draft national measures in the

spectrum single market procedure should not be influenced either by views of a

competent authority proposing the measure or of the Commission. Therefore, by way

EN 106 EN

of exception, the experts from the Commission and relevant national regulatory

authority or competent authority responsible for spectrum should not attend the

meetings of the relevant BEREC or RSPB working group.

(348) The RSPG has played an important role in the Union’s preparation for WRCs through

identifying together with the Commission items of the WRCs’ agendas that might

affect Union law, policies or programmes and recommending the position the Union

should take at the WRCs. As these recommendations should not be influenced by any

non-EU administration, members of the relevant RSPG subgroup are only experts

from Member States and the Commission. Such arrangement should continue after the

tasks of the RSPG are taken over by the RSPB.

(349) Where appropriate and depending on the allocation of tasks to authorities in each

Member State, other competent authorities should be invited to participate and their

views should be taken into consideration in the relevant BEREC working group where

their expertise is needed. If experts from other competent authorities are unable to

attend such meetings, national regulatory authorities should demonstrate that their

views have been taken into account. In any event, the independence of BEREC should

be maintained. As a rule, BEREC and the RSPB working groups should have specific

mandates and should be dissolved as soon as they complete their mandate. In this way,

the work of BEREC and the RSPB would be more flexible and experts would be

engaged where and for time needed. On the other hand, it should be possible to create

permanent BEREC or RSPB working groups where their activities are recurrent.

(350) The RSPG’s current practice to work on the basis of a biennial work programme

proved positive as it provided for two-years continuity of activities without creating

unnecessary administrative burden. It allowed engaging the national experts more

rationally by organising the RSPG activity depending on urgency and sensitivity of the

activity thus allowing all the activities to be completed at least within the two-year

period. This good practice should continue with the RSPB and should be adopted also

by BEREC. The Commission should be able to request BEREC or the RSPB for an

opinion at any time within a biennial cycle even if an activity based on the request

would continue in the next biennial cycle.

(351) In order to reduce administrative burden, BEREC and the RSPB should each adopt a

report on their activities every two years, in line with their respective work

programmes.

(352) In order to ensure a coherent and consistent application of the Union regulatory

framework for electronic communications and radio spectrum policy, it is necessary to

strengthen the cooperation between BEREC and the RSPB. Given the increasing

interdependence between electronic communications regulation and radio spectrum

management, structured, regular and systematic cooperation, including through joint

meetings and joint working groups, is essential to avoid regulatory fragmentation,

enhance policy coherence and support the effective functioning of the internal market.

(353) To enhance the cooperation between BEREC and the RSPB, the Chair of the BEREC

Board of Regulators and the Chair of the RSPB Board should meet at least twice a

year. To address issues identified as needing close cooperation between BEREC and

RSPB, the Chairs should make proposals to their respective boards for joint activities,

including to set up joint task forces. The issues identified to be subject to close

cooperation should also be described in the work programmes of BEREC and the

RSPB. The areas where more cooperation is advisable could include regulatory issues

of mutual interest, in particular market regulation and competition related to radio

EN 107 EN

spectrum, as well as satellites communications, verticals, 5G and 6G networks and

future mobile communications.

(354) The role of the BEREC Office, currently providing mainly administrative support to

BEREC, should be enhanced to provide BEREC and the RSPB with support on

administrative matters and with expertise on the merits of the tasks assigned to them.

To this aim, the BEREC Office’s structure should be adapted and its budgetary

resources increased. The new official name of the BEREC Office should be ‘Office for

Digital Networks’. The designation ‘ODN’ should be used as the Agency’s short

name.

(355) In light of the increasing complexity and strategic importance of electronic

communications networks and digital network infrastructures, and of their growing

interdependence with radio spectrum policy, it is necessary to establish a reinforced

Union-level support structure. The ODN should play a central role in providing

expertise, analytical capacity and coordination supporting BEREC and the RSPB,

while fully respecting their respective mandates and independence. Strengthened and

structured support at Union level is essential to ensure the consistent application of

Union law, enhance regulatory and policy coherence, avoid fragmentation of the

internal market and support the effective implementation of Union digital objectives.

(356) The ODN should provide all necessary professional and administrative support for the

work of BEREC and the RSPB, including financial, organisational and logistical

support, and should contribute to BEREC and RSPB’s work.

(357) To ensure that BEREC receives sufficient support on its tasks and to strengthen the

impact on the internal market of its output, this Regulation should assign the ODN

clear and defined role and tasks, such as to actively participate and contribute to all the

activities of BEREC working groups, prepare the Plan to strengthen the resilience and

preparedness of electronic communications networks, services and other digital

infrastructures at Union level in the event of natural or man-made disruptions, crises or

force majeure which may have a significant adverse impact on the population or the

functioning of the internal market, and to support the coordination among national

regulatory authorities and other competent authorities to facilitate the issuance of

single authorisations to operate within the Union. Given that to carry out the tasks

assigned to it in support of BEREC, the RSPB or the Commission, the ODN needs to

collect data and analyse it, it is appropriate to entrust the ODN with the task to issue

informative annual reports on the progress towards the single market for electronic

communications. Such reports should describe the state of the market, the market

structure, and the impact of the measures implemented under this Regulation on the

internal market, including the ex post effects of mergers on the market. The

Commission may take them into account when preparing Digital Decade reports.

(358) The ODN should also be entrusted with tasks in support of the RSPB, for example to

provide analytical, administrative and logistical support to the RSPB Board and its

working groups in carrying out the tasks assigned to them by this Regulation. The

ODN should also assist the Commission and the RSPB in the process of granting the

Union authorisation for the provision of satellite networks and services and the use of

radio spectrum for satellite, and upon Commission request, it should assist it in

conducting a selection procedure at Union level. The ODN should also act as a where

a one stop shop procedure is created by the Commission to facilitate the granting of

radio spectrum under common authorisation conditions.

EN 108 EN

(359) Given it is replacing the BEREC Office, the ODN should be a body of the Union with

legal personality and enjoy legal, administrative and financial autonomy. As a Union

decentralised agency, the ODN should operate within its mandate and the existing

institutional framework. It should not be seen as representing a Union position to an

outside audience or as committing the Union to legal obligations. Its seat should

remain in Riga, as decided by the Representatives of the Governments of the Member

States65. The first Seat Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Latvia

and the Office entered into force on 5 August 2011. It was subsequently replaced by a

new Headquarters Agreement signed on 21 December 2020, in accordance with the

provisions of Article 47 of Regulation (EU) 2018/1971.

(360) The ODN should be composed of a Management Board and a Director.

(361) The Management Board of the ODN should decide on administrative matters, such as

the budget, staff and audits, and the BEREC Board of Regulators should focus r on

regulatory matters relating to BEREC’s tasks. The Management Board should be

composed of the representatives of the national regulatory authorities, of the

Commission and of the RSPB. In principle, the representatives of the national

regulatory authorities on the Management Board should be the same persons as those

appointed to the BEREC Board of Regulators, but national regulatory authorities

should be able to appoint other representatives fulfilling the same requirements. Given

that the ODN is tasked to support also the RSPB, the RSPB Chair should be a member

of the Management Board, to ensure that the needs of the RSPB are adequately

addressed.

(362) This Regulation provides for the Management Board to delegate relevant appointing

authority powers to the Director, who is authorised to sub-delegate those powers. This

is intended to contribute to the efficient management of the staff single point of

contact for submission of applications and notifications of the ODN.

(363) The Director should remain the representative of the ODN with regard to legal and

administrative matters. The Management Board should appoint the Director, subject to

the positive opinion of the representative of the RSPB and following an open and

transparent selection procedure in order to guarantee a rigorous evaluation of the

candidates and a high level of independence.

(364) The ODN should be adequately staffed for the purpose of carrying out its duties. All

tasks assigned to the ODN, including professional and administrative services

supporting BEREC and RSPB in carrying out their tasks, together with compliance

with the financial, staff and other applicable regulations, and the increased weight of

operational tasks required of the ODN vis-à-vis administrative ones should be duly

assessed and reflected in the resource programming.

(365) Because of its legal nature as a Union body, Commission Delegated Regulation (EU)

No 2019/71566 should apply to the ODN.

65 Decision taken by common accord between the Representatives of the Governments of the Member

States of 31 May 2010 on the location of the seat of the Office of the Body of European Regulators for

Electronic Communications (BEREC) (2010/349/EU), OJ L 156, 23.6.2010, p. 12. 66 Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2019/715 of 18 December 2018 on the framework financial

regulation for the bodies set up under the TFEU and Euratom Treaty and referred to in Article 70 of

Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2018/1046 of the European Parliament and of the Council (OJ L 122,

10.5.2019, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg_del/2019/715/oj).

EN 109 EN

(366) In order to guarantee the ODN’s autonomy and independence, and in order to provide

support to the work of BEREC and RSPB, the ODN should have its own budget. The

budget should be adequate and should reflect the additional tasks assigned and the

enhanced role of BEREC, RSPB and the ODN. The ODN should be mainly financed

from the general budget of the Union. However, to ensure that it has adequate budget

to carry out its tasks, the ODN should be able to levy fees from undertakings for

obtaining and maintaining Union satellite authorisations and pan-European numbering

resources. The level of those fees and the modalities for payments should be set by the

Commission in implementing acts. The financing of the ODN should be subject to an

agreement by the budgetary authority as set out in point 27 of the Inter-institutional

Agreement of 16 December 2020 between the European Parliament, the Council of the

European Union and the European Commission67. In order to further extend the

consistent implementation of the regulatory framework for electronic communications,

the BEREC Board of Regulators, the RSPB Board, the working groups, where

relevant, and the Management Board should be open to the participation of authorities

of third countries competent in the field of electronic communications or spectrum

policy where those third countries have entered into agreements with the Union to that

effect, such as EEA EFTA States and candidate countries.

(367) BEREC and the RSPB should be entitled to establish working arrangements with

competent Union bodies, offices, agencies and advisory groups, with competent

authorities of third countries and with international organisations, which should not

create legal obligations. The goal of such working arrangements could be, for instance,

to develop cooperative relationships and exchange views on regulatory issues. The

Commission should ensure that the necessary working arrangements are consistent

with Union policy and priorities, and that BEREC and the RSPB operate within their

mandate and the existing institutional framework and are not seen as representing the

Union position to an outside audience or as committing the Union to international

obligations. Participation in the work of BEREC, the RSPB and the ODN without the

right to vote of the authorities of third countries with primary responsibility in the field

of electronic communications or spectrum, should only be possible when relevant

working arrangements are in place.

(368) In order to further extend the consistent implementation of the regulatory framework

for electronic communications, the BEREC Board of Regulators, the RSPB Board, the

working groups and the Management Board should be open to the participation of

authorities of third countries competent in the field of electronic communications or

spectrum policy where those third countries have entered into agreements with the

Union to that effect, such as EEA EFTA States and candidate countries.

(369) In order to ensure a high level of confidentiality and to avoid conflicts of interests, the

rules on those matters applying to members of the organisational bodies of BEREC,

the RSPB and the ODN should apply to their alternates.

(370) NRAs should cooperate with BEREC and the ODN and should provide them with

timely and accurate information to ensure that BEREC and the ODN are able to fulfil

67 Interinstitutional Agreement of 16 December 2020 between the European Parliament, the Council of the

European Union and the European Commission on budgetary discipline, on cooperation in budgetary

matters and on sound financial management, as well as on new own resources, including a roadmap

towards the introduction of new own resources (OJ L 433I, 22.12.2020, p. 28, ELI:

http://data.europa.eu/eli/agree_interinstit/2020/1222/oj)

EN 110 EN

their tasks. BEREC and the ODN should also, pursuant to the principle of sincere

cooperation, share with the Commission, the NRAs and other competent authorities all

necessary information. Where relevant, the confidentiality of information should be

ensured. When assessing whether a request is duly justified, BEREC should take into

consideration whether the information requested is related to the carrying out of tasks

exclusively attributed to the relevant authorities. The same would apply to RSPB and

competent authorities responsible for radio spectrum mutatis mutandis.

(371) The ODN should establish a common information and communication system to avoid

duplication of information requests and facilitate communications between all

authorities involved.

(372) The Commission should carry out a regular evaluation of the operation of BEREC, the

RSPB and the ODN and the effectiveness of their institutional structure in a changing

digital environment. If, as the outcome of that evaluation, the Commission finds that

the institutional structure established by this Regulation is ineffective for the

achievement of its objectives, in particular, to ensure the consistent implementation of

the regulatory framework for electronic communications, it should propose necessary

amendments.

(373) The BEREC Office which was established as a decentralised agency with legal

personality by Regulation (EU) 2018/1971, is succeeded by the ODN established by

this Regulation as regards all ownership, agreements, including the seat determination,

legal obligations, employment contracts, financial commitments and liabilities. In

order to ensure continuity in the work of BEREC, the RSPG and the ODN, the current

members of the BEREC Board of Regulators, of the RSPG and the Director and the

members of the Management Board of the BEREC Office should continue in office

until the end of their term of office.

(374) National regulatory authorities, other competent authorities and BEREC need to gather

information from market players in order to carry out their tasks effectively, including

assessing the compliance of general terms and conditions with this Regulation without

suspending the applicability of those terms and conditions during the assessment. It

may, by way of exception, also be necessary to gather information from other

undertakings active in sectors that are closely related to the electronic communications

services sector, such as content providers, that hold information which could be

necessary for them to exercise their tasks under Union law. It might also be necessary

to gather such information on behalf of the Commission, to allow it to fulfil its

respective obligations under Union law. Requests for information should be

proportionate and not impose an undue burden on undertakings. Information gathered

by national regulatory and other competent authorities should be publicly available,

except in so far as it is confidential in accordance with national rules on public access

to information and subject to Union and national rules on commercial confidentiality.

(375) In order to ensure that national regulatory authorities carry out their regulatory tasks in

an effective manner, the data which they gather should include accounting data on the

retail markets that are associated with wholesale markets where an undertaking is

designated as having significant market power and as such are regulated by the

national regulatory authority. The data should also include data which enable the

national regulatory authority to assess compliance with conditions attached to rights of

use, the possible impact of planned upgrades or changes to network topology on the

development of competition or on wholesale products made available to other parties.

Information regarding compliance with coverage obligations attached to rights of use

EN 111 EN

for radio spectrum is key to ensure completeness of the geographical surveys of

network deployments. In that respect, the competent authority should be able to

require that information is provided at disaggregated local level with a granularity

adequate to conduct a geographical survey of networks. Common templates and

approaches should be developed for the reporting of financial, statistical data,

networks and service categories and other market information by services providers.

Changes to reporting requirements, once established, should be minimised wherever

possible.

(376) In order to support Union sustainability objectives, it is vital that the Union attracts

investments into sustainable activities in the field of electronic communications

networks and services. Such regulations as, but not limited to, Regulation (EU)

2020/852 of the European Parliament and of the Council68 and under Directive (EU)

2022/2464 of the European Parliament and of the Council69 allow financial and non-

financial undertakings to share a common definition of economic activities that can be

considered sustainable. Electronic communications networks are covered notably by

the Union Code of Conduct for the sustainability of telecommunications networks, as

planned under the Commission’s Communication of 18 October 2022 entitled

‘Digitalising the energy system - EU action plan’. In line with the once-only principle,

it is necessary that national regulatory and other competent authorities assess whether

the information on sustainability already provided by undertakings pursuant to Union

law is sufficient for them and BEREC to carry out their regulatory tasks under Union

law. In this regard, BEREC should, as part of its horizontal guidelines on information

and reporting, map the sustainability related reporting obligations. BEREC should

cooperate with other competent authorities to ensure efficient data gathering and

processing from other sustainability related reports required by Union law or national

law in the application of Union law, with the view to minimising the administrative

burden and reusing the existing relevant data.

(377) It should be possible to exchange information that is considered to be confidential by a

competent authority, in accordance with Union and national rules on confidentiality

and business secrets and on the protection of personal data, with the Commission,

BEREC and any other authorities where such exchange is necessary. The information

exchanged should be limited to that which is relevant and proportionate to the purpose

of such an exchange.

(378) Member States’ obligations to provide information for the defence of Union interests

under international agreements as well as reporting obligations under law that is not

specific to the electronic communications sector such as competition law should not be

affected.

(379) To alleviate the burden of information requests from network and service providers

and the competent authority concerned, BEREC should adopt guidelines on the scope

of information and reporting requests, templates, formats, timing and frequency.

BEREC guidelines should harmonise regular and systematic reporting related to

68 Regulation (EU) 2020/852 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 June 2020 on the

establishment of a framework to facilitate sustainable investment, and amending Regulation (EU)

2019/2088 (OJ L 198, 22.6.2020, p. 13, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2020/852/oj). 69 Directive (EU) 2022/2464 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 December 2022

amending Regulation (EU) No 537/2014, Directive 2004/109/EC, Directive 2006/43/EC and Directive

2013/34/EU, as regards corporate sustainability reporting (OJ L 322, 16.12.2022, p. 15, ELI:

http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2022/2464/oj).

EN 112 EN

general authorisation, individual rights of use for scarce resources and specific

obligations and should not be required more than once per year and should be subject

to BEREC templates as well. Any information requests and reporting obligations

should be proportionate, objectively justified and limited to what is strictly necessary.

In particular, duplication of requests for information by the competent authority and

by BEREC, and the systematic and regular proof of compliance with all conditions

under a general authorisation or a right of use, should be avoided. Undertakings should

be made aware of the intended use of the information sought. Provision of information

should not be a condition for market access. For statistical purposes and to maintain

accurate information in the notifications database, a notification may be required from

providers of electronic communications networks or services when they cease

activities.

(380) Regulatory intervention must rely on detailed information regarding network roll-out

in order to be effective and to target the areas where it is needed. That information is

essential for the purpose of promoting investment, increasing connectivity across the

Union and providing information to all relevant authorities and citizens. It should

include surveys regarding both deployment of gigabit networks as well as significant

upgrades or extensions of networks which might not match the performance

characteristics of gigabit networks in all respects, such as roll-out of fibre to the

cabinet coupled with active technologies like vectoring. The gathering of information

should also support the process of copper switch-off with all the relevant information.

The relevant forecasts should concern periods of up to three years. The level of detail

and territorial granularity of the information that competent authorities should gather

should be guided by the specific regulatory objective and should be adequate for the

regulatory purposes that it serves. Therefore, the size of the territorial unit will also

vary between Member States, depending on the regulatory needs in the specific

national circumstances, and on the availability of local data. National regulatory and

other competent authorities should be guided by BEREC guidelines on best practice to

approach such a task, and such guidelines will be able to rely on the existing

experience of national regulatory and/or other competent authorities in conducting

geographical surveys of networks roll-out. Without prejudice to the respect of

confidential information and business secrets, competent authorities should, where the

information is not already available on the market, make data directly accessible in an

open format in accordance with Directive (EU) 2019/1024 of the European Parliament

and of the Council70 and without restrictions on reuse the information gathered in such

surveys and should make available tools to end-users as regards quality of service to

contribute towards the improvement of their awareness of the available connectivity

services. In gathering any of that information, all authorities concerned should respect

the principle of confidentiality and should avoid causing a competitive disadvantage to

any undertaking.

(381) Where geographical surveys, possibly in combination with other relevant data, show

competition issues, national regulatory authorities should be able to conduct a market

review when justified.

(382) Reliable information on the deployment of broadband networks is essential for the

precise targeting of State aid, the verification of universal service obligations, and the

70 Directive (EU) 2019/1024 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 June 2019 on open data

and the re-use of public sector information (OJ L 172, 26.6.2019, p. 56, ELI:

http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2019/1024/oj).

EN 113 EN

effective promotion of competition. Periodic surveys may fail to capture the dynamic

nature of fibre rollouts. Therefore, best practices suggest evolving the mapping of

network deployments from a static survey to a continuous survey, ideally based on

APIs-based data ingestion model, creating a ‘real-time digital twin’ of Union

connectivity that includes both terrestrial and non-terrestrial (satellite) connectivity.

(383) In order to comply with State aid rules, the subsidised network must provide, inter

alia, an adequate step change compared to existing and planned networks that already

exist or are forecast to be deployed. This may require mapping of concrete speed

thresholds.

(384) Accurate calculation of availability (premises passed), readiness (premises connected)

and take-up (premises activated) of the geographical reach of gigabit networks

connectivity coverage, take-up rates as well as market shares require a precise

denominator. To ensure the robustness of these calculations, national regulatory

authorities and other competent authorities should have access to the authoritative

count of households and physical premises per address point, as held by National

Statistical Institutes or Cadastral Authorities. Access to this reliable data is essential to

calculate accurate connectivity coverage and penetration rates for the monitoring of

Digital Decade targets and to ensure robust and consistent market analysis across the

Union.

(385) Access to gigabit networks is a prerequisite for social inclusion and economic

development, yet demand-side factors significantly influence market contestability and

investment viability. To effectively perform market analyses, define relevant markets,

and target public interventions, national regulatory authorities should be able to

distinguish between ‘infrastructure gaps’ (where networks are absent) and ‘adoption

gaps’ (where networks exist but remain unused). Therefore, it may be useful to

compare geospatial network data and socio-economic micro-data to assess the possible

constraints affecting coverage, demand, and digital inclusion.

(386) Data concerning household composition, age structure, and disposable income could

be relevant for assessing demand elasticity and potential barriers to the adoption of

broadband services. Furthermore, where available income and poverty indicators may

be used for the automatic verification of eligibility for social vouchers. The processing

of these metrics would allow Member States to target public subsidies to support the

most vulnerable citizens while limiting any possible distortion of competition.

(387) Experience has shown that technical barriers often persist within the final connection

to the user, distinct from the near network deployment. Therefore, statistical data

regarding physical building characteristics, including construction year, dwelling type

(multi-dwelling units vs single dwelling units), and tenancy status, is relevant. Access

to this data could enable regulators to identify ‘vertical bottlenecks’, such as internal

wiring costs which may act as barriers to investments, and to adjust cost models for

wholesale access pricing accordingly.

(388) To effectively perform regulatory tasks, including the definition of sub-national

geographic markets and the targeting of State aid, national regulatory authorities may

require the processing of geospatial network data in combination with granular socio-

economic and physical micro-data at the level of individual address points. Where

processing of personal data is necessary to pursue those tasks, such processing is

carried out pursuant to Article 6(1), point e) and Article 6(3) of Regulation (EU)

EN 114 EN

2016/679. To ensure full compliance with the principles of statistical confidentiality

laid down in Regulation (EC) No 223/200971, this Regulation should promote the use

of a Secure Processing Environment (SPE) or equivalent secure technical interfaces.

That environment ensures that while analysis is performed on micro-data for accuracy,

no confidential data is disclosed to the regulatory authority, and any public reporting

derived from this analysis must be aggregated to a level that prevents the re-

identification of specific statistical units, typically ensuring a minimum threshold of at

least three units.

(389) To ensure consistency across the internal market, BEREC should be able to update its

guidelines to specify the technical standards for the Secure Processing Environment

and the data definitions for the socio-economic indicators, ensuring that the burden on

National Statistical Institutes is minimized through standardised APIs.

(390) While market participants can change their deployment plans for unpredictable,

objective and justifiable reasons, competent authorities should intervene, including

where public funding is affected, and, where appropriate, impose penalties if they have

been provided, knowingly or due to gross negligence, by an undertaking or public

authority with misleading erroneous or incomplete information. Regarding penalties,

gross negligence should refer to a situation where an undertaking or a public authority

provides misleading, erroneous or incomplete information due to its behaviour or

internal organisation which falls significantly below due diligence regarding the

information provided. Gross negligence should not require that the undertaking or

public authority knows that the information provided is misleading, erroneous or

incomplete, but, rather, that it would have known, had it acted or been organised with

due diligence. It is important that the penalties are sufficiently dissuasive in light of

the negative impact on competition and on publicly funded projects. The provisions on

penalties should be without prejudice to any rights to claim compensation for damages

in accordance with national law.

(391) Bridging the digital divide in the Union is essential to enable all citizens of the Union

to have access to the internet and digital services. To that end, in the case of specific

and well-defined areas, the relevant authorities should have the possibility to invite

undertakings and public authorities to declare their intention to deploy gigabit

networks in those areas, allowing them sufficient time to provide a thoroughly

considered response. The information included in the forecasts should reflect the

economic prospects of the electronic communications networks sector and investment

intentions of undertakings at the time when the data are gathered, in order to allow the

identification of available connectivity in different areas. Where an undertaking or

public authority declares an intention to deploy in an area, the national regulatory or

other competent authority should be able to require other undertakings and public

authorities to declare whether or not they intend to deploy gigabit networks. That

procedure, that relies on market participants responding truthfully and in good faith,

should create transparency for undertakings and public authorities that have expressed

their interest in deploying in this area, so that, when designing their business plans,

71 Regulation (EC) No 223/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 2009 on

European statistics and repealing Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 1101/2008 of the European Parliament

and of the Council on the transmission of data subject to statistical confidentiality to the Statistical

Office of the European Communities, Council Regulation (EC) No 322/97 on Community Statistics,

and Council Decision 89/382/EEC, Euratom establishing a Committee on the Statistical Programmes of

the European Communities (OJ L 87, 31.3.2009, p. 164, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2009/223/oj).

EN 115 EN

they can assess the likely competition that they will face from other networks. In the

interests of predictable investment conditions, competent authorities should be able to

share information with undertakings and public authorities expressing interest in

deploying gigabit networks on whether other types of network upgrades, are present or

foreseen in the area in question.

(392) It is important that national regulatory and other competent authorities consult all

interested parties on proposed decisions, give them sufficient time to the complexity of

the matter to provide their comments, and take account of their comments before

adopting a final decision. In order to ensure that decisions at national level do not have

an adverse effect on the functioning of the internal market or other TFEU objectives,

national regulatory authorities should also notify certain specific draft decisions

concerning, in particular market functioning and competition to the Commission and

other national regulatory authorities to give them the opportunity to comment. It is

appropriate for competent authorities to consult interested parties in the cases defined

in this Regulation on all draft measures which have an effect on trade between

Member States.

(393) In the context of a competitive environment, the views of interested parties, including

users and consumers, should be taken into account. In order to appropriately address

the interests of citizens, Member States should put in place an appropriate consultation

mechanism. Such a mechanism could take the form of a body which would,

independently of the national regulatory authority and service providers, carry out

research into consumer-related issues, such as consumer behaviour and mechanisms

for changing suppliers, and which would operate in a transparent manner and

contribute to the existing mechanisms for stakeholder consultation. Furthermore, a

mechanism could be established for the purpose of enabling appropriate cooperation

on issues relating to the promotion of lawful content. Any cooperation procedures

agreed pursuant to such a mechanism should, however, not allow for the systematic

surveillance of internet use.

(394) Standardisation should remain primarily a market-driven process. However, there may

still be situations where it is appropriate to require compliance with specified

standards at Union level in order to improve interoperability, freedom of choice for

users and encourage interconnectivity in the internal market. At national level,

Member States are subject to Directive (EU) 2015/1535. Standardisation procedures

under this Regulation should be without prejudice to Directives 2014/30/EU72 and

2014/35/EU73 of the European Parliament and of the Council, and Directive

2014/53/EU.

(395) Radio spectrum harmonisation and coordination, and equipment regulation supported

by standardisation on the basis of Directive 2014/53/EU74, are complementary and

72 Directive 2014/30/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 2014 on the

harmonisation of the laws of the Member States relating to electromagnetic compatibility (OJ L 96,

29.3.2014, p. 79, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2014/30/oj). 73 Directive 2014/35/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 2014 on the

harmonisation of the laws of the Member States relating to the making available on the market of

electrical equipment designed for use within certain voltage limits (OJ L 96, 29.3.2014, p. 357, ELI:

http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2014/35/oj). 74 Directive 2014/53/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 April 2014 on the

harmonisation of the laws of the Member States relating to the making available on the market of radio

equipment and repealing Directive 1999/5/EC (OJ L 153, 22.5.2014, p. 62,

ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2014/53/oj).

EN 116 EN

need to be coordinated closely to meet their joint objectives effectively, with the

support of the RSPB. Coordination between the content and timing of mandates to

CEPT under Decision No 676/2002/EC and standardisation requests to standardisation

bodies, such as the European Telecommunications Standards Institute, including with

regard to radio receivers parameters, should facilitate the introduction of future

systems, support radio spectrum sharing opportunities and ensure efficient radio

spectrum management.

(396) Standardisation requests to standardisation bodies, such as the European

Telecommunications Standards Institute, including with regard to radio receivers

parameters, should facilitate the introduction of future systems, support radio spectrum

sharing opportunities and ensure efficient radio spectrum management.

(397) The Union and the Member States have entered into commitments in relation to

standards and the regulatory framework of telecommunications networks and services

in the World Trade Organization.

(398) Out-of-court dispute resolution procedures may constitute a fast and cost-efficient way

for end-users to enforce their rights, in particular for consumers and microenterprises

and small enterprises as defined in the Annex to Commission Recommendation

2003/361/EC75. Member States should enable the national regulatory authority or

another competent authority responsible for, or at least one independent body with

proven expertise in dealing with, end-user rights to act as an alternative dispute

resolution entity. With respect to such dispute resolutions, the authorities or other

bodies notified as alternative dispute resolution entities should fully meet the quality

requirements of the Directive 2013/11/EU of the European Parliament and of the

Council76, notably, it should not be subject to any instructions. As many Member

States have established dispute resolution procedures also for end-users other than

consumers, to whom Directive 2013/11/EU of the European Parliament and of the

Council does not apply, it is reasonable to maintain the sector-specific dispute

resolution procedure for both consumers and, where Member States extend it, also for

other end-users, in particular microenterprises and small enterprises. In relation to out-

of-court dispute resolution, Member States should be able to maintain or introduce

rules that go beyond those laid down by Directive 2013/11/EU in order to ensure a

higher level of consumer protection.

(399) In the event of a dispute between undertakings in the same Member State in an area

covered by this Regulation, for example relating to obligations for access and

interconnection or to the means of transferring end-user lists, an aggrieved party that

has negotiated in good faith but failed to reach agreement should be able to call on the

national regulatory authority to resolve the dispute. National regulatory authorities

should be able to impose a solution on the parties. The intervention of a national

regulatory authority in the resolution of a dispute between providers of electronic

communications networks to the public or services or associated facilities in a Member

State should seek to ensure compliance with the obligations arising under this

Regulation.

75 Commission Recommendation of 6 May 2003 concerning the definition of micro, small and medium-

sized enterprises (OJ L 124, 20.5.2003, p. 36, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reco/2003/361/oj). 76 Directive 2013/11/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 May 2013 on alternative

dispute resolution for consumer disputes and amending Regulation (EC) No 2006/2004 and Directive

2009/22/EC (Directive on consumer ADR) (OJ L 165, 18.6.2013, p. 63,

ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2013/11/oj).

EN 117 EN

(400) In addition to the rights of recourse granted under Union law or national law, there is a

need for a simple procedure to be initiated at the request of either party in a dispute, to

resolve cross-border disputes between undertakings providing, or authorised to

provide, electronic communications networks or services in different Member States.

(401) One important task assigned to BEREC is to adopt, where appropriate, opinions in

relation to cross-border disputes. National regulatory authorities should therefore fully

reflect any opinion submitted by BEREC in their measures imposing any obligation on

an undertaking or otherwise resolving the dispute in such cases.

(402) Technology and market developments in electronic communications networks and

services and cloud and AI based networks and services are leading to increased

interaction, cooperation and commercial agreements among a broad range of

undertakings, including electronic communications service providers, CAPs, software

and AI developers as well as network equipment and device manufacturers. In light of

those developments BEREC should assist undertakings through guidelines, covering,

inter alia, best practices for facilitating cooperation among market players in the

broader connectivity ecosystem in compliance with competition law rules. The

guidelines should be forward looking and enable future break-through innovation and

development of use-cases contributing to the Union’s objectives under the

Competitiveness Compass. BEREC, with the support of the ODN, may work closely

with industry representatives and other relevant stakeholders. To that end, BEREC

may establish a dedicated stakeholder cooperation group to facilitate structured

dialogue, exchange of best practices and technical expertise, and to support the

consistent and effective implementation of the guidelines.

(403) Cooperation aspects under those BEREC guidelines should include service-level

agreements between network providers, aspects related to fair, reasonable and

proportionate use of the resources of the other party, in particular in cases such as the

handover of IP traffic via interconnection, peering and transit for the purpose of

providing information society services or electronic communications services in an

efficient, economically sustainable, and reliable way, in particular, to the benefit of the

end-user. Notably, agreements between those actors concerning the hand-over of

traffic should not lead to disproportionate or economically unsustainable investment

needs for network providers, and the benefits arising from increased traffic should be

shared in a manner conducive to continued investment, innovation and network

resilience. Accordingly, the guidelines should cover practices that allow for beneficial

technical collaboration across the broader connectivity and digital services ecosystem.

(404) The BEREC guidelines should also encompass the exchange of information on

expected traffic patterns, including peaks, and in general traffic forecasting, in order to

support optimised network planning and congestion management. Furthermore, the

guidelines should address additional aspects of energy-efficient, economically

sustainable and reliable traffic delivery from an end-to-end perspective, including the

promotion of a more harmonised use of data compression techniques, such as codecs,

in order to reduce energy consumption and improve network usage efficiency. At the

same time, and with the objective of incentivising provision of innovative services, the

BEREC guidelines may also provide guidance on co-innovation frameworks, between

electronic communications networks and other undertakings active in the electronic

communications or closely related sectors. In addition, the guidelines may provide

good practices for neutral host and multi-cloud deployment in electronic

communications networks, lowering barriers for AI developers and content providers

to innovate, in accordance with Regulation 2023/2854 of the European Parliament and

EN 118 EN

of the Council, promote interoperability standards and other relevant measures to

incentivise deployment of innovative products and services requiring cooperation

between electronic communications networks providers or between such providers and

other undertakings active in the electronic communications or closely related sectors.

Such innovative products and services may include, among others, joint deployment of

edge computing services to bring cloud resources needed for delivery of low-latency

services closer to mobile subscribers, provision of enterprise/industrial IoT platforms

requiring collaboration between cloud and electronic communication providers, or

electronic communications network providers and content and application providers

co-deploying caches inside networks to optimise streaming. Matters addressed in those

guidelines, including issues relating to interconnection between publicly available

electronic communications networks and networks owned by undertakings other than

publicly available electronic communications networks, should not be subject to

dispute resolution mechanism, which should be limited to the enforcement of

obligations laid down in this Regulation and which should not extend to arrangements

of a cooperative or voluntary nature.

(405) In order to promote effective cooperation between providers of electronic

communications networks and other undertakings active in the electronic

communications or closely related sectors, it is appropriate to establish a voluntary

conciliation procedure to facilitate dialogue on technical and commercial

arrangements. Such a procedure provides a structured and neutral forum, supported by

national regulatory authorities in cooperation with BEREC to encourage amicable

solutions and reduce the likelihood of protracted disputes and enhance regulatory

consistency. In order to ensure a coherent and harmonised application of this voluntary

conciliation procedure across the Union, close cooperation with BEREC should be

ensured throughout the procedure, including in the conciliation meeting and its report.

In particular, BEREC should provide an opinion on individual cases brought forward

by the parties in the context of conciliation procedures led by national regulatory

authorities. In addition, the guidelines on ecosystem cooperation should provide

guidance to national regulatory authorities on the assessment of the relevant

commercial and technical matters, as well as on options for effective cooperation

between the parties. By encouraging cooperation and mutual understanding, this

procedure can contribute to the more efficient, economically sustainable and reliable

delivery of IP traffic, support interoperability and quality of services, and facilitate the

deployment of innovative services based on collaboration, while preserving

contractual freedom.

(406) Member States might need to amend rights, conditions, procedures, charges and fees

relating to general authorisations and rights of use where this is objectively justified.

Such proposed amendments should be duly notified to all interested parties in good

time, giving them adequate opportunity to express their views. Unnecessary

procedures should be avoided in the case of minor amendments to existing rights to

install facilities or rights of use for radio spectrum or for numbering resources when

such amendments do not have an impact on third parties’ interests. Minor amendments

to rights and obligations are amendments which are mainly administrative, do not

change the substantial nature of the general authorisations and the individual rights of

use and thus cannot generate any competitive advantage over other undertakings.

(407) Considering the importance of ensuring legal certainty and in order to promote

regulatory predictability to provide a safe environment for investments, in particular

for new wireless broadband communications, any restriction or withdrawal of any

EN 119 EN

existing rights of use for radio spectrum or for numbering resources or right to install

facilities should be subject to predictable and transparent justifications and procedures.

Hence, stricter requirements or a notification mechanism could be imposed in

particular where rights of use have been assigned pursuant to competitive or

comparative procedures and in the case of harmonised radio spectrum bands to be used

for wireless broadband electronic communications services (‘wireless broadband

services’). Justifications referring to effective and efficient use of radio spectrum and

technological evolution could rely on technical implementing measures adopted under

Decision No 676/2002/EC. Furthermore, except where proposed amendments are

minor, where general authorisations and individual rights of use for radio spectrum

need to be restricted, withdrawn or amended without the consent of the holder of the

right, this can take place after consulting interested parties. As restrictions or

withdrawals of general authorisations or rights may have significant consequences for

their holders, the competent authorities should take particular care and assess in

advance the potential harm that such measures may cause before adopting such

measures.

(408) Competent authorities should monitor and secure compliance with the terms and

conditions of the radio spectrum general authorisation and rights of use, and in

particular to ensure effective and efficient use of radio spectrum and compliance with

coverage and quality of service obligations, through administrative penalties including

financial penalties and injunctions and withdrawals of rights of use in the event of

breaches of those terms and conditions. Undertakings should provide the most

accurate and complete information possible to competent authorities to allow them to

fulfil their surveillance tasks.

(409) Any party subject to a decision of a competent authority, including a decision not to

deal with applications for the granting of rights to install facilities, should have the

right to appeal to a body that is independent of the parties involved and of any external

intervention or political pressure. That appeal procedure should be without prejudice

to the division of competences within national judicial systems and to the rights of

legal entities or natural persons under national law. In any case, Member States should

grant effective judicial review against such decisions.

(410) To ensure legal certainty for market players, appeal bodies should carry out their

functions effectively. In particular, appeal proceedings should not be unduly lengthy.

Interim measures suspending the effect of the decision of a competent authority should

be granted only in urgent cases to prevent serious and irreparable damage to the party

applying for those measures and only where the balance of interests so requires.

(411) In order to ensure uniform conditions for the implementation of this Regulation,

implementing powers should be conferred on the Commission to adopt decisions to

resolve cross-border harmful interference between Member States; to identify a

harmonised or coordinated approach for the purpose of addressing inconsistent

implementation of general regulatory approaches by national regulatory authorities on

the regulation of electronic communications markets, as well as numbering, including

number ranges, portability of numbers and identifiers, number and address translation

systems, and access to emergency services through the single European emergency

number ‘112’; to make the implementation of standards or specifications compulsory,

or remove standards or specifications from the compulsory part of the list of standards;

to adopt the technical and organisational measures to appropriately manage the risks

posed to security of networks and services, as well as the circumstances, format and

procedures applicable to notification of security incidents; to specify relevant details

EN 120 EN

relating to tradable individual rights publicly available in a standardised electronic

format when the rights of use for radio spectrum are created to specify the physical

and technical characteristics of small-area wireless access points; to authorise or

prevent a national regulatory authority from imposing on undertakings designated as

having significant market power certain obligations for access or interconnection; to

harmonise specific numbers or numbering ranges to address unmet cross-border or

pan-European demand for numbering resources; and to specify the contract summary

template to be provided to consumers. Those powers should be exercised in

accordance with Regulation (EU) No 182/2011 of the European Parliament and of the

Council77.

(412) The publication of information by Member States should ensure that market players

and potential market entrants understand their rights and obligations, and know where

to find the relevant detailed information. Publication in the national gazette helps

interested parties in other Member States to find the relevant information.

(413) To determine the correct application of Union law, the Commission needs to know

which undertakings have been designated as having significant market power and

which obligations have been placed upon market players by national regulatory

authorities. In addition to publication of that information at national level, it is

therefore necessary for Member States to submit that information to the Commission.

Where Member States are required to send information to the Commission, they

should be able to do so by electronic means, subject to agreement on appropriate

authentication procedures.

(414) The Commission should review the functioning of this Regulation periodically, in

particular to determine whether amendments are needed in light of changing

technological or market conditions. When reviewing the functioning of this

Regulation, the Commission should assess whether, in light of developments in the

market and with regard to both competition and consumer protection, there is a

continued need for the provisions on sector-specific ex ante regulation or whether

those provisions should be amended or repealed.

(415) The European Data Protection Supervisor was consulted in accordance with Article

42(1) of Regulation (EU) 2018/1725 and delivered their opinion on [dd month 2026].

(416) There is a need to provide for a transitional period for the Commission to set up the

Union satellite authorisation regime which should replace the national ones. During

this period, the Commission should define the conditions applicable to the provision of

satellite networks and satellite communications services and the use of spectrum and

set up the procedure, including timelines and practicalities, for undertakings to submit

their Union authorisation requests. Moreover, there should be sufficient time for

holders of rights of use or users of spectrum under national law to request Union

authorisation and for the Commission to process such requests.

77 Regulation (EU) No 182/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 February 2011

laying down the rules and general principles concerning mechanisms for control by Member States of

the Commission’s exercise of implementing powers (OJ L 55, 28.2.2011, p. 13, ELI:

http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2011/182/oj).

EN 121 EN

HAVE ADOPTED THIS REGULATION:

1. PART I - SCOPE, OBJECTIVES AND DEFINITIONS

Article 1

Subject matter

1. This Regulation establishes rules for the provision of electronic communications

networks, electronic communications services, associated facilities and associated

services, the strategic planning and management of radio spectrum and certain aspects of

terminal equipment.

2. This Regulation also establishes a governance framework for the electronic

communications sector composed of the national regulatory and other competent

authorities, the Body of European Regulators for Electronic Communications

(‘BEREC’), the Radio Spectrum Policy Body (‘RSPB’), and the Office for Digital

Networks (‘ODN’), laying down the tasks of BEREC, the RSPB and the ODN as well as

those of national regulatory authorities and, where applicable, of other competent

authorities, and establishes a set of procedures for the application of the relevant legal

framework throughout the Union.

Article 2

Definitions

For the purposes of this Regulation, the following definitions apply:

(1) ‘electronic communications network’ means transmission systems, whether or not

based on a permanent infrastructure or centralised administration capacity, and,

where applicable, switching or routing equipment and other resources, including

network elements which are not active, which permit the conveyance of signals by

wire, radio, optical or other electromagnetic means, including satellite networks,

fixed and mobile networks, electricity cable systems, to the extent that they are used

for the purpose of transmitting signals, networks used for radio and television

broadcasting, and cable television networks, irrespective of the type of information

conveyed;

(2) ‘gigabit network’ means either an electronic communications network which consists

wholly of optical fibre elements up to the network termination point, or an electronic

communications network which is capable of delivering, under usual peak-time

conditions, similar network performance in terms of available downlink and uplink

bandwidth, resilience, error-related parameters, and latency and its variation;

This definition replaces the definition of ‘very high capacity network’ of Article 2(2)

of Directive (EU) 2018/1972;

(3) ‘electronic communications service’ means a service normally provided for

remuneration via electronic communications networks, which encompasses, with the

exception of services providing or exercising editorial control over content

transmitted using electronic communications networks and services, the following

types of services:

(a) internet access service;

(b) interpersonal communications service;

EN 122 EN

(c) services consisting wholly or mainly in the conveyance of signals such as

transmission services used for the provision of machine-to-machine

services and for broadcasting;

(4) ‘premises passed’ means end users’ premises for which an operator has deployed its

access network up to serving point (i.e. the first concentration or distribution point

intended to serve that premises), such that, from receipt of the request, the operator

can make the access service available within four weeks with reasonable additional

built out (i.e. by carrying out only the standard premises-specific final drop

connection and activation, without extending the access network beyond the serving

point;

(5) ‘premises connected’ means an end-user’s premises where the access network

infrastructure has been physically extended from the serving point and terminated

inside the end user’s premises;

(6) ‘essential copper-based service’ means an electronic communications service

delivered over legacy copper access infrastructure to the extent that it supports

mission critical or essential functions, such as emergency communication, telecare

systems, alarms and monitoring control systems, used by the water, energy and

transport industries;

(7) ‘internet access service’ means a publicly available service that provides access to

the internet, and thereby connectivity to virtually all end points of the internet,

irrespective of the network technology and terminal equipment used;

(8) ‘interpersonal communications service’ means a service normally provided for

remuneration that enables direct interpersonal and interactive exchange of

information via electronic communications networks between a finite number of

persons, whereby the persons initiating or participating in the communication

determine its recipient(s), and does not include services which enable interpersonal

and interactive communication merely as a minor ancillary feature that is

intrinsically linked to another service;

(9) ‘number-based interpersonal communications service’ means an interpersonal

communications service which connects with publicly assigned numbering resources,

namely, a number or numbers in national or international numbering plans, or which

enables communication with a number or numbers in national or international

numbering plans;

(10) ‘number-independent interpersonal communications service’ means an interpersonal

communications service which does not connect with publicly assigned numbering

resources, namely, a number or numbers in national or international numbering

plans, or which does not enable communication with a number or numbers in

national or international numbering plans;

(11) ‘public electronic communications network’ means an electronic communications

network used wholly or mainly for the provision of publicly available electronic

communications services which support the transfer of information between network

termination points;

(12) ‘network termination point’ means the physical point at which an end-user is

provided with access to a public electronic communications network, and which, in

the case of networks involving switching or routing, is identified by means of a

specific network address, which may be linked to an end-user’s number or name;

EN 123 EN

(13) ‘associated facilities’ means associated services, physical infrastructures and other

facilities or elements associated with an electronic communications network or an

electronic communications service which enable or support the provision of services

via that network or service, or have the potential to do so, and includes buildings or

entries to buildings, building wiring, antennae, towers and other supporting

constructions, ducts, conduits, masts, manholes and cabinets;

(14) ‘associated service’ means a service associated with an electronic communications

network or an electronic communications service which enables or supports the

provision, self-provision or automated provision of services via that network or

service, or has the potential to do so, and includes number translation or systems

offering equivalent functionality, conditional access systems and electronic

programme guides (EPGs), as well as other services such as identity, location and

presence services;

(15) ‘conditional access system’ means any technical measure, authentication system

and/or arrangement whereby access to a protected radio or television broadcasting

service in intelligible form is made conditional upon subscription or another form of

prior individual authorisation;

(16) ‘user’ means a natural or legal person using or requesting a publicly available

electronic communications service;

(17) ‘end-user’ means a user not providing public electronic communications networks or

publicly available electronic communications services;

(18) ‘consumer’ means any natural person who uses or requests a publicly available

electronic communications service for purposes which are outside his or her trade,

business, craft or profession;

(19) ‘provision of electronic communications networks’ means the establishment,

operation, control or making available of such networks;

(20) ‘application programming interface’ or ‘API’ means the software interface between

applications, made available by broadcasters or service providers, and the resources

in the set-top boxes intended for connection to television sets or in integrated digital

television or digital radio sets;

(21) ‘radio spectrum allocation’ means the designation of a given radio spectrum band for

use by one or more types of radio communications services, where appropriate,

under specified conditions;

(22) ‘harmful interference’ means interference which endangers the functioning of a radio

navigation service or of other safety services or which otherwise seriously degrades,

obstructs or repeatedly interrupts a radio communications service operating in

accordance with the applicable international, Union or national regulations;

(23) ‘general authorisation’ means a legal framework ensuring rights and laying down

obligations for the provision of electronic communications networks or services in

the internal market, in accordance with this Regulation;

(24) ‘small-area wireless access point’ means low-power wireless network access

equipment of a small size operating within a small range, using licensed radio

spectrum or licence-exempt radio spectrum or a combination thereof, which may be

used as part of a public electronic communications network, which may be equipped

with one or more low visual impact antennae, and which allows wireless access by

EN 124 EN

users to electronic communications networks regardless of the underlying network

topology, be it mobile or fixed;

(25) ‘radio local area network’ or ‘RLAN’ means a low-power wireless access system,

operating within a small range, with a low risk of interference with other such

systems deployed in close proximity by other users, using, on a non-exclusive basis,

harmonised radio spectrum;

(26) ‘harmonised radio spectrum’ means radio spectrum for which harmonised technical

conditions relating to its availability and efficient use have been established by way

of implementing measures in accordance with Article 4 of Decision

No 676/2002/EC;

(27) ‘shared use of radio spectrum’ means access, on an equal or hierarchical order of

protection, by two or more technologies or users, to the same radio spectrum bands

or channels, in order to ensure the efficient use thereof, which can be based on a

defined sharing arrangement between users, authorised on the basis of a general

authorisation, individual rights of use for radio spectrum or a combination thereof; it

includes regulatory approaches such as licensed shared access that guarantee to all

users predictable and reliable sharing conditions;

(28) ‘access’ means the making available of facilities or services to another undertaking,

under defined conditions, either on an exclusive or a non-exclusive basis, for the

purpose of providing electronic communications services, information society

services or broadcast content services; it covers, inter alia: access to electronic

communications networks and network elements and associated facilities, which may

involve the connection of equipment, by fixed or non-fixed means (in particular this

includes access to the local loop and to facilities and services necessary to provide

services over the local loop); access to physical infrastructure including buildings,

ducts and masts; access to relevant software systems including operational support

systems; access to information systems or databases for pre-ordering, provisioning,

ordering, maintaining and repair requests, and billing; access to number translation or

systems offering equivalent functionality; access to fixed and mobile networks, in

particular for roaming; access to conditional access systems for digital television

services and access to virtual network services;

(29) ‘interconnection’ means a specific type of access implemented between providers of

electronic communications networks by means of the physical and logical linking of

electronic communications networks used by the same or a different undertaking in

order to allow the users of one undertaking to communicate with users of the same or

another undertaking, or to access services provided by another undertaking where

such services are provided by the parties involved or other parties who have access to

the network;

(30) ‘operator’ means an undertaking providing or authorised to provide a public

electronic communications network or an associated facility;

(31) ‘local loop’ means the physical path used by electronic communications signals

connecting the network termination point to a distribution frame or equivalent

facility in the fixed public electronic communications network;

(32) ‘call’ means a connection established by means of a publicly available interpersonal

communications service allowing two-way voice communication;

(33) ‘voice communications service’ means a publicly available electronic

communications service for originating and receiving, directly or indirectly, national

EN 125 EN

or national and international calls through a number or numbers in a national or

international numbering plan;

(34) ‘geographic number’ means a number from the national numbering plan where part

of its digit structure contains geographic significance used for routing calls to the

physical location of the network termination point;

(35) ‘non-geographic number’ means a number from the national numbering plan that is

not a geographic number, such as mobile, freephone and premium-rate numbers;

(36) ‘total conversation service’ means a multimedia real-time conversation service that

provides bidirectional symmetric real-time transfer of motion video, real-time text

and voice between users in two or more locations;

(37) ‘public safety answering point’ or ‘PSAP’ means a physical location where

emergency communication is received under the responsibility of a public authority

or a private organisation recognised by the Member State;

(38) ‘most appropriate PSAP’ means a PSAP established by responsible authorities to

which emergency communication is routed and that is competent to convey

contextual information to emergency services from the relevant area of intervention;

(39) ‘emergency communication’ means communication by means of interpersonal

communications services between an end-user and the PSAP with the goal to request

and receive emergency relief from emergency services.

(40) ‘effective emergency communication’ means emergency communication that ensures

timely communication between the end-user and the most appropriate PSAP, and

makes available in a timely manner contextual information, including caller location

information;

(41) ‘contextual information’ means the information conveyed through emergency

communication by the end-user or derived and transmitted automatically from the

terminal equipment of the end-user or the relevant network in order to enable the

timely identification of the intervention resources of emergency services and the fast

arrival of emergency services at the intervention scene;

(42) ‘emergency service’ means a service, recognised as such by the Member State, that

provides immediate and rapid assistance in situations where there is, in particular, a

direct risk to life or limb, to individual or public health or safety, to private or public

property or to the environment, in accordance with national law;

(43) ‘caller location information’ means, in a public mobile network, the data processed,

derived from network infrastructure or handsets, indicating the geographic position

of an end-user’s mobile terminal equipment, and, in a public fixed network, the data

about the physical address of the network termination point;

(44) ‘terminal equipment’ means terminal equipment as defined in Article 1, point (1), of

Commission Directive 2008/63/EC78;

(45) ‘satellite communications services’ means services whose provision makes use,

wholly or partly, of the establishment of radiocommunications from satellite ground

stations or their complementary ground and airborne components to space station

78 Commission Directive 2008/63/EC of 20 June 2008 on competition in the markets in

telecommunications terminal equipment (OJ L 162, 21.6.2008, p. 20, ELI:

http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2008/63/oj).

EN 126 EN

(‘uplinks’), and/or the establishment of radiocommunications from a space station to

satellite ground stations or their complementary ground and airborne components

(‘downlinks’);

(46) ‘provision of satellite networks’ means the establishment and operation of satellite

systems, satellite ground stations and, where applicable, their complementary ground

and airborne components;

(47) ‘satellite ground station’ means equipment on Earth which is capable of being used

either for transmission-only, or for transmission and reception (‘transmit-receive’), or

for reception only (‘receive-only’), of radiocommunication signals by means of

satellites or other space-based systems. This includes, but is not limited to, ground

stations, terminals and terrestrial-based equipment needed to communicate with

satellites or other space stations;

(48) ‘complementary ground and airborne components’ means ground-based or airborne

stations of satellite networks used at fixed or changing locations, in order to improve

the availability of satellite communications services in geographical areas within the

footprint of the system’s satellite(s), where communications with one or more space

stations cannot be ensured with the required quality;

(49) ‘personal data’ means personal data as defined in Article 4, point (1), of Regulation

(EU) 2016/679;

(50) ‘consent’ means consent as defined in Article 4, point (11), of Regulation (EU)

2016/679.

Article 3

General objectives and principles

1. In the context of this Regulation, Member States, national regulatory and other

competent authorities, as well as BEREC, the RSPB, the ODN and the Commission,

shall, in accordance with their respective competences, pursue the following general

objectives which are not listed in order of priority:

(a) reinforce the competitiveness of the connectivity sector and industry at-

large by facilitating investments in advanced digital infrastructures,

including cloud and AI based solutions, by enabling innovative services,

including quality-assured and reliable services, and by facilitating

cooperation among players in the broader digital ecosystem;

(b) develop a single market for electronic communications facilitating network

operation and service provision across borders within the Union, the

development of trans-European digital networks and the provision of

innovative electronic communications networks and services including

pan-European satellite communications services;

(c) reinforce the resilience and preparedness of electronic communications

networks and services at Union level, by fostering cooperation among

public authorities and providers of electronic communications networks or

services in building the necessary resilience capacities, and in ensuring

security and defence interests of the Union and its Member States;

(d) promote investment in connectivity and widespread availability, access to

and take-up of gigabit networks, including fixed, mobile and wireless

EN 127 EN

networks, to the benefit of all citizens and businesses of the Union, in

terms of price, quality and choice;

(e) ensure the provision of high-quality, affordable and publicly available

electronic communications services to all end-users through effective

competition in electronic communications networks and associated

facilities, including efficient infrastructure-based competition, and in

electronic communications services and associated services throughout the

Union;

(f) promote the interests of the citizens of the Union and safeguard the

protection of end-users’ rights, including the equal and non-discriminatory

treatment of traffic in the provision of internet access services, so that all

end-users continue to benefit from a large choice of advanced affordable

and high-quality services; and guarantee a high and common level of

protection in particular in particular for vulnerable consumers, including

affordable pricing, choice and equivalent access;

(g) promote sustainability by facilitating investments in energy-efficient and

low-carbon digital networks and solutions and incentivise end-to-end

traffic efficiency;

(h) support the objectives of other Union policies relying on radio spectrum

including space and common security and defence policy.

2. When exercising their competences or carrying out their tasks in the pursuit of the

general objectives, national regulatory and other competent authorities, BEREC, the

RSPB, the ODN and the Commission shall act impartially, objectively, transparently and

in a non-discriminatory and proportionate manner. In particular, they shall apply the

following principles:

(a) promote regulatory predictability to guarantee consistent regulatory

approaches, through mutual cooperation;

(b) ensure that, in similar circumstances, measures are applied consistently

and that there is no discrimination in the treatment of providers of

electronic communications networks or services;

(c) take due account of the potential regulatory and administrative burden

imposed by regulatory decisions and strive to limit them as much as

possible;

(d) apply Union law in a technologically neutral fashion, to the extent that this

is consistent with the achievement of the general objectives set out in this

Article;

(e) take due account of the variety of conditions relating to infrastructure,

competition, the circumstances of end-users and, in particular, consumers

in the various geographic areas within a Member State.

2. PART II - RESILIENCE

Article 4

Role of electronic communications networks and services in ensuring resilience

EN 128 EN

Taking into account the essential role of electronic communications networks and services

for the overall resilience of Union society and economy, providers of electronic

communications networks or services referred to in Article 5(1) of this Regulation, BEREC,

the ODN, national regulatory and competent authorities designated pursuant to Article 8(1) of

Directive (EU) 2022/2555, national crisis management and civil protection authorities,

including cyber crisis management authorities designated pursuant to Article 9(1) of Directive

(EU) 2022/2555, shall contribute, within their respective competences, to the anticipation,

prevention and response to natural or man-made disruptions, crises or force majeure that may

negatively affect the population, through the coherent implementation of preparedness-related

obligations under this Regulation and in line with the relevant Union and national civil

protection, crisis management and response mechanisms.

Article 5

Availability and capabilities of electronic communications networks and services

1. Providers of public electronic communications networks, publicly available electronic

communications services and other providers referred to in Article 9(2), national

regulatory authorities, national competent authorities designated pursuant to Article 8(1)

of Directive (EU) 2022/255579 and other competent authorities including, where

relevant, national crisis management and civil protection authorities, including cyber

crisis management authorities designated pursuant to Article 9(1) of Directive (EU)

2022/2555, shall cooperate to ensure the continuous availability of electronic

communications networks and services as well as their necessary capabilities to

anticipate, prevent, prepare for and respond to natural or man-made disruptions, crises or

force majeure that may negatively affect the population.

In doing so, authorities and providers referred to in the first subparagraph shall take into

utmost account the BEREC Union Preparedness Plan for Digital Infrastructures referred

to in Article 6.

2. Without prejudice to Directive (EU) 2022/2555, providers referred to in paragraph 1 of

this Article and PSAPs shall take all necessary measures, with consideration of the

BEREC Union Preparedness Plan for Digital Infrastructures referred to in Article 6 of

this Regulation, to ensure uninterrupted availability of critical communications and

emergency communications, as well as uninterrupted transmission of public warnings, in

the case of natural or man-made disruptions, crises or force majeure that may negatively

affect the population.

3. When implementing new technologies in their electronic communications networks or

services, providers of public electronic communications networks and publicly available

electronic communications services and PSAPs shall take all the necessary preparatory

measures, including testing and validation of solutions, to ensure the availability of

emergency communication and public warning services within the Union.

4. Where the migration to other network technologies may result in the discontinuation of

services on currently used end-user devices, providers of public electronic

communications networks and of publicly available electronic communications services

79 Directive (EU) 2022/2555 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 December 2022 on

measures for a high common level of cybersecurity across the Union, amending Regulation (EU) No

910/2014 and Directive (EU) 2018/1972, and repealing Directive (EU) 2016/1148 (NIS 2 Directive)),

(OJ L 333, 27.12.2022, p 80, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2025/3445/oj).

EN 129 EN

shall inform national competent authorities and end-users at least 2 years in advance, by

providing a roadmap reflecting the migration process.

Article 6

Union Preparedness Plan for Digital Infrastructures

1. By [12 months after the date of entry into force of this Regulation], BEREC shall adopt a

report, entitled ‘Union Preparedness Plan for Digital Infrastructures’ (‘the Plan’), with a

view to strengthening the resilience and preparedness of electronic communications

networks and services and other digital infrastructures at Union level in the event of

natural or man-made disruptions, crises or force majeure which may have a significant

adverse impact on the population or the functioning of the internal market.

2. The Plan shall include:

(a) a comprehensive assessment of the architecture, capacities, capabilities

and use of electronic communications networks of providers referred to in

Article 5(1), prepared on the basis of information collected pursuant to

Article 7(2) of this Regulation and transmitted to the ODN in accordance

with Article 7(3) of this Regulation;

(b) a set of operational recommendations on network resilience measures

based on, among others, the assessment under point (a);

(c) crisis management practices.

The assessment referred to in the first sub-paragraph, point (a), shall, among other,

provide an overview of network topology at Union level, identify route diversification,

potential bottlenecks or points of failure and areas where resilience-related measures,

such as strategic investments to support redundancy, in particular for trans-European

digital networks, are needed. The assessment shall be handled in accordance with

applicable Union and national rules on the protection of classified information. The

information contained therein shall be presented in aggregated form, to prevent exact

geolocation of sensitive assets.

The operational recommendations referred to in the first sub-paragraph, point (b), shall

include recommendations ensuring the technical capability of electronic communications

networks to integrate with different types of terrestrial and non-terrestrial networks such

as satellite networks, capabilities to ensure the continuity of essential

communications networks and services during situations of increased demand, network

congestion, or natural or man-made disruptions including, but not limited to, system

outage threats, such as intentional harmful interference, or other measures considered

instrumental in ensuring service availability and necessary network capabilities.

The crisis management practices referred to in the first sub-paragraph, point (c), shall be

addressed to the national regulatory and other competent authorities and aim at

harmonised procedures, coordination arrangements and operational protocols to be

applied in the event of natural or man-made disruptions, crises or force majeure. The

crisis management practices shall be consistent with and complementary to relevant

Union and national civil protection, crisis management and response mechanisms.

Article 7

Cooperation and data gathering supporting the preparation of the Plan

EN 130 EN

1. To support BEREC, the ODN shall prepare the draft Plan in close cooperation with the

Commission and, where it concerns the preparedness and resilience of electronic

communications networks and services, with the Cooperation Group established by

Article 14 of Directive (EU) 2022/2555, and in consultation with ENISA and the

relevant European crisis response and civil protection coordination authorities, as

appropriate. The Plan shall be reviewed and updated regularly based on, among others,

information collected under paragraph 2 of this Article.

2. To support the preparation of the Plan, national regulatory authorities shall, on a biennial

basis, collect information on the architecture, capacity, capabilities and use of public

electronic communications networks, publicly available electronic communications

services and, where relevant, networks used, wholly or mainly, for the purpose of

providing electronic communications services or information society services available

to the public, insofar as such information has not already been made available to them or

to other national competent authorities pursuant to Union law or national law.

3. Requests for information under paragraph 2 shall be reasoned, proportionate and limited

to what is strictly necessary for the performance of tasks related to resilience and

preparedness. The information shall be transmitted to the ODN on a biennial basis.

4. By [6 months after the date of entry into force of this Regulation], BEREC shall, in close

cooperation with the Commission and ENISA, publish a common template to be used by

national regulatory authorities for the collection of the information referred to in

paragraph 2.

Article 8

Cooperation with the Commission, other Union bodies or expert groups

1. Where a natural or man-made disruption, crisis or force majeure involves or coincides

with a large-scale cybersecurity incident within the meaning of Article 6, point (7) of

Directive (EU) 2022/2555, BEREC shall provide the European Cyber Crisis Liaison

Organisation Network (EU-CyCLONe) and the Commission with relevant information to

ensure shared situational awareness and coherence in crisis response.

2. Upon request, the ODN shall share with the Commission details of the analysis used to

prepare the Plan in accordance with Article 6. The Commission shall take such

information into account in the development and implementation of funding

instruments, including strategic investments in trans-European digital networks or when

adopting policies or measures to enhance the resilience and preparedness of electronic

communications networks, as appropriate.

3. The tasks and actions under this Part shall not affect the tasks of ENISA, the Computer

Security Incident Response Team (CSIRT) network, EU-CyCLONe, the Cooperation

Group established by Directive (EU) 2022/2555 or other expert groups or coordination

systems under the Union civil protection law.

3. PART III - SINGLE MARKET AUTHORISATION AND PASSPORTING

Article 9

General authorisation

1. The freedom to provide electronic communications networks and services shall be

subject to the conditions and obligations set out in this Regulation. Member States may

EN 131 EN

limit the freedom to provide electronic communications networks and services only for

the reasons set out in Article 52(1) TFEU on grounds of public policy, public security or

public health. Any such limitation shall be duly reasoned and shall be notified to the

Commission.

2. The general authorisation regime shall apply to providers of public electronic

communications services and providers of electronic communications networks used,

wholly or mainly, for the purpose of providing electronic communications services or

information society services available to the public.

3. The general authorisation regime shall not apply to number-independent interpersonal

communications services.

4. Under the general authorisation regime, the right to provide electronic communications

networks and services shall be subject only to the following conditions:

(a) compliance, as applicable to the provider, with requirements for resilience

and preparedness of networks during natural or man-made disruptions,

crises or force majeure under this Regulation and terms of use for

communications from public authorities to the general public for warning

the public of imminent threats and for mitigating the consequences of

major catastrophes;

(b) compliance, as applicable to the provider, with terms of use for critical

communication services during major disasters or national emergencies to

ensure communications between emergency services and authorities;

(c) compliance, as applicable to the provider, with the standards or

specifications referred to in Article 187;

(d) compliance, as applicable to the provider, with cybersecurity rules,

including ICT supply chain security requirements imposed in accordance

with the Cybersecurity Act which is to replace Regulation (EU) 2019/881

of the European Parliament and of the Council80;

(e) enabling of access to data by law enforcement and judicial authorities,

including for lawful interception and data retention in accordance with

applicable Union or national legislation, in the Member States in which the

service is provided, which complies with Union law, as applicable to the

provider;

(f) maintenance of the integrity of public electronic communications

networks, including by conditions to prevent electromagnetic interference

between electronic communications networks or services in accordance

with Directive 2014/30/EU81, as applicable to the provider;

80 Regulation (EU) 2019/881 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 April 2019 on ENISA

(the European Union Agency for Cybersecurity) and on information and communications technology

cybersecurity certification and repealing Regulation (EU) No 526/2013 (Cybersecurity Act) (OJ L 151,

7.6.2019, p. 15, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2019/881/oj). 81 Directive 2014/30/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 2014 on the

harmonisation of the laws of the Member States relating to electromagnetic compatibility (OJ L 153,

22.5.2014, pp. 62–106, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2014/53/oj), as amended by Regulation (EU)

2018/1139 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 July 2018 (OJ L 30, 11.09.2018,

ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2014/30/2018-09-11), and by Directive (EU) 2022/2380 of the

European Parliament and of the Council of 23 November 2022 amending Directive 2014/53/EU on the

EN 132 EN

(g) compliance, as applicable to the provider, with requirements or measures

on interconnection in accordance with Article 66;

(h) for electronic communications networks and services, compliance, as

applicable to the provider, with relevant international agreements relating

to the use of scarce resources which are not subject to granting of

individual rights of use;

(i) interoperability of services in accordance with this Regulation, as

applicable to the provider;

(j) where appropriate, administrative charges in accordance with Article 12.

Additional conditions for the use of radio spectrum shall apply in accordance with

Article 20 and 21, as applicable to the provider.

Additional conditions for the use of numbering resources which are assigned from the

national numbering plans and, when applicable from the Union numbering plan, shall

apply in accordance with Articles 46 and 50, as applicable to the provider.

Article 10

Single Passport procedure

1. Under the general authorisation regime, where a provider intends to provide electronic

communications networks or services in one or several Member States, it shall submit a

notification to the national regulatory authority of one of those Member States under the

Single Passport procedure.

2. Providers shall not be required to obtain a decision or any other administrative act by any

regulatory authority of the Member State of notification, in which the provider intends to

operate, before exercising the rights derived from the general authorisation.

3. The notification referred to in paragraph 1 shall be made by means of a notification

template in accordance with BEREC guidelines issued pursuant to Article 125 not later

than 6 months after the entry into force of this Regulation. BEREC shall update the

relevant guidelines where necessary.

4. The notified regulatory authority shall transmit the notification received to the ODN

without undue delay. Where the notification concerns the start of provision of networks

and services in several Member States, the ODN shall transmit it for information to the

competent authorities of the other Member States where the provider intends to operate

without undue delay.

5. Where the notification concerns the intent of a provider already operating in one or

several Member States to extend its operations to additional Member States, the ODN

shall transmit such notification for information to the competent authorities of all the

Member States concerned, including those Member States where the provider already

provides electronic communications networks or services.

6. Under the Single Passport procedure, the notified authority shall confirm to the provider

the authorisation to provide electronic communications networks or services within one

week of the submission of the notification referred to in paragraph 1. The confirmation

harmonisation of the laws of the Member States relating to the making available on the market of radio

equipment (OJ L 315, 7.12.2022, p. 30, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2022/2380/oj).

EN 133 EN

shall include information concerning all the general authorisation conditions applicable

in the Member State or Member States, in which networks or services are intended to be

provided, as well as related obligations and rights derived from the authorisation. Where

the notification concerns the intent of a provider already operating in one or several

Member States to extend its operations to additional Member States, the confirmation

shall include information concerning the general authorisation conditions applicable in

the additional Member States.

7. Once the notification is confirmed, the provider may exercise the rights derived from the

general authorisation and start the activity, where necessary subject to the provisions on

the rights of use under this Regulation.

8. The ODN shall maintain a publicly available Union database of the notifications

submitted to the national regulatory authorities. The notified authorities shall update the

information about all received notifications in the database at least every two months.

9. For electronic communications networks and services notified before [6 months after the

date of entry into force of this Regulation], no new notification shall be required.

Providers may notify to the notified national regulatory authority to obtain a new general

authorisation for existing networks or services under the Single Passport procedure.

When deploying new electronic communications networks or services, providers shall be

subject to the Single Passport procedure concerning these new networks or services.

Article 11

Guidelines and mutual Assistance

1. By [6 months after the date of entry into force of this Regulation], BEREC shall, in close

cooperation with the Commission and other competent authorities, including contact

points designated in accordance with paragraph 2 of this Article, publish guidelines to

ensure that all the conditions listed in Article 9(4) are applied in a coherent, non-

discriminatory and proportionate manner and are accessible to providers via the ODN

webpage.

2. Each Member State shall designate a national single contact point tasked with

communicating with the ODN and with maintaining up-to-date information about the

national legislation and procedures applicable to the provision of electronic

communications networks and services, in particular those related to general

authorisation conditions, including the conditions regarding cybersecurity, access to data

and data protection and the obligations laid down in this Regulation.

3. The procedures concerning notification, confirmation for start of activitiesand mutual

assistance for enforcement and the arrangements for the exchange of information

between national competent authorities and the ODN in accordance with Regulation

(EU) 2024/903 may be further specified by the Commission by means of implementing

acts. Those implementing acts shall be adopted in accordance with the procedure referred

to in Article 199(4).

4. Without prejudice to the enforcement powers of Member States concerning applicable

law in their jurisdiction, under the Single Passport regime the national regulatory

authority of the Member State of notification shall have the power to impose penalties

for breach of the authorisation conditions. In case of a serious breach, possible measures,

where necessary after consultation with the regulatory authorities of the affected Member

States, shall include the withdrawal of the right to operate in the Member State or

Member States covered by the Single Passport.

EN 134 EN

5. Where the national regulatory authority of the Member State where the electronic

communications networks or services are provided concludes that the breach of the

authorisation conditions may have a serious negative impact in its territory on the

grounds of national security or public interest, it shall have the right to impose penalties

within its jurisdiction, and where appropriate, after consultation with relevant authorities

of the Member State of notification.

Article 12

Administrative charges

1. Where Member States impose administrative charges on undertakings providing

electronic communications networks or services under the general authorisation or to

which a right of use has been granted, those charges shall:

(a) cover, in total, only the administrative costs incurred in the management,

control and enforcement of the general authorisation system and of the

rights of use and of specific obligations as referred to in Articles 67, 68(1)

69 and 77, which may include costs for international cooperation,

harmonisation and standardisation, market analysis, monitoring

compliance and other market control, as well as, where appropriate, work

involving preparation and enforcement of administrative decisions, such as

decisions on access and interconnection;

(b) be imposed upon the individual undertakings in an objective, transparent

and proportionate manner.

2. Undertakings of the turnover below a certain threshold or the activities of which do not

reach a minimum market share or have a very limited territorial scope, shall not be

subject to administrative charges.

3. Where administrative charges are imposed, national regulatory or other competent

authorities shall publish an annual overview of their administrative costs and of the total

sum of the charges collected. Where there is a difference between the total sum of the

charges and the administrative costs, appropriate adjustments shall be made.

4. PART IV - RESOURCES (RADIO SPECTRUM AND NUMBERING)

4.1. TITLE I: RADIO SPECTRUM

4.1.1. CHAPTER I: Principles and objectives

SECTION 1: INTERNATIONAL RULES FOR RADIO SPECTRUM USE AND

MANAGEMENT

Article 13

Strategic planning and management of radio spectrum

1. Member States and the Commission shall manage radio spectrum in the internal market

in a coordinated way, taking into account its value as a common European resource,

under shared competence with a view to fostering economic growth, protecting Union

values and security, in pursuit of the objectives laid down in Article 3, in particular

single market for electronic communications as well as in pursuit of security, and digital

sovereignty.

EN 135 EN

2. The Commission, assisted by the RSPB, and national competent authorities shall

cooperate in the strategic planning of radio spectrum and coordination of radio spectrum

policy approaches.

3. National competent authorities shall manage radio spectrum effectively and efficiently in

accordance with this Regulation and with the International Telecommunication Union

(‘ITU’) Radio Regulations and other agreements adopted in the framework of the ITU

applicable to radio spectrum. They shall make every effort to eliminate any potential or

actual source of cross-border or national harmful interference and shall take radio

spectrum related measures to minimise the security risks in providing electronic

communications networks and services.

4. Where this Regulation empowers the Commission to manage radio spectrum, it shall be

subject to the same principles and respect the same obligations as competent authorities,

unless this Regulation or other Union law provide otherwise.

Article 14

Harmful interference

1. Holders of rights of use for radio spectrum shall have the right to use their frequencies

free from harmful interference, subject to the National Frequency Allocation Plans and

international agreements.

2. National competent authorities shall cooperate with each other, and, where appropriate,

through the RSPB, in the cross-border coordination of the use of radio spectrum. They

shall make every effort to resolve any problem or dispute in relation to cross-border

coordination or cross-border harmful interference which prevents the use of the radio

spectrum in the territory of the Union.

3. In case of unresolved cross-border coordination or cross-border harmful interference

between Member States, any national competent authority or any holder of a right of use

for radio spectrum may request the RSPB to use its good offices to resolve the issue. The

RSPB may issue an opinion proposing a coordinated solution. Where requested by a

competent authority, the RSPB shall issue such an opinion.

4. Where the cross-border issue between Member States is not resolved within 12 months

from the request referred to in paragraph 3, the Commission shall, at the request of a

national competent authority from any affected Member State or holder of a right of use

for radio spectrum, or on its own initiative, take a decision by means of an implementing

act to resolve the cross-border issue, taking account of any opinion of the RSPB pursuant

to paragraph 3.

5. Where a cross-border issue involves a third country, including a candidate and acceding

country, the Commission and national competent authorities within the RSPG shall, upon

the request of any national competent authority from an affected Member State,

cooperate to provide legal, political and technical support to resolve such issue, so that

the Member States concerned can observe their obligations and exercise their rights to

use radio spectrum under Union law.

6. Where the cross-border issue involving a third country is not resolved within 12 months

from the request referred to in paragraph 5, the Commission may, at the request of a

national competent authority from the affected Member State and after consulting the

RSPB, adopt a decision by means of an implementing act to define the assistance or

contribution that Member States are to provide, with the support of the Commission, to

EN 136 EN

resolve such issue, irrespective of whether they are affected by the harmful interference

or not.

7. Where the cross-border issue with a third country cannot be solved with the assistance or

contribution referred to in paragraph 6 of this Article, the Council may consider adopting

restrictive measures under Article 29 TEU, in line with the objectives of the Common

Foreign and Security Policy.

8. The implementing acts referred to in paragraphs 4 and 6 of this Article shall be adopted

in accordance with the procedure referred to in Article 199(4) with the assistance of the

Committee referred to in Article 199(2) (‘Radio Spectrum Committee’).

SECTION 2: PRINCIPLES

Article 15

Principle of shared use of radio spectrum

1. Without prejudice to the exception provided in the second subparagraph, radio spectrum

under general authorisation and individual rights of use shall be shared by providers of

the same service (intra-service sharing) or different services (interservice sharing),

subject to compliance with competition law.

National competent authorities may restrict shared use of radio spectrum when this is

necessary on grounds related to:

(a) safeguarding competition and non-discriminatory market access;

(b) technical or economical feasibility;

(c) where exclusive rights of radio spectrum use are necessary to safeguard

public safety, national security, defence or the protection of essential

services;

(d) avoidance of harmful interference;

(e) cross-border coordination.

2. National competent authorities shall ensure that the assigned radio spectrum is used

efficiently. For this purpose, they can require the holder of the radio spectrum rights,

including those for defence and security, to share any portion of radio spectrum that is

unused within a given geographic area or time period, provided that shared use of radio

spectrum does not interfere with, degrade, or otherwise limit the original holder’s use of

the radio spectrum and that the shared use is in compliance with competition law.

Article 16

Principles of technology and service neutrality

1. Any type of technology may be used to provide electronic communications networks or

services within the radio spectrum declared available for electronic communications

services in the National Frequency Allocation Plan, in accordance with Union law.

National competent authorities may only restrict that right when this is necessary and

proportionate on grounds of:

(a) avoidance of harmful interference;

EN 137 EN

(b) protection of public health against electromagnetic fields at risk, taking

account of Recommendation 1999/519/EC;

(c) ensuring technical quality of service;

(d) ensuring maximisation of radio spectrum sharing;

(e) safeguarding efficient use of radio spectrum;

(f) ensuring the fulfilment of objectives in accordance with paragraph 2.

2. Any type of electronic communications service may be provided in the radio spectrum

declared available for electronic communications services in the National Frequency

Allocation Plan, in accordance with Union law.

National competent authorities may only restrict that right in order to fulfil a requirement

under the ITU Radio Regulations based on proportionate and non-discriminatory criteria.

A national competent authority shall have the right to request that a particular service is

provided in a specific band only where justified on grounds of:

(a) protection of safety of life;

(b) promotion of social, regional or territorial cohesion;

(c) avoidance of inefficient use of radio spectrum;

(d) promotion of cultural and linguistic diversity and media pluralism, for

example the provision of radio and television broadcasting services;

(e) necessity to safeguard public safety, national security, defence, or the

protection of essential services.

National competent authorities may only prohibit the provision of any other service in a

specific band, where justified by the need to protect the safety of life.

4.1.2. CHAPTER II: Allocation

SECTION 1: RADIO SPECTRUM STRATEGY AND ROADMAPS FOR ALLOCATION

Article 17

Union radio spectrum strategy and roadmaps

1. After having consulted the stakeholders and the RSPB, the Commission shall set up a

forward-looking Union radio spectrum strategy and shall update it after each World

Radiocommunication Conference, where needed.

2. The Union radio spectrum strategy shall guide long-term radio spectrum planning,

innovation and efficient use of radio spectrum across the Union. It shall identify radio

spectrum needs and ensure availability and, where relevant, protect radio spectrum

necessary for fulfilling objectives of different Union policy areas involving the use of

radio spectrum, including defence and security, for critical communications and other

purposes, including sensing. The availability of radio spectrum for safeguarding public

safety, national security, defence or the protection of essential services under harmonised

conditions shall be taken into account in the Union radio spectrum strategy and

adequately reflected in the national frequency allocation plans.

3. On the basis of the Union radio spectrum strategy, the Commission may, where relevant,

by means of implementing acts, adopt Union radio spectrum roadmaps.

EN 138 EN

Each Union radio spectrum roadmap shall identify radio spectrum needs related to a

specific radio spectrum technology or service and set timelines for technical

harmonisation of the radio spectrum use pursuant to Decision No 676/2002/EC and,

where relevant, deadlines for authorisation of the use of that radio spectrum pursuant to

this Regulation, which may derogate from the deadline set by Article 18(1). This is

without prejudice to the possibility to derogate from the deadline of Article 18(1)

pursuant to Article 18(2) and (3).

The implementing acts referred to in the first subparagraph shall be adopted in

accordance with the procedure referred to in Article 199(4) with the assistance of the

Committee referred to in Article 199(2). The RSPB shall monitor technical, economic

and societal developments related to radio spectrum use, and shall, where necessary,

recommend updating any Union radio spectrum roadmap.

4. Within 9 months from the adoption of the Union radio spectrum roadmaps, national

competent authorities shall submit to the Commission and the RSPB their national radio

spectrum roadmaps, indicating, where relevant, national measures necessary to

implement a Union radio spectrum roadmap and their timelines. National competent

authorities shall publish the national radio spectrum roadmaps and regularly update

them.

5. National competent authorities shall regularly report to the Commission and the RSPB

on the implementation of their national radio spectrum roadmaps. The Commission and

national competent authorities within the RSPB shall cooperate to identify and address

any deficiencies in areas where progress towards one or several objectives of the Union

radio spectrum roadmap is regarded to be insufficient by the Commission or the RSPB.

Article 18

Coordinated timing of assignments

1. Where the use of radio spectrum has been harmonised in accordance with Decision

No 676/2002/EC for wireless broadband electronic communications networks and

services, the national competent authorities shall authorise it within 24 months from the

adoption of that measure, or as soon as possible after the lifting of any decision to allow

alternative use on an exceptional basis pursuant to paragraph 5 of this Article.

2. The deadline set by paragraph 1 may be extended for a specific band to the extent

necessary by one of the following circumstances:

(a) a restriction to the use of that band based on the general interest objective

provided in Article 16(2), second subparagraph, point (a) or (d);

(b) unresolved cross-border coordination issues resulting in harmful

interference with third countries, provided that the affected Member State

has, where appropriate, requested Union assistance pursuant to

Article 14(5);

(c) the need to safeguard national security and defence;

(d) force majeure.

The national competent authority concerned shall review the extension referred to in the

first subparagraph at least every two years and upon request from a prospective radio

spectrum user or the Commission.

EN 139 EN

3. The deadline set by paragraph 1 may be extended for a specific band to the extent

necessary and up to 24 months in the case of:

(a) unresolved cross-border coordination issues resulting in harmful

interference between Member States, provided that the affected Member

State takes all necessary measures in a timely manner pursuant to

Article 14(3) and (4);

(b) the need to ensure, as well as the complexity of ensuring, the technical

migration of existing users of that band.

4. In the event of an extension under paragraph 2 or 3, the national competent authority

concerned shall inform the other national competent authorities and the Commission in a

timely manner, stating the reasons.

5. Notwithstanding with paragraph 1, national competent authorities may allow an

alternative use of all or part of harmonised radio spectrum band, where:

(a) a public consultation held in accordance with Article 184 and forward-

looking assessment of market demand, in accordance with Article 32,

demonstrate a lack of marked demand for harmonised use of the radio

spectrum band in the foreseeable future;

(b) such alternative use does not prevent or hinder the availability or the use of

such a band in other Member States.

The national competent authority shall inform the Commission and the other national

competent authorities, through the ODN, of its decision, together with the reasons

therefor, and regularly review it.

6. The Commission may, by means of an implementing act, determine common dates for

the authorisation of the use of specific harmonised radio spectrum in accordance with

paragraph 1 and in derogation from paragraphs 1, 2 and 3.

That implementing act shall be adopted in accordance with the procedure referred to in

Article 199(4).

SECTION 2: PETITION FOR ALLOCATION/HARMONISATION

Article 19

Request for harmonisation of radio spectrum

1. Any interested party may submit a reasoned request to the Commission to consider the

harmonisation of conditions for the availability and/or efficient use of a specific

frequency band pursuant to Article 4 of Decision No 676/2002/EC.

2. Upon such request, the Commission shall organise a public consultation and submit that

request either to the RSPB for a report or opinion, or to the Radio Spectrum Committee,

or to both. Where addressed, the Radio Spectrum Committee shall adopt an opinion

pursuant to Article 3(2) of Decision No 676/2002/EC.

A reasoned response to such request shall be provided within a reasonable deadline.

3. The Commission shall publish the request and the response.

EN 140 EN

4.1.3. CHAPTER III : Assignment

SECTION 1: PRINCIPLES

Article 20

General authorisation of the use of radio spectrum

1. Radio spectrum shall be used under general authorisation subject to compliance with

conditions in paragraph 2 of this Article, unless an individual right of use is required in

accordance with Article 21.

2. Undertakings authorised to use radio spectrum based on general authorisation shall only

be subject to the following conditions:

(a) to provide a service or to use a type of technology if a restriction is

imposed pursuant to Article 16(1) second subparagraph or 16(2) second

subparagraph including, where appropriate, coverage and quality of

service requirements;

(b) to use radio spectrum effectively and efficiently in accordance with this

Regulation;

(c) to apply technical and operational conditions necessary for the avoidance

of harmful interference and for the protection of public health against

electromagnetic fields, taking account of Recommendation 1999/519/EC,

where such conditions are different from those accompanying the use of

radio spectrum under the general authorisation;

(d) to comply with cybersecurity rules, including ICT supply chain

requirements pursuant to Cybersecurity Act which is to replace Regulation

(EU) 2019/881.

Article 21

Individual rights of use for radio spectrum

1. National competent authorities may subject radio spectrum use to individual rights only

where necessary to maximise the efficient use of radio spectrum in light of demand and

taking into account the following:

(a) the specific characteristics of the radio spectrum concerned;

(b) the need to avoid harmful interference;

(c) the development of reliable conditions for radio spectrum sharing, where

appropriate;

(d) the need to ensure technical quality of communications or service;

(e) objectives of general interest as laid down by Member States in

accordance with Union law;

(f) the need to safeguard efficient use of radio spectrum.

2. Undertakings holding an individual right of use for radio spectrum may be, in addition to

the conditions in Article 20(2), subject only to conditions, established by the national

competent authority prior to assignment or renewal of such right, related to:

EN 141 EN

(a) time frame and maximum duration in accordance with Article 24, subject

to any changes in the National Frequency Allocation Plan;

(b) transfer or leasing of rights in accordance with Article 26;

(c) payment of fees for rights of use in accordance with Article 29;

(d) fulfilment of any commitment made in the framework of an authorisation

or authorisation renewal process prior to the authorisation being granted

or, where applicable, to the invitation for application for rights of use;

(e) pooling or allowing access to radio spectrum for other users in specific

regions or at national level or sharing radio spectrum in accordance with

Article 27;

(f) using radio spectrum bands in compliance with relevant international

agreements;

(g) conditions specific to an experimental use of radio spectrum bands;

(h) sharing passive or active infrastructure which relies on radio spectrum;

(i) commercial roaming access agreements;

(j) joint roll-out of infrastructures for the provision of electronic

communications networks or services which rely on the use of radio

spectrum.

Competent authorities shall not attach conditions under the first subparagraph, points (e),

(h), (i) or (j) of this paragraph unless justified pursuant to the procedure referred to in

Article 32.

3. Competent authorities shall consult and inform interested parties, in a timely and

transparent manner, about the conditions to be attached to individual rights of use before

they are imposed. They shall set the criteria for assessing compliance with those

conditions in advance and transmit them to the interested parties in a transparent manner.

4. The competent authority may combine individual rights with general authorisation for

the use of radio spectrum, considering any likely effects on competition, innovation and

market entry.

5. The RSPB shall collect good practices on the choice between general authorisations and

individual rights.

SECTION 2: HARMONISATION

Article 22

Common authorisation conditions of use for radio spectrum

1. Prospective users of radio spectrum in two or several Member States, for public and non-

public electronic communications networks, may request national competent

authorities from the Member States concerned to jointly establish, with the assistance of

the RSPB common authorisation conditions to reduce the cost of deployment or

environmental impact. National competent authorities shall inform the Commission of

such requests.

2. Without prejudice to Article 39 of this Regulation, where the Commission or at least two

national competent authorities concerned submit a reasoned request, irrespective of

whether the request is submitted by providers of public electronic communications

EN 142 EN

networks or not, the RSPB shall, after consulting stakeholders, develop a proposal for

common authorisation conditions, including as regards the best way to share radio

spectrum between public and private networks, in compliance with competition law. The

Commission may, by implementing act, taking into account the RSPB proposal and,

where applicable, the requirements set out in Article 39(4), adopt common authorisation

conditions binding in all Member States and setting a common format to be used.

3. At the request of two or more national competent authorities, or of the Commission, the

RSPB shall address the opportunity and modalities of authorising a part of radio

spectrum at Union level and to suggest the appropriate authorisation procedure and the

award conditions to ensure the existence throughout the Union of high- quality wireless

broadband electronic communications services (‘wireless broadband services’), including

Direct-to-Device satellite communications services. After consulting the RSPB, the

Commission may supplement this Regulation, by means of a delegated act in accordance

with Article 198, defining the processes and award conditions for the authorisation of

radio spectrum use in a particular harmonised radio spectrum band, or parts thereof, at

Union level.

4. When carrying out the authorisation process, the Commission may seek assistance of the

RSPB, the ODN, the Communications Committee or external experts.

5. Where the common authorisation conditions have been established pursuant to paragraph

2 of this Article, the Commission may lay down by means of implementing acts, the

details of a one-stop-shop procedure that allows an undertaking to file at the ODN

requests for rights of use for radio spectrum in more than one Member States, and

specify the procedural arrangements, including administrative deadlines.

6. The national competent authorities shall grant the rights and authorisations within the

deadlines set by Article 30(8).

7. The implementing acts referred to in paragraphs 2 and 4 of this Article shall be

adopted in accordance with the procedure referred to in Article 199(4).

Article 23

Harmonised assignment of radio spectrum

National competent authorities shall not impose any further conditions, additional criteria or

procedures where holders of rights of use for harmonised radio spectrum have been selected

under a common selection procedure at Union level or where Union harmonised authorisation

conditions apply.

SECTION 3: HARMONISED RULES APPLICABLE TO AUTHORISATION CONDITIONS

Article 24

Duration of rights

1. Rights of use for radio spectrum shall be in principle granted for an unlimited duration.

Individual rights of use granted for an unlimited period of time for radio spectrum used

for wireless broadband networks and services shall be subject to regular reviews by the

national competent authorities, including coverage and quality of service obligations.

Such reviews shall not be carried out earlier than every 20 years after such individual

EN 143 EN

right of use for radio spectrum was granted. Periodic reviews shall be notified under the

procedure of Article 31.

2. Individual rights of use for radio spectrum which are granted for an unlimited period of

time may be revoked at any time for any of the reasons provided for in Article 25(2), and

with a 5-year notice in all other cases. By exception, where individual rights of use for

harmonised radio spectrum for wireless broadband services which have been granted for

an unlimited duration are revoked within the first 40 years from their issuing, Article 195

shall apply.

3. By exception to paragraph 1 of this Article, individual rights of use for radio spectrum

may be granted for a limited period that is considered appropriate in light of the

objectives pursued in accordance with Article 30(4), where there is a need to promote, or

avoid any distortion of, competition, in line with Article 32.

Where individual rights of use for radio spectrum are granted for a limited period, the

competent authority shall set the maximum duration in advance, without prejudice to any

subsequent changes in the National Frequency Allocation Plan and specify it in the

decisions on the granting of individual rights.

4. Where competent authorities subject individual rights of use for harmonised radio

spectrum measures in order to enable its use for wireless broadband services to a limited

duration, holders of those rights of use shall have the right to use radio spectrum for a

period of at least 40 years.

Where granted for a limited period, individual rights of use for radio spectrum shall be

subject to renewal in accordance with Article 25.

5. Where duly justified, the national competent authorities may impose a duration shorter

than 40 years, for harmonised or non-harmonised spectrum, in any of the following

cases:

(a) in limited geographical areas, where access to high-speed networks is

severely deficient or absent;

(b) for specific short-term projects;

(c) for experimental use by imposing specific obligations;

(d) for uses of radio spectrum which, in accordance with Article 16(1) and (2),

can coexist with wireless broadband services;

(e) for alternative use of radio spectrum in accordance with Article 18(5).

6. National competent authorities may adjust the duration of rights of use laid down in this

Article to ensure the simultaneous expiry of the duration of rights in one or several

bands, or with the view to assessing the need for a renewal in accordance with

Article 25, in the latter case only for a period of two years, renewable once.

Article 25

Renewal of individual rights of use for harmonised radio spectrum

1. Any right of use of harmonised radio spectrum subject to limited duration shall be

automatically renewed for a similar duration and with similar conditions upon request by

its holder.

2. By derogation to paragraph 1, after giving all interested parties the opportunity to

express their views through a public consultation in accordance with Article 184, the

EN 144 EN

competent authority may decide, at least five years in advance of the expiry of the right,

not to automatically renew the right of use and either let the right expire and organise an

open, transparent and non-discriminatory authorisation procedure in order to grant new

rights, or to renew the existing rights subject to a different duration or to different

conditions for one or several of the following reasons:

(a) the fulfilment of the objectives set out in Article 3 and Article 30(4), as

well as public policy objectives under Union law or national law, taking

also into account the importance of existing investments;

(b) the implementation of a new technical implementing measure adopted in

accordance with Article 4 of Decision No 676/2002/EC;

(c) the serious non-implementation of the conditions attached to the right of

use concerned by its holder;

(d) the need to promote, or avoid any distortion of, competition in accordance

with Article 32;

(e) the need to render the use of radio spectrum more efficient in light of

technological or market evolution;

(f) where radio spectrum was granted free of charge.

When the national competent authority considers not to renew the right of use for

harmonised radio spectrum for the reasons laid down in the first subparagraph, point (d),

it shall proceed with a new selection procedure only where there is evidence of credible

market demand from undertakings other than those holding rights of use for radio

spectrum in the band concerned and where it has established that the number of

infrastructures that can be economically sustained in the market is higher than the

number of incumbent operators.

3. Unless the decision referred to in paragraph 2 is taken at the latest 5 years before the

expiry of the rights concerned, the existing rights shall be automatically renewed

pursuant to paragraph 1.

4. The decision of renewal shall be accompanied by a review of the annual and one-off fees

related to the use of radio spectrum, which shall be carried out on the basis of Article 29.

When defining the level of the fees, competent authorities shall take into account among

others historical prices, international benchmarks, the evolution of the average revenue

per MHz per connection taking into account all radio spectrum used for the respective

service, and the opportunity cost of radio spectrum.

5. This Article shall also apply to rights of use for harmonised radio spectrum that were

granted before [the date of entry into force of this Regulation] and that expire within a

period of time of at least seven years after that date.

Article 26

Transfer or lease of individual rights of use for radio spectrum

1. Holders of rights of use for radio spectrum other than radio spectrum assigned for

broadcasting with a general interest or cultural objective attached and other than

spectrum which was granted free of charge, shall have the right to transfer or lease their

rights of use in conformity with this Article and subject to compliance with competition

law.

EN 145 EN

2. The holder of rights of use for radio spectrum shall notify its intention to transfer or lease

rights of use for radio spectrum, as well as the effective date of transfer thereof, to the

national competent authority which shall make this information public.

From the date of the transfer or lease, the transferee or lessee shall be bound by the

original conditions attached to the rights of use for radio spectrum, including, for

example, strict conditions against spectrum hoarding and conditions to ensure effective

and efficient use of spectrum, unless otherwise decided by the national competent

authority in accordance with paragraph 3. In the case of lease, the original assignee shall

be bound by the original conditions together with the lessor. In the case of harmonised

radio spectrum, any such transfer shall comply with such harmonised use.

3. The transfer or lease of those rights of use shall not be refused unless there is a clear risk

of distortion of competition from the accumulation of rights of use in particular in

accordance with Article 32 or there are serious doubts as to whether the new user is able

to meet the original conditions for the right of use.

Taking into account the context and circumstances of the transfer of the right of use for

radio spectrum, in particular whether the transferee is controlled directly or indirectly, for

example through significant funding, including subsidies, by the government of a third

country or is pursuing State-led outward projects or programmes, national competent

authorities shall have the power to block the transfer of rights of use for radio spectrum

which is necessary and proportionate for any of the following:

(a) resilience;

(b) security, including continuity of supply of electronic communications

services;

(c) defence;

(d) the maintenance of public order, the disruption or abuse of which could

have a significant impact in a Member State or in the Union.

Any administrative charge imposed on undertakings in connection with processing an

application for the transfer, sharing or lease of rights of use for radio spectrum shall

comply with Article 12.

4. National competent authorities shall assess whether the conditions are met to make

current rights of use transferable and leasable in accordance with this Article and amend,

where necessary, in accordance with Article 194 the conditions attached to the existing

rights of use in a timely manner after [the date of entry into force of this Regulation] and

shall ensure that rights of use for radio spectrum or the relevant radio spectrum may to

the best extent be partitioned or disaggregated.

Article 27

Shared use of radio spectrum

1. In accordance with Article 15, and without prejudice to coverage or other obligations

imposed on holders of individual rights of use for radio frequency, and to obligations

undertaken in the context of a competitive or comparative procedure, holders of rights of

use for radio spectrum shall take steps to organise, allow and offer the sharing of their

rights of use, where such sharing is technically feasible and subject to compliance with

competition law.

EN 146 EN

2. Any third party interested in using a part of the radio spectrum in a specific territory or

period of time may express its interest to the national competent authority.

Holders of rights of use for radio spectrum shall have the right to refuse shared use of

radio spectrum where they demonstrate that they are using the radio spectrum or that

they have developed plans to use it in the foreseeable future, in a manner which makes

sharing not technically feasible. Holders of rights of use for radio spectrum shall commit

to those plans. If a holder of the right of use does not act in accordance with their plan,

Article 196 shall apply.

Where assessing the feasibility of shared use of radio spectrum, national competent

authorities shall take into account the deployment plans of holders of rights of use for

radio spectrum for the entire duration of their right. National competent authorities shall

apply the procedure of Article 188 mutatis mutandis. They may allow the shared use of

radio spectrum for a limited duration of time or provide for periodic review. National

competent authorities shall have the power to block the shared use of radio spectrum on

the grounds provided for in Article 26(3).

3. The conditions for the shared use of radio spectrum shall be set in the right of use for

radio spectrum in accordance with Article 21.

Such conditions shall determine the following:

(a) the usage priority, the coexistence rules and the type of protection against

harmful interference between the primary and secondary holder;

(b) the type of usage allowed to the new user in comparison with the original

usage authorised;

(c) whether shared use of radio spectrum can be imposed in case of breach of

an obligation attached to the right of use, such as of a coverage obligation.

4. Any obligation accompanying the right of use for radio spectrum may be fulfilled either

by the original or the new user or both. Both users shall be bound by the obligations set

in the right of use that regulate the sharing of the radio spectrum.

5. By [12 months after the date of entry into force of this Regulation] the RSPB shall, in

close cooperation with Commission and BEREC, adopt guidance to contribute to the

consistent implementation of this Article and Article 15.

Article 28

Database

1. The ODN shall establish a dynamic database for geolocation and monitoring of radio

spectrum usage opportunities to promote and allow the shared use of specific radio

spectrum bands so as to improve the efficiency of radio spectrum use, in order to support

Union policies.

The database shall include up-to-date information collected and provided by Member

States and holders of rights of use of radio spectrum on the geolocalisation of existing

uses of radio spectrum to allow prospective radio spectrum users to access such radio

spectrum.

The database shall be directly accessible to any prospective user of radio spectrum.

2. For the purposes of ensuring the uniform implementation of paragraph 1, the

Commission, after consulting the RSPB, may, by means of implementing acts, define the