Prof. Timo Harrikari
27 January, 2026
Planetary Solidarity and Social Work in the Age of the Third Modernity: Contemporary Diagnostic Perspectives
Solidarity is the moral and emotional force that holds societies and communities together. It constitutes the ethical and affective bond that connects individuals to one another, making possible coexistence, mutual responsibility, and care. Solidarity implies a commitment to the common good and a willingness to take responsibility for the wellbeing of others, even when such responsibility yields no immediate personal benefit. At its core lies the recognition that the fate of each human being is inseparably linked to that of others. Yet the forms and moral foundations of solidarity change and vary across historical ruptures, societal contexts, and temporal horizons. The developmental trajectories of societies, their economic structures, and cultural logics continuously shape how people experience belonging and to what extent they acknowledge their responsibility towards others. Solidarity can therefore be understood as a social phenomenon that reflects the moral order of each epoch as well as the vulnerabilities inherent in its solidarity base.
Social work forms part of the institutional architecture of solidarity. It is the sphere in which the moral responsibility of communities finds its concrete expression. The international ethical principles of social work explicitly require that professional practice be grounded in the respect for human dignity, the pursuit of social justice, and the promotion of collective responsibility (IFSW 2018). Social work is not merely case-based individual assistance but part of the broader societal capacity to maintain the structures and practices through which moral coherence and social sustainability are upheld.
In this essay, I will examine the transformation of social solidarity through the lens of classical theories of modernisation and situate social work within these changing configurations of solidarity. The approach is contemporary diagnostic: it seeks to interpret the present moment through the thought of Émile Durkheim, Ulrich Beck and Hartmut Rosa, and to ask what function social work may assume in the epoch of the third modernity, which is an era characterised by planetary interdependence and intensified immediacy. The key question concerns the moral and institutional means by which social work can sustain solidarity in a world where the need for it is increasingly planetary, while its normative legitimacy and structural supports are simultaneously being eroded.
The historical evolution of solidarity can be traced through three sociological traditions. The first is Émile Durkheim’s classical distinction between mechanical and organic solidarity, where the basis of social cohesion shifts from similarity to interdependence. Ulrich Beck conceptualised the second modernity through the theory of the risk society, in which solidarity arises from shared vulnerability and collective fear. To understand solidarity in the digitalised and compressed present of the third modernity, this article turns to Jürgen Habermas’s notion of distorted communicative rationality, Hartmut Rosa’s concept of resonance, and Axel Honneth’s theory of recognition. Through these modern classics of social theory, the paper outlines the idea of solidarity within a planetary socio-ecological fabric and explores the possibility of re-attuning the moral foundations of solidarity in a global, digital, and ecologically fragile world.
Émile Durkheim: Mechanical Solidarity in Pre-modern Societies
Questions of social cohesion and solidarity have been central to the classical canon of sociology. In The Division of Labour in Society (1893), Émile Durkheim examined the forces that hold pre-modern and modern societies together and the dynamics through which they operate. Durkheim referred to as mechanical the form of solidarity that prevailed in pre-modern communities. According to him, mechanical solidarity rested upon the homogeneity of the members of a community, their shared beliefs, and a common moral code. The collective consciousness extended deeply into all spheres of communal life. What made this form of solidarity ‘mechanical’ was the fact that the moral code was taken as natural, given, and self-evident, without a collective capacity to reflect upon its foundations or the practices through which it was applied.
Repression and criminal punishment played a central role in producing and maintaining mechanical solidarity in pre-modern societies. Crime did not primarily offend an individual but violated the moral sensibilities of the community. Punishment, Durkheim argued, was a ritual act through which the community reaffirmed its unity and restored its moral equilibrium. Communal life was sustained above all by the preservation of sameness among individuals and by the reinforcement of a moral order in which deviation was eradicated and conformity upheld. The public character of punishment served as an instrument of collective identity and cohesion, rendering visible what was considered acceptable behaviour and what lay beyond its boundaries.
Durkheim and the Organic Solidarity of Modernising Societies
According to Durkheim, the foundations of solidarity in Western societies began to transform as a consequence of industrialisation and urbanisation. The functioning of societies became increasingly complex, and the division of labour within them grew more differentiated, thereby undermining the basis of mechanical solidarity. Social cohesion could no longer rely on the uniformity of individuals, for in modern society wage labour took place outside the household, production became differentiated, and occupational specialisation developed. Durkheim (1893) referred to as organic the form of solidarity that emerged from this differentiation of labour and the resulting interdependence among various occupational groups and their respective competences. The moral bond was no longer rooted primarily in shared beliefs or a common moral code but in a consciousness of mutual dependence and reciprocity grounded in trust. Thus, organic solidarity represented a new moral structure: society remained cohesive because its parts required and complemented one another. Law, contractual relations, and modern institutions increasingly replaced ritualised punishment as the means of maintaining social cohesion.
Following Durkheim’s thesis, it may be argued that the more differentiated the division of labour became on the threshold of modernisation, the greater the need for common norms that enabled the coexistence of diverse individuals. Here lies the essential tension of modern solidarity: as individual freedom expands, so too does mutual dependence. Organic solidarity is not a natural state of human communities but an inherently fragile and continually negotiated agreement. Its maintenance has required a moral infrastructure composed of institutions that mediate collective responsibility and preserve the moral fabric of society. Talcott Parsons’s (1951) well-known AGIL model, which posits that every society and community must fulfil four integrative functions – adaptation, goal attainment, integration, and latency – encapsulates the basic structure through which modern societies sustain social cohesion.
Durkheim’s distinction between two forms of solidarity is, of course, categorical and a type of ideal type. Yet if taken seriously, it may be argued that the moral infrastructure established upon organic solidarity provided the very ground upon which professional social work developed. Industrialisation and urbanisation displaced people from their local communities and uprooted traditional forms of belonging. Societies required new mechanisms to sustain collective responsibility and to reinforce the social bond as the shared moral code of mechanical solidarity receded. The task of social work became to strengthen the moral integrity of society and to assume responsibility for those unable to participate in the division of labour that organic solidarity presupposed. In modern societies, philanthropy was thus incorporated into the social order and institutional framework as a means of fostering social stability.
Ulrich Beck: The Erosion of Trust and Solidarity Based on Shared Anxiety in the Second Modernity
In the Durkheimian sense, social work in welfare states functioned as a reflexive organ of the community. It sustained the moral order of society and mitigated the vulnerability of those left at the margins of the social-ecological fabric shaped by the division of labour. This moral infrastructure provided the foundation for modern collective responsibility, in which solidarity was tied to work, shared norms, and mutual trust. It was essentially affirmative in nature, grounded in faith in progress, reason, and the continuous expansion of prosperity and welfare. The very success of this model, however, laid the groundwork for the next transformation, in which the achievements of modernisation began to turn against their own foundations. Modern societies started to produce silent and unintended side effects that they could no longer control. Mutual trust and moral cohesion were gradually undermined by an awareness of surrounding risks, by growing insecurity in everyday life and employment, and by an expanding sense of human and planetary fragility.
During what Beck termed the ‘second modernity’, whose latent origins Anthony Giddens located in the 1950s, the basis of solidarity shifted from trust to the terrain of uncertainty and fear. While welfare states had long governed risks, such as unemployment or incapacity, through collective mechanisms of risk sharing (Ewald 1986), including unemployment funds and health insurance, these instruments proved inadequate to address the emergent risks of the late twentieth century. In his theory of the risk society, Ulrich Beck (1992) argued that the very products of modern industrial society, such as technological innovation, nuclear energy, economic globalisation, and environmental degradation, generated collective and transnational risks that could not be contained within the limits of the nation state. At the same time, the individualisation tendencies of the second modernity gave rise to what Giddens (1991) described as ‘life politics’, in which the grand narratives of religion or ideology no longer provided a framework for personal decisions or biographical meaning. As a result, questions of anomie, ontological insecurity, mental distress, and the compensatory routines of everyday life became central to late modern experience.
The logic of the risk society is therefore twofold. On one hand, individualisation and life-political projects have rendered risks personal and their management a matter of private choice. On the other, global phenomena such as climate change have expanded the scope of risk into what Beck termed a ‘cosmopolitan community’ (2005), founded upon shared vulnerability that transcends social class, national borders, and generations. If global and transnational risks are shared, then responsibility must also be collective. Yet this form of solidarity based on risk governance entails a profound paradox. Risks engender uncertainty, anxiety, and fear that can unite people, but they also breed mistrust, defensiveness, and competition for safety. Anxiety and fear does not necessarily bind communities together; it may equally encourage withdrawal, erect boundaries, and intensify divisions between groups, thus nurturing prejudice, stereotyping, and hostility. The modern world has, in historical perspective, enjoyed an exceptionally secure social fabric over recent decades, which is something easily forgotten amid contemporary discourses of threat and securitisation.
The assessment and governance of risk have likewise become central tasks for social work in the risk society (Webb 2007). Social work is charged with managing and mitigating the risks that intrude upon the lives of its clients while also supporting their life-political projects. In this respect, its practice often continues the traditional casework orientation, albeit framed by the lexicon of risk. Social work also fills the gaps left by collective risk management systems such as welfare and social security institutions, particularly in cases of labour market exclusion or insufficient income. Although the ‘person-in-environment’ approach has been a defining feature of social work since Mary Richmond (1917), the issues raised by the risk society and the various forms of ecological disorganisation such as heat, drought, and flooding, observable not only near the equator but also in developed Western societies, have strengthened post-anthropocentric perspectives and fostered eco-social orientations within contemporary social work.
The Third Modernity? Compressed Present, Fragmentation, and Distorted Communicative Rationality
The core texts that defined the second modernity were published in the late 1980s and early 1990s by Ulrich Beck, Anthony Giddens, and Scott Lash. Over the past three decades, however, the socio-ecological fabric of Western societies has changed profoundly. Technological development has always guided the trajectory of human civilisation from the use of tools to the invention of the steam engine and the telegraph. The digital revolution, encompassing both its infrastructure and applications, has been described as the ‘fourth industrial revolution’ (Rifkin 2008). The networks enabled by this transformation have created an immediate and planetary structure of interaction and possibility. At the same time, digital technologies have facilitated the transfer of cultural artefacts and financial capital within a virtual dimension at a speed that would have been inconceivable to those living in the early twentieth century.
The diffusion of digital technology and the tendencies of the so-called ubiquitous society (Greenfield 2010) have transformed the socio-ecological fabric of contemporary life. If the modern world was organised within institutional ‘boxes’ and the second modernity softened their boundaries (Bauman 2000), the metaphor of the third modernity is a dense, network-like configuration (Castells 2010) that is only partially ordered. The traditional spatial and temporal parameters of human activity are radically altered: the world compresses, interdependence increases, temporal rhythms accelerate, and distances vanish through digitalisation and networked communication in a historically unprecedented way. The sociological distinctions between micro and macro levels, so influential in the 1960s, now appear irrevocably outdated when one considers that we can engage in face-to-face dialogue with a person on the opposite side of the globe through a handheld device. Although access to mobile and internet connections still varies globally, by the mid-2020s nearly the entirety of human civilisation has become integrated into this planetary network.
As this new dynamic takes hold, the dynamics of solidarity change. With the transformation of spatial parameters, the growth of interdependence, and the ‘death of distance’ (Cairncross 1997), populations and cultures across continents have come into closer contact. The digital infrastructure provides a planetary platform for interaction and the potential for cosmopolitan forms of solidarity to develop within the everyday arenas of a virtual civil society. Yet critical voices have warned that such developments may lead to ‘clashes of civilisations’ or even to civilisational decline (Huntington 1996). The maintenance of this global infrastructure requires committed actors, economic resources, and natural energy sources, particularly electricity. Moreover, its alleged democratic openness is deceptive: transnational corporate actors such as Google and Microsoft, through the algorithms they design, subtly shape users’ consciousness, behaviour, and decision-making. Moreover, the planetary digital infrastructure is fragile and vulnerable. Global powers increasingly exploit this digital vulnerability through hybrid influence and regulatory control as an instrument of geopolitical expansion. Although such strategic manipulation is not new, the conjunction of digital interdependence and hybrid influence has elevated it to an entirely new level (Hardt and Negri 2000).
Digital networks, intensified spatial experience, and growing interdependence have undoubtedly brought people and cultures into unprecedented proximity. The communicative architecture of the ubiquitous society ensures that local events and cultural fragments circulate globally within seconds, entering everyday consciousness as so-called ‘viral’ phenomena. Yet communication surrounding such viral events rarely reflects the ideal of communicative rationality (Habermas 1987). Instead of reasoned deliberation and the pursuit of mutual understanding, the communicative ideal appears in a distorted form, manifesting as individual performances driven by visibility, clicks, and followers, rather than by dialogue or reflection. In this economy of affect, moral pathos and emotional expression are rewarded with visibility. The resulting form of solidarity can be described as performative or ‘click-based’ solidarity, in which moral gestures and emotional intensity substitute for sustained commitment, while the structural foundations of solidarity are absent. Empathy, sympathy, aggression, anger, and outrage follow one another in algorithmically conditioned rhythms. Such affective cycles erode the foundations of trust-based solidarity, transforming shared vulnerability into competition for victimhood and turning fear into a political currency. Instead of fostering understanding or resonance, digital communicative spaces generate a fragmented and affectively charged marketplace where compassion is selective and hostility often goes viral.
This logic extends beyond social media to everyday politics and the practices of the mainstream press. The pursuit of visibility through emotionally charged headlines has become a defining feature of the attention economy of digital capitalism. The boundary between tabloid sensationalism and serious journalism has blurred, as intertextual references circulate in fractions of a second, news spreads virally across networks, and the verification of sources becomes increasingly complex. A further political dimension traverses this planetary media landscape. Platforms such as X (formerly Twitter) and even private messaging between political leaders have become central arenas of political communication. Particularly among the populist far right, strategies of disruption, emotional agitation, and deliberate confusion have replaced conventional political discourse. Their tactics rely on polarisation, the construction of enemies, and the exploitation of fear as a unifying emotion. This form of exclusive solidarity reinforces a sense of superiority through imagined threats, maintains internal cohesion through exclusion, and counts not on universal responsibility but on the logic of antagonism. The past decade’s debates on the ‘post-truth’ condition have revealed how the manipulation of emotion, information, and perception has reached an intensity unimaginable during the Cold War. In the age of digital technology and artificial intelligence, the capacity to distort truth and fragment solidarity has ascended to an entirely new plane.
The Crisis of Resonance, the Possibility of Planetary Solidarity, and the Role of Social Work
Critical theory has long woven its arguments around a civilisation-critical narrative and a dystopian vision of society. This lineage encompasses Max Weber’s ‘iron cage’ of bureaucracy, Ulrich Beck’s risk society, and Jürgen Habermas’s analysis of distorted communicative rationality. Communicative action – the capacity for public dialogue and the pursuit of mutual understanding through rational deliberation – has been central to the moral core of democratic life in modernity. Yet this ideal has increasingly been challenged by political manipulation, emotionalised discourse, and reactive forms of communication in which the search for mutual understanding and the ‘better argument’ has been displaced by performative emotionality (Harrikari & Rauhala 2019).
Among the leading figures of critical theory, Hartmut Rosa’s (2013) writings on social acceleration extend Habermas’s critical reflections initiated in the 1980s. According to Rosa, technological development accelerates both the everyday and institutional rhythms of human life. In his work Resonanz (2016), Rosa describes a world in which accelerated time, technological control, and constant accessibility have diminished humanity’s capacity for connection, in other words resonance, with others and with the surrounding world. Resonance requires that the individual remain receptive to reality: to hear and be heard, to respond and receive a response. When this reciprocity is lost and relationships become instrumental, a ‘crisis of resonance’ emerges. The culture of control and efficiency characteristic of modernity have rendered the world ‘mute’: people communicate more than ever, yet they speak past one another and fail to meet. The click-driven sphere of social media epitomises this experience, demonstrating a condition in which the connection to others, to nature, and to one’s inner world becomes shallow, fragmented, and intermittent.
Habermas and Rosa differ from other critical theory authors in that they deliberately seek to avoid dystopian conclusions and to identify pathways toward normative renewal. The same imperative applies, even more strongly, to the field of social work, which cannot afford to retreat into the shadow of dystopia but must instead articulate ethically viable and practically grounded means of sustaining solidarity amid the crisis of resonance. Social work encounters clients living in vulnerable circumstances, whose lives are marked by uncertainty, isolation, and experiences of exclusion. At the same time, it operates within a public sphere where empathy and collective responsibility have lost much of their moral legitimacy. Contrary to the Thatcherite dictum that ‘there is no such thing as society’ ot the disappearance of ‘social’ (Rose 1996), social work must defend the very principle of solidarity. Thus, its professional ethics, rooted in the respect for human dignity, social justice, and care for the most vulnerable stand as a counterforce to the instrumental and affectively charged climate of the modern age of compressed planet.
The idea of planetary solidarity may be viewed as a moral counterpoint to the crisis of resonance. It does not signify a nostalgic return to the communal forms of the past but rather a moral attunement to a world that recognises the interdependence and transnational entanglement of human societies. A planetary orientation expands the sphere of solidarity beyond national, cultural, and even species boundaries. It entails an awareness that human well-being is inseparable from the well-being of other living species, of nature, and of the biosphere itself. This foundation of solidarity presupposes resonance: the capacity to be attuned, to connect, to hear and to be heard. Axel Honneth’s (1995) theory of recognition complements this perspective by emphasising that solidarity consists in the acknowledgement of the other’s value as part of a shared planetary fabric.
The planetary socio-ecological fabric and the solidarity among the actors responsible for sustaining it is not an abstract utopian ideal. In the compressed modern condition, local and global phenomena have become inextricably intertwined. The effects of climate crisis, migration, digital deprivation, and political polarisation are manifested daily in the practice of social work. Every ‘person in situation’ is simultaneously embedded in the global economy, in digital networks, and within the socio-ecological web of planetary interdependence. This reality assigns to social work a new moral function: to act as an interpreter in a world where individual actions may resonate globally and where every local decision forms part of the planet’s collective fate. In practical terms, this requires a reflexive professional identity that integrates ecologically sustainable methods, participatory communities, and a critically informed digital orientation. It also demands the courage to resist the forces that seek to restore exclusive identity communities and to base collective life on the politics of fear.
Conclusions: The Re-attunement of Solidarity?
In this brief essay, I have examined the transformation of social solidarity through the lens of classical modernisation theory and considered the position of social work in relation to these evolving forms of solidarity. My approach has been diagnostic in nature, asking what kind of moral and institutional function social work might assume in the era of the compressed and planetary age. The history of solidarity is, in this sense, the history of modernisation as well: a narrative of how societies, across shifting economic, technological, and cultural conditions, have articulated their moral bonds and constructed the foundations of social cohesion. Émile Durkheim described premodern solidarity as a set of mechanical practices that held communities together, and modern solidarity as organic, rooted in the division of labour, trust, and reciprocity. Ulrich Beck, in his writings on the risk society, characterised late-modern solidarity as founded upon shared fear and vulnerability. Although Beck’s risk sociology offered little comfort from dystopian conclusions, his later work pointed towards cosmopolitanism and a status of world citizenship as potential responses (Beck 2005).
Like all earlier attempts to define modernisation, the notion of a ‘third modernity’ remains hypothetical: modernity as such may never have existed in any coherent or unified form. Yet if we take the hypothesis seriously, we may ask what kind of solidarity it presupposes. It would be tempting to regard it merely as a continuation of late-modern risk culture, in which fear and collective anxiety draw people together. Indeed, the public sphere of the mid-2020s appears saturated with dystopian imagery, crises, and developments that challenge the ethical foundations of social work. The digital environment has transformed the moral rhythms underlying solidarity: online communication has become rapid, superficial, and fragmented. The Habermasian ideal of communicative rationality is frequently replaced by the logic of the attention economy by distorted forms of communication driven by personal visibility and emotional performativity, where resonance, the capacity for genuine connection, is often absent.
Yet the digital condition has created within our planet’s socio-ecological fabric a new architecture of possibility, enabling immediate and direct interaction between people physically distant from one another. The compression of the world and the intensification of interdependence bind human communities into a shared existential fate amid the global crises of environment, climate, displacement, and xenophobia. If solidarity is grounded in this shared existential condition, then conceiving it as a relation to the world in which resonance and recognition constitute its moral core may offer a path toward its re-attunement. This observation further illustrates how the forms of solidarity have shifted from shared moral codes to inward experiences and the qualitative texture of interaction.
International human rights conventions and professional ethical frameworks can provide the institutional and normative context within which social work fulfils its societal function in an age of eroded trust, climate transformation, and proliferating dystopias. Within its everyday rationalities, social work retains what much of public discourse has lost, that is, the capacity to listen with resonance, to respond with empathy, and to recognise the other as a moral subject. Through its practice, social work weaves the threads of solidarity that keep individuals connected to society and prevent their marginalisation. In a broader sense, local practices of social work are embedded within a planetary socio-ecological fabric (Harrikari 2023) in which the re-attunement of solidarity and the renewal of connection extend beyond human relations to encompass ecosystems, nature, and the living conditions of future generations. Thius, resonant solidarity is not merely a virtue of the present but a precondition for humanity’s future. Social work possesses all the moral resources to form its ethical core.